Korean Studies at the Dawn of the Millennium

Proceedings of
The Second Biennial Conference
Korean Studies Association of Australasia

Edited by Young-A Cho

Hosted by
Monash Asia Institute
Monash University, Australia
24-25 September 2001
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Preface


The abstracts of papers were selected through a blind reviewing process by two referees in each academic field concerned. Our criterion for selection reflected the need to include a cross-section of research in the diverse disciplines of Korean Studies. Papers in this volume contain only those papers that were submitted by the authors for publication. Minimal formatting changes have been made in the editing process; no modifications have been made to the content of the papers.

As the biennial conferences of KSAA represent the diversity of the discipline of Korean Studies, the collection of papers in this volume embodies a wide range of topics in the fields of anthropology, applied linguistics and linguistics, economics and business, history, literature, politics, religion and sociology. Additionally we have included papers from sessions focusing specifically on North Korea, library resources, and issues related to schools.

We hope that this conference provided an opportunity for scholars not only from Australia and New Zealand but also from Korea and other countries to present and discuss the outcomes of their research and develop research networks in the region which can be built on in the future.

As organisers of the conference, we would like to express our gratitude to all the participants of the conference, Dr Kenneth Wells and members of the organising committee. We would also like to thank the Korea Research Foundation, Australia-Korea Foundation, Korea-Australasia Research Centre, and the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Australia for their interest in and financial support of this conference. We are also grateful to the Monash Asia Institute for their hosting of this conference and for administrative support. Finally we gratefully acknowledge the editorial assistance rendered by Mr. Andrew Carter.

Young-A Cho

September 2001
KSAA CONFERENCE 2001

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**Primary and Secondary Education**: Mrs Colleen Wood, Victoria Department of Education Employment and Training
# CONTENTS

## Plenary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title of Paper</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laurel Kendall</td>
<td>Of Hungry Ghosts &amp; Other Matters of Consumption in the Spirit World in Korea</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Yul Kwon</td>
<td>Australia-Korea Economic Cooperation in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Anthropology & Sociology

| Chong-Ho Kim    | Cultural politics or cultural contradiction? Prejudice against shamanism in Korean society | 38   |
| Chulhee Chung and Kwang Yeong Shin | Cultural Tradition and Democracy in South Korea | 51   |
| Hee-jung Kwon   | Making a Confucian country: Cultural discourses and representation of Confucian tradition in South Korea | 66   |
| Nicole Risse    | The Evolution in anti-Americanism in South Korea: From Ideologically Embedded to Socially Constructed | 88   |

## Art & Music

| Annette Bowie   | West and East: Creating Music with National Cultural Identity in South Korea | 100  |
| En Young Ahn     | Korean Women and Korean Women Artists | 105  |

## Business & Economics

| Chang Han Joo   | Relative Valuations: An Application to the Korean Automobile Industry | 113  |
| Tim Beal        | Is Kumgangsan the Beginning or End of the Road? Prospects and Problem for the Development of DPRK Inbound International Tourism | 121  |
| Youngok Kim     | Determinants of Financial Reporting System: The Case of South Korea | 139  |

## History

| Kenneth M. Wells | Doctrinal Origins and Social Ends: Tensions in Korea’s Early Protestant Experience | 155  |
| Luc Walhain      | Democracy on the Back-burner: A Critique of South Korea's Student Movements in the 1980s | 190  |
| Ruth Barraclough | The life and times of proletarian literature in South Korea | 198  |
| Tae-Gyun Park    | The Impracticable Plan: the Phase-down Policy of Korean Army by the U.S. in 1950s and 1960s | 204  |
## Language Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eun Hee Koo</td>
<td>Using Martial Arts for Teaching Foreign Language: Taekwondo and Korean Language Education</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Won Yoon, Young-Gyun Han and Hyuk Suh</td>
<td>The Basic Principles and Directions for Developing Unit Base for the Globalization of Korean</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Jung Cho</td>
<td>Internet Resources for Korean Language Education</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Gosling</td>
<td>Korean collections and services at the National Library of Australia: a national asset</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung-ran Park</td>
<td>Information retrieval of Korean materials using the CJK bibliographic system: issues and problems</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung-Sim Kim</td>
<td>Korean library resources in Australian academic libraries: Monash University Library case in particular</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Linguistics and Applied Linguistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dae Song Choi</td>
<td>Pragmatic Function of Ye In Opening and Closing Sequence in Korean Travel Consultations</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duk-Soo Park</td>
<td>Lexical Local Control in Korean</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gi-Hyun Shin</td>
<td>‘Apjonbeop’ and an Emerging New Politeness Strategy in Contemporary Korean</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeong-Bae Son</td>
<td>Strategies for reading printed texts and electronic texts: Same or different?</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jong Hoon Park</td>
<td>Structure and function of sub-information in lecture discourse</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young-A Cho</td>
<td>Study Strategies of Korean Students in Australian Higher Education</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grace E Koh</td>
<td>The Perception and Function of Myth in Historical Writings of The Koryo Period</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory Evon</td>
<td>Tracking a Ghost's Lingering Influence: Chong Chisang (?-1135) and a Forgotten Style of Sino-Korean Poetry</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael J Pettid</td>
<td>Overcoming sexual repression: Humor and sexuality in Choson period literature</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## North Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danton Ford</td>
<td>Democratic capitalism and juche: common values and challenges</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwang-Shick Kang</td>
<td>Juche Idea and the alteration process in Kim Il-Sung's works: A study on how to read Kim Il-Sung's works</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeon-Gak Kim</td>
<td>Ideological Changes in North Korea since the 1990s</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyuk-Rae Kim</td>
<td>Civic Coalition in Transition to Democracy: The 2000 General Elections in South Korea</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sallie Yea</td>
<td>Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The (Re)presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising Through Mangwol-dong Cemetery</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sang-hwan Lee</td>
<td>The Roles of Non-Governmental Organizations in Environmental Policy-Making Processes and Protection Works: A Case Study of South Korea</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Primary and Secondary Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hee-kyoung Lee</td>
<td>Korean language program, Narrabundah College, ACT</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabina Chang</td>
<td>Pioneering the teaching of Korean in South Australia</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sook-hee McRoberts</td>
<td>Practical Issues Affecting the Promotion of Korean in Years K-12</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of hungry ghosts and other matters of consumption in the Korean spirit world

Laurel Kendall

American Museum of Natural History

1. Introduction

1.1. This essay is about contradictory impulses, about the desire for and the moral disdain of consumption, and how these impulses are set at play in contemporary shaman rituals in the Republic of Korea (hereafter “Korea”). I will argue that in their portrayals of gods, ancestors, and ghosts, Korean shamans embody both desire for and disdain of material wealth, acknowledging the tangled emotions inherent in a lived history of rapid social transformation and unprecedented material possibility. Debate over the positive and negative aspects of global consumption is on going within the discipline of anthropology where it has been linked to an older anthropological insight that things are always more than things. I would like to tie this discussion to an aspect of popular religious practice—in Korea and many other places—which has been despised as “irrational” and “superstitious: the deployment of material goods in the quest for non material ends such as health, wealth, and good fortune. As I hope to show, popular religion is one domain where the contradictory attributes of global consumption can be both literally and figuratively digested.

1.2. The following anecdote introduces some of the paradoxes of the contemporary Korean moment. It also highlights two very different attitudes toward what ritual is and how it works: The shaman, Yongsu’s Mother, was setting out the offerings for the ancestors at a client’s home. To make a good display, she had purchased a large bunch of bright yellow bananas. Her client’s husband took offense at the bananas. They were imports, he said, not indigenous to Korea, not “urigôt,” not “ours.” “Uri,” this possessive pronoun is so often used in Korean speech to make a link between intimate collectivities of “us” and the imagined community of nation. The bananas were not Korean products and therefore unsuitable offerings for Korean ancestors. Yongsu’s Mother, surprised but never at a loss for words, defended her choice. “We offer bananas,” she said, “so that the ancestors can enjoy them. They weren’t able to eat them in the past. A single banana used to cost thousands of wŏn.” The man was adamant, and a purist, “When you do rituals in our house, you should just set out pears and apples as we have done from long ago.” Yongsu’s Mother was astonished by his rigidity, his unwillingness to share with the ancestors all of the delightful gustatory possibilities of the contemporary moment.
1.3 At one level, Yongsu’s Mother and her interlocutor reflect two distinct polarities in Korean attitudes toward and dealings with the ancestors. The apples and pears that the man considered as traditionally appropriate are foods specified in ritual manuals that describe the procedures for making ancestral offerings (chesa) including placements of food and the directional orientation of the offering table and the officiants. Even my illiterate village landlord could recite the Sino-Korean formula for the proper arrangement of offering food on the ancestors’ tray, “Red in the east (apples) and white (pears) in the west.” In Korea, these procedures are explicitly identified with the neo-Confucian tradition where the proper and precise enactment of rites—including the directional orientation of the participants, the offering tray, and the items on the offering tray—is an expression of “propriety” (ye, Chinese li), an act of morality. The rites express virtue irregardless of whether the ancestors literally imbibe the offering food (a fine point that many contemporary Koreans gloss with ambiguity). For Yongsu’s Mother, on the other hand, ancestors have human appetites and feelings. The dead respond to the affairs of the living as an active and hungry presence capable of making their displeasure known through appearances in dreams or by causing illness or misfortune. Because the dead are also a part of the present tense, their tastes, like those of the living, can expand to new horizons of consumption. Why should they not crave a taste of banana, something that would have been beyond their means in this lifetime? If living family members can afford to enjoy bananas, how can they not share them with the ancestors?

1.4 But there is more to this disagreement between Yongsu’s Mother and her client’s husband than the old play between Confucian and shaman, man and woman, form and substance that intrigued a generation of Korea anthropologists weaned on French structuralism, myself included (Brandt 1971; Dix 1987; Kendall 1985; Sorensen 1983). In 1990s Korea, the man considered bananas improper because they were a foreign item of consumption. His disdain was of a piece with concerns that had been abroad in Korea from the late 1980s. A newly prosperous Korea had been pressured to open her borders to foreign goods. Brand names originally encountered as luxury goods, the forbidden fruit of the black market, were now available on the bulging shelves of supermarkets and in the 7-11 stores and their clones that seemed to be springing up on every street. The importation of beef and tobacco, harmful to domestic production, had been vigorously resisted, but to no avail. I recall signs strung across Seoul streets in 1988, “Smoking is bad for your health, smoking foreign cigarettes is bad for the nation’s health,” a moral equation of the human body and the body politic. In the early 1990s, a national campaign for moderate consumption vested the purchase of foreign goods with an unpatriotic aura, injunctions that would become even more strident in the wake of the I.M.F. crisis in 1997 (Nelson 2000). In Laura Nelson’s apt characterization, the man who disdained bananas as not being sufficiently Korean was an exemplar of “consumer nationalism,” for whom the use of domestic goods had taken on both moral and emotional qualities; it was wrong to offer foreign bananas to Korean ancestors.

1.5 Korean anti-foreign consumption discourses are about genuine concerns for fiscal well-being and they are also transparent expressions of nationalist sentiment, but they are about other things as well. They reflect a more general ambivalence about the costs of Korea’s economic success. In so many conversations, with so many different kinds of people over the last several years, I have heard speculations
that in the desire to modernize, too much has been thrown away, that Koreans have lost a critical national essence, an ability to endure and triumph in hard times. These discourses are witnessed in widely varied contexts of ethnographic writing, from my own discussion of nostalgic revivals of the traditional Korean wedding (Kendall 1996a), to Richard Grinker’s (Grinker 1995) account of south Korean fantasies of finding their lost former selves in the harsh and economically deprived north, to Nancy Abelmann’s (Abelmann 2001) description of a successful middle class woman’s nostalgia for what she remembers as the simpler and purer Korea of her youth.

1.6 But Yongsu’s Mother’s advocacy of the bunch of bananas was no less moral and emotional than her interlocutor’s. She also positions herself in relation to the past, but in a different way. She had known extreme hunger and poverty during the Korean War and its aftermath and speaks of the comforts of her present life with a mingling of pride and wonder, “Could I ever have imagined myself living the way I do now?” She, and others like her, those who knew not merely the relative deprivations of underdevelopment but bitter, bitter poverty, seldom romanticize the vanished Korea of their childhoods. It is thoroughly consistent with her worldview and experience that filial children should want to share the sweet taste of imported bananas with ancestors who once ate coarse barley and millet.

1.7 Contemporary Korean life—at least until the economic crisis of 1997—was replete with a contradictory disdain and celebration of consumption. Foreign goods harm Korea, so everyone says, but the sheer abundance of suspect objects is simultaneously a measure of national accomplishment. This paradox, which can make even simple purchases moral and patriotic choices, is the subject of Laura Nelson’s recent ethnography. When my own interlocutors expressed dismay over particularly shocking instances of consumption—and people seemed to love talking about it—I could not but suspect that they relished the notion of Korea as a place where such shocking things were possible and maybe even within one’s own reach. Post-war deprivation followed by years of government-ordained austerity, “no rice” days and restrictions on foreign goods—tantalizingly present for some through the back door of American military bases—had given way, seemingly overnight, to a flowering of shopping malls and top line label recognition.

1.8 To some degree, the Korean consumer’s paradox recalls a Euro-American experience where, by the mid 19th century, new patterns of intensive market consumption, made possible by successful industrialization and changes in merchandising, had confounded the disciplined and restrained Protestant Ethic with its own entrepreneurial success (Felski 1995; Miller 1987:147). Social historian Nancy Cott notes how the growth of the market posed a particular problem for Protestant Christian Americans who had long equated “worldliness” with carnal sin (Cott 1977). Ironically, notions of selling as seduction, and consumption as the satisfaction of lust have been used to good effect in marketing, as students of popular culture are constantly reminding us (Felski 1995; Ross, 1983; Williamson, 1986).

1.9 The sexual sell is also evident in 1990s Korea, but it is generally regarded as a new thing, a side effect of democratization, a novel response to the lifting of censorship. The moral disapproval surrounding getting and spending comes from a more generalized disdain for craving, appetite, and naked ambition as a contradiction of both Buddhist salvation and Confucian injunctions to balance and
moderation and it is mediated by a specific local history. Laura Nelson suggests that the particular disapprobation cast upon consumption in general and the consumption of foreign goods in particular is the product of specific strategies of national development, ideologically committed to “self reliance” but practically export-oriented, dependent upon certain critical imported goods and favorable trading conditions in global markets such that when the Republic of Korea became a successful player, it was forced to open its markets to foreign goods. (Nelson 2000).

1.10 Between them, Yongsu’s Mother and her client’s husband, arguing across their contemporary Korean moment, manage to capture both sides of the discussion in a now significant body of anthropological and related writing about consumption as a cultural phenomenon. The client’s husband might side with those who see the consumption of foreign goods as symptomatic of the homogenizing influence of the global marketplace, an assault on the social and cultural meanings previously embodied in local goods, a prompt to diverse and sometimes unpredictable forms of resistance (Comaroff and Comaroff 1990; Pred and Watts 1992; Williamson 1986). Yongsu’s Mother stands with those theorists, most particularly Daniel Miller, who see consumption as constitutive of local culture as who celebrate the creative potential of local culture to appropriate goods from out there and reinscribe them with local significance and meaning (Howes 1996; Miller 1994; Miller 1995; Thomas 1991). And well might Yongsu’s Mother side with those who see culture as a creative bricolage. Yongsu’s Mother is a shaman; it is her business to make sense of things from “out there.”

2. New visions

2.1 Anthropologists who study shamans are reaching a new understanding of this broadly comparable phenomenon. Marjorie Mandelstam Balzer in Siberia (Balzer 1993; Balzer 1996), Caroline Humphrey in Buriatia (Humphry 1999), and Marina Roseman (Roseman 1998) and Carol Laderman (Laderman 1997) in Malaysia, and myself in Korea (Kendall 1996b) have all described shamans as highly innovative practitioners who adapt contemporary imagery into rituals aimed at addressing contemporary concerns. This is perfectly consistent with what shamans are supposed to do, report from “out there,” either by recounting their adventures of magical flight or by invoking the spirits and manifesting them through their own bodies. Korean shamans--the mudang, mansin, or posal--transmit dreams, visions, and intuitions in the persona of gods and ancestors as inspired words and formulaic phrases pour from their mouths. Gods once associated with the prosperity of family farms and feted after the harvest are now solidly entrenched in the world of family enterprise. Through the mouths of shamans, they proclaim an active presence as “the Spirit Warrior of Business, the Spirit Warrior of Commerce, the Electrician’s Spirit Warrior” (Changsa Sinjang, Yongop Sinjang, Chonopkisul Sinjang). The kings and generals, princesses, and Buddhas who appear in antique dress inhabit a landscape where references to raising a multi-story pilding--they have borrowed the English word--are hyperbolic prognostications of good fortune for more modest investments, such as foretold my own household’s successful purchase of a small co-op apartment in New York, a failed factory owner’s financial recovery, and a bar girl’s future prospects for a bar of her own.
3. Goods in the shaman world

3.1 But if Youngsu’s Mother’s practices are a fluid domain while her client’s husband invokes the fixed texts of a ritual manual, both are in agreement that offering apples, pears, or bananas to the ancestors is the expression of a relationship with the ancestors, (although they might disagree about the form and precise substance of that relationship). Both might accept a long tradition in anthropological writing that regards things as more than things. Anthropologists from Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1969) to Arjun Appadurai (Appadurai 1986) have asserted that objects are embedded in social relationships and that transactions in things convey multiple meanings. Appadurai, in particular, focuses our attention upon shifting contexts of significance as objects move from one domain of experience to another. Appadurai has also been credited with bringing the mass produced commodity into the domain of anthropologically significant goods (Miller 1995). Mary Douglas (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992a, xxii; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992b, 151; Comaroff and Comaroff 1990; Douglas and Isherwood 1979), and others remind us that material objects, even the most ordinary sort, can be encoded with moral and emotional significance. In Janet Hoskin’s (1998) ethnography, a green bottle becomes a “biographical object” evoked in the funeral of a young woman to suggest perishability without renewal. In Daniel Miller’s (Miller 1998) recent work, the booty of a weekend shopping expedition comes home invested with love.

3.2 Korean shamanic practices assume that favorable interactions between human and spirit are affirmed through transactions in tangible goods: food, liquor, clothing, and cash. All shaman rituals, both simple and elaborate, require offerings of rice, fruit, alcohol, and mountain herbs, candles, incense and cash displayed face up along the altar. More elaborate rituals require meat and large steamers of rice cake to feast the deities. Clients are sometimes called upon to make gifts to the gods in the form of costumes and equipment bestowed upon the shaman and kept in her shrine. When Korean shamans perform kut, the appearance of multiple spirits is marked by multiple changes of bright and often spectacularly spangled clothing. Each costume is an offering, either from a client who has a particular relationship with a particular category of spirit or from the shaman herself who has been advised to make this gift through a dream or vision granted by her spirits. Even newly-made and newly-dedicated costumes are thus artifacts of a reconstructed history in which a remembered or very distant ancestor “carried a sword and served in the palace,” “was a destined shaman,” or “zealously honored the Seven Star Spirits” and as a consequence, has sufficient spiritual power to be transformed into a minor deity (Kendall 1985, Ch.4, 6). An experienced shaman may thus have multiple robes for several spirits. When she performs an annual ritual for her own gods and ancestors and her community of clients, she will bundle on several layers of the same robe to bestow blessings on multiple clients and also, less explicitly, to advertise that her spirits are powerful spirits who have brought her much business.

3.3 The elaborateness of the shaman’s shrine accoutrements—offering bowls, incense burners, candlesticks, and decorations—are similar indications of a successful practice, evidence of efficacious gods and satisfied clients who have been advised to provide these things on the basis of the shaman’s dreams and visions. By a similar logic, experienced and successful mansin usually flaunt a
great deal of jewelry in real gold and gem stones. Powerful gods bring the shaman business. Potent gods demand offerings, cash, and clothing, and potent gods are efficacious on behalf of clients and shamans.

3.4 Should these transactions between humans and gods be characterized as “gifts,” “fees,” or “bribes?” An attempt to make such distinctions in a Korean context is as clumsy and unsatisfying as the anthropologist’s old dichotomization between “gifts” and “commodities.” (Appadurai 1986). These are simply not distinctive and mutually exclusive categories. The giving of goods and cash to spirits is modeled upon similarly ambiguous transactions with powerful and influential beings in the everyday Korean world. Offerings are “gifts” insofar as they are a ritualized affirmation of an enduring relationship—in this instance, a relationship with gods and ancestors. Offerings to the gods—who are often portrayed in the guise of high officials—also have the quality of “fees” or “bribes” insofar as the relationship is asymmetrical and the gift is intended to nurture the recipient’s favorable regard to the giver’s future advantage.

3.5 This “spiritual materialism” is, of course, a troubling aspect of shamanic practice for modern rationalists, as many contemporary Koreans would define themselves. It is not “rational” to give material goods to non-material spirits. While pre-, colonial, and more than one post-colonial regime have attempted to suppress Korean shamans altogether, in recent years a number of self-styled professional associations have attempted to improve the social condition of shamans by reforming their practice (Kendall 1998). A utilitarian impulse to “teach the shamans” not to make “wasteful” uses of offering food is almost always a part of the agenda. In the summer of 1994, my field assistant would never fail to point out the piles of offering food left to rot outside a shrine; a documentary on this theme was fresh in her mind. Bearing an awareness that this domain of activity is as problematic for some Koreans as it would have been for the Victorian fathers of the anthropology of religion, I shall attempt to situate the giving of goods to gods and ghosts within a frame of signifying practices and social experience.

4. New things

4.1 The flowering of material life in late twentieth century Korea can be seen in the physical accoutrements of shamanic practice. Costumes are more elaborate. Some of the gauzy synthetic robes that were common in the 1970s have been replaced with fantastic satin creations studded with sequins. The offerings in the shrines reflect the spirits’ own changing tastes: a carton of Pringles, a small but expensive package of imported kiwi fruit, ornately dressed dolls in glass boxes. Child Gods (Tongja) are given large, cuddly stuffed animals, toy airplanes, and in more than one fantastically decorated shrine, a bubbling aquarium equipped with shifting colored lights (“To amuse them while I’m out working,” a shaman told me).

4.2 Like many of their flesh-and-blood counterparts, the spirits have a fondness for foreign goods. In a market stall that vends dried fish and confections used in ancestor rites and shaman ceremonies, I found bags of tiny Snickers bars such as Americans buy in anticipation of Halloween trick-or-treaters. “These are imported,” the proprietor chuckled. “These days, the Child Gods don’t like traditional sweets. This is what they want to eat.” New fashions for drink have
also entered the spirit realm. I have seen my own contribution of Chivas Regal hold pride of place at the center of one shrine for a period of several years. When the Supernatural Official of a tiny bar appeared in a kut, he refused a cup of makkoli, the traditional coarse fermented rice brew normally offered to this spirit, and insisted on drinking whiskey. A similar spirit, at another kut, was slow to take the proffered cup of makkoli and was accused of having developed a taste for beer. My own Supernatural Official, appearing in the person of Yongsu’s Mother, dragged three whiskey bottles off of the altar but returned the one that had a Korean label on it.

4.3 Whisky replaces traditional, often home made or locally brewed coarse rice wine. In an older, agricultural Korea, makkoli was poured out for the household gods when offerings were made after the harvest. In the shamans’ kut, the Supernatural Officials, the gods whose influence can make or break a family’s fortunes, routinely carouse with cups of makkoli. Made from fermented rice, makkoli is associated with prosperity from the land, with rice as an old idiom of wealth and fertile abundance. Where the Supernatural Officials crave whiskey, they have left farming behind, become cosmopolitan in their tastes, and their influence on a family’s good fortune extends to new realms of entrepreneurship and investment. The whiskey demanded by the bar proprietress’s official was her very source of livelihood, at least potentially, a “biographical object” in Hoskins’ sense (Hoskins 1998).

4.4 Oh yes, it provokes a smile when familiar commodities—the Snickers bars, Pringels, and Chivas Regal—appear in distant shaman shrines. But these things are more than playful decoration, more than merely status symbols, although of course, they are that as well. Not every shaman has access to duty free Chivas Regal courtesy of her own anthropologist. Perhaps I should think of myself as one more foreign commodity in the shrine. When kiwi fruit and Pringles are chosen from a Korean supermarket shelf and placed within a shrine, they become—with the other offering food—part of a transaction between human and spirit enacted within the frame of contemporary Korean life. In the remainder of the discussion, I will focus on some of the ways that contemporary consumer goods are deployed in ritual evocations of ancestors and gods. As we shall see, this play of gods and goods both resists and resonates with Korean discourses of consumption.

5. Ancestors, ghosts, and goods

5.1 In the Korean shaman world, ancestral manifestations articulate longing and craving, longing for those left behind and craving for the pleasures they missed while in this world. The Buddhist notion that emotional bonds hold souls back from release and salvation, causing them to wander in pain, is braided with the Confucian obligation of the living to succor the dead. Parents who died young constantly remind their children that in life, they worked hard and had scant opportunity to enjoy themselves. In the sometimes wrenching, sometimes humorous dramas of ancestral manifestation performed by shamans in kut, living kin are called upon to provide the dead with gifts of food, drink, clothing, and “travel money.” The expressions of grief and recrimination that the dead level at the living are resolved when the dead finally accept these tokens of obligation and express their gratitude. The living have, for a time at least, made peace with old ghosts.
5.2 In contemporary *kut*, many meetings between the living and the dead occur in a borderland between the impoverished past and the thoroughly commoditized present. Sometimes these encounters are painful, as when a long-dead child accuses, “You didn’t buy me medicine,” and someone answers, “We didn’t have any medicine back then.” Sometimes the gesture is more playful, “Give the old man a bottle of Baccus tonic, he couldn’t enjoy Baccus back when he was alive,” and the little brown bottle of popular pick-me-up is given over to the ancestor. Often, the dead will tug on their relatives’ clothing, insisting that they were never able to wear such fine fabric when they were alive. One dead mother-in-law, noting the fine quality of her daughter-in-law’s blouse, asked “Did it cost a million won?” “No, only five thousand” (a bargain), her son chuckled. Another dead mother-in-law asked for a ramie cloth jacket such as she had never been able to wear in her lifetime. Manufactured ramie cloth was fashionable and cheap in the summer of 1994, a revival of older tastes, but in the past, it had been hand-loomed and expensive. Now it was available in inexpensive factory-made garments; nearly everyone could wear it. Judith Williamson’s (1986: 12) characterization of the commodity as an object of “congealed longing” takes on added poignancy here, where longing is not only “congealed” but also “entombed.”

5.3 Recent ancestral encounters provide at least two different takes on contemporary life. On the one hand, the dead remind the living of the distance between hard times and this time, a better time. They play to an often-recounted Korean story about hard work, struggle, and hard-earned rewards. But by mapping desires for contemporary consumer goods onto older notions of hungry souls who are never completely satisfied, who reappear in subsequent rituals through the duration of living memory, the play of the dead also becomes a dramatization of desire within the frame of capitalist consumption. None of us, living or dead, will ever be satisfied with what we have. The market would not have it so. The economy would grind to a halt. Consumer societies tantalize us with the relentless possibility of newer, better products, and we are all hungry ghosts.

5.4 And some have more reason for dissatisfaction than others. The inflated Korean real estate market of recent years (Nelson 1996b, Thomas, 1993), the high cost of preparing a child to pass the all-important college entrance examinations (Cho 1995), and the constant visual display of seemingly boundless and very expensive things to buy have brought with them an uncomfortable awareness of those who have been left behind. The “have-nots” are sometimes seen as objects of pity, sometimes as having an ominous potential for social unrest. Their frustrations are akin to those of the unsettled dead.

6. Divine appetites

6.1 The gods’ appetites are another matter, not a plaintive, dependent cry of longing but a boundless, authoritative demand, an expression of “greed” or “rapacious appetite,” called *yoksim* in Korean. The Supernatural Official’s appetite is exhibited in *kut* as a Rabelasian comedy of excess. Routinely contemptuous of the heaps of meat, rice cake, and offering food that have been set out for him, he smears meat grease on client faces, demands musicians and sometimes dancing partners, and shows his lust by thrusting dried fish and other stiff, straight objects at the client. Cold cash is an important prop, as the Official extorts 10,000 won bills from the usually giggling client, decorating his cheeks, chin, forehead, and waistband with money. The gods’ demands are a measure of their power, the
potentially dangerous energies that can also be turned to the benefit of their clients. “Give me more,” says the Supernatural Official. “First make me rich,” says the client.

6.2 Within the logic of shamanic performance, great piles of money inspire the shamans to make robust manifestations of the gods who cackle with pleasure and dance and sing. When I sponsored a kut, my former landlady and fictive mother was concerned—knowing my academic frugality—that I would not make an appropriately lavish display. She offered to lend me money. The gods’ appetite is a measure of the shaman’s power. Not only her lavishly fitted shrine, but the rings that twinkle form her fingers testify to the popularity of a particular shaman, the success of her gods in satisfying client wishes. Shamans, the bearers of demanding gods, are themselves stereotypically avaricious. When a shaman, in the persona of a Supernatural Official, addresses a client’s prayers for wealth with the statement, “Your greed is even greater than my own,” a three-way conflation of purpose is suggested. They are all in this together, the client too. The ambitions that drive gods, shamans, and clients, the ambitions that drove the Korean economy, are reduced to comic play.

6.3 But a morality play, it is not. If the mood of ancestral encounters is lachrymose, that of the Official’s play is ebullient. The gods cackle, first with disdain and then with pleasure. Yoksim is not an admirable quality, but its satisfaction can be very pleasant for gods and humans alike. This is, after all, the contradiction at the heart of most consumption discourses, all over the world. Excessive consumption is routinely condemned and, simultaneously, desired, desired and consequently condemned. As Michael Taussig would have it, the coherence and equilibrium of the social world is perpetually traumatized by the thrill of “giving and spending for the hell of it” (Taussig 1995: 392).

7. Discussion
7.1 I have presented Korean shamanic practice as a domain of “creative imagination,” in Raymond Williams’ terms, a space where the dominant system fails to reduce all experience into instrumentality and all things into commodities” (Williams 1977: 151). The view from the Korean shaman world is not a simple “reflection” of new tastes and fashions. New material, grafted onto older forms of belief and practice, becomes the substance of dramas of ambivalence, a site for both the celebration and satire of consumption, a paradox that many Koreans live with every day. This is possible, in part, because the Korean shamanic ritual encourages the expression of emotion, and wry humor, in part because this domain is fluid, adaptable, and consequently open to new material, and in part, because interactions between human and spirit, as extensions of relationships between humans, are grounded in transactions in literal material goods. The spirits’ own changing tastes are testimony to their presence and agency in the mundane world. They, in effect, are us.

7.2 We can return now to the argument between the shaman and her client who became stand-ins for those practitioners of cultural studies who would argue for the inevitability of “some overt or covert form of symbolic contestation” against global market forces (Pred and Watts 1992) versus those who celebrate the appropriative potential of commodities. At first blush, the Korean shaman material would favor an appropriative interpretation, following the work of Daniel Miller and others.
who have shown how global goods, like the Chivas Regal offered to the Supernatural Official, are localized within specific social and historical contexts, vested with new meanings, and become the very stuff of local culture (Miller 1994). Yes, we can see something of all of this in the shaman’s shrine. The things themselves have been taken over, set at play, used as props in dramas about the desire for things. But let us not forget the contradictory ground on which these dramas unfold. Greedy gods and hungry ancestors make trouble; this is the expressed motive for holding a kut. They demand satisfaction, their demands are bothersome if not dangerous, and satisfaction is a temporary state. It is precisely because shamans are so adept at deploying things, at bringing new commodities into the very substance of transactions with the spirit world that Korean mansin are capable of simultaneously mocking both anti-consumption discourses and the act of consumption per se, offering their own apt commentary on a confusing moment in time.

Notes
Abelmann, Nancy
Appadurai, Arjun
Balzer, Marjorie Mandelstam
Balzer, Marjoie Mandelstam
Brandt, Vincent
Comaroff, Jean
Comaroff, John, and Jean Comaroff
Comaroff, Jean, and John Comaroff
Comaroff, Jean, and John L. Comaroff
Cott, Nancy F.
Dix, Griffin M.

Douglas, Mary, and Baron Isherwood
1979 Towards an Anthropology of Consumption: NW Norton.

Felski, Rita

Grinker, Roy Richard

Hoskins, Janet

Howes, David

Humphry, Caroline

Kendall, Laurel

Kendall, Laurel

Kendall, Laurel

Kendall, Laurel

Laderman, Carol

Mauss, Marcel

Miller, Daniel

Miller, Daniel

Miller, Daniel

Miller, Daniel

Nelson, Laura C.

Pred, Allen, and Michael Watts
1992 Reworking Modernity: Capitalisms and Symbolic Discontent. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Roseman, Marina
Sorensen, Clark Wesley
Thomas, Nicolas
Williamson, Judith

1 Because this text will be “read” on Microsoft 97, I have removed or attempted to remove all diacritical marks from standard McCune Reischauer romanizations. I apologize for the resulting confusion which is an artifact of electronic incompatibility and my own middle-aged resistance to breaking with the habits of a lifetime and adopting the new system.

2 The remembered hardships of her early life are a significant part of her personal narrative as presented in The Life and Hard Times of a Korean Shaman (Kendall 1988).

3 These are not irreconcilable positions. Jean Comaroff’s has illuminated how the clothing of colonial subject in store-bought goods went hand in hand with the thorough transformation of the Southern Tswana into a rural “peasantariat.” At the same time, rural Tswana women developed a distinctive style of dress that signified both limited dependency on the market and ethnic distinction (Comaroff 1996).

4 As I have described in another place, campaigns enjoining “rational” and “wholesome” rituals that respecting economies of both time and money have been a part of Korean life for much of the twentieth century (Kendall 1996a) Ch 3.
Australia-Korea Economic Cooperation in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects

O. Yul Kwon
Griffith University

1. Introduction

Although Australia-Korea relations begun to develop in the late 19th century, it was only since the mid-1970s that both countries recognised each other as an important economic partner. Since then, bilateral trade between Australia and Korea has increased by leaps and bounds. Two-way trade increased from A$176 million in 1975 to A$13.8 billion in 2000 with an annual growth of 19.1 percent. This compares with an annual growth of 10.7 percent in Australia’s world trade during the same period. In 2000, Australia was Korea’s eighth largest trading partner and Korea was Australia’s fourth largest trading partner. In 1994, in particular, Korea became Australia’s second largest export market. Although this ranking slipped during the economic crisis in 1998, Korea is still Australia’s third largest export market after Japan and the United States.

The complementarity of the Australian and Korean economies, primarily based on the differences in resource endowments, accounts for the pattern and growth of bilateral trade. Australia’s principal export items to Korea are mainly natural resource and agricultural products (non-monetary gold, coal, iron ores, aluminum, wool, sugar and wheat), while the principle import items from Korea are mainly manufactured consumer goods (passenger cars, electrical equipment, textiles, telecommunications equipment and office machines. The complementarity of the two economies has been accelerated by patterns of economic development within each country, accelerating the bilateral trade. In particular, Korea adopted two important economic strategies during the 1970s. One was diversification of resource imports following the 1973 oil crisis, and the other was development of heavy and chemical industries (Kwon, 1997a). Both were facilitated by reliable supplies of industrial raw materials from Australia.

However, the present pattern of bilateral trade between Australia and Korea, which is based on their existing characteristics of comparative advantage, could pose serious problems for both countries over time. In response to internal and external pressures, the two countries are now striving for the development of knowledge-based economies. These changes in their respective industrial structures will change the comparative advantage of the two countries and dilute the economic complementarity. Australia wants to diversify the bilateral economic relationship with Korea to reflect its position as a sophisticated industrial society with an advancing industrial structure and rich in technological assets. As the Korean economy matures and moves toward a knowledge-based economy, its demand for Australian natural resources is bound to decline. Korea also wants to expand its exports of high-technology products.

To cope with the structural change in each economy and ensure continued success in the economic relationship including bilateral trade, new approaches should
be explored which will expand and diversify the scope of economic relations. To this end, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the feasibility of a free trade arrangement (FTA) between the two countries and to explore ways to expand two-way investment flows between the two countries. It should be noted that expansion of trade through an FTA and expansion of FDI are closely related. It has been well documented that trade is linked to investment particularly in manufacturing and high-technology areas, because companies usually establish their overseas direct investment strategy together with their export strategy, and thus exports tend to follow FDI (UNDP, 1999: 9). Typically an FTA includes clauses on investment liberalisation within the trade zone, which purports to expand investment relations. FDI will also be encouraged to flow from outside of the FTA zone into the zone in order to take advantage of free trade inside the zone.\(^1\)

2. **A Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA)**

International enthusiasm for regional free trade agreements (FTA) has been rising. Even though the world economy is being integrated based on the multilateralism principle of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), numerous countries have engaged in regional or bilateral trade agreements as a way of securing their foreign markets, minimising trade disputes, and at the same time enhancing their national competitiveness. As of May 2000, 214 FTAs that were registered with the WTO, of which 90 were registered since 1995, the year in which the WTO took effect (Cheong and Lee, 2000: 20). The most influential FTAs are the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Following the induction of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries such as Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995, the EU is now deliberating on the admission of a few East European countries. Since 1994, the United States has been carrying on discussions for the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) for the purpose of linking the North and South American continents under one trade regime.

Multilateralism is giving way to bilateralism or regionalism, and the WTO runs the risk of being sidelined as numerous countries opt for the quick fix of bilateral trade agreements. This situation traces back to the debacle of the 1999 WTO talks in Seattle. The follow-up protests at meetings of the World Bank, the IMF and the World Economic Forum further convinced politicians of developed countries that the promotion of globalisation and the WTO could be counter-productive domestically. Thus, none of the developed countries is willing to take the real political leadership to regain the trade liberalisation momentum lost at Seattle, even though most countries want the WTO to initiate a new trade liberalisation round. This suits the developing nations, which have opposed United States and European efforts to link human rights, labour, intellectual property and environmental standards to trade liberalisation. Besides, FTAs are in general regarded as complementary and beneficial in the search for wider global trade agreements, and thus the WTO has not seriously challenged any FTA nor opposed the establishment of FTAs.

In this context, when Australian Prime Minister John Howard visited Korea in May 2000, he proposed to President Kim Dae-jung that the two countries form a free trade agreement to further expand bilateral trade and investment ties (*Korea Herald*, 20 May 2000). The success of a bilateral free trade agreement depends on the

\(^1\) It should be noted that FTA and promotion of FDI are long-term approaches to expand and diversify the scope of economic relations. In the short-run, the two countries should expand intra-industry trade relations in knowledge-based industries. This would include searching for new niches in these industries that offer opportunities for both countries and identifying efficient and effective ways of seizing them.
economic size, economic systems, willingness and commitment of the countries involved, existing trade barriers, and complementarity and competition of the two economies. As shown in Table 1, the Australian and Korean economies are similar in size, and thus the possible benefits or costs of an FTA would not be skewed towards either of them. The economic systems of the two countries are quite compatible. Both economies have pursued outward-looking economic policies, and the Korean economic system has been transforming rapidly towards the western economic system by undertaking deregulation and liberalisation. Also, although the bilateral trade between the two countries has expanded rapidly, there is still room for improvement, since tariff and non-tariff barriers are still significantly high between the two countries.

Table 1: Comparison of the Australian and Korean Economies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Korea</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (2000)</td>
<td>19.0 million</td>
<td>47.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1999, US $ billion)</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP (1999, US$)</td>
<td>20,773</td>
<td>8,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (1985-1999, %)</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>7.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export growth (1985-1999, %)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import growth (1985-1999, %)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export/GDP (1999, %)</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be noted that the bilateral trade between Australia and Korea accounts for a small portion of their respective world trade. As shown in Table 2 the two-way trade between the two countries accounted for about 2.8 percent of Korea’s world trade during the 1990s. During the same decade, the amount of bilateral trade took up about 5.5 percent of Australia’s world trade (Table 3). Both Australia and Korea depend heavily on the rest of the world, and hence they should organise a non-discriminatory, open trade bloc. By opening competition between the two countries, a KAFTA would be regarded as a useful experiment and a stepping stone towards further trade liberalisation with free trade agreements with other countries. Success of a bilateral free trade agreement depends heavily on national policy toward the FTA in general and perspectives on the proposed FTA taken by the countries involved. The perspective will indicate the extent of willingness and commitment of the countries involved. Thus, FTA policy and perspective on KAFTA taken by Korea and Australia will be examined.
Table 2: Korea’s Exports and Imports to Australia

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports (X)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (M)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World exports</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>125.1</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td>136.2</td>
<td>132.3</td>
<td>143.7</td>
<td>172.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World imports</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>135.1</td>
<td>150.3</td>
<td>144.6</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>119.8</td>
<td>160.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>X to A/world (%)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M from A/world (%)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X+M)/world (%)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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Table 3: Australia’s Exports and Imports to Korea

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<tr>
<td>Exports (X)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (M)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
<td>+3.8</td>
<td>+1.9</td>
<td>+2.4</td>
<td>+4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World exports</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>110.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>World imports</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>101.5</td>
<td>116.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X to K/world (%)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>M from K/world (%)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(X+M)/world (%)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Component of Trade*, Canberra: DFAT

a) Korea’s FTA Policy and Perspective on KAFTA

In contrast to the recent trend of FTAs in the world, Korea is one of the few countries in the world that has not actively pursued FTAs until recently. The Korean government had no particular intention of exploring FTAs in fear of the adverse effects of the market liberalisation on weak domestic industries. As a result, Korea and Japan are the only two countries among the WTO members that have not concluded any regional trade agreements. However, over the last few years, it appears that Korea has changed its attitudes toward FTAs. In the face of a stronger trend toward regional economic integration in recent years, Korea could not maintain its position of multilateralism and the resulting isolation from increasingly influential regional trade agreements.
Korea would expect that FTAs would contribute to the liberalisation and structural reform of the economy that it has been seeking since the 1997 crisis. As compared to ideal multilateralism anchored in the WTO, regional or bilateral free trade agreements could be a practical and short-term approach to opening the economy and to enhancing economic efficiency. Korea had opposed FTA until recently, fearing that market liberalisation would have devastating effects on weak domestic industries—including the agricultural, manufacturing and services sectors. The Korea government realised that protection of domestic industries from foreign competition over time had resulted in the inefficiency of these industries, thereby contributing to the financial crisis. Korea would expect that FTAs would enlist foreign pressure in support of its efforts to shake up its inefficient agriculture and service sectors. FTA would make it difficult, if not impossible, to maintain Korea’s inefficient agricultural sector insulated from foreign competition. As a result, since 1999 Korea has been actively pursuing the establishment of FTAs with Chile, Thailand, South Africa, Turkey, the United States and Japan (Cheong, 1999: 14, Cheong and Lee, 2000, Cheong and Yun, 1999, LIEP, 2000).2

Korea would attempt to take advantage of a variety of benefits available from an FTA. One is to expand export markets in the member countries of the FTA and to minimise trade disputes with the member countries. Given the paramount importance of exports to the Korean economy, Korea has to secure its export markets. By opening the economy to FTA member countries, Korea would expect that its business efficiency and competitiveness would be enhanced. FTA will also contribute to the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI). In order to take advantage of free flows of goods and services across the FTA member countries, FDI flows into the FTA region. Moreover, an FTA usually includes clauses of liberalisation of FDI across its member countries which will improve FDI across those countries. Unlike government policy before the 1997 financial crisis that had restricted incoming FDI in order to protect domestic industries, Korea embarked on seeking and attracting FDI soon after the onset of the crisis. FTA is thus consistent with government policy toward FDI.

Korea might have sought a political partnership through FTAs in international relations. In some cases of FTAs like EU and ASEAN, the political partnership among member countries is equally important as the economic partnership. By being isolated from the trend of regionalism, Korea might have realised that it was lacking a strong diplomatic partnership with other countries. In the event of economic crisis, member countries of a FTA are more willing to help each other as seen by the attempts made by the United States authorities to help out Mexico from its recent financial crisis.

With regard to a KAFTA, Korea would attempt to surmount tariff and non-tariff barriers of Australia with which Korean exports have faced some difficulties and to secure access to the Australian market. Although the Australia average tariff rate is 5.0 percent, high tariff rates are charged for Korea’s major exporting goods. For example, Australia charges tariff of 20 percent for automobiles and parts, and 20-30 percent for textiles, clothing and footwear (Cheong, 1999). Australia has increased its use of trade remedy laws such as antidumping and countervailing duties to restrict foreign imports. Although only a few cases of antidumping duties have been imposed on Korean goods, there is no guarantee that Australia would not expand its use of such laws more often on Korean goods.

2 Korea has been negotiating an FTA with Chile since 1999, aiming at conclusion of the agreement by 2002. It appears that Korea has chosen Chile as the first candidate country for an FTA through which to learn the benefits and costs of an FTA.
KAFTA will help Korea secure access to Australia’s abundant natural resources and agricultural products. Korea relies heavily on foreign sources for its mineral and energy sources, and will be interested in securing access to Australian mineral resources not only with freer trade but also through investment environments favorable for resource development. Some agricultural products such as cotton, wool and sugar are used for intermediate goods for Korea’s manufacturing sector. KAFTA will facilitate Korea’s access to these input materials from Australia.

KAFTA may also attract Australian investment in Korea. As compared to the dynamic trade relationship between Australia and Korea, two-way FDI has been sluggish. In particular, Australian investment in Korea amounted to only US$38 million by the end of 1998, accounting for an insignificant proportion of Australian overall overseas investment (Kwon and Oh, 2001: 4). One of the important reasons for sluggish Australian investment in Korea was that there were not many areas in which Australian firms had comparative advantage in Korea. Hence, KAFTA will open the Korean services sector and provide significant advantage for Australian firms. This would encourage Australia firms to undertake FDI in the Korean services sector.

Korea’s major concern with KAFTA will be its possible adverse effects on the Korean agricultural sector. In effect, KAFTA will be a double-edged sword with regard to Korean agriculture. As indicated above, KAFTA will force the Korean agricultural sector to improve its efficiency and to open itself to the world. KAFTA would also be a means by which Korea is able to demonstrate its continuing commitment to trade liberalisation. Most Australian agricultural exports to Korea (except a few items such as beef and live animals) complement Korean agriculture in the sense that some are not produced in Korea, and others (fruits, beverages and horticultural products) are produced in different seasons. Nonetheless, possible adverse effects on Korean agriculture of a KAFTA would produce some resistance to it in Korea.\(^3\) Korea imported agricultural products worth about US$8.1 billion in 2000, as compared with about US$20 billion of Korea’s GDP generated by its agricultural sector. Korea’s agricultural imports from Australia amounted to US$706 million, accounting for 8.7 percent of total agricultural imports in 2000 (KCS, 2001 and KNSO, 2001). This made Australia the third largest import source country after China (with a market share of 21.0%) and the United States (with a market share of 19.5%) in 2000. Hence, by the sheer level of imports from Australia, it is understandable why Korea is concerned about opening its agricultural sector to Australia through a KAFTA. Moreover, once the Korean agricultural market is open to Australia, it will be difficult for Korea to restrict agricultural imports from other countries.

b) **Australia’s FTA Policy and Perspective on KAFTA**

Like Korea, Australia was also one of the few countries that had not actively pursued FTAs. Recently, however, interest in regional or bilateral FATs has been rising in Australia. ASEAN countries, China, Japan and South Korea decided to study the possibility of establishing a free trade area among them (ASEAN + 3) at the end of 2000, and a number of countries in the Pacific Rim area (Chile, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore and the U.S.) are courting each other to stitch up a web of bilateral trade deals. Australia has expressed interest in joining the negotiations on the ASEAN + 3, but it has not been invited, and a proposed merger of the CER (Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship) with the ASEAN

\(^3\) Impacts of KAFTA on Korean and Australian agriculture in terms of specific agricultural products should be further investigated. This is beyond the scope of this study.
Free Trade Area has been rejected (*The Australian* 27 November 2000). Under these circumstances, Australia should have realised that it would face the risk of becoming isolated from East Asia and other major trading countries. Through an FTA, Australia would aim to gain maximum short-term trading advantage before a WTO round, to capture strategic advantage by establishing closer links with its traditional trade partners, and to experiment with a trial liberalisation in an environment smaller and less threatening than under the multilateral arrangement. In this context, Prime Minister John Howard would have proposed an Australia-Korea free trade agreement to further expand bilateral trade and investment ties (*Korea Herald*, 20 May 2000). Australia also embarked on negotiating a comprehensive FTA with Singapore in 2001. Although Australia rejected an official overture by the United States on the possibility of a bilateral free trade arrangement in the early 1990s, it has been pursuing FTA discussions with the United States since the inauguration of the Bush administration early in 2001 (Vaile 2001a and 2001b). Australia and Thailand are also moving closer to the conclusion of a FTA (*Korea Times*, 15 August 2001).

Australia would have proposed KAFTA for a number of reasons. KAFTA will secure Australia’s existing Korean market for its traditional products and further facilitate the movement of Australian goods and services to Korea. Although Korea has recently pursued an import liberalisation policy, thereby raising the import liberalisation rate to 99.9 percent by 1999, Korean tariff rates are still high. While Australian tariffs on Korean products averaged 5.0 percent, Korean tariffs on Australian products averaged 9.1 percent as of 1998 (DFAT, 1999: 56). Korea’s average tariff rate is expected to decrease to 8.3 percent by 2004 in line with its commitment to the WTO. Although Korean tariffs on imports of mineral products are low at 3.6 percent on average in 1998, its tariff rates on agricultural and food products, which are of major interest to Australia, range from 11.3 percent on fats and oils to 19.8 percent on prepared food (DFAT, 1999: 56). Korea continues to use the adjustment duties to limit disruptions to domestic markets from imports, and the rates of these adjustment duties can be higher or lower than those shown in the tariff schedule.

Korea still imposes non-tariff barriers particularly on those commodities in which Australia has high interest. Korea has been liberalising trade under the WTO commitments and IMF requirements, both of which are intended to reduce the level of state control over trade and increase the transparency of Korea’s trade-related policies. As a result, except for imports affecting national security, the environment and public health, Korea has removed most of import restrictions, and by 2004 will completely tariffy most agricultural products except for the rice quota. However, in order to protect the agricultural sector, Korea currently imposes tariffs, quotas or prohibitive out-of-quota rates on agricultural imports. Because of these tariff quota rates, tariffs on ten products of interest to Australia exceed 40 percent (DFAT, 1999: 59). Korea also imposes quarantine restrictions and customs-related impediments, particularly for horticultural, animal and dairy products.

Australia would also regard Korea as a foothold to promote it to Northeast Asia and other East Asian countries. As mentioned earlier, since Korea has been moving to establish free trade agreements with a number of countries and since a dialogue has been underway to establish a trade bloc of ASEAN + 3 with Australia excluded, KAFTA will also pave the way for closer relations with other East Asian countries. A free trade agreement with Korea or any Asian country will help disperse the Asian perception of an alienated Australia and enhance the image of Australia’s connectedness to Asia.
Australia would also be concerned with the potential for trade diversion of products in which Australia has comparative advantage to the United States and other competitors. If the ongoing dialogue concerning a free trade agreement between Korea and the United States turns out to be successful, Australia may be displaced by the United States in supplying agricultural and mineral products to the Korean market. Australia will also be in danger of losing to Japan the Korean market for its manufactured goods such as automobile engines, once a Korea-Japan free trade agreement is consummated.

Australia would attempt to penetrate the Korean market with services in which Australia has been reputed to have comparative advantage. Korea’s services sector has been liberalising as a result of Korea’s Uruguay Round negotiations in 1994 and accession to the OECD in 1996. Additional liberalisation of its services sector took place after the 1997 financial crisis, as a way of attracting more foreign investment (Kim and Kim, 2000: 14). As a result, except for a few wholly restricted and partially restricted categories related to national security, culture and primary producers’ special position, most of the services businesses – transport, communications, finance, insurance and business services industries - are now open to foreign investment and competition.4 A KAFTA will facilitate the expansion of Australian services to Korea.

An FTA is to eliminate trade barriers and investment restrictions among its member countries. To what extent trade barriers and investment restrictions must be eliminated by an FTA is a controversial issue. To be registered with the WTO, an FTA should eliminate tariff and other trade restrictions for ‘substantially all trade’ in commodities including agricultural products, and eliminate ‘substantially all discrimination’ in trade in services among the member countries. There is also a restriction on the phase-in period of an FTA over a ‘reasonable length of time’ which is in general regarded to be less than 10 years (Cheong and Lee, 2000: 15-16). An FTA cannot raise barriers to trade with those outside the agreement region, and should be open for additional membership. Under these conditions for establishing an FTA, Korea is highly likely to confront serious difficulties from a KAFTA particularly by opening its agricultural sector to Australia. Because of these difficulties in concluding a KAFTA, neither of the two counties appears to be pushing for a KAFTA, nor has serious analysis of a KAFTA been undertaken by either country since its proposal by Prime Minister John Howard.5

c) Economic Effects of a KAFTA

The net gains from an FTA depend on whether the agreement generates “trade creation” which improves welfare, or generates “trade diversion” which lowers welfare. Trade creation occurs when member country X imports from member country Y a product, which was sourced locally in country X before the establishment of the FTA. Since the protection structure in country X raised the price of imports above the domestic production price, it was previously cheaper to source the product locally. Welfare increased because country X now imports the good from a lower cost source. On the other hand, trade diversion occurs when the establishment of an FTA causes member country X to import a product from member country Y that it

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4 As of July 2000, only 2 business categories (at the KSIC five digit level) are completely restricted, and 22 categories are partially restricted out of 495 total business categories in the services sector (Kim and Kim 2000: 16).

5 After the Prime Minister’s proposal of a bilateral free trade agreement, the two countries held a ministerial meeting to discuss ways to improve economic relations between them, and in pursuit of an agreement at the meeting, the two governments established their own study teams in 2001 to explore ways to of strengthen the economic partnership.
previously had imported from a non-member country. This implies that the FTA causes the country to import from a higher cost supplier, thus decreasing welfare. The more divergent the patterns of comparative advantage across member countries are, the greater is the presumption that there exists room for trade creation with the formation of an FTA. Alternatively, similar patterns of comparative advantage across member countries vis a vis the rest of the would imply that there is a greater possibility of trade diversion.

Except for studies by Cheong (1999) and Kim and Cheong (1996), no quantitative assessment is available in the literature that has measured economic impacts of an FTA between Australia and Korea. According to Cheong (1999: 26) which simply restates the quantitative measurements of Kim and Cheong (1996), in 1992 a KAFTA would have increased GDP of Korea and Australia, respectively, by 0.76 percent and 0.72 percent by eliminating tariffs between the two countries. Korea’s total exports to Australia amounted to US$1.1 billion in 1992, or only 0.3 percent of Korea’s GDP. Such a relatively tiny share of exports to Australia suggests that the extent of the benefit estimated by Kim and Cheong (1996) is likely to be overestimated. According to Cheong (1999: 26), in 1992 Australian exports to Korea would have increased by US$3.4 billion, or 109.7 percent of Australia’s total exports to Korea valued at US$3.1 billion in that year, and Korea’s exports to Australia would have increased by US$1.6 billion, or 145.5 percent of Korea’s total exports to Australia of US$1.1 billion in that year. These estimates of the impact of a KAFTA on bilateral exports of appear to be gross overestimates.

Unlike the study by Kim and Cheong (1996) which produced highly aggregated estimates of KAFTA’s economic effects, this paper takes a different approach by examining sectoral level data, and does not attempt to measure either the aggregate income or trade effects of a KAFTA. Instead, this paper attempts to determine whether there are potential gains from trade by identifying a significant possibility for trade creation between Korea and Australia under a KAFTA. To this end, the concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is the method employed to do this.\(^6\) RCA calculations are used to analyse the trade complementarity and competition between the two countries, which in turn provides some indication of the effects of a KAFTA for both Korea and Australia. The RCA technique does not provide a complete analysis of the bilateral trade creation and trade diversion. However, it does provide a relatively disaggregated look at sectors that are likely to generate significant impacts under a KAFTA.

A country’s comparative advantage is determined by pre-trade relative prices. Since observable data of pre-trade relative prices are not readily available, Ballassa (1965) developed a concept of RCA in which a country’s comparative advantage is reflected or revealed in its exports to the world market. As such, the revealed comparative advantage of exports (RCAX) is represented by a country’s commodity composition of exports \textit{vis a vis} the commodity composition of world exports. The RCAX index is defined as:

\[
\text{RCAX}_{kj} = \frac{(X_{kj}/X_{kt})}{(X_{wj}/X_{wt})} = \frac{(X_{kj}/X_{wj})}{(X_{kt}/X_{wt})}
\]

where:

- \(X_{kj}\) represents the value of country k’s exports of commodity j
- \(X_{kt}\) represents the value of country k’s total exports to the world
- \(X_{wj}\) represents the value of world exports of commodity j

\(^6\) The concept and measurement of RCA are well known. See, for example, Kwon (1998) for an exposition.
The RCAX of country k in the export of product j is measured by that product’s share in the country’s exports (Xkj/Xkt) relative to that product’s share in world exports (Xwj/Xwt). It can also be measured by the country’s share of world exports of product j (Xwj/Xwt) relative to the country’s total export share of world exports (Xkt/Xwt).

The RCAX index has a straightforward interpretation. If the index exceeds unity, then the implication is that the country has a revealed comparative advantage in commodity j. Similarly, if the index takes a value less than unity, then this implies that the country does not have a revealed comparative advantage in commodity j.

A revealed comparative advantage of imports (RCAM) index, representing a country’s import composition vis-à-vis the world total, can be defined as:

RCAM\(k_j\) = \(\frac{Mkj}{Mkt}\) ÷ \(\frac{Mwj}{Mwt}\) = \(\frac{Mkj}{Mwj}\) ÷ \(\frac{Mkt}{Mwt}\)

where:
- \(Mkj\) represents the value of country k’s imports of commodity j
- \(Mkt\) represents the value of country k’s total imports from the world
- \(Mwj\) represents the value of world imports of commodity j
- \(Mwt\) represents the value of total world imports of all commodities

RCAM is interpreted in the same way as is RCAX. An RCAM value of greater than unity implies that country k has a revealed comparative advantage in its importation of commodity j, or a revealed comparative disadvantage in commodity j. In the case of an RCAM value less than unity, the country would be said not to have a comparative advantage in importing that product.

RCA can be used for a number of purposes. It can examine shifts in the comparative advantage of industries over time by comparing RCA indices over time. It can also estimate the competitiveness of various countries in one export market by comparing RCA indices of competing countries in the market. This paper uses RCA to determine whether the bilateral trade between Australia and Korea is complementary or competing on a cross-sectional basis. The results are then used to assess whether a KAFTA is likely to lead to bilateral trade creation.

RCAX and RCAM indices are calculated for all products at the three-digit SITC level for the years 1995 and 1998 for both Australia and Korea. Data are from the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1999. Calculations of RCAX and RCAM are limited to those products for which values of exports and imports are reported for Australia, Korea and the world. First, to determine the extent of complementarity of Australia-Korea bilateral trade, RCAX values for Australia and RCAM values for Korea are compared for individual products over the two years. Australia’s RCAX larger than unity in conjunction with Korea’s RCAM larger than unity in either 1995 or 1998 is the criterion used to identify products for which complementarity was assumed to exist. This implies that Australia’s export specialisation matches Korea’s import specialisation, and thus the two economies are

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7 Kwon (1998) estimates changes in comparative advantages over time and competitiveness of foreign mineral products in the Korean market.
8 Given the fluctuations of imports and exports at the disaggregated commodity level, the criterion of accepting complementarity based on either of the two years could result in an overestimate or underestimate of complementarity. To smooth out annual fluctuations of exports and imports at the disaggregated commodity level, averaging the data over more years would be more appropriate. This is not attempted in this study, because more extensive comparable data are unavailable.
complementary in trade of those products. Once a KAFTA is established, trade would increase in favour of Australian exports for those products for which Australia has high RCAX values and Korea has high RCAM. Similarly, trade would increase in favour of Korea for those products for which Korea has high RCAX and Australia has high RCAM. Second, to determine the level of competition between Australia and Korea, RCAX values for the same products are compared between the two countries. For products for which both Australia and Korea have RCAX greater than unity, trade competition is considered to exist in the world market. This means that both countries specialise in exporting the same products, indicating that they are competing with each other in the world market.

The results of the calculated RCAX and RCAM indices are divided into three parts. First, Table 4 shows the extent of complementarity of the bilateral trade in favor of Australia. It shows the product categories in which Australia’s export specialisation with RCAX larger than unity match Korea’s import specialisation with RCAM larger than unity. There are 17 product categories representing 39.2 percent of Australian world exports in 1998 that are complementary with Korean imports. Major sectors of complementarity of Australian exports, which account for a significant share (more than one percent) of total Australian exports, include raw agricultural products (wheat and cotton), mineral products (iron ore, base metal ores, coal and petroleum products).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITC</th>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>Australian Exports (RCAX&gt;1)</th>
<th>Korea Imports (RCAM &gt;1)</th>
<th>Share of Aust total exports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>041</td>
<td>Wheat etc unmilled</td>
<td>7.176</td>
<td>14.590</td>
<td>0.990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>081</td>
<td>Feeding stuff for animal</td>
<td>1.404</td>
<td>1.506</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>Hides skins .exc furs.raw</td>
<td>5.626</td>
<td>6.507</td>
<td>6.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222</td>
<td>Seeds for <code>soft</code> fixed oil</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>1.748</td>
<td>1.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>263</td>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>4.308</td>
<td>9.106</td>
<td>2.513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281</td>
<td>Iron ore. concentrates</td>
<td>24.831</td>
<td>24.157</td>
<td>2.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>287</td>
<td>Base metal ores. conc nes</td>
<td>14.878</td>
<td>19.260</td>
<td>1.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>Nonfer metal scrap nes</td>
<td>1.669</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>322</td>
<td>Coal lignite and peat</td>
<td>26.448</td>
<td>30.651</td>
<td>3.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>334</td>
<td>Petroleum products. refin</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td>1.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>533</td>
<td>Pigments, paints etc</td>
<td>1.421</td>
<td>1.342</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611</td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>2.157</td>
<td>1.930</td>
<td>1.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>672</td>
<td>Iron, steel primary forms</td>
<td>1.958</td>
<td>1.929</td>
<td>3.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>Copper exc cement copper</td>
<td>1.857</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>1.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>684</td>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>4.307</td>
<td>4.719</td>
<td>1.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>793</td>
<td>Ships and boats etc</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>1.229</td>
<td>3.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>882</td>
<td>Photo.cinema supplies</td>
<td>1.389</td>
<td>1.424</td>
<td>1.195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculations based on the **UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1999**

It should be noted that, according to the calculated RCAX and RCAM, Australia’s live animals for food, meat, and milk are not complementary with Korea. This shows the limitations of RCA as an indicator of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage depends on pre-trade relative price. The Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem argues that the pre-trade relative price is determined by factor endowments. In practice, however, the pre-trade relative price is affected by market distortions introduced primarily by government interventions, which make RCA divergent from true comparative advantage. These market distortions include tariffs, quotas, export subsidies, embargoes, a myriad of other governmental distortionary activities, and different stages of industrialisation (Maule, 1996). Because of numerous types of market distortions introduced by the Korean government in its agricultural market, the calculated RCA does not reveal the highly probable complementarity in the bilateral agricultural trade between Australia and Korea. Other than in the agricultural sector, however, market distortions introduced by the Korean government are not serious enough to diminish the usefulness of RCA.

Table 5 shows the extent of complementarity in the bilateral trade in favour of Korea. In 1998 there were 23 product categories representing 37.3 percent of total Korean exports that were complementary with Australia’s imports. Major sectors of complementarity of Korean exports, which account for a significant share (more than one percent) of total Korean exports, include some chemical products (polymerisation products), some basic manufactures (rubber tyres, man-made fibre fabric), and machines and transportation equipment (automatic data equipment, telecommunications equipment, household equipment, transistors, passenger motor vehicles, and ships and boats).

Table 5: Complementarity between Korean Exports and Australian Imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITC</th>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>Korean Exports (RCAX &gt;1)</th>
<th>Aust. Imports (RCAM &gt; 1)</th>
<th>Share of Korean total exports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>Carboxylic acids etc</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>1.884</td>
<td>0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>582</td>
<td>Prod condensation etc</td>
<td>1.758</td>
<td>1.694</td>
<td>1.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>583</td>
<td>Polymerization etc prods</td>
<td>1.678</td>
<td>2.095</td>
<td>0.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>625</td>
<td>Rubber tyres, tubes etc</td>
<td>2.154</td>
<td>2.483</td>
<td>1.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>653</td>
<td>Woven man-made fib fabric</td>
<td>7.999</td>
<td>6.477</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>658</td>
<td>Textile articles nes</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td>1.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>678</td>
<td>Iron/st tubes/pipes/etc</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>1.112</td>
<td>1.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>Copper exc cement copper</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>1.705</td>
<td>0.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>723</td>
<td>Civil engneer equip etc</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>2.656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>Textile, leather machinery</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>0.777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>752</td>
<td>Automatic data proc equip</td>
<td>1.274</td>
<td>1.158</td>
<td>1.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>761</td>
<td>Television receivers</td>
<td>3.416</td>
<td>1.949</td>
<td>1.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>762</td>
<td>Radio broadcast receivers</td>
<td>1.626</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>1.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>763</td>
<td>Sound recordrs.phonogrh</td>
<td>3.429</td>
<td>2.108</td>
<td>1.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>764</td>
<td>Telecom eqpt,pts,acc nes</td>
<td>1.438</td>
<td>1.251</td>
<td>1.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>775</td>
<td>Household type equip nes</td>
<td>2.035</td>
<td>1.972</td>
<td>1.312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>778</td>
<td>Electrical machinery nes</td>
<td>2.846</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>1.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>781</td>
<td>Pass motor veh exc varies</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>1.248</td>
<td>1.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>793</td>
<td>Ships and boats etc</td>
<td>6.050</td>
<td>7.869</td>
<td>2.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>831</td>
<td>Travel goods,handbags</td>
<td>1.874</td>
<td>0.998</td>
<td>1.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>845</td>
<td>Outerwear knit nonelastic</td>
<td>1.508</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>0.609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>898</td>
<td>Musical instruments,pts</td>
<td>1.876</td>
<td>1.256</td>
<td>1.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>899</td>
<td>Other manufactured goods</td>
<td>1.371</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>1.317</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculations based on the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1999

Table 6 shows the extent of competition between Australian and Korean exports in world markets. These are the product categories in which both Australia and Korea have RCAX indices higher than unity. These reflect intra-industry trade, where Australia and Korea export the same products in significant quantities to the world market, including each other’s market. There are only a few product categories in which Australia and Korea are competing in world markets. They are petroleum products, leather, iron and steel in primary forms, copper products, and ship and boats, representing 12.2 percent and 4.7 percent, respectively, of Korean and
Australian total exports in 1998. This finding indicates that the two economies are in competition with each other in the world market only for a limited number of products.

Table 6: Product categories in which Australian and Korean Exports Compete

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>334</td>
<td>Petroleum products.refin</td>
<td>1.054</td>
<td>1.036</td>
<td>1.069</td>
<td>1.921</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611</td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>2.157</td>
<td>1.930</td>
<td>4.053</td>
<td>3.326</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>672</td>
<td>Iron &amp; steel primary forms</td>
<td>1.958</td>
<td>1.929</td>
<td>1.746</td>
<td>2.420</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>Copper exc cement copper</td>
<td>1.857</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>1.705</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>793</td>
<td>Ships and boats etc</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>1.229</td>
<td>6.050</td>
<td>7.869</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>6.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculations based on the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1999

RCA will also show the extent of ‘domestic intra-industry trade’ within an economy. This type of domestic intra-industry trade would be reflected by a country exporting a product as well as importing that same product in significant quantities. Significant amounts of intra-industry specialisation will yield high RCAX and RCAM indices for the same product categories of a country. There are only three product categories in which Australia has RCAX and RCAM both larger than unity. They are copper products, ships and boats and photo cinema supplies. Exports of these products amounted to only 2.4 percent of total Australian exports in 1998. This reflects the simple industrial and trade structures of the Australian economy which exports mainly agricultural and mineral products, and imports mainly manufactured products.

Table 7: Sectors in Which Australia has Comparative Advantage in Both Export and Imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>Copper exc cement copper</td>
<td>1.857</td>
<td>1.238</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>1.115</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>793</td>
<td>Ships and boats etc</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>1.229</td>
<td>6.050</td>
<td>7.869</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>882</td>
<td>Photo. cinema supplies</td>
<td>1.389</td>
<td>1.424</td>
<td>1.771</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculations based on the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1999

Korea has more extensive ‘domestic intra-industry trade’ within the economy. For 17 product categories both its RCAX and RCAM are larger than unity. They are refined petroleum products, some chemical products, some basic manufactures, and some machinery and transport equipment, representing 40.2 percent of total Korean exports in 1998. This shows that Korean industrial and trade structures are more diversified than in the Australian economy. This may imply that Korea is more likely to take advantage of trade liberalisation resulting from a KAFTA, as compared to Australia, in the non-traditional trading industries.
**Table 8: Sectors in Which Korea has Comparative Advantage in Both Exports and Imports**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITC</th>
<th>COMMODITY</th>
<th>Korean Exports (RCAX &gt;1)</th>
<th>Korean Imports (RCAM &gt;1)</th>
<th>Share of Korean total exports (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>334</td>
<td>Petroleum products, refining</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>1.921</td>
<td>1.624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511</td>
<td>Hydrocarbons nes. derivs</td>
<td>2.312</td>
<td>3.489</td>
<td>3.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>Carboxylic acids etc</td>
<td>1.625</td>
<td>1.884</td>
<td>1.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>582</td>
<td>Prod of condensation etc</td>
<td>1.758</td>
<td>1.694</td>
<td>1.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611</td>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>4.053</td>
<td>3.326</td>
<td>1.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>651</td>
<td>Textile yarn</td>
<td>1.584</td>
<td>4.053</td>
<td>1.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>654</td>
<td>Other woven textile fabric</td>
<td>1.621</td>
<td>1.404</td>
<td>1.841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>672</td>
<td>Iron, steel primary forms</td>
<td>1.746</td>
<td>2.420</td>
<td>3.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>673</td>
<td>Iron, steel shapes etc</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td>1.709</td>
<td>1.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>682</td>
<td>Copper exc cement copper</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>1.705</td>
<td>1.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>724</td>
<td>Textile, leather machinery</td>
<td>1.242</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>1.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>776</td>
<td>Transistors, valves, etc</td>
<td>4.295</td>
<td>40.720</td>
<td>2.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>778</td>
<td>Electrical machinery nes</td>
<td>2.846</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>793</td>
<td>Ships and boats etc</td>
<td>6.050</td>
<td>7.869</td>
<td>3.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>871</td>
<td>Optical instruments</td>
<td>1.256</td>
<td>4.658</td>
<td>2.140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Calculations based on the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1999

d) **Policy Implications of a KAFTA**

Analysis of the calculated RCA indices indicates that the Australian and Korean economies are highly complementary for numerous products and are in competition with each other for a limited number of products. For Australia, 39.2 percent of its exports are considered to be complementary with Korea, and only 4.7 percent of its exports are in competition with Korea. In the case of Korea, 37.3 percent of its exports are complementary with Australia, while 12.2 percent of them are in competition with Australia. From these results, it may be argued that there are large opportunities for inter-industry trade creation from the formation of a KAFTA. The extent of trade creation will be higher than that implied by the calculated RCA, if a KAFTA eliminates distortions in the Korean agricultural sector. On the other hand, the low intra-industry trade between the two countries would indicate that the two economies have not yet developed intra-industry trade particularly in manufacturing and high-technology areas, although such intra-industry trade is required to advance their economies towards knowledge-based economies. This may imply that there would not be significant potential for trade expansion through intra-industry trade with the establishment of a KAFTA under the existing industrial and trade structures of the two economies.  

High levels of complementary together with low levels of competition between the two economies do not suggest that a KAFTA could be a substitute for multilateral trade liberalisation. As shown earlier in Tables 2 and 3, bilateral trade between the two countries accounts for only a small portion of their respective world trade. Both the Australian and Korean economies depend heavily on the rest of the world. Hence, the two countries should continue to pursue their respective multilateral trade liberalisation. The low extent of competition is not necessarily desirable in conjunction with the formation of a KAFTA; it may indicate few opportunities for intra-industry trade creation. Under the existing industrial and trade structures of the two economies, a KAFTA is unlikely to generate extensive intra-industry trade in the

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9 It should also be noted that the calculation of RCA indices was done with trade data with the three-digit SITC level. Further disaggregated product categories might generate different results.
knowledge-based industries, in which both economies are attempting to advance through bilateral trade. In particular, the Australian industrial structure has not been diversified to take advantage fully of opportunities arising in the Korean knowledge-based sectors.

Another type of benefit from an FTA is an increase in inflows of FDI. With the relatively small size of the two economies, a KAFTA is unlikely to attract significant amounts of FDI to establish production bases within the two economies. However, given the ongoing dialogues by both Australia and Korea to establish other regional free trade agreements with neighbouring countries, the KAFTA region is likely to be part of a large regional trade bloc. This prospect would attract FDI into the region either to develop the sources of raw materials in Australia or to develop a foothold in a broad Northeast Asian economic region.

Another advantage of a KAFTA for both countries is that it would provide an experimentation of a free trade agreement with minimum disruptions in their respective trade relations and economies. Given the ongoing international trend toward FTAs, both countries may have to consider seriously establishing an FTA with other countries to minimise economic and political losses arising from being isolated from the trend. As the economies are similar in size and their bilateral trade accounts for a small proportion of their respective world trade, disruption from the formation of a KAFTA on their respective economy may not be high. Insofar as a KAFTA reduces trade and investment barriers between the two countries, it sets out a schedule for lowering trade barriers, which might not otherwise have occurred, and facilitates formations of other regional trade agreements. For Korea, in particular, the formation of a KAFTA will help to improve its international competitiveness and facilitate domestic structural reforms which is likely to make Korea more attractive to foreign investment.

The major stumbling block to the establishment of a KAFTA is the Korean agricultural sector. Korean agriculture has faced serious structural problems. Land suitable for cultivation is not sufficient for production to meet domestic agricultural demand. The sparsity of arable land by comparison with the agricultural population has resulted in small-scale farming that has been the main cause of low agricultural productivity and low incomes for farm households. Low farm income has in turn accelerated the exodus of young farmers to urban areas. Aging farmers are reluctant to mechanise agriculture and to introduce innovations, thereby slowing productivity and income growth. With this vicious cycle of structural problems, the Korean agricultural sector has declined continuously, accounting for only 4.6 percent of GDP and 10.9 percent of total employment in 2000.

Although Korea’s agricultural sector is small when compared to the nation’s total population and national income, it has enormous political clout. Besides, the government attempts to maintain the viability of the agricultural sector and rural communities to alleviate and prevent further social problems in urban areas arising from internal migration. Korean agriculture is characterised not only by small-scaled farms but also by rice-oriented farming systems. As the staple food in Korea’s diet, rice remains the dominant crop in terms of production, land use and government support. Livestock products, fruits and vegetables are, however, growing in importance. Secure provision of staples, in particular rice, with domestic resources is regarded as important for national security. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to envisage that Korea will agree to a KAFTA at the present time. Realising this,

10 For a detailed analysis of Korean agriculture and its relations with Australia, see Kwon and Kang (2000).
investment relations will be analysed between Australia and Korea and some proposals will be made to promote investment relations as an early stage solution of the Australia-Korea economic cooperation.

3. **Australia-Korea Investment Relations**

As indicated earlier, one of the premises of this paper is that Australia and Korea should expand two-way investment flows in order to meet the challenge of expanding bilateral trade in a mutually desirable direction which is in turn consistent with the drive by both nations for knowledge-based economies. As compared to the dynamic trade relationship between Australia and Korea, two-way FDI is still at a low level. At the end of 1998, the stock of Korea’s FDI in Australia amounted to US$425 million, and that of Australia’s FDI in Korea was US$38 million. The stock of Korea’s overall overseas investment amounted to US$26 billion, and that of Australia was estimated at US$53 billion. Thus, the stock of FDI position between the two countries - US$463 million at the end of 1998 - accounted for only 0.6 percent of the US$79 billion of total outward FDI of the two countries (Kwon and Oh, 2001). This compares with the amount of bilateral trade between Australia and Korea that accounted for 2.1 percent of the sum of their respective world trade in 1998.

Two-way flows of FDI between the two countries are dwarfed by the magnitude of the flows of FDI worldwide. Over the past two decades, there has been a marked increase in the annual flows of FDI worldwide, reaching US$827 billion of one-year inflows of FDI worldwide in 1998. This amounted to 7.7 percent of world trade (exports plus imports) (UNCTAD 2000 and UN 1999). Korean FDI in Australia, though markedly higher than Australian FDI in Korea, amounted to only 0.7 percent of its trade with Australia over the 1995-99 period. Therefore, this section attempts to examine the reasons for the low levels of bilateral FDI flows and to explore some means to expand these flows. To this end, an examination of appropriate theories of FDI is in order. Since Australian FDI in Korea has been markedly less than Korean FDI in Australia, emphasis will be placed on the reasons for the sluggish Australian investment in Korea.

**Theories of FDI**

Although a number of models have been put forward to explain FDI, most appear to be based on two premises. First, FDI is largely undertaken by MNEs, and second, the world is characterised by imperfections in the output and factor markets (Agarwal 1980, Rugman 1980, Teece 1983, and Hill and Kim 1988). The genesis of FDI thinking in this direction, known as the ownership advantage theory, came from Hymer (1960, 1976), and was refined by Kindleberger (1969) and Caves (1971, 1982). This theory argues that when MNEs invest in a foreign country they should have advantages over local firms compensating for their disadvantages on the foreign turf. Advantages owned by MNEs will include firm-specific monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages such as superior technical knowledge, well-known brand names, managerial and marketing skills, special access to markets, cheaper sources of financing, economies of scale, and differentiated products.

For a firm to possess monopolistic or oligopolistic advantages is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for conducting FDI, because the firm can also serve foreign markets with exports or by licensing, renting or selling these advantages. A

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11 The stock value of Australia’s direct investment in Korea was provided by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) Office in Sydney from its internal material.
12 For a detailed analysis of Korean direct investment in Australia, see Kwon and Oh (2001)
13 This section draws heavily on Kwon and Oh (2001)
number of models have been proposed to explain why a firm chooses FDI over other alternatives to take advantage of its ownership advantages internationally. Among these models, the internalisation model, which was first proposed by Buckley and Casson (1976), has been broadly accepted. This model argues that the markets for key intermediate products such as technology, knowledge and expertise, and managerial and marketing skills are imperfect. These intermediate products are held largely by MNEs. Market imperfections involve the so-called transaction costs such as time lags, uncertainties in negotiating the value of products, monitoring and enforcing contracts, and government intervention. Hence, when the transaction costs associated with these intermediate products are high, MNEs replace these imperfect external markets with their own internal markets. The internalisation of the external markets across national boundaries leads to FDI – internalising international production within the firm.

The creation of an internal market facilitates the transformation of intangible intermediate goods such as technology invented by a firm into valuable properties, retention of the exclusive right to use the innovation, and the exploitation of monopoly rent from them. Expanding their operations through FDI, MNEs may also realise economies of scale. Although internalisation can be applied to any type of MNE with firm-specific advantages, the available empirical studies conclude that the process of internalisation is concentrated in industries with relatively high R & D expenditures (Agarwal 1980).

Although internalisation theory addresses why firms choose FDI as the mode for entering international markets, it ignores the question of why production should be located in a particular country. Here the question is whether there is a location advantage in producing in a particular foreign country. This issue was incorporated by Dunning (1981, 1988, and 1998) in his eclectic theory. According to Dunning’s eclectic theory, a firm undertakes FDI when there are three types of advantage for the firm: (a) ownership advantage, (b) location advantage, and (c) internalisation advantage. Ownership advantage means that the firm possesses a competitive advantage that allows it to overcome the disadvantage of competing on the firm’s foreign turf. Location advantages refer to the advantages that arise from using resources and assets that are tied to a particular foreign location and that a firm finds valuable to combine with its own ownership advantage. The internalisation advantage arises when the firm finds it cheaper to produce the product by itself rather than hire a foreign firm to do so, because of high transaction costs.

Dunning’s eclectic theory is a comprehensive theory of FDI. However, the eclectic theory does not mean that all foreign firms undertaking FDI in different countries have the three types of advantages to the same extent, nor does it indicate that firms’ motives for pursuing FDI to capitalise on the three advantages are the same across countries and companies. Given the complexity of the global economy and the diversity of both the characteristics of firms and the opportunities that firms seek in different countries, it is not surprising that different motives may influence a firm’s decision to undertake FDI. Strategic motives for undertaking FDI are classified as ‘supply-seeking’ and ‘market-serving’. A firm’s supply-seeking motives for undertaking FDI are to control its own costs and secure supplies by capitalising on the location advantages of a foreign country. This includes lowering production and/or delivery costs, acquiring raw materials, and gaining access to key technology in the host country. A firm’s market-serving motive for undertaking FDI is to establish new national markets for its products. This motive is in general to explore new markets, circumvent prohibitive trade barriers, establish a local presence as a way of gaining local visibility, and respond to the strategic rivalry in host countries.
Drawing on strategic rivalry, Knickerbocker (1973) argues that FDI reflects strategic rivalry among companies in oligopolistic industries. A critical competitive feature of oligopolistic industries is the interdependence of major players in the sense that what one firm does can have an immediate impact on the major competitors, forcing a response in kind. Recognising this feature of oligopolistic industries, Knickerbocker (1973) argues that as one competitor in an oligopolistic industry undertakes FDI in a foreign country, other competitors tend to follow suit to ensure that the competitor does not gain the dominant positions in the foreign market.

It appears that most of the models of FDI that have been briefly surveyed above are based on the investor’s perspective; the host country’s perspective draws little appraisal. In particular, it appears that most available modes for FDI assume that the inflow of FDI is unrestricted in the host countries. Frequently, however, this is not the case, particularly in developing countries. Rather, capital-importing countries have foreign investment controls and regulations together with incentives to attract foreign investments. Under these regulations and inducements, FDI is encouraged for certain areas and restricted for other areas. These countries in general seek to attract FDI as a vehicle by which to attract advanced technologies and managerial and marketing skills and to expand export markets. The host country’s perspective has become further important with the rising trend of FDI in the form of joint ventures with the host country’s partners. The host country’s companies search for foreign companies with ownership advantages in areas consistent with their national FDI policy.

b) Australian FDI in Korea

One of the factors underlying the low level of Australian investment in Korea is the lack of location advantage in Korea perceived by Australian investors. Until recent years western business people perceived that Korea was a difficult place to do business (Kwon 2001). Korean government policy discouraged and restricted inward FDI with an excessive burden of government intervention and regulations. A number of sectors were closed to FDI by law until the early 1990s, and even in those areas that permitted FDI, the administrative regulations and processes for FDI were complex and lacked transparency. In addition, other economic conditions were not conducive to incoming foreign investment. The labour market was inflexible in the sense that laying off workers was impossible and labour relations were inefficient and sometimes volatile. Labour costs were thus among the highest of the Asian NICs. Restrictive zoning laws made land and real estate prices extraordinarily high, and foreigners were prohibited from purchasing land for business purposes.

Australian investors’ preference for western countries over Korea as an investment target country also appears to have hindered Australian investors’ willingness to explore the location advantage in Korea. Historically, Australia tended to favour the United Kingdom, the United States, and New Zealand over Asia, due to historical and cultural ties, trading arrangements, and a higher level of familiarity with these markets. Australia also faces a variety of unfavourable situations in Korea. Lack of understanding of Korea and mis-perceptions of Korea held by Australian business people are also part of the reasons for low Australian investment in Korea. Kwon and Trotman (1999) found that Australians’ understanding of Korea is quite

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14 This was pointed out by Kwon (1986).
15 Uren (2001) stated that the United States absorbs more than half of Australian total direct investment offshore – with the total amount of A$90 billion as of 2001, although it takes only about a tenth of Australian exports.
limited, and that their perceptions of Korea and its people are to some degree
incorrect and outdated.

Few Australian companies have much ownership advantage as far as
investment prospects in Korea are concerned. Australia’s few multinationals are
concentrated in resource industries where Korea offers few opportunities for foreign
firms. The Australian manufacturing sector has been under government protection
over time, and its international competitiveness is relatively low. Government
protection of oligopolistic markets has led Australian companies to focus on their
direct competition within Australia, thus reducing their interest in exploring niches in
foreign countries. This has happened because a large portion of the Australian
manufacturing sector has been controlled by foreign investors, and the main interest
of these foreign-controlled companies is to meet the Australian domestic demand.
Furthermore, Australian companies could not invest abroad until exchange controls
were removed in 1984, which led them to diversify their operations domestically,
rather than developing the areas of expertise required to compete in global markets
(Uren 2001: 50).

c) New Prospects for Australian FDI in Korea

There is no doubt that the business environment has changed markedly in
Korea and many of the root causes for the difficult FDI environment have been
eliminated since the financial crisis. Since the onset of the crisis Korea has become to
appreciate the value of FDI for its economic recovery from the crisis and future
economic development. Hence, the government has switched its policy toward FDI
from “restriction and control” to “promotion and assistance” (Bishop, 2001). The
government has opened for incoming FDI a number of industries that were closed
prior to the crisis. The labour market was reformed to improve its flexibility, and this
has significantly slowed increases in wage rates. For the first time in history,
foreigners are now allowed to purchase real estate in Korea for personal and business
purposes. The government has streamlined the complicated administrative procedures
for FDI by dismantling or relaxing more that 50 percent of the former restrictions
(Kwon 2001). It has also introduced the so-called “one-stop” service system for
inward FDI. Mergers and acquisitions (M &A), which were prohibited before the
crisis, have been promoted in conjunction with the liberalisation of the FDI regime
(KOTRA, 1999). In addition, numerous Korea companies need to dispose of their
surplus assets as part of their structural reform.

One of the sectors in which Australia has relatively high ownership advantage
is the services sector. Before the 1997 financial crisis, Korea protected its services
sector (banks, securities firms, insurance, and professional consulting) by restricting
incoming foreign investment in the sector. However, Korea has largely liberalised the
services sector and is in need of foreign professional services (accounting, financing,
legal and management). Australian companies can now capitalise on location
advantages arising from Korea and utilise their emerging ownership advantages
particularly in the services sector.

d) Australian Investment Strategy in Korea

To expand and deepen the bilateral economic relationship between Australia
and Korea in line with these nation’s their respective national strategy of advancing
their industrial structures and exporting high technology products, they should expand
their FDI relations in manufacturing, services and technology areas. In this respect,
Australian direct investment in Korea has been inadequate. The expansion of bilateral
investment relations requires cooperation between the two countries to reach better
understanding of the dynamics of each other’s economy and investment opportunities.
Concerted efforts are required by both Korea and Australia to enhance mutual understanding of Korea’s location advantages and Australia’s ownership advantages in the manufacturing, services and high technology areas and possible fusion of these advantages in the form of direct investment in Korea.

To promote the Korean manufacturing, services and high technology sectors to Australian investors, Korea should redress the inaccurate and outdated perceptions held by Australian business people. Korea’s core image in Australia is built on key perceptions developed through media reports of militant unions, corruption and political instability. Korea is also regarded as a country with a lack of transparency in business operation, inefficient corporate governance, complicated regulatory processes and a lack of intellectual property rights protection. Products or technologies from a country with a poor image like Korea are perceived by foreign consumers to be lower in quality than products made elsewhere. Korea has also been perceived as a newly industrialising country that produces mainly labour-intensive consumer goods and low-quality automobiles – not an industrially advanced country with sources of technology and technical expertise.

To capitalise on its ownership advantages in Korea, Australia will need to redress the outdated and inaccurate perceptions prevalent in Korea that Australia is a ‘fun in the sun’ nation of beach-goers – rather than an industrially advanced country with important sources of technology and technical expertise. Australia lacks a high technology profile. As Korea moves toward a knowledge-based economy, it vigorously searches for foreign technologies and foreign investment that incorporate advanced technologies. Korea also seeks to widen its international cooperation in science and technology with advanced countries such as the United States, Japan and countries in the EU. In searching for advanced technologies or technology cooperation, Korea would not be inclined to choose Australia first given the poor image of Australia and Australia’s poor profile in high technology.

Australia’s ownership advantages appear to exist in down-stream activities out of the value-chain, which are closer to the ultimate consumers. Australia should search for niche areas in down-stream activities related to Australia’s comparative advantages and exports such as warehouses, food distribution system, information and communications, biotechnology, environmental technology, the services sector and professional activities. Australia’s major manufactured export item is automotive components. Taking advantage of its advantage in automotive components, Australia should seek to invest in niche areas in Korean automobile parts manufacturers.

Multiple approaches should be undertaken simultaneously in order to improve Australia’s high technology profile. Australian firms should establish a presence in Korea and strive persistently to improve their profile of expertise and technology. At the same time, Australia should undertake awareness programs for Australian audiences about the various location advantages held by Korea and for Korean audiences about ownership advantages in Australia. To this end, the two countries should establish forums for discussion to exchange ideas and expertise in the area of knowledge-based industries on a continual and regular basis at the government, academic and business levels. Australia and Korea should also establish an organisation or a networking system through which exchanges of people – researchers, educators and policy advisors - will be undertaken. It should be added that as a long-term approach Australia should improve the profile of its tertiary education system. Koreans in general do not think highly of the Australian tertiary education system as comparable to that of the United States or Japan in terms of high technology (Kwon and Park 2000). Overseas perception of the tertiary education
system of a country will have an important bearing on that country’s technology profile intentionally.

4. Concluding Remarks

Bilateral trade between Australia and Korea has increased by leaps and bounds from the 1970s through 1990s, because of economic complementarity based primarily on the differences between these nations in resource endowments. The bilateral trade has been accelerated by Korea’s development strategy for heavy and chemical industries. As a result, the two countries have become important trade partners. The bilateral trade relationship based on the existing characteristics of comparative advantages could, however, pose serious challenges to both countries over time. In response to internal and external pressures, the two countries are striving to develop knowledge-based economies. These changes in their respective industrial structures and national economic strategies will change the comparative advantage these two countries currently have and dilute their economic complementarity. As the Korean economy matures to a knowledge-based economy, its demand for imports of primary products from Australia is bound to decline. Both countries seek to expand their exports of knowledge-based products in conjunction with their new industrial strategies.

For Australia and Korea to cope with domestic structural changes and to ensure continued success with the future bilateral trade and economic relationship, it is imperative to explore new approaches. To this end, the present paper has investigated the feasibility and potential benefits of a free trade agreement between Australia and Korea (KAFTA), and explored ways to expand two-way investment flows.

International enthusiasm for regional FTA has been rising particularly since the debacle of the 1999 WTO talks in Seattle. Numerous countries have engaged in regional or bilateral trade agreements as a way of securing their foreign markets, minimising trade disputes, and at the same time enhancing their national competitiveness. In this context, Australian Prime Minister John Howard proposed a free trade agreement between Australia and Korea when he visited Korea in May 2000.

Korea has changed its policy toward regional trade agreements. It has not pursued FTAs until recently and is one of the few countries in the world with no regional trade agreement. The experience of financial crisis in 1997 as well as the marginalised multilateralism have led Korea to shift its economic policy paradigm and embark on pursuing free trade relations with a number of countries. Through establishing FTAs, Korea seeks to improve investment relations and political partnership as well as trade relations. By forming an FTA with Australia, Korea would attempt to surmount existing tariff and non-tariff barriers in Australia, and to secure suppliers of Australian mineral and agricultural products. Korea also seeks to attract Australian investment, particularly in the services sector.

Australia has also actively been pursuing FTAs with a number of countries in order to gain maximum short-term trade advantages and to capture strategic advantages. Given that Korea has been negotiating FTAs with a number of countries including the United States, by forming an FTA with Korea Australia would attempt to secure the existing Korean market for its traditional exports, to surmount non-tariff barriers, and to establish a foothold in Northeast Asia. Australia would also seek to penetrate the Korean services sector through an FTA. However, a Korea-Australia free trade agreement has not been analysed by either country since its proposal by the
Australian Prime Minister. Hence, part of the purpose of this paper is to analyse the prospect of a KAFTA and assess its potential gains for the two countries using the technique of revealed comparative advantages based on the three-digit SITC level of products for year 1995 and 1998.

Empirical results quantitatively identify the complementarities of the Australian and Korean economies at a detailed product level. The high degree of complementarity implies strong potential for mutual benefits from a KAFTA. It is also found that the extent of competition between the two economies in the world market is quite limited. This implies low opportunities for intra-industry trade creation. Thus, under the existing industrial and trade structures of the two economies, a KAFTA is unlikely to generate much intra-industry trade in the knowledge-based industries, which the two economies are currently attempting to advance through bilateral trade. In particular, the Australian industrial structure has not been broadly diversified to take advantage of opportunities arising from the Korean knowledge-based sector.

The major stumbling block to the formation of a KAFTA is the Korean agricultural sector. Although Korean agriculture is inefficient and declining, the Korea government attempts to maintain the viability of the agricultural sector and rural communities to alleviate and prevent further social problems in urban areas arising from internal migration. Rice remains the dominant crop for Korean agriculture as the staple food in the Korean diet, but livestock products, fruit and vegetables are gaining importance. Koreans continue to regard secure provision of food staples using domestic resources as important for national security. It is thus difficult to envisage that Korea will agree to a KAFTA at the present time. Negotiations for a KAFTA would therefore require dexterous approaches.

Recognising that a KAFTA is unlikely to be formulated in the near future, investment relations between Australia and Korea were analysed to explore ways to promote them. Unlike the dynamic trade relationship between Australia and Korea, two-way investment relations have been lacklustre. In particular, Australian FDI in Korea has been meagre for a number of reasons. Prevailing perceptions held by Australian investors are that Korea lacks location advantages, and is a difficult place in which to do business due to extensive regulations and complex administrative processes. At the same time, Australia’s preference for western countries over Korea as an investment target country has been strong. Also, Australian companies lack ownership advantage with which to invest in Korea. The Australian manufacturing sector has been under government protection over time, which has weakened its international competitiveness.

The business environment has changed both in Korea and Australia. After the 1997 crisis, Korea has shifted its policy on incoming FDI from restriction and control to promotion and assistance. The Korean services sector in which Australia has ownership advantage has been liberalised for incoming FDI. In order to promote Australian FDI in Korea, concerted efforts are required of both Korea and Australia. Both countries should redress their inaccurate or dated mutual perceptions, with promotional activities to enlighten each other about their location and ownership advantages particularly in the areas of knowledge-based industries. This will improve the high technology profiles of the two countries. These tasks require establishment of an organisation or networking system, funded by both governments, to provide a forum for discussion of ideas and expertise and exchanges of people – researchers, educators and policy makers, so that present and future opportunities can be identified and realised for mutual benefit.
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Cultural politics or cultural contradiction?
Prejudice against shamanism in Korean society

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Introduction

This paper is concerned with the origins of prejudice against shamanism in Korean society. To explain the widespread prejudice, cultural politics have often been employed. In many existing studies, the prejudice is explained as a result of the cultural politics between Confucianism and shamanism. There is no doubt that the framework of cultural politics is helpful in understanding some aspects of the prejudice against shamanism. However, within this framework of cultural politics, the origin of the prejudice remains, mostly outside shamanism, and is to be found in other ideologies. It is noteworthy that shamanism has been continuously suppressed despite the change of ruling ideologies throughout Korean history. Shamanism has never been welcome, but always despised, no matter what Koreans took as their ruling ideology in different periods. Why has shamanism always been oppressed in Korean society regardless of the change of the ruling ideology?

Rather than examining the cultural politics between shamanism and various dominant ideologies, I look into a problem which is, I think, much more fundamentally embedded in the suppressions. This is the cultural contradiction of shamanism in the Korean cultural system. In many studies of Korean shamanism, this problem is not properly examined, but overlooked, mainly because their informants are, primarily, shamans, who are the main supporters of shamanism, even though they share many of the negative attitudes of other Koreans. To understand the logic behind the prejudice, we need to listen more closely to the voices of ordinary Koreans. My analysis is particularly focused on ordinary Korean women, showing how their opinions about shamanism differ from those of female shamans, even though both parties are Korean women. I exemplify the cultural contradiction surrounding shamanism with the case of a Korean woman's prejudice against shamanism.
The literature on Korean shamanism has consistently reported the negative connotations associated with shamans and their practice. In Korean literature, the shaman is described as a greedy, calculating charlatan, who callously exploits the sufferings of her clients and manipulates their credulity and trust for her own selfish gain... The mudang is portrayed as a greedy, selfish, insensitive charlatan. (Wilson 1983: 115-126)

Even a Korean scholar of folklore argues that “since shamanism is regarded as superstition, Koreans do not consider it a religion” (C-K Chang 1982: 60, quoted in Howard 1990: 160). Also, criticising the current use of shamanic practice, a well-known professor Dong-Kil Kim pleads to the public in a newspaper column, “Let’s not go backward!” (Hanguk Ilbo, 2nd February 1984). An anthropologist Kendall also reports that the shaman is disdained in Korean society “as a neurotic at best, a charlatan at worst” (1983: 107). In traditional Korea, shamanic practice was referred to as a “matter of malignance (heungakjisa)” (T-S Yu 1983: 48).

Indeed, many anthropologists have commented on negative opinions toward shamanism in Korea. Their explanations have, however, mostly focused on the cultural politics between Confucianism and shamanism from the 15th century onwards (e.g. Harvey 1979, 1980; Kendall 1984, 1985; Kendall and Dix 1987; Kendall and Peterson 1983; Sered 1994; Wilson 1983). The following statement is typical:

… the Yi government represented the political triumph of neo-Confucianism... Its exponents immediately launched a comprehensive, national program of social reform in which shamans and shamanistic cults were quickly identified as foremost targets of attack... Since the fall of the Yi Dynasty in 1910, subsequent governments, including the present one [1980], have continued the traditional policy of persecuting shamans to some degree. Thus, shamans and their families continue to suffer the ostracism directed against outcastes in Korea. (Harvey 1980: 42-3).

In fact, cultural politics has often been employed to explain the suppression of shamanism not only in the study of Korean shamanism (Harvey 1979; Kendall 1985; 1996d; S-N Kim 1989), but also in the study of other “shamanisms” (e.g. Thomas and Humphrey 1994; Tsing 1993). Some authors, like Wilson, see the Confucian opposition to shamanism as motivated primarily by gender issues, and the negative attitudes to shamans as being an extension of the Confucian dismissal of women as inferior beings:

The negative stereotypes of mudang [Korean shaman] are the combined product of centuries of systematic oppression of mudang and of women’s powerlessness in traditional Korean society. ... The stereotype of mudang as ignorant, irrational, perverse creatures is but an extension of the Confucian stereotype for all Korean women. (Wilson 1983: 126, italics in original)

Can these arguments about cultural and gender politics really explain the widespread prejudice against shamanism in Korea today? I start with the question of the Confucian suppression of shamanism.
There is no doubt that there was active suppression of shamanism during the Yi Dynasty, 1392-1910, when Confucianism was the ruling ideology. In the Yi Dynasty, anybody involved in supporting shamanic practice was supposed to be punished with a hundred lashes in public according to *Gyeonggukdaejeon*, the Dynasty’s law book (see G-H Park 1989: 46). Although the punishment was not implemented as strictly as it was supposed to be, it indicates the severity of the suppression at that time. Even ten lashes often killed a strong man.

However, Confucianism has been remarkably weakened in recent Korean society where it is hardly more than a superficial cultural survival. A national survey taken in 1983 shows that “only 0.5% of the 43% of the entire self-declared religious population admitted being Confucian. … Confucianism lost its role as the provider of the leading ideology of the Korean society” (S-H Kim 1988: 5). The most rapidly growing ideology in contemporary Korea is Christianity (see A. Kim 1995). It can be said that contemporary Korea is dominated by Christianity. “Of all the non-Western nations, Korea is the most successfully Christianized” (Y-H Yoon 1992: 9). Considering the current balance of power between religious groups in contemporary Korea, it is hardly believable that Confucianism is the main source for the omnipresent prejudice towards shamanism.

This fact can be confirmed from the comments of the well-known Korean shaman Kum-Hwa Kim (see C-H Kim 2001, Chapter 6, for her details). She never spoke to me of being treated badly by Confucians, but she has often complained about Christians. For example, she said to me,

One night in 1993, when we [her kut team members] were performing a kut ritual in a mountain near Seoul, forty or so Christians interrupted us. They surrounded us closely with fire sticks in their hands. It was a really scary situation. Shouting, “Go away, Satans!”, they drew a cross on our backs with red paint and even on the head of the pig we were using for the ritual. Because they outnumbered us so much, we had no choice but to bear the humiliation.

I myself witnessed an attack made by a Christian woman against Kim in 1991, when the shaman ran an office in Seoul. In order to attract more clients, the office was positioned in the main road nearby a subway station, with a large wooden plate in its front saying, “*Ingan Munhwajae 82-Na Ho Kim Kum Hwa Musok Yeongsusoo*” (National Living Treasure No. 82-B Kum-Hwa Kim’s Research Institute of Shamanism). Consequently, subway passengers could easily identify the place as a shaman’s office. It had three rooms: a waiting room, a consultation room and a kitchen. I was talking with Kim while sitting on the leather lounge in the waiting room when a woman brashly opened the door. I looked up at her. She looked to be in her late 40s and held a Bible in her hand. Without saying hello, she just shouted at us, “Go away, Satan! Repent your sins!” And then the Christian woman disappeared, shutting the door with a bang. When she had gone, the shaman Kim clicked her tongue and said to me, “You were frightened? But it is nothing to me. I’ve experienced this sort of thing many times. Now I am immunised.”

I would argue that, in contemporary Korea, Christianity is far more effective than Confucianism in producing prejudice against shamanism. However, despite the above
assertions, I do not suggest that Christianity, rather than Confucianism, should be regarded as the main origin of the prejudice against shamanism found in Korea.

However, within this framework of cultural politics, the origin of the suppression remains, mostly, outside shamanism, and is to be found in other ideologies. However, is it really sufficient to argue that the accusations against shamans by the Korean government at that time were totally baseless, or merely an expression of Confucian hostility to women, even though they were commonplace in that period? In the early 20th Century, Western Christian missionaries brought another ideology to Korean society. In that case, do we have to change our direction for the origin of the suppression of shamanism and argue instead that “the negative image of Korean shamanism originated from the Western colonialism” (S-N Kim 1989: 213)? Why should it always be the dominant ideology which takes the prime responsibility for the suppressions? Can shamanism itself really have nothing to do with the origin of the suppressions?

*Cultural Contradiction*

It is noteworthy that shamanism has been continuously suppressed despite the change of ruling ideologies throughout Korean history. Shamanism has never been welcome, but always despised, no matter what Koreans took as their ruling ideology in different periods: Confucianism in the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), Japanese Colonialism (1910-1945), and modernism and Christianity in recent Korea.

I am not discussing ancient Korean societies, such as the Bronze Age, the Three Kingdom period, and the Silla and Goryeo Dynasties, because the historical documents available are not sufficient for a proper discussion. It was 1927 when a Korean scholar Neung-Hwa Yi suggested in his article, "Chosun musokgo" (A study of Korean shamanism), that shamanism be regarded as the archetype of Korean thought, and that the kings of ancient Korean societies had been shamans (N-H Yi 1927). His suggestion is understandable in terms of his position in the Korean society of the 1920s. At that time, Korea was a Japanese colony, and he was a pioneer of Korean nationalism. The journal in which his article was published was Gyemyeong (Enlightenment). A well-known Korean historian and folklorist, Suk-Jae Yim, has been very critical of Yi, arguing that the historical materials referred to by Yi were too weak to be evidence for the connection between shamanism and ancient religions (S-J Yim 1970 and 1971). Actually, the first historical document in which mu, the Korean term for shaman, appears is Yisanggugjip, written in the 12th Century (I-H Kim 1987: 30). I agree with Yim. It is hard to find any historical evidence that the kings of ancient Korean society used communication with the spirit world or performed shamanic rituals like those of present-day Korean shamans. In any case, it is not rare to find social sanctions against shamans and their clients even in historical documents about Goryeo Dynasty (see G-H Park 1989b; T-S Yu 1975).

“The survival of shamanism in Korea is a kind of miracle: shamans have been beset and harassed for centuries. War has been waged on their ceremonies, and grim persecution has alternated with sheer contempt” (Zolla 1985: 101). In terms of the degree of oppression on shamanism, there has been no big difference between the regimes in Korean history:

[In] the neo-Confucian government of Yi Dynasty throughout its long reign … shamans were designated ch’omin (“outcasts”) by government decree …
During their period of colonization in Korea (1910-1945), the Japanese continued the policy of persecuting shamans … The present Korean government has mounted a renewed campaign to eradicate shamanism from Korea. Police raids on shamanistic ceremonies are a commonplace occurrence. (Harvey 1979: 10-11)

Why has shamanism always been oppressed in Korean society regardless of the change of the ruling ideology? Why has the relationship between shamanism and state power been so bad, no matter what the ideology of the state? Is it because shamanism is indigenous to Korea, or a form of “popular culture” (gicheung munwha; daejung munwha) in Korean society, as assumed by many scholars (e.g. S-N Kim 1989; H-Y Cho 1984, 1987, 1990; G-H Ju 1992; I-H Kim 1987; T-G Kim 1989d and 1993)? In that case, how can we explain the suppression of shamanism implemented by the Park regime, 1961-1979, even though it strongly promoted nationalism? During that period, “People would come knocking on our doors, crying, ‘stamp out superstition’ and then they’d take our equipment and burn it. I don't know how many times they dragged me away. ... Some people understood but others would report us to the police”, as the shaman Kum-Hwa Kim recalls (quoted in S-N Yi, 1992: 52-53). It is hard to believe that the government suppressed shamanism without any support from the common people, or in total opposition to their views.

Rather than the cultural politics between shamanism and various dominant ideologies, I shall look into a problem which is, I think, much more fundamentally embedded in the suppressions. This is the cultural contradiction of shamanism in the Korean cultural system. In many studies of Korean shamanism, this problem is not properly examined, but overlooked, mainly because their informants are, mostly, shamans, who are the main supporters of shamanism, even though they share many of the negative attitudes of other Koreans. While shamanism is stigmatised as superstition in Korean society, where “Koreans clearly regard shamans and their families as social deviants—as outcasts” (Harvey 1976: 5), existing studies are mainly focused on shamans and their arguments. The shaman-centred studies are ultimately incapable of understanding the cultural paradox of shamanism, since that paradox itself clearly indicates that shamans and their clients interact in a cultural environment where shamanism is not reconcilable to the dominant culture.

A significant aspect of Korean shamanism is that it is dominated by women. Most Korean shamans are women, and their clients are mostly women too. Women conduct kut or Korean shamanic ritual, and most of the participants are women. This characteristic of Korean shamanism, i.e. the dominance of women, has been highlighted in many studies (Harvey 1979, 1980; Kendall 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988a, 1989; Kendall and Dix 1987; Kendall and Peterson 1983; S-Y Yoon 1977). However, it is too naïve to assume that all Korean women are enthusiastic about shamanism. Throughout my fieldwork in 1995, I met numerous Korean women who said that they had never been in favour of shamanism. While some women had become involved in shamanism, the negative opinion towards shamanism was also commonly found among Korean women. As evidence of my assertion, I shall introduce a Korean woman, whose prejudice against shamanism I found very striking. She was the first landlady during my fieldwork in 1995 in Soy, a rural area of Korea.
It can be said that Gilsu’s Mother was an ordinary Korean woman in Soy. She was thirty-nine years old, and born in Soy, where she had had a primary school education only, like most of the Soy women of her age. She worked on the farm with her husband and three children and her mother-in-law, just like most of her neighbours. She had never left Soy for long. Her income was similar to that of most of her neighbours. And she did not have any special experiences which might have led her to be hostile to shamanic practices. The only thing in her experience, as far as I know, which differed from her neighbours was her participation in a health project as a village health worker in 1986-1988, during which time I had worked with her as an anthropologist. However, I do not think that the project made a big impact on her life. As far as I knew, the main reason why she participated in the project was the payment she received when she attended a project meeting. I had lived at her place for three months during 1987. When I returned to Soy for fieldwork in 1995, I decided to stay at her place again because she was the most familiar person to me in the village.

In the first phase of my fieldwork, she gave me a big welcome and offered me plenty of support for my research. She allowed me to stay at her place and did not hesitate to give her permission for my tape-recording. Tape-recording was not new to her, since I had used a tape-recorder when working with her seven years before. With her assistance, I was able to reintroduce myself to most of the villagers, whose memories of me had become dim, since I had been away for a long time. She did not hesitate to answer my questions about her neighbours. It seemed to me that she thought of my research as similar to the previous time, even though I told her that my research was much more focused on shamanism this time than before.

She seemed to regard me as a helpful person in several ways. First, my boarding fee was significant for a peasant who did not have any income during the winter. One of the main concerns of the village women about me during the first month of my fieldwork was how much I paid for board per month. Another reason was her children's education. She often asked my advice about how to get a high score in the university entrance examination. Gilsu, her eldest son, was about to take the examination. Most Korean housewives were concerned about their children's education, and she was no exception. Furthermore, both Gilsu’s Mother and Father were keen to get information from me about the world outside.

However, after a couple of weeks had passed, she began to turn her back on me. Whenever I asked about her neighbours, she ignored my questions. She said, “I don’t feel very comfortable telling you about your neighbours’ family affairs. Also, I don’t really understand why you are studying such a nasty thing. Do you really think that shamans can cure patients? I have never seen a patient who got well through a kut. Isn’t it just superstition?” She seemed to be getting more doubtful about my research. I found that she tried to listen to me transcribing tapes through the wall between her kitchen and my room. At that time I did not have an earphone. I turned the volume down as low as possible, but the wall was not sound-proof. Her neighbours peeped into my room to see what I was doing. They often stopped talking when I came in. I began to feel something was going wrong with my fieldwork. As I feared, one day she told me, looking serious, “My neighbours are saying that you are a spy!” This happened about twenty days after I began to stay at her place.
I was shocked. For me as a fieldworker in Korea, where the Cold War ideology was still vigorous, that was a really dangerous sign. My fieldwork was becoming really difficult at that point. Not only a tape-recorder but even a notebook was hard to use in the presence of my informants. When I took out a notebook and wrote something down in it, Pyongil's Grandmother cast a suspicious glimpse at me and said, “What are you writing down?” I lost confidence in continuing my research in the village. At last, Gilsu’s Mother informed me that she could not feed me any more because she had got a job in a factory. What this meant was that she did not want me to stay at her place any more. When I asked her to help me find another house where I could stay, she replied, “Is it necessary for you to stay in my village?” That meant that she wanted me to leave the village. I had to find a new place by myself. My new landlady was Chisun’s Grandmother, whose house was next but two to Gilsu’s Mother's.

However, the job in a factory was not a real reason but a mere excuse. Gilsu’s Mother kept the job for only one week. She was on casual work to replace her friend, Eunsun’s Mother, who was on holiday. I realised what the reason really was a month later when I came across her on a road in the village. She said to me sarcastically,

How are you? Is your research going well? I am sure you feel much better with Chisun’s Grandmother. She likes superstition a lot, doesn't she? You’ve got lots from her, huh? She must be a good assistant for your research. But we are not fond of that sort of superstition. … Even though she does not like to pay medical insurance, she doesn't mind paying for a shaman. Is the shaman better than the medical doctor? Funny! How silly she is!

Gildsu's Mother seemed to be criticising not only Chisun’s Grandmother but also my research. There were no talismans (bujeok) in Gilsu’s Mother's house. This meant that she did not go to practitioners of “superstition” such as shamans. In most cases, a talisman indicated the utilisation of a shaman. As far as I could tell, every housewife who had used a shaman had one or more talismans on their walls. Providing talismans was also regarded by shamans as an important part of their work. Chisun’s Grandmother got seven talismans from Soh Bosal three days after the shaman had conducted a kut for her. By contrast, Soy Christians never put talismans on their walls. They were very strict about not having any talismans. However, some villagers did not have talismans in their houses even though they were not Christian. Gilsu’s Mother was one of these. I never saw her going to the Soy church, which was about 600 metres away from her place. When I said to her that I could not find any talismans in her place, she replied,

They’re useless. I don't believe that a talisman can do anything. When one of my friends, Yongik's Mother, bought an expensive talisman for her son who was about to have a university entrance exam last year, I thought she was silly. Yongik failed the exam despite the talisman. If I had the money to purchase talismans for my children, I would spend it on private tuition instead. I have never had a talisman.

I never heard Gilsu’s Mother using the term mansin or bosal when she referred to a shaman. These terms are less derogatory than mudang in the Korean language. However, Gilsu’s Mother called Soh Bosal “Big Village Mudang”. Soh Bosal lived in Big Village, next to Willow Village where Gilsu’s Mother lived. She had never
visited Soh Bosal's house, even though it was only 150 metres away. I had never noticed Gilsu’s Mother talking with Soh Bosal. When they encountered each other, they just passed without saying hello. Gilsu's Mother said to me, “I know her, but I have nothing to do with her. I can never understand why people visit her. She doesn’t help us.” Gilsu’s Mother also said,

I don’t understand why some people seek treatment from shamans. They should go to hospital. A shaman does not show us any visible evidence like an X-ray film. How do we know whether a shaman deceives us or not? Superstition is quite tricky. I think that the *kut* is a very expensive imposture, and the shaman is a swindler.

In fact, Soh Bosal was entirely excluded from the Soy community, suffering from the stigma imposed on her as a shaman. She recalled,

When I moved into Soy seven years ago, few people welcomed me. Everything was hard. Anse's Grandmother, who was the leader of the Association of Female Villagers (*Maeul Bunyeohoe*) at that time, was especially bad to me. When I appeared, she whispered to her friends, “A swindler is coming!” I learnt about it later.

During my stay in Soy, Soh Bosal did not play any leading role in the Soy women’s community. Her role was restricted to shamanic practice. Actually, she herself was not interested in other forms of ritual such as *chesa*, the ancestor worship ritual commonly held in almost every household, and *tongche*, the village’s annual ritual. They were conducted by ordinary men and women, as reported by many existing studies (e.g. C-M Kim 1993; K-K Lee 1977, 1985).

With Gilsu’s Mother, who had shown such strong prejudice, it was not easy for me to build up a good rapport again. She always kept her distance from me and did not show me any friendship. It was obvious to me that she gossiped with her village friends about my research. I was very concerned about her because she could endanger my project severely.

A few months after I moved out from her place, I had an opportunity to give Gilsu’s Mother a ride to a hospital where her mother was hospitalised. I was very happy that the occasion came up, because she had not liked to ride in my car before. Even though I often offered her a free ride, she did not seem to feel comfortable. But on that occasion she wanted to deliver a heavy box to her sister-in-law who lived in the central township, and she asked me to help her with this job. Also, it was time for her daughter to go to school. She sat with her daughter in the back seat. It took about twenty minutes to get to the central township from the village. She seemed to have very complicated feelings towards me as I drove the car: both grateful and cynical. She spoke to the back of my head from the back seat,

I’m sorry, but I really don’t understand why you are studying superstition. It’s been many weeks since you began studying superstition here. Can you tell me about any patient who has really recovered after a *kut*? I have never seen a patient who got better through *kut* ritual treatment. Muno’s a good example. His illness is getting worse even though his mother has held three or four *kut* rituals for him. Why are you studying such a nasty thing? How can a patient get better without the proper medical treatment? You have said that your university is supporting your research, but I am afraid that you are wasting
time and money. Thank you for the lift anyway, but I really can't understand your research.

I had a glimpse of her in the car's rear mirror. She was talking like a judge, but I could feel that she was trying to understand me, even though she had not changed her negative attitude about my research. Sometimes I felt sorry for her, because my fieldwork interrupted her life. I must have been a great burden to her, since she had tried to get me to leave her village. It seemed to me that my research was a mystery and a source of confusion to her. She had a common sense view about shamanism, just like other ordinary Korean women.

"The Shaman Department of Seoul National University"

There was a moment when she began to show her friendship to me again. From late spring I gave a hand to my neighbours in their agricultural work. I spent one or two hours on this job every morning instead of other exercise. Even though this job took all day long, sometimes, because it was hard to leave in the middle of work, it was very helpful for me to get a good rapport with them. It seemed to me that the co-operative work and sweat created a feeling of community. Everybody welcomed a free hand. Actually agricultural work was quite boring for them, as sometimes they worked alone for a long time in the fields. They often said, "Even a bit of encouragement helps with this boring job." Gilsu's Mother was no exception. She welcomed me whenever I came to give a hand. One morning I helped her to plant sesame in her dry field, which was quite big. Gilsu's Father was out at a casual job in a factory. After an hour's work, we had a break. It was a very sunny day. I was enjoying the soft and fresh morning breeze. Giving me a drink and some snacks, she asked me tentatively,

You graduated from the Seoul National University, didn't you? Does the Seoul National University have a shaman department? I don't know what sort of departments the university has, but you must have graduated from the Shaman Department of Seoul National University. Am I right?

I could not help laughing. The Shaman Department of Seoul National University? What a puzzling idea! It must have come to her mind as a result of her long struggle to understand my research on shamanism. How hard my research topic was for her to understand!

Let us explore further this question of the "Shaman Department of Seoul National University." As far as I know, every Korean regards the Seoul National University as the best university in Korea, and almost every high school student is keen to be a student there. The Seoul National University is a symbol of success in contemporary Korea. The University's graduates occupy a large proportion of dominant positions such as government ministers, company presidents, professors and so on. While the Seoul National University is a symbol of success, the shaman is a symbol of misfortune in Korean society. No Korean wants to become a shaman. There are plenty of interviews in which many different shamans confess that they never wanted to become shamans (e.g. C. Choi 1987; J-Y Hahm 1993; Harvey 1979; Howard 1990; R-S Hwang 1986 and 1988; Kendall 1988a and 1996a; S-N Kim 1989; T-K Kim 1988; H-J Park 1992; Sun 1992; C-H Yi 1993). Harvey describes this matter well:
Still, Deaconess Chang resisted, thinking she preferred death to being a mudang. (Harvey 1979: 221).

I have never met or heard a Korean shaman who did not have experiences of misfortune before becoming a shaman. Misfortune experiences are one of the most essential prerequisites for becoming a shaman. In these contexts, “The Shaman Department of Seoul National University” was composed of two contradictory symbols: success and misfortune. It was an invention of a Korean woman trying to understand my research on shamanism, which involved these two contradictory symbols. I did not think that I was a very successful person in terms of my social position, but Gilsu’s Mother did, as I was a graduate of Seoul National University. She seemed to think that I had no need to be involved in shamanism, with which only people of misfortune would get involved. She often said, “How happy I would be if Gilsu got in to Seoul National University!” However, she never said, “How happy I would be if I were to hold a shamanic ritual at my place!”

Concluding Remarks
What I have tried to do in this paper is to show how ordinary Koreans feel about shamanism and about the contexts in which they may be forced to make use of it. The material I have presented supports my suggestion that the prejudice against shamanism which is commonly found in Korean society mainly originates from the cultural contradiction surrounding shamanism in the Korean cultural system, rather than from the cultural politics between shamanism and dominant ideologies such as Confucianism and Christianity. This cultural contradiction explains why shamanism has been suppressed in Korean society regardless of the change of its ruling ideologies. Because of the cultural contradiction, shamanism is still seriously stigmatised and its validity is denied by Koreans. I argue that shamanism has a contradictory position within the Korean cultural system, and that this cultural contradiction is the main origin of prejudices against shamanism found in Korean society. From this perspective, I do not think that shamanism is a form of popular culture.

References


After the “third wave” of democratization that swept Pacific Asia as well as other parts of the world, it became an issue: What is the likely shape of democracy in Asia? Under authoritarian regime, democracy was assumed to be something that everyone but a handful of top elites eager to have. However, after the authoritarian leaders were dethroned and after democracy became something they have to construct rather than to strive for, the emerging fledgling democracy seems to make intellectuals ponder on concrete workable models of democracy (Bell et al. 1995). As social scientists in this region discovered their political system different from Western representative democracy, the issues of universality and particularity of democracy emerge; some people argue for universal values that flow through West and Asia (Donnelly 1999; Inoue 1999; Sen 1997); others point out irrelevancy of democratic institutions in Asia and support for authoritarian “Asian values” (Lee 1998; See also Chua 1999; De Bary 1998; Hsiung 1985; Kausikan 1998; Zakaria 1994). Supporting particularistic view of democracy, our study investigates social factors that can explain Korean democracy with more relevancy than general or relatively universal social forces that have been discovered and developed in the West. This does not mean that these factors do not have any influence on Korean democracy. We rather mean that we investigate more historically and culturally sensitive factors that can explain promotion or stagnation in South Korea on top of the relatively universal factors.

We locate those factors at cultural tradition of Korea. Democracy in the non-Western societies could be understood as a kind of transplanted set of institutions and beliefs from the West. However, obviously, it is different from scientific technology. Just like any other culture it has to be interpreted based upon prior cultural lenses. E.P. Thompson (1966) makes this point clear in his study of class consciousness of English workers. Just as class consciousness derives from interpretation of the new social reality based upon existing cultural tools, so democracy is interpreted based

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upon tradition. Thus, making of democracy is a target of this research. More recent studies also suggest the persistence of traditional values in economic and political institutions (Fukuyama 1995; Hamilton 1994; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Putnam 1993). Fukuyama puts an emphasis on the influence of tradition on the mode of contemporary social institution. He argues for the crucial role of the non-economic factors of wealth of a nation such as trust or social capital that has been built up several centuries. Putnam also shows close relations between the level of mature civil society in the past centuries and performance of contemporary democratic institution in Italy.

Among the cultural tradition this paper focuses on Confucian values as a part of “civil religion” (Tu 1996). Confucianism has been regarded as one of the central cultural traditions in Korea and East Asia (Berger 1988; De Bary 1998; Helgesen 1998; Huntington 1996; Kim 1992; Koh 1996; Robinson 1991; Tu 1996; Weber 1951; Yang 1999). These students present following characteristics of Confucian values -- positive attitude of the affairs of this world, a sustained life style of discipline and self-cultivation, respect for authority, familial collectivism. It is our position that despite the demise of institutionalized Confucianism and import of Western life styles and thoughts it still constitutes significant parts of habits of hearts of East Asians. Confucianism appears to endure East Asia across regional and ideological boundaries. In spite of Chinese Confucian bashing from the May Fourth movements in the early twentieth century to Mao’s cultural revolution, Confucianism still features itself as an embedded cultural code in the socialist country (De Bary 1998). Underneath its Marx-Leninist slogan in North Korea, there is Neo-Confucian idealism and emphasis on Confucian virtues, “benevolence love, trust, obedience, respect, reciprocity between leader and the led” (Cumings 1997: 407-8). Even in apparently Westernized corporations in South Korea, Confucian kinship networks works as a central ingredient of the organization (Kim 1992). We do not assess Confucianism as a high culture of Confucian thought, texts, nor as Confucian practices in traditional Korea. Rather, the Confucianism as a part of civic culture will be on target. In other words, what matters in this paper is the Confucian values that contemporary ordinary Koreans subscribe in their everyday lives.

We argue that Confucianism does not necessarily oppose political democracy but obstruct the progress of democratic social relations. Given that Confucianism is unlikely to promote democracy in general, we assume that still Confucian values have differential effect on democracy when the values are mixed with such social reality as urban experience and religious belief. We suppose some social groups are able to mix tradition and democratic norms with less internal conflict, or in more creative ways, than other.

Our arguments are to be justified below. Political democracy refers to Dahl’s definition of polyarchy that has seven attributes (1) elected officials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) the right to run for the office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative information; (7) associational autonomy (O’Donnell 1999). Democracy in social relations involves individual and collective rights guaranteed in various social relations such as in between hospitals and patients, universities and students, professionals and clients, parents, and children, etc. (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; See also Bobbio 1989).

Based upon hermeneutical standpoints on democracy and culture, we acknowledge the importance of the study of political culture (Almond and Verba 1962; Beer and Ulam 1958; Inglehart 1977, 1990). Previous studies on this issue highlight universal categories of political culture that is internationally or globally applicable. Inevitably
studies of political culture neglect a country specific factors that explain its own political trends. Even many Korean students of political culture fail to address Korean factors of political culture (Han and O 1987; Kim 1980; O 1992; Yi 1993).

Concerning particularity of Asian culture, current discourse of Asian values draw attention (Lee 1998; See also Chua 1999; De Bary 1998; Kausikan 1998; Zakaria 1994). The epicenter of the issue is Singapore and we cannot think about Asian values without Lee Kuan Yew (1998; De Bary 1998). Domestically, the values are emphasized for the cultural integration of multi-ethnic groups in Singapore. Although conservative, it was an attempt for Asian identity formation in the age of Western culture: It is an expression of pride of a nation that went to different road to modernization with rare economic prosperity especially even in the midst of Asian economic crisis. The political economic basis of the values is the combination of Fabian socialism plus Confucian collectivism (Chua 1999; Moody 1996). The very target of the supporters of Asian values is Western individualism that allegedly have generated all the downside of modernization, extreme individualism, i.e., disintegration of family, and rising crime rates (Zakaria 1994). For them the alternative is collectivism that put public good over individual interests. In this context, human rights are less relevant in Asia than in the West.

We suppose the fruit of the debates of Asian values is its emphasis on the endurance of tradition. If tradition is a reality, we have to talk about democracy confronting this reality rather than avoid it. However, we are critical of the core of current debates of Asian values. It may easily serve the idea of Authoritarianism. Even the proponents of particularity of “Asian power” denies the merits of this discourse outright, seeing it as legitimizing authoritarianism (Pye 1999: 140). Collective good is overemphasized, while human rights are invisible. Our position is at severing the existence of Asian values and valorization of them; this way, we believe that we can acknowledge Asian values as a working reality, avoiding being a authoritarian. Being particular does not necessarily mean authoritarianism. And the discourse of Asian values does not have to be monopolized by Lee Kuan Yew. It is open to liberals and left. If they join it could make difference. In the following section, we discuss the debates on the relationship between Confucianism and democracy.

Confucianism and Democracy

There are two conflicting perspectives on the relationship between Confucian tradition and democracy. A group of scholars (Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones, 1995; De Bary 1998; Kang, 1997; Shils, 1996) support compatibility between the two, and others view Confucianism basically authoritarian (Gold 1996; Huntington, 1995; King 1996). Huntington (1991) views Confucian democracy as an “oxymoron” because Confucianism emphasizes authority over liberty and responsibility over rights. He also argues that Confucianism is lack of the tradition of individual’s claim of rights against the state. More empirically oriented studies also fail to find the positive contribution of Confucianism to democracy and only differ on whether the tradition would endure or decline (Gold 1996; King 1996). These studies show that the development of civil society in Taiwan would proceed in combination with Confucian tradition or that the emergence of new social structure created by industrialization will replace “institutional Confucianism” that has passed on since Han dynasty.

On the contrary, a group of students believe the compatibility of Confucianism and democracy (Shils, 1996; Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones, 1995; De Bary 1998; Kang 1997). In his analysis of Analectic, Shils locates the virtue of civil society in the
Confucian concept of “civility.” Although Confucianism is lack of the concept of civil society itself, Shils maintains, Confucius was a forerunner of the idea of civil society. Civility does not only include etiquette and courtesy but concern for common good that involves “the acceptance by the individual self-consciousness of the dictation of the collective self-consciousness in which the individual participates that makes him act toward others in his society with selfless solicitude.” As main components of civility, Shils(1996) suggests trustworthiness, respect, flexibility, breadth, and tolerance that Confucius proposed. Neither Huntington nor Shils sees democratic potential in Confucian institutional arrangement but Shils differs in his insistence on sharable values between classical Confucian humanism and modern Western concept of civility and civil society(Tu 1996: 15).

Another group of East Asian students assert possibility of democracy in Confucian tradition(Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones, 1995). These students grapple with the fact that Pacific Asians do not seem to be motivated by liberal political ideas that stress individualism and autonomy. For them, what makes liberal democracy untenable is the legacy of state tutelage and middle class’s disinterests in democracy as well as “a political language deeply rooted in traditional non-liberal concepts of hierarchy, familism, and …the desirability of the harmonization of potentially conflicting interests”(Bell and Jayasuriya 1995: 15). We could say that this approach is about Asian values of democracy. But, evidently, it is different from Lee Kuan Yew’s(1998) authoritarian Asian values. These students properly attends to the difference in Asian values from the Western ones that may require different kind of justification of democracy from that in the West. The answer is “illiberal democracy.” These students argue that Asians’s hearts and mind would support democracy with the justification that democracy protects and promotes communitarian-including familial-ways of life.

Despite of their opposing positions, Both Shils and Huntington neglect the fact that Confucianism is a broad system of thought and how people decode Confucianism and democracy may be contingent upon the historical settings that they are in. When Huntington regards Confucian democracy as oxymoron, he simply points out the logical contradiction between the two principles. Few people deny that Confucian principles include authoritarian elements. But, it is one thing that Confucian thought has these elements, and how people decode Confucianism and integrate them into ways of every day lives is another. Shils highlights important aspect of Confucian thought that would give a cultural support to the promotion of civil society. Both in pre-Enlightenment Western and Asian thoughts, there are both authoritarian and democratic elements(Sen 1997); there may not be an essentially democratic or authoritarian culture. For this reason, survey analyses are required. We believe that there have been too many speculative debates with little empirical evidence.

We suggest to approach cultural tradition in a terrain of contested multiple cultures. We oppose the assumption about existence of Asian values as Parsonian dominant values. Both supporters and critiques of Confucian democracy values presuppose existence of one dominant set of values in Asia. The supporters tend to neglect the existence of contending values and the opponents tend to categorically deny the existence of Confucian values. The latter confound denial of dominance of Confucian values with that of the existence of that values themselves(Sen 1997; Kim 1997; Pye 1999); they also are too quick to stick to universalism instead of compromise between universalism and particularism(Donnelly 1999; Sen 1999). We suggest that both sides should pay heed to the existence of multiple values contending each other in Asia. In
other words, in an age of pluralistic cultural struggle, assumption of a single monolithic value is untenable. However, in South Korea, Western values such as Postmaterialism, Christianity, and liberal culture of new middle class as well as traditional culture of Confucianism and Shamanism coexist. Thus, it would make more sense if they argued that Confucian culture might promote or obstruct democracy but that is not single dominant dynamic of political culture; there is no guarantee that final product of Asian political development would be illiberal democracy or “soft authoritarianism.” We have to assume that Asian political culture is at highly contested terrain.

Including discourse of Asian values, the literature on Confucianism and democracy in general fail to distinguish political democratization from societal one. We think the distinction is useful because it is less obvious that Confucianism would contradict political democratization than societal democratization. We believe the studies of illiberal democracy bear important implication in that they raises the possibility of Asians’s support of democracy based upon a different roots. Influenced by these students we attempt to locate the different root of the democratic support. Current observations of political situation in South Korea lead us to suspect the hidden relationship between “delegative democracy” and Confucian values.

Compare current type of political democracy in South Korea with those in Latin American countries. It is certainly a democracy or polyarchy but different from representative democracy that relies on institutionalization, law, and negotiation and compromise among interest groups. In delegative democracy president has all the prerogatives and accountability. Confucian values may collide representative democracy but it could co-exist with delegative democracy because the latter seems to have quite an affinity with paternalistic political attitudes.

Cumings(1989) once mentions that O’Donnell’s discourse of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism have more relevant to South Korea and Argentina than to any other Latin American countries(See also Han 1988). After the authoritarian regime has gone, once again we are stunned by similar trajectories of democracy of both regions in O’Donnell’s observation. O’Donnell’s analyses of features of delegative democracy being so much fit to South Korea after 1997 that we cannot tell weather it is description about South Korea or Latin America.

Remember that the typical incumbent in a DD[delegative democracy] has won election by promising to save country without much cost to anyone, yet soon gambles fate of his government on policies that entail substantial costs for many parts of the population. This results in policymaking under conditions of despair: The shift from general popularity to wild vilification can be as rapid as it is dramatic(170).

There is salient resemblance between what following two paragraphs depict--what O’Donnell describes as characteristics of delegative democracy and what Pye states Korean political culture.

The president is taken to be the embodiment of the nation and main custodian and the definer of interests…The leader has to heal the nation by uniting its dispersed fragments into a harmonious whole…The president isolates himself from most political institutions and organized interests… (O’Donnell 1999: 164)
the Koreans also believe their difficulties can be traced to the inadequacies of the ultimate political authority, who should be able to handle all problems, as should the ideal father in the family...traditional attitudes that favor a strong, domineering style are very much alive...(Pye 1985: 216).

Confucian extended familism, or paternalism, find father figure at President whom people bestow all the power and expect to be next to God. Thus delegative democracy holds little point to conflict with Confucian values.

However, Confucianism and social democratization are at odds both in an intrinsic sense and in a certain historical context. Confucianism stresses hierarchy within various social relations, between a husband and wife, and parents and children, etc., which directly opposes to emphasis on nonhierarchical relations as a key elements of social democratization. The hierarchical attitudes are reproduced in the family of which members are emotionally tied but unequal. Furthermore, in East and South East Asian context, the familism became more apolitical under the historical experience of authoritarian rules. The message of authoritarian regimes’s vindictive way of dealing with opponents has been “stick to your own affairs(Bell 1995).” However, We have to ponder on whether there are intrinsic relations between familism and societal authoritarianism. American republicanism has tradition of both self-organization and family values. Habermas(1989) proposes the emergence of intimate human relations within “bourgeois family” as an essential infrastructure of public sphere.

Earlier we present contingent nature of traditions. The contradiction between Confucian values and societal democracy might be offset by other social forces such as urbanization, religion, and generation. What makes this argument more relevant is Lucian Pye’s(1985:216) observation of contradiction in Korean political culture in which deference to authority and claims to individual rights coexists;

Korean culture includes contradictory views of the basis of legitimacy. Traditional attitudes that favor a strong, domineering style of authority is very much alive; but highly educated Korean also believe in democratic ideals and the obligation of authority to respond to popular sentiments... Koreans create this problem for themselves by simultaneously wanting their leaders to be supermen and insisting, perhaps more than in any other Asian culture, that everyone has a right to assert his or her views and to be treated with respect.

Despite of the heavily hierarchical culture, there clearly exist social dynamics toward individual rights and democratic norms.

**Hypotheses**

Hypothesis I: *Confucianism does not have negative effects on political democracy.*

Confucianism may contradict liberal representative democracy that is not the only type of democracy. On the contrary, Confucian values have little conflict with delegative democracy in which Presidents have firm grips with every political decision like in South Korea or in some Latin American countries.

Hypothesis II: *Confucian values work negatively for the social democratization.*
Confucian emphases on hierarchy contradicts the principles of social democratization that aims to extend individual and groups rights and their more say in decision making processes.

Hypothesis III: Confucian values have differential effect on democracy according to level of urban experience and religion.

In the West, one of the key to the development of democracy was emergence of civil society that was created in urban context. Urban experience may orient individual toward associations that are not based upon bloodline but on ideals of a society. It may promote the idea of citizenship based upon egalitarian principles, reducing hierarchical and emotional kinships. As Huntington (1991:72-4) mentions Christianity has elements favorable to democracy; its stresses on dignity of individual contribute to democratic promotion. Besides, Protestantism may sever hierarchical familial relation and encourage the idea of egalitarian community (Weber 1951). Thus, Christianity can push Confucian values to be more compatible to democratic norms.

Data

A national multi stage probability sample of 1,003 men and women aged eighteen or older in South Korea was interviewed from May eighteenth to thirtieth 2000 with the sample chosen by the method of probability proportionate to size. When the designated interviewees deceased or moved they were substituted through random sampling. Korea Research Company conducted this survey.

This data include various measures of political culture and actions. Several variables from the World Value Survey are included. However, the emphases are on country specific variables such as Confucianism, Shamanism, and regional discrimination. Another distinctive feature of these data is their inclusion of measures of democracy at societal level.

Variables

Dependent Variables

In this research dependent variables are measures of political democracy and democracy in social relations. Adding standardized scores of three items that derived from factor analysis creates the measure of political democracy. Since the Eigen value of second factor is .296 and the second factor in varimax rotation does not make sense, we choose three items that have high loadings in the unrotated analysis as in Table 1.

Table 1. Factor Loadings for the Measures of Political Democracy and Democracy in Social Relations(Unrotated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor Loading</th>
<th>Eigen Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy creates economic difficulties.</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy is too polemic and indecisive.</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>1.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy makes keeping social order difficult.</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Democracy in Social Relations

Necessity of hierarchy in private or public institution. .386
It is natural that juniors use honorifics to their seniors and
seniors have more authority over juniors in high schools
and universities. .371
In order for social order there should be clear distinction of
seniorities. .353
If you are a boss how do you hire people? .969

Excluded items due to the low factor loadings are; (1) freedom for the anti-government
organizations, (2) rule by an strong leader who does not care congress or election, (3)
despite its problems, democracy is better than any political system. Democracy in
social relations is measured by adding standardized scores of four items appeared in
Table 1. We exclude items pertaining to feminist/patriarchal attitudes from the
measure of democracy in social relations due to its conceptual overlap with the
independent variable of Confucian values. These four items are derived from the
result of unrotated factor loadings in the Table 1. The Eigen Value for the first factor
is barely 1 and items in the second factor do not conceptually make sense. We choose
the four items having high loadings in the unrotated factor analysis.

Measures of Confucianism

These measures are created through factor analyses. As in Table 2, three
meaningful factors are discovered. Each factor appears to suggest patrilineal
consciousness, filial piety, and familism. Since filial piety is an ethics of human
relations in family and patrilineal consciousness pertains to order of perpetuation and
reproduction of family identity, all three factors involve Confucian emphasis on
family (Helgesen 1998). Despite the relatively low Eigen Value (.810), due to the
theoretical importance of familism, we decide to include this dimension of Confucian
values.

Table 2. Rotated Factor Loadings for the Measure of Confucianism (Varimax
Rotation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Patrilineal Consciousness</th>
<th>Filial Piety</th>
<th>Familism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When only single parent is alive, you should live with him/her even</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.867</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>after your marriage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even if both parents are alive, you should live with them after your</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.870</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marriage.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When parents are sick, children themselves should nurse them.</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rights of primogeniture should be kept.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You should have sons.</td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have to make sacrifice readily for your family.</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For the sake of family, you should never have divorce despite marital</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eigen Values 3.218 1.320 .810
Measure of Urban Experience

This variable is measured by the region where respondents have grown up. This variable is coded 1 if official metropolitan districts, 0 if other region. Seoul, Inchon, Taejon, Taegu, Pusan, Ulsan, and Kwangju are included in the urban area. Responses of “foreign countries” are treated as missing values.

Measure of Religion

This variable has 5 categories of religion such as Buddhist, Protestant, Catholic, other religion, and no religion. In the analyses, Buddhist is used as a reference category.

Control Variables

Education: Education is measured by seven categories based upon highest level of education that respondents have at the time of survey. The values of 1,2,3 are given to graduation from elementary, junior high, high schools respectively. The values of 4,5,6 are given to graduation from or enrollment in community colleges, colleges, and graduate schools respectively. Education is coded 7 if other. The 21 respondents who mark on other are treated as missing cases. The 21 respondents who mark on other are treated as missing cases and omitted. This variable is recoded 1 for the values of 1 and 2, 2 for the value of 3, 3 for the value of 4, and 4 for the value of 5 and 6. This recoding is based upon the results of regression of political democracy on dummy education variable that report almost all other categories have significantly positive effects over the reference category of 1.

Age: This variable is coded 1 if “20-29,” 2 if “30 to 39,” 3 if “40-49,” 4 if 50-59”, and 5 if “60 or older.” Since Koreans count ages differently from the Westerners, compared with Western criteria, they are actually younger than their responded age approximately by one and half years.

Measure of Sex

This variable is coded 1 if male, 0 female.

Results

We use ordinary least squares regression to predict the effects of Confucian values on democracy. Table 3 reports the results of Pearson zero-order correlation among the continuous variables of this research. It shows that political democracy and democracy in social relations each other have strong correlation of .716. While political democracy have little correlation with three factors of Confucian tradition, democracy in social relations have moderate negative correlation with Confucian tradition. There are positive correlations between age and two variables of Confucian values, patrilineal consciousness and familism, which indicates that younger generations are less likely to subscribe these two values. However, the low coefficient of filial piety with age(.011) implies enduring nature of this value across generations. The strong negative correlation between age and education suggests that younger generations tend to be much more educated than older counterpart.
Table 3. Correlation among Variables Used in the Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Democracy in Social Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Political democracy</td>
<td>.716</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Filial piety</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Patrilineal Family</td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.258</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.55</td>
<td>4.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Familism</td>
<td>.274</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>.267</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Age</td>
<td>-.230</td>
<td>-.094</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>-.313</td>
<td>-.281</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Education</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>-.460</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model 1 in Table 4 reports that Confucian values do not suppress political democracy. None of the coefficient of categories of Confucianism appears significant. On the contrary, Model 1 in Table 5 shows significant negative effects of filial piety, patrilineal consciousness, familism on democracy in social relations. Each of the two models supports Hypotheses I and II, respectively.

Table 4. OLS Coefficients for Regression of Political Democracy on Urbanization and Other Selected Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filial Piety</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrilineal Family</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.288</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
<td>.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edu</td>
<td>0.514**</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>0.536**</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Experience</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>.173</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>.170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.258</td>
<td>.214</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>.235</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Religion</td>
<td>-1.120+</td>
<td>.642</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>.067</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban*Filial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban*Son</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban*Family</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.095*</td>
<td>.512</td>
<td>-0.809+</td>
<td>.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R</td>
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<td>.050</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>.049</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>894</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

+P<.10  *P<.05.  **P<.01.

Table 5. OLS Coefficients for Regression of Democracy in Social Relations on Urbanization and Other Selected Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Filial Piety</td>
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<td>Patrilineal Family</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>894</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+P<.10  *P<.05.  **P<.01.
Hypothesis III is not supported as strongly as I and II. Tables 4 through 6 report many cases of insignificant interaction terms between Confucian values and urbanization as well as between the former and religion. However, two interaction terms show significance. One of them is the interaction term of urban experience and familism in Model 4 on Table 5. For people having grown up in rural area versus in urban area, one unit increase in familism leads to .432 and .148 decrease in democracy in social relations respectively. This means that urban experience lessens the negative effects of familism on democracy in social relations. Table 6 includes interaction terms between religion and Confucian values with reference category of Buddhism. In this table, no interaction term holds significance except that of Protestant and patrilineal consciousness in Model 3. Being a Buddhist, one unit increase of patrilineal consciousness leads to .308 decrease in the dependent variable, while a Protestant have .022 decrease on average. This implies that Protestants are better able to mix democracy with Confucian values than Buddhists.

Table 6. OLS Coefficients for Regression of Democracy in Social Relations on Religion and Other Selected Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
<td>SE(b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 824

P<.10  *P<.05  **P<.01.
Discussion

This paper highlights the effects of cultural tradition on the democracy in South Korea. The results raise a question of practical relevance of Huntington’s argument of Confucian democracy as oxymoron. As far as political democracy is concerned, Confucian values turn out to be neutral. This implies that Confucian principle in the text is one thing and how people decode the principle in specific historical and cultural contexts is another. It may also support the argument for “illiberal democracy.” Huntington’s argument stands on tradition of liberal democracy but polyarchy in East Asia may go with strong state, low institutionalization, and concentration of power on President. This political situation corresponds to what O’Donnell(1999) mention delegative democracy.

Whereas most of research on Korean political culture and democracy limits to such globally applicable concepts as authoritarian, obedient, conformist attitudes, to Korean society, we attempt to apply culturally specific variables to the research on Korean democracy. We do not intend to show that Confucian values are exclusively unique to Korean society but that it is a relevant variable that we have to consider to enhance explanatory power of the political reality in the country.

Confucian values turn out to be obstacles to democratic practices in everyday life. Confucian emphases on hierarchies and neglect of public sphere outside of family should not work for the promotion of societal democracy. However, as mentioned above, it may not be an intrinsic nature of Confucian tradition. It may be what
happens in the transition to urban public social relations from rural familial order. Although, the evidence was not strong, this research shows that some combination of Confucian values and modern ways of social life, i.e. being brought up in urban area and being a Protestant, appear to lead to less conflict between the Confucian values and democracy in social relations. This has significant implication to the discourse of tradition and modernity. This finding suggests that East Asian tradition can be transformed to a less authoritarian direction without being extinct, coexisting with modern and Western values. We could also imagine new aspects of traditions may be articulated in their interactions with modern life styles and values. This articulation can be compatible with promotion of democracy. In this regard, this research may give a preliminary answer to Tu Wei-ming’s(1996:10) questions on “the role of tradition in modernity and the ways in which the modernization process may assume several different cultural forms.”

Because this research includes many attitudinal variables, it has problems of measurements. For the operationalization of political democracy, the word democracy itself is used in the questionnaire. If respondents’s interpretation of democracy varies to a great extent, its validity could be questioned. Another potential problem is that people may make higher score than they actually believe because support of democracy is something politically correct.

Although it is not attitudinal, the measure of being grown up in urban area has a problem. Due to the limitation of data, we include several metropolitan cities that have officially separate districts. Many cities having population of a million or less are excluded. Even if we include these cities, problem still remains; many mid-size cities were not even cities a few decades ago. Thus, the more aged the respondents are, the more likely they actually are to have been brought up in the rural areas that went through explosive population growth for the past one or two decades and became urban area.

A subtext of this research is that Confucianism is a major cultural source of delegative democracy. In the future research following questions should be asked: Is it an unstable democracy or different kinds of democratic consolidation?; if it is consolidation, how could political democracy without strong democracy in social relations be stabilized? Democratic consolidation is assumed to be possible only when civic culture or social relations are democratized(Shin 1999). However, South Korean case may present different shape of democratic consolidation, which could be a nightmare come true for many supporters of liberal and radical democratic norms—We have to admit that sometimes reality is hard to swallow. Or alternative question, which was partly answered in this study, we could ask is what kinds of counter forces would transform the Confucian delegative democracy into still Korean but more compatible to horizontal and participatory ones?

Reference


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1 Admittedly, partly due to the limitation of the measures, this research is slanted toward negative aspects of Confucianism. More positive side of relationships between Confucianism and democracy is yet to be studied.
Introduction

Raymond Williams (1977) has written of tradition that it should not be viewed as a vestige of the past, but rather as a cultural power acting on the present. Traditions are selected with the intent of the present society; thus, we should focus on the “selective tradition,” which influences the definitions and identifications of the current society. As such, some traditions are selected and emphasized as constant and true values while others are discarded and ignored.

The discourse on so-called ‘genuine traditional culture’ in Korea can be traced back to the colonial period. Confucianism was seen as a means to create a more easily governed colony by some Japanese, including Governor-general Ugaki Kazushige, who lamented the lack of “true” Confucianism among ordinary Koreans. Hence, when the colonial government conducted its Rural Revitalization Campaign (1932–1940), Confucian principles such as filial piety, loyalty to the emperor, harmony, and frugality were advocated (Shin and Han 2000). Conversely, some Korean nationalists in this period such as Ch’oe Nam-sŏn, Yi Nŭng-hwa, and Son Chin-t’aee criticized Confucianism as a major cause for Chosŏn’s colonization. Rather than Confucianism, these men sought the protoplastic culture of Korea elsewhere: Ch’oe in the myth of Tan’gun, Yi in shamanism, and Son in folk customs (Kim Sŏng-nae 1990: 225-226).

Subsequently, full-scale discussion on ‘genuine traditional culture’ started anew when South Korea inaugurated its government in 1948. At first, government officials roused mainly the spirit of anti-Japan and anti-Communism incorporating these negative sentiments. Later on, however, the Park Chung Hee government (1961-1979) raised the issue of revitalization of traditional culture, emphasizing the importance of searching for national identity; this search was largely based on
Confucian figures and ideology. The opposition parties and intellectuals in this period also desired to revitalize traditional culture. However, they advocated folk culture as the ‘genuine’ Korean tradition. They insisted that Confucianism was exclusively for ranking officials and had nothing to do with the common people.

Domestic political power relations largely regulated the discourses on ‘traditional culture’ until the early 1990s. Afterwards, presidents were no longer of military backgrounds and the international political mood shifted towards globalization. The discourse surrounding traditional culture separated from the logic of ‘the ruler’ and ‘the ruled,’ and instead met the logic of forming a ‘Korean identity,’ which was expected to be different from others. Hence, ‘traditional culture’ was generally understood as ‘genuine ourness’ or ‘true Koreanness’ and as a result many aspects of Korean culture were put together and reborn as ‘a true Koreanness.’ This sentiment has been promoted continually, eventually ushering in an era of numerous culture programs and festivals bearing the banner of ‘Korean traditional culture’ in the late 1990s. My major concern in this paper is how Confucian tradition is represented among the many other Korean cultures in this atmosphere.

I will first examine how the discourses on traditional culture have transformed in South Korea comparing two periods: when political power was held by those from military backgrounds (1961-1993) and when non-military background leaders held power (1993-present). Along with this, in order to explore my major concern, I will investigate a single cultural event (Korean Culture Program for Foreign Employees of Korean Embassies Abroad) conducted by the Academy of Korean Studies in September 2000. I will analyze ‘their’ voices, i.e., the participants, focusing on Confucian culture and the manner of Confucianism represented by ‘us.’ I expect my paper will demonstrate how cultural discourse is presently shaping South Korea as a Confucian country.

2.0 Genealogy of ‘traditional culture’ discourses

2.1 Confucianism and non-Confucianism: Rival traditions as genuine national culture

Discourses on ‘traditional culture’ were constantly discussed after South Korea entered the era of rapid modernization. The Park Chung Hee government announced major projects for developing the nation such as modernization, reforming social discipline, developing national culture, and promoting diplomacy. For developing national culture, the government first destroyed shaman shrines and campaigned against shamanic practices since these were deemed detrimental to modernization. Moreover, it enacted the Cultural Assets Protection Law (Munhwaje pohopóp) in 1962 and the Culture and Art Promotion Law (Munhwa yesul chinhûng-pôp) in 1972, proclaiming the need to preserve and transmit tradition and art in order to revive national culture. After this legislation, the Korean Culture and Art Foundation (Han’guk munhwa yesul chinhûng-wôn) opened (1973) and carried out the First Culture and Art Promoting Five-year Project (1974-1978), aiming “to establish a correct historical view and to create new national art.”

Consequently, generals such as Kim Yu-shin, Kwôn Yul, and Yi Sun-shin, who fought bravely for the country, were resurrected and their statues erected for inspiring the importance of loyalty (Kim Kwang-ôk 1991; Moon Ok-pyo, 2000). The government was criticized for only promoting military figures as national heroes by pro-Confucians, and thus it launched a new project to elevate Confucian scholars and relics as honorable figures and precious national treasures. For example, Tosan sôwôn, where Yi Hwang (1501-1570),

1 Korean Culture and Art Foundation, brochure (1985: 22).
the ‘Great Confucian scholar,’ studied, was reconstructed, the thought of Yi Yul-gok (1536-1584) was highly praised, and Andong, where many Confucian scholars lived in the Chosön period (1392-1910), was brought into relief as it demonstrated a high degree of loyalty (Moon Ok-pyo 2000: 83). Clearly, Confucianism and its cultural vestiges had become the standard-bearers for what was promoted as traditional Korean culture by the government.

Despite the effort by the Park government to create a proud national identity, anti-government sentiments arose after the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Japan (1965) and the adoption of various friendly policies such as encouraging Japanese investment and allowing Japanese to be taught at high schools. This chain of incidents led the anti-government group to start another movement for reviving tradition in order to shape a ‘true’ national identity. They criticized Confucianism as being exclusivist and only for the elite and high-ranking officials. Instead, they advocated shamanic practices and folk customs, insisting these were the very traditions that defined Koreans. Thus, shamanic rituals (kut), masked-dance dramas (t’alch’um), and farmer’s music (nongak) were performed largely as part of anti-government movements (Kim Sông-nae 1990; Kim Kwang-ok 1991).

The Fifth Republic (1981-1988) led by Chun Doo Hwan, proclaimed as major goals undertakings such as the realization of a society based on justice, accomplishing a democratic and welfare state, improving the economy, upgrading the national image to international society and so on. In addition, the government amended the provisions of Fifth Economic Development Project (1982-1986) and added a clause relating to culture and art. This stated, in part, that the effort to preserve national cultural inheritances and transmitting these should be reinforced to establish national subjectivity among the rapidly changing social environment which could cause confusion of the peoples’ values (Yi 1984).

Consequently, the government encouraged people to participate in reviving traditional culture by sponsoring cultural campaigns based on Confucian ideology. Examples include, Searching for Noblemen Movement (Yangban chatki undong), Tracing the Roots of our Ancestors Movement (Chosang chatki undong) and the Movement for Recovering Etiquette (Yechôl chatki undong).

Contrarily, resistant intellectuals, the opposition party and college students declared the Fifth Republic to be illegitimate as it sprung from the bloody Kwangju Uprising in 1980. They condemned its authoritarian rule, nepotism, and corruption, and conducted shamanic rituals as part of anti-government demonstrations. One example is the memorial service for Yi Han-yŏl, a university student who died while participating in an anti-government demonstration, that was performed and followed by a shamanic ritual even though Yi and his family were Christian. In this period, not only political congregations but also college festivals adopted many shamanic rituals.2 As a counter discourse, anti-government groups searched for the ‘true’ roots of Korean culture in shamanic rituals and folk customs, designating them as the peoples’ culture (minjuung munhwa), which allowed the venting of frustrations resultant from oppression and hardship of military dictatorship.

2.2 ‘Our culture’ versus ‘other’s culture’: National culture and foreign culture

The 1990s witnessed a dramatic change in the international mood with events such as the German unification. Political and ideological boundaries among nations became blurred and the need for new forms of globalization and economic regulation was realized. Ultimately, the Uruguay Round (12-1993) negotiations were

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concluded, urging countries to open their markets to free trade.

In South Korea, the UR negotiations stirred the people’s emotions, especially the demands to open the rice market. In Chôlla province, farmers demonstrated under the slogan of “Rice is our base of living, origin of our lives and symbol of our happiness. Let’s throw the bloody Americans out of Korea....”3 Also the slogan ‘Body and Land are One’ (shint’oburi) became popularized. Placards with ‘shint’oburi’ hung in front of major buildings and streets, and a song entitled shint’oburi became popular:

Who are you? Who am I? We are all born in this land and our bodies cannot be separated from this land. Oh! Shint’oburi! … Look at the mannequin in the store window dancing with its body wrapped with foreign products. Oh! Rice! Barley! Beans! Red beans! Our bodies should have our products; why are you looking for others? Oh! Red pepper paste! Bean paste! Kimchi! Radish Kimchi! Don’t forget that you and I are all Korean! Oh! Shint’oburi!

The opening of the Korean market to Japanese popular culture also struck a chord in the South Korean psyche and aroused an urgent need to establish a strong Korean identity, protecting Korean culture from foreign cultural influences. Han Kyông-gu argued that the arrival and influence of foreign cultures on an indigenous culture can result in urgent movements to either revive or recreate cultural traditions. Accordingly, Han proposed that in the search for cultural identity, new cultural discourses arise pursuing localization while simultaneously advocating globalization (2000: 74).

In this strong atmosphere of searching for ‘our Koreanness,’ Kim Young Sam was elected president in 1992. Voices proclaimed the need for establishing concrete cultural policies. For example, in a special New Year’s article entitled “Munhwa úkkochûl p’iuja” (Let’s Make the Flower of Culture Bloom) Shin Yong-hun, an expert adviser on cultural properties, criticized the low budget allocation for culture (less than 1% of the total) and insisted on the necessity of a concrete cultural policy for developing national culture to give Koreans a richer spirit and philosophy. 4 Similarly, Ch’oe Tong-ho, a professor at Korea University, emphasized the effectiveness of cultural policy, stating that he was pleased that the need to create ‘Korean-like culture’ was discussed throughout society and maintained that the state would further develop through pride and subjectivity in traditional culture. 5

The Kim government quickly established the Ministry of Culture and Sports (Munhwa cheyuk-bu), with expanded functions and organization. Additionally, the Korean Culture Policy Institute (Han’guk munhwa ch’ongch’aek kaebal-wôn) was formed in 1994 to elaborate strategy for unifying South and North Korea’s cultures and eventually developing a culture for the Korean nation.6 Following this lead, Seoul City announced ‘Globalization of Seoul Culture’ and planned festivals for enriching traditional culture.7 Moreover, many mayors stated the importance of preserving local tradition and promoting cultural programs. For example, the mayor of Kwangju sought to develop culture based on resources in Kwangju such as p’ansori, calligraphy, ceramics, and folk customs; the mayor of Inch’ôn, cited the

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3 See www.gonong.jinbo.net/index/juyodong.htm
4 Chosôn ilbo, 1-4-1993.
6 See www.kcpi.or.kr/
7 Chosôn ilbo, “Ch’oeech’o’úi munhwa chôngsajin” (The First Culture Blueprint), 5-19-1995.
The historic nature of the city with sites such as Kanghwa Island’s Mount Mani (where an altar of Tan’gun is located) that could be developed for education and as cultural tour sites.8

Cultural discourses became an even hotter issue during the 1997 presidential campaign after the severe economic crisis of late 1997. Opinion held that the new president should be a ‘cultural president’ and all candidates pledged to make Korea a world cultural leader by investing in Korean traditions for both nurturing national pride and economic recovery.9 The new president, Kim Dae Jung, declared that the twenty-first century would be the century of culture and the cultural industry would be adopted as a national strategic industry. As such, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism replaced its predecessor, declaring that they would develop traditional culture by promoting cultural festivals and designating special cultural areas for tourism.10 Subsequently, the budget reached 1% of the total and a wide array of cultural events and festivals were begun.

The search for ‘traditional culture,’ once used for producing ideology to mobilize national power or for gathering people’s power to end the military dictatorship, became unified in one voice ‘promoting our genuine culture’ which differed from ‘theirs’ as Korea headed into the globalized world-order.

3.0 Korean cultural programs and the representation of Confucianism

Cultural discourses arouse national consensus on the importance of promoting ‘our’ traditional culture, and thus various cultural events and programs have been initiated. The Academy of Korean Studies (AKS)—a leading institute in promoting Korean studies and culture abroad—operates various cultural programs.11 Of particular interest to this paper, is the first AKS Cultural Program for Foreigners Working in Korean Overseas Governmental Agencies (ACP) held in 2000.12 According to the president of the Academy, the institute endeavors to explore the essence of Korean culture while searching for a healthy sense of values and spiritual compass for the future of Korea since its opening (6-30-1978).13

As a ‘Mecca of Korean studies,’ the Academy initiated the ACP program in 2000, subtitling the event as ‘Fourteen Days of Exposure to Korean Culture.’ The purpose was described as “to enhance partnership of local employees who work in Korean overseas governmental agencies…through exposure [to] Korean culture and promote better understanding of Korea and its culture.”14

3.1 ‘Their voices’ on Korean culture and Confucianism

The fourteen-day program included Special Lectures on Korean Culture, Traditional Korean Culture Workshops, Historical Sightseeing in Seoul, and

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12 The program ran from 9-25 through 10-7-2000. It is also being offered in 2001.
Excursion Trips. I, as one of guides, participated in all activities and visited all places along with the participants. I used this opportunity to gain insight into participants’ impressions of Korea and established rapport with some members during the program. My major informants ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’, who came from France, Belgium and the U.S. respectively, and had all been doing Korea-related work for over ten years. Among them, C, with whom I conducted an in-depth interview, had a strong Korea background, having majored in Korean studies. They voiced many aspects concerning Korea and its culture. In terms of Confucianism, the three informants all shared the same feeling that Confucianism still exerts a great role in South Korea. I can divide their opinions about Confucianism into three large themes: the idea that Confucianism could be regarded as a universal value, that Confucian values require too many obligations, and the danger of searching for Korean identity in only Confucianism.

For example, A pointed out that the ties between family members in Korea are ascribed to Confucianism, but these values are also present in Europe. He told me “I have a sixteen-year old daughter; I love her and want her stay with us as long as she can. In Hungary and France where I was respectively born and raised, we should respect our parents and elders.”

C also emphasized how education, being a good student and son—all highly emphasized in Confucianism—have been important to his life: “Both of my parents were the first ones in their families to go to college. So their feeling about education was very strong. Now it is banned, but when I was young I got hit with a ‘hoech’ori’ (switch) many times. If I did something bad, I was paddled. In school, if you get into a fight, if you didn’t listen to the teacher, the same thing happened. I saw in a Korean drama when parents spank their children they say ‘I, who am hitting you feel more pain than you, who are being hit.’ The funny thing was I heard the same thing from my parents: ‘It hurts me more than it hurts you.’ I didn’t believe it though. It was my butt not anybody else’s.”

While I was confirming that the values emphasized by Confucianism such as strong family ties and the importance of education could be universal, I noticed that they seem to have lighter social requirements and fewer obligations to realize those values.

For example, C told me that he was expected to study and get good grades, but he did not get spanked for poor grades. He said his parents did not really care what he did in the future. He elaborated: “I mean they never said ‘we want you to be a doctor or car mechanic’ as long as I was happy and can live comfortably, they didn’t care. I think their idea of what makes me a good son is that I enjoy what I do. I am not robbing a bank, and killing somebody. I send e-mails and call them on the telephone regularly. And send gifts for birthday and Christmas. Regular contact makes them happy probably. It isn’t that difficult—it only takes a minute or two. They want to know what I am doing and I listen to what they are doing. That is just being a human…but one of my Korean friends does a lot more to be a good son. He goes very often to his parents’ house and does many things with them. And when his dad was in the hospital, he went there and all his family members were there too and stayed there all night. Being at his parents’ place is important. To go home and be there.”

According to B, the obligations Koreans bear seem very contradictory to her since Koreans perpetuate and pass on these duties to subsequent generations. She told me about one of her Korean friends: “I know married Korean women have many difficulties due to responsibilities to their in-law family. I worked with a girl from Korea. We were close. But she finished her duty and went back to Korea and married.
We are still in touch, but whenever we talk over the phone, she complains about her hard work for her in-laws on holidays and for ancestor memorial services. I listened to her but I don’t understand her since when I asked her not to work she answered that she had to. Then when I asked her not ask her children to do same thing when they grown up, she asked how she could get rid of those customs in a single day. Why do they want their children to do the same things that they didn’t like to do.”

C later on stated his impression on the mood of contemporary Korean society searching for identity in Confucianism in an in-depth interview and pointed the absurdity of making a single identity by using the collective pro-noun ‘we.’ “I thought about the identity issue when A commented in the lecture that he had met many Koreans and found their identity was strong, but wondered why they were saying that their identity is being lost. He asked, ‘How on earth was their identity strong before?’ I remember the lecture was about the spirit of Democracy being comparable to Confucian values. This seemed interesting but not accurate. If we look at The Analects or Mencius with tunnel vision, we can find some words or a sentence and say “oh it’s democracy,” but only if we don’t consider the context. I know these days Koreans are trying to find their identity in Confucianism or Confucian ideals, but we have many identities. Korean identity is huge; I don’t think people in any period absorbed a single culture or one value in a vacuum. When we talk about identity using ‘we,’ who do you think ‘we’ is? Confucianism sounds very idealistic, but there are no women. Then who are we?”

The three informants voiced that Confucian values seemed virtuous for identifying what they held as important in their own cultures, but that the practices seemed contradictory. Moreover, by creating a unified identity of Koreans as Confucian, it will result in the marginalization of other identities.

3.2 Representation of Confucianism as a mirror, a standard, and a vision

The participants attended lectures on South Korea and workshops to learn about playing samul-nori instruments, calligraphy, and meditation. They also traveled around Korea visiting temples, Confucian shrines, and historic places. As the informants described, I witnessed that Confucianism has been resurrected as the representative and most valuable Korean culture, and thus stands apart from other Korean cultures such as art or folk customs. While those were represented as mere cultural events, Confucianism was audio-visualized and substantialized with a special zeal and passion as a mirror of the past, a standard for the present, and a vision for the future. It was breathing next to us as a virtue of Korean culture for the universe.

The first lecture for ACP was “Korean Identity in Global Perspective.” The main idea was that Confucianism had contributed to making a democracy in South Korea and is fertile soil for creating universal values. The speaker emphasized the roots of democracy in the Confucian philosophy of minbon, or that people are the root of society and should be considered foremost by policymakers. His lecture can be summarized by his insistence that democracy was brought about in South Korea by a deep-rooted Confucian tradition of sarim (Confucian scholars with similar aims) that emphasized fairness—this was particularly seen in the Citizens’ Alliance for the 2000 General Elections—and further held that statistics proved that there was an “unmistakable consensus” that Confucian traditions such as minbon were needed for the future of Korea. He closed by stating that the new millennium required a strengthening of Korean identity through Confucianism.

The second day of the field trip took us to Ojukhôn in Kangnung. As the bus
drew closer to the entrance, I was shocked to find Ojukhôn totally different from what I remembered. I pictured it in my mind as I had seen it in the late 1970s, at which time it was surrounded by trees with a few buildings; now it was immense and I could not see the end of the square. In the bus, I explained, here was where the Confucian scholar Yi Yul-gok (1536-1584) was born and spent a great deal of his time studying. Further, that he was known for his superior integrity and being a great scholar who developed and enriched Confucian theory. One participant who was woken up by my explanation in the bus said that he (Yi Yul-gok) must have been very rich. I did not know how to answer his comments at the time, but later I found that Ojukhôn had undergone several reconstructions. First, it was designated as a National Treasure in 1963 and then the first reconstruction was carried out in 1976. Subsequently, the Folk Culture House (Hyangt’o minsok-kwan; 1992) and Historic Culture House (Yôksa munhwa-kwan; 1997) were built and the Municipal Museum was moved to its present location adjoining Ojukhôn. Consequently, the grand scale of Ojukhôn of today was formulated.

A guide at Ojukhôn praised the thought of Yul-gok as he guided us, saying: It is really shameful that some people put the 5,000 won bill in their mouths, not knowing that the great scholar Yi Yul-gok is on it. They shouldn’t do that because it is disrespectful. They have no idea about our roots, where we originated from. I heard there are many scholars studying the thought of Yi at places like Harvard, but we are only concerned with Western studies. I believe there is only one thing to study in this world: the thought of Yul-gok.

In Kyôngju, the representation of Confucianism reached an apex, demonstrating that it is the only cure for the ills of modern society. Under the catch phrase of “Big World, Big Dream,” the Kyôngju World Culture EXPO 2000 was underway with about twenty different exhibitions when we arrived in Kyôngju on the third day of the trip. The EXPO consisted mainly of programs such as a World Puppet Drama Festival, Asia-Europe Folk Festival, and a Cyber Character Show. There was also an Asia-Europe Forum that centered on a discussion of culture in the cyber age. Among these various events, a pavilion for Confucianism occupied the EXPO Square in an exhibit hall designated as the House of Friendship.

At the entrance was a big sign reading Cultural Exhibition of Human Virtue. The sign, however, did not reveal what the exhibit would be. As I entered, I found a large portrait of Confucius just inside the entrance, and along the hall, there was a portrait of Mencius and phrases from the Confucian Classics, all under a dim and soft light. A sign reading ‘hoech’ori’ informed that it, the hoech’ori, was the symbol of Confucian education which considers ‘filial piety’ of great importance and teaches people to act like humans. At the center of Confucian education, is the hoech’ori, for building the character of humans. Another sign informed that Confucianism respects life. However, today’s people have experienced a rapid collapse of morality, correlating with the speed of modernization. Living in a society where practices like abortion, murder, or despising disabilities is easily observed, we should look back on how our ancestors lived. Here is the reason we should relive our ancestors’ lives: because they greatly respected life. Passing these signs, the adjoining exhibition hall had a very different atmosphere. A mural covered two walls; one side was dark and the other was bright. On the dark side, people were demonstrating holding placards reading ‘Reform the Education System’ and ‘Our Students are Dying.’ On the bright side, young teenagers being arrested for prostitution was portrayed against a background of a red-light district. Many other photos in the very darkish hall
depicted the dead from wars or children starving in famines around the world. Playing in the background was the wailing of people, gunshots, and a fighter jet. Passing through the hall, three flags fluttered from the ceiling, reading ‘lost our conscience,’ ‘lost our etiquette,’ and ‘collapsed morality.’

As the quotation at the beginning of this paper states, the promoters of this pavilion held that Confucianism could cure all of modern society’s ills, and this was relayed at the exit of the exhibition.

4. Conclusion

Confucianism, first introduced to Korea during the Koguryô Kingdom in 372, has continually influenced Koreans’ way of life in varying degrees depending on the period. Yet, despite the ordeals of colonization, modernization, and extinction of certain cultures, Confucianism did not die out, and was even revived as an ideology for governing and upheld as virtuous principles. Although once rejected by anti-governmental groups in the 1970s and 1980s, by the 1990s Confucianism thrived in the mood of globalization with the reappraisal of various aspects of Korean culture. The rulers, intellectuals and people agreed upon the importance of culture for preserving national pride and reviving the economy in light of the influx of foreign culture and the opening of domestic markets.

In this mood, many aspects of Korean culture have been resurrected and promoted. Among them, Confucianism is given the highest status due to so-called humanistic characteristics such as filial piety, loyalty, consideration for life, and emphasis on education. In light of ‘their’ voices (the participants for ACP), the way ‘we’ (Koreans) represent Confucian values sounds agreeable and universal. However, while ‘they’ praised Confucian values, ‘they’ rejected the obligations inherent in observing Confucian principles as too burdensome.

It is useful here to examine the three aspects of identity that are manifested in society as described by Manuel Castells (1997: chap.1). First, there is legitimizing identity which rationalizes domination by the institutions of society vis-à-vis social actors. Second, resistance identity that is generated by those in positions of domination and encourages resistance. And third, project identity where social actors, build a new identity—based on available cultural resources—that redefines overall social structure.

According to Castells’ classification of project identity, the cultural discourses for creating a Korean-like culture in South Korea have given rise to cultural programs shaping Korea as a Confucian country. However, by selecting Confucianism as esprit of Korean philosophy and the prototype Korean culture, other aspects of culture and custom became symbols of the past and merely individual items in cultural events or festivals. While cultural programs are striving to establish Confucianism as ‘our’ identity, those who have lived and thought in accordance with other social/belief systems are isolated from ‘us.’ Nonetheless, it is certain that Confucianism will survive in the twenty-first century in South Korea. However, we should be cognizant that the burdensome responsibilities and obligations of Confucianism will also be part of Korean lives.
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Taesunchillihoe: factors in the rapid rise of a Korean new religion

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Taesunchillihoe is one of the hundred plus groups of the Chûngsan faith known to have existed since their saviour-god Kang Ilsun, styled Chûngsan, died in 1909. According to a decennial survey by the Chosôn ilbo, in 1995 Taesunchillihoe had 67,632 believers, making it the sixth largest religion in South Korea after Buddhism, Protestantism, Catholicism, Confucianism and Wôn Buddhism, which had 84,918 followers. Taesunchillihoe was not mentioned in the 1985 survey, being included under “other religions” (Chosôn ilbo 11/9/1996). Founded in April 1969, Taesunchillihoe has shown phenomenal growth, and the survey is likely an undercount, especially given the problems of such survey questionnaires in Korea (Yoon 1997), its own claims of membership and the extent of its properties and financial wealth.

In 1975, it claimed 100,000 followers (Prunner 1976: 15, 25), in 1978 219,176 members (Yi 1992: 746), 3,615,437 at the end of 1991 (HMC 1992: 599; Kim 1996: 261) and most recently, a staggering 8 million (Mun 1997: 17-18; TH 5/1/1997 no 52: 8). Undoubtedly pious exaggerations which include former members, they do suggest a much greater strength than the Chosôn ilbo figures, especially when its wealth is measured. In 1983 it is said to have possessed total assets of 1,740 million Won, and it was the largest religious contributor to the Independence Commemoration Hall, donating 130,800,135 Won (T’ak 1991: 30; Yun Sûngyong 1997: 178). In 1983 it had 700 proselytization centres (T’ak 1991: 30), but by 1994 that had risen to 1,634 (HMC 1992: 600). Taesunchillihoe’s current headquarters at Yôju is stated to be the largest religious centre (sawôn) in East Asia (Ch’oe 1998.,166) and can sleep over 10,000 people a night (Mun 1997: 105) There are similar massive centres (tojang) at the original headquarters in Chunggok-dong, Seoul, one at P’och’ôn and another at Sokcho (photographs in Mun 1997). In 1991 Taesunchillihoe had 53 halls or hoegwan (HMC 1992: 600), and by the late 1990s at least 70 (Mun 1997: 20), most of which are substantial buildings of at least five stories (various issues of TH plus personal observations). It has built a hospital of 450 beds in Sôngnam-si, opened in 1998 (TH nos 56, 60, 64) and is building another at Tongduchôn of 25 stories, with 1,480 beds planned, allegedly the biggest in East Asia (TH 58; Mun 1997: 31; personal observation 24/11/97). Taejin University was opened in 1992 and had 6,000 students enrolled in 1998, an intake of 1,956 in 1999 and is fed by six high schools (TH 60 and 63). It has over 50 buildings (Mun 1997: 20, 24-25). The religion has given scholarships to needy students since 1976, providing 6,694 students with 3,105,283,610 Won in 1998 (TH 64: 16) with the aim of producing future leaders for the religion and nation (Mun 1997: 23). It has also donated huge sums to assist disaster victims, giving 730 million Won in 1987 alone to flood relief, and runs various charitable institutions and participated in many campaigns for the public good.
(Kim 1996: 261; T’ak 1991: 30; Yi 1992: 746). Its relief and charity efforts have “conspicuously bloomed more than those of other religious groups” (Mun 1997: 27, 29). It contrasts well with the longer established Wôn Buddhism, which has 380 halls (kyodang), a self-proclaimed million believers, a 716-bed hospital, a university and many charitable institutions (T’ak 1991: 70; Kim 1996: 270-271).

Such a rapid rise demands explanation. Gernot Prunner explained it within the historical context of unsettling change, modernisation and the sufferings of the Korean people that influenced the formation of Korean new religious movements (hereafter, NRM), and by the characteristic traits of Taesunchillihoe. Those he perceived were an emphasis on nativism, messianic ideas, concentration on the present, belief in magic, a concept of enlightenment, efficiency of organisation, hierarchical structure, elaborate ritual and an attitude of tolerance (Prunner 1976: 23-24). While most of these offer a partial explanation, as Prunner himself admits, “many of these traits have been shown to be common to most of the new religions in Korea” (Prunner 1976: 24). As many NRMs have not demonstrated such growth or influence, additional explanations need to be found, especially as Taesunchillihoe grew during a period of increasing prosperity.

The academic study of religion in Korea is limited, criticised for its reliance on dated, narrow methodologies, which are mostly reductionist and lacking consideration of the “overall context of the particular religious tradition” (Yoon 2000: 192, 210, 214, 232-235). Among the weaknesses of research on NRMs are lack of on-site investigation and participatory research, plus insufficient attention to history (Kim 1997: 178-181). There are few detailed sociological or ethnographic studies, and no comprehensive histories of the evolution of Korean NRMs, their interaction with other religions and the wider society. Explanations used are the historically specific and now inappropriate concepts such as anomie, crisis cult, social deviance, relative deprivation and difficulties of acculturation. Architecture, art and myth are neglected (Yoon 2000: 225), as is language. Most significantly, the political and financial dimensions have been almost absent from research on the Korean NRMs, with the possible exception of the Unification Church, and much controversial material has been ignored, possibly for fear of upsetting NRM members or because of the hesitation of most researchers to side with anti-religious modernisers such as the military, politicians, the mass media, psychologists and the anti-cult movements (Jorgensen 1999a and 2001). In recent years, this reluctance to criticise or speak out has probably been heightened by the unsolved murder of T’ak Myônghwan, a Christian researcher who regularly denounced NRMs for their abuses and as “heresies” (private communication, on T’ak’s position see Kim 1997: 167 and T’ak’s numerous publications).

Research is hampered on Taesunchillihoe because it provides limited access to external observers, and much information has to be gleaned from apostates, rival NRMs, written materials (not all readily available), media reports, and full participation, which can only be achieved by membership. Although it does not murder people who attempt to desert, as was the case with Aum Shinrikyô (Reader 2000), such allegations have been aired in the press against its precursor, T’aegukdo, in March 1965, and against four Taesunchillihoe members for beating to death a member because he was drunk (CSD 1996: 44, 48, 58), and I have heard such
rumours. A pattern of alleged extortion, theft, embezzlement and violence involving thugs against members and local residents opposed to the building of Taesunchillihoe halls in their area can be found in the press and in attacks by its rival NRM, Chûngsando (CSD 1996: 53-79).

On 8th April 1984, the KBS programme “Pursuit (*ch’ujôk*) 60 Minutes” stated that Taesunchillihoe members believed that as the year was *kapja* in the 60-year cycle, the “apocalypse” or *kaehyôk* (for this idea, Jorgensen 1999) would arrive immediately, and so they abandoned study and jobs, extorted money, broke up families by leaving to join the order, and disappearing with the family savings. Believers reportedly made statements such as, “When the Latter Heaven arrives, body temperatures will rise to 3,600 degrees... and all will ride on clouds and fly up into heaven” (CSD 1996: 74-75). Similar apocalyptic events were predicted for 1988 or 1989, with a similar threat of a malicious *ki* descending to melt bodies, something avoidable only by joining Taesunchillihoe (Choi 2000: 85; Ch’oe 1998: 235). As with many of the allegations of criminality, these predictions and their failures were hushed up. Virtually no mentions of them were made in the religion’s literature, and vague responses were given by leaders. The only information available was in the newspapers (Choi 2000: 85). Predictions of an imminent eschaton, coupled with allegations of linked extractions of donations, surfaced again on the MBC TV show, “PD Memorandum (*suchôp*),” the edition called “Taesunchillihoe rûl asimnikka” broadcast on 5th March 1996 (Ch’oe 1998: 249-250), though on this occasion the approach of the *kaehyôk* may have been related to the death of its founder, Pak Han’gyông on 23rd January 1996. Some followers could not accept his death. Others deserted the religion as a result, but leaders were told to inform worried followers that he would come again soon to direct the post-apocalypse utopia, and that Pak had just hidden his human body temporarily (CSD 2000: 33, 44-45, citing the MBC show).

Such secrecy and seeming deceit has made it difficult to trace the inner history of this NRM. Even the repetitive hagiography of Pak Han’gyông (1917-1996), the leader or *tojôn*, by Mun Ilsôk is devoid of much other than pious tales, supposedly due to Pak’s “humble desire” not to make himself known outside of Taesunchillihoe circles. Mun, a reporter who has written other such religious “biographies,” complained of insufficient materials (Mun 1997: introduction). Pak, who was supposedly charismatic, tabooed revelation of details of his life to the mass media, blocked publication of his photograph, the only one being published in December 1990 without permission in *T’oyo sinmun*, and so remained virtually unknown to the public, unlike the media manipulators Cho Yonggi of the Yoido Pure Gospel Church and Mun Sônmyông of the Unification Church (Mun 1997: 113, 19).

Such intimations of secrecy, violence, exploitation, predictions of an apocalypse, and fights with rivals continuously reappear as a pattern throughout the genealogy of Taesunchillihoe. Kang Ilsun (1871-1909), after a shamanic experience that apparently unsettled his mind, acted very strangely, claiming to be the god Okhwang Sangje who could control the spirit world, and so was considered mad by his neighbours. He was accused by the families of his disciples of using sorcery to lure them away, and the authorities suspected him of being a trouble-maker and of deluding the people, and so hauled he and some disciples off for questioning (Lee
1967: 33-39; Yi 1992: 188-192; JeungSanDo 1995: II 20.3-7 et passim). On one occasion, he laid his concubine, surnamed Ko, down and sat on her stomach, pointing an ornamental knife at her head (or throat), asking “Even if I die, will you serve me?) And will you change your mind during the great work of Heaven and Earth?” (JeungSanDo 1995: VI 14.2-3; Chông 1989: 28 - texts vary slightly). When Kang died and was buried, some followers departed on the grounds that a god incarnate could not die, while others thought this was a docetic death, and that Kang would live on as a god or return again in the guise of Maitreya. Some scriptures claim he appeared again to the faithful after the burial, and as no successor had been appointed, many of the disciples, and concubine Ko, claimed the mantle and each established separate religions (Murayama 1935: 298; Lee 1967: 36-39; Yi 1992: 192; JeungSanDo 1995: X 26-36). Thus the scriptures of those Chûngsan NRM s mostly consist of chronological records of Kang Ilsun’s sayings and deeds, each emphasising or deleting the roles of certain disciples in order to give their religious founders and leaders a legitimate genealogy. This is one major source of disputes.

As a consequence, the founders of Chûngsan NRM s strove to create tighter linkages with Kang Ilsun. For example, Ch’a Kyôngsôk (1880-1936), a disciple who brought Kang into his own home, married his young cousin, the concubine Ko, to Kang. When she fell into a trance on the second anniversary of Kang’s death, and imitated his speech and mannerisms, it was believed Kang had possessed her. Ch’a then isolated her to control the followers, and when she and some believers left in 1919, he kept all the group’s assets. By about 1920, Ch’a’s P’ochôn’gyo claimed six million members and they were rumoured to possess 10% of Korea’s wealth (Yi 1992: 237-242; No 1995: 201, 205; Murayama 1935: 299-300, 312-313). Stigmatised as a secret society that would make Ch’a emperor, P’ochôn’gyo eventually was forced to compromise with the Japanese colonial authorities to maintain its existence, and it managed to create a commercial company. Ch’a was extremely rich, and murderous attempts were made to gain his wealth (Kim 1989: 307-310; No 1995: 201-206; Yi 1992: 242-258).

Another aspirant, Cho Ch’ôlje (1895-1958), heard the Chûngsan teachings, and following instructions, practiced in the mountains until he was enlightened. Externally, he gave the impression of shamanic possession. In 1917, he led his followers to Anmyôn Island where they started to build an economic base. But as his connection with Kang Ilsun was only via revelation, he felt a compulsion to gain a more tangible link with the god incarnate. He made Kang’s sister his concubine, shifted his base to the Chûngsan heartland around Mt. Moak, and took Kang’s first wife, who had been made insane by religious fervour, into his care etc. But even this was not enough, so he instigated his followers to steal Kang’s mysterious medicine cabinet from Ch’a Kyôngsôk’s home. In 1919, he exhumed and made off with Kang’s skeleton, but he was chased by Mun Kongsin, a pupil of Kang, to Taejôn Station. The police intervened in the resultant melee, and sent the skeleton, minus an arm bone, to Ch’a for reburial (Yi 1992: 1212-1214; Lee 1967: 58-60, 37 note 3). Cho’s religion took the name Mugûkdo in 1921, later modified to Mugûktaedo in 1925 (Murayama 1935: 332-333). In 1928, Cho marshalled some members into the Chin’ôpdan, which was devoted to economic production via land reclamation, pioneering wasteland and irrigation in Anmyôn and Wônsan. In 1930, Cho sent a team to northern Manchuria and another to Musan to cut timber in the mountains.
By 1926, Cho was being called Emperor Cho by believers, and he claimed to have 100,000 followers, although Murayama counted only 2,190 in 1934 (Murayama 1935: 340). These commercial activities expanded through the 1930s, opening up mines and irrigating land, until the religion was disbanded and its considerable wealth was confiscated by the Japanese in 1936 (No 1995: 203-204; Kim 1989: 314-315).

Mugûktaedo and its offspring, Taesunchillihoe, differ from other Chûngsan NRMs because they are based on a claimed revelation from the god, Kang Ilsun (Mun 1997: 143; table in Lee 1967: 64-66). Cho asserted that he had received the Heavenly Mandate from Kang, as Okhwang Sangje, to direct the Latter Heaven of the Immortals that would emerge from the apocalypse, which meant he was called “emperor”. In his lifetime, he was worshipped as the master of the Way (toju) and the tangible god-incarnate. Posthumously, his position on the pantheon altar was elevated to that of Okhwang Sangje, while Kang Ilsun, the essence, retreated as a deus otiosus. Symbolically, the chông or tripod of his style, Chûngsan, was the basis for the chûng or pot of Chûngsan, making Cho the operator and director of the magical revolution (Yi 1992: 1215-1216). This claim is vehemently rejected by other Chûngsan NRMs, with the exception of Taesunchillihoe.

In 1942 Cho secretly reactivated his religion (Kim 1989: 314-315; No 1995: 204). Now known as T’aegûkdo, in 1948 the headquarters was moved to Pusan, where it soon had 3,000 households as members. Moved to the outskirts of Pusan in 1955, the area was turned into a T’aegûkdo village. However, as Cho nominated no clear successor, on his death in 1958, the religion split into Old and New Factions, the former led by Cho’s son, Cho Yôngnae as tojôn, the latter by Pak Han’gyông. This led to a series of violent struggles and charges of embezzlement (Yi 1992: 1213, 744-745; CSD 1996: 14-15). In 1965, Park violently chased out a former tojôn, Yi Yunsôp, and he was denounced for leading a terror campaign. Pak was questioned by police about the violence, the financial books were examined, and a few days later questions were asked about the death of 76 members. Pak was eventually released for lack of evidence or because corrupt politicians wanted his followers’ votes. Again, Pak was denounced as leading a pro-communist group, was arrested, and released because he supposedly paid huge bribes, and the accusers were charged with libel. In 1961, Pak bought off the gendarmes of the new military regime with massive quantities of gold, and so his court-martial was suspended (CSD 1996: 25, 44, 48-50).

In 1968, Pak fled to Seoul, with 37.5 kgs of gold and 460,000 Won. Under the name of T’aegûkchillihoe, in 1969 he established a new religion, and bought a large property in Chunggok-dong on the rear side of Walker Hill (CSD 1996: 26-27). This marks the beginning of Taesunchillihoe, a name adopted in 1972. The T’aegûkdo charges are denied on the basis that a biography of Cho stated that the “bank books, seal, and cash box was given” to Pak by Cho, and that the police investigation resulted in a verdict of not guilty (Mun 1997: 71). A lasting resentment was held by the impoverished T’aegûkdo, and they wrote into their scripture a dramatic scene where Cho, as Sangje, casts Pak out with a wave of his hands and the shout of “thief” (CSD 1996: 14; T’aegûkdo 1989: 706). The T’aegûkdo gave the results of their investigation to the Pusan ilbo, which reported that every night Pak led a female believer to his rooms for illicit sex and then misappropriated the donations that were
to be used for devotions (CSD 1996: 26). These allegations were repeated by T'aegûkdo leaders on the 1996 MBC TV program (CSD 2000: 42).

Possessing these substantial resources, the secessionist Taesunchillihoe was able to build a considerable base. It also gathered monthly contributions from members and other funds gained by less honorable means. Its admirable charity work though, bought it increased respectability, and even when controversy flared in the media, the order declined to directly answer the charges, even those of the “Pursuit” TV show, despite its apparent hindrance to their proselytization. It claims to silently endure even the grossest of slurs made by its upstart arch-rival, Chûngsando, on the explicit orders of Pak, based on the principle of the faith “not to create enmity”. Pak ordered there be no law suits, and that members, as religious, should pray instead (Mun 1997: 55, 115).

Despite this reticence, controversy and violence erupted after the demise of Pak in 1996, and the familiar pattern of internal leadership struggles and media condemnation resurfaced. The problem, again, was that Pak had not nominated a successor, leaving the various power-holders to fight for hegemony. The war began at 2.15am, 16th July 1999, when a group of 1,500 invaded the Yôju headquarters and drove out Yi Yujong and 100 of his followers, in order to sequester the contributions of the faithful and the bank accounts. By 4 pm, about 3,000 members formed two warring factions in a face-off, and 15 squads of riot police intervened. At dawn, 6th January 2000, the Yi Yujong faction tried to forcibly eject that of Kyông Sôkkyu, Pak’s brother-in-law, from Yôju, after the failure of a court application for a temporary evacuation. Barricades were made with overturned buses and cranes, molotov cocktails were thrown. Shouting “thief,” the invaders, armed with clubs, charged, but the riot police repelled them. The next day, both sides even rallied children, with the occupiers bringing 2,500 supporters into the compound. All the major TV and press networks covered these events (CSD 2000: photos, 26-28, 34).

The Chûngsando heresiography gives two more reasons for the dispute. The first, is that as Pak was considered to be the most venerated of men (injon), he was popularly thought immortal. The apocalypse had to arrive while he was alive so that he could lead the forthcoming utopia. Upon his death, the tale spread that he had merely ascended to Heaven (his death is called hwachôn), rationalising an uncomfortable fact. He was part of a trinity, with Kang Ilsun the Sangje of Heaven, Cho Ch’ôlje the Sangje of earth, and Pak the Sangje of humanity. Therefore, he was not expected to die before the kaebûk (CSD 2000: 32-34). The other reason is the “mafia family”-like structure of Taesunchillihoe, which has a centralised pyramidal structure, with all the cells, parishes or chapters, separate and giving allegiance to their direct superiors. Moreover, some parishes (pangmyôn) have an overwhelming majority of women, others a majority of young people, etc. This further intensified divisions (CMD 2000: 29-30). Also, because of centralisation, all donations were first forwarded to the headquarters, which then distributed the funds (Mun 1997: 22, 81, 154).

Therefore, the struggles for power and wealth, and the failure to nominate successors, plus the disappointments and rationalisations of the death of presumably immortal
leaders, has repeatedly caused splits and factional fights in this Chûngsan lineage of NRM s. The media presentations of the violence have possibly undone that patient creation of a respectable public image that began in the 1970s, and makes a mockery of those like Mun Ïlsôk who asserted that one should not worry about a split (Mun 1997: 33-35). The internal clashes have other repercussions, for a division over the objects of worship has emerged, with the Kyông Sôkkyyu faction worshiping as Sangje only Kang Ilsun and Cho Ch’ôlje, placing them beside Buddha, while the Yi Yujong and An Yông’il factions venerate three Sangje; Kang, Cho and Pak. Yi Yujong has even been charged with apostasy, of following Ilgwando, another NRM (CSD 2000: 35-37).

One of the reasons for the success of Taesunchillihoe lies in its ability to obtain wealth, whether it was through appropriating the funds amassed by Cho and the T’aegûkdo believers, and later through the tithes on members, and possibly even by extortion. Some members live like monks or nuns, giving all their labour for free, working diligently for long hours on minimum sleep. Pak recommended the diminution of sleep in order to devote more time to practice, while encouraging frugality, supposedly by personal example. He stated that members should make donations to charity even when poor. The massive construction projects have been completed in extraordinarily short periods (Mun 1997: 51, 77, 83, 25) because the worker members lived on site, slept as little as two or three hours per night, and took hardly any breaks. I was told at Yôju that this was due to divine energy (ki) channeled from Heaven into the laborers. Even ordinary believers are expected to practice nightly chanting from 1.00 to 2.00 am, and at least at the Kunja chapter where I stayed, rise at 6.00 am to begin chanting again at 7.00am. At Tongduchôn I was told in February 1997 that the construction workers at the hospital were paid virtually nothing, and the area was strictly guarded.

Yet the wealth generated by this labour and appropriations, does not explain the zeal of the faithful or their motivation for joining. This prosperity has been achieved despite much negative publicity and hostility from rivals and modernisers. Some Chûngsan NRMs, such as P’ochôn’gyo, Mugûkdo and Taesunchillihoe, have achieved huge memberships and vast wealth, and yet most of the estimated 100 Chûngsan NRMs have had insignificant memberships (see study of one by Prunner 1988). Therefore, their shared religious features do not provide an explanation for success. The feature that stands out is the organisational capacities of the leaders of the successful groups, such as the intelligent selection of conversion targets, the operation of businesses and formation of a hierarchical structure. P’ochôn’gyo ran a newspaper and business corporation, and modernised by forming a nationwide bureaucracy, just like that of an empire Ch’a aimed to create. When threatened, he skillfully bribed the Japanese (Murayama 1935: 324-326; Kim 1989: 307-310; No 1995: 201-206; Yi 1992: 242-256). Cho operated a large corporation, which held 72 mining leases, and logging rights, and even in the poverty-stricken days after the Korean War somehow amassed 37.5 kg of gold. Pak also established a complex hierarchy (Prunner 1976: 15) and obtained huge sums of money. Even Taesunchillihoe’s most powerful rival, Chûngsando, founded in 1974, has been active in conversion, expanding overseas, publishing extensively, translating scriptures into English, using modern technology and setting up university circles (Ch’oe 1998: 167-168; Lee 1988).
Similarly, Taesunchillihoe has changed the targets of its proselytizing. While Ch’a and Cho were rural based and appealed to the majority farmers and anti-Japanese sentiment, Pak moved his headquarters out of a village of believers on the margins of Pusan into the Seoul metropolis. Prunner, in 1976, had the impression that the majority of believers were rural and poorly educated, but noted the prestige of a headquarters on Walker Hill (Prunner 1976: 14, 23). Now the overwhelming majority of members seem to be under 30, many being high school and university students. Propaganda methods include haunting places favoured by this demographic; the large bookstores, especially the Asian thought and religion sections, and the Seoul underground. The usual solicitation is to inquire if one is interested in Eastern thought or the Way, and then an invitation to a place that teaches such ideas, without mention of Taesunchillihoe. Occasionally, aggressive recruiters have caused problems for Chûngsando and the bookstore managers (Ch’oe 1998: 166; CSD 1996: 83-86).

Emphasis has been given to causes fashionable with the young such as the environment, organic farming, gender equality, political reunification and world peace, and since 1987 Taesunchillihoe has established many university circles (Mun 1997: 45, 48, 102, 111-112), although its enemies state it aims at the lowest levels of society, naïve women and young students without judgment (CSD 1996: 2), although the same could be said of its bitterest detractor, Chûngsando. This is evident from their fury at being lumped together in an attack by T’ak Myônghwan for their “encroachment” on students (CSD 1996: 81), which suggests they have been aiming at the same niche in the religious marketplace. Taesunchillihoe has learnt the organisational and propaganda techniques from its forbears, Christian missionaries and Wôn Buddhism. Among its methods are set practice times, quotas for conversions, sleep deprivation, intense periods of hard-sell proselytizing with two or more recruiters to one candidate, communal living, the combined threat of an apocalypse and utopia, and the proclaimed presence of a god incarnate or his saviour deputy. It plays upon nationalism and identity by asserting the saviour is Korean, and like its predecessors has built its centres in (Sino-)Korean temple and palace architectural styles with tanchông decoration, of which it seems inordinately proud (Mun 1997: 96, 100, 103, 155-157). Like some other NRMs, it uses Chinese characters to overawe those unversed in Classical Chinese with the seeming profundity and eternity of its teaching and the talent of its founders (cf. Mun 1997: 97; Chôn’gyông). It provides an appealing mixture of the familiar, “Korean” and shamanistic or ancient with the modern (pseudo)-scientific. Explications are made by compounding popular notions of ki together with science, and so the vaguely familiar symbols and half-understood science give verisimilitude for the young. Taoist immortals, figures from the Sino-Korean past, explanations of the 28 lunar mansions and five physical phases are found juxtaposed with modern medical facilities and computers. The spirirtism and New Age theories found in Japanese NRMs surfaces here also (Young 1990: 29-33). Globalisation is resisted and native identity heightened by rules requiring the wearing of traditional Korean dress, which symbolises peace (Mun 1997: 95), for all major ceremonies and in the sanctums such as Yôju, where no cameras are permitted. Watches and glasses are forbidden here and at initiation rituals, for such items prevent the descent of correct ki from Heaven into the performers (personal observation). Like many NRMs, the spirits are very important, as is the use of incantations and the
theory of the physical transformation of the body via these practices.

While it is a syncretic religion based on a chaotic jumble of the incoherent or symbolic aphorisms and deeds of Kang Ilsun, Taesunchillihoe has, unlike most of the Chûngsan NRMs whose scriptures follow the biographical and chronological collection of unconnected aphorisms, abandoned that approach in its Chôn'gyông. Rather, it retained the chronological approach in the first three chapters and then adopted a thematic approach in the last four. The text seems to have been a reworking of the earlier works of Yi Sangho (1888-1966) by Chang Pyônggil (1919- ), a professor of religious studies from Seoul National University who was allegedly recruited by Pak Han’gyông to head the compilation team. Chang had been a renowned authority on native NRMs until his retirement in 1974, publishing a number of standard references on the topic. Once retired, he headed a Taesunchillihoe research centre, published regularly in the Taesun hoebo (CSD 2000: 150-153) and wrote a book on Chûngsan thought that supports the Taesunchillihoe lineage and uses the Chôn’gyông as its only source (Chang 1976: 199 et passim). Taesunchillihoe has been clever in capturing such an academic expert, and it seems to have skilfully utilised academics, journalists and public figures who are sympathetic to support its cause, perhaps selectively quoting at times (cf. Mun 1997: 124-137). Such statements have given Taesunchillihoe added credibility and respectability, especially as a native Korean religion, and may also explain why in academia there has been little comment on its more questionable activities. Yet as the Aum Shinrikyô events proved, this lack of questioning of the actions of NRMs is undermining the authority of religious studies Watanabe 1997; Reader 2000a).

Taesunchillihoe’s success then can partly be explained by its financial astuteness, the exploitation of the religious zeal of its members, the positive image it has cultivated by charitable works, the manipulation of academic prestige, the play on nationalism, the repeated promises of a coming utopia after an ever-imminent apocalypse, the refusal to reply to criticism in order to garner sympathy, and the reclusiveness of its leader who thereby cultivated an aura of sanctity. While it shares many features with other NRMs, it has been the clever targetting of the shifting demographics, the disguised hard-sell and the financial prowess that have combined to allow it to rapidly outpace nearly all its NRM rivals. It is not particularly due to some inherent religiosity that has given it such success, for that is shared by most religions. Researchers therefore cannot ignore the history and politics of, and even abuses committed by, religious groups.

Abbreviations
CSD: Chûngsando chôn’guk ch’ôngnyôn sindo yônhapsaehoe
HMC: Han’guk minjok chonggyo kyoûi hoe
TH: Taesun hoebo
References Cited


The Evolution in anti-Americanism in South Korea: From Ideologically Embedded to Socially Constructed

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1. Introduction

Why should policy-makers and academics continue to be concerned about anti-Americanism? America has been the major player since the end of the Cold War. With the vanishing of the power of the Soviet Union, there has been a power vacuum, which was filled by the U.S. unilaterally and which has been challenged by many countries who are envious and angry of the role the U.S. plays in the world. In particular, Asia has become a hot issue when it comes to U.S. foreign policy interests. Some scholars have predicted that China will going to try to “throw” the U.S. out of Asia (Friedberg 2000). This would be devastating for U.S. strategic, political, and economic interest. Anti-Americanism is an indicator that the U.S. position is losing power and support abroad. It also means that those countries, which try to fight the U.S., might gain support from groups that promote anti-Americanism. The result of this struggle could be destructive because it might create another power vacuum with no single country strong enough to fill in the gaps.

Anti-Americanism has been a phenomenon in many counties since the end of World War II. Surprisingly, during the Cold War period, those countries, which were heavily supported by the U.S. excessively, have been countries that showed the strongest anti-American sentiment (Hollander 1992). South Korea (hereafter Korea) was seen as the most pro-American country among the allies (Kim 1994: 36); however, this tendency has shifted to a strongly expressed anti-American sentiment during the 1980s and again during the late 1990s after the Korean economy collapsed.

The hypothesis of this paper is that there has been a shift of anti-Americanism from an ideologically embedded state to social construction. During the Cold War, anti-Americanism in Korea was mainly supported and vocalized by radical leftist student groups, whose roots could be found in the nationalist movement during the Japanese colonization. Although the Korean government and the bourgeoisie (those figures whose opinions were openly expressed) were pro-American, there have been groups (especially student groups) who criticized America and American influence since the establishment of political and military ties between the Korean and the American government. At first, Koreans were hopeful about American support in their attempts to democratise the country. These hopes were destroyed when it became obvious that the American government was supporting the dictatorships of Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee instead the more democratic government of Chang Myon.

With the end of the Cold War and the introduction of democracy, anti-American sentiments started to become more pronounced by the general public, more so after the collapse of the Korean economy in 1997. Due to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout, many Koreans began criticizing the Western world, especially the U.S., perceiving the help they received not as a blessing but rather as a condescending act of domination. In order to find proof for this hypothesis, it will be necessary to examine several periods in modern and contemporary Korean history starting with the colonial period and the nationalist movements at the time around the 1920s. That was when nationalism and nationalist ideology started to flourish among Korean intellectuals, especially among students who studied abroad. Furthermore, the period of liberation will be discussed focusing on the role of the U.S. and on the perception many Koreans shared at the time of the entry of U.S. forces into Korea. This appears to be necessary because many Koreans feared that America could become the next colonizing power, a suspicion which seemed reinforce in the phrase “in due course” stated in the Cairo Declaration from 1943. Moreover, the 1980s will be researched because the 1980s showed the resentment many Koreans, especially students, felt toward the U.S. presence and influence. Finally, the transition during the 1990s shall be looked at. The questions of how and why the perception of U.S. Korean policy changed and why an anti-American sentiment spread among the broader public will be answered in this section. A look at the current state of Korean-American relations will be discussed in the conclusion. With the inauguration of the Bush administration there have been many problems concerning the issue of anti-Americanism, which shall be only mentioned here.

During the last decade, anti-Americanism has gained popularity due to across the board factors, which affect the common folk: the economic crisis, American pressure on the Korean government to open the Korean market, and the antipathy towards a growing influence of American culture which threatens the existence of Korean traditions. This new trend of anti-Americanism is implied when talking about socially constructed anti-Americanism because a greater part of the Korean population shares the sentiment in opposition to a few students and scholars during the Cold War period. Another difference is that during the Cold War period but particularly during the 1980s, the expression of anti-Americanism was much more outspoken and violent than today although it was not supported (at least not openly) by the majority of the people. These days, many more people criticise the U.S. without expressing it violently any more. What is the significance of violence or lack of here? Korea is no longer a developing country, but rather a major economic power; materialism and capitalism have taken over, and Korea, as well as the Korean people, wants to be treated as an equal. Although many people oppose a strong American influence and wish to be seen as equal, they have for the most part matured beyond violent clashes. Hence, anti-Americanism has reached a higher intellectual level where people try not to be as emotional but more rational, expressing their feelings and critiques rather with words than with acts of violence.

1.1. Defining anti-Americanism

Anti-Americanism is difficult to define; however, it manifests itself in at least four different categories: inauthenticity; capitalism, the associated injustices and inequalities and decline of the quality of life; aggressiveness and repressiveness, their cultural sources and by-products; and the loss of meaning and the deformation of the individual; the critiques of individualism (Hollander 1992: 49). Broadly, it can be defined “as any hostile action or expression toward the United States, its government,
domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people” (Kim 1994: 37).

Another definition by Yi Ch’ae-bong suggests that "anti-Americanism can be seen in various forms from doubt and disappointment to disdain and opposition against the American government's policy, culture and society" (Yi 1989: 11).

Paul Hollander also gives another definition stated in an interview with Brian Lamb on April 19, 1992:

A mindset, an attitude of distaste, aversion or intense hostility, the roots of which may be found in matters unrelated to the actual qualities or attributes of American society. In short, the way it is used here, anti-Americanism refers to a negative predisposition, a type of bias which is, to varying degrees, unfounded, regarded as an attitude similar to its far more thoroughly explored counterparts, such as racism, sexism or anti-Semitism.

And he gives another one in the same interview:

What holds together the varieties of anti-Americanism is a sense of grievance and the compelling need to find some clear-cut and morally satisfying explanation for a wide range of unwelcome circumstances associated with either actual states or feelings of backwardness, inferiority, weakness, diminished competitiveness or a loss of coherence and stability in the life of a nation, a group or individual.

All these definitions express a perception against America's political and military influence, although the last definition points more at a notion of envy towards American lifestyle as well as at a notion of a feeling of American ascendancy. In the case of Korea it should become obvious that especially military factors have played a crucial role. During the Cold War, military, political, and ideological issues might have been the most important factors when trying to define anti-Americanism, today, especially after the financial crisis in 1997, the importance of economical and cultural issues has increased, however military and political issues have not disappeared. Therefore, anti-Americanism in South Korea will here be defined as a rejection of the American political and military superiority criticized mainly by a few student groups and leftist movements during the Cold War, which after the financial crisis in 1997 especially but also before developed into a broadly supported notion against America's political, military, economic, and cultural influence. It asks for independence from U.S. Far Eastern policy as well as for the right to handle their own problems by themselves. Anti-American supporters in Korea also encourage the idea that the U.S. hinders Koreas attempt for reunification with the North and blames it for the failures of the Sunshine (Engagement) Policy.

2. Rise of Nationalism

As in most other nations (except England and perhaps France), Korean nationalism arose as a response to a crisis that it faced beginning from the late 19th century. As Korea signed an unequal treaty with Japan in 1876 and witnessed the breakdown of the existing East Asian order, Koreans were searching for ways to reform their inefficient system in order to participate in the formation of a new East Asian order. (Shin 2000a: 3.)
Nationalism plays an important role when one wants to talk about anti-Americanism. In Korea especially it can be argued that nationalism was an important factor during the Japanese colonial period and during the ongoing Korean War as well as afterwards. We have to question now, where this nationalistic sentiment came from. Professor Gi-Wook Shin talks about a divided group of Pan-Asians and Nationalists.

Korea first learned about nationalism and Pan-Asianism from copies of books that were translated by Korean scholars in the late 19th century. Pan-Asianism was a concept that embraced the idea that the Asian countries, the so-called "yellow race" should unite and build a front to the united European and American race. "Accepted as a natural category of people, yellowness became the basis for a variety of groups around East Asia to propose regional solidarity to resist Western white imperialism" (Shin 2000b: 7).

On the other hand, nationalism went far beyond that. Nationalists saw the threat of the Japanese and realized that Japanese did not plan to unite with the other Asian nations especially not after the Protectorate Treaty of 1905. "The piece was an expression of betrayal and marked and end to a call for pan-Asianist alliance" (Ibid: 10), therefore they were proposing "an energetic and nationalistic Korean state that can survive in a world of rampant imperialism" (Ibid: 11). They wanted to fight imperialist powers, especially Japan.

It was necessary to create a sense of a national identity, which according to Shin did not exist in the first half of this century. "Nationalism was a modern and Western phenomenon but as it spread into other parts of the world, it has taken various shapes and meanings, reflecting historically specific circumstances that a given country or people faced" (Ibid: 2). At first, it was rather difficult to find unique features that would provide the people with a collective identity, however, the representatives of the nationalist group like Sin Ch’aeho and Pak Unsik (1895-1925) tried very hard to find evidence for Korea’s uniqueness. Sin even reinterpreted the Korean history to place the Korean nation in the category of "historical race" (Ibid: 12). Furthermore, Shin points out that Sin tried to underline the importance of the national spirit, which was necessary to form an organic body, which was connected through a pure bloodline (Ibid). Sin is responsible for making Yi Sunsin and other historic figures national heroes in his attempt to create the real "Korean national spirit" (Ibid: 13).

In the case of Korean nationalism it was not so much the white Westerners that were seen as a threat but rather the Japanese who were the major enemy. That was different from Pan-Asianism, which saw Asia as a united front fighting against the imperialistic West. "Some even called for Japanese leadership in bringing "reform and progress" to Korea and peace to Asia" (Ibid: 14). Hence, Pan-Asianism was rejected also because the leaders of this group were seen as pro-Japanese.

Other nationalists, like Ch’oe Namsôn, tried "to present a Korea-centred view of East Asia to counter Japanese depiction of Korean history" therefore he restored "Tan’gun as the founder of the Korean nation" (Ibid: 16). With Tan’gun there was Shamanism and other national heroes (e.g. Yi Sunshin) that were supposed to show Korea’s uniqueness and to help to find a national identity. "Korea developed an organic, ethno-cultural, and collectivistic version of national identity centred around a belief in ethnic unity or racial homogeneity." (Shin 2000a: 3)

Many people who suffered under the Japanese regime were anxious to overtake these nationalistic ideas and even more so after the country was divided after 1945. After the Korean War ended in 1953, Korea was in a crisis and nationalism seemed to be a possible panacea. It was important, according to Shin, that the people
could "envision a society in which they can live together not only as ethnic Korean fellows but as equal citizens of a democratic polity" (Ibid: 23). He claims that the same held true for former East Germany when after reunification there were many problems.

2.1. Nationalism in Opposition to anti-Imperialism

During the years of Japanese colonization, there have been several nationalistic Korean groups, who tried to fight the invaders and uphold the Korean spirit. Michael Robinson in his book *Cultural Nationalism in Colonial Korea, 1920-1925* talks about two major groups: cultural nationalists and leftist nationalists. Although, he focuses mainly on cultural nationalists, he manages to provide the reader with a good interpretation of the problems that existed between both groups. In this part of the paper, the group that rebelled strongest against anti-Imperialism will be examined: the leftist (communist) nationalists.

The first official Korean Communist party did not exist before 1925. This was due to factional disputes among the Koreans in exile and the harsh repression by Japanese police. Their main goal was to liberalize the country from the Japanese imperialists. With their criticism of the cultural nationalists, a deep split occurred between the Korean nationalist groups at home and abroad, which was also supported by the Japanese. The difference between these two groups was that the cultural nationalist tried to be active in the borders set by the Japanese authorities. They were more concerned with losing their voice by abolishment than with getting their message out to the people. Therefore, they were criticized as being elitist (because they were trying to gain favors for some influential groups, e.g. the Korean manufacturers) and pro-Japanese by leftist nationalists, who were more radical in their approach. This led to stricter punishment by the Japanese censors and to the abolishment of leftist newspapers and magazines. Kaebuyok was eventually shut down in 1926 due to its radical content. Other magazines and newspapers were permitted but abolished after publishing only a few issues (sometimes it was even less than a few issues) (Robinson 1988: 115). It also provoked the Japanese to abolish the communist party as well as all communist activities.

The leftist movement started to gain a stronghold among Koreans after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. That is when the first Korean based Communist Parties were formed on Russian soil. The first Korean Socialist party (Han’in sahoedang), was founded by Yi Tonghwì in Khabarovsk in 1918 and Nam Manch’un organized a Korean section of the Communist party in Irkusk in the same year (Robinson 1988: 109). These groups were dedicated more to fighting for Korea’s independence than they were to the socialist cause. Their hope was to get Lenin’s help for their fight against the Japanese after helping Russia. The Koreans in Russia during this first period studied the communist literature and tried to spread the word and attract support for Communism in the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Shanghai and in Korea.

They faced many problems. Not only were the two communist parties in Russia competing against each other, their attempts to gain support from the KPG in Shanghai were not fruitful and destroyed the rather unstable alliance within the KPG. Another problem was Lenin’s perspective of the Korean situation. He initially decided to help the Korean independence fighters because of his respect to their
devotion to their cause; however, he later withdrew his support due to the ever-widening split among the pro-communist factions.

A second intellectual group, which became a strong supporter for socialism was the group of students who went to study in Japan. When these students came to Japan, they encountered a fairly open intellectual society where they were free to discuss many things including socialism. They started to study socialism from books in Japanese. This had already happened in the early colonial years, but when the authorities realized the radical shift the Korean students in Japan were undergoing, they issued a warning to the students. This was in 1914 already. Five years later, the restrictions for Korean students studying in Japan were lowered and the number of Korean students in Japan as well as the number of students with access to socialist and/or communist material increased (Ibid: 109-110).

The Japanese felt more threatened by leftist nationalists than by the cultural nationalists because they were fighting more openly against imperialism and were more attractive for the greater population due to their popular approach. Although the cultural nationalists also had an anti-imperialistic approach, during the 1920s their voice became weaker because of the fear of abolishment. The leftist nationalists on the other hand continued to fight loudly against the imperialistic intruders, which led to their abolishment.

The fight against imperialism was strongly pronounce in these communist groups due to the Marxist/Leninist ideology they were based on. However, although they had to face many and harsher restrictions by the Japanese Colonial Government, they managed to uphold their ideology, which finally found its climax in the division of the country in 1948.

3. The U.S. comes to Korea: Is America the new occupier?

When the United States finally came to Korea to liberalize the country, Soviet troops had already liberalized the northern part of Korea. They had already formed some type of governmental system, which included pro-Russian and pro-Communist Koreans in political affairs.

In the South on the other hand, there were pro-Communist intellectuals like Pak Hon-yong and Yo Un-yong organizing a governing system establishing Committees around the country in every South Korean city and two days before Lieutenant General John R. Hodge arrived in Inchon, they even founded a Korean government electing Rhee Syngman as president and electing other liberal and rightist intellectuals for other posts. Rhee refused to accept this position arguing that this government was communist and designed to appear moderate when it was actually communist. This Korean government was also ignored by Hodge who called it illegitimate and reestablished old colonial ties with former pro-Japanese Korean and Japanese officials. This decision led to a lot of disappointment and frustration among South Koreans and many people were upset about the condescending attitude the Americans had towards Korea.

U.S. interests in this part of the world were not especially high during this period and even during the 1950s, did not change significantly, although President Rhee forced the U.S. to sign a mutual defense treaty with South Korea towards the end of the Korean War.

Because the U.S. ignored the wishes of the Korean population and their ignorance to Korean history, the U.S. was perceived by many Koreans as another
threat to national independence. There were voices claiming that the United States would become the new occupier not wanting to give independence to the Korean people. This was first feared when Roosevelt and Stalin first agreed to be allies in World War II. In the Cairo Declaration (1st December, 1943) it was stated that Korea would gain independence after liberalization from Japan “in due course.” This upset many Korean nationalists, cultural and leftist, who had hoped for immediate independence once Japan was defeated. The decision to divide the country into zones also showed Koreans that the U.S. government did not perceive Korean nationalists of being capable to deal with their own politics.

However, Koreans were split in their opinions. Some believed that the United States would help them to accomplish their goals and used their influence to gain support from the U.S., like Rhee Syngman. Others believed in the Soviet government and/or claimed that the U.S. was trying to occupy Korea. These claims came mostly from the leftist anti-Imperialist faction in the South, which consisted mainly of university students and leftist intellectuals namely the group that dominated the anti-American/ anti-dictatorship movement throughout the Cold War period. Their major argument was the fact that the U.S. government supported dictatorships instead of a democratic government. Later on they accused the U.S. military of being responsible for the murder of student activists in Kwangju in May 1980, which, as will be seen in the next chapter, led to a decade of anti-American terror in Korea.

4. The Eighties: Increasing criticism

The 1980s was one of the toughest decades in Korea. Students were revolting on the street against the Chun Doo-hwan government; the U.S. the alleged supporter of the government and for democracy.

[At that time] Anti-Americanism became so intense that few Americans could walk the streets of Seoul without fear of insult or worse; the U.S. Embassy, which sits conspicuously adjacent to the seat of government in Seoul, came to look like a legation in Beirut, with concrete revetments and heavy security to keep the madding crowd at bay. (Cumings & Mesler 1998: Internet source)

Students were blaming the United States for the Kwangju massacre and for their position towards the South Korean government. Before the U.S. was remembered as a country having helped South Korea during the Korean War; however, this position was mainly held by older groups in Korean society. "The war generation is now a minority … and the memories of younger Koreans are not of liberation but of repression" (Bandow 1987: Internet Source). Many of the younger generation lost their faith in America. One reason was that after the fall of Rhee Syngman, "the U.S. embassy officials tried to support the elected [Chan Myon] government, but Washington refused to back them; the Kennedy administration decided to assist the military junta instead" (Ibid). Therefore, at that time too, the students and many other Koreans "suspected America of having been involved in the coup staged by the then-general Chun in 1980" (Ibid). Bandow states another reason for the student's anger and suspicion after the Kwangju Massacre:

The fact that Wickham raised no objection to Chun’s use of the troops and later publicly stated that the Koreans were not ready for
democracy made it appear that Washington would blindly support any pro-American government, regardless of whether it was cruel.

Hence, the anti-American sentiment grew and several incidents were recorded where Koreans attacked American soldiers or civilians. However, even after Roh Tae Woo was elected as the Korean president, the protests did not stop and anti-Americanism was still rampant among Korean citizens. This became particularly clear, "when Koreans lustily cheered a Soviet team to victory over the United States in the 1988 Olympics" (Holloran 1997: Internet Source).

In conclusion, it can be stated that anti-American sentiment during the 1980s was probably at a fairly high point due to the anger and fury that arose after the Kwangju massacre. Before America was seen as a supporter of the Korean people by most within the Korean society, however, the people lost trust when they saw America not intervening in the actions that were going on in Kwangju and throughout Korea during the Chun governmental period.

5. The End of the Cold War: Rising Problems and Transition

With the beginning of the 1990s democracy started to develop in Korea, especially after Kim Yong Sam, a well-known fighter for democracy, won the presidential election in 1993. Changes were expected and they came: for instance, the development of a free press started to take place during the time when President Kim Yong Sam held office. Although the democratization process is still going on, many things have changed in Korea.

Although this period of time can be characterized as a period when anti-Americanism was not expressed very frequently, it was a period where the foundations were laid for a new type of anti-Americanism in Korea. After the election of President Kim Yong-Sam, many people believed that Korea finally achieved a state of democratic governance. This also took away the basis for many student movements who where fighting vigorously for democracy. With a democratic government in place, many groups which were active in the democratization movement during the 1980s had to look for new objectives and goals to not lose their legitimacy.

These new problems that occurred during the 1990s were due to pressure from the U.S. to open Korea’s markets. Significant here is also the entry of Korea in the WTO in 1995. From that time on Korea had to follow certain economic standards and criticism from abroad grew louder when Korea did not follow these requirements. There were many issues, particularly trade issues, with the U.S. who forced Korea to open its market in all kind of fields but especially in the areas of agriculture and cars.

Many Koreans criticized the U.S. for their attitude towards Korea: they claimed that Korea could not open because they could never compete with American products due to their lack of resources and overall “backwardness” in comparison to the U.S. However, the U.S. government remained unyielding in their demands and finally realized a slow opening of the Korean market in the beginning and mid 1990s.

After the opening of the market, a lot of foreign goods (and in particular U.S. goods) came to Korea and with the goods came the culture. Many American chain fast-food restaurants opened up and started to dominate the streets of Seoul. Over the years, this attracted increased cultural criticism. Especially tradition and Korean culture advocates started to reject the growing impact of the invasion of American culture.
These factors created an aversion in many Korean minds. Criticism grew louder and started to tarnish U.S. reputation once more. This time, however, Koreans did not use acts of violence perhaps due to the reasons mentioned in the introduction. Anyhow, a stronger and broader resentment against the U.S. military, U.S. policy, and U.S. culture started to emerge, which only grew even stronger and broader during and after the economic crisis.

6. The Economic Crisis

The early 1990s until around 1995 can be characterized as rather stable. Although there were some problems these were minor once and did not have a significant impact on anti-Americanism. Actually, during the mid 90s anti-Americanism might have been at one of its lowest points ever considering that there were almost no anti-American demonstrations or any other reported acts of violence against U.S. citizens. This might have been due to the election of Kim Yong Sam, a well-known freedom fighter, in 1992 and to a stable and optimistic economic situation.

That changed rather rapidly after the beginning of the Korean financial crisis but especially after the bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the end of 1997. Although the IMF is an international organization many people view it as an entirely American organization. The people in Korea and other nations that suffered during the financial crisis could not overlook the "Schadenfreude" (Higgott 1998: Internet Source) by the other Western nations, especially America.

It was well known that the West was astonished and maybe even upset about the up rising of the Asian economy in such a rapid speed and that the East was very proud of its success over the West, what they showed rather openly. However, the crisis showed that the "Asian Way" failed.

Korea's rapid economic development and remarkable political achievements in recent years are a fundamental source of Korean national pride. In stark contrast, the economic crisis represents one of the most pivotal events to negatively shape modern Korean perceptions, both internal and external, equal in impact to the Japanese occupation, the Korean War, and the Kwangju Massacre for most Koreans (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) 1998: Internet Source).

This explanation - especially the "discovery" that all was not what it should be in the banking system - has made it difficult for many Western analysts to disguise a certain Schadenfreude at the situations in which these states now find themselves. If pride cometh before fall, then even the most saintly found it difficult to ignore the discomfort that Dr. Mahathir - and other high-profile exponents of the superiority of the "Asian Way" that had accompanied high East Asian growth in the 1990s - now faced (Higgott 1998: Internet Source).

This was bitter medicine for the ones who failed and in order to keep face, many people came up with a conspiracy theory, which explains that the financial crisis was put into play by the West to make the East fall.
Whether it is true or not, it is interesting to realize that many people in Korea did not see the failure and roots of the crisis in their own misdoing or in the misdealing of their own government, instead they started blaming Western nations, the IMF - but in particular the U.S. An anti-American backlash was the consequence. The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS 1998: Internet Source) puts it this way:

Anger and shame regarding the crisis and the IMF role were expressed early in the crisis through resurgent nationalism and an anti-American backlash. America's most famous diplomat, Henry Kissinger, cautioned recently that a "very virulent" kind of nationalism forms a particularly strong undercurrent in South Korea and urged restraint against promoting a sense of U.S. triumphalism. The by-product of an austere IMF program, with prescriptions most Koreans - including many well-educated elites - believe were shaped by U.S. policymakers, could trigger an extended bout of anti-Americanism, not only in Korea, but also throughout Asia.

This anti-American backlash is troubling. Their first reason is, it undermines regional peace and security and "it may undercut regional support for a continued U.S. military presence precisely when an American presence is necessary to buttress stability."

Secondly, "strong anti-Americanism could trigger a negative reaction in the United States, in particular with members of Congress." The U.S. ambassador to Korea, H.E. Stephen W. Bosworth, (Stephen W. Bosworth at the 23rd IEWS (Institute for East and West Studies) Diplomatic Round Table Series at Yonsei University in November 2000) expressed this concern as well when he pointed out how important the United States are for Korea’s security but these days even more for Korea’s economy. He mentioned that Korea has to realize and is realizing that it is a global player and that "the World is watching them." However, if they continue to express a strong anti-American sentiment, they will have to face a change of perception by the American population and that could have consequences for Korea.

The financial crisis was a dark era throughout Asia. For many nations it meant a loss of pride. The bailout by the IMF was therefore not perceived as the helping hand but as the hand that was slapping them in the face. Some people warned that this perception "maybe promoting a new round of anti-Americanism in the region" (Bello 1998: Internet Source). The Clinton administration has used the IMF to enforce reforms and due to these reforms a lot of people were laid-off and put in a miserable situation. Some people foresaw that:

When Korea begins to experience the real consequences of the austerity measures, for example, potential unemployment of as many as 1.5 million people, Korean politicians will deflect the people's anger by placing blame on the IMF, sowing the seeds for a renewed round of resentment (APCSS 1998: Internet Source).

In Korea, the financial crisis was called "IMF crisis". This clearly shows who is being blamed for their misery - the IMF - and as mentioned earlier, the IMF is being perceived not as an international organization but as an American one or at least as an organization that is being heavily influenced by America. In the end, this is the same thing.
Although the early and mid 90s where less influenced by an anti-American sentiment, the IMF and their bailout program did not just re-established but it also spread and broadened the scope of anti-Americanism after a rather quiet time.

7. Conclusion

Anti-Americanism is difficult to define and many people might even use the term rather loosely. If somebody criticizes one or two things about America, he or she is not automatically anti-American but rather is criticizing one fact or dimension of American society. Anti-Americanism includes a broader notion of criticism. It rejects American ideals, politics, and dominance. It rejects the fundamentals on which American society and U.S. policies are based in not always a very rational manner.

The concept of anti-Americanism implies more than critical disposition: it refers to critiques, which are less than fully rational and not necessarily well founded. It usually alludes to a predisposition, a free-floating hostility or aversion, that feeds on many sources besides the discernible shortcomings of the United States … Among the major sources of such anti-Americanism we find nationalism (political or cultural), the rejection of (or ambivalence toward) modernization and anti-capitalism (Hollander 1992: 7)

In South Korea, there have been groups opposing the U.S. throughout the Cold War although these voices were oppressed by the respective pro-American dictators in the country. The movement finally found its outlet and gained attention during the violent demonstrations and activities in the 1980s. These groups mainly based their resentment and aversion on ideological problems, being influenced by leftist (communist and socialist) thought. Therefore the period from 1945 to the early 1990s is called, ideologically embedded anti-Americanism in this paper. These groups have called the U.S. presence in Korea occupation and have perceived it more as an imperialist force which hindered reconciliation with the North rather than the good friend or older brother who protected the South from the North.

This criticism still exist. However, since the end of the Cold War this type of criticism has spread and a new type of criticism emerged among the Korean people marking the shift towards a socially constructed anti-Americanism. On the one hand, people started to perceive the U.S. as an imperialist force that only helped Korea during the Korean War and with economic aid after the war for its own benefit (this was even more so after the economic crisis). It has also criticized U.S. intervention in Korean internal affairs as well as the behavior of the U.S. military in Korea and the SOFA agreement. On the other hand, they have started to blamed the U.S. for exploiting the Korean economy and for destroying Korean traditional culture. Koreans also started to look at the U.S. as a hindering force in the reconciliation and reunification process with North Korea.

The latter one is particularly important with the change in administrations in Washington. Whereas the Clinton administration appeared to be pro reconciliation and seemed to be helping Korea to achieve their goal of reunification especially with the Summit in 2000, the Bush administration has rejected most agreements and arrangements with North Korea achieved prior, during Clinton’s time in office.

What does this mean to anti-Americanism? Anti-Americanism is going to increase and spread even more and not only throughout Korea but throughout East Asia because the new strategy for U.S. foreign policy does not only touch upon
Korean issues but also upon other major issues within East Asia. If the hardliners in Washington continue with their provoking strategy, they are not only going to endanger the security in the area but also lose a very important ally in the area without which it is going to be difficult to maintain a strong presence in East Asia.

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West and East:  
Creating music with national cultural identity in South Korea

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The history of Korean music dates from the time of Ancient Choson, however, the history of Western music in Korea, that is music from Europe and the USA, is relatively recent (Lee B-Y 1980:192/Lee Y-M 1988:7). Koreans knew very little about the West and Western culture until the middle of the nineteenth century, although it is considered that prior to this period some knowledge of Western instruments was gained through contacts in China. According to Lee Sang-mann:

“Korean visitors to China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries made some mention in their travel diaries of Western instruments and the nature of Western music.”(Lee S-M 1991:249)

It was not until after 1871 that the influence of the West made a significant impact on Korean lifestyle and culture. Following naval engagements with France (1866) and the United States (1871), and also after threats from Japan, Korea opened its ports firstly to Japan in 1876, and then in the 1880s to the United States, England, Germany, Russia and France. There was rapid assimilation of Western ideas, dress, education, newspapers and various aspects of every day Western life.

The main catalyst for the development of Western music in Korea was the arrival of two Christian missionaries from the United States in 1885, namely Horace. G. Underwood of the Presbyterian Church, and Henry G. Appenzeller of the Methodist Church. They brought hymnals with them and the singing of Western style hymns in Christian churches became common religious practice after their arrival (Lee Y-M 1998:9).

An initial result of this singing was the development of vocal music and of the art song which evolved by modifying an existing hymn tune and changing the text, thus a changga was created. Sometimes a patriotic text was used, for example, a song composed in 1920 by Hong Nan-pa, Balsam Flower (Lee Y-M 1988:13). Under Japanese rule this song aroused the national conscience and it is still a popular song today (Lee S-M 1991:250).

In 1910, Ewha Womans College, later the Womans University, established the first college level department of Western music which was formally able to grant degrees in 1925. Until 1945, this was the only music department at college level in Korea. However, extra-curricular musical activities at other schools and colleges encouraged the development of Western style music through the establishment of choirs and bands. For example Yonhi College, which later became Yonsei University, had a ten member band (Lee S-M 1991:257).
There are two layers to Korean traditional music. *Chong-ak* is that of the scholar/aristocrat, the music being usually at a leisurely tempo, with the emphasis on breathing and *Minsok-ak*, the music of the common people, which is of a more spontaneous nature.

In traditional Korean music, both classical and folk, the octave is divided into twelve *yuls* which are not of equal temperament and therefore pitch levels differ to those of the West. There are two modes *p'yonjo* (approximately 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 of the Western scale), and *kyemyonjo* (1, 3, 4, 5, 7), in which the emphasis is on 1, 4 and 5, as it is used generally in a tritonic manner. Each tone has a name, dynamic and special function. The main intervals are P4, P5, m3 and M2, the actual pitching of these intervals is not absolute and ornamental variations such as the wide use of vibrato, glissando and downward slides are an expressive part of performance (Crow 1989:18). Although there is no harmony, as in the Western sense, there is nevertheless a harmonic concept which, in Korean music can relate to combinations of tone colours. The horizontal relationship of these tones is more important than the vertical.

Most Korean music is based on triple beat and metre, rhythm plays an important part, the variation to the basic *changdan* (rhythmic pattern), creates variety within the piece. The speed of performance is also a critical component. The instrumental part is closely related to the vocal part with similar ranges, and both are designed to be performed independently if required (Condit 1983:1026/Kwon 1992:36).

One of the problems with establishing ‘purely’ Korean music is the difficulty associated with presenting works. Basically the concept of composition as such is foreign to the traditional performer. For centuries music has been ‘handed down’ and the performer has been able to contribute in his own way to the overall presentation of the work with his interpretation of ornamentation and subtle improvisation.

In 1993 Han Myung-hee in a Koreana article entitled “What makes Korean music different? A study of its roots and branches” wrote –

“Our ancestors liked plucked string instruments for the “margin” or “empty space” they conveyed, something professional musicians call the “rest” of the sound. The “cry of silence” created by Korean plucked string instruments is overwhelming in solo performance, especially in slow movements. The silence following the last vibration of a note is nothing less than imposing.

…..The very essence of Korean music is this emphasis on the “rest” of the sound as much as the sound itself.”(Han M-H 1993:40)

and in 1994 he commented:

“… it may be said that the concept of tempo in Korean music is based on the rhythm of mans breathing, whereas in Western music it is based on the heartbeat.” (Han M-H 1994:6)

When combining instruments of the two cultures matters such as tuning, differing playing techniques, and the quality of timbre in each instrument can create problems. Whilst Western instruments aim to achieve a certain clarity, Korean instruments are more geared to a subtle variation with overtones. Other aspects are all results of Western influence, such as written composition, paying audience, manner of presentation on a stage, seating arrangements and the use, at times of a conductor (Killick 1991:110).
During the Japanese occupation of 1910-1945 most Korean cultural activities were discouraged. Many aspiring musicians were sent to Japan to study Western style music and some select students were able to study in Germany and the USA. Since the end of the Japanese occupation there has been enormous development and growth in musical studies in Korea.

By the late 1950s the first orchestral atonal composition was presented. From that date the variety of compositional styles and genres has steadily increased, as composers have had greater opportunities for overseas travel and study thus broadening their experiences.

In 1956 Yun Isang (1917-1997), who “was one of the first East Asian composers to establish a reputation in Europe” (Howard 2001:1), went to Germany where initially he was strongly influenced by serialism, his later works show subtle incorporation of Korean court music elements while still retaining his own very personal compositional style.

Yun studied in Osaka and Tokyo from 1941-43, however in 1943 he was imprisoned by the Japanese for his work with the resistance movement. After the war he taught in Pusan and Seoul. In 1956 he won an award which enabled him to travel to Europe for further study.

“Yun’s fundamental aim as a composer was to develop Korean music through Western means, combining East Asian performance practice with European instruments, and expressing an Asian imagination in contemporary musical terms.” (Kunz, H 2001:696)

In 1956 Yun was abducted from Germany by the Park regime and imprisoned in Seoul, after International pressure he was released and returned to Germany in 1970. Yun became a German citizen in 1971. He taught in Hanover from 1970-71 and in Berlin for many years. His pupils included Kang Suk-hi, Kim Chung-gil and Paik Byong-dong, who have all made significant contribution to the development of music in Korea.

In Sori, for solo flute, composed in 1988, Yun was inspired by elements of Buddhist vocal music and p’ansori. This work displays contrasting passages of ornamented melismatic phrases and those of a more contemplative nature.

**Musical e.g 1 Sori**

Yun and many other Korean composers while using modern Western techniques, also try to keep some Korean characteristics in their compositions, emphasising, in most cases, the linear quality and its horizontal relationship of tone.

La In-yong and Lee Chan-hae’s music is indicative of the stylistic diversity which can be found in Korean composition. Both use Western techniques and materials. La is often inspired by Korean and Asian symbolism and philosophy, while Lee pursues her own musical style which she considers flows from within the individual (Kwon 1992:144).

La In-yong born 1936 into a Christian family, his early introduction to Western music was through attendance at religious services. However, he was also attracted to the music of peasant bands, which he often heard on festive occasions. La was therefore able to absorb elements of both musical cultures, which later assisted in the formation of his musical language. Although La was unfortunate enough to suffer
ill-health for a long period, leaving him disabled, he has been able through his experiences to strengthen his spiritual and philosophical ideals and interpret them in his music.

*Kasiri ‘Farewell’,* is for mixed voices, this was originally composed in 1978, and won the BBC Choral Competition prize. La revised the work in 1990, and again won first prize in the World Choral Competition sponsored by the European Broadcasting League. The text is taken from an anonymous secular *sijo*, a short lyric song sung by both upper and lower classes, for self entertainment. It is based on a poetic genre of the same name. *Sijo* are brief, three line poems, usually about nature, beauty or love, which were written by nobles, scholars and musicians. The song is usually performed by a solo singer, accompanied by the *changgo*. For more elaborate concert performances *p’iri, taegum* or *haegum* may be added. As the tempo is slow and melodies simple, the main interest lies in dynamics and ornamentation. This particular adaptation comprises three sections, A B A, the middle section includes the imitation of *kayageum* sounds by the chorus.

**Musical e.g 2 Kasiri – the middle section.**

In 1987-88 La was undertaking research at the Institute of Contemporary Music, Freiburg Hochschule fur Musik, in Germany. Here he wrote *Tae*, an orchestral work which was premiered in Seoul in 1991. Whilst using Western compositional techniques, the work is in part based on Asian philosophy. La was inspired by the philosophical model of the Korean flag, or *Tae-kuk*. In *Tae*, La symbolically treats the “Great Absolute” as a complete body of twelve tones. He divides his tones into two groups of six tones, and then works out a group of chords. The *Yin* chords are more dissonant than the *Yang* chords, both are generally treated in the cyclic principle of the Great Absolute. With respect to pitch materials, the first movement begins with the centre tone of D and gradually moves to Bb, the second movement has Bb as its centre tone and the third movement begins with Bb as the tonal centre and moves to end on D, *Yang-Yin-Yang*.

In recent years La has been concentrating on the composition of chamber music and says that philosophy now constitutes the essence of his musical expression, with technique playing a subservient part (La I-Y 1996:9).

A differing approach is taken by Lee Chan-hae b.1945. A graduate of Yonsei, Lee obtained her MM from the Catholic University of America in Washington. She is a professor at Yonsei and has also been a visiting scholar at Wayne State University and Oakland University in the USA. Her works have been performed by major symphony orchestras and chamber groups in Korea and overseas.

In seeking to establish her own identity, Lee realised the limitations of a Korean using only Western style composition. Thus she pursues her own music which she considers flows from the individual. As far as cultural characteristics are concerned, she feels if a composer recognises his/her own identity, the music will therefore express national characteristics even without intent (Kwon 1992:144). Although she believes shaman music may be the best suited to supply the characteristics of Korean music, she rejects this because of her strongly held Christian beliefs. Instead she borrows ideas from traditional Korean dance and art such as the linear character of dance, monophonic texture, shades of colour and slow movement.
Musical e.g 3 Sorickil for Taegum, (2000) ‘The sound of Life Journey.’ The taegum is a large bamboo flute with six finger holes, a blowing hole and a membrane covered hole which contributes to a buzzing sound. It has a relatively large mouthpiece which allows gradation of pitches to be produced (Crowder-Han 1999:134).

In conversation, Lee indicated that, whilst she considers choral music is important, she is not strongly influenced by poets or social factors that are not related to her religious beliefs. She sometimes changes styles of writing. In her attempt to find a Korean style, she is concentrating on research for Korean harmony, microtones and rhythm. She feels that percussion is an important side of colouration. Lee has been able to successfully combine traditional and Western styles with a composition incorporating a string quartet and kayageum.

The three composers whose works have been presented provide typical examples of the compositional strength apparent in South Korea. They are not alone in their achievements and influence. Many others could also be used to illustrate the developments and advances of Korean music since 1945.

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Korean Women and Korean Women Artists

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By looking at the works of some Korean women artists, this paper will explore a question: Why do many Korean women artists tend to reluctantly position themselves as a woman artist or feminist artist?

I have chosen three Korean women artists, YUN Suk Nam, KIM Soo Ja, and AHN Pil Yun, because their work deal with a political struggle that Asian women artists have in achieving success and recognition in the mainstream art world, which is still defined (overwhelmingly) as Western and white. Since exhibiting their work abroad, these artists are aware of an effect of dislocation within their work. This dislocation intersects and overlaps the issue of nation, race and gender.

Another reason that I have chosen YUN Suk Nam, KIM Soo Ja, and AHN Pil Yun among Korean women artists is that they have exhibited their work in Australia. YUN Suk Nam was included in the 2nd Asia-Pacific Triennial of Contemporary Art, Queensland Art Gallery, Brisbane, 1996 and The 12th Biennale of Sydney, 2000, Kim Soo Ja in The 11th Biennale of Sydney, 1998, while the AHN Pil Yun exhibited two of her solo show in Australia in 1996 and 2000.

YUN Suk Nam, KIM Soo Ja and AHN Pil Yun explore the questions of experience, body, gender and cultural identity through their use of traditional Korean references and materials such as Hanbok or traditional Korean costume (for example, slide 13: YUN Suk Nam, Vendor, 1993, slide 17, Living with her Husband Parents, 1992), Pojagi or traditional wrapping cloth (KIM Soo Ja, Lying on the Nature, 1994) and Musok or shamanistic rituals (for example, AHN Pil Yun, slide 15, Kaleidoscope III, Performance, Hamburg, 1999), as well as materials and activities associated with women such as cloth, housework and handicrafts.

These artists use the cultural and gender specific references and materials to interrogate stereotypes of Korean identity and women’s social identity. They are representative of many Korean women artists who discover Korean customs and tradition as positive components of their cultural identity. Despite the cultural specificity of their materials and references, their work has successfully built a base that refuses to easily please the West’s demand for the exotic Other. Opaque textuality of Korean references defies that the hybridity of their work within which one can sense a duality of Koreanness and modernity is a proof of the West’s monopolistic claim to modernism.

It was not until the mid-1980s in Korea that women artists began to gain recognition. Throughout the history of Korean art, women artists have continuously contributed to Korean culture. But their contribution has hardly been credited. This recognition was brought about by Minjoong art movement, which was pivotal to the formation of the
first phase of the women’s art movement in Korea. In short, Minjoong (Minjoong meaning ‘people’: KIM Jung Hon, Dog, 1980; HONG Sung Dam, Hong 37, 1980s; MIN Chung Ki, Untitled, 1980s; IM Ok Sang, A History of Africa, 1980s) art was a radical and political art movement. It emerged as a critique of modernist and internationalist art in Korea in the early 1980s, showing left and nationalist tendencies. We will return to Minjoong art later shortly.

It can be argued that it was the arrival of Postmodernism in the early 1980s in Korea that brought about the popularity of women’s art in Korea. Since the early-1990s there has been sudden mass media and public attention on women’s art in Korea. This attention was brought about, for good or ill, by Korean art historians, critics, academics and writers who were interested in the postmodernist or postcolonialist issues of subjectivity, gender, identity and difference. However, in the mid-1990s, the women’s art movement had become quickly dispersed in Korea.

There are some Korean women artists who wasted no time to make use of this fashionable attention of recognising difference of the cultural production of historically marginalised groups in pursing their professional career in a male dominant society. Although women artists have begun to receive more exposure and are visible these days, women artists still suffer from discrimination in the male dominant Korean contemporary art scene. For women artists, channels and opportunities for exhibiting and selling their work are still limited, controlled by the predominance of male-dominated professional networks.

In responding to the sudden special attention on women’s art, many Korean women artists tend to reluctantly position themselves as a woman artist or feminist artist. This can be explained by a refusal to be a victim of female tokenism. In a society in which gender discrimination is widespread, women artists often feel that their female identity, when showing professionally, is not the sort of position that ‘successful’ artists should endorse, or is a threat which displaces them outside the mainstream of the wider art world.

“To be a feminist in Korea means ‘isolation’, says YUN Suk Nam, who dares to define herself as a feminist artist in Korea. YUN Suk Nam was deeply involved with Minjoong art movement, which inspired her to be concerned with the then current social and political realities of Korean society and the role of art and artist.

YUN Suk Nam is an unusual Korean women who began her career as a professional artist without formal institutional education in visual arts at the age of 40, an age at which Korean women would plan for retirement. Her work has evolved from a housewife’s hobby to a political feminist art. It is still continuously evolving. In her recent site-specific installation work, Small Boat (2000), which creates a contemplative sanctuary, now extends itself to a poignant conceptual feminism.

When she realised the limits inherent in a political art movement, her work moved away from a political feminist art. Like Minjoong artist group, YUN Suk Nam questioned the status of purely aestheticised modernist art, which was the mainstream Korean art of 1980s, in which art was an intellectual play alienated from society. It is in this context and with a critical consciousness that her work aims to achieve the maxim communication. Minjoong art gained popularity in the early 1990s. However
its popularity was short lived, since Minjoong art often lacked in aesthetic quality while being strong in message. In reflecting her experience as a woman, housewife and Korean, YUN Suk Nam has developed a more refined critique of Korean society.

YUN Suk Nam deliberately uses the image of Hanbok or traditional Korean costume (YUN Suk Nam, Genealogy, 1993) steeped in traditional connotations. She is critical of that in its orientation to modernisation, Korea condemned its old cultural past as ‘vernacular’ and ‘old-fashioned’.

Minjoong art questioned modern Korean history as being Westernised rather than modernised. This brought to Korean artists an increased interest in their native cultural heritage. Yet Minjoong art, in its extreme nationalism, romanticised unrealistically Korean tradition as a paradise untouched by Westernisation (for example, KIM Jung Hon, Murungdowon or Paradise Lost, 1982).2 YUN Suk Nam seems to deal with the failure of Minjoong art to achieve a self-conscious synthesis between the particularity of ‘Koreanness’ as a resistant, identity-giving culture and the universality of ‘human culture’.

Since YUN Suk Nam is conscious of the inescapable hybrid condition of contemporary Korean society, she successfully manages her work to be ‘contemporary’ and at the same time to return to traditional sources. The term ‘contemporary’ is used specifically rather than term ‘modern’. When the term ‘modern’ is used, it has an effect caused by the very nature of translation. The present scene of Korean art appears to be merely a result of this translation of the Western notion of modernity, Modernism and Postmodernism, rather than an outcome of the Korean artists’ successful assimilation of Western elements into their local context.

The familiarity of the typical image of Korean women in Hanbok, chairs and sofas, marbles, beads, shoes and the ornamentality of her work create a friendly gesture to share ‘common’ feelings with the ordinary Korean people and even dismissive male observers. In this respect, it can be argued that her work achieves maxim communication which Minjoong art failed to achieve. Having successfully drawn attention towards her work, she is then able to push the audience to the true intention of her work.

In Pink Room series (1996, 1998, 2000), YUN Suk Nam fabricated a living room of upper-middle class Koreans filled with chairs and sofas surrounded by thousands of brightly coloured marbles. Despite the prettiness of the upholstery pattern which reminds us of typical Oriental embroidery, the cosiness created by a room-size environment of work reminiscent of the domestic space, and the shinning surface resembling the sleek surfaces of contemporary art, it evokes a disturbing aggressiveness. This aggressiveness is created by a collision of Korean tradition with the modern. The artist associates contradictions of her identity to those of Koreans who live in a country undergoing speedy industrial and economic development.

Her recent splendidly beautiful installation, 999 (1997) suggests that YUN Suk Nam who is in her early 60s has evolved beyond her earlier image of aggressive accusation of the brutality of patriarchy (for example, Genealogy, 1993) in order to create an unforced dialogue. YUN Suk Nam’s crowded and poignantly silent 999 wooden poles containing a painted image of typical Korean woman in the bright and vivid colours
of Hanbok asserts an unspoken cultural history of women in Korean society. 999 wooden Korean women statues are the body of the Korean women, which can be retraced in its continuity as the here and now in the history of Korean art. With or without a written history, Korean women have continuously contributed to Korean culture throughout Korean history. This interpretation of Korean history questions her work, as merely being a ‘re-discovered woman’s art’. It disputes an argument that Korean women were those who were marginalized victims of the established order.

This point becomes clearer in KIM Soo Ja’s art. In contrast to YUN Suk Nam who adopts Western feminist political strategy, KIM Soo Ja has developed a feminine and a unique Korean strategy drawing from her own experience as a woman and Korean cultural tradition.

Since the early 1980s KIM Soo Ja has consistently worked with the concept of sewing and wrapping by using fabrics and cloths through which the artist experiences the bonding between materials and activity, and transforms her life into an aesthetic experience.

Soo-Ja Kim has persistently worked with Bottari which she has installed all over the world since 1992 (KIM Soo Ja, Deductive Object, 1996). She uses the colourful Korean bedcovers as wrapping clothes to make her Bottari or bundle (KIM Soo Ja, A Laundry field, 1997). Though mass-produced, the bedcovers reflect traditional Korean colour coordination or the typical shaman coordination. Bottari is a parcel or bundle wrapped up in Pojagi. Pojagi is a wrapping cloth, traditionally used by the Koreans.

Bottari, usually made from old fabrics and cloths consisting of traditional Korean dresses and colorful bedcovers, has provided KIM Soo Ja with the possibility of expressing the buried memories of women and her own experience. The bed throw is associated with the woman, realm of the night, privacy, colour and sexuality. For the artist, it is laden with full of memories, and with symbolic and hidden meanings.

Through piecing ‘Pojagi’ and other fabrics together, KIM Soo Ja’s art has developed a way to connect her private experience with other people’s experience, especially anonymous Korean women, the past with the present, and her life with art.

Her work deploys the robust color of Pojagi and bright and striking sensuous colours of traditional bedcovers in order to cerebrate the existence of feminine qualities and difference. Perhaps this reminds us of the anonymous Korean women who have always found creative ways to breach their confined female realm by interweaving their female disposition into the male public sphere, even into the exclusive male realm of Confucianism. This female element is evident in all forms of Korean culture, literature, visual arts, music, architecture, garden design, etc. It can be said that the astonishingly colourfull Pojagi or Korean wrapping cloth and Korean women’s Hanbok or traditional costume visually testify that Korean women have endured under the austerity of monochrome of Confucian formalism. Korean literature has often generalized Koreans as ‘Pae-ui minjok’, meaning ‘the people of the white’. In a male dominated Korean society, women have sought not to confront oppression, rather to regard it as a necessary protective outer layer in order to endure life.
It can be said that KIM Soo Ja’s uniquely Korean and distinctly feminine appropriation of cloth and sewing has enabled her to arrest visually and physically the real of the-‘here-and-now’ of the silenced women in her artwork. This is clear in her Bottari truck of 1997 in which she worked with Bottari or the bundle and the notion of travel.

In the filmed performance Bottari truck, (Slide 1997) KIM Soo Ja sits piously on bundles loaded in the back of truck, traveling extensively across her country, Korea. In contrast to the traveller staying still, the landscape passed by. According to the artist, the Bottari or bundle represents a body and the human body, which is a moving bundle or the human body is the most complicated bundle.

In her earlier performance series of Sewing into Walking, KIM Soo Ja discovers her body as the needle with which she successfully synthesised her memory and experience of sewing bedcovers with her mother. According to the artist, using her body as needle is significant for her. It is interesting to note that the needle often represents the male organ according to Freudian analysis.

In her recent filmed performance, the Cities on the Move series, KIM Soo Ja was standing still in the middle of crowd, instead of moving herself. No one recognized or noticed her presence as a performance artist. KIM Soo Ja explained that she felt as if she were invisible. The artist related this to an idea that her body as the needle piecing together people passing by her body with continuously changing environment surrounded her body. This idea reminds us of unknown women and ordinary people who have continuously contributed to our human culture and civilization without recognition. Their contribution like the needle which sews the separate things, parts, and fabrics together, remains just a medium, yet not without any trace.

Like YUN Suk Nam and KIM Soo Ja, AHN Pil Yun draws the source of her strength from the image of Korean women, through which the artist experiences a spiritual reunion with her mother, grandmother, great-grandmother, and so on. Through this spiritual reunion, YUN Suk Nam, KIM Soo Ja and AHN Pil Yun, who are in a harsh, male dominant environment, regain their strength.

In traditional Korean society Korean women were defined as either a submissive daughter, loyal wife or nurturing mother. Yet Korean women constructed a contrasting image through their role as wife and mother. Korean women dominate the world of the Korean’s unconscious, through her practical rituals of most elementary everyday life and through her shaman rituals performed in her home.

AHN Pil Yun adopts Musok or Shaman ritual in her performance art (for example, Gambling, 1994) in order to tell the stories of silenced Korean women, while exposing the violence of patriarchal ideology over Korean women. In Korea, traditionally the majority of shamans have been female and the succession in priesthood of Musok was from mother to daughter.

AHN Pil Yun has successfully built a complexity in her work through incorporating her local tradition with continuously updated technique and reference (for example, sensors and computer are used in Gambling 1994).
Though KIM Soo Ja and AHN Pil Yun use materials and activities associated with women such as cloth and mirror, housework and handicrafts, they are reluctant to define themselves as a feminist artist. The exception is YUN Suk Nam who sees herself as a feminist artist.

YUN Suk Nam, KIM Soo Ja and AHN Pil Yun felt intimidated by the minimalist asceticism and have chosen installation and performance art. In order to practice asceticism, Korean minimalists avoided images, their practice creating a void or emptying of the artist by rejecting any emotion, that is, by eliminating content or image (for example, PARK Seo Bo, *Ecriture*). The majority of Korean minimalists were male artists.

In pursuit of their search for self-identity, the personal experiences of YUN Suk-Nam, KIM Soo Ja and AHN Pil Yun are interwoven into their work which deals with the universal questions of human existence and relationships. Since this universal idea is not constructed through a highly abstracted form of art, but through their own bodily experience, many people are easily touched upon by their work (YUN Suk Nam, *Flower Shoes*, 1994, KIM Soo Ja, *Reductive Object*, 1991, AHN Pil Yun, *Kaleidoscope*, 1995).

Though their choices of the form of art, materials and references reflect very much of their female sensibility and feminist consciousness, why KIM Soo Ja and AHN Pil Yun hesitate to define themselves as a feminist artist? There are the three possible answers to this question.

First, as YUN Suk Nam pointed out, there has been a fear of isolation, which can be caused by female tokenism.

Second, there has been the lack of an informed and accessible way of discussing contemporary women’s art, while life for many women artists in Korea is still difficult and often isolated. There was little theoretical discussion on the difference of women’s art. For many women artists, the only feminist theory that they ever encountered was through the social and political feminist movement in Korea.

Third, it can be argued that Korean woman artists find that the Western feminist theory is largely irrelevant to their local context and experience. Though many Korean women agree that the social and political feminist movement in Korea has inspired Korean women to combat the patriarchal practices and system, they are less satisfied with the Western feminist political viewpoint flattening out the complicity of the culture they wished to repudiate. Many Korean women believe that it has been possible for Korean women to interweave their voice into the mainstream culture, literature, visual arts, which was almost the exclusive male realm. A recent study suggests that an archetypal heroine in literature written not only by Korean men, but by Korean women is often the filial daughter or chaste wife who is employed to embody the Confucian virtues of the official ideology and exemplify society’s values and beliefs in a subtle way (Yim Ch’i-Kyun 1995: 1591-1609). Despite the Western feminist attempt to historicize them as a criticism of the repression and discrimination of women, they are often rather an affirmation of cultural values. It can be argued that this attempt often re-discovers the Korean women as a victim of Korean history and positions them as an absolute Other, which has never really existed.
In conclusion, it would be ideal that the notion of a women’s art will be no longer necessary or useful to young Korean women artists who, one hopes, will have the power to reinvent both contemporary art and themselves.

Reference

A List of Sides

1. YUN Suk-Nam, Vendor, 1993, Acrylic on wood, 35 x 18 x 15 centimetres
2. Suk-Nam, Living with her Husband Parents, 1992, Acrylic on wood, 30 x 15 x 12 centimetres
3. Yun Suk Nam, Mother, 1993, Acrylic on wood, 35 x 120 x 4 centimetres
4. KIM Soo Ja, Lying on the Nature, 1994, used bedcovers & cloth
5. AHN Pil Yun, Kaleidoscope III, Performance, Hamburg, 1999
6. KIM Jung Hon, Dog, 1980, Oil on Newspaper
7. HONG Sung Dam, Hong 37, 1980s, Oil on canvas
8. MIN Chung Ki, Untitled, 1980s
9. IM Ok Sang, A History of Africa, 1980s, Oil on canvas
10. YUN Suk Nam, Small Boat, 2000, Acrylic on wood
11. YUN Sukn Nam, Genealogy, 1993, Mixed media, 270 x 250 x 150 centimetres
12. KIM Jung Hon, Murungdowon (Paradise Lost), 1982, Oil on canvas, 134 x 100 centimetres
13. YUN Suk Nam, 1996 Pink Room, Acrylic on wood, chair, sofa and marbles, 450 x 350 x 300 centimetres
14. Yun Suk-Nam, 999, 1997, Acrylic on wood
15. KIM Soo Ja, Deductive Object, 1996, used clothes & Korean bed covers, Arken Museum of Modern Art, Copenhagen
16. KIM Soo Ja, A Laundry field, 1999, Installation at the 3rd APT, Queensland Art Gallery, Brisbane
17. KIM Soo Ja, Bottari truck, 1997, film
18. KIM Soo Ja, Deductive Object, 1997
19. AHN Pil Yun, Gambling, 1994, installation view, fluorescent light, acrylic box, vinyl plate. The first floor filled with 99 acrylic boxes (size varied between 100 and 250 centimetres tall) and covered with mirror-look-alike vinyl plate. In Mongolia, before the bride is taken to the groom's home, she is asked to sit on the mirror through which her ‘inside’ is seen. Light turns on by sensors activated by the viewer’s movement. The computer generated music, synthesising mechanical sounds, such as drilling and hammering sounds
20. AHN Pil Yun, Gambling, 1994, installation view, fluorescent light, acrylic box, vinyl plate on the floor.
21. Park Seo Bo, Ecriture, 1993, Mixed media with Hanchi (traditional Korean paper), 182 x 227.5 centimetres
22. Yun Suk-Nam, *Flower Shoes*, 1994, Acrylic on wood and mixed media
23. KIM Soo Ja, *Deductive Object*, 1991
24. KIM Soo Ja, *Deductive Object*, 1991
25. KIM Soo Ja, *Deductive Object*, 1991, *Deductive Object: dedicated to my marriage, the 5th Istanbul Biennale*
27. AHN Pil Yun, *Kaleidoscope*, 1995
28. AHN Pil Yun, *Voyeurism*, 1997

1 Korean names follow the order of the Korean name in which the family name or surname comes before the first name or the given name.

2 The meaning of *Murungdowon*, the title of the painting by Kim Jung-Hon is perhaps equivalent to the biblical context of ‘Paradise Lost’. By using the traditional theme of *Murungdowon*, the artist romanticises this Oriental pastoral landscape as a paradise untouched by Westernisation.
Relative valuations:
An application to the Korean automobile industry

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“As is all often the case, we find ourselves playing theoretical catch-up trying, after
the fact, to develop a framework for thinking about the events that have already
happened.” Krugman(1998)

1. Introduction

The valuation of financial assets is one of the most important issues in contemporary
finance, not only because of its importance in investment decisions but also because
of its economic significance. Overvaluation of financial assets typically induces
overconsumption and undersaving. Undervaluation encourages higher savings rates,
and inappropriate spending on infrastructure.

Financial valuation models have not benefitted from the systems approach in
economics, which has long recognised the importance of relative price effects. In
finance, the most common equity valuation models value a single asset and ignore
asset relativities with assets in the same industry. For example, this is the approach of
the dividend discount model (DDM) and free cash flow (FCF) valuations. The
essential idea is to derive the present value of expected future cashflows (dividends or
free cashflow). A recurring observation has been that such valuations often differ
substantially from observed prices. One reason is that the traditional valuation models
are difficult to implement because forecasting over a finite horizon is difficult. In
particular, valuations are very sensitive to terminal values, those values representing
cashflows more than 2 years ahead. Often such terminal values account for more than
50% of the valuation of an equity.

Significant developments in the economy also distort valuations. In Korea, structural
shifts towards a more open economy, and to a more technologically based economy
have meant that valuations are more difficult. Just as internet asset economies are
difficult to value, so is a market such as Korea where there is considerable transition.
Emerging equity markets such as Korea tend to restrict the supply of equity through
the concentration of share ownership. In such markets, speculative price bubbles often
occur and recur. Valuation trading often constitutes only 10% of trading. Explosive
increases and decreases in prices are common as shown in the behaviour of the stock
market index, the KOSPI, in figure 1.
In general, the price of an asset can be represented by the following equation

\[ P = \lambda_1 V_1 + \lambda_2 V_2 + \lambda_3 V_3 + \ldots + \lambda_n V_n + e_1 + e_2 \quad (1) \]

Where: 
- \( P \) is the market price
- \( \lambda \) is the weight given to the various intrinsic values derived by different valuation models
- \( e_1 \) is the trading error; and
- \( e_2 \) is the valuation error

The valuation models which can be used include the methods previously cited (dividend discount, free cash flow) and newer approaches including residual income valuation (Ohlson(1995)) and Economic Value Added (Stewart(1990)).

EVA has been developed with a different focus, concentrating on ‘economic’ earnings, rather than the ‘accounting earnings’ upon which RI is based. It is also possible to use various multiples such as price-earnings, dividend yields, price-cash multiples and so on.

The lesson of strategic behaviour of companies, however, suggests that the pricing model in (1) is too limited. In particular, companies compete against existing and potential rivals. Valuation methods should incorporate such competitive strategies. However, competitive analysis is often qualitative and case-specific. Subsequently, it has not been formally operationalised into valuation models or been formally tested. Practitioners, however, have often analysed the value of the firm in relative terms, incorporating both competitive advantages of individual firms as well as industrial characteristics.

This paper aims to establish a measurable framework for relative valuation models, and to consider an application to the automobile sector in Korea. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature, Section 3 the theory and Section 4 an application.

2. A Review of Valuation Models

2.1. Single firm valuations

The intrinsic value is typically derived by estimating future payoffs and transforming those payoffs into a present value at the appropriate discount rate. They, albeit general, can be represented by the following equation:

\[ V_{i,t} = \sum_{t=1}^{s} \frac{E_t(C_{t+s})}{(1+k_{t+s})^{s-r}} \quad (2) \]

where:
- \( V_{i,t} \) is intrinsic value at \( t \)
- \( E_t(C_{t+s}) \) is expected payoffs at \( t+s \); and
- \( k_{t+s} \) is the discount rate at \( t+s \)

There have been several different valuation models developed in the valuation literature and they are classified by the definition of future payoffs and discount rates. The most prominent valuation models are:
1. **Dividend Discount Model** (DDM): where the future dividends are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the cost of equity is used as the appropriate discount rate to derive the intrinsic value of the equity;

2. **Free Cash Flows Model** (FCF): where the future free cashflows are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is used as the appropriate discount rate to derive the intrinsic value of the total company, including equity and debt;

3. **Residual Income Model** (RI): where future excess accounting earnings are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the cost of equity is used as the appropriate discount rate to derive the intrinsic value of the equity; and

4. **Economic Value Added Model** (EVA): where future economic value added are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the WACC is used as the appropriate discount rate to derive the intrinsic value of the total company.

The principal motivation for valuations is to identify mispriced securities for investment purposes. For instance, Sorenson and Williamson (1985) have formed portfolios according to the degree of mispricing and found the considerable improvements of portfolio returns. A major problem is the forecasting of future cashflows. Most are based on earnings forecasts. There have been two branches of studies. The first branch of studies compared the analysts’ forecasts with time series forecasts. For instance, Brown and Rozeff (1978) were first to document superior accuracy of analysts’ forecasts over time series forecasts of quarterly earnings. Subsequent studies offered conflicting evidence. Notwithstanding the conflicting evidence, in recent years it is common practice to (implicitly) assume that analysts’ forecasts are a better surrogate for market’s expectations than econometric models (Kathari (2000)).

The second branch of studies analyses the composite forecasts where two or more forecasts are combined to produce another forecasts. They often combine the time series models of earnings that explicitly capture seasonality and cyclical movements of earnings and analysts’ forecasts which collectively represent the market expectations. Some studies have provided qualitative measures to forecast future earnings, including firm specific information that has been available since the last financial reports, competitive strategies relative to competitors re future prospects of the companies, industrial characteristics that may determine the long term growth opportunities, and macroeconomic information.

The general equivalence of these valuation models was been proposed theoretically by Miller and Modigliani (1961). This idea of general equivalence was further extended by Levin (1998) with the inclusion of corporate taxes. He concluded that in a world with corporate taxes, the general equivalence of the valuation models is achieved only when the company is expected to maintain a constant market debt ratio.

### 2.2 Relative valuations.

One of the most important factors determining the growth rate of cashflows is the competitiveness of a firm. Theories on competitiveness assert that the cost minimisation and/or product differentiation is the major factor in determining the
competitiveness of a firm and its profitability. For instance, M. Porter (1985) suggests that competitiveness of a firm is attributable to five factors: potential entrants, bargaining power of supplies and buyers, level of substitution and the level of industry competition. This proposition is supported by empirical research. For instance, Caves (1974), Wolf (1977), Dunning (1980) and Mishra and Gobeli (1998) found that the profitability of multinational firms is a function of product differentiation. One of the major implications of these studies is that the level of R & D and advertising expenditure can be used as proxy to estimate growth opportunities of the company in determining intrinsic values.

Industrial characteristics also determine the growth opportunities of firm profitability. Previous studies have found a weak but statistically significant negative relationship between industry concentration and profitability.

Investment opportunities, proxied by the industry q-ratio (the ratio of the market value to the book value) have also been found to be associated with industry profitability. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) and Mishra and Gobeli (1998) found a significant relationship between the industry q-ratio and industry profitability. These studies also analysed firm specific level and also found the significant relationship between q-ratio and profitability. Again, this has implications for valuation models.

3. A Theoretical Model of Relative Valuation

We consider the simultaneous determination of equity valuations for firms in the same industry. To make this empirically meaningful, we consider a number of cases beginning with the case when the valuations are observed, that is, when we have a time series of market valuations.

3.1 Observed valuations.

For simplicity, we assume an industry with 2 firms. The market return of firm i (i=1,2) is first assumed to be generated by its market valuation $V_{i,t}$, and that this effect is present next year (t+1) and in s years subsequent to the valuation.

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1V_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$
$$R_{i,t+s} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(s)V_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

It is expected that there is a positive relationship between observed valuation and returns, however the extent of impact of observed valuation to future returns are expected to decline over time. Hence, the coefficient, $\alpha_1(s)$ is expected to be positive and decline as s increases.

The above equations can be extended by incorporating competitiveness and industrial characteristics, as the competitiveness and industry characteristics are expected to have significant impact on returns.

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1V_{i,t} + \alpha_2\text{Comp}_{i,t} + \alpha_3\text{Ind}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$
$$R_{i,t+s} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(s)V_{i,t} + \alpha_2\text{Comp}_{i,t} + \alpha_3\text{Ind}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$
The coefficient on competitiveness, $\alpha_2$, is expected to be positive, as increases in competitiveness results in higher profits and subsequently higher returns. The coefficient on the industrial characteristics is expected to have positive relationship with returns, as favourable industrial characteristics, such as higher industry growth opportunities, should lead higher returns. Furthermore, it is expected that Industrial Characteristic dominate future returns ($R_{i,t+s}$) as the industrial characteristic are the main contributors of long run growth of companies in the steady state.

Furthermore, relative valuations can be incorporated into return estimations as followings.

\[
R_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 V_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \text{Comp}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \text{Ind}_{i,t} + \alpha_4 V_{j,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

\[
R_{i,t+s} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(s) V_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \text{Comp}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \text{Ind}_{i,t} + \alpha_4 V_{j,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

\[
(R_{i,t} - R_{j,t}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1(V_{i,t} - V_{j,t}) + \alpha_2 \text{Comp}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 \text{Ind}_{i,t} + \alpha_4 V_{j,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]  (5)

Where: $R_{i,t}$ is the continuously compounded return for the company i at t; $V_{i,t}$ is the logarithm of the observed valuation of the company i at t; $\text{Comp}_{i,t}$ is the competitiveness of the company i at t; and $\text{Ind}_{i,t}$ is the industrial characteristics at t.

It is expected that there is a positive relationship between the relative returns of the firms and the relative values of the firms.

3.2 Pseudo valuations.

In the absence of observed valuations, we construct pseudo valuations, based on traditional valuation models, such as the DDM, the FCF or the RI. In all the above equations (3)-(5), we replace $V_{i,t}$ by $V^*_{i,t}$.

An alternative approach is to incorporate factors that simultaneously determine returns without a particular reference to values, competitiveness or industrial characteristics. For instance, Choi (1995) incorporated exchange rates, retained earnings, cost of capitals and differences between cost of capital and earnings growth rate.

Then, returns are simultaneously estimated as followings:

\[
R_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Ex}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \text{Ex}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 k_{i,t+s} + \alpha_3 (k-g)_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

\[
R_{i,t+s} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Ex}_{i,t+s} + \alpha_2 \text{Ex}_{i,t} + \alpha_3 k_{i,t} + \alpha_3 (k-g)_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]

\[
(R_{i,t} - R_{j,t}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Ex}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \text{Ex}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 (k_{i,t} - k_{j,t}) + \alpha_3 (k-g)_{i,t} + \alpha_4 (k-g)_{j,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\]  (6)

Where: $R_{i,t}$ is the continuously compounded return for the company i at t; $\text{Ex}_{i,t}$ is the exchange rate at t; and $E_{i,t}$ is the earnings of the company i at t.
\( k_{i,t} \) is the cost of equity of the company \( i \) at \( t \); and \( g_{i,t} \) is the earnings growth rates.

The importance of the simultaneous and relative valuation models is the emphasis on economic factors such as measures of competitiveness, industrial characteristics, R&D, advertising on asset valuations, but also an emphasis on the strategic interaction of firms within an industry. We now proceed to consider the Korean automobile industry.

4. **Korean Automobile Industry**

4.1 a) Background:

Korea’s automobile industry achieved annual production growth of 15% during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, principally attributable to continuous developments in technology and to diversification of model lines. These economies of scale and scope were accompanied by robust export growth and enabled Korea to be ranked sixth in global automobile production by 1993. However, the economic and financial crisis of 1997 induced a significant restructuring of the automobile industry. At present, there are 5 companies in the industry: Hyundai Motor, Daewoo Motor, Kia Motor, Ssanyoung Motor and Renault-Samsung Motor.

The following graph, the graph1, shows the share price movements among selected automobile produces and KOSPI.

**Graph 4.1.**

![Graph 4.1: KOSPI and Korean Automobile Companies](image)

4.1 b) data Availability (1990 – 2000)

The following table, the table 2, summarises the available data which are available from Korea Stock Exchange (KSE), analysts reports, and Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association.

**Table 4.1.**
4.2 Other Applications: Internet Companies

There have been significant developments, especially since the early 1980s with the technological improvements. As a result, the corporations have been experiencing unprecedented growth opportunities, reflected upon their ever-increasing share prices, while the analysts were unable to appropriately make predictions for future earnings or risk premiums. One industry that has a particular interest is internet companies whose the total market value of which exceeds $1.3 trillion dollars (USD) from $50 billion over the last three years (Hand(2000)).

The speed with which the Internet is changing the business landscape has pre-empted structure description or economic analysis of net firms. This leads many interesting questions about the valuation of the Internet companies: how do we value these Internet companies which often have little or negative earnings, cashflows or dividends but have significant but uncertain growth potentials? How do we quantify this growth opportunities?

One approach to measure and hence value the Internet companies to analyse non-financial information, such as number of hits or number of web-page updates. Alternative approach is to analyse the decomposition of financial information, in particular, intangible assets such as patents, brand names and goodwill. However, these approaches have not been substantiated and period-specific, given the rapid changes in the Internet environment.

Bibliography


**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms:</th>
<th>Notations</th>
<th>Meanings:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dividend Discount Model</td>
<td>DDM</td>
<td>the future dividends are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the cost of equity is used as the appropriate discount rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Cash Flows</td>
<td>FCF</td>
<td>the future free cashflows are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is used as the appropriate discount rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Income Model</td>
<td>RI</td>
<td>future excess accounting earnings are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the cost of equity is used as the appropriate discount rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Value Added</td>
<td>EVA</td>
<td>future economic value added are used as the proxy for the future payoffs and the WACC is used as the appropriate discount rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book to Market ratio</td>
<td>B/P</td>
<td>Per share book value to market value ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P/E ratio</td>
<td>P/E</td>
<td>Per share price to earnings ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividend Yield</td>
<td>D/P</td>
<td>Per share, dividend to price ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Market prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed Valuation</td>
<td>V_{i,j}</td>
<td>Observed Intrinsic value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount rate</td>
<td>k_t</td>
<td>Discount rate reflecting the appropriate risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>R_{i,t}</td>
<td>Continuously compounded Return on share i, at time t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>Compi,t</td>
<td>Competitiveness of firm i, at time t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Characteristic</td>
<td>Indi,t</td>
<td>Industrial Characteristic of industry I, at time t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo Valuation</td>
<td>V^*_{i,j}</td>
<td>Derived intrinsic value according to fundamentals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate</td>
<td>Ext</td>
<td>Cross exchange rate between two countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth rate</td>
<td>g_i,t</td>
<td>Steady state growth rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m-firm concentration ratio</td>
<td>R_m</td>
<td>adds up the m highest shares in the industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Herfindahl index</td>
<td>R_H</td>
<td>the sum of the squares of the market shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Entropy index</td>
<td>R_e</td>
<td>the sum of shares times their logarithm:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Is Kumgangsan the beginning or end of the road?  
Prospects and Problems for the development of DPRK inbound tourism

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INTRODUCTION
This paper complements an earlier, and longer, paper which focussed largely on the potential for DPRK tourism as revealed both by ROK experience and by data on current and projected international tourism, especially in Northeast Asia (Beal 2001d).

In the paper I follow the Korean version of place names, such as Kumgangsan rather than ‘Diamond Mountains’, although anglicisations will be found in quotes and article titles. I also follow the usual romanisation used in each part of Korea for names from that part; that is Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il. Again quotations may vary. I have tended to stick with the more familiar romanisation of Southern place names rather than the new, and controversial, official version – Pusan rather than Busan, Kumgang rather than Geumgang and Inchon rather than Incheon – but again I have not changed versions in quotes.

FIG 1: KUMGANGSAN

The subject of international inbound tourism to the DPRK is wrapped in paradox and wreathed in obscurity. In one sense the DPRK is an industrial economy, with industry contributing 43% of GDP, compared with 35% for both Japan and China (CIA 2000). It has substantial mineral resources and an educated but cheap workforce. Nevertheless, tourism probably accounts for as great a share of foreign exchange earnings as it does for the tourist islands of the Caribbean. The Bahamas, for instance, where industry accounts for a mere 5% of GDP, direct spending by
tourists (‘visitor exports’) is 75% of export earnings (Beal 2001d: Statistical Appendix). Tourism is a product of peace, but the DPRK is still technically in a state of war with the ROK, it major current sources of tourists, and with United States, and diplomatic relations have yet to be established with Japan, the two countries that provide the bulk of tourists to the South. The DPRK probably has one of the most negative images of any tourism destination in the world and yet derives substantial earnings from inbound tourism. Although it undoubtedly has a very small share of international tourist arrivals, much smaller than the ROK, it has great tourism potential.

Data on DPRK tourism is nearly as scarce as data on any other aspect of its economy and, as with other international transactions such as trade, most of it comes from outside. In the case of tourism this is simplified to a large degree in that most of the current inbound tourism is controlled by one company, Hyundai Asan, and goes to one destination, Kumgangsan. However, whilst Kumgangsan is currently the major component of DPRK tourism, and even in the best of circumstances is likely to remain an important component, the real development of the tourism industry, if it is to happen, will take place on a much wider canvas, involving more of the country. If DPRK tourism is really to develop and achieve anything like its true potential then it will need to become like a ‘normal’ tourism industry. International experience, and especially that of countries with similarities in various ways to the DPRK – ROK, China, Vietnam and Cuba – can throw light on the opportunities and challenges it will face. That is discussed in more detail in Beal 2001d.

**THE POLITICS OF DPRK TOURISM**

Traditionally, tourism has been seen in the DPRK not so much as a way of earning foreign exchange, but as a propaganda device, a way of winning friends and influencing people. This continues today, as the essay competition run by the Spain-based Korean Friendship Association illustrates (Fig 2). More substantially, the Kumgangsan venture was seen by both sides as serving, to a greater or lesser degree, the cause of Inter-Korean unity.

The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the official DPRK new agency puts all the emphasis on politics:

> the Mt. Kumgang tour is a noble national project which started and has been under way in reflection of the unanimous aspiration of all the fellow countrymen after national reconciliation and unity and the reunification of the country and the wishes of the South Koreans to visit Mt. Kumgang, a famous mountain of the world. (U.S. urged to stop hampering Mt. Kumgang tour)

This is somewhat paralleled by the ROK newspaper *Korea Herald*:

> Come to think of it, however, the Mt. Geumgang tour should be more than just moneymaking. What has moved South Koreans to join the tour program was not just the sightseeing but that they could set their foot on the long forbidden half of motherland. For students in particular, the four-day tour is better than 100 classroom lectures about their nation and history. (Enlivening Mt. Geumgang tours)
The development of DPRK tourism, and the economy as a whole, is clearly contingent on the geo-political environment and, most crucially, on DPRK relations with ROK and the United States. In turn, it is clear at the time of writing, that this hinges primarily on the policies of the Bush administration and Pyongyang’s reaction to it. Despite brave words (Oh Young-jin 10 August 2001) and very substantial intervention to bail-out the Kumgangsan venture, which is discussed below, Seoul is unfortunately effectively sidelined at the moment. It is constrained by American pressure from providing electricity to the north (Kim Kwang-tae 31 July 2001) which is seen as one of Kim Jong Il’s demands for reactivating the North-South dialogue (Hwang Jang-jin 8 August 2001). The other demands focus solely on the United States.

When the incoming Bush administration suspended negotiations with the DPRK it came under pressure and sometimes scarcely disguised attack even from Chong Wa Dae and the European Union (Beal 2001c). To use a phrase which had wide currency, ‘the ball was in the US court’. (Kim Ji-ho, 8 May, 2001; ‘Koreas: The ball's back in US court’). In early June the United States announced that it was willing to resume talks (Hwang Jang-jin 8 June 2001) but as had been predicted, it imposed conditions which
the DPRK found intolerable (Beal 2001b). Although Secretary Powell claims that Washington is willing to talk “at any time and any place” (‘Powell Puts More Pressure on NK for Talk: AFP’), and ‘with no strings attached’ (Hwang Jang-jin 28 July 2001), Pyongyang clearly sees that the US negotiating stance has hardened to an unacceptable level (Rodong Sinmun on DPRK-U.S. negotiation).

Though still small by international standards, inter-Korean tourism, or more precisely tourism from South to North, has increased remarkably since 1998; In 2000 475,691 from South to North and about 700 the other way. (Soh Ji-young 4 May 2001). However, if that is to continue and to develop, and if DPRK tourism is to expand its intake beyond Korea then the political situation must move forward from the present impasse towards normalisation. That is, of course, a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. However, if the political framework can be established then the development of tourism, however difficult, can be achieved. Other countries have built up a tourism industry once peace has been established, including ROK itself; examples include Cyprus (Ioannides 1999), Israel (Mansfield 1999) Philippines, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (Richter 1999) although, as the list attests, peace is regrettably not always permanent.

The importance of US policy, even in respect to the Kumgangsan venture, which is virtually entirely a Korean affair, was highlighted by recent articles by the Korean Central New Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang attacking the Unites States for hampering and obstructing the venture (‘U.S. urged to stop hampering’; ‘U.S. obstructions to tour of Mt. Kumgang assailed’) The articles rebutted claims that the income from the venture was being used exclusively for military purposes. Whether the US has really been putting pressure on the ROK government, and Hyundai Asan as alleged, is unclear but as the bail-out, discussed below, indicates any such pressure does not seem to have been effective. When the visit of Hyundai Asan chairman Kim Yoon-kyu to Pyongyang to have discussions with the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, the DPRK counterpart organisation, was announced on 12 August press reports mentioned the DPRK allegation but gave no details (Oh Young-jin, 12 August 2001; Kim Ji-ho, 13 August 2001).

Even if US-DPRK relations improve, the memory of 50 years of hostility will linger on in popular consciousness and make if difficult to develop a positive image of DPRK as a tourism destination. Country image, of course, is a key component in tourism choice (Tapachai and Waryszak 2000). ‘Political stability’ is one aspect of this (Bull 1994) but there is a wide range of factors. The ROK for instance, faces image problems which run the gamut from eating dog (Kim M H 28 July 2001; Lee Chi-dong, 5 August 2001) to lack of things which appeal to foreign tourists, from boutique beers to salami (Lee, Justin 13 June 2001). The DPRK unfortunately has yet to reach those problems; its difficulties are at a more fundamental level.

There is a dreadful dilemma in the case of the DPRK, and other similar afflicted societies. Tourism offers a powerful contribution to the relief of the current humanitarian crisis, and to long-term development, but tourists tend to avoid, for moral and practical reasons, going to famine-ridden countries or those which are perceived to infringe ‘human rights’. Koryo Tours, a British tour company based in Beijing specialising in travel to the DPRK frankly addresses this issue on its website.
In another example the winner of the 2000 cross-border motor rally Shin Hyun-soo, commented
"The North Korean hosts were very hospitable. But when the night came, we could see no light at all in the North," ..."It was eerie, and I felt ashamed that we were engaged in a luxury sport in such a destitute country." (Choe Sang-hun, 2 June 2001)

It would be foolish to minimise the problems of the DPRK’s foreign political relations, nor the difficulties of its internal political-economy, which are inter-related. The current economic situation, with its shortages especially of electricity, are scarcely conducive to the development of tourism. However, it is also important to look beyond that at potential for tourism income revealed elsewhere in the world. To get from A to B may be extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, but it is important to ascertain how worthwhile getting to B is. This is covered in much more detail in (Beal 2001d); some highlights are touched on here.

**CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL TOURISM**

International tourism is already a major component of the global economy, and may well become even more important in the future if present widespread, albeit uneven, trends towards greater disposable income and longer holidays, combined with falling real transportation costs, continue. Even in the giant US economy tourism counts for 2.2% of GDP and employs 3.5% of the workforce (Table 1)

### TABLE 1 : ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TOURISM, SELECTED COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
<th>% of workforce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Tourism Organization, ‘TSAs - Revolutionizing the View of the Tourism Industry’, Press release, 10 May 2001 (note this includes both domestic and international tourism)

World tourism grew by an estimated 7.4 per cent in 2000, with 698 million international arrivals and receipts from international tourism of US$476 billion. (World Tourism Organization 31 January 2001) Europe, not surprisingly given its combination of wealth and multiplicity of countries, captured by far the largest share, 57% or 403 million arrivals but the Asia Pacific is the fastest growing region. (Beal 2001d)
The Republic of Korea is quite a small player by world standards (Fig 3) although tourism is a government priority latest figures suggest a slowdown in arrivals (‘Inbound Tourism Falls’). However, in Asian terms ROK does quite well (Fig 4). China, along with the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau which are counted as separate destinations (and Taiwan) is by far the major destination in Asia. However ROK just outstripped Japan, with 5.3 million arrivals compared with 4.8 million. In terms of growth 1999-2000, ROK did twice as well as Japan, 14.5% against 7.2%, nearly equalling China’s 15.5% (Beal 2001d Table A11).
The development of inbound tourism in ROK and the current situation offers lessons and encouragement for the DPRK. There are also all sorts of opportunities for joint activities, such as dual-destination marketing. ROK may be able to utilise DPRK landing rights in a way similar to the scheme under consideration between the US and Mexico; the proposal is to build an airport which straddles the border near San Diego. The terminals would be on the US side, so catering for inbound and outbound US traffic, while the runways, hangers, and fuel storage would be on the Mexican side, thus qualifying for unused Mexican landing rights in Asia. (PATA Strategic Information Centre)

In 1961 the Republic of Korea was seen as late developer in international tourism in the Pacific Asia region. A US Department of Commerce study published that year noted:

No matter how it is analysed, tourism in the Republic of Korea is extremely small. In fact, compared with that of its neighbouring countries, Korea’s international tourist business is so small it suggests the presence of important major obstacles. These would certainly include the attitude of international travellers toward visiting Korea. For instance, an attitude study completed in the United States and Canada (see chapter 1) shows that, out of 19 countries in the Pacific and Far East, potential travellers rate Korea next to last as a place they want to visit. Korea ranked high in the North American market as a place potential tourists considered “unsafe”. Clement (1961:279).

That was relatively soon after the Korea War, and at a time when China was still invisible to American eyes, and certainly those of tourists (China was not even mentioned in the this report). Most crucially, it was way before the Seoul Olympics, which was a key event in propelling ROK inbound tourism in higher growth. Sports events are important catalysts for tourism. Korea’s share of the World Cup events in 2002 is forecast to ‘create 350,000 Jobs, Boost GNP by 11.4 Trillion Won’ (‘World Cup to create 350,000’). “The World Cup is the largest event in Korea’s history”, President Kim Dae-jung was quoted as saying and it was estimated that it would attract some 4 billion television viewers, twice that of the Olympics (Kim Cheong-won 21 June 2001). As for the Beijing Olympics there have been conflicting opinions as to how much impact it will have on ROK, and no discussion, as yet, on implications for DPRK (Nho Joon-hun, 29 July 2001; Yoo Cheong-mo, 30 July 200; ‘Seoul sees windfall from Beijing Games’).

Joint sports events between North and South have had a chequered history. The joint march at the Sydney Olympics touched a chord and President Kim has advocated sports (and tourism) as important ways of promoting inter-Korean relations (‘Kim stresses promotion of sports’). However neither inter-Korean sports events nor DPRK participation with ROK-hosted events, such as the 2002 World Cup, have achieved anything like their potential, although talks do continue (‘Kim Un-yong to Visit North Korea’).
Today, on the eve of the World Cup, tourism is embraced as a key component of ROK’s move towards the ‘knowledge-based economy’-

………new motifs for economic growth will be developed as the nation advances into a knowledge-based economy.

First, infrastructure of information and telecommunication industries will be established, and new strategic industries of the future, such as culture and tourism, nurtured. In addition, industries in general will be transformed into ones suitable for the knowledge-based economy. (‘Transformation into a knowledge-based economy’)

2001 is being promoted as ‘Visit Korea year’ although according to reports not with great success (‘Inbound Tourism Falls’). However, Dato' Abdul Kadir, The Malaysian Minister of Culture, Arts & Tourism, on a visit to Korea May/June 2000 described tourism as the mega industry of the future and predicted that Korea, being close to Japan and China, had the potential to become a major tourist destination (Shin Kyung-hwa 2 June 2001).

How does ROK, in fact, compare with other countries? Here we look at a selection of countries that might be considered as competitors or benchmarks. Some, such as Cuba and Vietnam have particular relevance to DPRK because of their relationship with the United States.

In terms of total foreign income (Fig 6) ROK might be considered a middle-ranking market. Although less than a tenth of the US level ($18.5b against $196b), its income from international tourism is ahead of that of Taiwan, Macau, Cuba and Vietnam but quite a long way behind Hong Kong, China and Japan. ROK captures a mere 1.7% of the world’s tourism expenditure, compared with the US 18.5%. Again, it is behind
Japan (4.1%), China (2.8%) and Hong Kong (2.2%) but ahead of Taiwan (0.6%), Macau (0.3%) and Cuba and Vietnam which have 0.2% each.

**FIG 6: TOTAL FOREIGN INCOME, 2001, ROK AND SELECTED COUNTRIES**

Source: Beal 2001 Statistical Appendix  Table A5

The World Tourism and Travel Council (WTTC) predicts that ROK will increase its share of world income from international tourism from 1.7% in 2001 to 2.2% in 2011. The shares of the United States and Cuba will fall, Vietnam will stay steady and the others in our selection will all increase. Again this omens well for the DPRK.

It is estimated that the Republic of Korea will be earning $17 billion from visitor exports in 2011, plus a further $39 billion from ‘other exports’, giving total earning from international tourism of $56 billion. (Beal 2001d Statistical Appendix tables A6 and A7) By then the ROK will rank 22 in terms of visitor exports (down from 19) and 10 in terms of other exports (up from 13). Real growth in visitor exports over the decade 2001-2011 will be 2.6% a year (making ROK 124 in the league table) and other exports will grow at an annual rate of 9.5% (23rd place). In other words, ROK will perform below world average for visitor exports 2.6% against 5%) but above average for other exports (9.5% against 6.2%). (Beal 2001d Statistical Appendix Table A7b)

The WTTC projections suggest that ROK annual income from international tourism will grow by $37 billion over this period. What share of this increase the DPRK can capture is an open question but even at the most optimistic it is unlikely to make much dent.

**DPRK TOURISM**

Data on DPRK tourism is virtually non-existent, apart from that about Kumgangsan. No data relating to DPRK was found on the World Travel and Tourism Council
website, and just fragmentary data on the World Tourism Organization website (see Beal 2001d Statistical Appendix Tables A21 and 22).

**MAP 2: KUMGANGSAN AREA**

![Map of Kumgangsan Area](image)

Source: Hyundai Asan website

Most of the available data relates to the Hyundai Asan Kumgangsan venture, and originates with Hyundai. Apart from that the facts are sketchy. A DPRK tourism official, Kim Ryong Hwan, managing director of the DPRK travel company, who participated at the ITB travel fair in Berlin in March is reported as having said that 'just a few hundred European tourists visited North Korea last year, though a total of 100,000 foreigners, mostly Chinese, had the opportunity to breathe the country's rarefied air.' He is reported as having said that they expected 1,000 European visitors in 2001 and that facilities were ready (‘N. Korea Welcomes Tourists - But Not Americans’). The ‘100,000 foreigners, mainly Chinese’ were clearly in addition to the ROK visitors to Kumgangsan. However, a Bank of Korea assessment of the North Korean economy published in May 2001 is reported as stating ‘Hotels and restaurants, benefiting from a doubling in foreign guests to 50,000 visitors, expanded 27 percent.’ (‘North Korea Economy, Gap With South’). Again this figure would seem
to exclude Kumgangsan (most of whose visitors were not ‘foreigners’) but is half the level of Kim Ryong Hwan’s statement. However the Tumen Secretariat, quoting the DPRK National Directorate of Tourism says there were there were 130,000 international tourist arrivals in 1998 and it adds that ‘World Tourism Organization forecasts that the number of international arrivals in DPRK will increase to 146,000 in 2005, 159,000 in 2010, 173,000 in 2015. The average annual growth rate is around 1.7%’. (Tumen Secretariat 2001). Reports from China, compiled by the Korea Trade Organization (KOTRA), claim that on-day tours from Dandong (China) to Sinuiju (in DPRK) have brought in 50-60,00 tourists a year since 1988 (sic). The tours were suspended, for an undisclosed reason, for six months but resume on 17 May 2001 (‘One-day tour between Dandong and Sinuiju”)

The ROK Ministry of Unification website reported

As of November 30, the number of South Korean visitors to the North this year reached 6,846 in total, not including the Mt. Kumgang tourists. The number showed ups and downs in the early 1990's, but constantly grew since 1995. It increased rapidly after 1998 with the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung Administration. During the period from 1998 through the end of November 2000, a total of 15,762 South Koreans visited the North. During the early days of inter-Korean exchange in 1990 and 1991, the visits were made mostly in the social area. The economic area quickly became the major one thereafter. (Korean Unification Bulletin)

As for Kumgangsan itself, the Hyundai Asan website claimed 370,000 visitors between the first trips on 18 November 1998 and December 2000. By June 2001 that figure had risen to 407,000. But the rate was down; in the first quarter of 2000 Hyundai had 67,000 customers but in the same period the following year that had fallen to 30,000 (Yoo Cheong-mo 27 June 2001). The problem was that Hyundai had agreed to pay a fixed amount, roughly US$12m a month, irrespective of the number of tourists. and it was claimed that by June 2001 losses amounted to about $400 million (Kim Ji-ho 2 June 2001). Hyundai Asan started defaulting on the monthly payment in February, paying only $2million and then nothing until the bailout in June. By the end of May the debt stood at $46 million (‘Asan Deeper in Kumgang Debt’). Hyundai had attempted to increase revenues by introducing a floating casino but this was been rejected by the ROK government (‘Govt Rejects Hyundai Casino Plan’). In its negotiations with the DPRK Hyundai Asan asked for a reduction in the monthly fee, and more substantially, the designation of the area as a special economic zone and the opening of a land route from the south to Kumgangsan.

June saw a breakthrough in a series of deals which not merely salvaged the Kumgangsan venture but suggested, yet again, that Seoul and Pyongyang could just keep the water unfrozen beneath the Pyongyang-Washington ice. Just as the two sides managed to exchange mail for the first time in half a century in March 2001, despite the freeze in DPRK-US relations (Kim Ji-ho 16 March 2001), so too in June. The North’s Asia Pacific Peace Committee agreed to Hyundai Asan’s requests. A 13.7 km roadway from Goseong, in the North, to Songhyeon-ri, in the South, is to be opened up at a cost of 60-100 billion Won (to be borne by the South) and according to initial reports was expected to be operation by mid 2002. (‘Pyang Allows Hyundai Land Access’). This would reduce the travel time to 1 hour (‘KNTO to Join Mt. Geumgang’) down from the 13 hours of the existing 271km trip from Tonghae
(‘Enlivening Mt. Geumgang tours’). The flat $12m monthly fee is to be replaced by a per capita fee -$50 by land and $100 by sea. (Yoo Cheong-mo 21 June 2001). It was also agreed that the Kumgangsan area would be designated a special tourism zone which would, according to Hyundai Asan President Kim Yoon-kyu ‘help promote the Kumgang area as an international hub for trade, commerce, finance and culture as well as tourism’ (Shin H.J 11 June 2001).

Seoul provided the crucial sweetener to the deal. Barred by law from directly using the South North Cooperation Fund to bailout Hyundai it did it circuitously via the Korea National Tourism Office (KNTO). SNCF provided funds for KNTO to buy out Hyundai Merchant Marine (hence allowing the debt to the North be at least partially cleared) and invest in Kumgangsan. (Seo Soo-min 8 July 2001; Park Yoon-bae 4 July 2001). The deal was inevitably attacked by the opposition Grand National Party (Kim Kwang-tae 10 July 2001) although the rescue in principle seems to have had public support. (Kim Kwang-tae 27 June 2001)

Outsiders had always claimed that the Hyundai venture was driven by personal reasons, especially those of founder Chung Ju-yung, and did not make business sense. However, in an interview in Far Eastern Economic Review in October 2000, Kim Yoon Kyu asserted that this was no so. He said that opportunities in the South were drying up, so that the ventures in the North (of which Kumgangsan is not the only one, albeit currently the biggest) were necessary for future growth. Asked about losses he replied:

Now, yes, our losses are around $40 million or so since the project began two years ago. Over 300,000 South Korean tourists have visited Mount Kumgang so far and with foreigners being allowed to visit from the end of this year, the number could soon reach half a million. We expect to break even next year. Assume, for example, that each tourist spends $1,000 on a trip. That totals $300 million a year. Under our contract, we'd be paying up to $940 million over six years as licence fees. Our revenues over a three-year period alone would be $900 million, sufficient to cover our basic commitment. We plan to build a golf course, an amusement park, hotels and other accommodation to altogether handle up to half a million tourists a year, including foreigners. We want to bring investment from the United States, Europe and Japan for this mammoth project. We'd be selling Cokes and pizza and other capitalist goods there, inside North Korea. (North Korea: Open for Business)

The dreams were resuscitated by the 2001 agreement and there has been renewed talk of investment opportunities ranging from golf courses to casinos (Seo Soo-min 8 July 2001; Shin HJ 9 July 2001) and even involving foreign investors (Kim Ji-ho 21 July 2001; Shim Jae-yun 10 June 2001). Former U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz was one name mentioned (Shim Jay 26 June 2001; Yoo Cheong-moo 27 June 2001).

However in mid August it appeared that the 8th June agreements to open the land route and designate Kumgangsan as a special tourism zone had not progressed and it was announced that Hyundai Asan President Kim Yoon-kyu was going to visit Pyongyang soon, probably after the 15 August National Liberation Day holiday, in order to urge implementation (Oh Young-jin 12 August 2001; Kim Ji-ho 13 August 2001)
Kumgangsan though currently the jewel in crown of DPRK tourism is not the only attraction. Attempts have been made to develop tourism in Rajin-Sonbong targeting Chinese from China and Hong Kong with the lure of gambling. (Introduction to A Tour of Rajin-Sonbong Region) Mt Paektu, the sacred mountain on the Chinese border, is currently hampered by access problems but has long-term prospects (‘Ferry Tour to Mt. Paektu Opens’). According to a Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) report from Pyongyang, over the last 20 years some 100,000 ‘overseas Koreans’ and 60,000 foreigners have visited Myohyangsan. (‘Mt. Myohyang, tourist resort’) The ancient capital of Kaesong is scheduled to be opened to tourism, and developed by Hyundai Asan, and if that happens its proximity to Seoul will be a major strength (Shin Kyung-hwa 24 March 2001).

**CONCLUSION**

It is clear that there will, in all likelihood, be burgeoning tourism demand in Northeast Asia over the next decade and beyond. If the DPRK is able to participate in that, even at a modest level, it could produce sufficient foreign exchange earnings to transform and re-invigorate its economy. Participation in tourism will be contingent on the same factors which could unleash other forms of foreign income generation, especially joint venture exports. Tourism and exports, combined with an influx of FDI and loans from international financial institutions, could produce a virtuous circle of reinforcing growth.

A benign political environment is a necessary condition for tourism development but it is far from sufficient. Problems range from the general economic situation (and especially shortage of electricity) to establishing a tourism infrastructure, transportation and personnel training. Then comes the marketing of the DPRK as a tourism destination, a formidable task given its present image and fierce competition in the region. No doubt the Pacific Asia Travel Association task force led by Neil Plimmer will produce concrete recommendations on many of these issues (‘New Zealander Chosen to Lead North Korean Task Force’) although arrangements for the visit are currently stalled.

The impact of tourism on the social and political structure of the DPRK is a contentious issue. North Korea is not alone in facing this challenge, which is common around the world, especially in small previously insulated countries. The resilience of the DPRK has surprised many in the past; it may do so again in respect of tourism. The DPRK has long had modest inbound tourism but it was not until the beginning of the Kumgangsan venture in November 1998 that it moved into any form of mass tourism. Even that was small by ROK and international standards and bedevilled by problems. Whether Kumgangsan will be seen in the future to have marked the beginnings of ‘normal’ inbound tourism, or just as a temporary phenomenon which showed promise but was ultimately still-born is of course unknown but it is clear that whatever happens it will be the product of the same geopolitical forces that will fashion the Korean peninsula as a whole. However, within those constraints, and challenging them, tourism can play a positive and special role.
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Determinants of Financial Reporting System: 
The Case of South Korea

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1. INTRODUCTION
Several environmental variables have been found to influence the essential elements of a country's financial reporting system in varying degrees (Mueller 1967, 1968; Radebaugh 1975; Nobes 1983; Gray 1988; Cooke and Wallace 1990; Meek and Saudagar 1990; Adhikari and Tondkar 1992; Doupinik and Salter 1995; Nobes 1998). The most frequently cited variables in the literature are government; business enterprises; accounting profession; economic factors; international influences; and culture.

This study seeks to analyse the development of Korea's financial reporting system in relation to these key explanatory variables. The explanatory analysis explores how and why the unique financial reporting system arises, is maintained, and transformed over time in Korea. It enhances current understanding of the country's system and also helps to identify environmental factors equally important to other countries, thus facilitating the development of a comparative explanatory framework.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 proposes a conceptual framework for analysing the evolution of Korea's financial reporting system by critically reviewing prior contingency theory-based research. The role of these six variables in shaping Korea's financial reporting system is discussed in Sections 3 to 8. Section 9 provides some conclusions regarding the contribution of this explanatory approach to understanding development and current features of Korea's financial reporting system.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
A conceptual framework (Figure 1) has been proposed for analysing Korea's financial reporting system. It has been derived from a critical review of prior contingency theory-based research (e.g., Mueller 1967; Radebaugh 1975; AAA 1977; Frank 1979; Nair and Frank 1980; Nobes 1983; Yang and Lee 1994; Nobes 1998).
Figure 1  Proposed Conceptual Framework

As indicated in the proposed framework (Figure 1), this study adopts a broader definition of financial reporting system. It encompasses broad aims, institutional environment of financial reporting regulation, and detailed financial reporting rules and practices. These three elements of a country’s financial reporting system are depicted to be influenced by six key factors. They are: government, business enterprises, accounting profession, economic factors, international influences, and cultural factors. Each of these components is briefly discussed below.

2.1  Government
Government has been one of the most persuasive forces in the development of financial reporting objectives, standards, and practices in various countries (Radebaugh 1975; Cooke 1989; Demirag 1993). The active participation of government in financial reporting regulation has been particularly significant in countries with a relatively weak and unsophisticated accounting profession.

Taxation has also played a significant role in shaping a country's financial reporting system in situations where financial reporting systems are strongly influenced by state objectives (Mueller 1967; Meek and Saudagaran 1990; Radebaugh and Gray 1993; Doupnik and Salter 1995). In countries where there is a strong link between taxation and accounting, business enterprises are likely to adopt very conservative financial reporting practices to minimise their tax liabilities.

2.2  Business Enterprises
Financial reporting standards in a country with widespread ownership of company shares differ from those of another where shares are predominantly family-owned (Mueller 1967; Radebaugh and Gray 1993). The demand for public accountability and disclosure tends to be greater where there is a broad ownership of shares compared to family ownership.
2.3 Accounting Profession
The role of accounting profession in shaping a country's financial reporting system is evidenced in several studies. In countries with a strong and sophisticated accounting profession, active participation of the accounting profession in financial reporting regulation is common.

2.4 Economic Factors
Capital markets, particularly securities markets, have been found to be a major element in economic growth in various countries (Sedaghat et al. 1994). As the size and complexity of capital markets increases, capital is increasingly raised from external shareholders and a broad ownership structure results. Consequently, public accountability and information disclosure become more important and lead to the development of an extensive financial reporting system (Pratt and Behr 1987; Meek and Saudagar 1990; Adhikari and Tondkar 1992; Ray and Gupta 1993; Radebaugh and Gray 1993; Doupnik and Salter 1995). Countries with highly developed capital markets tend to adopt a professionally regulated, "true and fair" view audit system and disclose relatively large volume of information (Salter and Niswander 1995).

Inflation has also been a major influence on accounting in countries with a high rate of inflation, e.g., Argentina (Meek and Saudagar 1990). In these hyper-inflationary countries, some form of price index adjustment is called for and alternative measurement systems to the traditional historic cost approach are preferred (Radebaugh and Gray 1993, p. 45).

2.5 International Influences
Colonial influence on the development of financial reporting systems has been enormous in developing countries (Radebaugh 1975; Hove 1986). Business and accounting philosophies of developed countries have often been transferred and as a result, similar financial reporting systems have been instituted in their colonies.

In addition to the colonial influence, international pressures have led to an adoption of financial reporting systems generally accepted internationally. They include: growing international economic and political interdependence (e.g., EU, NAFTA), foreign direct investment, multinational firms, the rapid growth of international financial markets, the expansion in business services, and the activities of international regulatory agencies (e.g., IOSCO).

2.6 Culture
The influence of cultural factors on financial reporting has been studied and accepted in various countries (Jaggi 1975; McKinnon and Harrison 1985; Harrison and McKinnon 1986; Gray 1988; Gerardy 1991; Mathews and Perera 1996; Belkaoui and Picur 1991; Fechner and Kilgore 1994; Doupnik and Salter 1995). In particular, Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions of culture have been widely tested to identify any potential linkage between cultural variables and characteristics of financial reporting systems. Strong bureaucratic involvement in financial reporting regulation in specific countries has also been found to be closely linked to underlying Confucianist-based belief in the "moral basis of government."
In sum, despite some limitations associated with any contingency theory-based research (see Kim 1997 for details), the proposed framework substantially contributes to current understanding of a country’s financial reporting system.

3. **THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT**
The role of Korean government is discussed by addressing two aspects: financial reporting regulation and taxation.

3.1 **Financial Reporting Regulation**
Until the early 1980s, the Korean state had been pre-eminent in its relationship with the private business sector and with the accounting profession. The state as a major financier to the private sector had engendered a close, but superior relationship with the business sector (Jones and Sakong 1980; Chung and Lee 1989; Chen 1995). In addition, the state had controlled the accounting profession with respect to its examination, registration and practices.

The superior relationship with both sectors had enabled the state to play a pivotal role in regulating financial reporting in the country. Government agencies had been heavily involved in setting and enforcing accounting standards, with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) being given ultimate responsibility. Also prior to the enactment of the External Audit for Joint-Stock Companies Act (EAA) in 1980, government agencies had substantially controlled the accounting profession by allocating audit work among CPAs (Park 1990; KICPA 1992a).

Based on the discussions above, it can be argued that the institutional framework for financial reporting regulation prior to the 1980s had been predominantly legalistic because the regulation relied upon reserved application of state principles rather than market principles. In legalistic countries, laws are enforced not by commercial failure but by the state's monopoly of the means of coercion (Puxty et al. 1987; Parker and Nobes 1995).

Since the early 1980s, the Korean government has accelerated its liberalisation policy by deregulating various economic sectors, especially the country’s capital market. The private sector, chaebols in particular, has since been gaining both political and economic ascendancy in contrast to dwindling government intervention in the country’s economic affairs (EWYB 1995, The Economist 1996).

The deregulatory trend of government has also been reflected in increasing private-sector participation in accounting standards setting process. Despite some deregulatory moves in the 1980s and 1990s, the ultimate authority in accounting standards setting and enforcement had still rested with government agencies, i.e., Korean Securities and Exchange Commission (KSEC) and Financial Securities Commission (FSC) until 1999 when an independent private-sector accounting standards-setting body was established. It seems therefore reasonable to argue that government-directed legalistic approach had been widely accepted by most stakeholders until 1999.

The government-directed regulation has often been criticised for its susceptibility to political pressures from special interest groups (Zeff 1978; Solomons 1978; Jang and Chun 1999; Kim 2000). For example, the fourth and the fifth amendments to Korean
Financial Accounting Standards (KFAS) were made in 1990 and 1992 mainly because financial institutions lobbied the government against the implementation of LOCOM (Lower of Cost or Market) for marketable securities and long-term investments.

Following the crisis, the Korean government has been particularly subject to increasing international pressures (e.g., IMF, World Bank) for establishing independent and transparent standards setting processes and for developing effective enforcement mechanisms. As a result, an independent private–sector accounting standards setting body, Korea Accounting Institute (KAI) and its umbrella organisation, Korean Accounting Standards Board (KASB) were established in 1999. Subsequently, the FSC revised the EAA to provide a legal basis for delegating its authority to formulate accounting standards to KAI and KASB. Despite the establishment of private-sector standards-setting bodies, government intervention may still be needed to an extent for some time to facilitate the implementation of its reform measures, given the current state of Korea’s accounting profession. However, the role of the state should be limited to a supervisory role (Lee et al. 1994; Yoon et al. 1999).

3.2 Financial Reporting and Taxation

As the Korean economy has developed, the country's tax system has changed too (see KICPA 1992a for details). An outstanding feature of Korean tax policy since the 1950s has been its ability to adapt to substantial changes in economic and social policy directions, and its capacity to facilitate strong economic performance (Kim and Kim 1990; Whalley 1991).

Financial reporting rules and practices have been strongly influenced by national tax policies (Kim 1986; Nam 1994; Song and Yoon 1995; Kang 1995). First, most companies report on their financial statements the depreciation expenses prepared in accordance with the rules of the Corporation Tax Law (CTL) to minimise their tax liabilities (Kim and Kim 1990, p. 275). Second, a special provision called Chueng-Yi was allowed in 1975 by the government to prevent firms from being penalised by a “qualified” or “adverse” opinion because they engaged in accounting practices not allowed under KFAS to obtain government incentives. Third, special depreciation methods allowed under the CTL and the Tax Exemption and Reduction Control Law (TERCL) were implemented to provide tax privileges for business entities engaged in government-promoted activities. Fourth, most companies put aside statutory legal reserves and other types of reserves prescribed in the CTL and Commercial Code (CC).

Various attempts have been made, however, to minimise these tax influences on financial reporting since the late 1960s, as shown in the requirement of submission of tax reconciliations to regulatory bodies, the abolition of Cheung-Yi and special depreciation, and the recent introduction of tax accounting rules. Despite these continuous efforts to separate tax accounting from financial accounting, Korean firms still tend to prepare their financial statements in accordance with tax rules (Yoon et al. 1999). In particular, the increasing adoption of IAS will inevitably result in more gaps between accounting standards and tax rules. Albeit costly, it is suggested that Korean firms prepare two sets of financial statements for accounting purposes and for tax purposes separately to enhance the reliability and comparability of their financial information (Jang and Chun 1999).
4. THE IMPACT OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

The ownership structure of business enterprises in a country influences the financial reporting system, particularly the nature and extent of information disclosure. Among the various types of business enterprises that have existed in Korea, joint-stock corporations have, in general, a broader ownership base than sole traders, partnerships and other types of companies. As the broader ownership base has more significant implications for the nature and extent of financial information provided, this section focuses on influences of joint-stock companies, particularly chaebols, on the country’s financial reporting system. The focus on chaebols seems warranted in view of their economic significance in the country.

4.1 Nature and Ownership Structure of Chaebols

A chaebol is defined as "a business group consisting of large companies which are owned and managed by family members or relatives in many diversified business areas" (Yoo and Lee 1987, p. 97). The characteristics of chaebols have been studied extensively by Steers et al. (1989), Hattori (1989), Lee (1992), and Chang and Chang (1994). The distinctive features of chaebols are summarised as follows:

- unity of ownership and control;
- diversified business activities;
- vertical integration;
- close relationship with government; and
- centralised planning and coordination.

Among these features, the ownership structure is further discussed because of its relevance in financial reporting, especially disclosure.

Despite many varieties of ownership structures, chaebols are typically owned and controlled by founders and their immediate family members through direct and interlocking ownership among affiliated companies. Unlike Japanese pre-war zaibatsu or post-war keiretsu groups, chaebols without holding companies are strongly dominated by family members. For example, the ownership share of families amounted to 49.4 per cent (i.e., 13.7 per cent direct ownership and 35.7 per cent interlocking ownership) for top 10 listed chaebol companies in 1989. When unlisted companies of the chaebols had been considered, the proportion of family ownership in chaebols may have been even higher. However, the high level of family ownership is not limited to chaebol groups, as evidenced by the proportion of family ownership of 411 publicly-listed industrial corporations as of December 1988 (Table 1).
With the increasing economic power of chaebols, new financial accounting standards were promulgated and enforced to monitor their activities. Regulations on consolidation were first introduced in 1974 to monitor and control the amount of credit allocated to large business groups. Separate KFAS on Consolidation and KFAS Working Rules on Consolidation were also promulgated in 1985 and 1987, respectively. However, business acceptance of the consolidation regulations had been slow because of the lack of independent audit requirements. It was not until the 1992 and 1994 amendments to KFAS on Consolidation and KFAS Working Rules on Consolidation requiring independent audits of consolidated financial statements that consolidation rules were enforced relatively widely.

However, the 1992 and 1994 amendments were criticised for their incompatibility and inappropriateness in Korea's business environment (Chun 1995; Jang and Chun 1999). The criteria for consolidation (following US criteria on ownership and control) have resulted in only a smaller number of companies being subject to consolidation because of the unique control structure of Korean business groups. Few companies satisfied the designated ownership criterion (i.e., 50% of outstanding voting stocks). The "control" criterion (i.e., 30% of outstanding stocks and the largest shareholder) recommended under the regulations is deemed weak because of complicated intercompany influences within a chaebol group. The "control" in Korean business organisations actually occurs in management participation and personnel management.

Furthermore, it has been argued that consolidated statements alone do not properly reflect the financial position and performance of chaebols because of their unique practices like interlocking shareholding and debt guarantees among affiliated companies. The particular nature and ownership structure of chaebols has been taken into account in the most recent amendment to KFAS (1998). Chaebols are now required to consolidate the accounts not just of the chaebol’s subsidiaries but also of linked companies (‘combined’) with which they do business (Jang and Chun 1999; Yoon et al. 1999; Kim 2000; Economist 2000). Chaebols are thus expected to produce three sets of financial statements: individual, consolidated, and combined.

5. THE ROLE OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
Since the first post-war professional accounting body (Korean Institute of Registered Accountants) was established in 1954, the accounting profession in the country had been heavily regulated and at the same time highly protected by the government until the financial crisis (Kim 2000). As mentioned earlier, the state maintained close control over the profession with respect to its members’ examination, registration, and allocation of audit assignments.

The degree of government control over the profession has decreased since the early 1980s, as reflected in more market-directed competition among CPAs. This change in the audit environment has had a substantial impact on the distribution of audit opinions rendered. The proportion of companies which obtained an "unqualified" audit opinion was relatively low, ranging from 15% to 40% in the 1970s, but it amounted to 88% in 1985 following the adoption of a market-based audit choice (Shin 1977; Park 1990). The remarkable improvement most likely resulted from audited firms’ newly acquired power to retain or change their external auditors, which in turn deteriorated audit independence and quality substantially.

The poor audit independence and quality led to a few legal actions against audit firms in the 1980s. In particular, following the legal action against auditors of Heung-Yang Ltd. in 1991, audit quality and independence have been gaining increasing attention among investors and the public in Korea (Choe and Choi 1996, pp. 4-5). To maintain the independence of external auditors and the quality of audit work and reports, various regulatory measures and structural mechanisms were introduced (e.g., post-audit quality reviews, increased audit indemnity fund). Despite these various mechanisms in place, the external audit system largely failed to function effectively, as shown in a series of audit failures in the late 1990s surrounding the collapse of Hanbo Steel, Kia Motors, and Daewoo group (Kim 2000). The failure was partly due to the overwhelming power of audited firms in relation to their external auditors and a general lack of market response to audit failures.

To protect the independence of external auditors from audited companies, particularly the largest shareholder of these firms, the EAA recently included a new provision on the composition of the external auditor selection committee (Kim 2000). In addition, various regulatory and protective measures related to the external audit system in the country are being lifted to enhance the market mechanism and self-discipline of the accounting profession. Although the successful implementation of the proposed mechanisms remains to be seen, more market-based audit environment through self-discipline and self-regulation is expected to continue in the country.

6. THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC FACTORS
The evolution of a country's financial reporting system is closely linked to the country's economic development. The discussion here focuses on the influence of Korea’s capital market and inflationary environment on the development of its financial reporting system.

6.1 Modern Development of Korea’s Capital Market
Broadly, a capital market encompasses institutional arrangements and instruments through which savings are directed. Here, a capital market includes a country's non-securities market (i.e., banks and non-bank financial intermediaries) and securities
market (i.e., stock and bond markets) which provide long-term financing to private enterprises.

Korea's capital market has undergone several stages of development, consistent with the country’s economic development. Korea's financial reporting has also changed to meet the needs of its evolving capital market. The current study specifically focuses on the development of Korean capital market and its influences on accounting since the late 1950.

Table 2  
Ratio of Bank Capital Loans to Fixed Capital Formation  
1956-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banks</th>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>1956 (%)</th>
<th>1957 (%)</th>
<th>1958 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KRB (KDB)</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>72.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All sectors</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Banks</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All sectors</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Banks</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All sectors</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chiu (1992), p. 94

As shown in Table 2, manufacturing firms relied heavily on bank loans from 1956 to 1958. For example, in 1958, approximately 75% of their financing was sourced from banks, especially from the Korean Development Bank (KDB). The heavy dependence of business enterprises on banks for their financing continued until the mid-1970s. The first two sets of modern accounting standards in Korea were promulgated primarily to provide a basis for the KDB's decision making for loans to the private sector. Accordingly, they adopted a strong creditor orientation also by stipulating various types of reserves, including legal reserves and the use of historical cost valuation methods.

However, in the early 1960s, securities markets also began to be promoted through various legislation aimed at mobilising much needed domestic capital into government-promoted business activities and through various tax and financial privileges granted to publicly-held companies (e.g., Cheung-Yi). As a result, the country's equity market grew rapidly in the 1970s. The number of companies listed on the KSE increased from 24 in 1967 to 356 in 1978. Despite this growth in the equity market, the heavy reliance on debt financing was still notable. The debt-to-equity ratio of Korean manufacturing firms in 1978 was 366.8% compared to 160.3% and 92.8% for the US and Taiwanese counterparts, respectively (Leipziger 1988, p.128).

Nonetheless, the Korean government’s continuous efforts to boost the securities market saw a massive liberalisation of the market in the 1980s and 1990s (Cargill 1990; Chung 1994). The growth in securities market activity from 1980 to 1995 is evident in Table 3.
Table 3
Capital Market Indicators: 1980-1995 (billion won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Listed Companies</th>
<th>Market Capitalisation</th>
<th>Value of Stocks Traded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>2,527</td>
<td>1,134.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>2,959</td>
<td>2,534.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>3,301</td>
<td>1,974.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>3,490</td>
<td>1,753.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>5,149</td>
<td>3,118.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>6,570</td>
<td>3,620.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>11,994</td>
<td>9,598.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>26,172</td>
<td>20,494.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>64,544</td>
<td>58,121.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>95,477</td>
<td>81,200.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>78,070</td>
<td>53,455.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>70,470</td>
<td>62,565.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>84,711</td>
<td>90,624.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>112,635</td>
<td>169,918.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>151,217</td>
<td>229,772.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>141,151</td>
<td>142,914.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3 shows that the number of companies listed on the KSE increased substantially from the late 1980s, more than doubling from 342 in 1985 to 721 in 1995. Similarly, market capitalisation and trading value increased enormously from 6,570 and 3,620 billion won in 1985 to 141,151 ($US 173.5 billion) and 142,914 billion won ($US 175.7 billion) in 1995, respectively.

The ownership structure of Korean enterprises is becoming even more diffuse with the liberalisation and internationalisation of the country's capital market. As such, adequate disclosure of "comparable" corporate information has become increasingly important in enhancing the competitiveness of Korean companies seeking foreign capital. Stricter independent audit requirements have been instituted to ensure that companies provide users with useful and adequate accounting information. Such requirements are prompted by the development of a larger and more complex capital market and are designed to reduce problems arising from information asymmetry and opportunism in the market (Pratt and Behr 1987; Lev 1988; Ray and Gupta 1993). The increasing significance of economic substance over legal form in enhancing the decision-usefulness of financial information has also shifted measurement rules towards less conservative approaches since the 1980s and particularly since the financial crisis.

The KFAS has continuously shifted to an investor orientation from the traditional creditor orientation of Korean financial reporting (Choi 1995). This shift in orientation can be explained by the perceived need for enhanced comparability of financial statements provided by Korean companies internationally. The most recent amendment adopts IAS substantially. The increasing adoption of IAS seems inevitable because the competitiveness of companies depends more and more on their financing being provided by various creditors, investors, and other stakeholders, both domestic and foreign. To summarise, the analysis of Korea's capital market development highlights that the country's financial reporting system has evolved to
reflect the needs of its capital market participants and in response to increased competition for capital.

6.2 Inflationary Environment

Korea has adopted predominantly conservative approaches to asset valuation and profit measurement. However, the upward revaluation of some categories of assets has been allowed under the Asset Revaluation Law (ARL) since 1965 after two-time temporary revaluations of assets in 1958 and 1962. These assets have been allowed to be revalued at the beginning of each fiscal year provided the wholesale price index has increased by 25 per cent or more since the previous revaluation (ARL).

Despite the efforts to control hyperinflation in both years, the wholesale price index continued to rise, increasing 69% between 1962 and 1965. During these hyperinflationary periods, optional taxation (Inchung Kwase) rather than accounting-based taxation was prevalent in business practices to minimise the huge tax liability resulting from the enormous inflation. Consequently, asset revaluation of permanent nature was instituted to provide a more equitable basis for taxation and to further develop a sound business environment.

However, the upward revaluation sanctioned on a voluntary basis has been frequently criticised for reducing the comparability and consistency of financial statements. Many companies abused the law to engage in manipulative accounting practices, reducing the quality of financial reporting in the country. In particular, business enterprises engaged in upward revaluation to minimise their tax liabilities and/or to facilitate bank borrowing provided on the basis of values of collateral assets. The detrimental impact of these discretionary asset revaluations led to heated discussions about their possible abolition, especially following the financial crisis (Nam 1994; Lee et al. 1994; Song and Yoon 1995; Cho 1995; Jang and Chun 1999; Kim 2000).

The asset revaluation was finally abolished in the 1998 amendment with a special provision that it is not to be allowed beyond 2000.

7. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

Financial reporting rules in Korea have been heavily influenced by foreign standards, mostly from Japan, the USA and the IASC. The strong Japanese influence, which was particularly acute during the colonial period, had continued in the 1950s and 1960s. The Japanese influence continued until the mid-1970s and was reflected in the use of historical-cost valuation, accrual-basis accounting, all-inclusive income statement, and various other areas found in the 1976 standards. In addition, a strong government involvement in financial reporting regulation is a legacy of the Japanese colonial period.

However, US accounting concepts and principles have been increasingly adopted since the mid-1970s (Koh 1988, p. 56), largely because of changes in Korea's capital market. In particular, the increasing liberalisation and internationalisation of Korea's capital market since the 1980s has made the decision usefulness of financial statements an important factor in competing for capital in both the domestic and international markets. (Choi 1973; Gray et al. 1995). In addition, the increasing use of US accounting concepts can be attributed to a large influx of US-educated accounting practitioners and academics in the 1970s and 1980s. The representation of US-educated members on accounting standards setting bodies increased from 20% in
1958 to 60% in 1981, while the percentage of Japanese-educated members decreased from 70% in 1958 to 14% in 1981.

The IASC's influence has also increased since the 1980s. The need to be in conformity with the IAS has been enhanced to meet the needs of diverse information users, especially foreign investors, who have called for increased comparability of financial information provided by Korean companies. The 1998 amendment of KFAS following the crisis, in particular, introduced numerous accounting standards in accord with IAS, including asset valuation, abolition of asset revaluation, present value accounting, and fair value accounting (see Kim 2000 for details). The comprehensive adoption of IAS was accelerated by international pressures from organisations like IMF and World Bank who provided bailout funds for the country during the crisis. They argued that one of the major causes of the financial crisis lay in the overall loss of international confidence in the reliability of financial statements provided by Korean business enterprises.

Despite the convenience and apparent cost-effectiveness of adopting foreign standards or IAS, the unquestioning adoption of foreign accounting standards may not be compatible with the Korean context, as argued in the international accounting literature (e.g., Briston 1978; Ndubizu 1984; Hove 1986; Rivera 1989). For example, the adoption of US criteria for consolidation was found to be inappropriate to the Korean business context because of the unique control structure of Korean companies, particularly chaebols (McKinnon 1984b; Chun 1995; Jang and Chun 1999).

8. THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE

Culture is often considered to be one of the most powerful environmental factors affecting a country's financial accounting system (Jaggi 1975; Hofstede 1987; Gray 1988; Salter and Niswander 1995). Accounting is an activity involving both technical and social aspects. Because of the "social" aspect of accounting, accounting constructs social reality and cannot be culture free (Chua 1986; Hines 1988). Among various cultural factors, this study specifically addresses the influence of Confucianism that has most profoundly influenced the Korean culture.

8.1 Confucianism

Korean culture has been influenced most profoundly by the Confucian ethic. This became the officially sanctioned state philosophy during the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) and has remained dominant ever since (Eckert et al. 1990; Chiu 1992; Chang and Chang 1994; Song 1994; Simone and Feraru 1995; Haskins et al. 1996). The teachings and the value system of Confucianism have prevailed in the minds of Koreans.

The deep-rooted Confucian values have significantly affected Korea's economic and financial reporting system in several ways. First, financial reporting has been heavily regulated by government or government agencies. The state has also been perceived as an active, moral agent in the development of society as shown in most late industrialisers like Japan and Germany (Amsden 1989).

Second, corporate resistance to financial disclosures can be understood in the context of Korean group consciousness and interdependence. These traits are manifested in an individual's perception of him/herself as part of a group. Korea scores very low
(i.e., 10) on Hofstede's (1980) individualism dimension and is perceived to be a 'collectivistic' and 'particularistic' society. Accordingly, the concept of accountability in the country carries contextual meanings different from that of 'individualistic' societies (i.e., Anglo-American countries). Corporate information including financial data tends to be considered company property and held in confidence.

Third, group consciousness and interdependence has also implications for audit independence and quality in Korea, as in Japan (McKinnon 1984a). Under the CC, Korean corporations are subject to a statutory audit. However, the statutory auditor need not be independent of the corporation being audited and is frequently an employee of the company. Interdependence, rather than independence, characterises the relationship between the statutory auditor and corporate directors in which mutual loyalty and interests are emphasised.

Following the enactment of the SEL in 1963, an independent audit by external CPAs became a requirement for listed companies and was imposed on any stock corporations subject to the EAL (1980). An independent audit has long been considered by corporate directors as a legal requirement of little or no benefit to the corporations. The group consciousness and interdependence, which deeply permeates Korean business organisations, has had a negative impact on corporate directors' perception of external auditors. The sense of group membership, of who is an 'insider' and who is an 'outsider' looms significantly in Korean culture.

9. CONCLUSION

The explanatory analysis shows that distinctive features of Korea's financial reporting system (i.e., broad aims, institutional environment for financial reporting regulation and detailed financial reporting rules and practices) are influenced strongly by six key environmental factors identified in the proposed conceptual framework. These key environmental variables are found to have exerted various influences on the country's financial reporting system which is characterised by a government-directed legalistic approach to regulation, coupled with an increasing adoption of a micro-user oriented view of accounting.

It is difficult to clearly identify the degree of influence each variable has played in shaping Korea's financial reporting system. However, different environmental factors have played roles of varying degrees of importance in its development. Prior to the 1980s, it appears to have been dictated by the government and its macroeconomic policies, especially tax policies. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s, financial reporting rather served as a means to achieve the government's "economic growth-first" policies. Various financial and tax privileges were awarded to business enterprises involved in government-promoted activities and accounting was often used to protect these businesses from gaining unfavourable accounting treatment. Consequently, a macro-user view of accounting prevailed prior to the 1980s.

In contrast, Korea's financial reporting system since the 1980s shows a stronger capital market orientation. As Korea's capital market has become more sophisticated, business enterprises began to rely on direct financing through the equity market as a source of capital. A more diffuse ownership structure has resulted and consequently, a micro-user view of accounting is gaining in significance in the country. Independent audits are becoming increasingly important for ensuring reliable
information is provided by companies to external users. Accordingly, the status of the accounting profession has improved substantially. Thus the role of government in financial reporting regulation has diminished to a substantial degree, as evidenced by the recent establishment of independent, private-sector accounting standards-setting bodies and by the market-based audit environment.

In sum, with further internationalisation of financing and business activities expected, domestic and international capital markets will continue to play a most influential role in shaping Korea's financial reporting system towards a more micro-user oriented system. In addition, changes in the Korean population's long-cherished Confucianist values will coalesce with the country's fast-changing economic environment to effect continuous changes on Korea's financial reporting system.

REFERENCES


Doctrinal Origins and Social Ends:
Tensions in Korea’s Early
Protestant Experience

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This paper is about two men, Yun Ch’iho (1864-1945) and Kim Kyoshin (1901-1945), who struggled with the question of how to relate their new-found faith in an eternal, transcendent Christian God to the specific cultural and political situation of their country at the time. It is also about the way in which the beliefs and actions of these two men are interpreted. It is, further, about the perennial issue of how a transcendent God works, and is served, in the midst of immanent daily life, an issue which in this case arises in the relation of Christians to one of the most powerful forces of their (and perhaps our) time: nationalism.

Evaluation of these two men and the issues which surround them is a very complex exercise, if one wishes to address their every facet, for the introduction to Korea of Protestant Christianity and its growth into an active church community coincided with the decline of the long-lived Choson dynasty into colonial subjection to Japan, the loss of authority of the traditional Confucian intellectual and moral edifice that underpinned cultural, social, political and economic values and institutions, the oscillation between reform, revolt and reaction from the late nineteenth century, the sharp rise in interest in Western education, medicine, and technology, the debate over the proper roles of men and women, the appearance of ideological schism, and the general issue of modernity. In many cases, the growth of Christianity not only coincided with but also lent impetus to the developments.

I have chosen to single out of this complexity one chief issue that could be considered fundamental to Christian experience in such contexts, namely, the doctrine of Divine Providence. I propose to examine the positions and actions of Yun and Kim in relation both to their understanding of providence and to what might be regarded as the logic of the doctrine itself. It is of course not necessary to subscribe to this doctrine, but it is surely necessary to understand its place in their worldview. This venture brings me directly up against the vexed question of nationalism, and I think some comment is required on this head.

Nationalism, pronounced an historian several decades ago, is “first and foremost a state of mind.”1 In Korean historiography, this state of mind is manifested in a resolute adherence to the nation as the starting-point of any exploration of Korean history. It might be countered that this nation is implied or even required by the use of the word “Korea,” but this is not my point. What I am referring to is the almost undeviating use of a politically and ethnically defined nation as interpretive framework, evaluative standard, and ultimate meaning, in any exploration of human experience on the peninsula. This nation-state is both first and final cause of Korean
history. It follows, then, that all individuals must be examined in terms of how their thoughts, words, and actions register on this teleology of the nation-state. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the treatment of Yun Ch’iho and Kim Kyoshin. The nation-centred approach taken to both Yun and Kim seems to me to have led to quite serious misstatements of both men’s positions. Comparisons may be odious in any case, but hardly more so than when a yardstick is used with which neither parties compared would have been quite comfortable.

This is not, of course, a problem only in Korean historiography: it touches on the relation of the historian to one’s subject in a far more general sense. If historians have responsibilities, surely one of the most important is to interpret the words and deeds of historical figures as far as possible in terms that are consistent with their states of mind at the time. Thus if nationalism is one possible state of mind, the question ought naturally present itself whether other, even quite contrary, states of mind might have existed. What seems to prevent this rather elementary process from taking place in nationalist historiography is the ascription to the “nation” or the nation-state of a value greater than which no other can exist. The fact that there seem to be no terms other than collaborator or traitor available to describe someone who does not adhere to nationalist values underlines the difficulty of proposing an alternative state of mind to nationalism.

The notion of Divine Providence, however, invites the historian to look in a different way at how historical persons thought and acted. For the doctrine of providence is itself a view of the world that excludes adoption of the nation as the central category of interpretation and meaning. It does not do so by denying the existence or, perhaps, validity of nations, any more than of families, political parties, or individuals. Providence puts God’s purposes at the centre, and nothing is permitted to usurp that position. The chief implication for nations is that they become one among a large number of categories that surround the divine centre, and as such their status as a category or the status of any one nation is entirely relative to the purposes of that divine centre. Does God support the equality of all nations at all times? Does God privilege the “nation” over other categories? Does God even support the concept of a nation or nation-state? Does the political or cultural fate of nations have any relation to God’s purposes for humankind, i.e., does he use them and if so how? There is no self-evident answer to these questions, and the way in which theists (Hindus, Jews, Moslems and Christians) answer them determines the nature of their doctrine of providence.

For Christians, there is another aspect to be considered: the meaning of the new dispensation, that is, the transition from Old to New testaments, from Israel before Christ to the church after Christ. If the purposes of God were formerly revealed through his relation to Israel, are they now revealed through his relation to the church? If the identity of believers was formerly a matter of their membership in Israel, is it now a matter of their membership in the church? Does the nation, political or cultural, now have any spiritual significance at all? Might loyalty to the nation lead to betrayal of the church and Christ? There is not unanimity on all such questions, but a fair degree of consensus exists on the principle that if providence has any special place for nations, it is only with regard to the fate of Israel and thus no other nation can properly consider itself “chosen.” (Christians in some western nations, such as Calvinists in The Netherlands in the 16th century, have identified their nations as such, and the stronger the threat or ambition the stronger this tendency, but it is
regarded as a theological aberration. No official Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Orthodox doctrine supports the idea.) In general, however, God’s purposes are believed now to be pursued through the church and believers. For the rest, nations may be considered to reap the rewards of their own good or bad behaviour, a position that is liable to very fluid interpretation.

Unless these issues are understood, it is difficult to see how a proper historical study could be made of Yun Ch’iho and Kim Kyoshin, or of any of the Korean Protestants who attempted to view their nation’s situation in terms of providence. Certainly, the question has to be raised whether Christianity permits one to give central place to the nation, whatever its situation. And having done so, the historian might even be persuaded to adopt a little more objectivity towards oneself and question whether, apart from merely following the Zeitgeist, there is any justification for ascribing the highest value to the nation in any case.

Even if one does not allow this question to arise, one must still recognise that Christianity might be inherently incompatible with nationalism, and that mainstream Christian doctrines of providence certainly are. This might be a reason for a nationalist historian to condemn Christianity, but just as it would be absurd to condemn a socialist for not supporting capitalism, so it is odd to condemn a believer in Divine Providence for not automatically supporting nationalism. Quite apart from this logical whimsy, there is a tendency to forget that both Judaic and Christian doctrines of providence predate the rise of nationalism (as distinct from national consciousness) by many centuries, and so their compatibility with the latter can hardly be counted upon.

There is, to be sure, a problem here, since many Korean Protestants counted themselves and were counted as nationalists. But this is partly a question of consistency. Were the Christians confused? Here it is vital to ask what view of providence was employed; and the fact that the “good” nationalist Christians appealed exclusively to the Old Testament passages on the nation provides a clue: were they Christians or actually Judaists in this respect? And even on Old Testament terms, do the passages they appealed to actually support nationalism? But it is also in part a result of applying the term nationalist to anyone who worked on behalf of the nation. Yet it is quite normal for Christians (and Buddhists, etc.) to work for and within the boundaries of the communities in which they live without ascribing central or ultimate value to the prevailing definition of that community. They might perform similar outward work from different inner motives; and should circumstances change even a little, those inner motives might require outward acts that actually conflict, for example, with nationalist objectives.

In view of these questions and problems, it is clear that the “meaning” of the lives of Yun Ch’iho and Kim Kyoshin can hardly be explored adequately from a nationalistic perspective alone. What I propose to do, then, is attempt an answer to a simple question: what if instead of judging these men (and Christianity) according to the principles and demands of nationalism, one judges nationalism and the historical choices of these men according to the doctrines they presumed were Christian? At the same time, we must recall that Christianity at this point in Korea primarily concerned individual lives and the voluntary communities which they formed, and hence we must be extremely cautious when considering its relation to an involuntary
community such as the nation-state not to assume too many correspondences between
the logics of the two.

**Patriot or Turncoat?**

“Did Christianity plant in modern Korea a servile ethos of spontaneously
submitting to imperialism? Or did it play the role of restructuring national identity?”
The reason Yang Hyonhye raises this question in her recent and very thoughtful work
on Yun and Kim is the fact that whereas after a 12-month term in jail in 1942 for his
publishing activities Kim spent the two years remaining till his death from typhus
working among the poor in Hamhung, without implicating himself in the imperialist
activities of the Japanese, Yun in the 1940s made a number of speeches on behalf of
Japan’s war effort, after himself being interrogated in 1938 and manoeuvred into a
“political settlement,” and possibly committed suicide soon after Japan’s surrender in
1945. It has been common in the treatment of national figures who yielded in some
way or other to the intensified pressure exerted on them personally by the Japanese
Government-General from the late 1930s to the end of the war, to assume that there
must have been something in their positions on nationalism and imperialism
beforehand that led them to such tergiversations. Yun Ch’iho has been no exception,
and Yang’s work is partly an excavation of his earliest thinking, for the purpose of
exposing there the seeds of his later failure as a patriot. I have to admit to reservations
about the validity of this approach as a historical method.

Yang is no “straw man,” however, and she has produced a very thorough work that
tackles the complexity of the issues on the basis of some very detailed research.
Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the impression that the conclusion is implicit in her
starting point or in the way she raises the questions. There is an acceptance that the
starting point should unarguably be one’s relation to the nation in the sense required
by nationalists; and the question is not whether, from a Christian perspective on the
fortunes of nation-states, it is legitimate to judge Yun (and others) according to the
nationalist viewpoint, or even whether Yun did simply take sides with Japanese
imperialism, but “how an intellectual with such a general will and ethical sense as
Yun Ch’iho had, became so discouraged as to destroy himself.” What kind of
imperialism could do this to him? Although Yang disclaims any intention to judge
Yun or portray him in a bad light, it is very difficult to see what other impression
could be achieved by the terms of her investigation from the outset.

Yang introduces her discussion with a statement that reasonably clearly defines her
starting-point: “Probably no other period so clearly distinguishes light from darkness
in historical figures as one where national identity has been destroyed and its form is
being sought after again.” In such circumstances, the question is what lies behind
success and defeat, self-integrity and self-destruction, a question Yang decided to link
to “the Christian faith that was passed on to Korea from abroad with an emphasis on
human universality.” Hence, the subject of enquiry is “how Christianity related to
the reconstitution of national identity” in a critical historical period. This involves a
tension between Christianity as a universal faith and nationalism as a particular
phenomenon in time. It is proper here, I think, to quote Yang at some length, for this
is a central concern of my discussion and she states it lucidly.

Although the spheres [of the universal and the particular] are different, the two
are connected in some form or other in the arena where a Christian practises
one’s faith, because together with one’s belief in a universal God, a Christian must live as a member of a particular nation. When Christianity and national identity are combined in an undifferentiated way, Christianity ends up uncritically affirming that individual nation as it is. In this case, Christianity’s universality is lost and the nation’s absolute being alone is emphasised, so that Christianity becomes demoted as an exclusivist national religion that justifies a nations’ collective egotism. On the other hand, if it emphasises only its universality and disregards specific national characteristics, Christianity falls into a subjective history-escaping religion. Thus how one combines national identity with Christianity when one bases the restructuring of national identity on Christianity, is a very important question. That is to say, how Christians can simultaneously establish national identity through Christianity within the concrete historical situation and relativise the national identity that has been restructured according to Christian universalism so as to develop the individual nation in the direction of universal humanity, becomes problematic.

I do not think I have read anywhere a more concise or felicitous statement of the problem. But even while Yang points out that the question is a matter of the tension inherent between temporal and immanent modes of a Christian’s life, I would like to step back and question the question. The question itself reserves in advance a special status for the “nation”. But if a person becomes a Christian, there occurs a major transformation of one’s view of oneself, of others, of life, and of the world in toto. Having become a Christian is the single most important fact, and all else must be rearranged accordingly. The primary identity is with the new community of believers, or perhaps more primarily with Christ who creates the new community. In Yang’s presentation however, “how one combines national identity with Christianity” is introduced as a self-evidently central issue. If Christianity does not make this its mission, it “falls into a subjective history-escaping religion.” This appears to assume that there is no important or legitimate history other than national history; and that Christianity is to be evaluated according to its relation to national identity. The nation is thus given a special ontological status, something that exists there all the time and is history, and a category within and for which Christianity is required to work if it is to have any place in history. While it seems as though Christianity is given an active role, in fact there is no room allowed here for the idea that Christianity might have its own historical agenda quite separate from the “nation,” and which might perhaps involve the eradication of a nation-centred history and even of nations themselves.

Some western Christian thinkers have in fact simply dismissed nation from the sphere of Christian action as an illegitimate intruder. Part of the reason for this perhaps lies in the experiences of the two world wars and in the mistrust that experience has engendered for nationalism. In any case it remains a question why nation should be given this obligatory place in Christian life. It is hardly enough to say that one is born a member of a nation, especially when the idea of the nation itself may legitimately be called into question. One is born into many concrete situations, including into a certain family or no family at all, into wealth or poverty, high or low social status, and so on, and some identities such as educated and uneducated or male and female might be considered more real and consequential than the national. Why should nation be given such Christian prominence?

Yang gives two basic reasons. The first is that national identity in Korea was under dire threat because of the Japanese invasion. Something was seriously wrong with the
Korean nation and all who belonged to it who could do something about it were obliged to do so. This is surely a good reason why the idea of a nation might become important, and why political figures would become deeply involved, and on ordinary perceptions is indisputable. But a Christian position on such matters is seldom ordinary, and there is something a little circular in an argument that assumes the nation is terribly important in the first place. Important for whom and in what sense? If the nation is something for which Christians also must take responsibility, it is conceivable that they will come up with a perspective that many, even the majority of the “nation” will dislike and oppose. One cannot relativise the nation in front of a true nationalist: saying that there is something that takes precedence over the nation does lead inevitably to a different perspective on the nation. It is a little awkward therefore to judge Christians according to whether the “nation” approves of their position on the nation.

This is all very abstract, and it must be said that the issue lies in the details. When the actual historical behaviour of the Japanese in Korea is placed under scrutiny it is clear that there were many things that a Christian position would have to condemn and seek to take action on. But this was also the case at the end of the Choson dynasty and has been the case under successive regimes in the ROK since 1945. That element of Christian engagement is everlasting, and so the issue is not one of whether rulers are of one race or another, and it is hardly necessary—perhaps it is misleading—for Christians to style themselves as patriots, let alone nationalists, in endeavouring to live a life of faith in such situations. What is it about the nation that Christian thinking must be subjected by it to theological and logical juggling in order to assign to and guarantee it pride of place alongside the universal essence of Christianity?

The second reason Yang tenders for giving such Christian importance to the nation is that as Christianity was introduced by westerners a notion of “non-Christian” culture arose. Korean Christians were faced with the question of what relation their culture, which had developed for thousands of years without knowledge of Christianity or contact with Western cultures, had to so-called Christian civilization. The fact that Christianity spread to other places in either direct or indirect company of Western imperialisms made this question more momentous. Historically, this is undeniable: European, North American, and Australian missions were imbued with a sense of connection between Christianity, nation, and civilization, and in one way or other some of them encouraged the Korean Christians to think of nation as a basic category for Christian thought and action. Quite apart from the critical political situation in Korea from the latter half of the nineteenth century, the possibility of Christian nationalism was in some measure taught by missionaries, even if inadvertently, and was learned also through reading Western literature and history. Furthermore, it should be added, Japanese nationalism reinforced Korean nationalism and by basing its presence and policies in Korea on nationalism, Japan made it very difficult indeed for Koreans to respond other than in kind. But the question remains whether this is sufficient reason for contemporary Christians to give nation in Korea such prominence that one’s relation to it determines whether one belongs to “light” or “darkness”.

The Rights of Civilised Nations

In his search for a new understanding of the fortunes of peoples and the foundations of civilization, Yun Ch’i’ho, who was a politician—an important point to which we must later return—had to grapple with the seemingly endless history of imperialism, invasion, and colonisation. There were few periods of peace in most
parts of the globe except when one imperial order was sufficiently strong to maintain a kind of *pax*. Otherwise power seemed too precariously balanced to allow peace to prevail for long. As far as appearances were concerned, might was right. In May 1890 he took issue with Carlyle’s statement: “one strong thing I find here below: the just thing and the true thing.”

There is as much truth in this statement as in the ‘inalienable right of man’ which men talk about now-a-day. That is, those who have *might* have inalienable right and justice and success, but those who have no might have nothing but wrong, injustice, and failure. This is proved by the dealings of the stronger nation or race with a weaker nation or race. Therefore, one strong thing I find here below: might nothing more.\(^{12}\)

This Yun later found too petulant. It was much more in accord with the emotional sense of being wronged most Koreans felt than his later formulation, in October 1892, in which he applied his idea of Christianity as inwardness and God’s work in history as less arbitrary:

> We cannot say ‘might is right’ in the overthrow of one nation or race by another *unless* the conquered is better in morals, religion, and intelligence, therefore more *right* than the conqueror.... But we find the stronger has been almost always better or less corrupted in morals, religion and politics than the weaker.... Thus what seems to be a triumph of might over right is but a triumph of comparative – I do not say absolute – right over comparative wrong.\(^{13}\)

In some ways this reflected the currency of social-darwinism. The Japanese Christian and politician, Uchimura Kanzo, founder of the non-Church movement, mentor of Kim Kyoshin and Ham Sokhon, and an influence on Yun Ch’iho, also faced the idea of applying Spencer’s idea of “the survival of the fittest” to international affairs as early as 1881.\(^{14}\) But like Uchimura--and indeed, Kim Kyoshin--Yun became more concerned to understand international and national fortunes in relation to providence, the belief that all history and all that happens to us is somehow subject to God’s guiding activity.

Yun was troubled over how God’s morality could be consistent with the kind of providence that seemed to apply. The notion of a comparative moral superiority in the conquering nations--or at least of some moral or spiritual lapse in a nation that should have known better--was his way of reconciling God’s goodness and providence. The moral for Koreans was that they had better learn to be good stewards of the territory over which they were responsible, or lose it.

It followed, then, that certain peoples could exercise better stewardship than others and thereby create something like a Christian civilization. This was Yun’s view, and his experiences in North America in the 1890s and his voluminous reading led him to conclude that Europe and North America were Christian civilisations. This viewpoint has been the cause of considerable confusion and some rather exaggerated interpretations of what this implied. Indeed, it has been interpreted as the root cause for Yun’s “capitulation” to the Japanese in the 1940s. It is possible that a great deal of the confusion and negative interpretation stems from taking a “national imperative” rather than God’s providence as the hermeneutic principle.
Yang Hyonhye, for example, construes Yun’s position as “Calvinistic”: progress in commerce means a civilization is saved whereas lack of it attests to its damnation. Therefore the “Christian God that Yun Ch’iho met in this worldview was not a God who transcended the world and judged it, but a God who upheld the supremacy of the values of industrial civilization within this world.”

(Yt is a moot point why it is an advance to adopt a worldview in which God upholds the supremacy of the values of the nation-state.) Yun thus became a champion of imperialism of superior civilisations over inferior civilisations. But his imperialism did not follow the self-expansionist logic of European and Japanese Christians, Yang continues. Rather, by absolutising industrial civilization and measuring Korea against these foreign values, Yun portrayed Korea as inferior by definition: a logic of the loss of subjecthood (chuch’e), that is, self-destruction.

I believe this interpretation involves a non sequitur: on this basis, admission that one was a sinner, and always would be till the resurrection, would constitute a loss of subjecthood and self-annihilation. And in fact Yun did not believe Korea always would be inferior; nor did he absolutise European and North American civilisations. He frequently criticised United States culture from the very beginning of his life there, he delivered a speech in the early 1900s to Koreans in which he expressly warned against the idea of North America being taken as the model for Korea, and his diaries become more and more pointed in their antagonism to the idea that Western culture is superior to Korean--a very important point and a clue to his actions in the 1940s. Further, he advocated commerce and industry in the context, not of these being some sort of Calvinistic sign of salvation, but of his perception that Korea needed to strengthen itself and that the ideals of hard work and perseverance which he perceived in North America were vital to Korea’s regeneration. He looked forward to a regeneration of Korea through acquisition and application of ideals of stewardship, ideals which Yun believed were at the time most appropriately expressed through commercial and industrial activities. One might say he was following Yang Hyonhye’s principle of finding a particular form for obedience to universal divine truth that was relevant to the given concrete situation.

I have to agree with Yang, however, that Yun’s idea of a Christian civilization was a problem. It is a perennial problem, and I do not claim to know how it can be worked out. The idea of a Christian civilization exercised the mind also of Uchimura Kanzo, who also spent the formative years of his youth studying and travelling in the USA. He recalled in 1895 how when he set off “to Christendom” in June 1883, he believed that in a place where Christianity had enjoyed “undisputed power and influence for hundreds of years” there would be “Peace and Joy in a measure inconceivable to us of heathen extraction....” Of this notion he was, needless to say, steadily disabused by the crime, brutality and racism he encountered. On the latter he commented, “There never was seen such an anomaly on the face of this earth.”

(Interestingly, he also was troubled by might over right, but took a far less sanguine view of commerce than did Yun: “Might is Right, and Money is that Might,” he remarked.) The lesson he drew from his disillusionment with North American civilization, however, was never to “defend Christianity upon its being the religion of Europe and America. An ‘external evidence’ of this nature is not only weak, but actually vicious in its general effects.”
Since Uchimura had such a powerful influence on both Yun Ch’iho and Kim Kyoshin, it is worth considering what Uchimura had to say about providence in relation to nations. On 5 December 1886 he confided to his diary:

“Much impressed by the thought that God’s providence must be in my nation.... God does not want our national characters attained by the discipline of twenty centuries to be wholly supplanted by American and European ideas. The beauty of Christianity is that it can sanctify all the peculiar traits which God gave to each nation. A blessed and encouraging thought that J-- too is God's nation.”

Uchimura was more positive than Yun, perhaps, in his choice of expression, but it has to be remembered that Japan was not in the same precarious state as was Korea. But what did the spread of Christianity in Japan foreshadow? “One characteristic of Truth is that it makes the bad worse and the good better.... We may reasonably expect therefore the worst badness in Christendom.”

He then claims that the good people in America are far superior to the good people in Japan, throughout the centuries, and concludes:

So then, this differencing of good from evil...of sheep on the right hand from goats on the left,--this I consider to be a Christian state, the foretaste of that into which we are all going, the complete separation of the good from the bad. This Earth, though beautiful, was not originally meant as an angel-land. It was meant as a school to prepare us for some other places. This educational value of the Earth must not be lost sight of in our poor attempts to make it what it should be.

There is in this respect no great difference between Yun’s and Uchimura’s view of Christian civilization. Though he decried “mammonism,” Uchimura was no less susceptible than Yun of equating what they considered essential features of the west with Christianity. “I attribute the progressiveness of Christendom to its Christianity,” wrote Uchimura. “Faith, Hope, and Charity...have worked upon it for the past nineteen hundred years, and have made it as we have it now.”

National Independence

Yun’s preoccupation with the idea of a Christian civilization derived in part from his neo-Confucian training, which predisposed him to the view that a civilization must be founded on an ideal, and the best civilization on the truest ideal. Again, Confucian training inclined him to the view that knowledge and wisdom are mutually necessary and mutually supportive. “The rise and decline of a nation depends on the wisdom and nature of its people,” he wrote. So too Uchimura Kanzo: “With us we make no distinctions between moral and intellectual training. School is our church, and we are expected to bring up our whole beings in it. [As Takayama Hikokuro put it], ‘Knowledge is of worth as it enlightens the ways of righteousness.’”

How much contact Yun had with Uchimura by this stage (March 1889), if any, I am not sure, but since Uchimura used this idea against Western concepts of the church, the similarity of their positions presumably reflects their common Confucian background.

Yun, however, had no argument with the church as such, but he certainly viewed it in terms of increasing knowledge. Indeed, he saw in this institution the hope for Korea’s independence. “How then, given the present state of our country, can we hope for independence, and...how will we be able to defend ourselves against subsequent evils and preserve our land?” he asked himself. Not by accepting inferiority, at any rate.
“Thus the pressing need at present is to increase knowledge and experience, teach morality and cultivate patriotism.... There is no other instrument able to educate and renew the people outside the Church of Christ.”

It was not an entirely different kind of education that Yun envisaged the church would provide, although this is often the way in which his and other radical reformers’ ideas of the time have been construed. Yun’s position was that Confucian moral maxims were reflections of a universal, objective standard; and even in his scorn of the practice of filial piety, that coverer of “a multitude of sins,” he was not opposing respect and duty towards parents and elders. What he identified in Christianity as the vital, indispensable element, was God’s provision to humans of the power to overcome evil and practice what they already knew was true.28 Again, this is identical to the views of Uchimura and Kim Kyoshin. Like Yun, Uchimura taught that what Christianity offered was not the Tao (Way) so much as the means: “By it alone the law-keeping becomes a possibility. It is the Spirit of the Law.”29

In the relation between this spirit of the law and national independence, there is again a convergence between Yun and Uchimura. Alongside Yun’s belief that renewal began on a personal level as an inward movement in individuals and worked itself out in structural, national independence from there,30 we may place Uchimura’s statement that “[Christianity] of all religions works from the inside....”31 There does appear here a difference in perspective, however, which in terms of responses to concrete historical situations could lead to considerable divergence. This difference relates to the question of whether independence is a right. Uchimura chose not to accept money from foreign missions unless the independence of the Japanese Christians was entirely preserved. He viewed independence as a very precious thing. On establishing an independent church, he observed that “A dependent man is the most hapless being in this universe.... Independence is the conscious realisation of one’s own capabilities; and I believe this to be the beginning of the realisation of many other possibilities in the field of human activity.”32

It is doubtful that Yun would have disagreed with this as such. Nor would he have perhaps felt great unease with Uchimura’s explanation that “Our [church’s] independence was not intended as a revolt against Methodism, but as an expression of our real attachment to our heavenly Master, and of the highest sentiment of our love to our nation.”33 Nevertheless, Yun found no reason to seek his church’s independence from Methodism nor refuse their money for projects related to the Methodist mission inside Korea. Unlike Uchimura he did not seem to see a danger to national independence in this and might not have entirely agreed, then, with Uchimura’s crowning aphorism: “Thought is cosmopolitan....But not so bread.”34

At least, not in relation to the church. Yun did think financial dependency was very dangerous for a nation, and it was of course for this reason that he urged his compatriots to devote themselves to industry and commerce, and to learn from the West on this head—as did An Ch’angho, Cho Mansik and most Christian “nationalists” then and since. And Yun did believe that hard work and honesty were Christian virtues.35 But it was perhaps recognition that the church was universal whereas the nation was not, combined with his particular view of providence, that led Yun to diverge from Uchimura and Kim Kyoshin over the place of national independence in the Christian scheme of things. Yun did not regard national
independence as a right guaranteed by God. It was always dependent on stewardship and the overall purposes of God in the world.

Uchimura, however, and very likely Kim Kyoshin followed him here with regard to Korea, stated that “[Japan’s] existence as a nation was decreed by Heaven Itself, and its mission to the world and human race was, and is being, distinctly announced.” Yun didn’t regard providence as God’s fixing of the inviolability of each nation for all time. In history this was not true in any case, and the fact that God allowed political violation of nations by other nations required an explanation. Yun’s explanation was stewardship and the principle of the “right” of comparative good over comparative bad cited above. So instead Yun asked whether God could be blamed if he delivered Korea into the hands of another nation, although he did add that he felt he “must be mad” to wonder whether it would be better to fall under the dominion of England or Japan.

The root of divergence at this point, then, is a difference of opinion over the implication for national independence of their shared belief in providence. It might also be added that Yun’s notoriously critical and even contemptuous attitude towards the behaviour and qualities of his fellow Koreans possibly made it easier for him to accept the possibility of God delivering Korea to imperialism. But his contemplation of this possibility, against the background of his readings of history and the realities of Korea at the time, were certainly an attempt to understand the issue Christianly: “misgovernment has its own punishment as any other crime,” and “no sin is greater in a nation than weakness.” In any case, when the Japanese did take over his nation in November 1905, Yun immediately resigned from his political post, refused Japan’s offer of appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and decided to devote himself to education and Christian endeavour through the church and YMCA. The church’s mission was universal and Christians were obliged to pursue it first, whatever the temporal situation.

Kim Kyoshin and Patriotism

Kim Kyoshin was born in 1901, nearly 40 years later than Yun Ch’iho. His first memories were of the Russo-Japanese war, through which Japan gained control over the peninsula; he was nine when Japan formally annexed Korea. Growing up in Hamhung, he was far removed from the centre of events, however, and soon after the March First uprising in 1919 he went to Japan to further his education. He returned to Korea in 1927. Unlike Yun Ch’iho, he had no personal experience of the transition of Korea from independent to colonial status nor of the frustrations of a Christian politician wrestling with the cause of national independence amidst a divided monarchy and an ineffective succession of reforms, coups and revolts. Kim’s only experience of his nation was as a colony under the heavy and exploitative hand of Japan. There were fewer external inhibitions to his sympathy for Koreans. Unlike Yun, who had dedicated himself to a strenuous struggle to preserve Korea’s independence for twenty years before Kim’s birth, only to see all efforts fail, Kim’s world was one in which recovery of national independence was the focus.

The impact of Uchimura Kanzo on Kim, who studied under him for seven years and remained devoted to him till his death, was extraordinary. It was through Uchimura that he and Ham Sokhon met and organised together the non-Church movement in Korea. Uchimura’s view of providence as God’s affirmation of each nation is very clear in Ham’s thought. Ham defined providence as the operation of God’s agape
(divine love) in history, and believed Christians were duty-bound to share in the embodiment of that agape in their given historical condition. Kim followed much the same understanding. According to Yang Hyonhye, Kim believed that if he sundered his connection with Korea, or the connection between the Christian faith and Korea, this would prevent the attainment of universal truth in Korea. Colonial Korea was the location for realisation of agape love, and the Bible was the most precious gift he could give to “Choson, the greatest object of my love.” Hence the name of his serial publication: Songso Choson (Bible Korea).

This identification of the Bible with the nation is not self-explanatory, however. Kim’s influence in present-day South Korea, for example, ranges from the conservative, evangelical, politically quietist Student Bible Fellowship which takes “Songso Choson” as its motto, to the anti-government activists who value him—or Ham Sokhon perhaps more so—for the notion of national responsibility. The argument continues over whether a nationalist and political use of Kim is appropriate.

In 1947 Ham Sokhon presented Kim’s patriotism as follows.

It is meaningless to take Choson away from Kim Kyoshin.... He loved his country. But that love was not the so-called patriotism that is generally fashionable in the world. He realised that a living Korea was possible only in living people. That is why he could not separate Choson and the Bible and strove to enliven a new Choson within a biblical faith.... He sought to live life truly and love his country truly, and he believed that to live life truly was to love one’s country most truly and that a life lived in faith was a true life. This was his word and his writing, and trying to live this way was his life.... Words which are of use only at one time and have no use when that time has passed are not the Word. [Han ttae e man soyong twego ku ttaega chinagan hu e nun ssul dega omnun marun malssumi anida.] (...) These words of his that issue from realisations springing up within himself or from contact with the various events outside him, or that are generated in response to the ebb and flow of the times, though they are dressed up in clothing not unmarked by the limitations of time and space, nevertheless contain meanings which derive from the deep foundation of life and the unchanging truths of faith, and are thus worth chewing over thoroughly and tasting of deeply, and worth using to rescue a society tossed about in the muddy torrent. What is the foundation and what is unchanging? ... In a word, faith. Only through faith in the eternal God can one live this life and stand this country on its feet.

How did Kim’s patriotism differ from the normal, “fashionable” patriotism of his time? For one thing, Kim had to wrestle with the particularity and possible exclusiveness of the nation, and in characteristic fashion he attempted to solve this problem through contemplation of the passages in Matthew’s Gospel chapter 10: 5-6 where Christ is reported to have ordered his disciples to avoid all Gentiles and Samaritans and preach only to “the lost sheep of the house of Israel,” and in Mark 7:27 where Christ initially rebuffs the Greek woman’s plea with the words, “Let the children first be fed, for it is not right to take the children’s bread and throw it to the dogs.” These passages prompted a very revealing commentary (August 1936).

“It is unquestionable that Christianity is a great world religion that aims at the salvation of the whole world,” he observed, and therefore these passages presented a
severe problem for they appeared to contradict the “central doctrine of the universality of Jesus’ salvation.” At a time, he continued, when the whole world had become “like one house,” the common interpretation that since the Jews were God’s Chosen People he used them as a step to the rest of the world stuck in one’s throat. Kim then recalled that on reading an alternative explanation, “that it was Jesus’ incomparable patriotism that caused him to limit evangelism only to Israel,” we thumped our desks and cried out with delight, because we had discovered someone who had for certain taken a step forward in interpreting a passage so troublesome to understand.” However, this interpretation also seemed incomplete and Kim’s dissatisfaction was only dispelled when he read Ham Sokhon’s exegesis, according to which this was part of Christ’s strategy of attacking the Jewish church authorities and the church spirit, “the highest stage of humanism (in’ganjuui ui ch’oegobu).” For after telling his disciples to go only to the lost sheep of Israel, Jesus had himself crucified by them as the “human bullet” that would destroy this spirit. Kim judged Ham’s interpretation a “huge and very creative advance,” and urged readers of Songso Choson to reread their Bibles from this non-church perspective.

That Kim was a founder of the non-church movement is of course crucial to the issue of identity. If they have no church, what is the collective identity of Christians? Kim taught that there was only one basis for Christian identity: the Bible. Nor did he want to substitute identity with the non-church movement for identity with the church: “What I have learnt from Uchimura is not non-churchism but the truth of the Bible.”

In their pursuit of the Korean soul, Kim and Ham Sokhon laid down a particular providential view of Korean history and geography that affirmed Korean tradition and history and asserted a God-given national mission. Thus the Korean ethical tradition’s Chi (knowledge or wisdom), Chong (affection) and Ui (will) corresponded to the Bible’s faith, hope and charity, and it was Korea’s destiny to spread these conceptions. This pursuit involved also idealisation of Confucian prescriptions for the family, specifically the distinct nature and function of male and female whereby Korean women were to be prized for their position in the home as preservers of piety and custom, a model for the world to emulate.

Kim’s nation-centred view of providence was pushed into a possibly extreme position by his view of the relation between the Korean churches and the missionaries. If he had learnt the truth of the Bible from Uchimura he had also imbibed his strict refusal to accept any kind of subservient relation to the western missions. Kim’s own anti-missionary stance was apparently triggered (or justified) by a not very convincing incident: the Reverend Henry Appenzellar’s criticism of a Korean song included in the Methodist hymnary which revealed, Kim alleged, his ignorance of the subtleties of the Korean language.  In 1935 Kim reiterated that “What I desire is to disseminate teaching that will form the power of Christianity in Korea, and to build an eternal, immortal Korea on the basis of biblical truth.” “Korea” and the “Bible” were to become identified as Two Persons in One Body; national history was the expression
of the race’s soul and the key to its development was providence. Since all Korean history was equally under the same divine direction, a complete identification of Christianity and the nation was effected, and so, one might conclude, the danger Yang Hyonhui warned of was fulfilled.

But not necessarily with the consequences that Yang describes:

Christianity’s universality is lost and the nation’s absolute being alone is emphasised, so that Christianity becomes demoted as an exclusivist national religion that justifies a nations’ collective egotism.

For the Bible remains the standard and the nation is to achieve its historical fulfilment through conformity to it. What has happened essentially is that Kim Kyoshin has answered the question whether God privileges the “nation” over other categories very firmly in the positive. And to the question how the political or cultural fate of a nation relates to God’s purposes for humankind, he replied that a nation has a soul which God saves and establishes for eternity.

One may legitimately expect that if Kim urged his readers to read the whole Bible from the perspective of the non-church movement’s deconstruction of the structure and authority of an organisation so important to the experience and history of Christianity as the church, he might then urge also a similar deconstruction of the structure and authority of the nation-state, a phenomenon several centuries more recent than the birth of the church itself. Given his axiom that all life and activity must be founded on and measured against the Bible, there is no warrant to except any historical entity or experience. His critique of the church was radical: not simply criticism of behaviour of leaders or groups or policies, but dismissal of the entity itself. If it was not only possible but demanded that Christians should live outside and independently of the church—and indeed to undermine its existence—why was it not demanded that Christians view an entity such as the state or nation in similar fashion? There is after all an anarchist core to the non-Church movement’s basic tenets (which is partly why Anabaptists and Quakers were politically persecuted in Europe). Why then, other than for tribalist emotions that might be thought incongruous with Christianity, should Kim and his fellows have thumped their desks with delight when patriotism was (mistakenly?) attributed to Jesus? Why is the nation given this special status and exemption?

It does not seem sufficient to say that this is because the nation-state is a political reality. For in a sense much more germane to any Christian concern, the church has been a political and cultural reality for a great deal longer and continues to be so for the vast majority of Christians. It would seem closer to the mark to say that it is an issue of identity. Uchimura, Kim Kyoshin, and Ham Sokhon, and probably Yun Ch’iho also, all had a highly developed sense of national identity, to the extent that belonging to a nation was considered inborn and immutable.

But it is precisely here that one might have expected Kim to develop a critique of this sense of identity at least as radical as his critique of Christians making the church a site of identity. The principle was after all that identity with the church was a false identity, and that the church did or could not legitimately mediate God to his people, something which occurred truly only in meditation upon the Bible directly before God. It is something of a puzzle therefore that the nation, or its culture, should
nevertheless be given a status denied the church and be regarded as a mediator of God
to the minjok (race or people). Although the perspective, initially, of a strong and
progressive “west” and the missionaries’ complicity in the notion that theirs was a
Christian civilisation caused new Christians in the “east” to seek elements of God’s
presence in their own traditions, and thereby affirmed a natural tendency to regard
matters in national terms, it is still a puzzle why members of the non-church
movement would not see through this construction of the world instead of seeking to
enshrine it forever in the will of God.

I suspect part of this problem relates to the habit of making the nation an analogue of
the individual, a habit of thought that encouraged Uchimura and Kim, and sometimes
Yun, to indulge in analytically dubious notions such as “saving the nation.” At times
we do gain from their writings an impression of nations inhabiting the globe like
individuals. Certainly, talk of a national soul encourages the analogy with the
individual and can only make identity with the nation appear fundamental. This
problem is hardly worked out satisfactorily in the writings of Uchimura, Kim or Ham.
Uchimura’s observation that the most “Christian” nation is that in which the
distinction between light and darkness or good and evil is most pronounced, clearly
implies that a Christian nation is a radically divided community. Kim’s notion that a
“Bible Choson” is even attainable, or that if it were it would be a nation whose “soul”
is redeemed, is thus made a nonsense by Uchimura’s viewpoint. It is not explained
what an “eternal” nation could possibly mean in history, let alone beyond history.
One suspects that theology and sociology are being confused. Theologically,
salvation concerns the redemption of particular human beings; the question of the
impact of a given number of Christians on a nation and so on is a matter of sociology
(and perhaps economics and politics).

This problem arises also in Yang’s interpretation of Kim Kyoshin’s position. Yang
claims she detects a rift between Kim and Uchimura’s successor, Yanaihara Tadao,
precisely over and because of their national identity. While she admits that Yanaihara
was very critical of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea (and he was sacked from Tokyo
University for opposing Japan’s war against China), she faults him for counselling
Korean non-church members against getting involved in anti-Japanese resistance.51 If
I understand Yang’s construction of Yanaihara’s position correctly, however, his point
was that Korean believers should not take hostility towards Japan as their starting
point, but consider Korea’s colonial subjugation as part of providence and consistently
take repentance and obedience to God as their starting point. To interpret this only
and essentially as a matter of national identity is to fall into the trap laid by making the
nation an analogue of the individual, and leads to the quite extreme statement that
Kim and Yanaihara were ideologically opposed so that “as a Korean nationalist,” Kim
was “unable to co-exist with the bourgeois and Christian egalitarianism of the
Japanese non-church members represented by Yanaihara.”52 Yang then cites a letter
in which Kim proclaims common cause with Korean Christians who are being forced

If the nation-individual analogue were legitimate for Christian belief (quite apart from
the question of its analytical possibility), one imagines the New Testament would
have been written from a rather different angle. As it is, while the New Testament
speaks of making Christians from all nations, there is no suggestion that a nation may
be saved as a single unit, as though there existed a national soul. On the contrary,
nations, like families, will be divided by some members becoming believers, as Kim himself pointed out, and just as at the Second Coming (or Rapture) one spouse will be taken and the other left, so some members of a nation will be taken and others left. Where nation is used in the New Testament, it is used, as in I Peter 2:9, in a sense that transcends (and one might say deconstructs) immanent-historical nations: once one is saved one becomes a member of a new nation, a “holy nation, God’s people,” and henceforth one is a sojourner only in the world and one’s true identity is with the company of believers, fellow-citizens of the Kingdom of God.

If the nation is taken as the starting-point and the view that politics is the highest human activity and political action on behalf of the country is the highest virtue is accepted, of course Christians will be expected to justify themselves according to these criteria. But in terms of a Christian definition of fundamental identity, Yanaihara’s advice to Korean believers appears perfectly acceptable. (Of course, if he were complicit in Japanese oppression of Korea, his counsel might appear suspect—though then again, Christ seemed more interested in whether a Roman had faith than whether he were a centurion posted to enforce Roman rule over Judea.) A Christian cannot legitimately base one’s life and worldview around hatred or any negative perspective towards others. Accounts of people who have done so, such as campaigners against heretics and other Christian groups or rival religions, do not edify; and the harnessing of these negative emotions to political, military or cultural power, though often practised, is not generally admired as a Christian method. It is not a different question whether it is justifiable to base resistance to a colonial oppressor on nation-based antipathies. Of course it is far easier for one who is not in such a situation to make these remarks, but ease or difficulty is not the fundamental issue. Christianity has its own principles, and it is central to its message that one can only follow them with the aid of supernatural power. [Kim: But Christ says the meek, that is, those who do not turn their backs on heaven, but receive all trials as things sent by God, will steadily possess the earth.]

This was central, too, to Yun’s, Kim’s, and Uchimura’s understanding of the Christian faith, and it can be queried whether any of them would have been wholly happy with the nationalistic framework within which their positions and actions have often been viewed. As we shall see later, Kim did not base his decisions in the 1940s only on identity as a Korean nationalist who was impelled thereby to resist the Japanese nation, but also on Christian grounds which would have applied equally had the rulers been Korean. For now, it is sufficient perhaps to refer to Kim’s meditations in June 1938 on the “Way of the Cross.” Before referring to these, I should mention that he wrote an article exactly four years earlier, titled “Jesus the Materialist,” in which he drew on James 2:14-17 to argue that faith must have material results, must have some concrete historical expression. His meditations on the way of the cross indicate what he did not mean by this. In these meditations, Kim criticises the tendency for Christians and Christian evangelists to talk about Christianity as a path, not to the cross, but to wealth, health, and material well-being. To this he contrasts the uncompromising words of Jesus in Mark 8:32-38 and Luke 12: 49-53. In the former, Christ calls Peter “Satan” for urging him to follow worldly conceptions of power and says, “Whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospels’ will save it.” If one were to maintain the individual-nation analogy, this would have to be extended into an admonition against Korean Christians expecting material benefits for their nation from Christianity and counsel to deny rather than attempt to “find” their nation. This may be another point at which
the analogy proves unworkable, but it also warns us against interpreting Kim too readily as a regular nationalist. For it is problematic to hold up as a paragon of nationalism one whose thinking amounts to a rejection of the secular framework within which the nation-state operates and through which nationalism gains its form and power. It is necessary to delve more deeply into the issue of providence to clarify his, and Yun Ch’iho’s, relation to nationalism.

**Providence: The Old Testament or the New Testament?**

“Religious thought is genuine whenever it is universal in its appeal. (Such is not the case with Judaism, which is linked to a racial conception.)” - Simone Weil

If we widen the purview of our enquiry for a moment, we discover that there was a rather general tendency among Korean Christians throughout the colonial experience to draw hope and inspiration from the Old Testament accounts of the exodus of the Israelites from their bondage in Egypt and from the rebuilding of Jerusalem by Nehemiah. This was not a politically naive tendency, and the Japanese saw enough of its point to proscribe at times use of symbolism surrounding Moses and the restoration of Israel’s fortunes at different times. While some missionaries thought the Japanese read more into these symbols than was there, accounts by Korean Christians confirm some degree of political intention. There is little reason to believe that this proclivity for Old Testament symbolism did not owe a great deal to Korean hopes for restored political independence.

Among the Korean Protestants residing abroad during this period, it was a commonplace to regard the church as the Remnant that would return and rebuild the nation, and pastors were regarded almost as the de facto spokesmen and even political leaders of the Koreans abroad. The management and content of the Korean newspapers abroad, such as the Shinhan Minbo in San Francisco and Tongnip Shinmun in Shanghai, relied a great deal on Korean Protestants, who constantly encouraged this Christian-nation identity, tying the fate of the nation as a political and cultural entity to the fortunes of Christianity in the land and diasporic communities.

This identification with the Old Testament Israel ought to be expected. Christian nationalism, edging towards virtual identity of nation with the religion, is a not uncommon empirical historical reality. It has a long pedigree among western nations, despite the absurdity of several nations each drawing on the chosen nation imagery simultaneously. A crucial source of identity in the creation of the Dutch Republic in the sixteenth century was the fusion of two historical analogies: the Batavian and the Israelite. In response to the Spanish attacks, the Netherlands Anthem of Commemoration (Gedenck-Clanck) of 1626 includes the following in its closing prayer:

O Lord when all was ill with us you brought us up into a land wherein we were enriched through trade and commerce...even as you have led the Children of Israel from their Babylonian prison; the waters receded before us and you brought us dry-footed even as the people of yore, with Moses and with Joshua, were brought to their Promised Land. You have...freed us from the yoke of the Moabites even as it was with Deborah and with Barach whose power went before us in the field and that of stout-hearted Gideon who fought
against the violence of the Midianites.... Yea, the courageous and faithful David has been a mirror of piety and steadfastness to us and has not deserted us, and a Solomon [has come] whose wisdom and foresight are above all others.  

As a young and very much a minority religion in Korea, Christianity was naturally not in a position to command the imagery of the Korean people to this degree. It is perhaps remarkable that the Old Testament was drawn upon to the extent that it was and that early Protestant leaders such as Yun and Kim took up the issue of providence so emphatically. And as in the Dutch case, so in Korea there was some serious effort made to conflate imagery from Korea’s religious traditions with central Christian motifs such as the Trinity. CERTAINLY the precarious state of the nation prompted intense contemplation of the Old Testament, but the use of the Old Testament as the source of an understanding of divine providence had an important impact on the view of their nation among many Korean Christians, including Kim Kyoshin who was encouraged in this by Uchimura’s example.

According to his own testimony, Uchimura Kanzo was criticised by fellow-Christians for over-emphasising the place of the Old Testament in the Christian faith. Reading the Old Testament prophets, he claimed, transformed his religious thought. He records that his reading of Jeremiah led him to the belief that god must have spoken to Japanese people throughout their history through their great men. “The thought was inspiring beyond my power of expression. Patriotism that was quenched somewhat by accepting a faith that was exotic in origin, now returned to me with 100-fold more vigor and impression.... I compared Russia to Babylonia, and the Czar to Nebuchadnezzar, and my country to the helpless Judea to be saved only by owning the God of Righteousness.... Is not Russia of the north our Chaldea?”

The irony of this statement will not be lost on Koreans, but what may be lost is its lesson about the absurdity of this line of thought in itself and its fundamental incongruity with a Christian worldview. “My friends,” wrote Uchimura, “say that my religion is more a form of Judaism than the Christianity of the Gospels. But it is not so. I learnt from Christ and His Apostles how to save my soul, but from the Prophets, how to save my country.” (Uchimura’s italics)

On this view, there is no transition between Old and New testaments, and the new dispensation after Christ wherein God works through a new “nation,” that is the church (or company of believers), either does not apply or, nonsensically, has no relevance to providence.

The obvious problem is that whereas in the Old Testament era only one nation was “Israel,” such a restriction in the era of nation-states is repugnant - as Kim’s reaction to the very idea confirms. Is then every nation “Israel”? On Uchimura’s showing, Russia certainly wasn’t; and to Koreans, it was hard to see how Japan could possibly qualify. This difficulty does not appear to have worried either Kim or his and Yun’s later critics. But then, it did not worry the Dutch Calvinists either when they were locked in war against Cromwell’s Puritans: to the contrary, when shortly after the war Cromwell proposed an Anglo-Dutch alliance on the basis of their common faith, this perfectly consistent idea was greeted with astonishment.

Kim observed to one of his fellow Korean non-church members that Uchimura was every inch a patriot, and he prided himself in possessing the same quality. He followed Uchimura in his identification of the nation--but of course his own nation!--with Israel to such a degree and imputed to it such a special place in providence that
even one of his closest non-church movement colleagues, Song Tuyong, was moved to observe: “Kim loved the Choson of his ancestors more than Jesus.” It is somewhat surprising that Kim did not subject his own patriotic emotions and instincts to examination in terms of the New Testament dispensation. His writings betray an obsession with race, and on his own principles, this needed biblical justification, not simply the fact of colonial rule.

The use of the Old Testament by Uchimura, Kim, and the Christians in Korea generally, was nothing if it wasn’t selective. Even if we accept their use of the Old Testament as the proper source for understanding providence, the logic of their position remains very shaky. A more consistent use of Old Testament prophetic books concerning Israel could in fact lead to the conclusion that Korean Christians were in error when they refused cooperation with Japan’s political rule and acted as false prophets when they encouraged national resistance. In this regard, I will take the two prophetic books that were appealed to most: Daniel and Jeremiah.

If we place Korea’s national and Christian history alongside key passages from the Book of Daniel (King James Version), we get the following.

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<td>1 In the third year of the reign of Jehoiakim king of Judah, Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon came to Jerusalem and besieged it. 2 And the Lord delivered Jehoiakim king of Judah into his hand, along with some of the articles from the temple of God. These he carried off to the temple of his god in Babylonia and put in the treasure house of his god. 3 Then the king ordered Ashpenaz, chief of his court officials, to bring in some of the Israelites from the royal family and the nobility—4 young men without any physical defect, handsome, showing aptitude for every kind of learning, well informed, quick to understand, and qualified to serve in the king's palace. He was to teach them the language and literature of the Babylonians. 6 Among these were some from Judah: Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah. 7 The chief official gave them new names: to Daniel, the name Belteshazzar; to Hananiah, Shadrach; to Mishael, Meshach; and to Azariah, Abednego. 8 But Daniel resolved not to defile himself with the royal food and wine, and he asked the chief official for permission not to defile himself this way.</td>
<td>1910: Japan annexes Korea, which Japan begins to exploit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan wants to use Korean elites to help rule Korea. They want to train them in the Japanese language and and the learning of the empire.</td>
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<td>Japan orders Koreans to take Japanese names.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some Koreans vow not to be Japanized.</td>
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<td>Yu Songjun and some others accept positions as governors, etc., but many, including Yun Ch’i’ho, do not. It is stigmatized as “collaboration” with the enemy. Yi Wanyong and others like him enjoy privileges and posts, but this is not honoured either by the Koreans or the Japanese.</td>
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<td>The religious education controversy begins in Korea in earnest in 1915, when the Government-General decrees that all private schools must remove religious instruction from their curricula. The 1919 movement won a reprieve for religious instruction. In 1925 the Chosen Shrine is erected in Seoul. Obeisances are not forced at this stage. Governor-General Ugaki requires all school pupils to make obeisances before the shrines from 1935. Many Christian schools object, saying this is idolatry, since the shrines are</td>
<td>1925: The Chosen Shrine is erected in Seoul. Obeisances are not forced at this stage.</td>
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13 Furious with rage, Nebuchadnezzar summoned Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego. So these men were brought before the king.
22 The king's command was so urgent and the furnace so hot that the flames of the fire killed the soldiers who took up Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego,
23 and these three men, firmly tied, fell into the blazing furnace.
24 Then King Nebuchadnezzar leaped to his feet in amazement and asked his advisers, "Weren't there three men that we tied up and threw into the fire?" They replied, "Certainly, O king."
25 He said, "Look! I see four men walking around in the fire, unbound and unharmed, and the fourth looks like a son of the gods."
26 Nebuchadnezzar then approached the opening of the blazing furnace and shouted, "Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego, servants of the Most High God, come out! Come here!" So Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego came out of the fire.
28 Then Nebuchadnezzar said, "Praise be to the God of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego, who has sent his angel, and rescued his servants! They trusted in him and defied the king's command and were willing to give up their lives rather than serve or worship any god except their own God.
29 Therefore I decree that anyone of any nation or language who says anything against the God of Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego be cut into pieces and their houses be turned into piles of rubble, for no other god can save in this way."
30 Then the king promoted Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego in the province of Babylon.

Daniel 6

1 It pleased Darius to appoint 120 satraps to rule throughout the kingdom,
2 with three administrators over them, one of whom was Daniel. The satraps were made accountable to them so that the king might not suffer loss.
3 Now Daniel so distinguished himself among the administrators and the satraps by his exceptional qualities that the king planned to set him over the whole kingdom.
4 At this, the administrators and the satraps tried to find grounds for charges against Daniel in his conduct of government affairs, but they were unable to do so. They could find no corruption in him, because he was trustworthy and neither corrupt nor negligent.
5 Finally these men said, "We will never find any basis for charges against this man Daniel unless it has something to do with the law of his God."
6 So the administrators and the satraps went as a group to the king and said: "O King Darius, live forever!
7 The royal administrators, prefects, satraps, advisers and governors have all agreed that the king should issue an edict and enforce the decree that anyone who prays to any god or man during the next thirty days, except to you, O king, shall be thrown into the lions' den.
8 So they went to the king and spoke to him about his royal decree: "Did you not publish a decree that during the next thirty days anyone who prays to any god or man except to you, O king, would be thrown into the lions' den?"
9 The king answered, "The decree stands--in accordance with the laws of the Medes and Persians, which cannot be repealed."
10 Then they said to the king, "Daniel, who is one of the exiles from Judah, pays no attention to you, O king, or to the decree you put in writing. He still prays three times a day."
11 So the king gave the order, and they brought Daniel and threw him into the lions' den.
12 At the first light of dawn, the king got up and hurried to the lions' den.
13 When he came near the den, he called to Daniel... 21 Daniel answered, "O king, live forever!
22 My God sent his angel, and he shut the mouths of the lions. They have not hurt me, because I was found innocent in his sight. Nor have I ever done any wrong before you, O king."
Then King Darius wrote to all the peoples, nations and men of every language throughout the land: “May you prosper greatly!
26 "I issue a decree that in every part of my kingdom people must fear and reverence the God of Daniel. "For he is the living God and he endures forever; his kingdom will not be destroyed, his dominion will never end.
27 He rescues and he saves; he performs signs and wonders in the heavens and on the earth. He has rescued Daniel from the power of the lions.” 28 So Daniel prospered during the reign of Darius and the reign of Cyrus the Persian.

The first thing the Book of Daniel tells the reader is that God delivered Judah into the hands of the Babylonians. In secular terms, the Babylonian empire invaded and annexed Judah. The Babylonian King, Nebuchadnezzar, immediately orders the finest young men of Israel to be taught “the letters and language of the Chaldeans [i.e. the language of Babylon]” and how to “serve in the King’s palace.” Daniel was deemed the best student and was given the Chaldean name of Baltashazzar, while his deputies were given the Chaldean names of Meshach, Shadrach and Abednego, the names by which they are known to posterity. From the outset, then, we learn that the colonisation of Judah by Babylon was part of God’s will, his providential activity in history, and that this hero of Christian patriots in Korea such as Kim Kyoshin, was schooled in both the language of the invader and the arts of administration in order to rule over the Israelites as a representative of the invaders.

Some historical vicissitudes later, Judah is subjected to another non-Hebrew empire, that of the Medes and Persians, and Darius the Mede is made King. Under Darius, Daniel is made the senior of the three presidents and pleases the king so well in his implementation of imperial rule that even the Mede officials become jealous. Therefore they plot against Daniel, and it is here that Daniel is used as a model nationalist. But again, a reading of the incident on its own terms suggests that using him this way entirely obfuscates the essential point of the whole drama. The only way the officials can get Daniel off-side with Darius is not by getting him to resist imperial rule over the Israelites but to refuse an order he has to regard as blasphemous: worship of the king as God. It is thus not the nation of Israel that is put at the centre of providence but the exclusive divinity and honour of the one God.

Daniel is trapped by the order, and there follows the famous incident of his deliverance unscathed from the den of lions. There is, certainly, an analogy to be drawn here, about how God will deliver the faithful, which in Old Testament terms could be applied to a whole nation, and this was presumably recognised by Yun Ch’i’ho, Kil Sonju and the majority of Korean Protestants in addition to Kim Kyoshin. However, the reward for Daniel’s faithfulness was not the deliverance of Israel in any political sense. The offending law was rescinded, Daniel was restored to his high office in the colonial administration, and imperial rule continued. Daniel, we read, “prospered in the reign of Darius, and in the reign of Cyrus the Persian.” The important point is that Darius was converted to the Israelite religion and made it the official religion of the whole empire. And lest, even in the Old Testament scheme of providence, we be left under any illusion that God’s providence could be identified with any particular political order on earth, we read: “for he [is] the living God, and
stedfast for ever, and his kingdom [that] which shall not be destroyed, and his dominion [shall be even] unto the end.”

Yun Ch’iho’s conception of providence does appear close to this reading, since he recognised that being under God’s providence was actually a politically (and therefore culturally) very risky matter indeed. Even within the Old Testament, his (and the Japanese non-church leader Yanaihara’s) position that the Japanese invasion might be a matter of providence is more genuinely Christian than the common presumption that providence means that God is on one’s own nation’s side against another or that national independence is an inviolable part of God’s purposes. Kim Kyoshin, too, was probably torn between recognition of the biblical warrant for Yun’s understanding and his strong race-nation instincts. This might be what lay behind his comments in 1939, cited below. However, neither Kim nor the great majority of Korean Christians considered the establishment of Japanese rule over Korea as an opportunity given by God to convert the Japanese to Christianity and thereby spread it throughout the Japanese empire, a possibility that is explicit in the Book of Daniel. Nor would this idea have been particularly foreign to East Asian tradition, where the Chinese for example prided themselves on “sinifying” both the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Ch’ing empires.

If we turn to the Book of Jeremiah, the question of providence in relation to Korean nationalism becomes acute. A parallel reading of the book and the Korean experience follows.

| Jeremiah 15 |
| "Who will have pity on you, O Jerusalem? Who will mourn for you? Who will stop to ask how you are? You have rejected me,” declares the LORD. “You keep on backsliding. So I will lay hands on you and destroy you; I can no longer show compassion. |

| Jeremiah 18 |
| “O house of Israel, can I not do with you as this potter does?” declares the LORD. “Like clay in the hand of the potter, so are you in my hand, O house of Israel. If at any time I announce that a nation or kingdom is to be uprooted, torn down and destroyed, even if that nation I warned repents of its evil, then I will relent and not inflict on it the disaster I had planned. And if at another time I announce that a nation or kingdom is to be built up and planted, and if it does evil in my sight and does not obey me, then I will reconsider the good I had intended to do for it. |

| Jeremiah 25 |
| This whole country will become a desolate wasteland, and these nations will serve the king of Babylon seventy years. "But when the seventy years are fulfilled, I will punish the king of Babylon and his nation, the land of the Babylonians, for their guilt,” declares the LORD, “and will make it desolate forever. |

| Jeremiah 26 |
| When the officials of Judah heard about these things, they went up from the royal palace to the house of the LORD and took their places at the entrance of the New Gate of the LORD's house. Then the priests and the prophets said to the officials and all the people, "This man should be sentenced to death because he has prophesied against this city. You have heard it From 1887, Yun Ch’iho wrestles with the notion of Providence and wonders who will care if Korea loses its independence. In the event, George Kenan advises the US president in 1905 that Korea is not worth aiding. Even socialists like Beatrice Webb applauded Japan’s work in Korea post war after. Yun considers the possibility, late 19th century, that God will hand Korea over to some other nation. Yun comes to the view that nationhood is not an inalienable right. Yun embarks on his campaign from 1896 to save Korea through faith in God. He declares that the Christian church is the only hope for Korea. With the dispersion of the Independence club and arrests of its leaders by the Korean monarchy, Yun despairs over Korea’s future. But he believes that Korea can regain health. From 1899 to 1905, Yun’s diary becomes increasingly pessimistic. There is a resurgence of the Old Guard in Korea, like Shin Kison, who roll back educational and other reforms Yun had introduced. Yun has to leave Seoul to protect his life. Many of his |

176
Jeremiah 27

5 With my great power and outstretched arm I made the earth and its people and the animals that are on it, and I give it to anyone I please.
6 Now I will hand all your countries over to my servant Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon; I will make even the wild animals subject to him.
7 All nations will serve him and his son and his grandson until the time for his land comes; then many nations and great kings will subjugate him.
8 If, however, any nation or kingdom will not serve Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon or bow its neck under his yoke, I will punish that nation with the sword, famine and plague, declares the LORD, until I destroy it by his hand.

Jeremiah 28

10 Then the prophet Hananiah took the yoke off the neck of the prophet Jeremiah and broke it,
11 and he said before all the people, "This is what the LORD says: In the same way will I break the yoke of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon off the neck of all the nations within two years." At this, the prophet Jeremiah went on his way.
12 Shortly after the prophet Hananiah had broken the yoke off the neck of the prophet Jeremiah, the word of the LORD came to Jeremiah:
13 "Go and tell Hananiah, 'This is what the LORD says: You have broken a wooden yoke, but in its place you will get a yoke of iron.
14 This is what the LORD Almighty, the God of Israel, says: I will put an iron yoke on the necks of all these nations to make them serve Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon, and they will serve him. I will even give him control over the wild animals.'"
15 Then the prophet Jeremiah said to Hananiah the prophet, "Listen, Hananiah! The LORD has not sent you, yet you have persuaded this nation to trust in lies.

Jeremiah 38

4 Then the officials said to the king, "This man should be put to death. He is discouraging the soldiers who are left in this city, as well as all the people, by the things he is saying to them. This man is not seeking the good of these people but their ruin."
5 "He is in your hands," King Zedekiah answered. "The king can do nothing to oppose you."
6 So they took Jeremiah and put him into the cistern of Malkijah, the king's son, which was in the courtyard of the guard. They lowered Jeremiah by ropes into the cistern; it had no water in it, only mud, and Jeremiah sank down into the mud.

In 1910, Japan annexes Korea and takes over all ruling functions and power. The Korean economy is put at the service of the Japanese empire.

Yun Ch’iho was also imprisoned, from 1911-1915, on trumped-up charges of sedition. On his release, Yun told fellow-Koreans to accept the fact that they were in for the long haul, and that Japan was too powerful to resist politically or militarily at present. Koreans must strengthen themselves by deepening their faith and applying it, he said. But radical nationalist leaders grew more popular, and Yun and his kind were increasingly ostracised.

Yun was asked to join the 1919 movement, but refused, saying that it was based on illusory expectations. The Japanese will not walk out of Korea so easily, he warned, and he also predicted that many Koreans would only suffer great harm.

A split occurs between Koreans who want political or military resistance, and others who believe March 1919 proved that this kind of approach was self-defeating. Christians are divided on this issue: Kim Ku, Yi Tonghwi vs Yun Ch’iho, Chu Yohan, etc.

The militants denounce the others, and leaders of the Home Rule group are targeted for assassination. They are all accused of weakening Korean resolve. After liberation in 1945, militants assassinate a number of Koreans they accused of collaboration.
purely religious motives, but given Yun’s views on providence the question should surely be raised. But what was Jeremiah up against and what was his position?

The Hebrew princes were the political and aristocratic leaders of Israel, who obviously had the most to lose if the Chaldeans took over the country. Jeremiah’s advice naturally provoked outrage from the top military brass also. But who were the priests and the prophets? As a kind of theocracy, the king was advised by men whose office was both religious and political, or perhaps we should say the distinction was erased in their office and duties. They were also the intellectual or educated class. Without getting into too much detail, we can note that the priests had regular and in some cases hereditary positions within the state hierarchy and served as counsel for the rulers on matters extending from ritual to national policy. The prophets’ position was less regular, more free-lance, and in theory less answerable to the ruling class below the king himself.

The priests, other prophets, and the princes all took the natural position of patriotism, and accused Jeremiah of betraying the state. But they went further and accused him of plotting the harm of the ordinary people. This is a very important point. It is, as historians especially should know, the commonest form of rhetoric to which the ruling classes turn whenever their privileges and power are threatened. No rhetorical device is spared in the effort to form in the minds of the people the strongest possible connection between the transfer of power from one ruling group to another and severe harm to the welfare of the people. The history of political rhetoric in the two Koreas since 1948 is exactly the history of this rhetorical device. But it is also common rhetoric in established democracies, where the “good folk” are treated to the gloomiest predictions of what will happen to them (or their pockets) should the opposition party win the next election. As I write, those British people who favour a single European currency are accused by their political opponents of bringing economic harm upon the “people”.

The power of this rhetoric prevailed in Jeremiah’s time, as it prevails in nationalist movements and historiography today (often, of course, as vice-versa: transfer of power from the colonial authorities to the indigenous leaders will mean great benefit to the people), and so the accusation that he was against the people was taken at face value. The religious and intellectual establishment threw their weight behind the princes’ condemnation. When finally the prophet Hananiah broke the yoke which Jeremiah had placed around his neck as a visual aid to his message that God was putting Israel under Babylonian rule, Jeremiah could only leave history to prove Hananiah false. He wasn’t throwing over the Hebrew people for the Chaldeans: he prophesied also the restoration of political independence. He was condemning the “heroism” and ambition of the princes who were prepared to sacrifice the lives of ordinary people on the altar of their own power. And again, the focus and the only valid point was the centrality of God in all situations of life.

The biblical judgment on this whole affair is that Jeremiah was the true prophet and Hananiah the false. In secular terms we might say that this is because Jeremiah correctly understood “real-politics”: the Babylonian empire did attack and crush the Hebrew state and those who had resisted them were slaughtered together with a lot of the populace; and in fact a great deal of carnage of the people was subsequently perpetrated by the surviving “patriotic” princes. There are some uncomfortable parallels with the experience of Koreans during and after the colonial period. But it
was in Jeremiah’s conception a matter of obedience to God’s purposes. It is noteworthy that Jeremiah’s main ally was Ebedmelech the Ethiopian, whom God rewarded by saving his life when the Babylonians took Jerusalem, “because you trust in me” (Jeremiah 39:18). We should not, however, make too much of a distinction between obedience to God and real-politics, since in this scheme of providence, real-politics was determined by God’s purposes.

It is evident that the Old Testament doctrine of providence does not provide a rationale for nationalism, and is only construed as such after nationalism has already been adopted uncritically and only by selective use of the Old Testament imagery. To be fair, it is also a belief in divine justice that justifies religious nationalisms, a sense that nations that put other peoples in chains will receive their just deserts and that Christians have a duty to oppose injustice. And most certainly they do, but this is always the case and not any more so under colonial regimes than under any other oppressive regime. And while it is historically evident that oppressing nations often do not get their come-uppance in any event, for Christians there is no guarantee this will happen in history rather than at the Final Judgment. In short, it is not a nationalist issue.

But this brings us to the New Testament. In order to preserve a unity between the Old and the New Testaments Christian theologians have generally understood the difference between the two eras not as a replacement of one by the other or some sort of rupture but as the fulfilment by the incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ of the purposes of God pointed to by the prophets, even if the prophets themselves were not fully aware of this. This understanding is based on Christ’s statement, "Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill them" (Matthew 5:17). In terms of providence, except for some Calvinist theologians at certain times, this has been taken to mean that the founding of the church by Christ and his apostles signified the bringing to fruition the idea of Israel, and by extension the idea of providence. Israel was a figure, or prefigurement, of the church to come, and once this purer reality to which Israel pointed had been established, the idea of God choosing to work out his purposes through one or other nation was superseded by his working through the church. It is fairly common in Christian thinking to suppose that God has nevertheless still not “finished” with Israel - and hence the otherwise incomprehensible pressure on their governments by citizens of the United States of America concerning the Israeli state.

A minority of Christian theologians rejects the idea that the prophets were also talking about the coming of Christ and his church and prefer to interpret their utterances as only a matter of Israel’s literal historical fortunes. In this case, the Old testament form of providence is either more firmly rejected or, paradoxically, more strongly affirmed. But even on the latter terms, it is clear that a nationalistic interpretation of the Old Testament doctrine of providence is fraught with contradictions. As we have seen, both the literal notion of Israel as a political state and the purely racial conception of its make-up are severely relativised in the books of Daniel and Jeremiah, not to speak of the books of Ruth and Job. There is no shame--in fact there is glory--in participating at a high level in the rule over one’s own people by another race and state; and there is no hesitation expressed in extending God’s favour to non-Jews at the expense of Jews. The overriding consideration in the fortunes of the different states of Israel is the will of God, not their independence, and the idea that other states can serve this same God is explicit. Moreover, the idea of the salvation of the
“nation” is also frequently undermined by the assertion that some Jews will be destroyed and others saved. The nation is not an individual.

This is still a far cry from the New Testament, in which the nation hardly arises as a literal category. This does not mean that politics is out of bounds or unimportant to Christianity: far from it. But the motivation, meaning, and focus of political activity is so different as to be potentially quite subversive. The kernel of the New Testament conception of all such issues in the believer’s life is encapsulated in Christ’s startling words: “Someone told him, "Your mother and brothers are standing outside, wanting to speak to you." He replied to him, "Who is my mother, and who are my brothers?" Pointing to his disciples, he said, "Here are my mother and my brothers. For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and sister and mother" (Matthew 12:47-50).

Although Kim Kyoshin was familiar with the even more startling corollary of this principle—“If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother, his wife and children, his brothers and sisters—yes, even his own life—he cannot be my disciple” (Luke 14:26)—and although he taught that the family was the pattern for the nation, he apparently did not question whether one’s race or nation could legitimately possess the status he gave it. The relevant New Testament category is, after all, the Kingdom of God, and the tension of the Christian life is created not by belonging both to a nation and the Kingdom of God but by something quite different: living in the world while not belonging to it. This leads to an entirely different conception of the world than that demanded of nationalism. On New Testament terms the very notion that Christians could feel at home in a “nation” or find common cause with it, or indeed be popular with the people, is a strange one. Uchimura discovered that “[T]he faith we owned has made us repulsive in the eyes of the world...” The reason for this was clear to Uchimura and probably to Kim Kyoshin, but in the end the nationalist viewpoint was, if anything, buttressed by Kim’s version of providence.

But perhaps the non-church ideology of Kim played a part in this too. Having substituted race or nation for church, Kim then adopted an extreme organic view of the nation and endowed it with a soul, as if it were an individual. A fundamental division within this organism was therefore excluded, not simply as something undesirable, but as something impossible: a single soul cannot be half-saved. Hence God was to save this nation and then it, the nation, in some hypostatic union with the divine, would carry out its mission to the world. This conception of things clearly made it extremely difficult for Kim to include in his understanding of providence the persistent New Testament theme of the believer’s enmity with the temporal world (the servant is not greater than the master, and so there is always the possibility that a believer will die at the hands of one’s own people).

Caesar and God

What then of the place of the Kingdom of God in Kim’s relation to nation and empire? Here, it appears that Kim was much more consistently attentive to New Testament teaching and much less in accord with the spirit of his nationalist compatriots. According to Yang, Kim was a premillennialist, but he differed from the influential Korean premillennialist Rev. Kil Sonju in terms of emphasis. Whereas Kil placed emphasis on the timing of the Second Coming and on waiting in hope for it, Kim put emphasis on hope as the motivation for action in the present, the reason for
striving for the kind of values and society that the Second Coming promised, even though fulfilment of such must await the Second Coming. This hope is furthered by teaching the “moral truth” that will establish trust between nations and love between humans, thus revealing the divine hidden in the foundations of history, overthrowing the immoral idea of history that might is right and establishing the divine ordering of history whereby “righteousness overcomes might.”

Kim sought a combination of passive and active approaches to historical change. The passive involved realisation of one’s own evil and resolve for inner purification; the active involved indictment of evil done to others in solidarity with them, which requires taking upon one’s own shoulders the suffering the unrighteousness has caused. I am not sure whether Yang Hyonhui correctly interprets the meaning of this, and so I shall quote the whole of the original from which she takes extracts.

There is one object for non-Church members to resist. That being “declaring [the fact] to those who walk contrary to the truth,” the objects of resistance differ according to time and place. Today that which has taken on the role of disobeying the truth before us Christians and that which we must resist, is a very powerful beast. The whole company of believers, whethernside the church or outside it, who would while worshipping Jehovah render what is Caesar’s unto Caesar and what is God’s unto God alone, are faced with times in which they must join their strength together and fight. It is a situation in which the religion of truth can only be manifested through the blood of martyrs. In such times, we have lost interest in the argument over whether salvation is in the church or outside it.

Yang follows her version of this with a quotation drawn from Kim’s “Chaech’ulpal” (A new departure), written in February 1937: “This is a ‘fight that all who worship God must endure in cooperation with each other.’” The actual wording of the original is “I wonder whether this fight is not perhaps one which all who worship God must endure in cooperation with each other.” The context is important. Kim was anxious to defend his decision to “halt completely all attacks on and disputes with the churches,” something which seemed to violate the non-church movement’s charter. It is in this piece that Kim asks his readers not to accuse him of going against the great leaders of the faith, particularly Uchimura Kanzo, and he does so not, as Yang suggests, because he saw Korea as a nationalist whereas the Japanese non-church members did not, but because he believed solidarity with the organised Korean churches was demanded by the times. It is true that his style in this piece is rather more dependent on emotional rhetoric than is his wont: the question of the relation of principle to particular is almost swamped in his passion, but it is retrieved at the end: “We don’t feel any obligation to inherit Luther’s struggle or even Paul’s arguments. We simply offer our bodies to the Lord Christ with hearts that hope for peace.”

In other words, there is little warrant to draw from these particular words evidence of a nationalistic motive behind Kim’s decision to join forces with the Christian churches in Korea in their struggle against, as it happens, orders to worship at Shinto shrines. Opposing orders to render unto Caesar what was God’s was hardly a contended Christian duty by anyone at the time or since. This puts the issue into the same category as the fate of early Christians under the Romans, and has little to do, except incidentally, with race, let alone nation or nationalism, but rather with human power become, in Christian terms, blasphemous.
No doubt it was convenient for Kim that the human power become blasphemous was Japanese, and given his doctrine of providence, this must have further encouraged him to identify God with his nation. There is little doubt about this, and as we have seen, in this sense he was very much a nationalist. But it is still instructive to look in some detail at Kim’s decision to cease publication of Songso Choson in January 1938 in terms of the way in which Kim fails to fit the nationalist mould. Kim announced this decision in a letter to Katayama, a leader of the Japanese non-church movement after Uchimura’s death. Upon submitting issue No.108 to the Government-General Police Bureau as required of all publishers in Korea, he was informed that he had to print a pledge as a subject of the empire at the top of the first page. His immediate impulse was not to publish, but “on second thought, in light of the fact that it was the only Bible journal in Choson, I decided to contain myself and print the pledge as ordered.”

Some days later, however, he learned the issue had been denied publication and that further changes were required. This was too much. We too pray for the emperor in our hearts and as citizens try voluntarily to follow the state laws, but we can’t adorn the heads of our publications with these words as the condition of publishing, forced by the oppressive actions of the atrociouly faithless government officials. The present officials have no intention of the government-general being for the Koreans, but for dogs and pigs, it seems. In Korea at present, legal publishing is impossible without becoming pigs. To continue publishing Songso Choson I must either move to Tokyo or get a friend there to be publisher, but the first is impossible and the second would cause considerable trouble to my friend, so in fact I have decided to suspend publication (or cease altogether if it comes to that)... It might be discourteous of me to go on so long, but I am not suspending Songso Choson because I cannot promote anti-war and pro-peace doctrines as I please. If there is any “injury to the public peace” through conflict over political issues, I will voluntarily withdraw from it and exercise caution. But since I cannot tolerate, or dissemble under, instructions by officials to print certain words and forced flattery, praise, and Biblical testimony for present politics, I have chosen rather to accept an “honourable death.” I feel deeply heart-broken that the only Bible journal in Korea is thus hidden from view. But God will lead things forward in some other way even better than before. My Elder Brother, please pray for the Korean peninsula too. I pray for your emperor and the true mission of your country.

This heart-rending letter was followed two weeks later by another, in response to a missive from Katayama. Kim had changed his mind and reported that the issue was printed with the required amendments and the pledge.

This far have I retreated. And from Brother Yamamoto’s New Year message I learned that in order to render under God what is His one must be all the more particular to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s. I’ve resolved as far as possible voluntarily to refrain from outbursts over social and political questions. It’s difficult at times, especially when told what to write. As we enter the new year the attitude of the officials is softening somewhat. If there is no active interference beyond wording, things can probably carry on as they are. I’m grateful for your offer to become publisher. I’m inclined to think that something of the kind might be needed to ensure publication continues if some further clash occurs. In any case, I intend not to write any articles that might excite the officials unduly, and thankfully regard the fact that I can speak according to the Bible as the greatest freedom. Should it happen that we are
forced to praise or give Biblical support to the war, Shinto shrine obeisance, or the present politics of the government-general, we will have to cease publication or choose some other means such as changing publisher.  

Conclusion

On the basis of his letters concerning publication of Songso Choson, written as they were at a time when the national stakes were very high, Kim Kyoshin turns out to be far less easily assimilable to the nationalist point of view than is often claimed. As Ham Sokhon wrote in 1947, Kim’s love for his nation was not the kind of patriotism that was fashionable among Koreans. Although his view of providence differed from Yun Ch’iho’s, they both firmly believed that a Christianised Korea would secure its independence and they held practically identical positions on the issue of God and Caesar. How then do we account for the two men’s contrasting behaviour at the end of their lives?

I am not sure we can get to the bottom of Yun’s motives in agreeing to speak on behalf of the Government-General’s policies. But there are some factors already alluded to that one might put forward as partial explanation. First, Yun had quite different experiences and memories than Kim, having been active in Korea’s national affairs well before the Japanese invasion. He was a political animal, Kim Kyoshin less so. His potential political influence was well known by the Japanese rulers and he was thus subjected to greater political pressures--and temptations--than Kim. It is evident from his letter to Syngman Rhee immediately after the liberation in 1945 that Yun still harboured political ambitions as an old man.

Second, Yun’s idea of Providence was bound up closely to the notion and phenomenon of the nation-state and attendant international system. He sought to see God’s hand and a Christianly supportable logic in the political vicissitudes that surrounded him and had such concrete consequences for his country. In a sense, Kim was less well placed to work out the relation between faith and nation than Yun, both because he had no political experience and because of the incipient Manichean streak in the non-church movement’s position: it is easy to understand his legacy of political quietism in contemporary South Korea. Thus paradoxically, the fact that Yun had a much better worked out idea of providence and a more practical acquaintance with the political nation than Kim may have led him to act on behalf of Japanese power. Since his return from Japan in 1927, Kim did not ever engage in any overt political activity, whereas Yun was frequently engaged.

Third, Yun undeniably harboured rather dim views about the moral fibre, practical sense, and general national character of his fellow Koreans. He deplored their lack of perseverance in long-term but vital projects and while he came to admire the strength and even tenacity of the people’s commitment during the 1919 March First movement and donated funds to the families of those whose men-folk had been imprisoned or killed, he remained impatient to the end with what he believed were unrealistic, politically naive, and counter-productive outbursts that neither had backup nor increased one whit the spiritual and material foundations of independent statehood. In this regard, from time to time Yun compared Koreans unfavourably with the Japanese.

But again, this surely has roots in his pre-annexation experiences of the nation when it was formally independent, and in this regard I am not convinced this quite marks Yun
off from Kim. Kim’s movement was very much an intellectuals’ movement, characterised even by one of its members as a “scholarly association.”81 And unlike Yun, Kim deplored the 1907 Great Revival legacy as an irrational expression of the common people, and harboured mistrust of the lower classes. He was equally severe on the Koreans’ character, attributing the failure of the Korean university movement in the mid-1920s to the fact that “out of 20 million Koreans not a single person had one yen’s worth of sincerity.”82 It is instructive to ponder Ham Sokhon’s view of the moral character of his nation in 1947, when Korea was emerging from colonial status towards renewed independence.

What can one expect when our political institutions and our educational institutions are entrusted to animals who know not the principles of life, who have no notion even of what a principle might mean? This is the reason we say that our country has gone mad and that our times are rotten. Unless a person of real integrity stands at the head of the march of history, it is clear that there will be tumult and ruin....

The way of politics and the way of culture are not different; the way of education and the way of religion are not different; and the way of business and the way of morality do not differ one from the other. It is thinking that progress consists in separating them and treating them as different which is the cause of the stagnation of modern (hyondae) civilization. The World War and the USA-USSR stand-off are sicknesses which reveal that civilization has entered a blind alley; so what do we, who talk of building a new nation and being born as the masters of a new age, think we are about using old grain thrown out by others and crawling into burning houses that others are fleeing? There has to be a truly new philosophy of life; there has to be a clear and penetrating view of history; and we have to hold to a lofty human religious faith.83

This, mutatis mutandis, could easily have come from the pen of Yun. If anything, the expressions carry a deeper contempt and frustration, but the logic is identical.

Finally, it is reasonably clear from his diary that Yun’s growing disillusionment with the attitudes and behaviour of some North American missionaries and his correlative pride in what he called the “yellow race,” helped incline him towards acceptance of the idea of the solidarity of East Asia that the Japanese were propagating. It may well be that this, far more than any doctrine of providence, was the crucial ingredient in his decision. As we have seen, Kim also felt offended by missionaries, but whereas this prompted Yun to view matters in broader terms of eastern and western cultures, Kim was confirmed in his search for a specifically Korean Christianity.

Whatever the case, for any who wish to judge Yun’s actions in the 1940s and earlier, it is important to state what one’s starting point is. If it be the supreme importance of the nation as a politically independent state, then Yun can only be found wanting—and found wanting most of the time. So too, might Kim, for it was, after all, not until 1938, and then over the question of blasphemy, that he considered direct defiance; and it was not until 1942 that he actually did defy the Government-General, and then not through his own words but by publishing those of another. But if some variety of Christian worldview is the starting point, then it is important to recognise both the doctrines that Yun and Kim employed and the logic of whatever Christian position one employs.
I am inclined to think that Kim (and Uchimura), too, is easily misrepresented in his relation to the nation. The evidence of his own words appears to suggest that Kim did not consistently give such supreme value to his country as often claimed. He certainly did not give much importance to politics as such: it would have been a little contradictory if he had, given his non-church movement’s position on human institutions. Obsessed with race and nation though he was, Kim’s concept of the nation was vague and intangible—a soul—and hardly a clear idea of a political unit. If Kim had a particular political philosophy, I imagine that given his enamourment with the traditional family system as an ideal pattern for society, it would have been paternalistic and at least informally hierarchical.

Uchimura had warned against looking inward upon one’s own nation, as the only or the proper sphere of one’s activity: “[The] world is a unit, and the human race is one great family. This is what I read in my Christian Bible, though Patriotisms, Christian and otherwise, seem to deny this. You cannot make yourself perfect without making others perfect… In Christianising other peoples you Christianise yourself.” Kim did not appear concerned to “Christianise” other peoples until the whole elusive soul of Korea was saved, but with Uchimura he was aware that if one could not, when required, “hate one’s mother and one’s father for Christ’s sake,” one was not a worthy Christian. As desirable as national freedom was, Kim still regarded speaking “according to the Bible as the greatest freedom.”

In this regard, Yun and Kim are in the same camp. After his release from jail in 1915 for nationalist activities, Yun decided not to resist Japan politically since he regarded promoting Christian faith and action as obviously more important than political activity, wherever the latter appeared to obstruct the former. (It should be remembered, however, that Yun was interrogated in 1938 for his involvement in the secret Hungop Club, an organisation that the Japanese considered seditious.) In both men’s Christian worldview, people are born into or later find themselves in all sorts of political contexts and regimes, but the duty of Christians to live a life of faith remains throughout. According to the context, one may be impelled to resist a government, as in the cases of Daniel under Darius and Christians ordered to worship the emperor. But the idea that Christianity is somehow at stake in the question of who rules is very problematic, except, perhaps, when Christians (or others) are directly persecuted, though even here the history of the Christian and other religious traditions suggests that the power of governments in such cases is usually overrated.

From the “fashionable” nationalist perspective, Yun betrayed the nation. If Yun’s decision, under duress, to speak on behalf of the Government-General involved assent to the notion that the Japanese emperor was divine and was due worship, then he betrayed his faith. But if he avoided this assent and chose to yield partially to the pressure in order to continue his Christian work in the church, university, and YMCA, then he was going much less far than Daniel, and in terms of any Christian doctrine of providence or the Kingdom of God he made a legitimate choice. There is here an interesting comparison with Kim Kyoshin. Throughout almost the entire period of Japanese rule over Korea, from 1905 to the early 1940s, Yun refused all pressure to participate in the political structure; then at the very end he joined the Privy Council and was accused of betraying the nation. Throughout almost all his life as a Christian in Korea, from 1927 to the early 1940s, Kim refused to participate in any church structure; then at the very end he openly supported and worked within protestant...
church institutions and was accused by colleagues of betraying the non-church movement.86

We are left uncertain why Yun Ch’iho took his final decision and therefore can only speculate concerning its meaning. But the idea that it was because he identified the industrialising nation of Japan with God’s standard of civilisation can only be entertained at all from a steadfastly nationalistic standpoint. From the point of view of Christian history in Korea it was Yun who made the deeper, more crucial contribution at a very critical period for the church and nation, while Kim at best became an important figure among a relatively small group of intellectuals on the margins of Christian growth in Korea. But Kim’s meaning, too, has been distorted by the nationalist perspective, and it would be appropriate perhaps to conclude with two excerpts, one from Uchimura Kanzo’s diary in November 1927 and the other from Kim Kyoshin’s letter to the Japanese non-church member Katayama in March 1943, upon Kim’s release from gaol.

I was visited this morning by Kim Chongsik after a long time. I was happy to see his countenance glowing with just the same lustrous faith as ever. Every time I meet Kim I am reminded of the certainty of the unity of Japan and Korea in Christ.... I am Japanese and he is Korean; we are true brothers in Christ.87

Among those who have come to Korea calling themselves disciples of Uchimura, I hear there are some Japanese making irresponsible claims that Uchimura’s teachings are good for Japan but not appropriate for Korea. Can that really be so? Whenever I met with difficulties over the past year of prison life Uchimura appeared in my dreams to succour me, or instruct me, or lead me on with comfort. Indeed, for the last year I lived all 365 days together with Uchimura. I still haven’t been able to discover any reason why the truth which saves his countrymen is inappropriate for Korea!88

Unless these issues are understood, it is difficult to see how a proper historical study could be made of Yun Ch’iho and Kim Kyoshin, or of any of the Korean Protestants who attempted to view their nation’s situation in terms of providence. To the degree that they placed the doctrines of providence, evil, and God's rule at the centre of their interpretations of Korea's colonial subjection to Japan, their positions were incompatible with the dominant nationalist identification of Japan as the exclusive or even principal source of Korea's ills. In this respect the Korean Protestants found themselves in a position both similar and dissimilar to that of the socialists. Neither could ultimately support nationalism as an ideology. On the other hand, when socialists refused to make the nation the central point, this did not threaten their patriotic credentials, since the identification of Japan as the imperial power meant they could by no means work with it (although whether they could work meaningfully within it was a question that created division). For the Protestants, however, problems of evil and power were not disposable of, as in Leninism and the kind of Confucianism that had informed Korea’s intelligentsia, by recourse to cut-and-dried judgments concerning righteous or winning causes. Instead, evil was considered present in all regimes to relative degrees, and rather more so in colonial regimes. But even here there was some doubt, as we shall see. For Yun, who lived under it, the pre-colonial Korean regime was marred in his eyes by a rather high concentration of
evil, while for Kim the stresses of colonial rule served equally to expose the seriousness of the evils afflicting the Korean people.

3 I do not claim to know how Yun died and am not here endorsing the belief that Yun did commit suicide, but reflecting the common viewpoint.
4 Yang, p.7
5 Yang, p.6
6 Yang, p.7
7 Yang, p.14
8 As we shall see, this was a point Kim Kyoshin made repeatedly in his writings on the essence of the Christian faith.
10 Yang, p.15
11 Some church historians, such as Min Kyongbae, have charged Christian missionaries generally with attempting to prevent Korean Christians from becoming interested in nationalism. There is evidence that some missionaries acted thus, but the issue is, again, not properly understood in these terms, since another theological issue was at stake: the separation of the church and the state. It was considered theologically wrong for a church or its affiliated organisations to identify themselves with the state.
12 Wells, pp.51-52
13 Wells, p.52
15 Yang, p.47
16 Undated speech, but I estimate between 1903 and 1905, or possibly later after the YMCA had been established.
17 Uchimura, p.87
18 Uchimura, p.98
19 Uchimura, p.100
20 Uchimura, p.105
21 Uchimura, p.147
22 Uchimura, p.181
23 Uchimura, p.187
24 Uchimura, p.189
25 Wells, p.51
26 Uchimura, p.166
27 Wells, p.51
28 See Wells, pp.53-56
29 Uchimura, p.179
30 Wells, p.50
31 Uchimura, p.179
32 Uchimura, pp.73-74
33 Uchimura, p.67
34 Uchimura, p.157
35 Wells, p.65
36 Uchimura, p.108
37 Yun Ch’iho Diary
38 Wells, p.52
39 See Yun Ch’iho’s diary entries for 1905-1907
40 Yang, p.107
41 Ham Sokhon’s forward to the 1947 edition of Kim Kyoshin’s collected works, reprinted in Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, 1971, vol.1, pp.5-7
44 Ham Tuhwan. “‘Kim Kyoshin no minzoku seishinshiteki isan,” in Kan, vol.8, no.2, February 1979, pp.56-58
45 ibid, p.66
47 ibid, pp77ff
48 Min Kyongbae. “Kim Kyoshin no mukyokaishugi to ‘Chosenteki’ kurasutokyo,” p.31
49 ibid, p.25
50 ibid, p.37; Kim Tuhwan. “Kim Kyoshin no minzoku seishinshiteki isan,” p.82
51 Yang, p.154
52 Yang, p.155
54 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.1, pp.65-67
55 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.1, pp.62-65
57 Compare, for example, H.H. Underwood’s observations of Japanese censorship in his book, Modern Education in Korea (NY 1926), with the books of Christians such as Henry Chung, Hugh Heung-Woo Cynn, and Yim Louise. Some exaggeration by the latter must be allowed for, however.
58 Interview with Paik Nakchun (George Paik), 1981. See also the works cited in the above note.
60 ibid, p.98
61 See wells, p.
62 Uchimura, pp.127-128
63 Uchimura, p.128
64 See note 43.
65 Simon Schama. The Embarrassment of Riches, p.96. See also pp.104-105.
66 No P’yonggu. “Naega saengakhanun Kim sonsaeng,” in Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, supplementary volume, p.72
68 Even the idea of a “spiritual” Israel distinct from the historical nation is present in the idea that many Jews are uncircumcised (though physically they are circumcised) and hence do not belong to God.
69 Uchimura, p.59
70 Yang, p.118-119
71 Yang, p.190
72 Yang, p.191
73 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.1, pp.202-203
74 Yang, p.194
75 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.2, p.365
76 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.2, p.363
78 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.6, p.531-532
79 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.6, p.533-534
80 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.6, p.534-535
81 Kim Tuhwan. “Kim Kyoshin no minzoku seishinshiteki isan,” p.68
82 Min Kyongbae. “Kim Kyoshin no mukyokaishugi to ‘Chosenteki’ Kurisutokyo,” pp.32, 34, & 37
84 Uchimura, pp.190-191
85 See Yang, p.188
86 See Min Kyongbae, “Kim Kyoshin no mukyokaishugi to ‘Chosenteki’ Kurisutokyo,” pp.44-45
87 From Uchimura Kanzo’s diary, 7 November 1927, quoted in Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, supplementary volume, p.133
88 Kim Kyoshin Chonjip, vol.6, p. 536
Democracy on the back-burner: an evaluation of South Korea's student movements in the 1980s

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In 1988, Seoul hosted the XXIVth Olympic Games with pride, showing off the outstanding development South Korea had achieved since her complete destruction during the Korean War. This was a new country, one which used to be viewed as a closed kingdom, and later became known for its cheap textile products and cars. The world economists had been endlessly praising the economic miracle of Korea, but this miracle came with heavy human costs, including inhumane working conditions, brutal police repression, and methodical use of intimidation and state terror.

To be sure, these governmental abuses did not remain unchallenged. Throughout the post-war period, students were at the forefront of the protest movements against the authoritarian and military governments. During the years before the 88 Seoul Olympics, the street demonstrations organised by students became so large that they made their way to the TV screens in the West. What filtered from these pictures looked like a powerful call for the end of the Chun Doo-hwan dictatorship and the establishment of a democratic government. Eventually, street and international pressures combined forced Chun Doo-hwan to step down and agree to democratic elections in 1987. As a result, the student movements of the 1980s were primarily remembered for their active contribution to the political democratisation of South Korea. However, contrary to appearances and popular impressions, student activists of the 1980s veered dramatically from their predecessors' focus on democracy and national reunification; in actuality, democracy was gradually put on the back-burner until the so-called "June Resistance" in 1987 which ended the Chun regime.

This paper argues that, during the 1980s, the student movements extended their demands and ideas far beyond Chun's resignation and democratic elections. The student movements' rationale was rooted in a three-way transformation they experienced over the 1980-1987 years: ideologisation, organisation, and popularisation.

The results of this research are based on primary and secondary sources in English and Korean, interviews of scholars, and former and current student activists, which I conducted during fieldwork in Korea this past year, as well as numerous statements written by students and student bodies during the above-mentioned period.

1. Student movements before 1980

1.1 A traditional duty

Before immersing ourselves in the 1980s student dissidence, it is necessary to present a brief history of the student movements in Korea, since there has been a solid
tradition of student protests in Korean history. It goes as far back as the Choson dynasty during which it was a scholar's duty to criticise his king's policies if he believed they conflicted with Confucian rules and virtues (Kim Haboush 1996: 344). Some scholars argue that this sense of responsibility survived amongst students who protested against the dictatorial governments thereafter. During the Japanese colonial period, Korean high school and college students actively took part in the liberation movement, as illustrated by their involvement in the March 1st Independence Movement in 1919.

In April 1960, students' widespread demonstrations succeeded in forcing President Syngman Rhee out of power and into exile to Hawaii. Throughout the Park Chung-hee regime (1961-1979), students protested regularly against the government's policies in spite of the frightening police surveillance and repression. During the 1960s, they strongly denounced the war settlement the Park regime signed with Japan in exchange for economic aid, and compared it to Japan's recolonisation of Korea (Yi 1984:123). Three other main issues they protested about were: 1) liberalisation of the school, 2) democratisation and anti-authoritarianism, and 3) opposition to the constitutional reform which enabled Park Chung-hee to run for a third presidential term.

1.2 Adjustment to military dictatorship

The 1970s established the foundation of the changes which occurred within the student movements during the 1980s. Firstly, the tragic self-immolation of the young textile worker Chon T'ae-il in 1970 raised the students' awareness about the workers' sordid working conditions. Secondly, in October 1972, President Park declared Martial Law and had a series of significant amendments of the Constitution passed which, in essence, guaranteed him an even stronger grip on the Korean government. According to Park, these amendments were necessary in regard to the "general trend of relaxation of international tensions," and the disorder and inefficiency that prevailed in the Korean political circles, which endangered the national security. In his opinion the political parties had lost the sense of national mission, and it was clear that "Revitalizing Reforms," or Yushin, were necessary to ensure the safeguarding of the national sovereignty, as well as to achieve the long-awaited unification (Park 1976:56-61). Thereafter, Park issued several emergency decrees which further reduced the students' room for manoeuvring.

Several government attacks against dissident organisations, such as the NH group (Nationalism-Humanism) in 1973, the Minch'onghangnyon (National Democratic Youths and Students Federation) and the Inhyoktang (People's Revolutionary Party) in 1974, led to the arrest and imprisonment of large groups of student activists. This effectively purge the most active universities at the time, i.e. Seoul National University (SNU), Korea, and Kyongbuk, of their main sources of dissidence. Until the assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1979, police repression on and off campus only became heavier. Korean CIA agents were on college campuses permanently, and demonstrations were crushed swiftly and mercilessly. Accordingly, the few remaining student activist groups could not afford to lose more members, and for several years, their activities focused on organisation rather than visible actions, e.g. printing books, and organising ideology circles (Pak Sok-un, interview).
2. Transformation of the Student Movements after 5.18

From the mid-1970s, students came to question their objectives and methods of protest in the midst of increasing police suppression, and searched for a fresh approach to their struggle. Their hopes for the start of a democratic era following Park's death in October 1979 were quickly shattered by Chun Doo-hwan's "12/12" coup d'état. This course of events enraged the students, but it was the Kwangju massacre in May 1980 which sparked the radical transformation of the student movements. The bloody military suppression of the Kwangju citizens' uprising against the Korean military government, often called "5.18," served as a reference point for subsequent dissident movements.

The 5.18 suppression also dealt a violent blow to the student and other opposition movements. It was not until October of the same year that the first student demonstration occurred at Korea University, denouncing the fascist government and calling for democratisation (Kang 1993: 343). However, despite the brutality of the Chun regime against dissidents, the opposition movements continued to grow steadily until the 1987 June Resistance.

2.1 Ideologisation

During the 1970s, students' freedom was further curtailed by the establishment of the Yushin Constitution and the emergency decrees imposed by the Park Chung-hee regime. In their October 2nd, 1973 Declaration, soon after the introduction of the new constitution, students from the Liberal Arts and Sciences College at SNU condemned the authoritarian nature of the government and called upon their comrades to fight for freedom and truth. They issued four resolutions: 1) To abolish the fascist government and establish a liberal democracy which would guarantee basic rights for citizens, 2) to establish economic relations based on independence with Japan, 3) to abolish the KCIA, and reveal all the details on Kim Dae-jung's kidnapping in Tokyo a few month earlier, and 4) to encourage politicians and journalists to "wake up" (Yi 1984:325).

At this point, students still believed in the US model of liberal democracy. They still believed that the righteousness of their demands would make them prevail. They did not demand the establishment of a communist, nor a socialist state. Instead, they insisted on the basic rights provided by a liberal democracy, i.e. freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of association. During the second half of the 1970s, police repression was so heavy-handed that students could not demonstrate openly on campus, or off campus. The situation led them to proceed differently: they resorted to guerrilla-type tactics, organising quick and small-scale protests, involving only a few students at a time, but more frequently. They also organised ideology discussion groups, searching for the appropriate political, economic and social system for Korea.

The Kwangju massacre of May 1980 increased dramatically the ideologisation of the student movements. In its immediate aftermath, SNU student activists initiated debates to discuss why this popular uprising failed to engender a democracy. This series of debates, called the "murim-hangnim dispute," developed into issues regarding the position and the role of the student movements, the view of the reform movement thereafter, and the shape of the organisation that would carry it out (Kang 1993:24).

During the 1970s, most students did not view the United States negatively. But when they learned the U.S. did nothing to prevent the massacre in Kwangju in May 1980,
they became very suspicious, and accused the U.S. of supporting the military dictatorship in Korea. Their convictions were further reinforced when President Reagan invited President Chun Doo-hwan for an official visit to Washington soon after the terrible event.

The anti-U.S. movement started with a few attacks on American institutions in Korea, such as the arson against the U.S. Information Service Office in December 1980, and the arson of the U.S. Cultural Centre in Pusan in March 1982. These actions served as catalysts for the anti-U.S. sentiments amongst students. In the declarations they wrote before their actions and at their trial, the perpetrators accused the U.S. of supporting the Chun regime, which had ordered the Kwangju massacre (Declaration, Pusan arson).

The students' rhetoric against the United States became radical: they accused the U.S. of exploiting Korea, of treating her as a vassal country. The accusations of imperialism which had been directed primarily towards Japan, were now concentrated onto America. Students also blamed the U.S. for maintaining the division on the Korean peninsula, and demanded the withdrawal of American forces from Korea. It became clear to them that the issues of Korea's autonomy, U.S. imperialism, Korean division and reunification, and the type of democracy for Korea were all interconnected. The anti-America movement allowed students to include criticism of capitalism in the equation of politics, labour mistreatment, and social inequalities. Until the late 1970s, discussions on Marxist, communist, or socialist theories were almost inexistent, as the censorship effectively kept this sort of literature out of the public's hands. Furthermore, fresh memories of the Korean War, anti-communist propaganda, and fear of police repression had the majority of the population convinced that there was no likeable alternative to capitalist liberal democracy. Indeed, students from the 1980s believed their predecessors from the "ach'im isul" (morning dew) generation of the 1970s were "romantic" and "sensitive" but had failed to propose a thought-out solution to the Korean problem (Han, 1989:12). In contrast, the 1980s students began introducing radical concepts and ideologies which included dependency theory and class struggle, as they moved beyond anti-communist principles.

Kim Doh-jong describes the 1980s as the period of institutionalisation of the student movements. Students were psychologically politicised, and acquired the means and apparatus with which to pursue their political objectives. They did not hesitate to blame U.S. imperialism, and the monopoly capitalism controlled by the business and military authorities (Kim 1993:243-264). The changes they demanded were far more radical than during the previous decade, and addressed a larger pool of issues. These resulted from the strong ideologisation of the students, but could hardly have occurred without improved organisation of the student movements.

2.2 Organisation

During the 1970s, many protests carried out by students were poorly organised. Street demonstrations were often "planned" the day before they took place, by a few student leaders wanting to vent their frustrations regarding the situation in Korea. Indeed, the above-mentioned N-II, minch'onghangnyon and inhyoktang incidents had severed the head of student dissidence by 1974, and left the remaining student activists without a student structure, independent from university administration.

In contrast, 1980s students managed to organise large street demonstrations. In May 1980, students called for an end to martial law, and the dismissal of Chun Doo-hwan
and President Choi, successfully co-ordinating large demonstrations in major cities in Korea, including one in downtown Seoul which gathered about 50,000 students (Kim 1991:204). During the following days, increasing unrest was matched with increasingly repressive measures, i.e. stronger martial law, arrests of political leaders, which eventually led to the bloody intervention of the army in Kwangju.

Thereafter, the military surveillance was far too severe for students to be able to organise demonstrations. However, political debates and student organisations increased dramatically on campuses. This led to the creation of several different student factions. With time, two main groups emerged, one emphasising national unification, the other emphasising people's liberation. These two groups came to be known as NL (National Liberation) and PD (People's Democracy). As in the murim-hangnim dispute, they agreed that the political system needed to be changed, but they disagreed on the procedure and objectives. By 1984, however, students had realised they would exert a much stronger pressure if they were unified, and launched a nationwide student federation, which became the chondaehyop (National Federation of Student Union) the following year (Kang 1995:652).

Other changes within students' tactics attest to the sophistication of their organisation. Student activists augmented their co-operation across universities, and, for instance, organised demonstrations simultaneously on several campuses, or co-ordinated joint street demonstrations, as in September 1982, when about ten thousands students took to the streets to denounce distortions of a Japanese history textbook (Kang 1993:345).

Though police repression reduced significantly anti-government protests during the early 1980s, student activism increased in intensity. Students organised numerous political and ideological circles on campus, which served as training ground for future activists. After developing and articulating theories, they printed and distributed a great number of leaflets reflecting their ideologies. The students' discipline and organisation succeeded in defeating one of the purposes of the government's suppression; they managed to speak to many more people.

2.3 Popularisation

Many scholars agree that Chon T'ae-il's self-immolation influenced greatly the student movements. In November 1970, this young textile worker immolated himself at Seoul's Peace Market to protest against the miserable conditions workers were subjected to. While the incident was not reported in all newspapers, students demonstrated massively to echo young Chon's demands a thousand fold. One week later the government reacted to the student rallies. It warned employers of strong punitive actions if they did not improve the working conditions of their employees, and that all places of work would be inspected within the following month ('Sweatshop Employers Get Ministry Warning', The Korea Herald, 20 November 1970, p. 8). As a result, students became increasingly interested and involved in labour issues during the 1970s. This acquainted them with social inequalities, and exposed them to concrete problems requiring practical solutions, such as the enforcement of labour laws.

Students and average citizens were further brought closer to each other by the Kwangju Uprising of May 1980, as they suffered similarly from the army's brutality. Students' concerns for workers' rights soon extended to farmers' rights, and to the rights of the homeless and the poor. During the 1980s, a fair number of students sacrificed their studies, and sometimes put their future in jeopardy, to go work in factories as "undercover" student-workers (Cumings 1997:380-381 and Ogle 1990:99).
They helped workers learn about their rights, and establish labour union structures. Students also denounced the appalling conditions in which homeless people lived in the outskirts of urban areas. Many were fiercely opposed to the hosting of the Olympic Games by Seoul in 1988. They argued the huge amounts of money spent to organise them could be invested more sensibly, e.g. to improve the lives of tens of thousands of homeless people.

By 1987, student movements had strong connections amongst popular movements. They often acted as leaders of protests, and enjoyed a solid support from the general population. The June Resistance in 1987 was the culmination of that general collaboration, as people from all sectors of society came to the streets to support the protest initiated by the students: students, workers, farmers, employees, Catholic nuns, housewives, and even Buddhist monks joined their forces to demand, and finally gain, the end of the Chun regime.

3. Conclusion

It is tempting to view the student movements of the 1980s as a force of dissidence solely dedicated to the establishment of democracy, and that their ultimate goal was achieved when the dictatorship ended in 1987. Indeed, student protests against misrule and dictatorship have a long tradition in Korea. Student demonstrations managed to force the authoritarian Syngman Rhee to go into exile in 1960, and continued their struggle against the military regime of Park Chung-hee despite constant repression. The demand for democracy was mainly expressed by the students during the 1970s through calls for the abolition of the Yushin Constitution, the abrogation of the National Security Law, the resignation of the military government, freedom of the press, freedom of association, and the struggle against authoritarianism.

However, while student movements from the 1980s included these demands, they dealt with many more issues than during the previous decades and opened up to a broader range of ideologies, including socialism and even communism. A major turning point was the Kwangju Uprising in May 1980 which was brutally repressed by the army. It announced the beginning of dramatic changes amongst the student movements: ideologisation, organisation and popularisation.

All these changes were the result of decades of authoritarianism, but also conscious decisions made by students to achieve specific goals. When the Chun Doo-hwan regime crushed the Kwangju uprising, student activists pondered on the causes of their defeat. It became obvious to them that the U.S. was supporting the dictatorial government, and was therefore an enemy. The subsequent anti-U.S. movement was a strong element of the students' ideologisation, as they searched for alternatives to the U.S. model of democracy. Having "freed" themselves from the anti-communist strait-jacket, they sought new ideas, and naturally found in communist and socialist theories an abundant source of explanations for the contemporary problems in Korea.

Students were also prompted to improve their organisation in order to survive in the very repressive environment of the second half of the Park regime and the Chun dictatorship. However, their organisation developed around new theories, and from their efforts to have a more powerful impact on the general student population and the average citizen.

Ideologisation and organisation contributed to the students' endeavour to rally more people to their cause. They applied the theories they studied through concrete efforts...
to improve labour conditions, fight for reunification, aid the homeless, fight against imperialism, etc., which found support amongst a wider population.

One could argue that, ultimately, the protest movement led by the students resulted in a democratic system in 1987, but the 1980s student movements debated about and struggled over issues which went far beyond liberal democracy.

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The life and times of proletarian literature in South Korea

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Life and times

*Nodong munhak* or ‘proletarian literature’ is a literary field that was popular from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the period of the heyday of the union and student movements in South Korea. It describes literature – fiction, autobiography and poetry - that takes an industrial landscape as its setting and urban types for its protagonists – green young factory workers, the jaded unemployed, umbrella boys, stray university students, and so on. But the distinguishing feature of proletarian literature generally is of course its political project, and South Korea is no exception. The authors of proletarian literature wrote explicitly of their commitment to the union movement and saw literature as a vehicle to achieve a range of movement goals - raising class consciousness amongst their readers, inviting solidarity, and explaining the experience of work within a Marxist analysis of capitalism.

*Nodong munhak* can be said to have emerged at a specific moment in the history of the development of an industrialised working class in South Korea. In the 1980s, in a period of political instability, industrial militancy and unprecedented economic prosperity, these books captured the imagination of their times. As literature with an avowed political purpose, the establishment of free unions and democratic government, its authors and readers have apparently seen their dreams realised. The dissident union movement has succeeded to become the present day *Minjunchong* (Korean Confederation of Trade Unions) and military rule is over. At the same time, *nogdong munhak* has been superseded by other forms of political literature. Even as the union movement succeeded in transforming itself into a legitimate bureaucracy over the 1990s, *nogdong munhak* has declined in popularity. So now that the ideological strain of these literary works, and of the dissident world they depict, has lost some of its power, what can be retrieved from this literature? Why this scrutiny?

I argue in this seminar that the stories as well as the fate of proletarian literature reveal some of the dilemmas of the rapid industrialisation experience in South Korea. In discussing these books and their inheritance today, now that the union movement has succeeded, or at least survived in the ways that it has, I must own that they are difficult to return to and re-read. It is difficult to claim all that rage, suffering and brutality as an inheritance, an essential stage in the campaign for democratic government and free unions. They do not convey a broad perspective of their epoch and circumstances, reading them one returns to the trapped confines of unfolding consciousness, the daily walk from the factory gates to a small rented room in Machang-dong. They are a reminder of all the limited possibilities of that era.
Today I will refer to a particular variety of proletarian literature – the autobiographies (or factory books) that emerged from the union disputes of the 1970s. These include Chang Nam-su’s *The Lost Workplace* (1984), Song Hyo-sun’s *The Road to Seoul* (1982), Sok Chong-nam’s *Factory Lights* (1984) and Chon Tae-il’s collected writings. These four authors wrote about themes that would become emblematic of the labour movement of the 1970s – their journey to Seoul from the provinces, their induction into factory life, their encounter with left-wing ideas, and their fight for a representative union at their workplace. But they would also frame their work as a challenge both to literature and to society, writing literature that foreshadowed a new kind of world where workers would be the central protagonists. In his book *A History of Contemporary Korean Fiction* literary historian Kwon Young-min (SNU) notes that ‘the social problems brought about through the process of industrialisation were to make workers very lives and inequities a matter of concern in literature.’

Perhaps this is a good moment to introduce a working definition of ‘proletarian literature’ that will carry us through to the 1990s. Raymond Williams introduced the term ‘industrial novel’ to describe fiction whose characters’ lives were uncomfortably bound by industrial work:

[Thus] industrial work, and its characteristic places and communities, are not just a new background: a new ‘setting’ for a story. In the true industrial novel they are seen as formative… The privileged distancing of another kind of fiction, where people can ‘live simply as human beings’, beyond the pressures and interruptions and accidents of society, are in another world or more specifically in another class. Here, in the world of the industrial novel… work is pressing and formative, and the most general social relations are directly experienced within the most personal.

In South Korea the same mixture of literary experimentation and ideology characterised the early industrial literature of the colonial period – short stories and poetry for the most part. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, the appeal of proletariat literature was not so much the allure of an unfamiliar world, but its powerful rendering of the existing one.

**History**

Proletarian fiction in Korea first came to prominence as a distinct literary category in the period from the late 1920s to the mid-1930s, during Korea’s colonial occupation by Japan. Its emergence in works like Yu chin-o’s *Factory Girl*, published in the Choson Ilbo in 1931, Kang Kyong-ae’s novel of 1934 *The Human Predicament*, and Han Sol-ya’s *Dusk* that appeared in 1936 coincided with the appearance of a burgeoning industrial working-class and a growing but scattered interest in socialist ideas and strategy.

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1 There have been two published versions of Chon Tae-il’s collected writings. The first *A Critical Biography of Chon Tae-il* was written by Cho Young-rae and published by Tolpekae (Stone Pillow) in 1983 and has been republished several times, the second *Don’t Waste My Death – Diaries, Stories and Letters*, was brought out by the same publisher in 1988.


3 Raymond Williams, The Welsh Industrial Novel, pp. 221-222. Raymond Williams was describing novels like Jack Jones’ *Black Parade* (1935), and Gwyn Thomas’ *All Things Betray Thee* (1949).
Explicit accounts of working conditions dominate the *nodong munhak* of this era, just as they head newspaper accounts of factory life, where visiting journalists tell readers of the Tonga Ilbo and Choson Ilbo horror stories of the new factories, and publish poetry that is more like screaming than writing. In the graphic accounts of these working conditions the ironies of a colony enthralled in a barbaric ‘modernisation’ process are laid bare. Here is a sample of this heavy irony: (The narrative voice is a mine manager comparing the rickety pulley lift at the mines with the elevators of the fashionable Seoul department stores)

Elevator! Just the word itself sounds great. Our elevator is the very latest lift machine, completely different from those you see in places like Mitsukosi or Sirakiya.4 When it glides up of course it has to use energy, but when it comes down it doesn’t use any force at all. As the line slackens it just sails down of its own accord. Even as it leans headlong into a nosedive it doesn’t matter. And if a workman or some such fellow in the wooden duct gets his head a bit smashed by the fall, who cares? Why even if there’s no medical insurance or pension in the mining regulations, well it’s one head, or one leg broken, and what is that in the all in all? With the combination of such power and thrift, it’s the way a company becomes prosperous…

From Sung Young’s *Kyodae Shigan* (Shift Change)5

The early proletarian literature project shares a number of aims with more recent proletarian fiction of the 1970s and 1980s. The 1930s proletarian literature project was also an attempt to write a new kind of society/history, where proletarians are the central actors. And it is also characterised by what Raymond Williams calls the struggle between the ‘values of literature and the lives of working people’. It diverges from recent proletarian fiction in a number of significant ways: early proletarian literature did not have much of a working-class readership; it was written by what may be described as ‘visitors’ to the working class; and it was not part of a mass union movement. The proletarian novels of the colonial era would not command the same sway that the factory books would have fifty years later.

After the division of Korea in 1945 this early proletarian literature was banned in South Korea, along with the works of all writers who ‘went north’ (wolpuk chakka) to settle in communist North Korea. Following the reforms of 1987 when the South Korean government lifted the ban on some of this literature it experienced an enormous revival. Novels and short stories, which may otherwise have been left in undisturbed obscurity, were triumphantly welcomed in the atmosphere of intense curiosity about all things North Korean that characterised the late 1980s. One scholar of North Korean literature was derisive about the publishing frenzy, saying: ‘Left-wing nationalist or *minjung* scholars… display a grim determination to enjoy this once-forbidden fruit no matter how bad it may taste.’6

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4 Mitsukosi is the zaibatsu famous for its elegant department stores.
But I’d like to leave the history aside and turn to the more recent heyday of proletarian literature.

**Autobiography & Leadership**

In contrast to the earlier work the factory books that emerged in the early 1980s from the experience of the 1970s were overwhelmingly autobiographies. The authors of these factory books did not write in command of a fictional world with a field of characters, but instead tended to write of their own past.

The three books *The Road To Seoul*, *The Lost Workplace*, and *Factory Lights* were all written by women workers who were union activists and wrote their books within the discipline of the union movement. The latter two are austere books, and at first glance may appear to avoid romance and all subjects that do not lead to a political discussion. *The Road to Seoul* became famous as a working class weepy, and remains the most famous of the three, the only one to be still remembered outside of union circles. But as autobiography they are also incontestable monuments to a personal, subjective experience of ‘the overwhelming realism’ of poverty, work and the law in the late 70s. (Sara Suleri, Woman Skin Deep, p.254)

These autobiographies and the influence they had on readers tells much about people’s disenchantment with Seoul’s capitalist society in the 1970s, and who in society would most powerfully express that discontent. The urgent tone of the books and the immediacy and violence of the situations they describe indicate how absorbed both authors and readers were by this new genre. University students had never found themselves described like this before, nor had visiting journalists been able to capture the odour of factory work as these authors described it. Amidst all the rumours and propaganda of the Yushin period of the 1970s, in these books the morality of ‘modernization’ found itself openly judged by the morality of conscientious dissent.

The factory books appeared amidst a spate of factory autobiographies and anthologies of workers’ writings, all produced through the auspices of what was becoming known as the ‘democratic union movement’ (*minju nocho undong*). They are also works that straddle classes, eloquent books that commanded a broad and eclectic readership. Indeed the literature of the 1970s that crossed class borders is one of the inspirations of the student-worker (*hakch’ul*) movement that in the 1980s brought university students into the factories and amongst the workers they had read about.

Far more of a sense of a united front on the left than in the besieged 1920s and 30s.

One interesting thing about the proletarian fiction of the recent past is that there is very little debate about what is and what is not ‘class’ fiction. Proletarian literature was not a contested term for the authors themselves. Very often there is an introduction like the one in Sok Chong-nam’s *Factory Lights* that makes very clear to the reader just what kind of book they will be opening:

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7 When I asked a range of people with experience in social movements in the 1980s about these three books, only people in the union movement were familiar with *The Lost Workplace* and *Factory Lights*. 

201
… this is not a comprehensive account of the entire arrangement of the labour movement in the 1970s, but rather tries to give an understanding of the personal impressions and feelings of those who participated. As much as this has been overlooked in other accounts, it is emphasized here.8

So proletarian fiction was marked by this openness despite the very oppressive circumstances in which it was written; confident in its overt political message. It signifies what was a real sense of unity on the entire left wing, far more than in the 1920s and 30s, that would manifest itself on the streets in June 1987 when first students then white collar types and finally blue collar workers would take over downtown Seoul and demand free elections and democratic government. But it is also the sense of leadership, the sense these authors give us that they were driving public debate, and at the nerve centre of an ideological reality that so conclusively dates these books.

Decline
So why did the books decline? Firstly, the decline of their ideological persuasiveness has not taken place in isolation from ideological changes within the KCTU or the South Korean state. In 1997 when President Kim Young-sam’s government legalised the affiliated unions of Minjunc’ong it became clear that the ideological world of the union movement has ended up being as fragile as the ideological world of the South Korean state. As we observe the reconfiguring of union movement into bureaucracy and company managers into negotiating partners (however thuggish), we are also observing the contraction of these ideological worlds, and their meeting, finally, in a race for parliamentary power.

In retrospect we can look at proletarian literature as one vehicle for expressing a worldview that was for a time suppressed in its legal and social forms. Once union members were able to act and organise through a bureaucracy that represented and spoke for them, the necessity for the voices of nodong munhak declined.9 The eloquence of Minjunc’ong in its public championing of its members, its political clout and its legitimate role in the affairs of the nation have eclipsed the appeal of worker narratives and rendered their confined literary world obsolete.

So finally I would like to consider the literature that has supplanted these books. While the original subject matter of movement literature, and nodong munhak in particular, was a sort of raw, didactic look at ‘real life’, in the retrospective literature of the 1990s the subject is most consistently the movement itself as a great, creaking and irrefutable phenomenon of the times. Movement literature in the 1990s has become retrospective, engrossed in explaining the history and sense of loss of a militant generation.

In some of the retrospective literature of the 1990s the union movement, and more often the student movement, is remembered as a site where innocence (that is, a true, individual belief in democratic relations) was sacrificed to totalitarian collectivism. In others the expression of a complicated debt to the past and the movement sits

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9 I am grateful to Hwang In-won for reminding me of this important point.
alongside relief at the freedoms that have been achieved. But circumspection and retrospection have replaced the urgency and lack of introspection of proletarian literature, and are perhaps the most fitting sentiments to bring to a re-reading of the factory books today.

**Conclusion**

It is interesting to consider which of the books of proletarian literature continue to be reprinted and read, which have entered high school literature syllabuses (*In’gan Munjæ*), and which have been read, absorbed, *known* and consigned to the past. Three of the books from the 1970s examined in this talk appear to belong to the latter category, literature that is interesting for its history and not for its story, for its political purpose and not for its literary one. Because the conclusions of these books are known to everyone – the birth of a militant union movement out of the exploitation of workers – their tale has become obsolete. And yet to me it is the telling of the tale and the uncertainty of its consequences for the authors themselves that make these books so interesting to read, both as literature and as history.

There is no doubt that these autobiographies were written as a political project, to achieve a range of union movement goals – raising class consciousness amongst its readership, inciting solidarity, explaining the experience of work within a Marxist analysis of capitalism. It is the ways in which they fail to achieve these goals, or rather the ways in which they show how painful it was to be both a ‘factory girl’ (*kongsuni*) and ‘the subject of history’ that illuminate the revolutionary demands of the union movement and people’s impossible efforts to realise them.

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10 For the latter see particularly the political exile Hong Sae-hwa’s best-selling *I Was A Taxi Driver in Paris*, 1995, Seoul: Ch’angjak kwa Pibyong.
The Impracticable Plan; the Phase-down Policy of Korean Army by the U.S. in 1950s and 1960s

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1. From New Look to Economic Development

From the viewpoint of foreign policy, the ‘New Look’ Policy under the Eisenhower Administration was considered as ‘old look’ by new policy makers under the Kennedy Administration. They criticized the direction of U.S. foreign aid during the 1950s, which concentrated on military rather than economic issues. Policy makers, like Walt W. Rostow and Robert Komer, stressed the psychological effects of economic development and social reform in the Third World in order to contain the communist expansionism. (Park 1999:103-106)

U.S. strategy toward the Third World including South Korea clearly changed in the early 1960s. (Gaddis 1982:198-236, WalkerIII 1994:44-45, Park 1999: 106-109) Nevertheless, one of the most important issues regarding South Korea was not changed during the transition from the Eisenhower Administration to the Kennedy Administration; the phase-down policy of South Korean army. As an existing work points out, throughout the 1950s the U.S. stressed the necessity of reducing the South Korean army in order to carry out its ‘New Look’ policy. (Yi 1995: 228-230) This policy was continued until 1965 when the Korean Japanese Normalization was joined and the South Korean military forces were dispatched to Vietnam.

In spite of the fact that the Chinese communist army was stationed in North Korea until 1958 and North Korea did not declare that it gave up unification policy by starting war, why did the U.S. want to reduce size of the South Korean Army in the 1950s? What was the reason that this policy was continued under the Kennedy Administration? Were there differences between the policy pursued by the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration? Although the policy of reduction in forces was one of the key points of two administrations’ policy regarding South Korea, why was not the policy carried out?

2. The Phase-down Policy in the 1950s

2.1. Background of the Policy

Under the Eisenhower Administration, the New Look policy was carried out. The New Look policy focused on balancing the governmental budget deficit that had been caused by the Korean War. (Gaddis 1982:171-197) As a result, U.S. policy makers reconsidered foreign assistance, seeking to reduce it as much as possible. Of course, assistance toward South Korea was reexamined, since South Korea was the largest recipient country throughout the 1950s. (Park 1999:95-96)
Consideration of the reduction of South Korea’s military size commenced shortly after the Korean War. The Tasca Paper (NSC 176) first mentioned the necessity of the reduction in order to carry out economic rehabilitation projects, although the National Security Council opposed Tasca’s proposal because the projects were considered to potentially worsen inflation in South Korea. (Department of State, 1984:1244-1263, 1384-1394) NSC 5514 reconsidered the phase-down policy: “Maintain the general security position of the ROK by increasing the combat effectiveness of its active armed forces and developing an effective reserve in order to permit a reduction in the size of its active armed forces at an appropriate time.” (Department of State, 1993:46) After the NSC 5514, the phase-down policy appeared in U.S. policy papers regarding Korea throughout the 1950s. Even in the memorandum of discussion at the 326th meeting of the National Security Council, a symbolic statement uttered: “at long last, the New Look has come home to roost with a vengeance.” (Department of State, 1993: 443-454)

However, Admiral Radford, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed the policy from the viewpoint of security in the Korean Peninsula, since the Chinese Communist Army was stationed in North Korea until 1958. Whenever U.S. policy makers estimated security consideration in South Korea, Chinese Communist forces were jointly calculated in the position of North Korea’s strength. Disputes ensued between the proponents of the “New Look” and those of the containment policy against the Chinese Communists in the administration.

In the end, the modernization policy of South Korea’s forces appeared as a compromise between two opposite positions. U.S. policy makers decided to deploy the 280mm. guns and the Honest John rockets in U.S. forces stationed in South Korea instead of reducing both South Korean and American forces. At the same time, the United Nations Command suspended the reinforcement provisions of subparagraph 13d of the Armistice Agreement on June 21, 1957. Paragraph 13d of the agreement prohibited “the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged, worn out, or used up during the period of the Armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for piece of the same effectiveness and the same type.” (Department of State, 1994: 460-461)

While the New Look policy was the foremost background of the phase-down policy, another reason was raised to rationalize the policy: economic reconstruction. In the Tasca Paper, it can be seen that the United States tried to force South Korea to reduce its military size in order to free up the manpower necessary for prescribed economic development activities. Moreover, U.S. ambassador proposed that money from the military budget could be transferred to economic areas if the South Korean government accepted U.S. proposal for reduction.

In fact, America started to stress the necessity of economic development in the Third World from 1955 and on. Among policy papers regarding Korea, the necessity first appeared in 1957. (Woo 1991:71, 73-74; Yi 1995:205-222) Although it is not easy to find significant changes in basic economic ideas in the papers, appearance of the necessity of economic development in U.S. policy papers reflected the changes in the Soviet’s and Communist China’s foreign policies. Russia and China started to allocate economic assistance toward neutral countries including India and Egypt in the middle of the 1950s. (Rowtow 1985:13-15, 17-20) Therefore, officials and scholars who were interested in foreign policy emphasized the role of economic assistance in order to respond against communist block’s offensive from the economic
viewpoint.

2.2. Failure of the Policy

President Eisenhower uttered at the 411th Meeting of the National Security Council as follows:

It seemed clear to him that we could not consider the Republic of Korea in a vacuum. It had to be considered in the context of the world situation. To illustrate his point, the President read a portion of a cable just received this morning on the most recent discussion between Averell Harriman and Khruchev. … This kind of intelligence meant to the President that we could not sit down and coolly calculate whether the ROK was to have 16 or 18 divisions without regard to other situations in the world. The President strongly emphasized this view that the U.S. could not afford to be weak anywhere. … The President insisted that he was not arguing that it was necessarily wrong to reduce ROK forces but he did insist that there was a real danger that the U.S. would display weakness in too many critical places in the world. While, said the President, he realized that we were trying to match the Soviets in missiles, we could not afford to let ourselves become weak in other areas of the struggle with the Russians. (Department of State, 1994:565)

Clearly, the President expressed his opinion that the phase-down policy of South Korea’s military size should be given up because of the Russian expansionism. The impact of the Sputnik in 1957 was enormous to all Americans, including foreign policy makers. This situation led to the abandonment of the phase-down policy in the late 1950s.

Responses of the South Korean government and unstable social situation were another reason why the policy was not successful. First of all, President Rhee strongly opposed the policy because he believed that the policy meant the reduction of U.S. assistance toward South Korea. In fact, American grants were reduced suddenly from 1958 on, a lot of opinion leaders in South Korea regarded the situation as a serious economic crisis. (Park 1999:100) In order to maintain his power, the President utilized American assistance as if only he could request huge amount of the assistance in order to hinder the South Korean economy collapsed. That kind of belief played an important role as a ruling ideology throughout the 1950s. In 1954, when the phase-down policy first occurred, President Rhee proposed to dispatch the South Korean Army to the Indochina area. (Macdonald 1992:48-50) The prerequisite of the dispatch was to strengthen South Korea’s army from 20 to 35 divisions. In spite of the fact that American officials refused his proposal, he again proposed the dispatch to Indonesia in 1958 and to Laos in 1959. He continued to oppose the phase-down policy until South Korean people dismissed him from the presidency in 1960.

Social instability in South Korea was more important than the President’s opposition. In 1950s, an enlarged labor force would have been a burden to South Korean society since its immature economy was not yet capable of accommodating so many additional workers. Whereas officers could easily find professional jobs, thousands of discharged privates may only contribute to increased unemployment, according to American bureaucrats. (Department of State, 1993:315-20; Department of State, 1994:559-570) At that time, the industrial capacity in South Korea could
not absorb additional manpower.

In the end, the policy could not help being successful despite of the withdrawal of Chinese Army from North Korea in 1958. Although reduction of two divisions and partial modernization of weaponry system was carried out, the original phase-down plan was not implemented at all. Though the Chang Administration established shortly after the collapse of the Rhee government sought to reduce the size of the military in order to devote more fund to economic development plans, the Eisenhower Administration’s policy toward South Korea had already changed.

3. The Phase-down Policy in the early 1960s.

3.1. New American Policy

Criticism against U.S. foreign policy under the Eisenhower gained popularity among the Kennedy Administration. One of the key points in the new policy focused on economic development in the Third World by replacing grants with loans. The necessity of economic development was stressed from the psychological viewpoint, and cooperation in the capitalist world including West Germany and Japan that achieved economic recovery from the World War II was also emphasized. In particular, the latter might play an important role in rationalizing America’s huge amount of expenditure in order to allocate economic development assistance. If free world countries as well as the United States actively shared the assistance to the Third World, advisers of President Kennedy believed, it would be possible to persuade U.S. Congress as well as the American people. (Rostow and Milikan 1957:103-125)

Of course, changes in U.S. policy toward South Korea was accompanied by the new foreign policies. (Park 1999:102-106) Therefore, two points were stressed: one is to encourage South Korean government to design and carry out economic development plans which should be consistent with U.S. policy, and the other is to force South Korean and Japanese government to join normal diplomatic agreement. (Park 2000:126-146) A new policy paper by the Presidential Task Force on Korea was handed out in June, 1961 shortly after South Korea’s military coup. (Department of State, 1996:469-473) The President concluded that “the best opportunity for improvement … would appear to be the improvement of Korean-Japan relations” and directed Ambassador Berger “to concentrate on the issue.” (Department of State, 1996:481)

Although the whole framework of the U.S. policy toward South Korea changed, the phase-down policy of South Korea’s military size continued under the Kennedy administration. The Task Force Report on Korea shows the disputes on military size in South Korea commenced during the Kennedy Administration.

Under the Defense draft of Par. E on p. 8, now incorporated in the report, U.S. action to permit increased use of RKO armed forces for economic development purposes subpars. (3) and (4) must await the study of force goals. The argument for this approach is that we cannot commit ourselves on the increased use of ROK forces for civilian purposes(particularly for training) until we are clear as to whether we wish to maintain ROK forces at existing levels and with existing missions. We might desire, for example, to reduce ROK forces and to use the savings for economic development rather than to employ some of a larger ROK force in economic development activities. (Department of State, 1996:471-472)
This citation clarifies that the purpose of the reduction policy was closely related to economic development in South Korea. This means that the purpose of the policy of the Kennedy Administration was quite different from that under the Eisenhower. The sentence in above citation, “[w]e might desire … to reduce ROK forces and to use the savings for economic development,” is reflected by the purpose of the reduction policy. In fact, defense budget of South Korean government was about 30% of the total budget, whereas investment was less than 15% of the whole budget in 1950s and the early 1960s. (KDI 1990:416-427, 494-502, 527-532) If the portion of the defense budget were not reduced, it would be impossible to increase investment, or the U.S. would increase economic assistance for economic development plans.

On the other hand, the reduction policy was connected with the normalization between South Korea and Japan. Throughout 1950s, the U.S. encouraged both governments to normalize diplomatic relationship in order to reduce U.S. burden. While the U.S. requests in the 1950s had been not successful because of strong opposition from the Rhee government, the situations changed in the 1960s. First of all, as I mentioned above, the U.S. wanted Japan to take part in assistance to Asian countries, especially South Korea, in order to implement new foreign policy under the Kennedy Administration. At second, the military junta in South Korea sought to normalize diplomatic relationship with Japan in order to obtain capital for economic development plans. Lastly, the Japanese government could not refuse U.S. proposal, since Japan successfully achieved economic recovery through the Korean War and high growth era from 1955 and on. Therefore, through the normalization and the reduction of South Korean forces, the U.S. sought to transfer its burden to Japan from the security as well as from the economic viewpoint. These three topics, the economic development, the normalization, and the reduction policy of South Korean forces were closely connected.

In a State Department despatch, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State Department, wanted Samuel Berger, U.S. Ambassador in Seoul, to consider two directions. One was to maintain the size of the military at existing levels, and the other was to reduce it by one hundred or two hundred fifty military personnel. (Rusk to Berger, Enclosure 2, “Alternatives to military assistance for Korea,” August 1, 1961, NND 948813, Box 27, Korea, General Records, 1961, RG 84) Although L.L. Lemnitzer, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the reduction plan because of cheap maintenance cost and poor absorbing capacity of the additional worker, the reduction and assistance policy had been discussed during the junta era. (“Strategic Appraisal of US Position in Korea 1962-1970(U),” 10 April 1962, Lot70D199, Records of the Policy Planning Council, 1963-1964, Box 281, RG 59)

Specific considerations on the reduction policy started in late 1963, shortly before returning civil authority. Following the McNamara’s proposal on the reduction in June 4, 1963, the President Kennedy directed Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and Dean Rusk to investigate problems that might occur if the reduction of South Korea’s forces were carried out. Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, deliberated the level of South Korea’s military size, and handed in a position paper. In this paper, four division reduction in South Korean army and completion of the reduction plan by September, 1965 were recommended. In addition, new deployment of missiles like SERGEANT and PERSHING at American forces in South Korea and using nuclear weapons in a major attack from North Korea should be pursued, the paper recommended. (“A Plan for US/ROK Force Reduction,”
Reconsideration of this paper commenced in December 1963. While officials in the Department of Defense chiefly expressed consensus on the paper, the State Department officials disagreed with the paper’s position because of political instability in South Korea. ("Reduction of Military Forces in Korea," December 17, 1963, Lot 67D244, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Box 1, RG 59) In spite of the disputes on the reduction policy, the phase-down of military forces in South Korea gradually came into reality from 1964 on.

One more issue deserves attention as a background of the reduction policy in the early 1960s: it appeared that the existing ROK ground forces were more than adequate to meet the North Korean threat without either assistance from the two U.S. divisions or usage of nuclear weapons. (McNamara, Memorandum for the President, 4 June 1963, NND 932019, Records of Robert S. McNamara, Defense Programs and Operations, Box 65, RG 200) U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed with the opinion. Since U.S. officials had continued to regard the Korean Peninsula as a buffer zone between China and Japan after the Korean War, the evaluation from the military viewpoint was one of the most important factors of the reduction policy.

3.2. Dispatch of South Korean Army to the Vietnam War

Military leaders who carried out the coup in 1961 worried about the reduction policy of the United States, as the United Nations Command believed that a counter-coup might occur if South Korean forces were cut. (From Magruder to General Bond, August 14, 1961, NND 948813, Korea, General Records, 1961, Box 27, RG 84) The first action of the junta was to propose the dispatch of South Korean army to Vietnam by Chairman Pak Chŏng-Hŭi in November 1961. ("Topical Outline For the President for His Conversation with Chairman Park," 9-15, 1961, NSF; Country File, Korea: Box 128)

The Chairman’s proposal was not accepted by the President Kennedy because America did not carry out a full-scale intervention in Vietnam at that time. But the attitude of President Kennedy was quite different from that of President Eisenhower. He recommended the chairman to meet the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to examine the possibility of South Korea’s participation at the Vietnam War. Chairman Pak expressed that South Korean government should get involved in the Vietnamese situation in March 1962, and specialists on guerilla warfare were dispatched to Vietnam on April 11, 1962.

The Johnson Administration and Vietnamese government officially asked the South Korean government to dispatch forces to Vietnam in late 1963 and early 1964 before President Johnson announced the “More Flag” and “Free World Assistance Forces.” The South Korean government started to dispatch Taekwŏn-do advisors to Vietnam in September 1964 and assistance forces for construction in 1965. No request was raised by the South Korean government in the first dispatch of South Korean forces in 1964, but the government asked foremore rigid security commitment from the United States.

At the presidential election campaign in 1967, President Pak stated following:

Frankly speaking, if our forces were not dispatched (to Vietnam), I believed at that time, 2 divisions of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea might be sent to
Vietnam. … At that time, when American and Vietnamese government asked (South) Korea’s involvement, we could not accept their request. If so, 2 divisions of U.S. forces would have been dispatched. … For the sake of our defense, was it possible not to get involved in the Vietnamese war? (Presidential Secretary’s Office 1967)

The reduction of South Korean forces was more urgent matter to the South Korean government where a lot of high ranking officers were involved than that of U.S. forces in South Korea. Moreover, South Korean Army was one of the most important political bases of the regime. If the reduction policy was carried out, the regime might lose officers’ trust at once. In 1966, at a meeting between South Korean and American Secretary of Defense, the American Secretary proposed the necessity of phase-down of South Korean forces. However, while the phase-down was not mentioned anymore at the meeting, even the South Korean Secretary asked about the possibility of more assistance to South Korea.

Donald S. Macdonald wrote that the phase-down policy of South Korean forces by the U.S. was further delayed again by the dispatch of the South Korean army to the Vietnam War. (Macdonald 1999:99) The phase-down policy did not appear anymore in a position paper regarding South Korea for Cyrus R. Vance, Presidential Special Envoy, in 1968, responding to the Pueblo Incident. (Policy Planning Council, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” NND 979519, Records of the Policy Planning Council, Box 306, RG 59)

4. What Did Hindered the Reduction Policy?

Researchers specializing in foreign policy generally focus on policy documents and the situation of the country where the policy paper was produced. This tendency was greatly influenced by the World-System theory created by Immanuel Wallerstein. However, as I examined above by using the phase-down policy of South Korean forces by the U.S., sometimes the domestic situation in recipient country is one of the most important variables.

While in the 1950s the world situation was the most serious factor behind the abandonment of the phase-down policy, opposition of the South Korean government and social instability were also variables. As the aggravation of the Vietnamese situation provided the basic blockade, the dispatch of South Korean armed forces became the most important reason why the U.S. could not carry out the policy. Moreover, a comparison between the forces of the South and North in the Korean peninsula made it possible to design or rationalize the phase-down policy from the military viewpoint. Of course, withdrawal of the Chinese Communist army in 1958 should also be considered.

The alliance between South Korea and the United States has been concrete compared to other alliances in terms of economic and military perspective since 1945. Nevertheless, there had been a lot of conflicts between the two countries, especially with regard to U.S. assistance and security commitment. In order to understand the relationship between the two countries, not only to examine the U.S. viewpoint toward South Korea, but to illuminate South Korea’s social situation including public opinion and political leaders’ responses to American policy should be needed. Foreign policy of one country is not a one way process, but a reciprocal process.

The phase-down policies of the 1950s and 1960s had commonality outwardly but were not carried out. Aims, process, and characteristics of the policies in both eras,
however, were quite different. In particular, the new policy of the Kennedy Administration and the Vietnam War in the 1960s deserves careful attention. Through the participation of South Korean forces at the Vietnam War, U.S. intention that American burden might be reduced by normalization between South Korea and Japan had been delayed until the end of the Johnson Administration. Furthermore, through the participation, South Korean government was able to escape from the “American Boundary” to some extent. Above all ROK was able to reserve America’s policy regarding South Korean forces’ reduction through the Vietnam War. (Macdonald 1992: 108-111)

<References>
Committee for Publication of 40 Years History of Korean Budget. 1991. 40 Years History of Korean Budget. Seoul: Korean Development Institute. (Korean)
YI, Chong-Wòn. 1995. ToAjia reisen to Kan-Bei-Nichi kankei [The Cold War in East Asia and Relations between South Korea, America, and Japan]. Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppanbu(Tokyo University Press) (Japanese)
Walt W. Rostow and Max Millikan. 1957. A Proposal;Key to an Effective Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Brothers
1. Introduction

Each nation in East Asia has own martial art such as Judo for Japan, Kunfu for China and Taekwondo for Korea. Regardless of which one, students who want to learn the martial arts need to learn and to use the origin languages of the martial arts. If we can use martial arts to teach the languages, it will be beneficial for teaching the languages. According to McGehee & Reekie (1999), studying international sport in physical education classes can tap this interest and thereby offer an opportunity to foster an understanding and appreciation of the diverse cultures of other nations. In addition, a study of international sport in physical education can provide a useful vehicle for critical thinking.

Taekwondo is the name of the martial art turned modern international sport, which has been independently developed over about 20 centuries in Korea. In recent years, Taekwondo has become a modern amateur sport. It has become a modern world sport with tradition and spirit of martial science maintained. It was incorporated into regular curriculum of primary schools through colleges. Taekwondo is not only Korean spirit, but also a worldly popular sport.

When people learn Taekwondo, it is mandatory to learn Korean languages, for the formal language of the Taekwondo is Korean. It is not strange to see that non-Korean Taekwondo masters to teach Korean language with joy. Through learning Taekwondo as a Korean Total Physical Response (KTPR) method, people will learn Korean easier and faster than before.

In this paper, the history and philosophy of Taekwondo, and the benefits of learning Taekwondo will be introduced, and how we can use Taekwondo for teaching Korean language as a foreign or second language will be presented and discussed.

2. The Philosophy of Taekwondo

2.1. The Literal Translation of Taekwondo

The literal translation of Taekwondo is a method of defending yourself with your hands and feet. ‘Tae’ means jumping or flying, to kick or smash with the foot, Kwon means to punch or destroy with the fist, and ‘Do’ means art or way of. Some people use ‘Tae Kwon Do’ to emphasize their meaning of each word instead of using ‘Taekwondo’.
2.2. Philosophy of Taekwondo

Each Tul (pattern) of Taekwondo expresses the thoughts and the actions of these great men, so the students of Taekwondo must reflect the true intentions of those whose name each Tul bears. The ultimate goal of Taekwondo is to build a more peaceful world. The Art strives to develop the character, personality, and positive moral and ethical traits in each practitioner.

Taekwondo strives to develop the positive aspects of an individual's personality: Respect, Courtesy, Goodness, Trustworthiness, Loyalty, Humility, Courage, Patience, Integrity, Perseverance, Self-control, an Indomitable Spirit and a sense of responsibility to help and respect all forms of life. In order to help build a more peaceful world, Tae Kwon Do starts with one person at a time. Taekwondo strives for this unification. Race, creed, and nationality have nothing to do with Taekwondo. The philosophy of Taekwondo can be attained through the cultivation and maturity of all three aspects of the Art; physical, mental and spiritual, in each individual.

2.3. The Trinity of Taekwondo

The trinity of Taekwondo consists of the three major aspects of Taekwondo: the Body, the Mind, and the Spirit. In order for an individual to develop into a complete and well-rounded person, he must cultivate each aspect of Taekwondo.

2.3.1. Body

The first aspect of Taekwondo is the body. When a person begins his training, he must first learn to stretch his muscles and get his body into physical condition to perform the movements of Taekwondo. He works on kicks, stances, blocks, hand strikes, breathing, rhythm, balance, and much more in order to properly execute the techniques. The practice of these exercises and techniques are sharpening the individual's physical condition and thus developing a strong body.

2.3.2. Mind

The second aspect of Taekwondo is the mind. While learning the physical techniques of Taekwondo, the individual is engaged in an intense edification process. Unexpected delays or issues. He learns anatomy, how his body functions, what enables it to generate more power, and the weak points of the body so he can both protect his vital areas, and use the opponent's weak points to defend himself. The student is learning to focus his concentration and to set and reach goals which he may have felt were far beyond his capabilities. He learns to teach and help others and share his knowledge with other members of the dojang (school). He becomes confident, knowing he can defend himself, his family, and should the need arise, his country. He has also learned how not to fight. How to walk away from a confrontation. That when a person engages in physical conflict, no one wins. He learns it is better to help others so they to can learn the "Way" of Tae Kwon Do and help build a more peaceful world.

2.3.3. Spirit

The third aspect of Taekwondo is the spirit. The evolution of the spiritual aspect of Tae Kwon Do is achieved only after the physical and mental aspects have begun to unfold and take root. A person may have a strong body and he may possess a vast amount of knowledge but in order to become a complete individual he must have vision. He must believe in an idea, other people, himself, and God. This stage of enlightenment comes when a person is at peace with himself. He must cultivate the ability to stand up for his beliefs, to not give in to others who lack the courage to
stand by their convictions. The person who has developed the spiritual aspect of Tae Kwon Do has faith in not only himself, but also those around him.

He has become one with the tenets and teachings of Taekwondo. He lives Tae Kwon Do every day of his life. He applies the tenets of Taekwondo to his work, family and friends, and yes, even to his enemies: Courtesy, Integrity, Perseverance, Self-control, and an Indomitable Spirit. He has reached total development.

He has become a true student of the Art of Taekwondo The utmost purpose of Taekwondo is to eliminate fighting by discouraging the stronger men’s oppression of the weak men with a power that must be based on humanity, justice, morality, wisdom and faith, thus helping to build a better and more peaceful world.

2.4. The Basic Ideals for the Taekwondo Practitioners

1. By developing an upright mind and a strong body, we will acquire the self-confidence to stand on the side of justice at all times;
2. We shall unite with all men in a common brotherhood, without regard to religion, race, national or ideological boundaries
3. We shall dedicate ourselves to building a peaceful human society in which justice, morality, trust and humanism prevail.

3. Martial Arts and Personality Factors

Beard (1982) compared students in martial arts group and students in non-martial arts group. His subjects were 161 volunteers at University of Arkansas activity classes. He divided subjects into three groups based on the characteristics of activities; 1. Martial arts group where students took martial art of Judo and Taekwondo; 2. Closed activities of Archery and Bowling; and 3. Open activities of Racquetball and Badminton. He found that there was significant difference among three groups, and that martial art group was significantly higher than other groups on assertiveness, experimentalism, ego strength and attitude toward physical education.

Solis (1997) found similar result from his research that martial art group obtained higher score than non-martial art group on all the aspects of Personal Skills Map Inventory; levels of assertion, empathy, interpersonal aggression, interpersonal deference, and self esteem.

Yang (1997) specifically studied the effectiveness of learning Taekwondo for students’ self-esteem. The sample was 252 children, both boys and girls, attending elementary schools in the District of Columbia or its suburban area of the States of Maryland and Virginia. Participants were 8 to 12 years of age and were randomly assigned to experimental group 1, experimental group 2, and control group from the groups of volunteers. Findings revealed that there were significant effects and differences among the groups (experimental groups and control group) on the construct of children's self-esteem and the trend of self-esteem, and among the advanced, intermediate, and beginner groups.
4. Learning Taekwondo and Korean Language

Since the official language of Taekwondo is Korean, no matter which country you are from you need to learn and use Korean language for learning Taekwondo. Even in the Olympic sports, people always use Korean language for official terminologies of Taekwondo, such as ‘Cha Ryut’, meaning ‘Attention’ and ‘Kyung Nye’ meaning ‘Bow’. You also need to learn salutations in Korean such as ‘Kam Sa Hab Nee Da’, meaning ‘Thank you’ and ‘Mee An Ham Nee Da’, meaning ‘I am sorry’. Additionally, you need to use all the names and titles, body parts, terminologies of techniques in Korean. You need to be able to count up to one hundred, directions, and the disciplines and the miscellaneous of Taekwondo should be spoken in Korea.

Table 1. presents the command terms of Taekwondo to show how various Korean expression is used in Taekwondo. Also, if we use Taekwondo for Korean Total Physical Responses to teach Korean language as foreign or second language, students will learn Korean language unconsciously while they are learning Taekwondo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>줄서</td>
<td>Chul Su</td>
<td>Line Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>차렷</td>
<td>Cha Ryu</td>
<td>Attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>경례</td>
<td>Kyung Nye</td>
<td>Bow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>앉아</td>
<td>Ahn Ju</td>
<td>Sit Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>목념</td>
<td>Mook Nyum</td>
<td>Meditate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>일어서</td>
<td>I Lu Su</td>
<td>Stand Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>준비</td>
<td>Choon Bee</td>
<td>Ready Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>시작</td>
<td>Si Jak</td>
<td>Begin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>바로</td>
<td>Pa Ro</td>
<td>Return to Ready Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>쉬어</td>
<td>She U</td>
<td>Rest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>그만</td>
<td>Go Mon</td>
<td>Stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>빨리빨리</td>
<td>Balee Balee</td>
<td>Hurry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>돌아</td>
<td>Doe Rha</td>
<td>Turn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. shows the salutations in Korean that Taekwondo students should learn.

Table 2. Salutations in Korean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salutations in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>내</td>
<td>Nae</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>아니오</td>
<td>Ah Nee Yo</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>감사합니다</td>
<td>Kam Sa Ham Nee Da</td>
<td>Thank You For Teaching Us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>미안합니다</td>
<td>Mee An Ham Nee Da</td>
<td>I am Sorry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>고맙습니다</td>
<td>Ko Map Sm Nee Da</td>
<td>Thank You</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>천만에요</td>
<td>Chun Man Ae Yo</td>
<td>You are Welcom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>안녕하십니까 또는 안녕하세요?</td>
<td>Ahn Nyoung Ha Sim Nee Ka? or Ahn Nyoung Ha Say Yo?</td>
<td>How do you do? (You may use these two salutations at anytime of the day or as a reply to the same greeting).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>안녕히 가세요.</td>
<td>Ahn Young Hee Ka Sae Yo?</td>
<td>Stay in peace or Go in peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The Pronunciation was created by a non-Korean Taekwondo master.
As we can see from Table 2, all the basic salutations in Korean are taught in Taekwondo. In other words, without learning Korean language, it is very difficult to learn Taekwondo. Table 3. shows names and titles of Taekwondo.

Table 3. Names and Titles of Taekwondo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>단</td>
<td>Dhan</td>
<td>Degree (Black Belt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>유단자</td>
<td>Yu Dan Cha</td>
<td>Holder Of Degree (Black Belt) Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>급</td>
<td>Gup</td>
<td>Grade (Rank Below Black Belt)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>유급자</td>
<td>Yu Gup Cha</td>
<td>Holder Of Gup Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>제자</td>
<td>Jeja</td>
<td>Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>남</td>
<td>Nim</td>
<td>Term of respect &quot;honorable&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>사범님</td>
<td>Sa Bum Nim</td>
<td>Instructor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>관장님</td>
<td>Kwan Jang Nim</td>
<td>Director of a Martial Arts School, Style or Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The names and titles in Table 3. can be taught in any intermediate or advanced Korean class. If we can teach those terminologies with teaching Taekwondo, students will learn them faster than when we teach them in the regular classroom, for the terms can be connected to their goals or respect persons for Taekwondo. Students wish to obtain ‘Dhan’ to have black belt, thus, students will remember ‘Dhan’ easily. Table 4. shows hand parts that are used in Taekwondo.

Table 4. Hands Parts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>손</td>
<td>Son (also, &quot;Soo&quot;)</td>
<td>Hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>손칼</td>
<td>Son Kal</td>
<td>Knife Hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>손칼등</td>
<td>Son Kal Dung</td>
<td>Reverse Knife Hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>권</td>
<td>Kwon</td>
<td>Fist (To Smash Or Destroy With Fist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>주먹</td>
<td>Ju Muk</td>
<td>Fist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>앞주먹</td>
<td>Ap Ju Muk</td>
<td>Forefist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>옆주먹</td>
<td>Yup Ju Muk</td>
<td>Side Fist (Hammer Fist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>팔목</td>
<td>Pal Moke</td>
<td>Outer Forearm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can teach body parts with teaching Taekwondo as we can see from Table 4. While students are learning Taekwondo, they can learn the names of body parts in Korean. Table 5. shows the terms of Taekwondo stances and techniques.

Table 5. Stances and Techniques of Taekwondo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>나란히 서기</td>
<td>Naranhi Sohgi</td>
<td>'Parallel' stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>편히 서기</td>
<td>Pyonhi Sohgi</td>
<td>Ready stance (i.e. &quot;at ease&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>모아 서기</td>
<td>Moa Sohgi</td>
<td>'Closed feet' stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>앞서기</td>
<td>Alhp Sohgi</td>
<td>Walking stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>주춤 서기</td>
<td>Juchoom Sohgi</td>
<td>'Horse riding' stance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>차기</td>
<td>Cha Gee</td>
<td>Kick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>앞 차기</td>
<td>Ap Cha Gee</td>
<td>Front Kick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>옆 차기</td>
<td>Yup Cha Gee</td>
<td>Side Kick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>돌려 차기</td>
<td>Tollyo Cha Gee</td>
<td>Turning Kick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>반대 돌려 차기</td>
<td>Pan Tae Tollyo Cha Gee</td>
<td>Reverse Turning Kick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>뒤 차기</td>
<td>Dwi Cha Gee</td>
<td>Back Kick</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We can see that Taekwondo students learn most of the basic verbs in Korean with directions or body parts. It is very important for the Taekwondo students to know those terms in order to understand what the masters or the referees speak. If the students in Korean class know those terms in Korean, they can be placed in the intermediate level. Taekwondo students also need to learn counting in Korean both with pure Korean numbers or Chinese origin numbers. Table 6. presents Korean numbering with pure Korean words, and Table 7. shows the numbering in Korean with Chinese origin numbers.

Table 6. Counting in Korean with Pure Korean Words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>하나</td>
<td>Hana</td>
<td>one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>둘</td>
<td>Tul</td>
<td>two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>셋</td>
<td>Set</td>
<td>three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>넷</td>
<td>Net</td>
<td>four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>다섯</td>
<td>Tasot</td>
<td>five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>여섯</td>
<td>Yosot</td>
<td>six</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>일곱</td>
<td>Ilgob</td>
<td>seven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>여덟</td>
<td>Yudol</td>
<td>eight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>아홉</td>
<td>Ahop</td>
<td>nine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>열</td>
<td>Yeol</td>
<td>ten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>열하나</td>
<td>Yeol Hanna</td>
<td>- eleven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>열둘</td>
<td>Yeol Tul</td>
<td>- twelve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>열셋</td>
<td>Yeol Set</td>
<td>- thirteen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>스물</td>
<td>SeuMool</td>
<td>- twenty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>스물하나</td>
<td>SeuMool Hanna</td>
<td>- twenty one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>스물둘</td>
<td>SeuMool tul</td>
<td>- twenty two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>서른</td>
<td>SoReun</td>
<td>- thirty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>마흔</td>
<td>MaHeun</td>
<td>- forty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>쉰</td>
<td>Sheen</td>
<td>- fifty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>예순</td>
<td>YeSoon</td>
<td>- sixty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>일흔</td>
<td>IlHeun</td>
<td>- seventy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>여든</td>
<td>Yudoon</td>
<td>- eighty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>아흔</td>
<td>Aheun</td>
<td>- ninety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>백</td>
<td>Bak</td>
<td>- hundred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Counting in Korean with Chinese Origin Numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>일</td>
<td>Il</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>이</td>
<td>Ee</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>삼</td>
<td>Sam</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>사</td>
<td>Sah</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>오</td>
<td>Oh</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Students also need to learn the following terminologies for the disciplines of Taekwondo. The following words are very difficult, and those terms may be taught in the advanced Korean class, but we can teach those difficult terms with Taekwondo in the beginning or intermediate class. Table 8. shows the terminologies for disciplines of Taekwondo.

Table 8. Disciplines of Taekwondo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>품새</td>
<td>Poomse</td>
<td>- style-forms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>호신술</td>
<td>Hosinsul</td>
<td>- self-defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>겨루기</td>
<td>Gyorugi</td>
<td>- sparring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>격파</td>
<td>Kyepka</td>
<td>- breaktest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>예의</td>
<td>Ye ui</td>
<td>- courtesy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>염치</td>
<td>Yom chi</td>
<td>- integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>인내</td>
<td>In nae</td>
<td>- perseverance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>자제</td>
<td>JahJeh</td>
<td>- self-control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we teach the directional words in Korean with Taekwondo as KTPR, students will learn the direction without being confused, for they are moving their body according to the direction in Korean while they are learning Taekwondo. Table 9. presents the terms of direction in Korean.

Table 9. Directions in Korean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>앞</td>
<td>Ahp</td>
<td>- front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>뒤</td>
<td>Dwi</td>
<td>- back</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>반대</td>
<td>Bandae</td>
<td>- reverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>바깥</td>
<td>Bakat</td>
<td>- outer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>안</td>
<td>An</td>
<td>- inner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>안으로</td>
<td>Anuro</td>
<td>- inward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>밖으로</td>
<td>Bakuro</td>
<td>- outward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>오른</td>
<td>OhReun</td>
<td>- right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>왼</td>
<td>Wen</td>
<td>- left</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The miscellaneous terms of Taekwondo are also taught in Korean. Table 10. shows the miscellaneous terms of Taekwondo, and we can see that large numbers of Korean vocabularies are used in Taekwondo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms in Korean</th>
<th>Pronunciation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>기본동작</td>
<td>Kibon dongjak</td>
<td>fundamental practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>품새/형</td>
<td>Poomse/ Hyong</td>
<td>style figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>대련</td>
<td>Daeryon</td>
<td>step sparring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>기합</td>
<td>Kihap</td>
<td>- powerful yell, to collect and focus internal energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>차기</td>
<td>Chagi</td>
<td>- kick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>치기</td>
<td>Chigi</td>
<td>- attack with hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>찌르기</td>
<td>Jiroegi</td>
<td>- punch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>단</td>
<td>Dan</td>
<td>-black belt: 1st - 10th degree Gup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>급</td>
<td>Gup</td>
<td>- colored belt: 10th (white) - 1st (red-black)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>도복</td>
<td>Tobok</td>
<td>- Taekwondo uniform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>띠</td>
<td>Tie</td>
<td>- belt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>도장</td>
<td>Dojang</td>
<td>- practice gym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>관</td>
<td>Kwan</td>
<td>- school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>사범님</td>
<td>Sabeom Nim</td>
<td>- instructor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

It is true that students who learned Taekwondo have positive attitude towards Korea, Korean and Korean language. Even Sabeom Nim is the person whom they respect mostly. Also, as we saw in the above section, students who learn martial arts including Taekwondo obtained good personal skills including high self-esteem that is a very important element of language learning.

Using Taekwondo as KTPR will make same beneficial of TPR. Students will learn Korean language unconsciously while they are learning Taekwondo. They do not need to focus on learning Korean language but on Taekwondo. Especially, for teaching body parts and direction, Taekwondo will be very effective.

It is true that the words or expressions that are used in Taekwondo are enough to consist of basic of Korean language. If the students know all the expression that are used in Korean, they will be placed in the intermediate or advanced level classes.

We need to develop the method of teaching Korean with Taekwondo, and the way of teaching Korean for Taekwondo students. For the further study, it is recommended that teachers actually use Taekwondo for teaching Korean and find out the effectiveness of using Taekwondo.
References
1. Introduction

Nowadays, Korea has been accelerating the pace of globalization and technological development of its society. Furthermore, after Korea entered the OECD, its economic and cultural exchanges with advanced countries are increasing in economy as well as education. The globalization of Korean Studies, especially that of the Korean language is coming to the front as an important task to be developed and defined through this process.

At the beginning of the national globalization drive strategy, refer to Seong(1996), the policy makers did not consider the globalization of Korean language as a priority. However we are fortunate enough to find some agencies which have promoted a series of projects such as developing teaching and reference materials, Korean language teachers training etc. Accordingly, these projects, commissioned by the Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism, have significantly promoted the globalization of Korean studies (and in turn Korean culture in general) in recent years.

This article focuses on making the concept of "unit base" concrete which can be preliminarily understood as having a similar meaning to the terms "operation base" or "network". And then the basic principles of constructing unit base will be suggested

2. The concept of Unit Base

The similar concept of unit base we focus on this paper has already been discussed such as ‘information center’ in Seong Gwang Soo (1995), ‘unit base’ in Han Young Gyun etc (2000), ‘operation base’ in Cho(2001), ‘network’ in Suh(2001).

Seong Gwang Soo (1995) pointed out ‘the discontinuation of research inside and outside the country, disharmony between theory and material, and no relation between linguistics and language education’ in relation with Korean language education in the America. This problem is a general tendency in Korean linguistics research. Much more interest and collaboration is required for globalization of the Korean language. For this, it is needed to establish such as ‘Korean language information center’ which should play a important role to integrate collaborative and systematic research.
Han Young Gyun etc (2000) shows that there are respective characteristics in overseas Korean language education and Korean studies according to area or country. Namely, Korean language learners in Europe are just a few who intend to pursue Korean studies. Whereas in the USA, the offspring of overseas Korean is mainstream. Also, overseas Korean language institutes are varied, from regular education institutes centered in universities to irregular education institutes in the shape of ‘weekend’ Korean schools. That is why it is difficult to understand existing phases and support these education institutes.

Also, it has been suggested that establishing unit base for Korean language support be implemented as an alternative plan to activate enhancement of overseas Korean language education. Therefore, considering needs of Korean language education and distribution, they would divide overseas Korean education into regions by countries and select some institutes among numerous institutes to carry out a important role as a core institution at the university level. And the role of the unit base was suggested as follow;

-fulfilling the role as an institute taking Korean language education and Korean language research
-establisihing network among Korean language education institutes in given areas
-supporting textbook development and distribution, and training Korean teachers in the area
-establishing base camp for Korean language and Korean culture education systems abroad.

For this purpose, we should initiate a consultation and basic investigation to construct unit in each region in the world. The political and financial assistance of related countries as well as Korea is implemented continuously with closely interconnection system in unit bases. Establishing unit base will be very important role to support the previously mentioned work continuously.

We can see a concrete reference related to unit base in ‘operation base’ in Cho (2001). It can be said that Cho (2001) put an emphasis on establishing information centers to collect, digitalize, and spread research results. He also argued that communication and discussion about research methodologies need to be activated among researchers, and that establishment of operation bases is needed in the aspect of cutting down the cost of information exchange. To use Australia and its function as an operation base for Korean studies overseas covering Oceania and South East Asia as an example, Australia worked as the center of information flow to coordinate research interests. When with systematic and continuous supporting programs about overseas Korean Studies research centered on the above-mentioned operation base, this operation base has been more effective.

We can see the aforementioned inter-coordination plan simply in Suh (2001). Namely, Universities and research centers conduct collaborative research, activate numerous academic conferences provide, variety and efficiency of support in relation to countries, and educate postgraduate students in the field of education and research. In relation with fostering postgraduate students, he put an emphasis on bringing up future generation of scholars in Korean Studies by establishing Ph D courses in Korean Studies. Also, holding forums or awarding excellent theses/dissertation of postgraduate students and research students is proposed as good example of activation plans.
Of course, this requires assistance, but for the purpose of developing and globalizing Korean Studies, we can only look forward to continuation and efficiency through the ‘localization of Korean Studies’.

It can be said that Suh (2001) especially suggests to the researchers of Korean or Korean studies the necessity of strong networks and specific direction for a realistic and long-term approach. In other words, the cooperative field, for building up networks which include not only just Korean but also Korean studies in a broader sense, is increasingly needed more than ever before.

Particularly, in the case of Australia, research in Korea Studies is not so extensive, compared to the economic relationship between Korea and Australia. As a good example of establishing networks, the international symposium: ‘Korean studies In Oceania and Southeast Asia’ is significant for the exploring of cooperative systems in the phase of education and Korean studies. Suh (2001), in symposium, suggested that ‘globalization’ and ‘localization’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ are related with establishing Korean studies networks in Oceania and South East Asia.

The ‘unit base’ concept referred to in this paper has something in common with establishing networks, and also is very useful for combining all of these: ‘globalization’, ‘localization’, ‘cooperation’, ‘competition’. The concept of unit base is especially useful on that point of altering the concept of networking positively as a strategic concept; namely, both ‘Network’ and ‘Unit Base’ are same in it’s approaches and philosophy. But the nuance of networks can be shown as a passive concept of building connections between individuals or institutes, while the concept of unit base is a positive strategic concept to lessen a passive concept.

And so, ‘Unit Base’ will be the basis of establishing effective systems for numerous policies and the support of Korean language and Korean studies globalization, through accumulation and sharing of information, and preparation for problem solving strategy.

3. The Basic Principles and Directions of Developing Unit Base

As mentioned above, Suh(2001) suggested globalization and localization, and the principle of competition and cooperation with regard to establishing academic and financial networks. To this principle we suggest adding the following.

3.1. The principle of specialization and integration

The principle of specialization and integration signifies sharing roles and generalization in diverse fields and dimensions. Namely, this is the integration which can make the most use of local specialities, and also categorial, logical specialization and the integration of research itself.

3.2. The principle of concentration and dispersion

The principle of ‘concentration and dispersion’ is similar to the establishment of a "point institution(Geo-jeom-gi-ji)" proposed since 1984. The principle of a concentration and dispersion is not only the establishment of unit bases in specific areas but also a positive and plural notion which aims towards globalization. But establishing point institutions seems to be from local or minor viewpoints. On the contrary, the establishment of unit bases strongly connotes a concentration; the concept of areal dispersion is that it can reflect plural aspects in Korean studies. Furthermore, it will be possible to concentrate academic potential through dispersion
into global units. These are ultimately getting systematized in accordance with the above mentioned principle of integration.

In fact, the past logic of the point institution may be quite responsible for partial and incomplete support to overseas Korean studies. On the other hand, the principle of concentration and dispersion helps to preserve the fair distribution of academic and financial support. The problem of partial support invested to only a few advanced countries such as the United States and Great Britain so far must be overcome through the principle of areal dispersion followed by the establishment of unit bases, attempting diversification and globalization of overseas financial support programs for Korean studies. This principle of concentration and dispersion can be more concrete when the following principles are added.

3.3. The principle of efficiency and systematic organization

The core of this principle is the establishing a systematic and efficient supporting system by preparing a macro index of overseas research support programs for Korean studies. Namely, the establishing of a general, systematic and feasible evaluation system with regard to the concrete 'plan, practice, outcome' in research and support overseas Korean studies must be the prior condition.

3.4. The principle of specialty and fundamentality

Specialty means specialization and high-classification in a research area. It is important to bring up and support experts in the related field of Korean studies domestically and internationally in order to sustain continued globalization. Specialty implies the necessity to set limits for choosing and dispatching researchers abroad and research supporting institutions. We should only support qualified researchers who are sufficiently tested, have prominent competence, and moreover possess a chance to produce excellent results. This procedure is very important in supporting the Korean studies and may be a key point to the promotion of international Korean studies in the future. It contains not only searching for materials, arranging and spreading them, but also introducing Korean culture and Korean studies abroad, teaching Korean, and training experts of overseas Korean studies.

3.5. The principle of utility and productivity

It is desirable that the support of overseas Korean studies followed the principle of utility and productivity more so ever than before. It is not easy to find visible effects within short term. Introducing or spreading Korean culture is like trying to raise one's image through public relations, which can be a slow process. However, these days, it is true that culture is converted to the core of export products more so than in any other field.

No matter how we emphasize the genuine academic character, we should not ignore the mental and physical value-added sides which are the basics of human life. In addition, researchers including those in Korean studies should realize that it is time to make efforts for surviving not only by the national support but also for their own ability based on educational-industrial complex in the long run. In this context, the principle of utility and productivity is not simply based on economy oriented logic.

3.6. The principle of integrated access

The efforts for integration of sciences, companies and civil-government are the key point to the principle of integrated access in the above mentioned context. For
example, if Korean culture or Korean studies find some interest in a country abroad, the whole about Korea has relation to it without regard to the kind of area; business, education, religion and cultural activities. In this point, when a company advances into a country, it should not only be concerned with its business but also Korean culture at the same time.

So, we need to point to the method of integrated access among sciences, companies and civil-government. Each of them has its own role and acts independently, but we need to consider a mutual cooperation system as important. In addition, we can reduce doubly supported costs or total ones. Integrating access methods like the educational-industrial cooperation system maintains importance as a mutual support between companies and researchers (or Institutions) at home and abroad.

3.7. The principle of the universality and popularization

This principle is related to the popularization policy of culture, not only established previous academic outcomes but also modern and popular trends in Korean studies. In other words, it is necessary to approach and highlight the public cultural side academically which foreigners inside or outside of Korea can approach universally. It can have concrete shapes bearing characteristics of diverse local programs and events centering on a unit base.

We have to be more interested in the research, spread and introduction of various types of mass media such as TV, radio, movie, music and multimedia. There can be a limit to the promotion of Korean studies only with the most typical and traditional Korean. The integration by educational-industrial complexes related to Korean studies has greatest productivity and utility.

4. Conclusion

Korean studies can provide tremendous impetus for the globalization of Korean language (as they possess elements of each other). Enlarging the scale of supporting research and education in diverse areas may be the best way for maintaining the established development of Korean studies and going one step forward.

We think that the sympathy to ground the international base for the globalization of Korean and Korean studies is well prepared. We will find no differences by the terms of ‘network’ or ‘unit base’ to embody it.

This article has suggested the basic principles and directions meta-dimensionally on the basis of establishing ‘unit base’ from the viewpoint of a positive strategy for systematizing and utilizing the globalization of Korean. We think that the issues suggested here should be more concretely discussed through review and consultation from the fields afterwards for applying them effectively.

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1. Introduction
My presentation is about how to create a better learning environment for learners of Korean and how to create a better teaching environment for teachers of Korean by using Internet resources.

Of all technologies, the Internet has most potential benefits to the field of Korean language education. The benefits can be discussed from two aspects: teaching and learning. The aspect of teaching is all about cooperation and collaboration between teachers via the Internet and this can bring immediate benefits to them, consequently resulting in better learning for learners. In addition, many learning activities utilising Internet resources require students of different schools and institutions to carry out the activities together. Therefore, I will discuss the teaching aspect first and then the application of the Internet resources for learning.

2. Resources for teachers
Like other Less Commonly Taught Languages (LCTLs) Korean has fundamental problems such as lack of teaching resources and professional development opportunities (Sung, 1995; Kim, Y., 1994; Kim, N., 1994; Ogosi, 1994). These problems have all originated from the simple fact that there are not many students learning Korean (Cho, 1997). Due to the small number of students, commercial publishers are not enthusiastic about the development of Korean teaching resources. Not-many-students means not-many-teachers and, furthermore, these few teachers are scattered all over the place making it difficult to provide professional development opportunities.

Given the fact that there is no dramatic and significant increase in number of students expected in a short or medium term, one way of lessening these problems is to maximise the use of limited resources we have: human resources and teaching/learning materials. Unfortunately, this has not been easy in the past since we were geographically far away from one another and the cost of communication was high.

The tools of the Internet have opened up new opportunities for easy and inexpensive communication between teachers. The Internet allows us to exchange ideas, class activities, lesson plans, and so on with ease. We do not have to struggle in isolation from one another any more.
Here are some of communication channels set up by universities and associations of Teaching Korean as a Foreign Language in and outside Korea:

- **Mailing lists for Korean teachers**
  1. Name: TKFSL-L@arts.monash.edu.au
     Topic: Teaching Korean as a Foreign or Second Language
     Manager: Korean Studies, Monash University
  2. Name: ICKL@listserv.uta.edu
     Topic: Korean linguistics
     Manager: University of Texas
     Further Information: http://listserv.uta.edu/archives/ickl.html

- **Sites with Web BBS for Korean teachers**
  1. Teaching Korean as a Foreign Language Program
     Graduate School of Education, Kyunghee University
     http://www.kyunghee.ac.kr/~koredu/
  2. Teaching Korean as a Foreign Language Program
     Graduate School of Education, Yonsei University
     http://suny.yonsei.ac.kr/~koreaedu/
  3. Department of Korean Language Education
     Ewha Womans University
     http://www.korealo.com/
  4. Association of Korean Language Education for Foreigners
     Seoul National University
     http://www.aklt.net/

These communication channels allow us to exchange ideas, class activities, lesson plans, and so on leading to a better teaching environment. In other words, we can maximise the use of existing human and teaching/learning resources. Therefore, I urge all the participants here to take part in creating a better teaching environment.

I also urge all the participants here to become more active in building up the Web presence of their schools and institutions. In general, Korean programs do not rank high in their Web presence compared to other LCTLS. The Web presence of Korean language programs is important in that it promotes not only your program but also Korean language education as a whole.

We also have to strive to create or increase Korean presence at the Web sites of national language organizations such as Language Australia and Modern Language Teachers Association.

**3. Resources for learners**
Although there is a variety of Internet resources which can be used for learning or teaching of Korean, today I will just focus on ready-made learning materials which
are readily available. Here is the list of web sites which have substantial amount of learning materials:

1. Korean@Monash
   http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/korean/

2. Korean Studies at Sogang University
   http://korean.sogang.ac.kr/

3. An Introduction to Korean by J. David Eisenberg
   http://catcode.com/kintro/

4. Korean Study Net by the Korean Ministry of Information and Communication
   http://www.interedu.go.kr/

5. Korean Language at Korea & Korean
   http://parallel.park.org/Korea/Pavilions/PublicPavilions/KoreanImage/hangul/index.htm

6. Korean through English by the Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism
   http://www.mct.go.kr/hangeul/index.html

7. Korean Language Institute at the University of Bridgeport
   http://www.bridgeport.edu/Indexhtml/Centers/Disted/crsmaterials/korn101/

8. Mr. Oh's learnkorean.com
   http://www.learnkorean.com/

9. Korea for Kids
   &
   Snapshots of Asia (Korea) at Access Asia

10. Learning Hangul with Soyongdori
    http://library.thinkquest.org/20746/

11. Audio files of Korean conversations and narrations at Indiana University
    http://languagelab.bh.indiana.edu/korean101.html

12. Korean Folk Tales for Kids at the Korean company 'LG' web site (This is not designed for language learning. But it has an English version as well as a Korean one. Excellent site!)
    http://story.lg.co.kr/english/index.html

There are also mailing lists through which learners of Korean can exchange e-mail messages in Korean with other learners and native speakers of Korean.

1. Name: LearnKorean1-L@arts.monash.edu.au
   LearnKorean2-L@arts.monash.edu.au
   Manager: Korean Studies, Monash University
   Further Information:
2. Name: LearningKorean@yahoogroups.com  
Manager: Benjamin Barrett  
Further Information: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/LearningKorean

Although all of the above web sites allow anyone with Internet access to use their materials free of charge, I will talk about the Monash web site in detail. That’s because the Monash site is specifically designed for other Korean educators to be able to use its learning materials with ease. In other words, it has been designed with sharing of materials between schools and institutions in mind.

The learning materials are designed to be flexible enough in content, structure, and the containing and navigation system to be easily incorporated into courses outside Monash. This high degree of flexibility has been achieved in the following ways:

- **Micro-components of learning materials.** Learning materials are made as small as possible. These micro-components can be compared to LEGO blocks. Just as we can construct an endless variety of structures with LEGO blocks, subject designers can construct an endless variety of courseware by interlinking the micro-components. This also allows students to construct their own learning path.

- **Web page as versatile container.** The learning material is represented in the form of Web pages. The Web page is a simple but powerful and interactive medium — simple because it is easy to create; powerful because it can contain a wide range of media such as text, audio and video; and interactive because it can contain a wide range of interactive learning materials written in computer languages.

- **Site independence of navigation system.** The navigation elements in the learning material should not assume any specific location or structure. It is essential that we can assemble micro-components in different configurations required by any particular courseware. The navigation system should allow multiple entry points and enable users to return directly to wherever they came from.
Greeting
Choose the correct answer for each question.
Copyright © 2003, Korean@Monash

== 1/3 ==

Which greeting is more polite?

☐ A  안녕하세요?
An-nyeong-ha-seo-yo?

☐ B  안녕하세요니까?
An-nyeong-ha-seon-i-kka?

Figure 1: Example of micro-components and its navigation system

This 'plug and play' approach increases not only re-usability but also shareability. Shareability is important for easy collaboration not only within the school or institution but also between schools or institutions. Collaboration enables us either to develop more materials of better quality in any given time, or to shorten development time for a given amount of materials. Sharing between schools or institutions is very important for LCTLs such as Korean in which there is a dearth of resources. This will also help to avoid the 'not invented here syndrome'.

4. Conclusion
Although the field of Korean language education has many problems and obstacles, we should not despair and instead work together to overcome them. If we work together we can overcome them sooner. So I would like to finish my presentation emphasizing again the importance of cooperation and collaboration among Korean educators. Ehrmann (1996) said, “We educators advance as communities of inquiry, groping forward together through the dark. We help each other and advance, or else we fail to advance.”

References


Korean collections and services at the National Library of Australia:
a national asset

Andrew Gosling
National Library of Australia

Introduction

“In national terms, the Korean language collection in the National Library of Australia is extraordinary. It is by far the largest as well as most comprehensive collection in the country. The decision by the NLA leadership in the 1950s to commence regular and wide collection in Korean language materials is one of those decisions which show real long-term thinking, and is directly responsible for the ability of scholars and others within Australia who have Korean language proficiency to carry out high-level research on Korea. In this sense it is a genuine national asset and should be maintained as such.” (Wells 1998)

The National Library holds nearly 36,000 volumes of monographs in Korean as well as 1,500 serials and newspapers and materials in other formats such as microform. In comparison with other institutions outside Korea these holdings are in fact the largest in the Southern Hemisphere, more extensive than those of any single library in Europe, though somewhat smaller than the leading North American collections. The National Library also has strong holdings on Korea in English and other Western languages. The Library has developed a Korean Collection home page which provides further information on its Korean resources and related sites (http://www.nla.gov.au/asian/lang/kor.html).

While this paper is concerned mainly with published materials, the National Library also holds important resources for Korean studies in its special collections. The Manuscripts Section includes the papers of prominent figures associated with Korea such as Sir William Bridgeford, Sir William Keys and Sir John Mason. The Oral History area includes interviews relating to Korea such as with the writer Denis Warner, recorded National Press Club addresses by visiting Korean leaders and even a recorded speech by Sir Robert Menzies at a public meeting in July 1952 talking about the Korean War. There are also extensive holdings of current and older maps of Korea; films and videos on Korean culture, currently managed by Cinemedia in Melbourne; and Korean musical scores.

This paper covers the National Library’s Korean collections and services in the context of Korean studies and resources more generally in Australia, including major developments in the twelve years since the Ingleson Report. Jung-Sim Kim’s presentation on Monash University Library’s Korean resources is complementary, with a good coverage on electronic information for Korean studies.
History

The National Library of Australia is celebrating its one hundredth anniversary in 2001. The Library originated as a library for the new Commonwealth Parliament at Federation in 1901, and was initially based in Melbourne, the interim capital prior to the creation of Canberra. To mark the anniversary the Library has published a history of its collections. In addition a major exhibition, “Treasures from the World’s Great Libraries” will begin in December 2001. This will display a Dead Sea Scroll, the first printed edition of the map of Cheng Ho’s seven voyages from China between 1406 and 1433, manuscripts of Mozart’s Requiem and Beethoven’s 8th Symphony, a seventeenth century edition of the Tale of Genji, early Malay manuscripts and many other treasures lent by libraries from around the world. It is planned to include some rare Korean publications.

David Walker’s chapter in the National Library’s centenary history (Walker 2001: 163-181) traces the development of the Asian Collections including Korean holdings. As he recounts, the first calls for an Asian collection were made in the 1930s, but it was in the 1950s during the long period of Sir Harold White’s stewardship as National Librarian (1947-1970) that systematic acquisition of materials from and about Asia began (Walker 2001: 163-168).

Asian studies and Asian library collections have developed comparatively recently in Australia. Prior to the Second World War there were no significant collections of Asian publications and no Australian library was systematically acquiring current publications from the region.

This situation changed in the 1950s, as the importance of Asia was gradually recognized. The National Library and the Australian National University Library in particular started acquisition programs which have made them the leading Asian research collections in this country.

The fact that the National Library’s Korean and other Asian collections have been developed since the 1950s has partly dictated the nature of these collections. While some old and rare items are held, the real strength is in contemporary materials, serving the research and information needs of academia, government and the public with emphasis on the social sciences.

During the 1960s the Asian language collections were given a formal structure and permanent home. In April 1962 the Orientalia section was established to control Chinese, Japanese and later Korean and Thai resources. After several temporary locations around Canberra, the collection and its reading room were finally housed on the Third Floor of the then new National Library building in 1968, and have remained there ever since. In 1987 the section’s name was changed to its current name Asian Collections. The section now has five units with specialist language staff, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Thai and Indonesian, but also has responsibility for other Asian language collections including Burmese, Khmer and Lao.

Growth of the Korean collection
In April 1963 the Library’s Chief Cataloguer reported that 773 Korean monographs were held out of 35,331 East Asian language works. In August 1968 when the National Library moved to its new building on the shores of Lake Burley Griffin, the Asian Collections totaled 84,000 volumes of which 2,000 were Korean. By 1970 the Korean holdings had grown to 4,000 monograph volumes and 437 serial titles, mainly on history, politics and government, foreign relations, literature and Buddhism. Most titles had been acquired during the preceding ten years as a result of successful exchanges with Korean libraries. By June 1990 10,948 titles in 18,074 volumes of Korean monographs were held out of 298,483 East Asian language volumes in all.

**Current collection**

At 30 June 2001 the National Library held 25,315 titles in 35,748 volumes of Korean language monographs. This was part of a total for East Asian languages of 287,711 titles in 425,163 volumes. The Korean collection has been growing at the rate of about 1,300 titles per annum over the past five years.

The strengths of the collection lie in the social sciences, especially economics, statistics, politics and government, foreign relations and law; Korean history, biography and archaeology; language and literature; philosophy and religion (Fry 1994).

The collection is strong in government publications received regularly on exchange. Major exchanges have operated with the National Assembly Library in Seoul since 1965 and with the National Library of Korea also in Seoul since 1967. These exchanges actually originated in 1951 when the Australian Delegation to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea suggested that publications be sent to the National Assembly Library to help replace stock destroyed in the Korean War. The Library has a number of other exchange partners in South Korea, including universities and research institutes. Gifts from individuals and institutions are also an important source of materials. The Korea Foundation is a generous donor of publications as is the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Canberra.

Exchange relations were established with the Grand People’s Study House of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, formerly the State Central Library of the DPRK in Pyongyang in 1973. For many years this exchange was the main source of North Korean books, serials and newspapers obtained by the National Library. Unfortunately in recent years this exchange has ceased operating, though the Library is continuing to seek materials from and about the DPRK.

Until the 1970s Korean materials were acquired almost exclusively through exchanges, but while these remain important most Korean books are now purchased through commercial suppliers. Serials are received on subscription or exchange.

**Collection development policy**

The latest published version of the National Library’s collection development policy states that:
“The Library has over a long period, developed extensive collections relating to Asia and the Pacific. These collections have now attained considerable strength. They offer scholars research opportunities not available in other Australian libraries… The Library accepts responsibility for the maintenance and enrichment of its Asian and Pacific collections as a service to the research and library communities.” (National Library of Australia 1999 : 53-54)

Under this policy the collecting of materials about the Republic of Korea and the DPRK remains at the research level. This includes both Korean and Western language works, whether published in Korea or elsewhere.

Recent acquisitions


Microfilms continue to be important for retrospective sources on Korea. For instance the Library recently acquired the 31 rolls of a microfilm collection of the Board of Foreign Missions : Korea Mission Records, 1903-57. These are from the Presbyterian Historical Society in the USA and supplement the Library’s Korea mission materials from the nineteenth century.

Original older works are also obtained. The Library has just purchased a copy in excellent condition of the 1785 edition of Jean Baptiste Bourguinon d’Anville’s Nouvel atlas de la Chine. This atlas is important not only for its detailed coverage of China but for containing the first separate map of Korea by a European cartographer.

Staffing

Although collecting had begun much earlier there was no consistent staffing for Korean until November 1971 when Mrs Taisoo Watson was employed in the Orientalia section. She was succeeded by Mrs Jung-Hee Fry, who has presided over the collection for a quarter of a century, completing 25 years service at the Library in August 2001. As Ken Wells has written:
“The nature of the collection is very much the result of continuity in acquisitions responsibility in the person of Mrs Fry, who has been consistent and diligent in maintaining a good collection that serves the purposes of academics, the Korean reading public, and those who require reliable information on Korea.” (Wells 1998)

In 1990 a second Korean position was created, and Mrs Jung-Ok Park has been Mrs Fry’s able assistant for the past eleven years.

**Bibliographic control**

While for many years locating items in the Korean collection required checking of the Korean card catalogue in the Asian Collections Reading Room, access has greatly improved more recently. All current Korean monographs are now accessible on the National CJK Service and in the National Library’s own online catalogue searchable through the Internet.

A major milestone was reached in July 2001 as all titles in the main Korean monograph run (OK) have now been catalogued onto the automated system. This leaves some smaller sequences including North Korean books and the McLaren-Human Collection of older Korean works to be added.

**Formed collections**

David Walker’s history of the National Library’s Asian Collections stresses the important role of formed collections acquired over the years from eminent scholars, book lovers and organizations (Walker 2001 : 172-178). These formed collections in Asian and Western languages have provided the base for further collection building.

**McLaren-Human Collection**

The McLaren-Human Collection is the Library’s most important formed collection for Korean. This major gift of old and rare Korean titles had belonged to Mrs Jessie McLaren. She and her husband went to Korea from Melbourne as Presbyterian missionaries in 1911 and stayed for thirty years. Her interest in Korean culture led her to collect many books, some of which she was able to bring back to Australia at the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. Following her death, her daughter, Mrs Rachel Human of Melbourne donated the material to the National Library in 1984 so that the books could be kept together and be freely available for use.

The collection is rich in old and rare titles, dating from the fifteenth to the early twentieth centuries, and primarily relating to Korean history and literature. There are 82 titles in 150 volumes of Korean books. 15 are from before 1890, including *Tongmunson* [Anthology of Korean literature] in 10 volumes from 1544, *T’oegye sonsaeng munjip* [Collected literary works of T’oegye] in 6 volumes believed to be from 1599, *Samjol yugo* [Posthumous works of Samjol] in 3 volumes from 1672 and *Namhwagyong (chuhae)* [The Chuang-tzu, Taoist classic] believed to date from 1680. The oldest publication, *Samgang haengsilto* [The Three Principles of Basic Human Relationships] is believed to date from 1490. This work of 118 cloth pages consists of illustrated Confucian moral tales in Chinese and Korean scripts. The McLaren-Human Collections also contains a number of items in Japanese and Chinese.
A list of the books in the McLaren-Human Collection is available free from the Library (National Library of Australia 1985).

Harold S. Williams Collection

The Harold S. Williams Collection relates mainly to the history of foreign settlement in Japan and the interaction between Japan and the West but also includes works on other parts of East Asia, including China, Hong Kong and Korea.

Harold S. Williams, who lived from 1898 to 1987, was an Australian who spent most of his adult life in Japan. He was a businessman, writer and collector, whose extensive library of monographs, manuscripts, maps and pictorial items was donated to the National Library between 1978 and 1995. His book collection has been fully catalogued.

While mostly about Japan, his collected papers, newspaper cuttings and photographs include a few items on neighbouring parts of East Asia, including China, Hong Kong, Macao and Korea. The Library recently published a detailed guide to these papers and other materials, which is available free of charge (Collins 2000)

Korean library developments in Australia 1989-

Ingleson Report, 1989

The Ingleson Report of 1989 drew attention to the concentration of East Asian library resources in Canberra; the need for an automated cataloguing system for East Asian scripts and the shortage of specialist Asian Studies librarians. Ingleson also reported that the only viable collection of Korean material was at the National Library, though there were small collections at the ANU, the University of Sydney and La Trobe University. This report was important as the first major examination of Australia’s Asian library resources for many years. The Ingleson inquiry was intended as a review of Asian studies in universities as the basis for advice to government on future directions.

Following Ingleson several reports and a series of meetings on Asian library issues organised by the National Library during the 1990s reiterated the need to overcome these and related problems.

A major result of cooperative action stemming from these meetings has been the development of the National Chinese, Japanese and Korean Service. This national system for automated cataloguing of East Asian scripts was implemented in June 1996. Currently 24 Australian academic, research, special and public libraries are members of the National CJK Service.

Survey of Trends in Asian Studies and Asian Collections, 1992
A survey of Asian Studies teaching and research trends and priorities for improving Asian library resources nationally was carried out by the ANU Library and the National Library in 1992. In the three years since the Ingleson Report interest in Korean studies had clearly grown. Monash University had established a Korean research collection as part of the National Korean Studies Centre or NKSC linking several Victorian universities, while Griffith University was also becoming active in Korean studies.

**Asian Collecting Agreements Meeting, November 1995**

This meeting was called at the National Library to see if Australian libraries with Asian collections could indicate areas for possible collecting and access agreements. The most significant outcome of this gathering was agreement that given Australia's increasing interest in Korean studies and collections and services, the National Library should call a meeting of major stakeholders to consider collecting and access issues for Korean language materials. It was agreed that it was an opportune time to seek more systematic co-operation particularly to avoid unnecessary duplication of Korean research materials and to provide maximum accessibility to the collections nationally. Documentation from this meeting is at:


**Korean Collections Meeting, March 1996**

Prior to this meeting at the National Library, the Library prepared a *Conspectus Report for Korean Library Collections in Australia* (http://www.nla.gov.au/dnc/asiart/korea.html) and *Results of the DNC Korean Library Materials Survey* (http://www.nla.gov.au/www.nla.gov.au/dnc/korea/results.html). These showed that the overall national collection and budget for Korean were modest, with only two major players, the National Library with by far the largest collection and the National Korean Studies Centre with its developing Korean collection at Monash University.

It was agreed that as a first step towards implementation of a number of resolutions there should be an evaluative study of the needs of Australian researchers and business related to Korea for the next five years. This study would be used by the Korean Working Group of academics and librarians to establish the present situation and the value of setting up electronic networking, formal supply arrangements and the need to fill gaps in the totality of the holdings of Australian libraries. The Working Group included the President of the Korean Studies Association of Australasia, other leading Korean scholars and librarians from institutions with major Korean interests.

Extensive documentation on the meeting is at:

Agreement between National Library of Australia and The Australian National University Library for collecting and providing access to Korean vernacular materials, August 1996

The National Library and ANU Library have several collecting agreements for East Asian materials. An agreement reached in 1955 for Japanese language resources is still operating successfully. Broadly speaking it divides collecting by subject and by period, with the ANU Library collecting pre-Meiji Restoration and the National Library post-1868 publications. Cooperative arrangements for Chinese materials also date back to the mid-1950s. More recently the two libraries agreed in 1998 to divide responsibility for Chinese provincial statistical yearbooks. The division is geographical with ANU Library acquiring yearbooks for northern and the National Library for southern provinces of China. A similar agreement for Chinese local gazetteers is now being finalized.

In August 1996 the libraries signed an agreement to cooperate in the collection of Korean vernacular materials, so as to, where possible, avoid duplication of collections, and to facilitate effective use of the Korean holdings of both institutions. The text is at http://www.nla.gov.au/dnc/agree/mevan.html

In effect the agreement formalized a long-standing arrangement between the libraries whereby the ANU has left most collecting of Korean language research materials to the National Library.

Under the 1996 agreement the National Library has undertaken to continue to develop and maintain a research level collection capable of supporting the needs of postgraduate students and independent researchers, with a continuing level of budget of around A$80,000 per annum. In fact the National Library’s annual budget for Korean is well above this figure.

The National Library agreed that its collecting would in the main continue to concentrate on the social sciences, in particular economics, statistics, politics and government, public administration, foreign relations, law and social conditions. Korean history, particularly in the modern period was to remain an area of strength. Major works in the humanities, including language and literature, philosophy and religion and the arts would continue to be collected.

The ANU Library agreed to develop and maintain a basic, mainly Western language reference and study collection that would support undergraduate teaching at the University.

In determining future collecting directions for Korean materials, the National Library would take into account new and emerging research emphases as well as the collecting intentions of other libraries.

Both libraries agreed to contribute at least minimal level bibliographic records to the National CJK Service for new Korean acquisitions within two months of receipt.

Both libraries also agreed to facilitate access and lend materials through the interlibrary loans system. The National Library extended liberal lending conditions to
the ANU for Korean materials (and later extended this to other Asian language materials).


A survey of existing and potential or assumed users of Korean materials was carried out by the Korean Working Group, with the assistance of consultants, between June and September 1997 (Korean Working Group 1998). Funding for the project was provided by the Korea Foundation, the Australia-Korea Foundation, the Korean Studies Association of Australasia and the National Library of Australia.

The survey was conducted by mail questionnaire and interviews. Face to face interviews were carried out in Melbourne, Adelaide, Sydney and Brisbane between June and October 1997, and telephone interviews were carried out in November 1997. The total survey population was 155 throughout all Australian states.

The objectives of the project were:

• to survey research and information needs related to Korean academic studies
• to survey research and information needs for Australian businesses having dealings related to Korea
• to determine library usage patterns, on-line usage, adequacy of collections, areas of growth, readers’ services, subject/formats used for research and information
• to determine growth areas, together with the reaction to and the potential for paid-for services and the types and numbers of potential users/information seekers.

The objectives of the project were largely met and the results of the survey established not only areas requiring further investigation, but also resulted in recommendations and resolutions for future actions, collection strategies and policy development.

The conclusions drawn were that:

awareness of the extent of collections around Australia was relatively low, especially among the business community;
use of on-line services was clearly increasing, but knowledge – and use – of the CJK system was low;
rationalisation of collections, together with lack of awareness of other collections, may be a factor in lower levels of satisfaction with library services and collections;
timeliness of information, both in the provision of information and the currency of information collected, was an issue, in particular the lack of newspapers and current periodicals;
there was a need for materials about and from North Korea in all subject areas;
gaps in collections in areas other than North Korea related more to a perceived lack of depth in collections rather than a lack of subject matter; and
further research was needed to determine the viability of offering or extending paid for services.
A series of recommendations were developed for referral to the Korean Working Group. The recommendations addressed the issues raised.

Recommendations were:

1. that Australian libraries continue to work together to improve access to materials on Korea in both printed and electronic formats; that coordination between libraries be improved; that increased networking should be pursued including via the Internet

2. that access to the National Chinese, Japanese and Korean Online System be more widely promoted and made available in all major and academic Australian libraries

3. that existing library services be more effectively promoted as it appeared that users were not fully aware of them

4. that contacts with Korean libraries be developed to improve services to Korean users in Australia; that the possibilities of obtaining photocopies and loans through formal arrangements with them be pursued

5. that the problem for users of slowness of inter-library loans and supply of photocopies be considered as well as the effectiveness of the system including direct charges

6. that access to electronic economic data on Korea be improved within Australia

7. that collecting of library materials on North Korea be given greater priority by Australian libraries with Korean holdings especially the National Library

8. that gaps in collecting, such as lack of current periodicals and newspapers, be considered together with possible funding sources

9. that needs of business which were bypassing libraries be discussed more fully with business councils and users.

Implications for the National Library

The findings of the survey were clearly important for the National Library, as by far the largest provider of Korean collections and services in Australia. The survey found rather low awareness and use of Korean collections and of the National CJK Service pointing to a need for greater promotion to prime clients. Perceived problems with slowness and charging issues with inter-library loans were also raised. Material from and about North Korea was identified as a priority for collecting.

Follow-up by the Library has included extensive promotion of the National CJK Service including at meetings such as the First KSAA Conference.
The National Library is continuing to devote considerable resources to acquiring Korean and Western language works about Korea, including seeking to improve holdings relating to North Korea.

By no means all the issues raised in the survey have been dealt with fully in the three years since the report was published. Some including perceived difficulties with inter-library loans are common to libraries generally and are being looked at nationally. As Ken Wells suggests, other needs such as those of business may require different solutions outside the research and academic library system. Nevertheless the survey remains a valuable document, and certainly the most detailed assessment of user library needs for any one Asian language resource ever undertaken in Australia.

**The future**

As it has for the past five decades the National Library remains strongly committed to providing Korean collections and services, in cooperation with other libraries. Technical changes including the growth of electronic information such as CD-ROMs and networked resources are greatly expanding the range of all libraries in their collecting and provision of services. However despite major changes in information technology traditional library materials will remain vital for libraries and their users. The National Library will continue to collect Korean publications and provide improved access to its Korean holdings, as well as to electronic resources. This is in line with the Library’s goal for 2000-2002 and beyond that “All Australians, at their place of choice, have direct, seamless access to print and electronic sources of information.” (National Library of Australia [1999])

Given the importance of Korea to Australia use of the collection is likely to continue to grow. As has been noted “The use by academics is actually increasing, and this increase has been quite rapid since the late 1980s. The number of scholars on Korea has been increasing, though still inadequate, and … this is the time when the enlightened policy of the 50s and 60s is really showing its long-term fruits.” (Wells 1998)

One area where more could be done is in scholarships and grants for researchers to make greater use of the collection. For example it would be good to see Korean studies scholars applying for Harold White Fellowships at the National Library. The Library instituted the Fellowship scheme in 1983. The aims are to promote the Library as a centre of scholarly activity and research; to encourage scholarly and literary use of the collections and the production of publications based on them and to publicise the collections. Each year a number of Fellowships and Honorary Fellowships have been awarded to enable established scholars and writers to work for periods of three to six months on materials in the Library’s collections.

There have been no recent applications and no Fellowships awarded for research on the Korean collection. So far ten Fellowships have been awarded for Asia-related topics, including four in the past two years. They have involved work on the Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, Thai, Burmese, Philippine and other holdings.
As Ken Wells has urged: “Use is increasing, but it is up to us who use the collection to promote it wherever we can, and justify and protect the expenditure on it by further increased use” (Wells 1998).

References


Information retrieval of Korean materials using the CJK bibliographic system: issues and problems

Jung-ran Park
Indiana State University, University of Hawaii at Manoa

The acceleration of both print and electronic information production and use, along with the expansion of information utilities such as the on-line databases and the explosive growth of the Internet, are all clear indications of society’s inevitable march toward the knowledge-based information age. The fundamental issue of information retrieval in this information age is closely interrelated with the characteristics of language.

In this paper, I will focus specifically on the Korean component of the CJK (Chinese, Japanese and Korean) system, one of the electronic bibliographic utilities. From a background on Korean linguistics, I will examine the extent to which this system accurately reflects the informational needs of its users from the perspective of information retrieval and access. In particular, I will focus on the inherent drawbacks of the McCune-Reischauer (MR) romanization scheme, as well as word division practices, which impede the full exploitation and use of the informational tools of the CJK system.

The phonetic-based MR system causes inconsistency, ambiguity and idiosyncrasies in the searching for and retrieving of information by users, as well as in creating/cataloging information by catalogers. These problems deteriorate both information retrieval and the process of creating new tools, such as indexes and thesauri. The result is that the goal of bibliographic control is defeated. This brings about various hindrances for Koreans in accessing Korean language materials in academic and public libraries in North America.

The need for indexes and thesauri will be unavoidable in the future. For these purposes, a romanization scheme based on morphemic principles has much merit, in that such a system dissolves semantic ambiguity, while the MR system increases such ambiguity. Also, a system requiring fewer diacritics would be much more suitable to the electronic environment. Concerning word division, an automatic parser needs to be implemented to ensure critical factors, such as consistency, quality, and efficiency, in information retrieval. The development of an automatic parser needs to be based on linguistic principles, the foundation of natural language processing.

1. Introduction

The increase in both print and electronic information resources, the expansion of information utilities such as the on-line databases, and the explosive growth of the Internet, are all clear indices of society’s inexorable march toward the knowledge-based information age. As a social and societal institution, the library is naturally reflective of this fundamental societal shift.
Historically, the principal role of the library, among others, has been as a conservatory of the human record. However, the fundamental societal shift mentioned above has forced libraries to rethink and redefine their role. Along with its traditional role, the library as an institution has taken on other functions as a result of the information revolution underway. Among these are: providing access to and dissemination of electronic information resources, fulfilling users’ information needs, and empowering information seekers by providing instruction and methods for the accessing of new electronic resources. One of the great figures in the area of Library and Information Sciences, Jesse Shera, back in 1972 foresaw this role of libraries thus: “maximizing the graphic records of the social utility”. After all, the function of information access and information dissemination mirrors the needs and demands of our society, which is increasingly knowledge and information based.

Information access and dissemination is closely tied to the needs of information users. Therefore user needs must be ascertained through study and analysis of their information-seeking patterns and behavior. In this regard, user studies provide an important avenue for improving existing information systems and for designing new systems and components, such as electronic databases.

According to Bonta (1992), among international students in North American universities and colleges, more than half are East Asian, mainly from Korea, China (and Taiwan), and Japan. The size of this East Asian segment of the student body will inevitably grow in the future. Among the factors contributing to this trend are the strong long-term economic growth potential in these countries (despite short-term reversals), the Confucian-based emphasis on education, and the well-established and continued perceived prestige and value of an overseas degree, especially on the graduate level. With the recognition of the critical nature of these countries’ resources, and the growing informational needs in this area, the CJK (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) system was developed by the on-line utilities, RLIN (Research Library Information Network) and OCLC (Online Computer Library Center).

In this paper, I will focus specifically on the Korean component of the CJK system. In the following sections, I will examine the extent to which this system accurately reflects the needs of its users from the perspective of information retrieval and access. In particular, I will focus on the types of drawbacks which hinder the full exploitation and use of the informational tools of this system. These drawbacks block not only the use of information, but impede the sharing and cooperation necessary for the building of bibliographic databases. After consideration of these critical impediments, I will suggest some potential remedies that could serve to overcome these problems. In sum, the goal of this paper is to point to the need for a serious reexamination of the current system.

2. Drawbacks of the CJK Korean system

The chief, although by no means exclusive, users of Korean materials in North American libraries are native Koreans. Let us assume that the Korean collections at, for example, Hamilton Library at the University of Hawaii or at McCully Public Library in Honolulu primarily serve patrons who can at least read Korean. This assumption could be validated by surveying the use and perceived utility of these collections among non-native Korean speakers who can read Korean, non-native speakers who cannot read Korean, and native Korean speakers themselves. My submission is that such a survey would show that the drawbacks of the Korean cataloging system are primarily manifested in its deficient utility for the primary,
namely Korean, users of the CJK bibliographic utilities. The reasons for this will become clear below.

The prevailing situation is a result of the fact that the Korean cataloging system, based on the McCune-Reischauer (MR) romanization scheme, is designed for and aimed at non-native speakers, especially English speakers. The MR system, although based on the phonetic structures of Korean, is designed to accommodate non-native Korean speakers. Phonetic types of romanization, such as the MR scheme, represent speech sounds as they are pronounced. This brings about multiple hindrances for Koreans in the accessing of Korean materials, as I will describe in the following sections.

This situation also causes impediments in the development of tools for the enhanced retrieval of information. It is to be hoped that the acceleration of technological development will extend into the area of materials for Korean and, for that matter, other non-Roman scripts. The need for more efficient information access and retrieval through the use of such tools will only increase as a result of the information explosion. From such a perspective, the current system is clearly not adequate.

As well, the current system is neither cost-effective nor time-effective. It blocks the sharing of bibliographic records and the cooperation necessary for the efficient building of databases. In other words, using the current system Korean catalogers have to spend time creating new records rather than duplicating existing records, as the current system blocks even an adequate searching of records.

In the following sections, I will expand on the above indicated drawbacks, focusing on the areas of romanization and word division. However, it should be kept in mind that these two major problem areas are not meant to represent the entirety of impediments engendered by the current system. Within the scope of this paper, I will not examine the entire gamut of problems. However, other difficulties will be enumerated in the conclusion.

2. 1. The inherent problems of romanization

At present, there is no unified romanization scheme in use in Korea. Among several systems, the McCune-Reischauer (MR) system, the Yale system, and the Ministry of Education scheme are employed in different sectors for different uses. For example, in the area of publication and bibliographic records in libraries, the MR system is used. Conversely, the Yale system is uniformly used by linguists within and without Korea. Lastly, government documents, including street signs and road maps, employ the Ministry of Education system.

The differences among the above cited schemes can be discerned in the linguistic principles which underlie them. The MR system is based on the phonetic structures of Korean, as the inventors clearly specified in their original presentation. Phonetic types of romanization represent speech sounds in the manner in which they are pronounced. For example, in English the word “two” is transcribed phonetically as follows: [tu]. This romanization clearly does not capture the semantic differences caused by the existence of homographic forms. Thus, if we romanize a language on the basis of its phonetic structure, we cannot differentiate among words sharing the same pronunciation, of which especially English, but also Korean, is burdened with. The following illustration in English makes this clear: “two”, “to”, “too” are all transcribed as [tu].

On the other hand, the Yale system is based on morphemic principles. The morphemic type of romanization transcribes the base form of a word regardless of
sound changes. Korean is one of the languages employing a rich morphophonemic complexity. In other words, the base form of a word changes according to the adjacent sound environment. Most agglutinative languages, including Japanese, fall into this category. They are all very complicated morphophonemically. For example, the form of the Korean word ‘mul’ (water) is changed into ‘muri’ when the nominative particle -i is attached to it. The morphemic type of romanization is not reflective of sound change as is the phonetic type of romanization, instead reflecting the base form. (The romanization system of the Ministry of Education is structured, if we can envision a continuum, toward the phonetic type. Owing to the scope of this paper, I will not detail this system here).

As mentioned, the current cataloging system dealing with Korean materials employs the MR romanization scheme. Noteworthy is the inventors’ originally stated goal for their romanization scheme:

We have devised our romanization with the purpose of providing a comprehensible guide to the standard modern pronunciation of Korean for those unfamiliar with the language, as well as for those who know it. (McCune and Reischauer: 1940).

In the above passage, we can perceive that this system was primarily designed for users who cannot read Korean. The phonetic principle is very much valid for such a purpose. For those unfamiliar with Korean, such as scholars with a need for Korean materials, journalists, tourists, etc., this system could adequately, if not optimally, play a role.

However, the primary users of Korean collections in North America are those who are familiar with Korean, either native speakers or non-natives with at least a modicum of fluency, not those unacquainted with Korean. Non-native speakers using Korean materials can presumably be able to at least read basic vocabulary. The fundamental reason for the drawbacks of the Korean cataloging system lies in this set of circumstances.

In other words, because the MR scheme romanizes on the basis of the phonetic side of the non-native speaker’s pronunciation, Korean users bear the resulting confusion. For example, the distinction between the voiceless [p] and voiced [b] is not heard by Koreans, while these are clearly distinct phonemes to English speakers. The MR romanization system follows this phonetic distinction.

Another problem engendered by the use of the MR system is that it causes information loss. This is especially true in the area of name authority. By romanizing according to pronunciation, a given name can become unclear. For example, the Korean name Kim Sok-min becomes Kim Song-min according to the MR system. With author names romanized according to the MR system, ambiguity becomes inevitable. Through informal experiments, I have noted that Korean students rely heavily on the author’s name search in the retrieval of desired information, as search by title results in a lower rate of success, largely because of the MR system. However, Koreans discover that searching by the author’s name inevitably involves this inherent ambiguity.

This could be very critical when considering the design of electronic indexes, especially name indexes. The linguist S. Robert Ramsey (1982) presented an insightful suggestion in this case: “This information loss becomes especially critical when all cataloging work is done by computer, and so it is perhaps time to give some
thought as to how appropriate McCune-Reischauer is in cases where precise data processing is required.”

Along this line, the MR system increases the number of homographs, the primary cause of semantic ambiguity. This phenomenon can be illustrated by the previously cited English example two, to, too. If these three lexical items are encoded according to their common phonetic form, tu, the resulting semantic ambiguity can be clearly seen. This is the case in many instances with the MR scheme. Considering the ongoing creation of thesauri for Korean databases, such ambiguity inevitably cause significant impediments in the process of information retrieval.

Lastly, the MR system brings about inconsistency in the creation of bibliographic records. In other words, when catalogers encode words according to their pronunciation, there is a strong possibility for individual catalogers to create inconsistent and arbitrary records. This is based on the fact that the pronunciation of a phrase can be represented differently according to speech register. If a cataloger pronounces a phrase using careful speech, the resulting transcription would be different from that of a transcription based on casual speech. The creation of differing records is thus entirely possible, either by the same cataloger, or different catalogers transcribing identical material. Furthermore, pronunciation can vary among catalogers based on dialect, even though the MR scheme has suggested rules to follow.

The following bibliographic record illustrates this problem. Owing to the scope of this paper, I will not indicate each field and subfield designation, or the use of diacritics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>100</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Kim, Yong-un,$d1927-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>245</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Che-2 k^onggungnon :$bkungmin kukka ^ui wans^ong ^ul wihay^o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/Sc</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kim Yong-un.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ch”op”an.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bibliographic record 1**

For the sake of illustration, let us take a look at the 245 field. This field represents the title of a bibliographic item. The portion of the title in bold, k^onggungnon, represents the casual speech register. If the cataloger who created this record had pronounced it using careful speech, then it would have the same form as in Han’guk, in that the sound environment of the final underlined consonant of the first syllable, kong, is the same as in hang. Both are followed by the velar sound [g]. In casual speech, however, the nasal sound [n] becomes assimilated into the following velar sound [ng]. In other words, in careful speech, the final consonant remains as a nasal sound, as indicated in bold: k^onggungnon instead of k^onggungnon.

This inherent drawback hinders the ability of users to search the record. This hindrance applies to the professional cataloger as well, resulting in a major impediment to the sharing of cataloging records. Consequently, the goals of bibliographic control are vitiated, and the concomitant necessity for the creation of new records increases costs unnecessarily.

The MR romanizing scheme has inherent problems that are critical in the era of the information age. These problems deteriorate information retrieval as well as the process of creating new tools, such as indexes and thesauri. The minimum standards and criteria of bibliographic control cannot be maintained under the current system vis-à-vis Korean and similarly structured languages.
2. 2. Problems of word division

According to Yi Sung-u (1993), word division errors appeared in 29% of Korean standard books in current use in the school system. This highlights the difficulty in conducting word division in the written Korean form. I suspect that this problem can be found in any type of highly agglutinative language because of their inherent morphosyntactic complexity. Inconsistent and arbitrary word division can be found in even the most authoritative Korean dictionaries. This phenomenon is made worse in part by the frequent change of word division rules promulgated by the Ministry of Education in Korea. Interestingly, this problem has not attracted the attention of the general public. Only educators, publishers, linguists, and journalists are to some extent aware of and concerned with the issue. This is because arbitrary word division does not cause communicative hindrances in ordinary language use. That is, through context or conversation, any communicative ambiguities can be resolved.

However, the matter of word division is a critical factor in the electronic environment, where there is little or no context to resolve any semantic ambiguity. As well, at present there is no satisfactory software program to process the multiple properties of natural languages, such as accent, intonation, paraphrase, context, etc. In this regard, then, the fundamental problems of word division may exist in any type of romanization system.

According to the Library of Congress ALA-LC Romanization Tables (1991), in addition to the rules specifying word division, there are four basic underlying principles. Before looking at some of the specific rules, I will go over one of the basic principles. The first basic principle is stated thus: “Each word or lexical unit (including particles) is to be separated from other words (ALA-LC … 1991: p. 82)”.

The following record helps us to understand this principle:

| 245      | Y^oksa sok^ ui^ in’gan kwa^ chis^ong^ ul^ t’amgu^ handa /$c Kim Chae- yong ...[et al.] p’y^on. |
| 250      | Che 1-p’an. |
| 260      | S’oul :$bHan’gilsa,$c1996. |

Bibliographic record 2

Referring to the title field (245), it can be seen that in the title Yoksa^ sok^ ui^ in’gan^ kwa^ chisong^ ul^ t’amgu^ handa, individual units are conventionally designated by the mark ^, denoting a total of eight spaces. This principle follows one of the suggestions presented at the 1981 Workshop Conference on Korean Romanization, held at the University of Hawaii under the auspices of the Korean Studies Center. The main aim of the conference was to examine the MR system with a view toward “… producing more uniform, more consistent, and simpler guidelines for those wishing to use this system to romanize Korean.” Under such a goal, a total of thirty-three recommendations were devised. Included among these is the basis for the unit division principle.

When looking at the totality of recommendations, we can see a conceptual basis for the MR system incorporating morphemic principles, in which romanization is performed according to the base form of a word. Let us look again at the ALA-LC principle: Each word or lexical unit is to be separated from other words. At the 1981 conference, a draft proposal by Dae. W. Chang of the Library of Congress (LC) was presented. Interestingly enough, his proposal reflects the desire of Korean catalogers to seek a system that “… more exactly represents the individual words of Korean so that scholars can work their way back to the original syllables …” In other words,
Korean catalogers themselves are confused by the various and non-standardized ways used to romanize the same word, depending on the speech register used by the individual cataloger.

As the first step toward resolving this problem, the basic principle relating to word division has, in the span of eighteen years, been largely implemented. However, this principle engenders its own problem in that such word division is not used in Korean being contrary to conventional practices of the language. This could bring about a very heavy burden to Korean users in their searching processes. In fact, the above title has only three word divisions in the actual Korean written form, as follows: Yoksasokui^ in’gankwa^ chisongul^ t’amguhanda. Moreover, this rule presents another intrinsic difficulty. It applies only to case particles of a noun phrase, not to affixes of verb phrases, as shown below:

```
245 10 Hakkyo ka ch’ongsony’on pihaeang e mich’in’un y’onghyang e kwanhan
  y’on’gu =$bA study on school and juvenile delinquency /$c[y’on’gu ch’aegimja Kim Chun-ho, y’on’guja No S’ong-ho].
246 31 Study on school and juvenile delinquency
260 S’oul :$bHan’guk Hy’ongsa Ch’ongch’aek Y’on’guw’on,$c1993.
```

**Bibliographic record 3**

In the title field (245) of the record shown above, the part indicated in bold is an affix of the verb phrase mich’i. Thus, we can see here that the word division principle is not applied to the entire structure of the sentence. This could cause confusion for users in the process of information searching.

Concerning the specific rules for word division suggested by the Library of Congress, it can be said that contradiction rules. This seems to be a result of misunderstanding of the linguistic concepts underlying grammatical elements. I will not labor the matter here. However, It should be pointed out that such self-contradictory rules obviously engender inconsistent and arbitrary practices in the cataloging of Korean materials. Indeed, inconsistent practices and arbitrary cataloging records are the reality in the Korean collections of most North American libraries today.

Moreover, there are many Library of Congress cataloging records which embody flaws in word division. I will present several examples of such records below to illustrate this point. These Library of Congress records are structured contrary to the rules set by the Library of Congress itself for word division.

```
100 1 Kang, S’ok-ky’ong,$d1951-
  245 10 Sup sok^ui pang /$c Kang S’ok-ky’ong.
  250 Ch’op’an.
  260 S’oul :$bMin’umsa,$c1986.
```

**Bibliographic record 4**

There are no rules specifying division of the word in bold supsok into sup sok. In the Korean written form, there is no division between sup and sok. Thus, we can safely assume that this practice is arbitrary.

```
100 1 Ch’oe, S’og-y’ong.
  245 10 Ilcheha musongnon kwa singminji kw’olly’ok /$cCh’oe S’og-y’ong.
```
Bibliographic record 5

The above bibliographic record 5 is runs contrary to rule 5B: “If two single character substantives appear in succession, write the second one as a separate word (ALA-LC … 1991: p. 85)”. As such, the word in bold in the 245 field should be separated in the following way: musok\^  non.

Let me gloss another bibliographic record as shown below:

| 100 1 | Pak, Nam-ch^ol,$d1953- |
| 245 10 | Pan sidaej^ok koch”al :$bPak Nam-ch”ol sijip. |
| 250  | Ch”op”an. |
| 260  | S^oul-si :$bHan Ky^ore,$c1998. |
| 300  | 141 p. ;$c21 cm. |
| 440 0 | Han Ky^ore sinjak sijip |

Bibliographic record 6

The above example does not coincide with rule 3B: “Connect a prefix, such as the native Korean prefixes kat, hol, hat, p’ut, to the words that follow them (ALA-LC … 1991: p. 84)”. The bold type in the 260 subfield (publisher information) and the 440 field (series) indicates the native Korean prefix Han. Even though it is not used as an example in the above cited rule, according to rule 3B it should be corrected to the following word, as Han’gyore.Interestingly, I could find a record in which there is no division between Han and gy^ore, observing rule 3B, as shown below:

| 100 1 | Yi, Chin-ho. |
| 245 10 | Nongsakkun ^ui my^ongham /$cYi Chin-ho. |
| 300  | 140 p. ;$c21 cm. |
| 440 0 | Han’gy^ore sis^on. |

Bibliographic record 7

These examples illustrate the fact that inconsistent cataloging is being widely practiced when it comes to Korean materials, to the ultimate detriment of information users, primarily native Korean speakers. Due to inconsistent practices in word division, the recall percentage of retrieved information is inevitably lowered in the process of searching for Korean language materials. In addition, catalogers spend valuable time creating new records rather than exploiting the existing record, due to the inconsistent practices of word-division. Consequently, cost-effective cataloging practices are vitiated.

3. Addressing the drawbacks

Thus far, I have attempted to present the drawbacks inherent in the Korean cataloging system. I have addressed such hindrances both from the perspective of information retrieval by public users and from the perspective of professionals in the cataloging system. In order to suggest some alternatives, a survey and analysis of user information-seeking behavior is a definite prerequisite. In this regard, I am not in a position to suggest specific ways to resolve problems. Projects such as improved romanization schemes and word-division systems are enormous undertakings.

However, through observations and informal experiments, I have found that the current romanization scheme is definitely inadequate in fulfilling the needs of its users in that identical information can be rendered by differing romanization. To
address this matter, I strongly hold that a romanization scheme based on morphemic principles is necessary. In the previous section, I presented critical problems only from an information retrieval perspective. Thus, I did not illustrate other problems, such as the employment of diacritical symbols. Through surveying materials on Korean romanization, It is notable that the principal drawbacks of the MR system adduced by mainly linguists center on the matter of diacritics. One of the principal advantages of basing romanization on morphemic principles is that the need for diacritical symbols is substantially reduced.

As mentioned in the previous section, the need for indexes and thesauri will be unavoidable in the future. For these purposes, a romanization scheme based on morphemic principles has substantial merit in that such a system resolves most semantic ambiguity, while the MR system serves to increase the semantic ambiguity. Also, a system requiring fewer diacritics would be much more suitable to the electronic environment.

Concerning word division, I think that an automatic parser needs to be implemented in order to ensure critical standards, such as consistency, quality, and efficiency, in the process of information retrieval. As pointed out earlier, word division in Korean is very much flexible in actual written form. Thus, even though there are guidelines and rules for word division, inconsistent and arbitrary practices, with concomitant pitfalls, are the rule. The design of an algorithm for an automatic parser is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the development of an automatic parser needs to be based on linguistic principles, in that such principles form the foundation for natural language processing.

Lastly, I would like to point out the importance, indeed the necessity, for bibliographic instruction both for the native as well as for the non-native speaker. Bibliographic instruction is especially crucial to native Korean students in that they are not accustomed to reference and information services, library automation, and other prevailing standards and practices of North America libraries.

The hindrances inherent in the Korean cataloging system make this all the more critical. As sketched in the previous sections, there exist multiple impediments to adequate and efficient information retrieval. Besides the drawbacks forming the focus of this paper, there is another serious hindrance that should be briefly mentioned. This is the problem caused by translated subject headings. Translated subject headings inevitably hinder efficient information retrieval. The conceptual gaps that exist between any two languages, more so between languages as divergent as English and Korean, result in catalogued headings having some degree of inequivalent semantic value as a result of the translation process. This is an unavoidable reality; the goal should be to maximize awareness of this and other related phenomena in order to alleviate and possibly eliminate anticipated difficulties.

4. Conclusion

In many ways, the problems and hindrances outlined in this paper are not solely confined to the cataloging of Korean materials. In different ways and with different specifics, other languages employing non-roman scripts share similar impediments. Just within the CJK system, Japanese, which is grammatically and structurally close to Korean, has similar word division issues. Chinese, structurally distinct from both Japanese and Korean, is faced with a different set of issues but similar hindrances in information retrieval.

Bibliographic databases, search strategies, indeed the entire electronic information environment, were originally designed based on the Roman alphabetical
system. Therefore, using romanized Asian scripts in such an environment will inevitably cause some amount of difficulties. The goal should be to minimize these difficulties to the extent possible in order to maximize searching and cataloging efficiencies. Cost and time considerations are other factors that need to be optimized. My view is that the current system dealing with Korean materials does not adequately meet these criteria.

Specifically concerning Korean, a perfectly accurate representation of the language in romanized form is not attainable. It is fantasy to think that romanizing a given language precisely represents its phonemic value. When McCune and Reischauer devised their romanization scheme in 1939, the non-native phonetic values they assigned to it resulted in distortions and difficulties. Any such scheme aimed at the non-native speaker will never be adequate. Perhaps we should look to China as an example in this regard. Although circumstances differ, the Chinese themselves found the Wade-Giles scheme to be inadequate in representing their language. Therefore, Pinyin was promulgated as the superior alternative.

The problem of word division is potentially more easily dealt with. The rules set forth by the Library of Congress need to be modified to make their uniform implementation more easily attainable. To achieve this result, linguists and library professionals need to work in concert. However, the creation of an automatic parser is ultimately necessary to ensure consistent and cost effective cataloging, and to promote successful information retrieval.

Finally, I think it is imperative that students, faculty, researchers, and scholars be made aware of the issues and difficulties put forth in this paper. Most Korean foreign students enrolled in North American universities assume that the reason for inadequate retrieval when searching for Korean materials lies in poor search strategies on their part, lack of materials, and the like. The issues outlined in this paper are not generally known to them. The result can be detrimental long-term effects on their academic career. Bibliographic instruction for this group, and others who have the need to search for Korean materials, would go a long way toward improving scholarship and research in Korean materials. That should be the ultimate goal.

References
Korean library resources in Australian academic libraries: Monash University Library case in particular

Jung-Sim Kim
Monash University Library

This is information for Korean users to understand the current situation in Korean studies and collections in universities in Australia so as to help the users access and utilize these information resources. The information focuses on the Korean Studies Research Library of Monash University Library. However, it will assist users to understand how to become familiar with library resources, and find out the problems with which they may be faced as they use library resources such as CD-ROMs, online catalogs and databases. In order to support the needs of all the users, I searched the Web catalogues of several universities, which have Korean Programs. I will also mention the Melbourne Asian Research Libraries Consortium (MARLC).

1. Background

The National Library of Australia (NLA) has the largest Korean language collection in Australia.
The second largest Korean collection is at Monash University.
In the early 1990s, several university Korean Programs were established. However, these university library holdings were inadequate to cover the needs of researchers or students working on Korea. At that stage, there was a particular lack of detailed statistical material on all aspects of Korean society.
“The rapid development of Korean studies in Australian universities has implications for libraries. Until now, NLA has had the only developing Korean vernacular research collection, although ANU and the University of Sydney have had small more or less static collections.
Monash University is now establishing a Korean research collection as part of the National Korean Studies Centre (NKSC) which links Victorian universities with a focus on Korea. A specialist Korean librarian has been appointed since 1992. During discussions, academics associated with the NKSC stressed that they would develop the collection in conjunction with the NLA collection.
Griffith University is also becoming active in Korean studies, and is currently seeking a tenured position. Their Korean teaching program includes a video teleconferencing scheme for lectures to and from Korea. By agreement, any Korean material acquired by the University of Queensland which, together with Griffith, forms the Key Centre for Asian Studies, is sent to Griffith for cataloguing.” (Gosling, 1992, p. 11).
As Mr. Gosling mentioned, in 1992 the NKSC established its research library located at the Asian Studies Research Library of Monash University, the Korean Studies Research Library (KSRL) (http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/subjects/korean/index.html), to support a major program of research on contemporary Korea, Australian-based
research resources on Korea, with a special emphasis on Korean language material focusing on Economics, Politics, Law and the other social sciences. As a result of the Asian economic crisis, many Australian universities removed or reduced the number of subjects on Korean studies. The Korean collection of Monash University Library is an ongoing service to its users as part of the Melbourne Asian Research Libraries Consortium (MARLC) team. The MARLC was formed in 1993 to enhance access to the Asian materials held in the Monash University and University of Melbourne libraries. The sharing of expertise and the joint development of collections can provide a much-improved service for researchers and students of both institutions. (http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/asrl/marlc/index.html)

2. Library resources on Korea in academic libraries in Australia

Dr Wells’ paper mentioned, “The business and political community is not aware of the Korean collection and needs to be informed of its quality. This is perhaps a little misleading. The materials the survey was designed to cover are the Korean vernacular and Sino-Korean holdings. Clearly, these materials cannot be read unless one is proficient in these languages. …. The use by academics is actually increasing, and this increase has been quite rapid since the late 1980s”. As he mentioned, the Korean language materials are not only for the users who are working in the business and political sectors but also for those who want to learn the Korean language as well as those who research on Korea. To cover those who cannot read the Korean language, most libraries acquire materials on Korea in English, too. To support individual library users, each library has to acquire basic teaching or reference materials, and further provide specific information to the postgraduate students and on researchers’ specific topic areas. Information was retrieved by each university’s Web OPAC to get figures on materials related to Korea, in both the Korean vernacular and non-Korean language materials. Table 1 shows the size of Korean-related library collections and Korean programs in Australia. Most library holdings are under 10,000 titles. Holdings are still poor to support library use about Korea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University (in alphabetical order)</th>
<th>Collection by Web OPAC (as at 21/05/01)</th>
<th>Status of Cataloguing</th>
<th>Korean Studies Librarian</th>
<th>Korean Program*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian National University</td>
<td>2,141</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curtin University of Technology</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Griffith University</td>
<td>3,192</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As indicated above, large numbers of researchers are still relying on their research resources from overseas, requesting by document delivery or by email.


The Korean Language Collection is housed in the Asian Studies Research Library in the Matheson Library of Monash University at the Clayton Campus. English language material on Korea can be found in the Undergraduate, Main, and Serials collections of the Matheson Library as well as other branch libraries of Monash University Library.

3.1 Collection, users and services

According to the needs of users, their needs on Korean resources do not only focus on Economics, Politics, Law and the other social sciences but also various other topics such as music, architecture, … etc. Acquiring materials on Korea relies on purchasing, gifts or donations. Our major gift and exchange partners are the National Library of Korea, The National Assembly Library, and the Korea Foundation. Also gifts come from various institutes or bodies.

Monash University Library has resources on Korea as follows:

- Full text databases in CD-ROM format
  “Hanguk munhwa” data cumulates from 1980 to 1998
  “Kongchuk yoksa yongu” data cumulates from 1992 to 2000
  “Kugo kyoyuk” data cumulates from 1969 to 1998
- Electronic database on the Internet
  “The Statutes of the Republic of Korea” by the Korea Legislation Research Institute (restricted access)
- Databases in CD-ROM format
  “Hanguk munhon mongnok chongbo = Korean MARC on CD-ROM” (Index of the National Library of Korea’s monographs, theses since 1945)
  “Kukhoe Tosogwan munhon chongbo = Korean national bibliographies on CD-ROM” (Index of the National Assembly Library’s periodicals, books, theses, and non-book items)
Microform collection

More than 300 theses on Korea can be found from the Monash Voyager Catalogue. There are more than 650 titles of non-book materials including microform, audio-visual materials, CD-ROMs, ... etc. Also users can visit “Major microform collections on Korea” from the library page (http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/asrl/iskormic.html).

Monash University Library provides a dedicated Korean multimedia PC, which can view and input Korean characters, for its users to search and retrieve Korean information from the Internet as well as the ANCJK database. This saves much time for users to get information.

A Korean-speaking librarian looks after the collection. The librarian’s primary duties are selection, acquisition and cataloguing of Korean language material, and to liaise with academics and students of the department. Additional duties include rostered time on the Matheson information desk to assist clients to locate relevant sources of information across all campuses, prepare and deliver classes on using the Library and information resources.

The Korean Studies Librarian updates the Korean Studies Resource Web page on a regular basis. For the users’ convenience, recently received non-book material information is on the Website (http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/asrl/whatsnew.html#KOREAN), because these kinds of items are not catalogued straight after being received unless urgently required for rush cataloguing.

Newly received materials are also notified to the relevant Korean studies users who contact the librarian on their topics.

Access from other universities:

- For university students or academics from Victoria, they can visit the library with a CAVAL card which they can get from their own library or some users can also use inter-library loan/document delivery.
- For others from interstate, they can use inter-library loan/document delivery from their own library.

The pattern of usage of library materials varies and potential users of the Korean collection at Monash University are:

(i) Within Victoria: University students who are undertaking projects or assignments on Korea; School students who are taking subjects on Korea (more than 1,000 students); Korean community in Victoria (approximately 5,000)
(ii) Australia-wide: Postgraduate students or researchers from all Australian states (phone, email, fax, and document delivery)

3.2 Cataloguing and processing of materials on Korea

Over 93% of materials on Korea have been catalogued. Korean language materials in the collection are catalogued using the McCune-Reischauer romanisation system on the Australian National Chinese-Japanese-Korean databases (ANCJK Database). Non-Korean language materials are catalogued in Kinetica (National Library Database, which provides access to the national database of materials held in Australian Libraries). If an item record is not in ANCJK database, it is necessary to search other databases such as RLIN, OCLC.
All catalogued materials’ records are in the Monash Voyager catalogue. This ensures that items are readily available to all researchers elsewhere in Australia. Users outside Monash can also search Monash Voyager Web OPAC through Monash Voyager Catalogue. (http://library.monash.edu.au/)

3.3 Useful Korean database information on the Internet

Each university library is purchasing large numbers of resources in electronic format, which also cover the Asian area including Korea. Non-Korean language information can be accessed from these databases.

To avoid having to seek information from limited existing resources, Korean database information on the Internet will be helpful to users.

Those who want to search articles published in Korea, can use Internet sites as below:

Research Information Service System (RISS4U) (http://www.riss4u.net)
It provides services such as a Union Catalog, overseas research information, journal articles, etc.

E-government by Government Computer Center (http://www.egov.go.kr/index.jsp)
This site is an electronic government portal site, which combines in one several government Internet sites such as http://www.korea.go.kr, http://open.korea.go.kr, and http://minwon.korea.go.kr, and provides a search and directory service for most government information.

Ministry of Legislation (http://www.moleg.go.kr)
All law and regulations of Korea are available on the Internet on this site.

Korea National Statistical Office (http://www.nso.go.kr/eng/)
This site provides major statistical information. It also provides Korean Statistical Information System (KOSIS)

National Digital Library (http://www.dlibrary.go.kr)
This site provides searching of the union catalog and some full text of seven major public libraries.
- The National Library of Korea (http://www.nl.go.kr)
- The National Assembly Library of Korea (http://www.nanet.go.kr)
- Supreme Court Library (http://sclib.scourt.go.kr)
- Korea Institute of Industrial and Technical Information (http://dlib.kiniti.re.kr)
- Korea Research and Development Information Center (http://eve.kordic.re.kr)
- Korea Education & Research Information Center (http://www.keris.or.kr). RISS4U is managed by KERIS.
- The Science Library in KAIST (http://pasteur.kaist.ac.kr)

Korean Integrated Newspapers Database System (KINDS) (http://www.kinds.or.kr)
This site provides full-text articles of newspapers, some magazines, and TV news.

Related sites at Monash University
- The Monash University Library is accessible from anywhere through its homepage (http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/index.html)
Monash University is the only university in Victoria, which teaches Korean language programs. (http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/korean/)

4. Conclusion

This brief information on the current situation of Korean studies and collections in universities in Australia, the Monash University Library case in particular, is able to give us not only some information on the situation of Korean studies in Australia but also the way Korean information clients use the library. Although the funding situation was not covered I hope that the users gain some ideas how to use the library effectively and conveniently.

Reference
Pragmatic Function of ye in Opening and Closing Sequence in Korean Travel Consultations.

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1. Introduction

Ye is one of the frequently used interjections in ordinary Korean conversation. It is equivalent to “yes/yeah” in English. There have been studies to explicate the pragmatic meaning of ye based on ordinary conversation (Kim 1989, Lee 1993, Oh 1995, Noh 1991, Choe 1996). These studies show that ye’s various meaning is derived from its canonical meaning of positive answering and agreeing. Ye’s various illocutionary meaning has been noted in requesting, accepting, confirming, promising (Kim 1989). Oh (1995) has examined multi-functional aspects of Korean interjections with regards to their class, (phonological, semantic and pragmatic) characteristics of Korean interjections. Lee (1993) has studied ye’s sequential functions: turn initial ye functions as acknowledgment, topicalizer and topic closing. Turn final ye emphases the assertion. As freestanding, it functions as continuer, indicating turn boundary and self-response.

It has been found that ye is used for greeting and leave taking. This is achieved by sound stretch in flat pitch contour at its end (Kim 1989:10-11, Oh 1995:89,137-138). Ye’s functions are further refined considering ye’s multiple production is related to speaker’s social status, psychological state and context in which it occurs (Kim 1989:11).

In general, findings in the data support the previous findings. This study is based on those findings. However, it is rare to find an analysis based on the sequential context, while applying Conversational Analysis methodology. This study examines ye’s sequentially situated meaning by describing in depth the opening and closing sequences. In the first section, it demonstrates that the participants negotiate ye’s function in relation to its placement, which results in ye in the second turn position. Here ye is utilised to establish the participants’ institutional relationship.

In second, it analyses how participants exploit ye in the third turn position to circuitously move into closing section (Kidwell 2000: 33). It further discusses ye’s function related to previous findings defining ye as “passive recipiency” (Jefferson 1984:200) and “retrospective and sequence closure relevant (Gardner 1997:135). This study further argues that ye is often produced as a response to unmentioned turn-part of the co-participant, which is predicted to occur in the subsequent turns. In relation to this, prosodic features (gaps, sound stretch, and pitch) are also examined.

2. Data

15 cases of Korean travel consultation were audio recorded and transcribed. Data

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1 It is reported that in conversation in hotel reservation utterance including ye/ne takes one quarter (1079) of the whole turns (4516). 70 percent of this is used to acknowledge the prior turn (Choe 1996:12).
were collected from 4 travel agencies: two in Korea and two in Australia. The consultation lasted for 5 minutes to one hour. Average duration of consultation is approximately 20 minutes.

3. Opening sequence (greeting \(\rightarrow\) purpose of visit)

One of the functions of ye is to substitute greetings and leave-takings. In the data, Clients (Cs) greet by uttering, \textit{annyeong-ha-se-yo} “Hello?” and Agents (Ags) welcome by uttering, \textit{eoseo o-si-psio} “Come on in please.”

Following fragment further shows that ye can be used for initiating greeting. Ag is in the middle of consultation with another C. Notice that Ag greets C2 by uttering ye (line 6).

Fragment [1] (Booking)
\(\text{Ag} = \text{Agent}, \text{C1} = \text{primary Client and C2} = \text{secondary Client}\)

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & \text{C1:} \quad "\text{annyeong ha se yo}" \quad \text{well:being do HON POL} \\
   & \quad \text{“Hello.”} \\
2 & \text{Ag:} \quad "\text{ye}" \quad \text{yes quickly come HON IMP} \\
   & \quad \text{“Oh, come on in please.”} \\
3 & (1) \\
4 & \text{C2:} \quad "\text{ha-}" \\
5 & (1.4) \\
6 & \text{Ag:} \rightarrow "\text{ye}" \\
   & \quad \text{yes} \\
   & \quad \text{“Yes.”} \\
7 & \text{C2:} \quad "\text{annyeong ha se yo}" \quad \text{well:being do HON POL} \\
   & \quad \text{“Hello.”} \\
8 & \text{Ag:} \quad "\text{jamsi jom anjeu se yo:}" \quad \text{a:little:time a:bit sit HON POL} \\
   & \quad \text{“Would you like to take a seat?”}
\end{array}
\]

Ag utters ye to respond to C1’s greeting (line 2) and to acknowledge C2’s presence (line 6), which leads to C2’s greeting (line 7). Here ye is used for greeting response and initiation. This instance shows that sound stretch is applied not only in the closing sequence (Oh 1995: 139 and Kim 1989: 13), but also in the opening. The sound stretch at the end of the first turn is also reciprocated with similar length at the end of the response turn (lines 1-2 and 6-7). This highlights how the stretched intonation with flat pitch contour enhances ye to function as greeting expression.

Data show that the initiators of interaction orient to starting off the opening sequence. C prefers to initiate opening by greeting. Subsequently, Ag prefers to acknowledge it by uttering ye and further welcome C. This allows C to be in the third turn position to utter their purpose of visit as illustrated in the following opening sequence:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & \text{C:} \quad \text{greeting} \\
2 & \text{Ag:} \quad \text{ye + welcoming} \\
3 & \text{C:} \quad \text{telling purpose of visit.}
\end{array}
\]

This sequence is explained by the “distributional rule”: the caller provides the
first topic of conversation (Schegloff 1968: 354). This implies that C is expected to greet tell her/his purpose of visit following Ag’s acknowledging and welcoming turn.

In this way, C can avoid Ag’s inquiries for sale purpose. In other words, C takes the first turn position, which allows them to take the third turn to further inquiry (Sacks 1992 (1966): 256-257, 264, and Jefferson 1993:29). This reflects the character of a conversation: a person who asks first reserves the right to talk again. This is termed as “the chaining rule” (Sacks 1992). Thus, C can avoid Ag’s possible sales oriented inquiries into C’s preferences/wishes etc., which is developed into a sales offer. This may obligate C to respond to purchase or not. Thus, C’s greeting is a strategic attempt to strengthen her/his negotiation stance by taking the third turn with her/his discretion. C can obligate Ag to respond in the fourth turn regardless of a type of the third turn (i.e., question/statement).

Data show that Ag disprefer greeting C. Without C’s initiation of greeting, Ag acknowledges first and welcomes C in the first turn. Ag within the same turn can inquire into C’s purpose of visit, which may lead to C telling her/his purpose of visit. However, Ag disprefer to do so. The reason for the argument is that Ag may avoid inquiring directly into C’s purpose of visit by uttering a common expression, eteoke o-sheot-seumi–kka? “What have you come for?”

This is demonstrated in the fragment below. In line 3, Ag utters ye with relatively short sound stretch. This leads to C’s stating purpose of her visit (line 5).

Fragment [2] (US visa)
Ag = Agent, C1 = primary Client and C2 = secondary Client

((C comes into the office, while Ag is in the middle of consultation with another client.))

1 Ag: eoyu. eseo -o -se -yo::.
   Oh quickly come HON POL
   “Oh, come on in please.”

2 C1: ye::=
   “yes.”
   “Yeah.”

3→ Ag: =ye:.
   ((towards C2))
   yes
   “Yes.”

4 (0.5)

5 C2: tiket gaji -reo wa -t -neunde -yo
   ticket take in:order:to come PST CIRM POL
   “(I) came to pick up a ticket.”

Data show that Ag disprefer inquiring into C’s purpose of visiting. Without C introducing the purpose of her/his visit, Ag’s concern is to differentiate the type of visitor whether they are related to business or non-business. If business related, it is necessary to know whether it is C’s intention to buy the product or to seek information only, while implying the possibility of purchase. If C’s intention is to purchase the products then the whole interaction is likely to be a plain transaction of goods and services. Accordingly, negotiation is not expected. Thus, it seems natural that Ag inquires into C’s purpose of visit.

However a question is raised at this point with regard to literal meaning of commonly used inquiring expression per se: Eteoke-o-sheot-seumbi–kka?, “What have you come for?” delivers undesirable connotation. It inquires into the reason for
visiting as interpreted “Why have you come (here)?” Somewhere in the data, a Korean version of “How can I help you” in English, Eoteokokedowa-deuill-kkayo? is found. But this is not yet considered as ritualised expression in service encounters. Thus, Ag prefers to leave the first turn space to C to initiate greeting and tell the purpose of their visit in the third turn following Ag’s second turn.

This is also the way for Ag to proceed into further interaction in a more efficient manner without losing courteous stance, which is derived from ye’s canonical meaning of positive answering and agreeing. So, the sequence explained is a balancing effort to maintain “efficiency” and “openness to interaction” preferred by Dutch (Houtkoop-Steenstra 1986 in Hopper 1989:177) and “intimacy” orientedness in Greeks (Sifianou 1989: 538-539).

This sequence demonstrates a high degree of “density” of ‘pre-empting” (Shegloff 1986:133-138) in a sense that ye includes the functions of the summon-answer, recognition-response, greeting and “How are you?” sequences. This is described as “cultural variance” (ibid), which is further interpreted in the data as characteristics of institutional interaction (the opening of a travel consultation).

Ye in opening sequence is uttered so as to establish the participants’ institutional role as buyer and seller. This is based on ye’s function to accept not only verbal expressions, but also C’s presence (Oh 1995: 124-125) by acknowledging C’s presence, Ag accepts C as a prospect customer. This changes the status of the participants’ relationship from unknown to temporal acquaintance for accomplishing their interactional goals (Goffman 1967: 34). The affirmative acknowledgement of ye is an interactional resource to smoothly enter into social activity. Here, sound stretch with flat intonation conveys affinitive feature (Kim 1989: 11-13) that eases the burden of opening interaction due to high density of sequence.

Thus, C initiates greeting with strategic motivation to establish a social relationship. This reflects a previous finding: Korean speakers disprefer to greet between those unknown. Greeting is a much more common practice between acquaintance (Han 1998: 42). In the data, greeting-greeting sequence is rarely found.

In summary, ye is used to substitute greetings. It helps to establish institutional relationship. In this process, it is preferably located in the second turn position by Ag. The participants collaborate to achieve a typical opening sequence (C → Ag → C).

In the next section, the study describes the process of closing sequences in which the participants exploit ye in the third turn position in acknowledging sequence.

4. In closing sequence (third turn position)

This section describes the process of consultation closing, in which ye is pervasively used. It also defines another function of ye as “prospective response token” that occurs before the co-participants’ response. Ye’s function is further examined by considering prosodic features accompanied with ye with regards to stretch sound, pitch change.

The participants initiate closing sequence (preclosing implicative), mutually agreeing (preclosing sequence) before they terminate consultation (terminal sequence). The participants exploit the third turn position of ye to close on-going topic and confirm they have nothing to add to the on-going topic. They also implicitly agree to move into further closing sequence. Through the third turn position, the participants “confirm understanding of one anther’s action so that mutual understating

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2 In data, ye-ye pattern is also found but it is not a common sequence in closing.
3 Details of closing sequence are explained in Schegloff & Sacks. 1984 (73). Opening Up Closings.
is thus displayed” (Heritage 1984: 257-259).

In the fragment below, C visits Ag to inquire into information about visa application. After Ag’s offering price (for handling visa application), C further questions in relation to the price offered.

Ag = Agent, C = Client

((Topic was about document necessary for passport application. C inquires about the service charge for it.))

149  Ag: bija pi -neun:: jeohi -neun jigeum gu -man
visa fee TOP we TOP now nine ten:thousand
150  won bat –go it -geodeun -yo
Won receive CNN be CIRM POL
“We charge 90,000 Won as a fee for visa application service.”
151  (0.5)
152  C: il -in -dang -yo?
one person per POL
“(Is it) per person?”
153  Ag: ye.
“Yes.”
154  (0.3)
155  C: jeonbu da ha -eseo -yo?=
all all do CNN POL
“Does it include everything?”
156  Ag: =ve.
“Yes.”
157  (1.1)
158  Ag: aegi -deul -eun yeokwon gat -go gyese -yo?
baby PL TOP passport have CNN stay (HON) POL
“Do your children have a passport?”

A moment after Ag’s price offer (lines 149-150), C’s decision to accept/refuse the offer is expected. This is Sales Relevant Place (Clark, Drew and Pinch 1994: 440). In the subsequent turns, C develops a chain of question-answer sequence (lines 152-153, 155-156), in which he is positioned in the third turn to continue to ask questions (Sacks 1992). After this, C further delays his decision as indicated by 1.1 second of gap (line 157). Ag orients to C’s delay in decision making by introducing a transitory topic (line 158), by inquiring about whether C’s children have a passport. This is a “topic shading’ (Schegloff, & Sacks 1984 (1973): 83) in a sense that the new topic is related but not introduced for its development as indicated by frequent topic shifts.

Several turns later, C initiates a three-turn parts sequence by questioning.

((6 lines omitted. Ag asks whether C’s children have a passport.))

165  C: han- (0.4) han boreum isang geoli -gu -yo::=
about about fifteen:days over take CNN POL
“It takes more than a fortnight, doesn’t it?”
166  Ag: =ve::.
“Yes.”
167  (0.5)
C in the third turn position (line 168) indicates he has nothing to add to the ongoing topic at this moment. This is further proved by the gaps (lines 167, 169). Similar phenomenon is found in the subsequent turns (lines 172, 174) in which the participants confirm each other’s turn.

Following a series of the three-turn parts sequence, in line 176, C acknowledges the previous turns in the whole consultation (Oh 1994: 137). C produces initial turn ye to initiate preclosing sequence. This is accepted by Ag, who also utters turn initial ye (line 177) (Oh 1994: 138 and Kim 1989:10). So, the initiation of closing section of the consultation is achieved by topic shading, which is contrasted to “shutting down” (Schegloff & Sacks 1984 (73): 81) approach in English. It is typically characterised by following sequence:

A: OK?
B: All right.

This is the first part of closing section (preclosing) and the participants mutually agree to move into terminal sequence (leave-takings) (ibid).

Therefore, through the three-turn parts sequence, the participants are reluctant to terminate voluntarily and provide opportunity for the next speaker to move out of closing (Button 1987: 139). In this fragment, the participants are confirming that C is delaying/refusing his decision. They prepare to proceed to speedy preclosing sequence (lines 176-177) and terminal sequence (lines 177-178) by introducing “transitory topics” (Jefferson 1988: 433) and “reinstating continuous talks” (Maynard 80: 284), which are not elaborated in depth and shifted frequently. Without these transit topics, the Sales Relevant Place is directly connected to a preclosing sequence. To avoid this abrupt closing or prolonged silence which may occur, the participants
repeat the three-turn parts sequence.

Another instance of the participants’ orientation to the three-turn parts sequence is displayed below in which ye is placed in a series of acknowledgement turns.

Fragment [4] (Booking)
Ag = Agent, C1 = primary Client and C2 = secondary client

(((C pays for the flight ticket and Ag counts cash received.))

488   ?: ( )=
489  C2: =ye:::=
yes
“Is it OK?”
490  Ag: =ye:=maja -yo= yes correct POL
“Yes, that’s correct.”
491→C2: =ye=
yes
“Yeah.”
492→Ag: =ye::.
yes
“Yeah.”
493  C2: deot -j -yo?
become DCL POL
“Alright?”
494  Ag: [ne=gomap -seubnida.
yes thank DCL (HON)"
“Yes, thank you very much.”
495  C1: [tiket dalae -t -seo -yo?
ticket request PST CNN POL
“Have you got the ticket?”

In line 489, C requests Ag’s confirmation on the amount of cash paid for the flight ticket. This is performed by uttering ye, which invokes Ag’s response as she finishes counting. Here the focus is on C’s ye (line 491) and Ag’s ye (line 492), which are in the third turn position respectively. This indicates that they are structurally orienting to three turn parts acknowledging sequence. Thus, they stay in conversation without doing any further movement to closing sequence (Jefferson 1986: 173).

Thus, through the three-turn parts sequence the participants mutually understand and confirm (Heritage 1984: 257-259) that they do have nothing to contribute to the on-going topic. However, this is not warrant for moving into further closing sequence.

This phenomenon seems to be due to the nature of the freestanding ye that functions as “passive recipiency” and elicits the co-participant’s talk (Jefferson 1984: 200). So, its function is similar to “Mm” in English as a third position recipient token, which is “retrospective and sequence closure relevant” (Gardner 1997:135). This is a contrastive aspect to the turn initial ye as topical shifter and higher speakership incipience (Drummond & Hopper 1993: 205).

Due to ye’s nature of passive and openness toward following turn, the three-turn parts sequence does not warrant terminal sequence. This requires explicit preclosing sequence, which is offered in requesting question form deot-j-yo? “Alright?” (line 493) and confirming (line 494). That is, C further confirms Ag’s readiness to enter into further closing sequence. This indicates that participants go through a closing implicate stage through the three turn–parts sequence prior to preclosing sequence. Thus in the closing implicative stage, the participants gradually confirm the timing of
further closing movement until it becomes ripe to initiate further closing movements.

In what follows, the study argues *ye* in turn final or in a freestanding form functions to respond to the co-participant’s possible response in advance. It is often repeated with sound stretch and pitch contour incorporated.

5. Anticipatory response.

The instance below indicates *ye* is repeated within the same turn, while each *ye* functions differently according to its location. Cs predict Ag’s main clause turn as she produces the subordinate clause “When you decide on your schedule,” (lines 191-192).

Fragment [5] (Vancouver)
A = Agent, C = Client

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((Ag explains the advantages of using the national carrier for return travel to US.))
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191  Ag: najunge iljeong -i japi= 
      later itinerary SUB decided

192  if “When you decide on your schedule,”

193  C2: [ne::=\(\ddagger\)ye.]
      yes yes
      “Yes, yes.”

194  C1: [grureo -lkke –yo
      so DCL POL
      “(We) will do that.”

195  Ag: [\(\ddagger\) yeonlak ju -se -yo= 
      contact give HON POL
      “Please contact (us).”

196  C1: =ye:: ye.
      yes yes
      “Yes, yes.”

197  Ag: ne.
      yes
      “Yes.”
```

Two *yes* (line 193), *ne::=\(\ddagger\)ye.* become differentiated by their length of sound stretch and pitch contour. The first one is produced in flat intonation with stretch sound, while the second is latched to the first with falling tone. It is considered that the first one acknowledges the previous Ag’s turn (lines 191-192) and the last one accepts the immediately following part, which is not yet uttered. Cs anticipate Ag’s subsequent turn part and respond to it positively in advance (lines 193, 194). C2’s anticipated *ye* is interpreted by C1’s utterance, *grureo-lkke–yo* “(We) will do that.” (Line 194), which is a sequentially relevant interpretation because it is overlapped with C2’s second *ye*. That is, C1 elaborates the meaning of C2’s second *ye*. Accordingly, Ag’s anticipated main clause is produced in line 195. Cs produce “anticipatory response” before Ag completes her turn. Thus, C1 accepts in advance (line 194) Ag’s upcoming request (line 195) and confirms in her third turn (line 196). Ag also acknowledges Cs previous turns in her third turn position (line 197). So, they close the on-going topic in an agreeable manner (Schegloff and Sacks 1984 (1973):

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4 This is a term borrowed from “anticipatory completion” (Lerner 1993: 53).
while implying further closing sequence is imminent.

Based on this finding, it is argued that each ye in multiple production functions differently according to their location within the turn. The first one acknowledges/responses to preceding turn and the second one does the same function, but to unmentioned turn part of the co-participant.

In the similar manner, stretch sound attached to single ye also seems to do the same function. In the following fragment, notice that Ag initiates delayed second pair part of terminal sequence (line 244). It is considered as the second pair part of a terminal sequence initiated by C (line 236).

Fragment [6] (Ticket pick-up)
A = Agent, C = Client

((C has paid for the flight ticket and is about to leave.))

236→C:  

237  

238  

239  

240  

241  

242  

243  

244  

245  

246→Ag: ye::=:=

247  

248  

253  

254→Ag: ye::=ye.

In line 241, Ag prompts C’s turn by producing frequent yes as continuer (Schegloff 1982:81). This is evidenced by Ag’s early response (line 244), which is overlapped with the last syllable of the first word of C’s turn (line 243).
Ag’s intention to end the consultation is further revealed by her ye:::. (line 246), which is stretched with falling tone at the end of it. Considering its sequential distance from the C’s overlapped leave-taking initiation, Ag’s ye is considered to be reinitiating the terminal sequence. Ag anticipates C’s possible second part of leave-taking by uttering ye with sound stretch. At this point, C does not accept Ag’s initiation of the terminal sequence by developing the on-going topic. This leads to another terminal sequence (lines 253-254).

Thus, Ag’s ye::: (line 246) indicates that she acknowledges in advance C’s possible response (leave taking) to it. The outcome is an initiation of a terminal sequence. This argument is based on ye’s feature of orienting to acknowledging the co-participants’ previous turn. During the duration of sound stretch, the speaker leave turn space to the co-participant to develop a turn.

In line 254, another example of this is found in the sound stretch (:::) attached to at the end of yo with falling intonation (.). This is reformulated into ye:=ye. in which the last ye. acknowledges C’s possible response which might occur immediately following ye::=ye. In this respect, ye functions differently from that of Ag’s continuers, ae, ae “Yeah, yeah” (line 241), which are individually uttered with monotone in a speedy tempo with flat pitch contour.

Other form of prompting the co-participants’ turn is displayed in the fragment below. Notice ye=ye=ye (line 12).

Fragment [7] (Booking)
Ag = Agent, C = Client

(( Ag recommends C2 to take a seat.” and returns to consultation with another client)).

10  (17) ((Ag completes consultation with another client.)
11  Ag: ye: asiana-lo ye yak ha - dyeo t f (j - yo)?
    ye Asiana by reservation do HON PST DCL POL
    “Okay, you have booked a flight with Asiana, right?”
12  \ C: ye=ye=ye=
    ye yes yes
    “Yeah yeah yeah.”=
13  = jeo: c (name) -yo
    (name) POL
    “My name is 000.”

Unlike the previous fragment, where ye is separately produced as a continuer, here ye is produced in three times in a row and latched to one another. It occurs towards the end of Ag’s turn. It pre-empts Ag’s possible question, “May I have your name?” Thus, when ye occurs in a speedy tempo, without sound being stretched at the end of it, its function is mainly to prompt the co-participant’s turn.

Individual function of ye in multiple productions (ye::: =ye or ye::: =\sqrt{ye}) can function differently according to its location in it. The second ye in ye::: ye (acknowledgment + sound stretch + anticipatory acknowledgment) pre-empts the co-participant’s possible response, while the sound stretch provides turn opportunity to the co-participants to take turn.

The structure of ye in multiple productions (mostly in double) is further explained as a turn–in-series (Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974: 722):

1st ye : responding (relating to a prior turn)
middle : (void)
2nd ye : responding (relating to a succeeding one)

In this respect, ye’s function is to link the participants’ actions and confirming mutual understanding. This allows the participants to co-operate to terminate interaction.

6. Summary and Conclusions

The study has demonstrated that ye’s pragmatic functions vary according to its sequential location: as in turn initial, turn final and entire turn. It also displays that the participants collaborate to achieve smooth entry into the opening and closing of the encounter. Ye is used as an alternative expression for greeting and closing sequences. In the opening, ye is available only to Ag. Thus it preferably appears in the second turn slot due to C’s preference to greet first and maintain inquiring stance in the subsequent turns so that C can avoid Ag’s possible sale pitch.

This is further accorded with Ag’s preference to open the encounter with efficiency, which results in the shortened opening sequence (greeting → the first topic (C’s purpose of visit). This constitutes “type” (Schegloff 1979: 121) of travel consultation or any encounter where negotiation is relevant. This is facilitated by the use of ye, which invokes positive circumstantial inference (Oh 1995: 124-125) to convey interactional goals in a harmonious manner. In this way, the participants establish their roles to conduct their interactional goals.

In closing, through ye in the three-turn parts sequence, the participants are attentive to each other, while moving to terminal exchange in an implicit and agreeable manner (Jefferson 1993: 29)\(^5\). In this way, they close the on-going topic. So, moving into further closing sequence becomes relevant. This is due to lack of ye’s capacity to terminate interaction.

Due to ye’s inherent nature of agreeing/accepting is similar to that of “Mm” in English, which shows ”passive recipiency”, proposing the co-participant to go on talking (Jefferson 1984: 200). It further implies that the topic is exhausted (Jefferson 1993: 22). Thus, ye can be described as “retrospective and sequence closure relevant” (Gardner 1997:135), while allowing the introduction of a new topic.

This is contrastive feature of ye compared to turn initial ye which can claim topic change or speakership change. The three-turn parts sequence enables initiation of closing sequence but the termination is subjected to the participants’ negotiation. The participants often repeat the three-turn parts sequence or develop explicit preclosing sequence in a question-answer form before they move into terminal sequence.

This study further finds that sound stretch is distinctively observed at the end of greeting and leave-taking sequence. Furthermore, it is reciprocated in terms of its length. Ye in multiple production functions differently according to its location. The first ye acknowledges the co-participant’s previous turn and the last one responds to the co-participant’s possible turn to follow. In this sense, the last ye in multiple production (mostly in double) functions as “anticipatory response/acknowledgement token”. Stretched sound of final single ye::: is considered as an alternative form of the “anticipatory acknowledgement token” ye in multiple productions. It accommodates the co-participant’s possible response by providing opportunity for the co-participant’s to introduce further response/acknowledgement (ye) or “unmentioned mentionable” (Schegloff 1984 (73): 91). Without the co-participant’s possible response at this point,

\(^5\) Similar phenomenon is found in ne “yeah/right?” in Japanese (Tanaka 2000: 1165, 1170)
the participants implicitly agree that the on-going topic is closed. Hence, introduction of a new topic or moving into proceeding stage of interaction is relevant.

Data show that the participants often complete sentence/turns with interjection ye attached to the turn final position. The above argument is further proved that turn initial ye/ne occurs to indicate topical change. Ye in multiple production ne ne/ye ye do not occur at turn initial position (Hong & Lee 1998, cited in Lee 1998: 16). Thus, the last ye in multiple production orient to responding to the co-participants’ upcoming response.

Thus, the pragmatic functions of ye vary according to its sequential context. The participants use ye as an interactional device to build shared understanding. Therefore, they enter into social relationships and close it in collaborate manner.

References


[Korean]


**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADV’</td>
<td>Adverb</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIRM</td>
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<td>Connective</td>
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<td>Past tense</td>
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<td>Quotation particle</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUB</td>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOP</td>
<td>Topic marker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Transcription Glossary

(Developed by G. Jefferson, in Wooffit & Hutchby 1998)

(0.5) The number in brackets indicates a time gap in tenths of a second
(,) A dot enclosed in a bracket indicates a pause in the talk of less than two-tenths of a second.
= The ‘equals’ sign indicates ‘latching’ between utterances.
[ ] Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech indicate the onset and end of a spate of overlapping talk.
.hh A dot before an ‘h’ indicates speaker in-breath. The more h’s, the longer the in-breath.
hh An ‘h’ indicates an out-breath. The more h’s the longer the breath.
(( )) A description enclosed in a double bracket indicates a non-verbal activity.
- A dash indicates the sharp cut-off of the prior word or sound.
: Colons indicate that the speaker has stretched the preceding sound or letter. The more colons the greater the extent of the stretching.
( ) Empty parentheses indicates the presence of an unclear fragment on the tape.
(guess) The words within a single bracket indicate the transcriber’s best guess at an unclear utterance.
. A full stop indicates a stopping fall in tone. It does not necessarily indicate the end of a sentence.
, A comma indicates a ‘continuing’ intonation.
? A question mark indicates a rising inflection. It does not necessarily indicate a question.
↓↑ Pointed arrows indicate a marked falling or rising intonational shift.
a: Less marked falls in pitch can be indicated by using underlining immediately preceding a colon.
° ° Degree sings are used to indicate that the talk they encompass is spoken noticeably quieter than the surrounding talk.
> < ‘More than’ and ‘less than’ signs indicate that the talk they encompass was produced noticeably quicker than the surrounding talk.
→ Arrows in the left margin point to specific parts of an extract discussed in the text.
1. Introduction

This paper is concerned with problems that arise in the formulation of the syntactic conditions on lexical local control in Korean within the framework of Government and Binding theory (Chomsky 1981, 1982) (henceforth GB). The control structure—the coreferentiality of a phonetically null complement subject with some NP in a higher sentence—has been variously treated as conditions on a transformation generally known as EQUI-NP-Deletion in the literature on traditional Transformational-Generative Grammar (henceforth TG).

Although we will not discuss details of the EQUI-NP-Deletion analyses here, the motivation for the transition from EQUI-NP-Deletion to the Control Theory is worthy of notice: Standard TG postulates deep structures like (1a) and deletes the subject of a for-to (or poss-ing) clause if it is coreferential with the subject or object of the matrix clause. Thus sentences like (a) would be transformed into sentences like (b) by EQUI-NP-Deletion, and finally into sentences like (c) by for-Deletion, as exemplified below:

(1) a. John persuaded Bill for Bill to leave.
   b. John persuaded Bill for ____ to leave.
   c. John persuaded Bill to leave.
(2) a. John promised Bill for John to leave.
   b. John promised Bill for ____ to leave.
   c. John promised Bill to leave.

Starting with two coreferential NPs in the deep structure, traditional TG does not have to identify the coreferentiality of the phonetically null subject of a subordinate clause in the surface structure. On the other hand, the GB framework does not allow deletion of any phonetically non-null entity, and the D-structure and S-structure for sentences (1c) and (2c) are identical as in (3) and (4). Thus the theory of GB needs to identify the reference of phonetically null elements (here PROs).

(3) John persuaded Bill [PRO to leave]
(4) John promised Bill [PRO to leave]

Chomsky (1982) establishes the following four empty categories (henceforth ECs):

(5) a. NP-trace : [+anaphoric, -pronominal]
b. PRO : [+anaphoric, +pronominal]c. pro : [-anaphoric, +pronominal]d. variables : [-anaphoric, -pronominal]
Among these four ECs, PRO has two contradictory features from the point of Binding Theory (henceforth BT), i.e., [+anaphoric] and [+pronominal] cannot be handled by BT, because BT maintains that an anaphor must be bound in its governing category (BT-(a)), whereas a pronominal is free in its governing category (BT-(b)). Therefore PRO has been frequently treated as an EC which may not be accounted for by BT, but to be accounted for by another theory, namely Control Theory.1

Lexical local control phenomena in English are characterized by the lexical properties of main verbs: For example, PRO in (3) is controlled by the object of the main clause Bill, whereas PRO in (4) is controlled by the subject of the main clause John. Therefore Control Theory uses the notions of object-control verb for verbs like persuade and subject-control verb for ones like promise.2

At this point, let us consider the differences in distribution of EC and control structure between English and Korean. In English, the EC PRO appears only in the subject position of tenseless (e.g., to-infinitive or -ing) clauses, whereas lexical nominals may appear in the subject position of tensed clauses as exemplified below:

(6) a. John promised [PRO, to go]
   b. *John thinks [PRO is right]
   c. John thinks [he/Mary is right]
   d. *John promised [him/John, to go]

On the other hand, ECs in Korean are not confined to the subject position of tenseless clauses (cf. (9a/b) in Section 2), but rather appear in both subject and object positions in tensed and tenseless clauses. I.e., PROs may appear in the subject position of a tensed clause as in (7a), and also the empty variable (viz. e) can appear in the object position of both a tenseless clause and of a tensed clause as in (7b) and (7c) respectively:

   ku-ka
   Mr. Kim-i
   kutul-i
   C-SM (Y-DM) [PRO leave-PAST-MOOD-COMP] say-PAST-SE
   he-SM
   Mr. Kim-SM
   they-SM
   'C told Y that PRO might have left.'

   -SM -DM
   meet-COMP persuade-PAST-SE
   'C persuaded Y to meet e.'

   -SM -SM
   see-PAST-COMP say-PAST-SE
   'C said Y saw e.'

In this paper, we will not discuss the EC in the object position (viz. e) in detail (cf. (7b/c)), since it is not directly relevant to the present topic. For relevant discussions, readers should refer to Huang (1984). In Huang (1984), the object EC is treated like a trace of Wh-movement. In his discussion of Chinese object EC, Huang (1984) represents sentences like (7b) and (7c) with the structures like (7b') and (7c') which have an empty operator (OP). Their structures are identical to those of topicalized sentences (7b") and (7c") respectively:
Huang claims that an EC pronoun is impossible in the object position in all languages though an empty variable is possible in the object position. For the relationship between PRO and its antecedent, the obligatory control structure such as sentences (3) or (4) is characterized by a number of properties in Riemsdijk and Williams (1986: 137):

(8) a. There must be a controller,
b. the controller must be the subject or object of the immediately dominating clause, and
c. lexical NP cannot be substituted for PRO.

However, contrary to (8c), control phenomena in Korean are not limited to the EC (here PRO), but appear with all kinds of nominals such as regular pronouns, reflexive pronouns, and lexical nominals (cf. (9a) and (9b) in Section 2). We will discuss this issue in detail in the following section when we review Yang's recent analyses of the Korean control phenomena (Yang 1984, 1985); in Section 3, I propose subordinate clause TENSE as a condition to predict lexical local control in Korean; and Section 4 is a brief summary of the paper.

2. Joint-Effect Analysis
In his discussion of lexical local control in Korean, Yang (1984, 1985) concludes that control phenomena in Korean are ascribed to the so-called joint-effect (translation is mine) of a main verb and a complementizer/mood marker. Yang maintains that Control Theory should be modified and expanded so as to cover lexical or morphological causes of control such as the combinatory relationship between complementizer/mood marker and main verb in non-configurational languages like Korean. Now let us briefly review Yang's arguments with his own data:

(9)
   ku-ka
   Yi-ka
   *eakii-ka
   C-SM Y-DM [PRO leave-COMP] persuade-PAST-SE
   he-SM
   Y-SM
   self-SM
   'C persuaded Y to leave.'

   ku-ka
   cakii-ka
   *C-ka
   C-SM Y-DM [PRO leave-MOOD-COMP] promise-PAST-SE
   he-SM
   self-SM
As shown in (9a/b), in sentences which contain the main verb *seltukha-*ta 'persuade' or *yaksokha-*ta 'promise', the subjects of their complement clauses are locally controlled by the indirect object nominal or the subject nominal of the main clause respectively. In (9a), the subject of the complement clause can be not only the EC PRO but also the pronoun *ku* 'he' as well as the dative nominal Y itself.

The reason that *caki* 'self' cannot be the subject of subordinate clause of (9a) is due to the violation of the subject preference in reflexivization (in Yang's term, *caki* can be coreferential with the c-commanding subject only). These cases of pronouns or dative nominal subjects in the subordinate clause should be treated as the same control phenomenon as in the case of PRO, because they must be coreferential with the object or subject of the main clause (cf. (9a/b)). In other words, if they are not control phenomena, they should be able to have other interpretations.

The same thing happens in a so-called subject-control verb structure like (9b). That is if a sentence has the main verb *yaksokha-*ta 'promise,' the subordinate subject is controlled by the subject of the main clause. In this case also the subject of the subordinate clause can be not only PRO but also pronoun *ku* 'he' or reflexive pronoun *caki* 'self.' Here the reason that the nominative nominal C cannot be a subject of the subordinate clause is accounted for by BT-(c), R-expression must be free everywhere. Notice that if C occurs in the subject position of the subordinate clause, it will be c-commanded by the main clause subject C. For the same reason—the fact that all possible subjects in the subordinate clause must be coreferential with the subject of the main clause exclusively—we should treat these other phonetically non-null nominal structures as control phenomena too (cf. Yang 1984).

Thus, while we have confirmed that local control in Korean can be characterized by the lexical properties of main verbs as it is the case in English, since the Korean control phenomenon is not confined to the EC PRO, but appears with all kinds of nominals, it should be treated from a different perspective. But when we consider the following examples, we can see that the Korean control phenomena go beyond the lexical properties of main verb:

(10)

a. C-ka (Y-eykey) [PRO ttena-l-kes]-ul seltukha-yess-ta.
   -SM    -DMleave-MOOD-COMP-OM persuade-PAST-SE
   'C persuaded (Y) (of the fact) that PRO will leave.'

   -SM    -DM    leave-MOOD-COMP promise-PAST-SE
   'C promised (Y) that PRO might leave.'

Even though the main clauses of (10a/b) contain the same subject-control verb and the object-control verb of (9a/b) respectively, the PROs in (10) are not controlled at all—the PROs can refer to anybody according to their discourse reference. The syntactic difference between (9) and (10) seems to be attributable to the different classes of complementizer (henceforth COMP). Notice that (9a) contains the COMP -tolok (adverbial phrase COMP), whereas (10a) contains -lkes (noun phrase COMP) in their subordinate clauses. The noun phrase COMP -lkes requires the object case marker -ul, whereas the adverbial phrase COMP does not. The same phenomenon is observable when we compare (9b) and (10b). Notice that (9b) contains the volition/intention mood marker -keyss (henceforth VOLMOOD), whereas (10b)
contains the conjecture mood -li (CONJMOOD). Thus, we observe that the
difference between COMPs or MOODs may block the control power of the main
verb.

Here, one question that arises is whether the control phenomenon in (9) are
due to the main verbs or the COMPs/ MOODs in the subordinate clauses, because we
have seen that there are non-control structures such as (10) despite the existence of the
control verbs. At this point of argumentation, Yang temporarily conjectures that the
whole responsibility of control can be ascribed to the differences between different
classes of COMPs or MOODs, not to the main verbs.

In addition to (9) and (10), however, Yang (1984) maintains that the control
structure in Korean seems not quite so simple if we look at cases in which COMP or
MOOD cannot create the local control by itself (cf. (11)) and cases in which they can (cf. (12)):

(11)
   -SM   leave-COMP do-PAST-SE
   'C made PRO to leave.'

   -SM   -DM             leave-MOOD-COMP say-PAST-SE
   'C said to Y that PRO might leave.'

(12)
   -SM   leave-COMP do-PAST-SE
   'C wanted to leave.'

   -SM   -DM               leave-MOOD do-PAST-SE
   'C ordered Y to go.'

Yang uses (11) as supporting evidence for not ascribing the whole responsibility of
lexical local control to COMP/MOOD, and he ends up with a vague notion of a joint-
effect of main verb and COMP/MOOD. But his joint-effect conclusion does not
provide any prediction of the control phenomena in Korean, unless all possible
combinatory effects of main verbs and COMP/MOOD are provided. One thing I
should point out is that Yang's conclusion of the joint-effect is derived from an
incorrect analysis of the examples in (11). If we look at the following examples in
(13), we can see why (11) cannot be a piece of evidence from which the conclusion of
joint-effect can be induced:

(13)
   -SM    leave-COMP persuade-PAST-SE
   'C persuaded PRO to leave.'

   -SM   -DM             leave-MOOD say-PAST-SE
   'C said to Y that PRO might leave.'

   -SM   -DM               leave-PAST-MOOD say-PAST-SE
   'C said to Y that PRO might have left.'
As in (13a), even the best combination for the object control structure (namely, the adverbial phrase COMP -tolok and the object control verb seltukha-ta) fails to control PRO in its subordinate clause. Notice that neither (11a) nor (13a) contains any overt object nominals (dative or accusative), from which PRO may receive its reference. Those null objects can be represented as another EC. Let us call it "pro" (the small pro). While the reference of the small pro is not in the scope of Control Theory (but in the scope of a discourse level theory), the reference of the big pro (PRO) must be described within the theory—i.e., whatever the reference of the pro, the same is the reference of the PRO.

This issue originates from the fact that in Korean, which is one of the pro-drop languages, any understood topic nominals can be dropped. For example, unlike English even an object of the transitive verb seltukha-ta 'persuade' can be dropped in Korean:

(14) a. *John persuaded [PRO to leave]
      -SM leave-IMPMOOD-COMP persuade-PAST
      'John persuaded PRO to leave.'

This clearly indicates that the failure to predict the reference of PRO in (11a) is due to the absence of overt object nominals on the surface structure, and by no means it leads us to the joint-effect of main verbs and COMP/MOOD markers. I will discuss this issue with more data in Section 3. One more crucial point to make is that here Yang does not differentiate the conjecture mood -keyss as in (11b) from the volition/intention mood marker -keyss as in (9b).5 Thus, the syntactic difference in control between these two sentences is attributed to the substitution of main verb malha-ta 'say' for yaksokha-ta 'promise.' From this line of reasoning, in Yang (1984) the difference in control phenomena between (9b) and (11b) is ascribed to the joint-effect of main verb and mood marker.

Also notice that in (13b/c) the subject control verb yaksokha-ta 'promise' fails to control PRO. I assume that the -keyss in (11b) is different from the one in (9b): -keyss in (11b) and (13b/c) is a conjecture mood marker (CONJMOOD), while -keyss in (9b) is a volition/intention mood marker (VOLMOOD). A piece of evidence comes from the grammaticality of their past tense counterparts—i.e., (9b) cannot have a past counterpart, whereas (11b) or (13b) can. Notice that the ungrammaticality of (15a) is due to the past tense in the subordinate clause:

(15) a.*C-i ka Y-eykey [PRO, ttena-ass-keyss-tako] malha-yess-ta
   -SM -DM leave-PAST-VOLMOOD say-PAST-SE
      -SM -DM leave-PAST-CONJMOOD say-PAST-SE
      'C said to Y that PRO might have left.'

3. Tense as a Variable

From this observation, I hypothesize that TENSE in the subordinate clause is a variable of lexical local control in Korean: The PRO in a tenseless subordinate clause

281
is locally controlled, whereas the PRO in a tensed subordinate clause is free. I will
test whether the tense variable works with the previous data. In order to test the
hypothesis, let us examine whether the previous data (9) through (12) can take the
past tense marker -ass (or the past modality -un) in their subordinate clauses. The
following are examples of past counterparts of the given data (9)-(12). Each past
counterpart is prefixed by P. Notice that when a verb stem ends with a vowel, the
past tense suffix and modality are surfaced as -ss and -n respectively by phonological
reason:

(P9) Tenseless clause [-TENSE]
     -SM   -DM    leave-PAST-COMP persuade-PAST-SE
     -SM   -DM    leave-PAST-VOLMOOD promise-PAST-SE

(P10) Tensed clause [+TENSE]
  a. C-ka Y-eykey [PRO ttena-n-kes]-ul seltukha-yess-ta
     -SM   -DM    leave-PASTMOD persuade-PAST-SE
     -SM   -DM    leave-PAST-CONJMOOD promise-PAST-SE

(P11) Tenseless clause [-TENSE]
     -SM   -DM    leave-PAST-COMP do-PAST-SE
     -SM   -DM    leave-PAST-CONJMOOD do-PAST-SE

(P12) Tenseless clause [-TENSE]
     -SM          leave-PAST-VOLMOOD do-PAST-SE
     -SM   -DM    leave-PAST-IMPMOOD do-PAST-SE

Notice that, as we have examined so far, the sentences which do not permit a tensed
clause as a subordinate clause are obligatory local control structures: As in (P9),
subordinate clauses with the adverbial phrase COMP -tolok or the volition MOOD -keyss
cannot have past counterparts, and PROs in (9) are indeed locally controlled.
As in (P10), on the other hand, subordinate clauses which contain the NP COMP -l
and the conjecture MOOD -li can have past counterparts with -n-kes and -ass-u-li,
and, as expected, PROs in (10) are not locally controlled at all, but they have free
references according to understood discourse topic.

Also, the tense analysis predicts that the PROs in (11b) and (P11b) will be
free, whereas the PRO in (9b) must be obligatorily controlled within its main clause.
Identically, the tenselessness of the subordinate clauses in (12a) and (12b) predicts
that PROs in these sentences must be sentence-bound. In fact that is what they are.
Thus, I postulate that the TENSE in subordinate clauses is the variable for obligatory
lexical local control in Korean:

(16)
If a subordinate clause INFL is [-TENSE], the PRO in that clause must be coreferential with an NP in its immediately higher clause (viz. locally controlled); but, if the INFL is [+TENSE], the PRO is not locally controlled but free and discourse-bound.

The following is the sample tree structure of (9a):

```
S(=INFL")
  NP
    INFL'
      VP
        INFL
          NP
            S'                                    V    [+TENSE]
              [+PAST]
          S(=INFL")                                 COMP
            NP
              INFL
                VP
                  INFL
                      C       Yi  PROi  ttena [-TENSE] tolok seltukha-yess
                                      [+OBJCON]
```

Of course, in order to decide whether a PRO is coreferential with the matrix subject or the object, we need further classification of COMPs and MOODs in Korean—e.g., the volition MOOD -keyss and -lye are subject-control verbs with the feature [+SUBCON]; and the adverbial phrase COMP -tolok and the imperative MOOD -la are object-control ones with [+OBJCON], etc.

One interesting point to be studied further is that obligatory lexical control in Korean seems to be more attributable to the property of COMP/MOOD than that of main verbs. The following are examples of different combination of COMP/MOOD and main verbs from those in (9). Compare (17a/b) with (9a/b):

(17)

   -SM  -DM  leave-VOLMOOD persuade-PAST-SE
   'C persuaded Y PROi will leave.'

   -SM  -DM  leave-VOLMOOD do-PAST-SE
   'C said to Y PROi will leave.'

   -SM  -DM  leave-COMP promise-PAST-SE

   -SM  -DM  leave-COMP do-PAST-SE
   'C made Y leave.'

'C ordered Y to leave.'

Notice that although (17a) has the object control verb *seltukha-ta* 'persuade,' the volition MOOD *-keyss* ([+SUBCON]) not only blocks/interferes with control power from the main verb, but indeed controls the reference of PRO. Unfortunately since (17c) is an unacceptable sentence for most native speakers of Korean, we do not have strong supporting evidence for the proposition. However, as shown (17b/d/e), the fact that the so-called formal pro-verb *ha-ta*, which does not carry inherent meaning, can be substituted for main verbs indirectly implies that Korean obligatory control can be determined at the subordinate clause level.

4. Conclusion

The notion of joint-effect of main verb and COMP/MOOD (Yang 1984, 1985) does not provide any prediction for lexical local control phenomena in Korean, unless all possible combinatory effects are provided. The Korean lexical local control is predictable by the TENSE in subordinate clauses: If INFL is [-TENSE], the PRO in that clause is obligatorily controlled by a nominal in its immediately higher clause; but if INFL is [+TENSE], the PRO is not controlled but discourse-bound. To predict whether an obligatorily controlled PRO is coreferential with the subject or the object of immediately higher clause, further classification of COMPs and MOODs is needed. Unlike English, the lexical local control in Korean can be largely determined within a subordinate clause by the lexical feature specification of its COMP or MOOD.

*This is a revised version of my paper written while I was at the University of Hawaii. I am grateful to Professors Gregory Lee, Roderick Jacobs, William O'Grady, Ho-min Sohn, Chin-Wu Kim and Dong-Jae Lee for their invaluable and critical comments on preliminary versions of this paper. Special thanks go to my colleague Young-Seok Choi whose keen insight gave my an impetus to pursue this work. But, of course, any errors are exclusively mine. In this paper, the Yale Romanization is used for the transcription of Korean data as well as the following abbreviations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tr>
<td>Y:</td>
<td>Youngsoo</td>
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<tr>
<td>C:</td>
<td>Chulsoo</td>
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<td>SM:</td>
<td>subject marker</td>
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<td>past modality</td>
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<td>GRD:</td>
<td>gerund ending</td>
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</table>

1 However, Bouchard (1982), Sportiche (1982) and Manzini (1983) et al. propose that PRO is to be accounted for within Binding theory on the basis of the fact that it can be locally bound as in other cases of [+anaphoric] which fit into Binding Theory such as NP-trace or reflexive pronoun. Here they treat those locally bound PROs as [+anaphoric] and [-pronominal] in order to accommodate PRO in a theory called Extended Binding Theory (Manzini 1983).
According to the generative semanticist Gurosu (1971), this kind of idiosyncratic verb marking can be eliminated by decomposition of verb—e.g., X persuades Y to S is analyzed as X causes Y to come to intend S, and X promises Y to S as X causes Y to know that X intends to S, etc.

Yang (1985) claims that these pronouns and reflexive pronouns have limited interpretations with respect to the immediately higher clause NP, since they have to satisfy conditions of both Binding Theory and Control Theory.

The best combination of main verb and COMP/MOOD for PROs to be controlled is not identified in Yang (1984, 1985), but by the implication of his data, the adverbial phrase COMP -tolok with the main verb seltukha-ta 'persuade,' and the volition MOOD -keyss with yaksokha-ta 'promise' may be reasonably assumed as the best combinations for the object-control and subject-control structures respectively.

Yang (1984) maintains that even if we treat -keyss in (9b) and (11b) as two different mood markers, we still need to have different lexical specifications in the lexicon of two -keyss's. However, in my tense analysis this distinct lexical specification, namely [+/-control], is not needed, because the control phenomenon is predictable by the TENSE in subordinate clauses.
References

Apjonpeop and an emerging new politeness strategy in contemporary Korean

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1. Introduction

A reference term is a linguistic expression that the Speaker (S hereafter) employs in his/her utterance to ‘name’ the target, or the Referent (R hereafter), for the benefit of the Hearer (H hereafter). By definition, R can be any person. It can be the first person, i.e., S him/herself, the second person, i.e., H, or a third person.

As in many other languages, reference terms in Korean are more than just pronouns and personal names. They include kinship terms, title terms, and various other expressions such as combinations of a demonstrative and a pronominal epithet, e.g., ibun/keubun/jeobun (this/the/that person, honorific), yae/kyae/jyae (this/the/that person (Lit. child), neutral and can be dishonorific), inom/keunom/jeonom (this/the/that person, dishonorific), etc. More ‘open’ combinations are also in use, such as those consisting of a surname or a full name and a title term, e.g., Bakchanho sajang ((company) President Bak Chan Ho, neutral), Bak sajangnim ((company) President Bak, honorific), etc., and those of a possessive pronoun and a kinship or a title term, neohui eomma (your mum/mummy, neutral or endearment), uli seonsaengnim (our teacher, honorific), etc. The inventory is evidently huge, with the availability of variant forms such as indicated in the examples above as honorific, neutral, dishonorific, etc.

A reference term encodes, however minimally, some properties of R by virtue of its semantics (Malsh (1987)), and hence we can say that the choice of a reference term for a particular R reflects how S sees R in the given speech situation. However, in making the choice of a reference term for a particular R, S is not entirely free. S’s social relationship with H plays an important part. This is clear when we want to have a functional answer as to why in Korean there is more than one pronoun form for the first person singular: na (I, neutral), and jeo (I, humble). Since the first person pronoun is for S to refer to him/herself for the benefit of H, when the particular H is a senior person, the Korean S would choose jeo. Choosing na can be inappropriate, because (1) the choice is indicative of S’s understanding of the social relationship between him/herself and H and (2) the senior H may not be happy about the represented relationship.

Referring to H, that is, ‘naming’ you to tell H that S is talking about H, can be a difficult task in Korean, as is widely known. There are three pronoun forms for the second person singular: dangsin (you, not lowered but not exalted either), jane (you, lowered but somewhat elevated), and neo (you, lowered). Yet none of them can be employed to refer to H who is senior to S — in this case kinship or title terms are used instead. Again, the difficulties involved in referring to H can be easily accounted for if we assume the importance of the S – H relationship in the choice of a
What is less clear and appears not to have been pursued seriously in Korean linguistic circles is the relevancy, and its implications, of the S – H relationship to S’s choice of a third person reference term. The availability of a large set of reference terms and their variant forms, which seems rather redundant from a purely grammatical point of view, suggests that reference is not just a grammatical means through which S and H achieve, for instance, discourse cohesion (cf. Halliday and Hassan (1976)). The central claim of this paper is that third person reference terms can also indicate or define the distant and formal, or the close and informal, relationship between S and H, and hence if the choice is inappropriate in the given speech situation, some serious consequences follow for the social relationship between S and H.

In this paper we limit ourselves to pragmatics of third person reference terms in Korean. Our concern is how S refers to an in-group third-person R for the benefit of an out-group H, where the in-group R is senior to S but not to H. As has been reported in Chosun Daily & National Academy of the Korean Language (hereafter CD & NAKL) (1996), many contemporary Koreans find it difficult to find an appropriate third person reference term in this speech situation. More importantly, this is where we find the traditional politeness rule in this culture, known as Apjonbeop, or ‘rules for suppressing respect’, is being replaced by a new politeness strategy. We characterise the strategy as ‘new’ in the sense that it is a different way of language use that has emerged over the past one or two decades reflecting the changing nature of interpersonal relations in this rapidly changing society. Our aim in this paper however is to bring out the linguistic characteristics of the new way of language use, rather than the changing nature of the society behind it.

2. The data

Politeness pertains to the meaning that arises from interaction between speakers. Observing objectively people’s language use in establishing, maintaining and changing personal relations with others, in particular, how they manipulate categories like honorifics in their private world, is a difficult task. As an alternative, we looked at two sources: CD & NAKL (1996) and a videotape of a contemporary TV drama.

CD & NAKL (1996) are the revised Second Edition of the book originally published as Ulimal-ui yejeol (Etiquette in our language) in 1992 with the subtitle Hwabeop-ui silje-wa pyojun (Polite speech: realities and the standard). From October 1990 to December 1991, the Korean Ministry of Culture, the Chosun Daily Newspaper, and the National Academy of the Korean Language jointly did a national project, entitled Hwabeop pyojunhwa sa-eop (Project for the standardisation of polite speech). The objective of the project was to produce guidelines for polite language use; in particular the terms of address and reference. The book Ulimal-ui yejeol reports on the findings of the project and includes, questions, opinions and justifications from readers and the general public regarding their own language use, survey results, a few short writings of various writers to highlight the ‘chaotic’ situation of language use (or misuse), as well as the proposed inventories of correct terms of address/reference. All in all, the book contains invaluable real-life information about ordinary Koreans’ language use.

The TV drama we studied is entitled Maheun sal-e ed-eun haengbok (A happy life gained at the age of forty), and was broadcast in Korea in February 1994. Set in our own times, the drama describes what happens to a forty-year-old unmarried...
man, nochonggak (old bachelor) in the Korean expression, in his daily life during one winter. The language in the drama strikes native speakers (six others as well as myself) as naturalistic, normal and appropriate to the situations in which it is used, and to the characters who speak it. The development of the story, particularly the progress of incidents within the story, and the characters’ views on the world all seem ‘ordinary’. While its running time is approximately an hour, the drama contains plenty of scenes where we can observe in context linguistic interactions among the characters. With the manageably small number of characters, there is a reasonable number of ‘minimal pairs’ in terms of who speaks to whom, about whom, in the presence of whom and in what situation, it has been possible to conduct a controlled experiment in linguistic analysis (cf. Brown and Gilman (1989)).

3. Apjonpeop, the normative tradition

The apjonbeop appears to have been a verbal repertoire amongst Yangban speakers in traditional Korea, and is essentially a means to recognise H’s seniority over S by suppressing respect to Rs who are ‘closer’ to S than to H. The normative tradition has survived even after the collapse of the Yangban – Sangmin division followed by Japanese rule and the Korean War, but rather than remaining as Yangban speech it has become a means available to anyone who wants to show that they are, perhaps, well-bred.

The apjonpeop in its more traditional use involves the knowledge of a long, elaborate list of reference terms for one’s family and clan members, e.g., great-grandparents, grandparents, parents, husband, wife, brothers and sisters, sons and daughters, various ‘uncles’ and ‘aunts’, and various ‘cousins’ and their sons and daughters. Korean etiquette books published even recently, e.g. Kwon (1999), tend to contain the list. These reference terms are male speaker oriented Sino-Korean expressions, and there is a sharp division for those to be used in referring to one’s own and those to be used for other’s family and clan members. For instance, when talking about one’s father one is to use, e.g., gachin, but when talking about another’s father one uses, e.g., chunbujang. Likewise, for one’s own mother one is to use, e.g., jachin, but for another’s mother use, e.g., jadang.

However, the generation fluent in the long list of reference terms is growing old, or more precisely, is dying out. As reported in CD & NAKL (1996:37-39), these Sino-Korean reference terms are mainly a source of confusion to the younger generation, although there remains in their consciousness a ‘modified’ version of apjonpeop: use of a non-exalted variant form when referring to an in-group senior R for the benefit of an out-group senior H.

Consider the following case, reported in CD & NAKL (1996:29).

(1) … A company director in his sixties felt embarrassed when one of his young male employees referred to his father who is alive as seonchin (Sino-Korean expression for one’s deceased father) when requesting special leave. He would like to perform his duty as son and celebrate his father’s 70th birthday in his hometown. …

The young employee may have tried to create for his boss an impression of being well-bred — so as to promote his family’s face (in terms of Brown and Levinson (1987)) — by employing the normative tradition, but has unfortunately gaffed by using seonchin, a term for a dead father. It is natural that the boss gets embarrassed when the young employee (he describes the employee as a promising, fine young man) comes to him and says that he would like to take leave to go to his deceased father’s 70th birthday party. As mentioned above, gachin would have
been appropriate in this normative tradition, which connotes that the young man is not elevating his own father in front of his boss.

Reference terms for one’s father that are currently used include abeoji (father/dad, neutral), abeonim (father, exalted), appa (daddy, endearment), and aebi (male parent(?), deprecatory). Quite possibly the young employee may have juggled with abeonim and abeoci on his way to his boss, could not decide which one to use, and so chose the ‘obscure’ reference term. In complying with the apjonbeop with the set of more current reference terms, the problem is that none of the terms can be a good replacement for the archaic Sino-Korean terms, which connotes in an ‘elegant’ way that S is not elevating the in-group R at the expense of the senior H. Aebi for one’s own father is patently rude, appa is too childish a term, abeoji by definition has no flavour (it is a neutral term), and abeonim sounds contradictory. We contend that this is the very nature of the problem, when many contemporary Koreans report that they have difficulties with apjonbeop.

Before closing this section, let us add that apjonpeop is still operative in talking to a senior H about an R whose seniority to S is unclear. Examples of this are a wife referring to her husband as aebi (male parent(?) of her children, deprecatory) for the benefit of her parent-in-law; and a husband naming his wife as emi (female parent(?) of his children, deprecatory) when talking to his parent.

4. Aspects of the new politeness strategy

Within the context of the difficulties involved in, and the changing nature of, the apjonbeop, we find a few examples of interesting language use in the TV drama, i.e., a new way of referring to a senior R for the benefit of H who is senior to R. This is what we call the new politeness strategy: where the S – H relationship is distant and formal, S employs an exalted reference term (if there is one), not a non-exalted one, for the senior R even if the R is junior to H. That the relevant examples come from a TV drama does not mean that the new strategy is an unnatural, idiosyncratic language use, however. It simply means that the talented scriptwriter has captured this emerging, new way of naming one’s senior in the real world and ‘recreated’ it in the drama. From my personal experience, this new politeness strategy is already practiced by a noticeable number of speakers.

Consider (2). In the drama, the main character has a twenty-eight-year-old younger brother, who lives away from home. This twenty-eight-year-old has a relationship with his boss’s daughter, who is now pregnant, and wants to marry her. This younger son would normally have to wait until his elder brother gets married, as Korean culture dictates. However, he is desperate, and in the following scene is seeking his parents’, particularly his father’s, approval for marrying before his elder brother. The father in the drama is a stern, authoritarian figure. The younger son is now speaking to him, but in a very careful manner.

(2) ceo ... ajik ogaewol-i-la ajik pyo-neun an na-jiman
INTJ yet five.months-COP-because yet mark-TOP NEG stand.out-but jogum hu-myeon bul-leo o-l-ges
a.little.bit after-if be.swollen-CONJ come-REL(FUT)-thing(PRO)
gat-asso-yo. jeo-du hyeong-nim-i jeil
seem-because-AHON I-also elder.brother-HON-NOM the.first
goelli-neunde-yo, yakhon-man ha-e-du-ko hyeong-nim
worrying.TRANSIT-AHON engagement-only do-CONJ-place-and elder.brother-HON
menje ga-n daum-e po-lyeo-gu-haess-neunde ...
first go-REL(PAST) next-LOC1 see-VOLITN-CONJ-do.PAST-TRANSIT
“Well, … it’s only five months, so people can’t see it (that she’s pregnant) yet, but soon they will notice her pregnancy, I suppose. … I’m also worried about my brother (Lit. elder brother, exalted) most. I thought I would just have an engagement and wait until he (Lit. elder brother, exalted) gets married. … But, … well, somehow, … things haven't developed that way.”

Notice that the younger son refers to his elder brother as hyeongnim (male speaker's elder brother, exalted), not as hyeong (male speaker's elder brother, neutral). (In the drama, the younger son addresses his elder brother generally as hyeong.) This is a clear contradiction to the spirit of the abjonbeop.

The sort of social pressure cast upon this particular S is perhaps that as an adult he should talk like an adult, i.e., give proper deference to his seniors, and more importantly, he has to show this to the even more senior H. In other words, H is then more like a ‘judge’ who has the authority to determine the ‘correctness’ of S's attitude towards R; the more distant and formal the relationship is between S and H, the more care S would exercise in the choice of a reference term to refer to the senior R. The result is, as it stands, that S employs a more deferential reference term for the senior R. Under this new strategy, had the younger brother said (2) to his mother, for example, we would expect him to refer to his elder brother as hyeong (elder brother, neutral) — the brothers in the drama are much less distant and formal to their mother. Unfortunately, however, we do not have data to substantiate this in this particular drama.

As mentioned above, many contemporary Koreans report that they find it difficult and confusing to follow the abjeonbeop. If one assumes this new politeness strategy, then complying with the normative tradition would create a dilemma. This is because on the one hand S has to ‘show’ to H that he/she can give deference to the senior R in an expected manner by employing a proper, exalted reference term, but on the other hand they are prohibited from doing so. From this we can infer that this new politeness strategy is operating already in contemporary Korea, and that our characterisation of the strategy is more or less correct.

Where does this new strategy come from? It appears that an analogy can be drawn between S’s choice of a more elaborated reference term for R when the S – H relationship is distant and formal and S’s choice of a more careful language when there is a Bystander in the speech situation. Consider (3), another interesting scene from the TV drama. The forty-year old main character telephones his mother from an express bus — he is travelling to Busan — which has temporarily stopped at a kiosk on the way. He picks up the phone, presses the buttons, and after a few seconds, says:

(3) yeoseyyo ... eomma!  
Hello mummy/mum

“Hello (a pause in which he presumably hears his mother’s voice) Mum!”

He then lowers his voice and continues to say:

(4) eo, eo, eomeni-seyo?  jeo-eyo ...  
mother-RHON.COP.’MOOD-AHON  I(HUMBLE)-COP.C’MOOD-AHON

“… I mean, is that you, Mother? It’s me.”

What the main character is doing here is that he initially calls his mother eomma (mum/mummy, endearment) as he does at home, but then, realising that there are other people within earshot on the bus, he switches to eomeni (mother, neutral). He does this in order to avoid appearing ludicrous to the passengers inside the bus. It is childlike behaviour, and can thus lead to a loss of face, that a middle-aged man
like him addresses his mother as eomma in public in Korea. While the expression eomma in (3) is used as an address term, not as a reference term, it does demonstrate our point well: the role of H in the new politeness strategy is analogous to the role of the Bystander in (3) and (4).

Also, in CD & NAKL (1996:225) we have a relevant report from a high school girl. The girl says that she was surprised when she saw her thirty-two-year-old teacher calling her mother (i.e., the teacher’s mother) eomma (mum/mummy, endearment). She was surprised because she expected an adult like her teacher to ‘behave’ differently from her.

While the teacher may not be as sensitive a person as the main character in the drama, we may say that she did not see the school girl as the same sort of Bystander that the man in the drama saw the people on the bus. In terms of the new politeness strategy, (4) would be an analogous situation to where S refers to a senior R for the benefit of the even more senior H whose relationship with S is not distant and formal, that is, where S does not have to exercise extreme care in the choice of the reference term.

The employment of this new politeness strategy is not confined to the family domain. Speakers show the same tendency of naming their senior by a more deferential reference term when speaking to an out-group H. However, although the choice of a more deferential reference term is to indicate to H that S is being polite to his/her senior in an expected manner, it has a side effect. S may also be seen to be attempting to put his senior ‘higher’ than the out-group H.

Speakers resolve this problem by qualifying the deferential reference term with the First person possessive pronoun, particularly with its humble form. There are four variant forms of the First person possessive pronoun in Korean: nae (my, neutral), je (my, humble), uli (our, neutral) and jeohui (our, humble). Among them, it is jeohui and je that are used for this purpose. We thus see that a ‘complex reference term’, consisting of the humble form of the First person possessive pronoun and the exalted variant form of a kinship term, is used when speaking to an out-group H. We may perhaps regard it as an instance of pragmatic embedding where ‘exaltation’ of an in-group senior is embedded in ‘self-abasement’.

In the drama, the main character refers to his father as jeohui buchin (our[humble] father, exalted and formal) when speaking to a woman who was just introduced to him by his sister. Note that buchin is a Sino-Korean expression that has formal and exalted connotations. The purpose for this introduction is to get them to know each other and perhaps develop a further relationship. Hence, it is an awkward moment for the two, where they have to take extreme care in their language. Replying to her comment that the rent would be high (the main character’s family owns a shop, but she assumes that the family is renting the shop), he says to her that his family owns the shop and continues:

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(5) han sipo-nyeon-jeon-i-la geu-ttae-neun about fifteen-year-before-COP-because that-time-TOP ssa-ss-eoss-jyo. jeohui be.cheap-PAST-PAST-JUDGE-C’MOOD.AHON our(HUMBLE) buchin-kkeso sa-si-n-geo-la father(exalted/formal)-NOM(HON) buy-RHON-REL(PAST)-thing(PRO)-COP.because jeonghwakha-n aeksu-neun gieok mos ha-pnida-man, ... be.accurate-REL(PAST) figure-TOP memory NEGCAN do-HDEFDECL-but "It was about fifteen years ago (when we bought the shop), so it (the shop) wasn’t that
expensive. I can't remember exactly how much it was because my father (Lit. our father, exalted) bought it."

While lowering the status of his father by one level, as it were, by choosing the humble form of the possessive pronoun, this forty-year-old man makes an effort to appear that, as a middle-aged man, he knows how to be deferential to his father by employing the highly deferential variant form.

Later in the drama the family’s second son arranges for his elder brother and his friend’s elder sister to come together to Busan, where he and his fiance’s family live. When they arrive he quickly asks the two to pretend to be a married couple in front of his future father-in-law, and then introduces the two to his future father-in-law:

(6) jeohui hyeong-nim naeoe-bun-i-si-pnida

our(HUMBLE) elder.brother-HON spouse-CL(PERSON.HON)-COP-RHON-HDEF.DECL

“These are my (Lit. our) elder brother and his wife.”

Here, naeoe means a ‘married couple’ (literally ‘inside and outside’) and bun is an exalted Classifier for human. Inside the Possessor construction, jeohui hyeongnim (our[humble] elder brother[exalted]), another Possessor and a Possessed are embedded, which are jeohui (our[humble]) and hyeongnim (elder brother[exalted]), respectively. Again, while lowering the status of his elder brother and his ‘wife’ by one level by choosing the humble form of the possessive pronoun, the family’s second son makes an effort to appear that, as an adult, he knows how to be deferential to his elder brother and his wife.

The choice between the singular and the plural forms of the First person possessive pronoun also assumes more than just the semantic category of number, i.e., whether or not the Possessor is singular. A careful study uncovers that underlying the choice is a culture-specific assumption about junior–senior relationships in general. When the First person possessive pronoun is used in referring to a senior, it is the plural form, uli or jeohui, that is most likely to be used. This is so even when S is the only one who is in the particular kin relation with the senior R. For instance, the second son introduces his elder brother and his ‘wife’ as jeohui hyeongnim naeoebun (our elder brother’s couple) to his future father-in-law in (6) above. He uses jeohui (our[humble]) even though he has no other brothers who would identify the main character as hyeongnim.

By contrast, when the First person possessive pronoun is used in referring to a junior, it is the singular form, nae or je, that is most likely to be used. In the drama, when the main character thanks his younger brother’s future father-in-law for having been generous to his younger brother, he uses je dongsaeng (my[humble] younger brother), not jeohui dongsaeng (our[humble] younger brother), as in (7).

(7) je dongsaeng-eul jal dolbw-a ju-sy-eoseo

my(HUMBLE) younger.brother-ACC well look.after-CONJ give-RHON-because

gamsaha-pnida ...

be.grateful-HDEF.DECL

“Thank you very much for having been generous to (Lit.) my younger brother.”

Upon hearing the main character’s saying (7), the second son’s future father-in-law, in fact, replies that he does not want to be seen to be ‘snatching’ a son away from home. The main character then says:

(9) geuleom-yo. gwiha-n tta-nim-eul

be.so-C’MOOD.AHON invaluable-REL(PAST) daughter-HON-ACC

ju-si-eoseo jeohui

give-RHON-because our(HUMBLE) parent-HON-PL-NOM(HON)-also

gamsaha-gey saenggakha-go gyesi-pnida

be.grateful-CONJ think-CONJ EXISTV(RHON)-HDEF.DECL
“Of course not! My (Lit. our) parents are also grateful (to you) for allowing (them to have) your invaluable daughter (as their daughter-in-law).”

Our main character’s choice of jeohui here is not necessarily an indication that he now includes his brother into the discourse. Rather, it is part of the deference directed towards the referents who are senior to him, i.e., his parents.

Behind the use of the plural form of the First person possessive pronoun in referring to a senior R is a belief that the senior–junior relationship is a one-to-many relationship, not a one-to-one relationship. That is, when a junior S refers to his/her senior with a kinship term under this politeness strategy, he/she ‘says’ that he/she is not the only one ‘under’ the senior R in the same kin relationship. Hence, the junior S says our elder brother rather than my elder brother for instance. However, nothing hinders a senior S assuming that, when referring to his/her junior with a kinship term, he/she is the only one who is ‘above’ the junior R, hence my younger brother rather than our younger brother, as we witnessed above.

It should be added that the cultural belief that the senior–junior relationship is a one-to-many relationship does not always override the semantic category of number. On intuitive grounds, when a senior S expresses that he/she ‘shares’ the junior R with others, or when a junior S wants to emphasise that he/she is the only ‘Possessor’ of the senior R, S will certainly use our younger brother, i.e., uli dongsaeng or jeohui dongsaeng, and my elder brother, i.e., nae hyeong or je hyeongnim, respectively.

Abbreviations

- ACC Accusative case
- CMOOD Common mood
- CONJ Conjunctive verb suffix
- DECL Declarative ending
- FUT Future tense
- HON Honorific
- JUDGE Judgemental modality
- NEG Negative Adverb (not)
- NOM Nominative case
- PL Plural
- REL Relative clause
- TOP Topic marker
- VOLITN Volitional modality
- X-Y (X and Y are not fused)
- AHON Addressee honorific suffix
- CL Classifier
- COP Copula
- EXISTV Existential verb
- HDEF Highly deferential speech style
- INTJ Interjection
- LOC1 Inner-locative case
- NEGCAN Negative Adverb (cannot/could not)
- PAST Past tense
- PRO Pronomininal
- RHON Referent honorific suffix
- TRANSIT Transitional modality
- X.Y (X and Y are fused)

References


Strategies for reading printed texts and electronic texts: Same or different?

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1. Introduction

The development of reading skills and strategies has been a major concern for teachers as well as readers. For the teaching of reading, a number of reading researchers (e.g., Barnett 1989; Block 1986; Brown 1994; Grellet 1981; Hosenfeld 1977; Nuttall 1982) have suggested various comprehension skills and strategies and encouraged teachers to adopt techniques found in second language (L2) and foreign language (FL) reading studies. Although more innovative computer-assisted language learning (CALL) software for teaching reading skills needs to be developed, recent CALL research in reading has tried to examine various factors of computer-assisted reading instruction, including reading skills and strategies on the computer, and to suggest ways in which CALL can improve students’ reading abilities. These research activities would provide understanding of how software can be developed and used best in a CALL environment, while looking at what students do when working with computer-assisted reading programs. This study addresses this issue and reports the results of a study that investigated students’ reading strategies in three reading conditions using three different reading text formats: paper-based format (PF), computer-based non-hypertext format (NHF), and computer-based hypertext format (HF). With a special focus on a hypertext approach to FL reading, the study particularly examines the presentation methods of reading passages and lexical resources of hypertext-based courseware for learning Korean as a foreign language (KFL). For the hypertext format, a simple hypertext design that uses an electronic glossary was chosen to explore the linking advantages of hypertext applications.

2. Reading Strategies and Interaction in CALL Activities

In observing and describing reading activities in CALL situations, researchers have attempted to discuss the features of classroom discourse, learning strategies, learners’ conversation and interaction between learners and the computer as well as learners themselves. For example, Windeatt (1986) recorded his twelve students on videotape while they worked on two reading tasks in CALL form and non-CALL form. He reported that there were no substantial differences in the interaction among students in CALL and non-CALL exercises but his subjects used different reading strategies in the two tasks. Piper (1986) also video-recorded students’ conversations to investigate the possible spin-off from three text-based CALL tasks in terms of interaction in the target language. She found that the language functions that learners used when working in groups on CALL activities were very limited in range and number.
Edmondson, Reck and Schroder (1988) recorded a combined, jumbled or shuffled English sentence exercise performed by nine secondary level students of a German school. The verbal reports were audio-recorded, and the keyboard workings were also recorded on the computer disk. Through a strategic analysis of the subjects’ shuffling procedures, they described different strategies used by a group of students working with a text-manipulation program called Shuffler. As a method of gathering data non-intrusively, Stevens (1996) also recorded students’ key presses into a data file on the hard disk and explored how students approach text manipulation activities in two CALL programs, Hangman-in-Context and SuperCloze. He found that students working in self-access mode tended to abuse help features and that there was an element of "window-shopping" (i.e., dropping in on the programs, just having a look, and going on to something else).

As reviewed above, previous studies on students’ strategies and interaction provide useful descriptive data on what students do and say in CALL activities. They also suggest that it would be of value to look at interaction with various types of programs, and that researchers need to take into consideration methods of data collection and analysis. Most studies that adopt computers for unobtrusive observation and recording provide the possibility of using computers as a valid means of investigating the learning process.

In terms of the future direction of CALL research on reading, Fox (1990:38) indicates that research into classroom behaviour is promising because it may give answers to the following questions: “What sort of language is used by students doing a reading exercise? Does the use of the computer encourage verbal interaction between students? What is the lexical and syntactic range of this language? … Finally, and most importantly, how much learning does occur?”

3. Method

3.1 Design

The study was conducted during class contact time in a Korean course over four weeks. CALL materials for the study were developed by the researcher and used in the computer lab during the reading sessions only. All of the participating students worked with one of the three formats at the same time during one reading session of each week. Session 1 was an introductory session which gave the students explanations of the experiments and the computer programs, and asked the students to fill out a consent form and an information questionnaire on their personal background. Reading passages in PF (paper-based format), NHF (non-hypertext format) and HF (hypertext format) were given to the students in Sessions 2, 3 and 4 in that order. Data on the students’ strategies was collected through self-report questionnaires and a post-questionnaire. Together with these questionnaires, the use of a computer tracking program was considered at the design stage of this study but the tracking program was not used for the study due to the limited storage capacity of the school server computer.

3.2 Subjects

The subjects in this study were students enrolled in a second year Korean course at an Australian university. A total of 9 students (6 females and 3 males) participated in
Session 2, ranging in age from 18 to 26 years old. Of the 9 students, 7 students’ L1 was English and 2 students’ L1 was Chinese. Six students were enrolled in the Languages and Applied Linguistics degree, two in the International Business Relations degree, and one in the Modern Asian Studies degree. 7 students (4 females and 3 males) were tested for Session 3 and 7 students (5 females and 2 males) were tested for Session 4.

All of the nine students had previous experience in learning one or more languages at secondary or tertiary institutions and, among them, three students had lived for about one year in Japan or Korea. They had also had previous experience with computers, mainly for word processing, and eight students had used simple self-access CALL materials in their first year Korean course. Their Korean was approximately at the level of low intermediate and they had no knowledge of Korean at all before learning Korean in their first year Korean course at the university.

3.3 Materials

i. Reading passages

Three reading passages were written for the study by the author with the aid of two other Korean teachers. The main topics and patterns of the passages were adapted from the students’ textbook, Learning Korean: New Directions 3 (Buzo & Shin, 1995). One reading passage contained approximately six Korean sentences consisting of 71 Korean words on average and was used for one session.

ii. Worksheet

A worksheet in PF was used in Session 2. The worksheet contained a Korean reading passage and a list of vocabulary and grammatical patterns. The passage was typed on the upper half of the page. The glossary section on the lower half of the page provided context-specific definitions of all of the new words and patterns. This structure gave the same direct access to the glossary in the off-line reading as in the on-line reading without using paper dictionaries.

iii. Courseware

Two pieces of courseware called Reading Explorer Da (RE Da) and Reading Explorer Ra (RE Ra) were developed and used for the study. A multimedia authoring tool for the Macintosh, SuperCard, was used in designing the two programs. All of the terms in the references were explained in English to ensure that the students understood what was involved, and the interface of the programs incorporated digitised sounds, imported graphics and icons. The two programs contained exactly the same reading passages, but they adopted different methods in the presentation of the on-line information. In RE Da, which was structured in a non-hypertext format, glossaries and grammar points were provided on separate screens when the students clicked on a certain icon on the main text screens. RE Ra, on the other hand, employed the concept of hypertext so the reading passages and glossaries were linked in a non-linear way. The students were able to get the meanings of new words instantaneously and directly from the text pages while moving the mouse on the screen. Unlike the paper-based format and the non-hypertext format, there were also options for choosing more information on selected grammar points with the mouse as
an indicator. From a gloss window, the students could access an information window via the ‘More’ button activated by a mouse click. The information window displayed information on the selected pattern with a grammatical explanation and an example sentence to give an idea of the usage of the pattern. By pressing the ‘O.K.’ button, the students were led to the main text screen. Whatever option they chose, it appeared on the same screen while displaying both the text being read and the glossary information at the same time.

iv. Tests

The students took follow-up tests as a part of reading activities for each session. The tests included vocabulary tests, multiple-choice comprehension tests and modified cloze tests.

v. Questionnaires

In total, three questionnaires were administered during this study. The first one, a pre-questionnaire, gathered student background information and included a consent form. The second, a self-report questionnaire, was given to the students at the end of each session. As pointed out by Bialystok (1981), this type of instrument could easily be administered to the students, and scoring and data compilation were relatively simple. This questionnaire gave the students the opportunity to describe the strategies they used for a specific reading text format after they finished reading. It consisted of two open-ended questions asking the students to describe the method and technique they had used, and a strategy list section where they rated the frequency of their use of each of 8 strategies on a 4-point scale (0 never, 1 rarely, 2 sometimes, 3 often). The eight strategies in the list included one metacognitive strategy (i.e., self-management) and seven cognitive strategies (i.e., resourcing, translation, note taking, imagery, auditory representation, transfer, and inferencing). These were selected from the list of learning strategy definitions in O’Malley, Chamot, Stewner-Manzanares, Russo, and Küpper (1985) and modified appropriately for the KFL context. The third, a post-questionnaire, was administered to document the students’ views on their experiences in the three reading text formats.

3.4 Procedures

In Session 1, which was an introductory session, the students completed the pre-questionnaire. From Session 2 to Session 4, the students used the reading text formats in the following order: (1) PF, (2) NHF and (3) HF. During each session, all of the students were given twenty minutes to go through the given text. They were then asked to take the short vocabulary and multiple-choice comprehension tests for about eight minutes. After that, they were also asked to take the cloze test for about five minutes. At the end of the session, they completed the self-report questionnaire in which they were asked to describe the strategies they used to work with the target passage. Finally, at the end of the study, the students completed the post-questionnaire in which they were able to indicate which format they found most beneficial and enjoyable.
4. Results

The students’ responses to the questions of the self-report questionnaires provided some clues as to how the students worked with each format. In Sections 1 and 2 of the questionnaire, the students described the methods that they used to approach reading passages and learn new words. Their responses indicate that they tended to read through the given passage first and then to write down the meanings of words or sentences when they used PF. With NHF, most students felt that it was difficult to get any continuity in the reading of the given passage because they had to swap back and forth between the text and the vocabulary list. When the students worked with HF, they read over the passage with the mouse following. As they came across new words, they were inclined to read the Korean-English translations by just placing the mouse on the new words in order to access and understand the meanings of the Korean words.

Table 1 presents the number of student responses regarding the extent to which they engaged in selected strategies described in Section 3 of the questionnaire. The results show that there were some differences in selecting appropriate points on the scale of the strategies according to the format. With regard to 'self-management' in Question 1, the students tended to use this strategy with HF more often than with the other two formats. Regardless of the type of format, the students relied heavily on strategies of 'resourcing' in Question 2, 'translation' in Question 3 and 'inferencing' in Question 8. On Question 4 where the students were required to indicate the extent to which they used a 'note-taking' strategy, it was found that 78 percent of the students used this strategy frequently with PF whereas 29 percent of the students used it frequently with NHF or HF. In other words, they used the note-taking strategy more when they worked with PF than when they worked with NHF or HF. On Question 6, most students expressed the view that they used an 'auditory representation' strategy sometimes or often. The strategies of 'imaging' in Question 5 and 'transfer' in Question 7 were not popular with the students in all formats. They were sometimes used by most students and rarely used by some students.

These results suggest that the students seemed to use different techniques in working with each text format. They also seemed to use key strategies selected for this investigation with different degrees of engagement.
Table 1
Number of student responses regarding the extent to which they engaged in strategies shown in the self-report questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>Often</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Understanding the conditions that help you learn and arranging for the presence of those conditions</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Using Korean language reference materials</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Using English as a base for understanding Korean</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Writing down the main idea, important points, outline, or summary of information presented in writing</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Relating new information to visual concepts in memory via familiar, easily retrievable visualizations or phrases</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Retention of the sound or a similar sound for a word, phrase, or sentence</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Using previously acquired linguistic and/or conceptual knowledge to facilitate a new language learning task</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Using available information to guess meanings of new items or infer the main idea of the target text</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NHF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HF</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. PF = Paper-based Format; NHF = Non-Hypertext Format; HF = Hypertext Format.

The students’ responses to open-ended questions in the post-questionnaire show that the students appreciated the use of computers in learning Korean. They seemed to think the hypertext-based program, RE Ra, was useful whereas most of them considered the non-hypertext-based program, RE Da, was not helpful. They also
regarded the use of PF as compatible although it did not provide any listening practice which is one of the special features of the computer-based formats. Most students did not like NHF because of the need to change screens to read passages and vocabulary information presented on separate screens. In comments on the differences between HF and the other two formats, they indicated easy access and quick processing as strong points of HF while the overuse of the English language help was a weak point of HF.

The responses to the question of how they used the three different approaches to read and understand the reading passages indicate that the students tended to write English translations along the text in PF. For some students, NHF was acceptable for learning because it required the students to remember vocabulary between screens. Regarding the use of HF, most students responded that they utilised not only the information on vocabulary and grammatical patterns but also listening features. Interestingly, two students pointed out that HF was less helpful than NHF in remembering words because HF seemed not to force them to read and remember the words carefully. However, there was agreement that it was easier to use HF which provided quick answers to the questions of the meanings of the words. In brief, the students showed positive attitudes toward the use of hyperlinks as well as the use of computers in learning.

5. Discussion

In relation to the reading strategies preferred by students, the results of this study indicate that foreign language readers employ different reading strategies depending on the text format they work with. This finding is similar to the results of Windeatt’s (1986) study that reported that the reading strategies used in cloze tasks in both computerised and non-computerised form were different. The students working in PF tended to write down the translations of the passage on the printed page while looking at the vocabulary section whenever they needed to. They used conventional techniques much more familiar to them from their experience with print material. In NHF, the task of working on the text and vocabulary on separate pages did not find favour with the students. Most students kept clicking back and forth to read the reading passage and vocabulary page, while some students tried to learn new words first and then to understand the reading passage. Generally, the students felt that HF was easier to look for information on new vocabulary and patterns, and they tended to read through the text as they followed along with the cursor on the screen. The students basically looked for the easiest way, and most agreed that the different presentation methods of information led them to use different strategies.

In terms of the frequency of the use of related strategies for working with the reading passages, this study found that cognitive strategies such as resourcing, translation and inferencing were exploited many times whatever text format readers read. This finding implies that the students were eager to translate and infer the meanings of the reading passages with the aid of glossaries not only in order to understand the reading passages but also to prepare for the follow-up tests. Self-management, one of the metacognitive strategies listed by O’Malley et al. (1985), was employed a little more frequently in HF than in the other formats. A possible reason for this is that the students needed to clearly understand the conditions such as the type of assistance and the way to get assistance in HF because they were not familiar enough with HF. In PF, on the other hand, the note-taking strategy was the most
popular because PF presented all of the contents in a piece of paper on which students could make notes easily.

Although the data collection method used in this study did not focus on direct observation of students’ behaviour, it did use a self-report approach which included students’ opinions collected via questionnaires asking students to report on their learning and preferences. Though quite illuminating, the investigation of strategies with the self-report questionnaires did not allow all possible strategies to be selected and examined. The use of more techniques for observing and recording students’ performance would enhance the potential of any future research. For instance, it would be useful to employ a kind of computer tracking program if the research situation allows. In this way, the computer would unobtrusively observe students’ behaviours while they read the text on the screen (cf. Jamieson and Chapelle 1987; Stevens 1996).

6. Conclusion

Due to the small number of the students in this study, it seems difficult to generalise conclusions. In some way, however, the results of the study show different strategy use by readers for each text format that presented adjunct lexical information for the target text in different ways. The students employed special strategies for each text format as well as general strategies for all of the formats. Different methods of accessing lexical resources led the students to use strategies in different degrees. This suggests that text formats, especially the presentation methods of reference aids, can influence reading strategies that FL readers use.

Further research is necessary on what students do during CALL activities and how the use of CALL can be integrated or linked to a range of language learning experiences. Describing what teachers and students do in CALL environments would help demonstrate the value of computer programs in engaging students with language learning activities. To strengthen our understanding of CALL, students’ interactions need to be described and analysed through empirical research on CALL. In doing so, it is essential to develop observation and recording techniques and to describe the data collected in a clear way.

References


Structure and function of sub-information in lecture discourse

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Seoul National University

1. Introduction
This paper argues that some parts of a lecture discourse that are commonly disregarded fulfill their own important functions with regard to a subject or purpose of an informative discourse. The ultimate purpose of an informative discourse is to communicate information effectively. There are two general methods to convey information effectively: The first method is to use scientific function of language faithfully. The second method is to compose discourse around core information you wish to convey so that it has coherence. These are regarded as the basic methods of producing an informative discourse, but, on the other hand, they contain some dangers that they might mislead the informative discourse as if it should preclude emotional function and sub-information. Consequently, in order to accomplish the purpose of an informative discourse, we have to discover the essence of it observing and analyzing practical discourses.

Up to now, research about the essence of informative discourse has centered chiefly on the structure of 'expository text'. For example, Brinker(1992; translated by Sung-man Lee 1994) analyzed on the level of proposition. He argued that the developing structure of expository text is composed of a combination of initial condition with rule statements explaining the object. However, the text used in his analysis can't explain what to discover in this paper because it has a high coherence relatively and it is a short text so we don't see the whole aspects of sub-information in it. Yeol-kyue Kim et al(1994) have discovered features of persuasive, argumentative, and expository text by focusing on content structure and grammar. In the case of expository text, the side of content structure relies on Brinker, and the side of grammar relies on coherence theory of general text linguistics. Sam-hyeong Lee(1994) analyzed the content structure of expository text regarding a principle permitting coherence of text as 'relationality'. The result is not so different from a way of explaining used in traditional rhetoric. Bong-soon Kim(1999) classified the comprising principle of core contents in expository text into three principles: the principle of inclusion, the principle of preference, and the principle of mutuality. But since her arguments focus on the construction of subject, they do not satisfy our curiosity about what kind of aspects and functions sub-information have. Most preceding in-depth analyses deal with written discourse, but since the frequency of sub-information, the focus of this paper, is low by nature, there might be some elements that have not been captured.

Taking all the results of these preceding researches into account, in order to intensify the analysis of informative discourse, we have to expand the breadth of the research material into spoken discourse and try to capture the wide aspects of discourse. The research of sub-information is also expected to contribute to the expansion of deepening research more or less.

The purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions:
1) What is the structure of discourse centering around sub-information parts like?
2) What kinds of functions do these parts have with regard to the ultimate purpose of informative discourse?
3) What is the significance of the answers for above questions in Korean language education or Teaching Korean as a foreign language?
I chose lecture discourse as the analysis material of this paper. This choice was made for two reasons.
First, lecture discourses are representative of informative discourses or expository discourses. Second, lecture discourses have a higher possibility than written discourses of containing some parts commonly regarded indirect such as anecdotes and humorous stories because they are basically a kind of spoken discourse.
The lecture observed and transcribed for use in this paper is 'Introduction of Korean Literature'. The lecture was opened as a major subject for freshmen in the department of Korean Education for the first semester of 2001 in S University.
Professor J. gave this lecture as a part-time lecturer. He has also been serving as a professor at C University of Education. Considering the students' messages on the web board and all of the results of interviews with students, we can see many students set a high value on his lectures. Accordingly, his lectures can be regarded as fulfilling their purpose of conveying information faithfully, and a premise can be formed that permits us to analyze the discourse.
The material analyzed intensively in this paper is the last lecture given on June 16th, 2001. The subject of this lecture was 'Korean Literature in the early 1920s' and went on for about three hours.
We still have a problem of generalization because the material of this paper is limited. However, the purpose of this paper is not to generalize but to find out a few important educative lessons, as well as to break down prejudices against informative discourse and language education related to this through an example of analysis. Consequently, from wider point of view, we could say that this research is a kind of case study.

2. Concept of Sub-Information
The term 'sub-information' is named from a point of view of conveying information. The speaker (or the author) of an informative discourse has the main-information. But an informative discourse is not always composed of the parts representing the main information. Especially, It is very usual that lecture discourses include not only main-information but also other parts. These parts appear as the example stories, anecdotes, and jokes etc. Written discourses gain considerable coherence through the process of polishing and rewriting. In this way, from now on, the information that is not main-information will be named as sub-information in this paper.
The standard of division of sub-information from main-information can be considered with regard to the intention of a speaker. In the case of lecture discourses, the speaker(lecturer) keeps conveying information to the listener(audience). There is some information conveyed even in the above example stories, anecdotes, and jokes. However, considering the character and purpose of a lecture, there can be some information meant for the audience to remember even after the lecture. This is preferentially what the speaker says and can be judged through analysis of discourse with regard to the subject or character.
We can name the former main-information and the latter sub-information at this time.
The information is always considered in relation to the structure of proposition because it exists with regard not to level of language form but to level of proposition. The structure of proposition, as van Dijk (1978, translated by Shi-ho Jung, 1995) analyzed, is divided into macro structures and micro structures, and the relationship of them is relative.
That is, macro structures break out by integration of micro structures. Macro structures
become micro structures again when they are considered with macro structures of higher rank. Since the proposition structure of a discourse is composed of the relative relationship of micro structures-macro structures, like this, the relationship of sub-information and main-information is also relative. In other words, the information, represented by Min, the nth global proposition within the i-th dimensional macro structure, functions only as a sub-information in the macro structure level. However, the global proposition $M^{i+1}_n$ that is combined by the Min and $M^i_{n+1}$ could be the main-information. As it were, judging whether certain information is main-information or not is possible only in the same level of proposition. For example, it is as follows.

*Reference 1*

S1: You stick to something pretty. S2: Gee..Try to put some time into it. S3: Everything is mutable. S4: Hey, we're expected to be wrinkled soon. S5: This doesn't go so long. S6: Why do you stick to that? S7: Money? S8: You know? Sometimes it is lost and comes out. S9: By the way, why do you stick just to what you have? S10: This is the very Buddhistic epistemology. S11: You got it? S12: It's not familiar to talk about Buddhism after a long time. S13: I used to be an officer of a general Buddhist meeting of students at Seoul University. S14: Yes, I'm a man who has such bygones. S15: Now, if so, from a point of view of Han, Yong-woon, if sticking just to the fact that his love has gone and he has left his love is eyes of people, then what do you think of the case of Han, Yong-woon? S16: Someone has left? S17: Oh, I bet they're to meet. S18: Somebody has met each other? S19: Oh, I bet they're to break up soon. S20: We see things in this way. S21: They're just the parts of whole transiency. S22: So, even though we've lost our country, that's neither sad nor frustrating. S23: We've lost our country? S24: If so, I bet we're gonna regain our country some day. S25: You got it? ....

The above discourse can by divided into three groups according to what they mean. They can be S1~ S12, S12~ S14, S15~ S25. The global proposition for group S1~ S12 is $M^1_i$ and $M^2_i$ for S12~ S14, finally $M^3_i$ for S15~ S25.

Each contents of the global proposition is as follows.

$M^1_i$ It's Buddhistic epistemology not to stick to something existing.
M'$_2$ I used to be an officer of a general Buddhist meeting of students at Seoul National University.

M'$_3$ Han, Yong-woon saw the truth of our country with Buddhist epistemology.

At this time, M$_i$ and M'$_2$ can become component propositions of M$^{i+1}$, global proposition, through the medium of S12. M$_3$ is confronted with global proposition, M$^{i+1}$, of itself. M$^{i+1}$$_1$ and M$^{i+1}$$_2$ compose a global proposition, M$^{i+2}$.

The following picture can explain this relationship.

Here, M'$_2$ becomes sub-information in the level of i+1. Because the story about the speaker's bygones comes from a part explaining Buddhistic epistemology, it cannot be regarded as information meant to be remembered by the audience referring to the subject and character of the lecture. In this case, M$^i$$_1$ becomes main-information relatively in contrast to M'$_2$. But even though M$^{i+1}$$_1$, formed by combination of these two informational pieces, includes main-information in lower level, it becomes sub-information relatively in contrast to M$^{i+1}$$_1$. Because the information about Buddhistic epistemology works as a supporting means to explain a world view of Han, Yong-woon.

3. Connection aspect of Sub-information and Main-information

Sub-information is connected with main-information inside the discourse. This connection is not just a simple connection-like arrangement but something that makes coherence of whole discourse possible. It's needless to say that a spoken discourse relies highly on the thread of situational connection. So it tends to have a lower coherence than a written discourse, but we cannot say that it doesn't have coherence at all. Because a lecture discourse has a subject as a completed discourse, it has coherence and the connection of sub-information and main-information will also proceed to assure this coherence. To expose this connection aspect, we need to analyze what kind of relationship sub-information has with main-information and what it is definitely, or what the process to come back to main-information again through sub-information from main-information is.

Generally speaking, there are a few relationships to assure coherence among the units of contents inside the discourse. They are collection, addition, deduction, cause & effect, and reason, comparison & contrast, specification, problem & solution, and finally meta-discourse. (Lee, Sam-Hyung, 1994). However, these relationships are extracted from relatively completed expository text and they make the connection of contents units logical. So they can't expose the exact relationship between main-information and sub-information. As mentioned earlier, it's natural that the division of main-information and sub-information is relative and the information necessary for development of logic can also become sub-information relatively according to the level. Therefore, it can be true for relationship between main-information and sub-information, too.

But generally the relationship between them inside a spoken discourse such as a lecture discourse is regarded as something that has mainly lower coherence.

Accordingly, this paper will focus on finding out other relationships making an exception of these above.
3.1. Connection by Analogy

Analogy is a general way of explaining in rhetorical tradition. From a wider point of view, this is a kind of comparison to explain comparing something difficult to understand to another thing that is easier to understand.

At this time, the sentence "Something is easy to understand" means that vehicle is more concrete than tenor or that it is closer to the audience.

<Reference 2>
P1 Yeom, Sang-sup has had a high-school education and won a prize from in the intramural literary contest.
P2 I bet you're thinking, 'My, is that all? Is there anyone who has never won a prize from a literary contest in his or her youth?'
P3 There's no room for doubt that you also said, 'When I applied for the department of Korean Education of Seoul National University, I won a prize...'
P4 Now, listen to what I'm saying. Yeom, Sang-sup won a prize for writing a poem in Japanese after he had gone over to one of Japan's elite high schools.
P5 Do you think it's possible for you to win a prize for writing a poem in English after you go over to America? A good piece? You wouldn't even get smallish prize, would you? Yes, Wang, An-gi. Let me see.. Let's suppose that Wang, An-gi got a prize for writing a poem in Korean at a literary contest. Even so, that would not be something worth admiring in her but instead it would be a disgrace to all of you. Am I wrong?
P6 So, word about Yeom, Sang-sup has been already spreading. Meanwhile we've got also Kim, Dong-in to discuss.

The upper P1, P2, P4 and P6 come under sub-information and P3 and P5 come under sub-information. Here, the global proposition of P5 is connected to the global proposition, which is composed of P1~P4, by analogy. And P6 is connected to the global proposition directly. Judging from the level of global proposition within the macro structure, the main points may be summarized as follows.

M1: It's great that Yeom, Sang-sup won a prize for writing a poem in Japanese at an elite Japanese high school.
M2: It's great that Wang, An-gi won a prize for writing a poem in Korean.
M3: In the meantime, there was also Kim, Dong-in.

Here, the speaker is explaining how excellent Yeom, Sang-sup's talent for literature through a character, Wang, An-gi, with both concreteness and proximity. Wang, An-gi is a Chinese student studying in Korea and she belongs to the same class. so other students know her very well. We would say that this is analogy to intensify a degree of understanding definition rather than that to make somebody understand a difficult concept.

Adding one more thing, there's no need for sub-information to be joined to the before and
behind main-information at all. The conjunction of P6, so, is a mark not to show the connection with P6 clearly but to show the connection M1 with M3. This relationship is as follows.

M1              M2          M3

3.2. Connection by Association
The connection by association is not something caused by logical flow when moving from main-information to sub-information but something deviating to other subject associated from peculiar lexeme or subject for a while. It's a kind of deviation viewing from the whole discourse, but, on the other hand, it's a clear connection viewing from the relationship between information adjoined.

In order to make a natural and logical discourse above, the speaker needs to proceed from P1 to P3 directly. P2 is something deviated from the subject- Korean modern poetry of 1920s, which is associated through the medium of the word, 'Swan'. The lecturer discovered that some people fall into the error in writing in Chinese characters, so he/she might have put P2 between P1 and P3 judging that he/she needed to convince the students about this. In the case of written discourse, it has the property of appearing as a form of footnote, but spoken discourse doesn't have some devices like a footnote. Therefore, there's nothing for that but to use a form of inserting. However, since the length of P2 isn't so long, it's reasonable in connecting P1 and P3 logically. Regarding the global proposition represented by P1~P3 as M1~M3, the relationship is as follows:

M1              M2          M3

3.3. Connection by Discourse Convention
Both connection by analogy and that by association have a medium inside the text. We see the medium which is talent for literature of Yeom, Sang-sup and Wang, An-gi in example 2 and also the medium, the White-Tide, in example 3. But we also see some cases that are not so like the following example 4.
P1 Well, I'm sorry for being late even for the last class in the end. We're going on a vacation again simultaneously with just beginning school after a long vacation. I believe that all of you will get along quite well.

P2 Following the procedure, we say that Yook-Dang and the second Chun-Won are the representative men. But it doesn't mean that there were just two in the history of literature. To that extent, they were so influential that people called that time the age of two persons-literary circles. It is true that the achievements they left were remarkable.

P1 is a kind of speech that begins the lecture. That speech notifies that the lecture on that day will be the last lecture of that semester and that the speaker feels sorry for being late for the lecture. This paragraph can come under sub-information because it's not something essential. And P1 comes to the contents about 1910s' literature without delay. Here, we see that there's no medium within the text between P1 and P2.

In this case, since the lecture discourse usually includes notification as an introduction regardless of contents of the lecture, we don't feel that the switchover from P1 to P2 is unnatural. So to speak, the audience has background knowledge about the convention of lecture discourse other than the text, so they feel that the connection of P1 and P2 is natural.

The global proposition for P1 will be M1 and M2 for P2. And supposing that the background knowledge about discourse convention is K, the relationship of connection between main-information and sub-information can be shown by a picture as follows:

The broken line was used because the relationship between M1 and M2 is connected through the medium of the background knowledge, K, other than text indirectly.

K

M1          M2

4. Function of Sub-information

What is the function sub-information performs in relation to essential purpose, communicating effectively, of a lecture discourse? We can consider it dividing into a net function and reverse function and also think of the reverse function of sub-information in view that sub-information can get coherence of low degree connecting with main-information. However, what this paper is telling doesn't mean that sub-information performs only reverse function like this. This paper will present these three categories: reinforcement, addition, and awakening as the phase of net functions sub-information has.

4.1. Reinforcement of Acceptance with Recognition

Reinforcement is a function that makes people understand information accepted with cognition surely and makes carving a seal easier. At the former <Reference 2>, the object for explanation was explained through a medium, students, in the way of analogy. That is also for students to carve a seal that the talent for literature of Yeom, Sang-sup was fabulous.
김동인이 만든 말이에요. 아셨어요?
P2 바imately 이렇게 생각해 봅시다. 우리 조상들은 3인칭 여성대명사 없이도 어떻게 삶았다는 걸까? 불편하지 않았으니까 삶았지. 아무 불편함이 없었구. 알겠어요?
P3 이- 내가 이에 대해 강의를 하고 왔거든. 거기서 누가 질문을 하너란 말야. 그런데 너희들이 "남자요? 여자요?" 그러겠니? 상황과 같이 다 되는 거예요. 전혀 불편함 없었어요. 우리는 상상하기 힘들지만. 왜냐하면 우리 지금 더 삼인칭 대명사를 전체로 쓰기 있기 때문에 '그'라고 하게 되면 혼란될 거 같지만.
P5 그랬는데 김동인이 지금 그녀를 만들었던 말이에요. 예? 중요한 얘기죠. 잘 보세요. 그러면, 우리말에 그녀란 말이 없는데 소설을 위해서 그녀란 말을 만들었으면 그것은 언문일치가 아니지. 그렇지?
P1 Now, by the way, I can stand it all. But next, Kim, Dong-in says like this. "The one of my achievements was for me to use a third person pronoun for the first time. That's right. Nobody has ever used it before. The word, she, you use is what Kim, Dong-in created. Did you know that already?"
P2 But, then let's think about it in this way. Did our ancestors have special secrets to live without the third person pronoun? They must have lived without it because they didn't have any inconvenience for that. You got it?
P3 Well, I came here after having lectured at Ehwa University today. And there was a student asking a question to me. By the way, is it likely for you to ask like this "Was that he or she?" You know? We understand everything through circumstantial judgement. We didn't have any inconvenience. Even if it's difficult for us to imagine. Since all of us have been using the third person pronoun as premises, so we're likely to be confused by using 'he'.
P4 I'm talking to my friend like this, "He proposed marriage to me the day before yesterday." (making a surprised expression) "Oh?" You say like this? "Why didn't you tell me about your secret?" You do not, right? I mean you can understand everything. It's natural.
P5 By the way, now people say that Kim, Dong-in created 'her'. Eh? It's important thing. Listen to me! We have never had the word, 'her', before. meanwhile, he created it for novel? Then it's contrary to unity of speech and writing. Don't you think so?

P1,P2 and P3 are paragraphs that represent main-information in upper <Reference 5> and P3 and P4 represent sub-information. P3 and P4 become concrete examples for P2. So to speak, They show the fact that 'We have originally never had the third person pronoun before and it didn't cause any inconvenience.' through some concrete examples reinforcing the fact. Besides, a speaker has an imaginary situation with regard to himself or herself and this makes sure of concreteness and proximity as mentioned before. In this way, the audience can reinforce the acceptance of abstract information through some concrete and familiar objects and we could say that sub-information works as a function of reinforcement in the upper example.

4.2. Addition
It is function of addition that sub-information connected with main-information through association performs in <Reference 3>. This is information other than main-information that the speaker wanted to communicate through logical development from the beginning, and when we have information necessary to be communicated, this function means to communicate it along with main-information even though it is sub-information indifferent to the logical development. It's also the function of information represented by footnotes in a written discourse.

Addition is often used in the sub-information connected by association and the sub-information performing the additional function can be formed thanks to association. Similarly, Coherence can be ensured because there is a medium causing association within the text.
4.3. Emotional Awakening
There are many examples of sub-information that provoke laughter. P3 and P4 in <Reference 5> provoke laughter as well as perform the function of reinforcement. Especially, P4 moves people to much laughter setting up the theory about imaginary circumstances arousing their interest. Some interesting stories provoke still larger laughter combining with exaggerated expression and motions of the audience like this.

Laughter like this mainly makes the audience concentrate on a lecture easily by awakening of emotion and lightening some the burden of recognition during a lecture that needs a great deal of cognitive process from the audience. Besides, since sub-information performing such function is connected with main-information by analogy or association, the audience can accept that more easily. If <reference 5> shows the function of emotional awakening of sub-information connected by analogy, this following <reference 6> shows the function of emotional awakening of sub-information connected by association.

<Reference 6>
P1 Therefore, if my parents quarrel each other, my brother used to push me into the room where they were. "Hey, go and cajole father into calming down!" In fact, I used to come into the room and tell him not to quarrel. And then my father would say,"Fie! I forbear because of children." This is an official story of my home. So frankly speaking, who the hell am I? What's my life like? Then where does my ego head to? It was changed into ego for my family, wasn't it? Am I Digimon?

P2 Do prepare your lessons before the lecture from now. How can you listen to a lecture without knowing even Digimon?

P3 Now, in that case, looking back on my past, I wonder whether 'I' of that situation in my youth was really what I was. Don't you think so?

With regard to the information represented in the former paragraph and the latter, the whole of P1~P3 come under paragraph representing sub-information relatively. However, judging just within P1~P3, P2 represents sub-information and P1 and P3 represent main-information. P2 is a kind of joke spoken by association from the word, 'Digimon' and it provoked lots of laughter. The connection of P1 and P3 is not unnatural because the length of P2 is short relatively.

5. Conclusion: The aspect of sub-information and Education of Korean language
Till now, we've looked into the aspect that sub-information is connected with main-information through analyzing lecture discourse and confirmed a phase of function sub-information performs with regard to the essential purpose of discourse that means communicating information. We found out three connecting aspects that sub-information is connected with main-information and they are connection by analogy, connection by association and that by discourse convention. We also found out that sub-information performed three functions: reinforcement of cognitive acceptance, addition, and emotional awakening.

The sub-information isn't just subsidiary in a lecture discourse. That has its own mechanism of coherence and performs constant functions to fulfill its essential purpose- communicating
The education of Korean language so far classified the type of discourse strictly and gives the feeling it has restricted the character of typical discourse. Especially with regard to the informative discourse, it has focused on exact expressions and logical expressions rather than affluent expressions. And it has also selected text to be carried in the textbook depending on exact and logical structure of expression.

So a discourse of this type used to be regarded as so-called something insipid unconditionally. But, this paper argues that a parenthetical comment or expression can be helpful in fulfilling the essential purpose of a discourse through application of proper sub-information. It's a matter of course that an expression structure that is basically exact and logical is an essential condition in informative discourse. But informative discourse is also no exception in maximizing expression effect through various and proper expression structure.

The existent famous lectures or highly informative books all have expressive features supporting this. Such idea should be reflected when designing and planning Korean language education.

The aspect of informative discourse considered by sub-information is very significant in relation to Education of Korean language as a foreign language. The education of cultural elements in all secondary languages including education of Korean language is very important. The convention and the aspect of a discourse are more liable to be overlooked than other cultural elements. It's impossible that each and every language has the same detailed convention and aspect of development even though it's a discourse of the same type. Although the same type of discourse, a specific developing way depends on what the mother tongue of the audience is. The universality and peculiarity that a specific discourse has come under meaningful basic research for study of Korean language education.

To make the structure and the aspect clear through practical discourse forms the basis of such work and I hope this paper can be also the starting point of such research.
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Study Strategies of Korean Students in Australian Higher Education

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Introduction

Korean students are studying overseas in increasing numbers, especially since the Korean government’s advocacy of globalization. In the past most Korean students studying abroad would first graduate from a Korean university and then go to university in the USA for a degree at the postgraduate level. However, the pattern of Koreans studying overseas has changed in recent years. The number of students going abroad to study an undergraduate degree has increased, and while the USA is still the preferred destination, a country like Australia has managed to obtain a small but significant increase in the number of undergraduate students from Korea.

The difficulties Korean students experience while studying in Australia have been previously investigated by Choi (1997) and Armitage (1999). Choi (1997), for instance, investigated the problems Korean students experienced studying at universities in Victoria in 1992 and 1993 and Armitage (1999) dealt with Korean students at English language centers in Melbourne in 1997. According to Choi’s survey (1997), Korean students in Australian universities perceived their competence in their English language skills as having difficulties in speaking (53.2%), writing (25.5%), listening (17.0%) and reading (4.3%). Interestingly but not surprisingly, student’s perception in their English language competence is aligned with their perception of difficulties in study genre in order of class discussion (48.9%), written assignments (31.9%), understanding lectures (21.3%), tests (19.2%) and reading assignments (17.1%). She argued that the students’ difficulties derived not only from their lack of language proficiency and study skills but also from Australian teachers’ and peers’ lack of understanding of these problems in the educational context. On the other hand, Armitage (1999) pointed out that one major factor affecting the adjustment of Koreans living and studying in Australia is insufficient preparation prior to their departure from Korea, so they do not develop a fundamental understanding of Australian culture and society. While their findings are valuable, neither Choi (1997) or Armitage (1999) investigated how students develop strategies to overcome their problems.

The main difficulties students encounter while studying abroad involve not only acquisition of English language but also the way language is used in the academic context. Moreover, the use of similar labels for study genre, such as essays or exams,

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1 The number of Korean students who study overseas increased from 53,875 in 1991 to 154,219 in 1999, an increase of 286%.

2 Of the Korean students studying abroad, 42% were in the USA in 1997 but this figure decreased to 35% in 2000. For Australia, the percentage rose from 5% in 1997 to 7% in 2000.
may mislead Korean students to expect something similar to those genres found in their home country. Given that study genres are essential components in any educational culture and involve highly inferred knowledge and include various communicative and social norms (Mauranen 1994), we can hypothesize that differences in study genre can constitute one of the main roots of students’ problems when studying abroad.

**Methodology**

**Subjects:** This paper deals with 16 Korean students (aged 22-30 years) who are currently enrolled in different faculties at the undergraduate level at Monash University, which is located in Melbourne, Australia. The code KR (plus number) is used to refer to these students. Of 16 Korean students, 6 were female and 10 were male.

These Korean students fall into two main categories:

a) Exchange students who are enrolled at their home Korean universities and who study for one or two semesters at Monash University. They have studied two or three years of a four-year university degree in Korea (KR1-3).

b) International students who are enrolled in a full undergraduate degree course. Some students have been educated at secondary school in Korea prior to their entry to Monash University (KR4-5). Four students have studied at the tertiary level in Korea, either fully (KR6) or partially (KR7-10), completing a four-year university degree. Others have completed a two- or three-year diploma equivalent at a vocational college (KR11-16).

There is a distinctive difference in academic background of the international and exchange students in this study. Due to the requirement for exchange students to achieve a high TOFEL score, all are majoring in English in Korea. In contrast, the Korean international students had a wide variety of academic backgrounds, but their goals of studying in Australian universities were to improve their English in order to obtain a better job. The exchange students also perceived the value of improved English from studying in Australia as an important benefit to their future prospects. All exchange students stated that they expected to be exposed to a multi-cultural society and to understand Australian culture from participating in exchange program in Australia.

**Research questions**

This paper investigates the range of difficulties which Korean students encounter and how Korean students develop their study strategies while enrolled at an Australian university. The main research questions were:

1. What are the main difficulties Korean students encounter when studying at an Australian university?
2. What type of study strategies do the Korean students employ and what sort of processes do they undertake?
The difficulties Korean students face in the academic context relate to the academic competence which they need in university contexts in Australia. This competence consists of linguistic, sociolinguistic and sociocultural components, and applying at both the receptive and productive levels. The receptive competence involves, for example understanding lectures, tutorials and textbooks, and what students produce includes seminar papers, essays and theses (Mauranen 1994). Some difficulties may derive from their lack of language proficiency in understanding lectures and note-taking, for instance. However, many difficulties derive from more than one source of components. Participation in tutorials, for example, not only involves the implementation of appropriate linguistic elements of language but also the sociolinguistic components such as how and when to speak.

Data collection method and analytical procedures
This study employed a combination of questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. The students were given an open-ended questionnaire to complete at the beginning of August, 2000. In total, 30 questionnaires were distributed to Korean students via the Korean Students Association. In addition, semi-structured interviews ranging from 30 to 105 minutes in length were conducted in Korean with two female students and four male students. These interviews were recorded on audio-tape. In this interview, students were expected to clarify some of the information recorded in the questionnaire and to provide more detailed information relating to the research questions. The information collected through this interview included students’ perceptions about the differences between Korean and Australian universities’ educational systems, main difficulties they have in studying at Australian universities, types of study strategies employed and their communication networks.

Conceptual Framework
Because of the small number of participants in the sample and the nature of the study, the data will be analyzed qualitatively rather than statistically. In the analysis of data, the focus will be on finding out factors related to the study strategies used. In analyzing study strategies, the management model will be employed, which was developed by Jernudd and Neustropy (Jernudd and Neustupy 1987; Neustupy 1985a, 1985b, 1994, 1997), and applied by Marriott (1990, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000) in a number of sociolinguistic studies of Japanese students studying in Australia. In this model, interaction difficulties occur when there is a deviation from expected norms or patterns of behaviour. As a means of acquiring those norms which are appropriate in the new educational, students need to become aware of deviations from these norms, evaluate their deviations appropriately and subsequently implement suitable adjustments. However, students may or may not be aware of their deviations. Further more, not all of the adjustments will be satisfactory and so the management cycle may be repeated. I will also draw upon Oxford’s categories (1990), which was classified into six types of strategies, i.e., cognitive, memory, compensation, metacognitive, affective and social strategies.

Findings
Writing essays and examinations
In the interviews examined here, the main areas of difficulty which students reported are writing essays, understanding lectures, participating in tutorials, note-taking and
Despite the claim by several students, noted above, that the essay genre is consistent across the two countries, it seems that in Korea the most common type of written genre is a “report”. According to one exchange student, many students merely summarized their reading in their “report”, but to obtain a good “report” mark, additional analytical and critical contents are a crucial factor. Deviations in academic writing is rather discovered through assessment structure, which involves the length of term papers and frequency of term papers and the number of subjects required for this in Korea. According to an exchange student, two or three written assignments per week were required in her home institution, but no feedback was given. Even though she had ample experience of writing in Korea, she still claimed that writing was difficult in Australia. She maintained that the difficulties come from the different styles which were required and also the length of essays. In Korea a written assignment was usually short and she did not spend much time on each, since a large number of assignments were required.

The type of writing required differs according to the academic subjects and it was revealed that students taking Arts subjects experienced more stress with writing. One Science student who enrolled in an interdisciplinary subject offered by the Arts Faculty claimed that writing an essay for the Arts Faculty required a different style and which he had not yet mastered.

Examinations also constituted a difficult task for students. The exchange students did not find a big difference in examination formats between Korea and Australia. They claimed that the focus of the exam was comparison and analysis in Korea, and it was quite similar to the one in Australia. However the strain of exams was not eased, as exam was being required to write in L2 in a limited time period. One exchange student expressed her frustration, claiming that she could not answer a question, since it contained an unfamiliar key word, and wished she could have used a dictionary.

Understanding lectures and note-taking
Other difficulties students encounter during their study are understanding lectures and managing the quantity of reading. All students who participated in the interview reported that understanding lectures was very difficult. Even though the lecture genre constitutes the main part of courses in Korea, the amount of reading required per subject, unfamiliarity of background information and knowledge required, together with lack of English language proficiency, pose enormous constraints on Korean

3 The same difficulties were found for Japanese students studying in Australian universities (Marriott 2000) and Korean students studying in Australian universities (Choi 1997).
students studying in Australia. An exchange student claimed that even though she had fewer subjects, she only managed to read one-half of the required reading whilst in Australia.

It is anticipated that the slow speed of reading in their second language and difficulties of listening hinder students’ reading and understanding of lectures. In addition, the different character of their previous subjects undertaken in Korea in conjunction with a different educational system, such as the amount work per subject and the number of total subjects taken per semester, create difficulties for Korean students4. An exchange student claimed that fewer subjects and fewer contact hours in Australia gave her the wrong impression that students study less at Australian universities. But she quickly realized the importance of the different study methods required. She also experienced that the subjects in Australia went into more depth than did those similar subjects she undertook in Korea.

Along with difficulties in understanding lectures, note-taking was reported as a problem. Difficulties derived from note-taking are not only related to their language proficiency but also related to skill in selecting the salient content. Students claimed that they often failed to listen while they engaged in note-taking during lectures. But they also reported that they did not actually take notes but just copied the content from the over-head projector used by the lecturer. One student reported that the availability of lecture notes on the web helped him to understand lectures.

**Participation in tutorials**

The difficulties related to writing essays, understanding lectures and note-taking and exams are different from difficulties in participating in tutorials. The former difficulties mainly derive from linguistic aspects with some cultural differences, for instance, turn taking, when and how to talk and the hierarchy between tutors and students. Students found more difficulties in participating in tutorials compared to lectures. One student claimed, for example, that it is more difficult to understand other students’ talking in class than it is to understand the speech of tutors, since they have to get used to all different individual accent and some comments and questions by other students are not directly relevant to the class content.

One conspicuously different feature in the university system is that only the lecture type of classes is available in Korean universities and it is not accompanied by related tutorials, as in Australia. Most Korean students reacted favourably to their experiences of tutorials. For instance, one student thought tutorials better, since students could ask a tutor when they did not understand. In fact, most students have a positive attitude to the relationships between lecturers/ tutors and students. As one student explained there is more interaction between teachers and students in Australia, whereas it is very difficult to meet teachers in the Korean universities. Nevertheless,

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4 An undergraduate degree in Korean universities consists of a large number of subjects and more contact hours. For instance, one exchange student who enrolled at Faculty of Arts, Monash University explained that she studied seven or eight subjects each semester totaling 21-24 contact hours per week at her home institution in Korea, whereas she enrolled in only three subjects at Monash University, which required 9 hours of class attendance.
due to unfamiliarity with the new study genre, participation in tutorials is one of the most difficult tasks for Korean students.

Most students experienced constraints in interacting with tutors and classmates in the group. The differences in the teaching style from Korea, where tutors asked lots of questions in class, and also the requirements of presentations and group discussion in Australia classes restricted students’ involvement in class. The students evaluated the resulting difficulties is coming from their lack of English proficiency and their introspective characters. However, most students were not aware that different socio-linguistic rules relevant to this new study genre, involving matters such as how and when to speak in classes was same of the norms they needed to acquire and that lack of familiarity or exposure to these norms could make them less active in classes.

Tutorials are normally small-sized classes in which students are regularly expected to participate in discussion or to present a topic. Students reported that this type of class made them anxious and that lack of their confidence hindered them from participating. Exchange students and one international student could minimally participate in tutorials, but most students claimed to be unable to participate in tutorials during the first semester of their studying abroad, and although they started to participate from the second semester, often they did not gain full confidence even by the time they graduated or finished their oversea sojourn.

It is possible that Korean students suffer from the difficulties to a greater degree than students from some other countries where the educational environments have more in common with the Australian one. It is also possible that a lack of awareness on the part of different academic experiences may lead Australian teachers to reach a negative evaluation of Korean students and a consolidation of a stereotypical and ethnocentrical image of Asian students as passive recipients of knowledge and lacking in critical evaluation skills (Ballard and Clanchy 1991).

**Adjustment strategies and implementation**

It is assumed that when students interact with other people, they do so at varying levels of awareness. An important step in awareness is about the monitoring of one’s own and the other’s behavior. According to Marriott (2000), analysis of difficulties and the implementation of appropriate adjustments can occur only after students note the difficulties or deviations. In some cases, students do not notice their deviations and become frustrated when unexpected outcomes occur. In most cases, it takes a while for students to become aware of the existence of deviations. Consequently a specific and extensive correction process is required to deal with deviations from the norms at the beginning stage (Neustupny 1985).

As mentioned before, only after a negative evaluation of a deviation is formed can various corrective strategies be employed. Some deviations may remain unnoticed, some other deviations are noticed but no corrective adjustment strategies are pursued since these are evaluated neutrally (Neustupny 1985). After planning and implementation of various strategies, if difficulties still remain students need to review and modify the strategies which they previously utilized.
Although various strategies were employed by different students, there were common strategies among them. One type of strategy is a self-reliant adjustment strategy, such as listening to lecture tapes, utilizing library resources, previewing and reviewing of classes; re-writing the draft many times, and using dictionaries. A second type of strategy is utilization of a network-reliant adjustment, such as utilizing language exchange network, or peer support network, consulting with lecturers and tutors in their own subjects, the Language and Learning Service Unit which is a faculty-based-center for assisting students, either local or overseas, with a variety of study skills. A third type of strategy is problem minimisation, such as avoiding certain subjects which require oral presentations or which the students or other students have previously failed. Alternatively, these students may avoid teachers who have a reputation of harsh marking.

**Self-reliant adjustment strategies:** Lack of English proficiency is a major difficulty which students encounter in the first stage of studying abroad. Most students noticed the difficulties and evaluate their language proficiency negatively. The analysis of this problem facing the students led to the implementation of various strategies at different times. Some students analyzed that deficiencies in their English were combined with a lack of disciplinary content knowledge.

Strategies students employed regarding lack of disciplinary content knowledge and language proficiency involved making a vocabulary list, reading books on the disciplinary subject in Korean first and then reading a book in English, previewing the subject before classes using studying lecture notes on the web, reading subject objectives first and then reading the books and articles on the reading list, writing drafts several times, memorizing the important parts from books and articles and listening to lecture tapes.

During the first semester, most students who were interviewed used the lecture tapes and listened to these tapes. After implementation of this strategy, most students found that it was not working effectively and stopped using the tapes altogether. One exchange student managed to implement an adjustment strategy which was a combination of cognitive (analysis) and compensation strategies (guessing intelligently). She adjusted her strategy from just listening to the tapes to listening to the whole tapes first and listening again to find out the parts she did not understand. She stopped the tapes at the part which she could not understand and guessed the meaning through the context, and then referred to books and a dictionary if she still did not understand, and listened to the tapes again.

The frequently-appearing strategies which students employed for lectures or tutorials are a limited set of metacognitive strategies. Students found the amount of reading required for lectures and tutorials was a burden, so they had to employ a metacognitive strategy, such as giving priority of class preparation to tutorials, or practical classes. The format of tutorials requires more interaction than lectures and non-participation in tutorials is more obvious than in a lecture. One international student claimed that if she did not prepare, she could not participate in tutorials or she could not understand when other students talked. Another international student who enrolled in the Science Faculty claimed that he did not prepare for class much, though he prepared for practical classes. Without preparation, it took too long for him to understand questions in laboratory classes, because of difficulty of understanding
English. He also pointed out that the curriculum structure which contains enormous continuous assignments made him do more reviewing than previewing.

Some students employed a strategy of not preparing lectures at all. However, a few found a suitable adjustment strategy, such as the international student who reported that she read books on the reading list and prepared some answers to tutorial questions. She also prepared questions to ask in class in advance and memorized some phrases or expressions from the books on the reading list to ask questions in tutorials.

Another self-reliant adjustment strategies students commonly employed is utilizing library resources for writing. One international student reported that she undertook various adjustment strategies at different stages of writing. She used cognitive strategies in the drafting her essays. She read books for a brainstorming and idea mapping. Then she read more books as a means of changing her original ideas and also deleted unnecessary parts. If new evidence was required, she went to the library to find more information. Related to this, some students looked for models of good essays written by students who had studied the same subject before.

Social-reliant adjustment/ network-reliant adjustment: When Korean students confronted difficulties and evaluated their pattern of studying negatively, they usually seek self-reliant adjustment strategies. If self-reliant adjustment strategies were not employed successfully, especially relating to their major academic work such as essays and exams, which directly affect their academic results, often social-reliant adjustments are employed. The social network students utilized are lecturers/ tutors, peer support network or language exchange networks. Some students consulted their lecturers/ tutors at the planning or drafting stage of writing. For example, an international student consulted with a lecturer as a mean of selecting relevant articles to read. He reported that he did know how and where he would start, so he requested help from a lecturer, and the lecturer assisted with this task.

Sometimes students did not detect the existence of a deviation. One international student reported that she was not aware of her problems in the structure of writing until receiving the written comments by a lecturer, “…the essay makes interesting remarks about the situation in the Korean peninsula, and make a valiant effort to analyse it from a realist perspective. It would have been improved, however, had it a clearer structure to outline the realist ideas and principles”. She employed a clarifying strategy to rectify deviations and implemented it in her next essay. In this case, she made a table of structure using yes/ no forms, and showed it to the tutor before elaborating further ideas. A clarifying strategy was commonly employed by students. Students consult with a lecturer or tutor to clarify the requirement or structure of essays, or asked classmates or tutors about the parts they did not understand.

One of the effective strategies employed by students in this study was utilizing their peer support network, especially for writing essays and preparing for examinations. A good example of implementation of this strategy can be found in an international student who analysed that the good students are those who sit in the front of the lecture hall and identified them as his potential sources of support. He approached them and introduced himself as an international student, and told them frankly that he needed their help. However, we cannot expect all of the students to be as active as he is in building the peer networks.
The pattern of students’ peer networks is varied. One of the students’ peer networks is utilizing the language exchange network with students who study Korean language at the same university. Korean students put their messages seeking an exchange partner on the Korean bulletin boards of the Korean department homepage. Students found this network was very useful, since not only could they receive help from Australian students in terms of their study but also they could experience Australian university student culture and life through socializing with the language exchange partner and their friends. Another network was formed through Korean students club in the university. Some students felt more comfortable to ask help from Korean Australian students at the club than from other Australian friends since this type of ‘primary, monocultural network’ can provide a setting in which ethnic and cultural values are shared (Bochner et al. 1977). A third network was formed with students with whom they share classes. The various networks are very much dependent on the individual character of each students as well as the subjects in which they are enrolled. Here, there is a tendency for Korean students to form peer networks with other Asian students in preference to native Australian ones. But many of these have superior English speaking background, for example, Singaporean students who could provide them with a great deal of assistance. Korean students feel more comfortable with these students as they have much in common with them and can lower their affective filter when they speaking to these students.

**Problem minimization adjustment:** Whether it is desirable or not, problem minimization is another strategy students employed by making choices to avoid problems which the students evaluated as beyond their capability to solve. Problem minimisation can be explained as a kind of metacognitive strategy. Students evaluate their past learning experiences and conclude that they would not able to meet the challenges of the subject. Thus they arrange and plan their study to utilize their time more effectively within a limited time frame. As discussed before, many students were not able to participate in tutorials especially at the beginning stage of their studying overseas. When communication deviations occur in the initial interaction, the negative effect generated might prevent students from interacting in the future in class situations. For instance, because students evaluated participation in tutorials as beyond their competence, they often minimized their involvement or even attendance. Another variation of this kind of adjustment is to ask questions of their teacher after classes instead of during class time.

Some students employed this kind of strategy for selecting subjects. One international student reported that he chose to avoid the subject in which he had previously failed. The rationale of employing this strategy was that he failed the subject in spite of studying hard, so he would fail again if he repeated it. We can argue that he could not find ways of rectifying the deviations, so he employed a strategy of avoidance. Students utilize their social network to get information about subjects, especially related to marks. In this regard, there seems to be a tendency for students to avoid a subject which is known for its high failure rates. However, lack of information sometimes prevented students from employing this strategy. One student reported that he did not understand the tutorial very well and he thought it was due to his poor English. However, he later realized that the teaching methodology of his tutor in the first semester was not good, after he experienced a better tutor in the second semester.
He realized too late that he had a tutor with poor teaching skills, not realising it was possible to change tutors.

Another example of the employment of problem minimization was found from the international student who evaluated that he lacked presentation skills, so he enrolled in an open learning subject during the summer break to avoid presentations. An additional rationale for this was preparation for the possibility of failing a subject, as he could obtain extra academic credit before the semester began. As a result, he was able to manage the following semester more smoothly.

**Conclusion**

The study revealed that students’ difficulties were not only due to deficiencies with their English language competence but also their lack of familiarity with sociolinguistic and sociocultural competence, especially in relation to study genres. The difficulties of adopting to different study genres were partly due to their previous educational experiences. This previous educational background, together with an unawareness of cultural differences in the genre system, may place the Korean students in situations where learning is difficult.

This study focused upon the procedure of overcoming difficulties and identified several specific management strategies students employed to rectify deviations. Some important strategies like affective strategies and metacognitive strategies were not investigated much in this study. For example a good time management strategy can contribute to accomplishing academic life effectively. However, the management strategies outlined may give a valuable guide not only to Korean students but also to other international students who start an overseas sojourn. Hopefully this study will contribute to developing an effective way of teaching and learning not only for Korean students but also other international students.

**Implications for Korean students in Australia and for the Australian institutions**

From the above discussion we can draw some implications for Australian institutions as well as for students who need to implement appropriate management strategies for their study at the Australian institutions. Given that Korean students have predominant previous contact with the lecture genre and no experience of tutorial genre, training will be beneficial in order to acquire turn-taking rules and argumentation skills, and to become aware of the hierarchy relationship between teachers and students. Video and simulation of class using computer can be used to implement this kind of training.

As students will have undertaken written genre, they will need training in writing not only before commencing study but also concurrently with their academic subjects. To implement the training successfully, research on the comparative studies between Australian students and Korean students’ written genre will be required.

Students will be benefit from guidance from not only academics but also students from the same academic background, especially about how to implement strategies in their study. A mentor system between new students and current students can be utilized for this purpose.
Students should also play more an active role in establishing social networks within the Australian academic environment, and the Australian institution should also provide more opportunity for students become involved in activities in the community.

References
The perception and function of myth in historical writings of the Koryŏ period

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1. Introduction

Since the Chŏn dynasty period, mythological stories have been widely dismissed as unreliable sources for historical compilations. The fantastic elements that are embodied in mythical tales were considered to contort historical ‘truth’, a concept which, in the context of Neo-Confucian rationalism, signified impartial information of past events. However, in texts such as the Tongguk tonggam (‘Comprehensive mirror of Korea’, 1485), Sinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (‘Geographical survey of Korea’, 1530), and Tongsa kangmok (‘Outline of Korean history’, 1778), historical writings from earlier periods that incorporate legends and myths are criticised yet used as references. The Tan’gun legend appears in the Tongguk saryak (1403), Samguksa chóryo (‘Chronological summary of the Three Kingdoms’, 1476) and Tongguk tonggam. Under the account of the first year of the founding of Silla in the first chapter of the Samguksa chóryo, there is an annotation on the birth of King Hŏkkŏse that is found in the Samguk yusa (‘Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms’, 1285) by Iryŏn. Likewise, under the account of the fifth year of Silla, there is an annotation on Samguk yusa’s reference to the birth of Hŏkkŏse’s future wife. However, in the Tongguk tonggam, which is the extended version of the Samguksa chóryo, the annotations relating these ‘unusual’ stories are entirely omitted. In the ‘Ch’aegŏ sŏmok’ section in “Pŏmnye” of chapter one of the Tongsa kangmok, the Samguk yusa and Kim Pusik’s Samguk sagi (‘The History of the Three Kingdoms’, 1145) are both criticised for their inclusion of ‘unreliable’ accounts, which refer to the stories that incorporate peculiar events. In Koŏ pyŏnjŭng of “Pu kwŏn” (Appendix) of the same text, it states that the Samguk yusa “lists as many questionable matters in vain, and many of the names of people and places have been taken from Buddhist scriptures.” It goes on to claim that “it is a pitiful thing that people writing history, full of regret when unable to find facts that are worthy of noting, should have incorporated these (fantastic and supernatural) stories in authentic chronicles, whereby reducing a land of benevolence to that of strange clans.” At the same time, however, the Tongsa kangmok records stories from the Šamguk yusa in a section in the appendix that recount ‘strange stories’ (‘Ko-i’). Despite the clear segregation of the ‘strange stories’ category under which these stories are placed, the fact that the text included such a category raises questions related to the function and importance of myth.

In the Koŏ period, while the institutionalisation of historical compilation developed, and the adherence to Confucian rationalism was expected within these institutions, myth remained as a significant element in historical records. In discussing myth and its function in historical writings, it is first necessary to observe
the traditional perception of history, and how the recording of history developed in early Korea. In considering the traditions of history in the Koryŏ period, an understanding of traditional Chinese thought pertaining to history and development of historical forms is essential as they influenced those of early Korea.

2. Traditions and understanding of history in ancient China

While the concept of 'history' as a term has had different connotations in the past, the perception of history was often supported by religious beliefs and legendary accounts in ancient Chinese civilisation. The earliest Chinese historical texts emerged with the necessity to record the performance of sacrificial rites of rulers of the first dynasties. In doing so, genealogical records of the rulers were compiled and kept by a scribe. The inscriptions of names of the royal lineage can be seen on sheep bones and tortoise shells, which served as oracular instruments. These early historians were most likely scribes transmitting natural occurrences and human events, including court commands and state affairs. Natural occurrences and the movement of the heavens were closely observed, whereby astronomy became an integral subject in the writing of history. Prayers and divination were believed to be closely related to occurrences of natural phenomena that affected human fortunes and misfortunes.

Over time, history developed from the remaking of ancient myths to the refining of crude superstitious ideas to conform to reason. Methods and objectives of historical literature were shaped by rational discourse. The institution of history writing was established, with the court’s appointment of scholar bureaucrats entrusted with the task of compiling dynastic or ‘standard’ histories. With Confucian rationalism, the essence of history was the objective truth based on the consistency of existing records, and justified explanation of cause and effect. Praise and blame were considered to be the fundamental elements of official history. In order to achieve objectivity in historical writing, Chinese historians collected and preserved existing documents on which they based their work. The past was to be perceived as a series of concrete events, and history as an accurate and dispassionate registration of them. As Liu Hsieh stated, “in writing a historical record...the record must include sources collected by hundreds of authors; stand the test of time for thousands of years; show the evidences of rise and decline of a state, and demonstrate the reasons for its rise and decline.” (Liu 1970:123-124) In these ways, the Chinese historians developed a method of collecting information, largely from earlier authoritative documents, filtering out the insignificant or unreliable details, and compiling selections. With the establishment and development of standard history that strove to narrate impartial and accurate events of the past, there was a growing tendency to exclude unreliable sources, namely myths, legends, astrological data, and untenable records of natural occurrences. There was a growing tendency to include official data pertaining to court politics in their place. Balazs's study and table of the distribution of 'Treatises', or monographs, in dynastic histories confirm this shift in tendency. From his table (Beasley 1961:86), we observe the following: an overall decline in the number of monographs on 'sciences', or cosmology and unusual phenomena, and an overall increase in the number of monographs pertaining to government administration in standard histories over time. This tendency signifies that history developed into, among other things, bureaucratic guides for functionaries, and, as Balazs puts it, “the shift in interest from the irrational towards the rational, from the ritual to the functional, from the speculative to the concrete; in other words, secularisation, rationalisation, and bureaucratisation.” (Beasley 1961:87)
The function of standard history was to reflect a given society, namely its political ethics and events, so that the content would not only supply later historians with material, but also provide later officials with an insight on how to govern. With restraints in content and style imposed by the court for the beneficial reputation of the government in power in the compilation of standard histories, officials who wished to write history without external restraint often took on the task of writing private histories. Many private historians wished to include not only objective data, but also legends and stories surrounding historical events. Divine causality was not rejected, but added to emphasise the spirit of the times when people still believed in the intervention of the Mandate of Heaven. The concept of historical ‘truth’ was not defined, but rather challenged by the integration of myths. While private histories were unaffected by political bias and conventional rules, they have been for centuries considered as ‘miscellaneous’ works containing spurious information that distort the 'truth'. Hence, while many officials and scholars wrote private histories over time, these have often been dismissed as pi-chi, or notebooks, by historiographers.

3. Traditions and epistemology of history in Koryŏ (918 - 1392)

The early Korean concept of history was similar to that of early China. History writing developed from the transmitting of myths to the filtering of chimerical ideas to the establishment of historical methodologies, whereby history writing as an institution eventually emerged and developed. Confucianism, which constituted the historical perspective of the medieval period, emphasised the moral virtue of the rulers and the role of officialdom in service. Confucian virtue and ethics furthered the goal of enlightened rule, sought peace in foreign policy, and affected cultural society. There emerged a systematic recording of history by scholar bureaucrats appointed by the court. The Office of History in medieval Korea was an important central government office that not only collected and stored historical materials, but also compiled the history of the king’s reign after his death. Mythologies and biographies were sometimes used to justify the lineage of rulers and aristocrats. Early standard history, such as the Samguk sagi, focused on political history, and people were described almost only in relation to the ruler. It was written for the educated and not for the common people. Often, as it was in China, history was written by the bureaucrats for bureaucrats with the aim to educate officials in the art of governing. Dynastic histories came to be established as the standard form of history in the Koryŏ period, and they continued to develop into an increasingly sophisticated form in the Chosŏn period. While there were a number of official histories produced in times prior to the Chosŏn period, the number of texts that have survived from this era are very few. It appears that the silleok, or 'veritable records' was a popular form, certainly in the mid-to-late Koryŏ period. Many do not survive today, but their titles are mentioned in the Koryŏsa (‘History of Ko乃至, 1451) and Koroyŏsa chŏryo (‘Chronological summary of Ko乃至). The only standard history from the Koryŏ period that survives today is the Samguk sagi, which was commissioned by the court, and completed in the twenty-third year of Injong (1145). Kim Pusik and his co-editors adapted the style and structure of Chinese standard histories for their compilation. The writing of the Samguk sagi involved gathering extant records by both Korean and foreign writers on the Three Kingdoms period, and compiling them into a single comprehensive work. The trend in history at the time was to write events based on pre-existing documents, without greatly altering the passages taken from the primary sources.
With the Ch’oe military rule and the Mongol invasions and occupation during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the production of official history was sporadic. Private histories, on the other hand, flourished during this time as they were not controlled or restrained by governing bodies. Among these, which include epic verses, notable extant texts are "Tongmyŏng wangp'yŏn" (‘Lay of King Tongmyŏng’, 1193) by Yi Kyubo, Samguk yusa by Iryŏn, and “Chewang un’gi” (‘Rhymed chronicles of emperors and kings’, 1287) by Yi Sŏnhyu.

4. The characteristics and function of myth in Korean history

4.1 Characteristics of Korean myth (sŏrwa)

Korean mythology is essentially myths surrounding the birth and rise of founders of ancient times. These myths were sometimes integrated into the ‘Biography’ sections of history texts in medieval times to provide some means of justification for the lineage of rulers and aristocrats. 'Myth' is generally referred to as sŏrwa in Korean. The closest definition of the term ‘sŏrwa’ is ‘stories’, and refers specifically to tales that are passed down from generation to generation. ‘Myth’ is generally referred to as sŏrwa in Korean. The closest definition of the term ‘sŏrwa’ is ‘stories’, and refers specifically to tales that are passed down from generation to generation. ‘Myth’ is generally referred to as sŏrwa in Korean. The closest definition of the term ‘sŏrwa’ is ‘stories’, and refers specifically to tales that are passed down from generation to generation. While there are no rigid rules within this genre, there are a few characteristic factors that define it. For example, sŏrwa must involve stories of either mythical or legendary elements, or of fictitious nature. In other words, conspicuous historical facts or current events cannot be considered as sŏrwa. Moreover, sŏrwa is transmitted orally in the first instance, which distinguishes it from sosŏl, or novels. A ‘story’ must consist of characters (humans and other forms of existence), a background, and a linear plot of events often with a series of dramatic cause and effect. Sŏrwa generally includes unusual elements, which distinguishes it from ‘true’ stories. Sŏrwa always reflects the collective thought and belief system of a given culture in which it is created and transmitted.

Sŏrwa is divided into three broad categories: sinhwa (mythical epic), chŏnsŏl (legend), and mindam (folktale). The orator of sinhwa assumes that the story is ‘true’ and sacred. The world of sinhwa presumes the existence of a realm outside of the ordinary and rational world, and does not question the level of veracity and degree of sacredness of these stories. Sinhwa takes place in far ancient settings and holy places, and involves events that are not comparable to those that take place within the boundaries of ordinary human existence. Evidence of these mythical occurrences includes territorial space, kingdoms, and clans – the event of a myth is substantiated by the real existence of kingdoms and family clans that appear in the story. The hero of mythical epics is often a god or demi-god with supernatural powers. The hero in chŏnsŏls, however, is human, but his achievements are particularly exceptional. While the orator of chŏnsŏl does not assume the legend to be sacred, he believes the story to be true. Chŏnsŏl includes specific places, monuments, or objects that can be found in real life, which warrant its ‘factual legitimacy’. The time and place in a legend are fixed and precise. Mindam, however, does not need a specific locale. The characters in tales of mindam are common people, and their actions and behaviour are ordinary. The orator of mindam is aware that the story is entirely fictitious.

4.2 Function of myth in history: the Samguk yusa as an example

As works of standard history in medieval Korea were commissioned and controlled by the court, the content and style of ‘official’ historical writings adhered to an established set of rules influenced by early Chinese traditions. If we consider the traditional perception of history as outlined previously, the fantastic elements that comprise myth are not reliable material for history that aims to record faithful
accounts of events. Historical ‘truth’ lies in precise details of people, places, and incidents within the realm of human existence. While myth has its own boundaries and definitions of ‘truth’ within its world, they are not the same as those of the realm of human history. Mythical stories were included in medieval Korean history books since the earliest surviving records of Korea were often in the form of sinhwa or sŏrhwa. However, annotations were inserted next to these myths, questioning and doubting supernatural accounts, and sometimes attempting to decipher their meaning to make ‘sense’ of these fragments of tales. One such example is taken from the "Paekche pon-ki" of the Samguk sagi: "It is written in the Silla kosa (‘Ancient records of Silla’) - 'As a golden chest (kŭmgwan) descended from Heaven, he was given the name of Kim (kim - the same character for kŭm).’ This event (the golden chest descending from heaven) is questionable, and cannot be considered as true. However, as this story is old and has been transmitted for ages, in putting together history I cannot cut out and eliminate these words."

However, if we observe private historical writings (including poems), we can see how myth can express an important part of history – the spirit of the times, which impartial ‘facts’ cannot illustrate successfully. Due to the limited space and time, one text will be discussed to elaborate further on this matter.

The Samguk yusa was written at the end of the thirteenth century by the Sŏn (Zen) Buddhist master Iryŏn (1206-1289) and his disciples. A number of sources conjecture that the compilation of the text began in the seventh year of King Ch'ungjong (1281) and was completed around 1285. While factual accuracy is indispensable within the conventional definition and understanding of history, the historical vision embedded in Iryŏn’s Samguk yusa is not preoccupied with the historicity of events. In this work, the past does not merely consist of physical incidents, but involves diverse entities of human existence, including a spirit often unique to its given time influenced by a common societal belief system. This 'spirit' is essentially the shared perception and attitude of a collective group that affect its members’ interpretation of historical causation. From the references made to ancient Korean and Chinese texts in some sections, we know that Iryŏn consulted recorded documents that were extant in his time. Where there is no reference to specific texts, we are left to assume that these stories were the result of the author's transcription of oral accounts. By creating a unique literary structure, and making use of both his research-based knowledge and creative imagination, the author was able to go one step further from simply regurgitating impartial information to reconstructing a history that explores both the physical events and the abstract spirit of a community. The vision of history in the Samguk yusa is one that considers not merely 'what happened', but more importantly how human existence, including the issue of causality, may have been perceived and accepted by people at a given time in a given society.

Divine intervention in the form of creatures, spirits, and unnatural acts weaves itself in and out of the entire framework of the Samguk yusa. The narration of unusual occurrences alongside impartial information, and myth alongside fact demonstrates the people's superstitious outlook on human reality in the Three Kingdoms and Koryŏ periods. The coexistence and interconnectedness of these multiple worlds are the basis of Iryŏn’s historical vision: history does not merely consist of people (notably important figures) and physical events surrounding them, but takes into account the people’s attitudes towards human reality supported by existing belief systems and cultural influences. By integrating history, religion, and folklore into a single narrative work, the Samguk yusa demonstrates a perception of history that is supported by religious beliefs and legendary accounts, and the conviction of the interrelatedness
between the natural, supernatural, and unnatural worlds. Here, the ‘natural world’ signifies human existence or reality, and all physical events within this existence that are in accord with nature. The ‘supernatural world’ signifies the world of religion (primitive and otherwise) where spirits and/or higher beings exist. The ‘unnatural world’ signifies man-made inventions and practices such as language, literature, and folk customs, as well as rules and customs governing and affecting individuals within a society.

Iryŏn depicts the natural world with a historical narrative that recounts straightforward information on past events, the supernatural world with fantastic stories that involve divine intervention, and the unnatural world with songs that reveal aspects of literature, language (idu that is used to record the fourteen hyangga pieces), and folklore of a given period. Through a literary structure that fuses together historical narrative, fantastic stories, and songs, the natural, supernatural, and unnatural worlds are symbolically united. In other words, human existence is not separate from the supernatural; the supernatural world, which we perceive as ‘unreal’ today, is very much a ‘real’ part of human life in the Samguk yusa. This concept is further supported by the prevalence of divine intervention throughout the text, which incites and confirms the people’s belief and faith in higher beings (be it heaven, ancestral spirits, or Buddha), and their interaction with human life. This insinuates that the causality of human events was commonly perceived in direct relation to the workings of a higher force in the Three Kingdoms period. In the process of connecting these multiple worlds through the creative management of literary style, Iryŏn reconstructs history that underlines the close relation between human existence, religion, and culture, and the perception of historical causation influenced by a superstitious outlook on human reality.

Myth in the Samguk yusa functions as an eloquent mediator and illustrator of the concrete and abstract worlds. Through the use of myth, not only events but also human perceptions, mentalities, and lively images of the world as it existed then become unfolded before the eyes of the reader.

5. Conclusion

The discrediting of omens, unusual phenomena, and unsubstantiated lore, and the promotion of a methodical approach to history based on the spirit of critical investigation and discernment of facts confirmed the growing tendency towards rationalism and bureaucratisation in the writing of history in early China and Korea. Despite the developing scientific approach to the writing, study, and critique of history, myths have - while being perceived as less important factors in determining the authenticity of past events as the decline in the number of their appearances in standard histories suggest - never been entirely omitted from Korean historical texts. This is because of the irrefutable fact that the earliest source for history was myth and legends, and because keys to strengthen arguments and discussions on origins and lineage could be found in myths in spite of their figurative illusions. More importantly, however, myth can raise significant questions about historical 'truth' which impartial narration cannot, so long as the figurative codes of myth can be deciphered or interpreted.

As in the words of Yi Kyubo in his preface to the epic poem, “Tongmyŏng wang p’yŏn” (‘A lay of King Tongmyŏng’):

When I first heard them I laughingly remarked that the sage of Confucius did not speak of prodigies, feats of strength, disorders, or spirits.... I still could
not believe what I thought were false and illusory legends; but after mulling them over several times, I came round to thinking that they were not illusory, but holy; not false, but spiritual; and that if our national history was to be written properly, they could not be ignored. (Rutt 1973:48)

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Tracking a ghost’s lingering influence:
Chŏng Chisang (?-1135) and a forgotten style of Sino-Korean poetry

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1. Introduction

The idea that poetry (K. si; C. shi) possesses “a meaning beyond words” (K. ön-oe chi-ŭi; C. yan-wai zhi-i) is a commonplace in the history of Chinese literary thought. This expression seems generally to have been used as a positive aesthetic judgement, but it would seem to do little violence to read it against the larger Confucian literary tradition. In that case, we can look to two canonical statements regarding the functions of poetry.

The earliest definition of poetry is found in the Book of Documents:
The [p]oem articulates what is on the mind intently; song makes language last long (Owen 1992: 26).

Later, this was rearticulated in the “Great Preface” to the Book of Songs:
The poem [the poetry of the Book of Songs] is that to which what is intently on the mind goes. In the mind it is being intent; coming out in language, it is a poem (Owen 1992: 40).

These two ideas formed the cornerstones of traditional Chinese views of what poetry is and does. Against this background, the idea that poetry possesses “a meaning beyond words” can be seen to have political and ethical implications insofar as that meaning might be hidden from view—not openly stated—and yet accessible through a variety of extra-textual information.

Moreover, the definition of poetry offered in the “Great Preface” leaves ample room for this possibility if we draw a distinction between the poem as a finished product expressed in words and its origin as intention in the mind: “what is intently on the mind” is itself “beyond words,” and this, in turn, necessitates ever more words (cf. ibid.: 128-129).

Although these judgements on the identity and function poetry arose in China, they became fundamental to the Korean literary tradition, where, to no small extent, they persist in various forms to this day.

In this specific context, it is necessary to highlight the idea of what poetry is and does. It is on this basis that we can approach a unique feature of Sino-Korean poetry and attempt to address one aspect of the history of this feature.

2. Sino-Korean or Chinese?

In 1960, Richard Rutt published a lengthy article which provided an overview of the history Chinese learning in Korea and more important, for my immediate purpose, the mechanics and terminology used by Koreans when composing Chinese poetry (Rutt 1960). The importance of this article cannot be overstated. It is, so far as I know, the single most detailed treatment of this subject with regard to the full range of issues involved in the composition of Sino-Korean poetry (hereafter, Hansi), and
Rutt’s motives and methods in writing the article also are interesting and important. He was keen to record of a style of education that it seemed “may disappear in the hurly-burly of the technical age” (ibid.: 60-61), and critically, the sources he drew on were not limited to books. Instead, his primary sources were people who were involved in such education. In short, he preserved what was a still living method of traditional education (ibid.: 1-2), and one of the critical elements of that education was the composition of Hansi.

With regard to Hansi, there are two major divisions: “ancient style verse” (K. koch’e-si; C. guti-shi) and “modern style verse” (K. künch’e-si; C. jinti-shi), and both can be written with five or seven syllable lines, and with eight lines or four; the latter is known as a quatrain. The “modern style” is also known as “regulated verse” (K. ryul/yul-si; C. lu-shi), and it is the more demanding of the two in terms of its formal requirements (Liu 1962: 24-27). In addition to the required use of rhyme at the final syllables of even numbered lines, the “modern style” also requires that various positions in each line have characters belonging to one of the two tonal divisions, even or oblique.

Here I am solely concerned with the “modern style” or “regulated verse” with eight lines, for it is in Rutt’s description of this style that we are forced to recognize two equally important facts.

First, Koreans did compose Chinese poetry precisely on the same basis as did the Chinese, and at least in terms of the mechanics—the techniques employed—of composition, they demonstrated no shortcomings in their understanding of what was required. This is an aesthetic judgement of the most basic sort, and it is easily verifiable if one subjects Korean Hansi to an analysis of rhymes and tonal placement. Second, Koreans employed two variations of the “modern style” which were recorded by Rutt, and these two variations were codified as patterns that one could follow in writing “regulated verse.”

These two variations differ from what is regarded as the “modern style” proper in the Chinese context with respect to the placement of tones within any given line and in turn, the two lines which form a couplet. The normal pattern should have the tonal variation of the first couplet reversed in the second couplet, and the third couplet repeats the first and the fourth repeats the second (Liu 1962: 26-27).

The two Korean variations, however, provide an interesting twist: in the first variation, the pattern of the first couplet is reversed in each of the remaining couplets; in the second variation, the same pattern is repeated in the first three couplets, and then reversed in the fourth (Rutt 1960: 63).

These two variations are astonishing in light of the extensive work on the tonal prosody—the formal requirements—of regulated verse carried out by scholars working within the Chinese tradition and writing in English. In the authoritative works done by such scholars, there is no room for variation with regard to the “modern style” (Liu 1962; Bodman 1978; Bodman and Wong 1986), and as a consequence, these two Korean variations simply fall outside the limits of the “modern style.”

On the other hand, modern critical studies published in Chinese and traditional works themselves—especially those belonging to the traditional form of literary criticism known as shihua (poetry-talks)—are much more inclusive (e.g. Zhang and Zhang 1975, vol. 1: 126-132). It is not my intention here to provide an overview of
the Chinese scholarship, but rather to look at the history of this issue in the Korean literary context.

3. The clash and the complement of traditions

The idea that these two Korean variations have somehow been forgotten is neither completely correct, nor is it wholly incorrect, and as with many topics which stand at the crossroad of the Korean and Chinese cultural traditions, it is the nebulousness of the point—indeed, the difficulty of offering a neat answer—that makes the question so frustrating and also, so interesting.

In effect, one is responsible for two traditions, much as Korean writers were themselves. This double responsibility is a central point of concern in the Korean poetry-talk (K. sīhwâ; C. shihua) tradition—the body of writings on which this paper is partly based—and this body of writings is fascinating because we are forced to recognize Korean writers’ continual shifts of attention between the Korean and Chinese traditions. Such shifts are also disorienting, and here I would like to bring some order to this.

In the Chinese context, we can find examples of these two variations. These examples are included among various other examples (Wang 1958: 115), however, and there is no indication that these two variations provided models/patterns for emulation in China. Although there is a variety of specific terminology related to prosody—virtually the same in Korea as in China—these various examples are called, in sum, yoch’esi (C. ao-ti shí), and various translations of this word are possible.

In my opinion, the best is “transgressive style,” in which transgressive is to be understood in relation to the normal arrangement of tones in the “regulated style.” In short, the ao/yo style does not follow the normal rules: hence, it is “transgressive.”

In the Korean context, this style is explicitly associated with Chŏng Chisang (?-1135), who was executed for his alleged involvement in an attempted coup d’êtat with the Buddhist priest Myoĉ’ŏng (?. -1135). According to a story ascribed to Yi Kyubo (1168-1241), Chŏng later became a ghost and took revenge upon his executioner, Kim Pusik (1075-1151). Although the provenance of this story is questionable, there can be little doubt about the importance of Chŏng’s name in relation to this style or his lingering presence in the Sino-Korean critical tradition.

Chŏng Chisang and the “transgressive style” are virtually synonymous in the Korean sources—both traditional and modern—but in spite of this, it is not possible to say with any absolute certainty that he is the source for the two variant patterns in Korea. Even though these two variant patterns fall within the “transgressive style,” there are other patterns which also would be described as “transgressive.” In short, the two Korean variant patterns are yoch’esi, but not all yoch’esi are the same as the two Korean variant patterns.

Some of Chŏng’s extant poems do show irregularities which clearly mark them as yoch’esi. None conform to the two Korean variant patterns, however, and herein lies the greatest obstacle: very few of Chŏng’s poems have survived, and as a consequence, we cannot know whether he was, in fact, the source for these two variations in Korea, although it seems safe to assume that these two variant forms would have been associated with him in the Korean context.

This significance of this point will be addressed in more detail later, but now I would like to turn to the most of important of the traditional sources which treat him and the transgressive style.

4. A ghost in the Korean sources

The first mention of the word yoch’esi in Korea seems to have occurred in the late 15th century, in Sŏ Kŏjŏng’s (1420-1488) Tongin sīhwâ (Poetry Talks by a Man
from the East [i.e. Korea]), completed between 1474 and 1477. Sŏ had also worked on the final draft of the Koryŏ-sa (History of the Koryŏ Dynasty [918-1392]), completed in 1451, and here too we find specific comments about Chŏng’s poetry. Although the word yoch’esi is not found in the Koryŏ-sa, it is not unreasonable to think that Sŏ’s interest in Chŏng derived from his work on the History, and that this interest was subsequently reflected in his Tongin sihwa. As will be seen later, this interest seems to have been reflected in another important text as well.

The likelihood of this is further strengthened inasmuch as the word does not seem to be mentioned in any of passages related to Chŏng in the most important and earliest sihwa collections in Korea: the P’ahan-jip (Collection to smash leisure; Yi Illo [1152-1220]); the problematic Paegun sosŏl (Stories by White Cloud [Yi Kyubo, 1168-1241]) or the identical—or at least, similar—portions contained in the more authoritative Tongguk Yi-Sangguk-chip (The collected works of the Prime Minister Yi [Kyubo] of the Eastern Realm [Korea]; the Pohan-jip (Collection to mend leisure; Ch’oe Ch’a, 1188-1260); or the Yŏgong p’aesŏl (The stories of Yŏgong [Yi Chehyŏn, 1287-1367]).

The detailed reference to Chŏng in the Koryŏ-sa is significant because the focus is on politics and his poetry, and this portion comprises the final lines of the section on Myoch’ŏng’s failed rebellion. In full it reads:

Chisang’s original name was Chiwŏn and from an early age, he was intelligent and renowned for his ability to write poetry. He was selected as the top candidate in the state examinations, and passing through the ranks, attained the position of chamberlain (kigŏju) to the king. People say that [Kim] Pusik [1075-1151] at first kept his name on a par with Chisang in terms of literary composition, but that he stored up dissatisfaction and reaching that point [of dissatisfaction], he killed him, relying for support on [the charge of] secret compliance [i.e. the charge that Chisang had been in collusion with Myoch’ŏng’s planned insurrection]. Chisang wrote poetry and had obtained the style of the Late Tang [836-905]. [With] Strange and skilful quatrains (K. ku-gong; C. you-gong), his words (K. sa-ŏ; C. ci-yu) were splendid (K. ch’ŏng-hwa; C. qing-hua), and his tonal patterns (K. un-gyŏk; C. yun-ge) were heroic and unrestrained (K. ho-il; C. hao-yi). Of himself, he achieved a masterly method (ilgabŏp) (KS, vol 2: 773, a:18-b:5). The first of Sŏ’s several entries on Chŏng in the Tongin sihwa reads, in places, very closely to the above passage from the Koryŏ-sa:

(Munyŏl [lit. Literary Vigour]) Kim Pusik and the Royal Remonstrator (Kanŭi) Chŏng Chisang kept their names on a par through poetry at one time...[In Kim’s poems one finds that] his words and meanings are strict and orthodox, proper and elegant, and substantial, and these are the words of one who truly possesses virtue. The words and tones (K. ḃ-un; C. yu-yun) of Chŏng’s poetry are fine and brilliant (K. ch’ŏng-hwa; C. qing-hua), and the structure of his lines (K. ku-gyŏk; C. ju-ge) is heroic and unrestrained (K. ho-il; C. hao-yi). [He had] deeply obtained [i.e. mastered] the methods of the late Tang, and he especially excelled in the “transgressive style” (K. yoch’e; C. ao-tti) [as can be seen in some of his lines of poetry]. When these lines were recited [lit. came out of the mouth], people were astonished. Such lines were praised far and wide at that time, and at a stroke these lines were sufficient to sweep away the useless throng. The two masters’ [Kim and Chŏng] temperaments did not conform each to the other (TSH, vol. 1, no. 4: 33-35).
In the section immediately following this introduction to Chŏng and his poetic style, Sŏ explains what is meant by yoch’e. This explanation appears to be the first of its kind in Korea. It closely resembles those given in Chinese sources (e.g. Dong 1974: esp., 432), and it seems to be the model for subsequent explanations in the Korean tradition.

The “transgressive style” (yoch’e) was another change of Tang prosody (Tang-ryul), and in both the past and present, there are not many writers [who have used this style]. In this method [i.e. the “transgressive style”], one encounters a place at which the prosody (K. yul/ryul; C. lu) is to be changed [i.e. the tone should be altered]. Where one should write down a character belonging to the even tone category (K. p’yŏng-cha; C. ping-zi), one instead writes [lit. switches and uses] a character belonging to the oblique tone category (K. ch’ŭk-cha; C. ze-zi), [and one does this] in order to make the words’ energy (K. ŏ-ki; C. yu-qi) unusual, haughty, and not in accordance [with what is proper or usual]. The people of the late Tang delighted in employing this style, and Chŏng’s poetry deeply possessed that exquisiteness. Subsequently, there was no one able to continue [this style]. Only Ónghŏn Kim Chidae (1190-1266) obtained this method…[and in his lines of poetry], there are many which extensively adopt [this method] (TSH [1: 5]: 35-36).

It is clear that Sŏ admires Chŏng and his use of the “transgressive style.” Any doubts we might have on this point are dispelled in a subsequent section of the Tongin sihwa (TSH [1: 37]: 88-89), and in sum, these comments are important for a variety of reasons, in terms of both the history of Korean literary thought and Sŏ as a practicing literary critic.

First and foremost, it is evident that Sŏ is primarily concerned with Chŏng as a poet. There is no explicit mention of political issues, the most pertinent one being Chŏng’s alleged role in Myoch’ŏng’s failed rebellion. This is critical inasmuch as poetry itself is seen as linked to moral, ethical, and political concerns. In the Chinese and hence Korean classical literary traditions, this connection is of fundamental importance, as is made plain in the often quoted passage found in the Analects of Confucius: “Confucius said, ‘As for the three hundred poems in the Book of Odes, one word [i.e. phrase] embraces them [all]: ‘[their] thoughts have no deviations’” (cf. Ames and Rosemont, Jr. 1998: 76, 232; Owen 1992: 48, 584).

As a consequence, it seems that Sŏ is distancing Chŏng from this sort of moral and political criticism by focusing on his poetry alone. At the same time, the basis for these criticisms is evident, for it is, in effect, the fundamental basis of all poetry criticism. It is thus significant that in the forward to the Tongin sihwa, written by Kang Hŭmaeng (1424-1483), Kang devoted considerable space to justifying the text on the basis of Confucius’ statement, quoted above. Moreover, Kang cited the same passage as the first poetry-talk (sihwa) (TSH: K, 21; C, 22), thereby marshalling the support of the Confucian tradition for Sŏ’s book.

It seems possible that Kang was perhaps troubled by the lack of orthodox moral, ethical, and political values manifested in Sŏ’s text, since by the time the Tongin sihwa was written, the fiercely Neo-Confucian Chosŏn dynasty was over three-quarters of a century old, and distinctions between orthodoxy and heterodoxy were firmly drawn.

More to the point, Chŏng Chisang possessed no single attribute which might be used to present him as a good, orthodox (Neo-) Confucian. At best, he was an eccentric fellow who fell prey to the complexities of politics at the royal court; at worst, he was an eccentric who was also a dangerous plotter, complicit in an
attempted coup d'état. In neither case does he fit the stereotype of a good (Neo-) Confucian, and here the question of types is critical, and this brings us to the question of poetry.

To the best of my knowledge, we can assume that those who would have read the Tongin sihwa—especially those at the end of the 15th century—would have known Kim Puisk and Chŏng Chisang, and their respective places in the history of the Koryŏ dynasty. In light of this, the comments on their poetic styles seem to serve the purpose of defining these two different men’s personalities through their poetic styles. It would seem that So assumes that his readers know these two men, and through his evaluation of their poetry, he demonstrates that the quality and character of the man is expressed in his poetic manner: for Kim, this style—like his character and reputation—is orthodox; for Chŏng, this style is transgressive, just as his character, too, is transgressive.

The central point in his evaluations of the two men is the distinction between what is orthodox and what is transgressive, and as mentioned above, this distinction does not place Chŏng at a disadvantage in the Tongin sihwa. This runs counter to our expectations insofar as the Chosŏn dynasty was thoroughly influenced by Neo-Confucianism to the extent that all else—that is, the Buddhist and Daoist thought associated with Myoch’ŏng and Chŏng—were to be suppressed. If nothing else, this is the stereotype by which modern scholars have come to view the Chosŏn dynasty, and although it is accurate enough as a general description of the overall intellectual tendencies of the dynasty, it often fails miserably when applied to specific instances.

Kim Manjung (1637-1692) is perhaps the most well-known, clear-cut example of what amounts to a remarkable deviation from the norms of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy (Bouchez 1985), but when we consider that So too was a Neo-Confucian, we begin to sense the complexities involved, and just as important, the shades of difference among various thinkers, writers, and statesmen (kwallyo-munin).

This conflict was not confined simply to politics per se, but was instead clearly articulated in ideas about literature and its application, uses, and meaning, and the general division becomes [Neo-] Confucianism to one side, and Daoism and Buddhism to the other. By the time the Tongin sihwa was written, this division seems to have been firmly established (cf. Chŏng Taerim 1991: 71-72), and as a result we sense something rather transgressive in So himself.

Yet this is precisely where the problem is to be found: Chŏng Taerim firmly places So in the established Neo-Confucian camp in the early part of the Chosŏn dynasty. And Chŏng’s argument seems perfectly reasonable insofar as he focuses on utilitarianism (hyoyong-non) and its central importance in traditional Korean literary thought and criticism, especially in the early decades of the Chosŏn dynasty when Neo-Confucianism was becoming firmly entrenched to the exclusion of non-orthodox forms of thought: primarily, Daoism and Buddhism, two heterodox philosophical and religious systems whose positions were seen to be in direct conflict with the Neo-Confucians’ fundamental aims of a centralized, hierarchical bureaucratic system.

One of the critical pieces of information used by Chŏng Taerim is So’s preface to the Tongmun-sŏn. The larger context—political, intellectual, and even economic—in which the preface was written is interesting in and of itself, but these issues need not concern us here. What I would like to emphasise is the remarkable disparity between So’s Tongin sihwa and the views he advances elsewhere, specifically in his Tongmun-sŏn sŏ (Preface to the Anthology of Writings from the East) and Chin-Tongmun-sŏn chŏn (Note on Advancing the Tongmun-sŏn).
In his “Note,” Sŏ suggests a difference between the Koryŏ and the Chosŏn dynasties, and the question of the place of writing in the larger political, religious, and philosophical context is central to this difference: “Literary refinement came to great renown in the Koryŏ, and guidance by virtue flourishes in our well-governed age [i.e. the Chosŏn dynasty]” (quoted in Chŏng Taerim 1991: 70).

In the “Preface” Sŏ’s appeal to Neo-Confucian norms is most clearly stated, however, and this is evident in the final section in which he draws a broad distinction between the writings of the past—that is, the classical past of Confucianism—and those of the “subsequent ages” (K. huse; C. hou-shi)—that is, the generations subsequent to the classical past.

Here too he charts the development of writing/literature (K. mun; C. wen) in Korea, though in greater detail than in the “Note,” and as before he judges the newly established Chosŏn dynasty as sitting at the apex of Korea’s literary achievement:

Writing in Korea began in the Three Kingdoms [3rd-7th centuries], flourished in the Koryŏ, and has reached its apex in this vigorous Morning [Cho; i.e. the Chosŏn dynasty]. This is related to the vicissitudes of heaven and earth and of fortune, and the origins of this, nevertheless, can be scrutinized. Moreover, writing (mun) is a tool for piercing the Dao: the writing of the Six Classics [of Confucianism] “is not ‘having intention directed at writing’” [K. pi yuūi ŏ mun; C. fei you yi yu wen], and of its own accord, it is wedded to the Dao. The writings of the subsequent ages (huse) first have the intention of writing, and some [writings] are not genuine with respect to the Dao. For those engaged in study at present, if one is able really [to put one’s] heart in the Dao and not write within writing [i.e. instead to write in accord with the (Neo-) Confucian Dao, rather than being intent on writing first and foremost; see above], if one takes root in the Classics [of Confucianism] (K. kyŏng; C. jing) and is not stupefied by the cheja (C. zhuzi; i.e. the various teachings other than Confucianism), if one reveres what is true and rejects the ephemeral, and if one is high of virtue and scholastic attainment and is just: then this is what is taken to serve as the wings [i.e. aids or assists] for the writings of the sages, and it will surely have the Dao. If one writes within writing and does not take root in the Dao, if one turns one’s back on the model and standard of the Six Classics, [and thus] falls into the hollow of the grain mortar [i.e. mistakes] of the curriculum of the cheja, then one’s writings are not writings piercing the Dao (TMS, vol. 1: 552).

The position set forth by Sŏ is marked by a variety of inconsistencies, most notably the conflict between the virtue of the newly established Chosŏn dynasty and his overall emphasis regarding the devolution of writing—and the moral/ethical component therein. Sŏ seems to be arguing out of both sides of his mouth, and in the historical context, this is understandable. The question of the ethical/political legitimacy of the new dynasty leads to an inevitable conflict between means and ends, and as made clear in the “Preface” itself, the Tongmun-sŏn is being presented to the king whose own virtue is explicitly seen as linked to it (TMS, vol. 1: 22 and 552).

Chŏng Taerim also points to the logical absurdity (nolli-chŏn gaeūi mosun) of this position insofar as it leads to a collapse between the “root and the branch” (pon-mal)—the Dao itself, on the one hand, and writing and its function, on the other—and he notes that this absurdity is to be found in Zhu Xi himself and did not pass without criticism (69). There is nonetheless another position from within the Korean tradition by which this absurdity can be elucidated, and this position is to be found in Sŏ Kŏjŏng as critic in his Tongin sihwa.
Based on Sŏ’s comments regarding Chŏng Chisang, one can put forth the counter argument that the “Preface” and the “Note” were perhaps not so reflective of Sŏ’s intellectual position as they might appear at first glance. In particular, one is struck by his singling out the cheja, and as reflected in the annotators’ comments to the “Preface,” the use of cheja in this context is most strongly suggestive of Daoism, specifically the Lao-zi and the Zhuang-zi (TMS, vol. 1: 22). This censure of Daoism—though Buddhism perhaps can also be included here—is further underscored by his exhortation to reject the “ephemeral” (K. pu; C. fu), itself a none too subtle denunciation of the idea of transience central to both Buddhism and Daoism. In short, the disparity between the “Preface” and “Note,” on the one hand, and the Tongin sihwa, on the other, is remarkable, and it is difficult to know precisely how to interpret this disparity.

One thing is clear enough, however: the looseness and freedom in personality expressed through Daoism and Buddhism as found in Yi Kyubo’s writings, for instance, turns to a greater self-consciousness—more intellectual, more restrained—as found in Kim Manjung who, though sympathetic to intellectual traditions other than Confucianism, nonetheless subjected these to a critical gaze.

By contrast, Sŏ merely presents to us two utterly dissimilar critical bases upon which he appraises literature. In a sense, it is as if two very different people worked on the Tongmun-sŏn and the Tongin sihwa, and it is thus significant that Chŏng Taerim makes a point of dispelling any doubts regarding the veracity of Sŏ’s authorship of either the “Preface” or the “Note,” though he does so for reasons unrelated to either Chŏng Chisang or the Tongin sihwa (66).

In spite of this apparent dissimilarity, there is at least one reason to see a remarkable degree of continuity between the Tongmun-sŏn and the Tongin sihwa, and this continuity is precisely Chŏng Chisang’s poetry, or perhaps more accurately, the absence of it.

Sŏ is the figure whose name comes up in relation to three major texts which mention Chŏng Chisang and his poetry—the Koryŏ-sa (1448) (Pratt, Rutt, Hoare 1999: 430), the Tongin sihwa (1474-1477), and the Tongmun-sŏn (1478)—and the coincidence of the final two texts is interesting because it seems that all that remains of Chŏng’s poetry is gathered therein: Min Pyŏngsu counts 13 pieces (1997: 99), whereas the index to the Tongmun-sŏn lists 14 individual titles (TMS, saegin [index]: 47). Whatever the case, but a few pieces have been transmitted, and it is reasonable to believe that Sŏ is largely responsible for the preservation of what little remains.

5. Conclusion

While Sŏ seems to have been the critic who took the deepest interest in Chŏng Chisang and preserved his scanty corpus of poems, many other critics—both before and after Sŏ—have been responsible for preserving memories of Chŏng Chisang the poet barely exists, and yet he is a continual and important presence in Korea’s poetry-talk tradition.

Moreover, his name is virtually synonymous with the “transgressive style,” and this raises an intriguing question related to the two variant forms of the “modern style” recorded by Rutt: how is it that these two variant forms came to be codified patterns in Korea, albeit little used? These are “transgressive style,” but many other variations—“transgressive styles”—are possible: why these two in particular?

Answering such questions, if only tentatively, would require attention to issues and materials dealt with only briefly in the limitations of this paper: in particular, the
fascinating resources found in the Chinese poetry-talk tradition, the equally fascinating resources found in the Korean tradition, the influences of the former upon the latter, the many shifts in critical attitudes both in China and Korea, and the emergence of different schools of literary thought.

Of these, the last is the most important, and it seems likely that the codification of these two variant forms in Korea was a result of the empiricist Sirhak (Practical Learning) movement in the late 18th or early 19th centuries. This thorny issue, however, must be set aside for another occasion.

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Overcoming sexual repression: 
Humor and sexuality in Chosŏn period literature

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Introduction

In every society, group, or assembly of people there are multiple voices and worldviews. Despite this diversity, commonly a majority or “official” voice is emphasized to such an extent that dissenting or alternative voices are effectively secluded or marginalized. This often occurs in the creation of grand historical discourses that seek to establish a single narrative that explains a nation’s or people’s past. Yet, as Benedict Anderson (1991) has established in the context of nationalism, the manufacturing of a “national” or all-encompassing identity is little more than a fabrication and the emphasis of certain values/voices over others. Humans are diverse and multi-faceted, and to clumsily attempt to categorize any number of us into neat classifications is no more than a futile exercise. Humanity can be defined, in the most fundamental sense, by our individuality.

The case of the Chosŏn dynasty is illustrative of this tendency to oversimplify and selectively stress certain aspects of history. While the common characterization of Chosŏn concerns the influence of the Neo-Confucian ideology and its impact in transforming the whole of society, this is only one aspect of the actual situation. While acknowledging the expansive authority of Neo-Confucianism in the late Chosŏn period—many scholars argue otherwise for the early and mid Chosŏn periods (see Deuchler 1992; de Bary and Kim 1985)—I contend this merely represents one face of Chosŏn. Rather, Neo-Confucian discourses constitute what we can designate as the “official” ideology or discourse. Along with the “official” ideology, however, existed other—and equally important—“unofficial” discourses. These “unofficial” discourses were largely represented by the culture and belief systems of the common people, although not exclusively practiced by those in the lower classes. This corresponds with the circumstances in Europe described by Mikhail Bakhtin: an official society dominated by hierarchy and etiquette and an unofficial society that operated by a much freer set of rules (1984: 154). Yet, individuals were not confined to a single sphere of society, and the interaction of different classes of people in both official and unofficial society was (and is) characterized by fluidity and change depending upon time and place.

In this paper, I will focus my discussion on common human emotions such as passion and sexual desire. Certainly included in the Confucian code were norms that governed relations and interaction between the sexes, and these morals played a major role in repressing public discourse on sexuality and the propagation of ethics such as ch’ilse-pudongsŏk (男女七歳不同席 after the age of seven, one may not sit with one of the opposite sex) helped ensure that properly raised men and women were socialized in separate realms. Nonetheless, despite the pervasiveness of the Confucian codes and discourse, basic human emotions such as passion and sexual
desire were common, and as I will demonstrate, integral parts of society.¹

Subverting the Official Discourse on Sexuality

In his examination of sexuality in the West, Michel Foucault stated that in the process of transforming sex into a discourse, sexuality was carefully confined and moved into the home where it became simply a means for reproduction; thus it was not a matter for public discussion (1990: 3-4). Consequently, dialogues celebrating aspects of sexuality were no longer acceptable in official literature. Bakhtin wrote that the culture of folk humor was excluded from great literature and instead fell to the low comic level of the folk (1984: 33).

This is markedly different from early times when sexuality was closely linked with the sacred realm and religious beliefs. As ancient humans needed to multiply in order to ensure the survival of the tribe, aspects of the human body that emphasized sexual fertility were exaggerated in an attempt to bring about a magical influence on the reproductive capabilities of humans; this phenomenon is clearly seen in primitive art (Lucie-Smith 1991: 11-13). Yet, with the development of “higher” religions and beliefs systems, sexuality was understood as something that needed to be controlled or hidden from formal society.

One aspect of sexuality not discussed by Foucault is that of romantic love and passion. As Anthony Giddens reminds us, passionate love has long been viewed as a disruptive and even dangerous force by society, since it has the power to remove us from our usual existence and further pushes us to consider many radical options or sacrifices for the object of our passion (1992: 38). Marriage became a matter of economics instead of a consequence of mutual sexual attraction and desire. Yet passion is a relatively common human emotion and continued to figure significantly in male-female relations, oftentimes bringing about havoc in trying to desexualize or otherwise control the relationships between men and women.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the case of Korea is not all that different from the West and follows a similar continuum of relative freedom to systematic repression. As I have discussed elsewhere (2001), the sexual mores in ancient Korean states such as Koguryŏ were quite relaxed, a point on which some Chinese histories criticize their eastern neighbors. With the spread of Confucianism to all levels of society by late Chosŏn, the transformation of public discourses on sexuality was strikingly similar to that in the West. Still, this is not to say that the male-female union was not valued, as sons were needed to extend the family line, and women who did not produce sons were subject to expulsion by their husbands.² Accordingly, while the sexual act that would bring about heirs to a lineage was a necessary and natural function, it was excluded from the official discourse.

For a society such as Chosŏn that was organized on the foundation of patrilineal descent groups, the purpose of marriage, i.e., producing male offspring, was the manner in which society could survive (Deuchler 1992: 236-237). While males (at least the economically able ones) were allowed other outlets for their sexual desires such as concubines and female entertainers (kisaeng), this was definitely not the case for women. Adultery was harshly dealt with by society, and those women who were found guilty of this crime were punished severely in order to set an example. However, the sexual act that would bring about heirs to a lineage was a necessary and natural function, it was excluded from the official discourse.

¹ This paper is an extension of Pettid (2001). The present paper investigates new source materials that brings women’s voices into my discussion. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are mine.

² Not producing male offspring was one of the seven grounds for expulsion of a wife in Chosŏn (七去之惡 ch’ilgŏ chiak): the others are disobedience to one’s parents-in-law, adultery, theft, undue jealousy, grave illness, and extreme talkativeness.
example for the rest of society. At the same time, those women whose actions could be upheld as exemplars for others were glorified in educational works such as Oryun haengshil-to (五倫行實圖 Stories Exemplifying the Five Confucian Virtues with Illustrations) and Samgang haengshil-to (三綱行實圖 Conduct of the Three Bonds with Illustrations). Accordingly, the sexuality of women was repressed to an even greater extent than that of men during this period.

It is important to note that while control of sexuality was legislated to a certain degree in Chosŏn, for example with the ch'ilgŏ chiak and legal codes such as the Kyŏngguk taejŏn (經國大典 Grand Code of Managing the Nation), it was more significantly regulated by one’s neighbors and community. Bringing order and uniform acceptance of Neo-Confucian precepts in Chosŏn society—although begun by the state—became the duty of all yangban society. From the upper class yangban, this sense of propriety spread to the lower classes such as the chung’in (middle people). As Foucault (1977) has asserted in the case of nineteenth century Europe, by making the subjects of the state the agents of surveillance and regulation, laws were internalized and the people became their own policing agents. The acceptance and practice of Neo-Confucian doctrine allowed marriages to be contracted between families, strengthened political alliances, and established a family as cultured and worthy of engaging. Those who did not adhere to societal norms were shunned and became social outcasts. Hence, by propagating a highly restrictive code such as Neo-Confucianism, the Chosŏn government, at least on the surface, was able to create a self-perpetuating system of social controls. Although Neo-Confucianism was not the only belief system in Chosŏn, it was certainly the dominant ideology and accordingly exerted its influence on other systems such as shamanism (see Ch’oe Kil-sŏng 1982). Given this type of social milieu, we can expect to find the official literature of Chosŏn to be largely in adherence with the norms established by society. And, in fact, this is the case with most upper class literature. While there were some outlets for writings that contained sexual themes, these were largely anonymous. The veil of anonymity gave the writers of these works an opportunity to release their repressed sexual feelings, most often in the form of humorous narratives. As Bakhtin argued, the sexual act is closely linked to laughter; moreover, as laughter does not create dogmas and cannot be authoritarian, it is not something to be feared, but rather an emotion that provides strength (1984: 95). Thus, laughter allows us to discuss those matters that official society does not broach.

Sexual relations outside of the realm deemed proper are also treated didactically in other Chosŏn literature. In these examples, the primary impetus for discussing sex, at least superficially, is to condemn certain behaviors as immoral. Hence, we have works by known authors revealing the consequences of lust and

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3 Indeed, many remnants of the strong Neo-Confucian patriarchal system created in the Chosŏn period remain active in contemporary South Korean society. Some examples include the male-centered Family Registration Law (호족-بول), preference given to males in employment, and the societal expectations placed on women concerning “womanly duties” such as childrearing and homemaking.

4 For example, the Chosŏn wangjo shillok (朝鮮王朝實錄 Veritable Records of the Chosŏn Dynasty) records numerous instances of those punished for inappropriate sexual acts. One of the best examples concerns the wife of Ch’oe Chunggi (her name is given as Kamdong). Ch’oe, a magistrate, divorced Kamdong after her many affairs were revealed. According to the account in the Sejong shillok (世宗實錄 Veritable Records of King Sejong) she had sexual relations with some twenty-four yangban class men. See Sejong shillok, [1427.8.17] 37: 14-15. Additionally, as a means of criticizing the corruption of the Koryŏ dynasty, the Koryŏsa (高麗史 History of Koryŏ) gives several examples concerning the corrupt behavior of Koryŏ personages. The account of the sexual misconduct of the monk Shindon (? - 1371) is particularly illustrative of this point (132: 10b-11a).
uncontrolled sexuality. The two primary sources for understanding alternative perceptions of sexuality in Chosŏn are narratives in literary miscellanies and yadam (unofficial histories) collections, and narrative shijo. The authorship of some of these works is known, and in the case of the former, exclusively male. Narrative shijo, on the other hand, were written by both men and women and thus provide us the opportunity to investigate sexual descriptions by both sexes. A common element in these accounts is the use of humor to create descriptions, that while establishing a counter discourse to the “official” perception of sexuality, are able to be shared across gender and class lines. Humor, then, allowed the people to subvert the official taboo against bringing sexuality into the public forum.

**Alternative Views of Sexuality in Narrative shijo**

Before examining particular works, let me first briefly discuss the importance of narrative shijo (辭設時調 sasŏl shijo) and their composers. Basically, narrative shijo are those works that broke from the established method of composing shijo (平時調 p’yŏng shijo, ‘standard’ shijo); they are generally longer than standard shijo and musically they differ considerably. This has led some scholars to suggest that the origins of narrative shijo might be found in folk songs, which have similar musical qualities (Cho 1991: 3.291-292; Kim Hunggu 1997: 71). Another possible link between narrative shijo and folk songs is the baseness of their composers or composer groups. While not all narrative shijo were written by members of the lower classes, many records do indicate composers outside of the yangban class.

Beyond a mere stylistic transformation, narrative shijo represent a major break in subject and disposition. While standard shijo concentrated on refined expression and descriptions of contemplative beauty, narrative shijo explored other sentiments of the common class and humans in general. Accordingly, we have poems telling of daily life and thoroughly antagonistic towards the ruling class of Chosŏn. Along these same lines and of particular importance to this study is the fact that many narrative shijo feature subjects such as love, sex, and relations between men and women. The following narrative shijo retell sexual relations as described by women. These descriptions will, I believe, help in overturning some myths or fallacies concerning the attitudes of women about sex and their own sexuality. Consider the following account:

I think that I will miss the guy I slept with last night. As the son of a tile-maker works clay, he massaged me; as the son of a mole rummages about, he groped me; as a boatman thrusts with his pole, he thrust me; in my whole life, I’ve never had such a lascivious night! Though I have met many kinds of men, truly I’ll never forget the guy who was with me last night.

Rather than a sexually repressed woman, the narrator of the above poem seems a passionate and eager bed partner. While this is just one woman, her strong

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5 A good example of this is found in Yöllŏshil kisul (燃黎室記述 Narratives of Yöllŏshil) compiled by Yi Kŭngik (1736-1806), which records an account of the sexual misconduct of Yŏnsan-gun (r. 1494-1506), the tenth king of Chosŏn who was eventually disposed for his improper behavior. Yi retells the tale of a woman who was raped by the king and as a result committed suicide.

6 Translation aided by Suh Ji-young. Recorded in Chang 1980: 19, no. 64.

7 Although the authorship of this work is attributed to Yi Chŏngbo (1693-1766), a prominent yangban
voice—recollecting not romantic love, but sexual passion—should help us to debunk some of the myths that surround women and the qualities associated with them. Pam Morris (1993: 14-15) has written that the creation of “femininity” is merely the offspring of the fabrication of the traits grouped under the banner of “masculinity.” That is, the traits that men despise in themselves are the ones linked to women: hence, men are virile, enjoy sex, and are rational, while women are ascribed the opposite characteristics, as being yielding and demure, desirous of romantic love rather than sex, and are emotional. The above poem, however, depicts a woman who enjoyed the physical nature of her sexual encounter—she does not seem to have any vision of romance, just sexual satisfaction.

The imagery used in the poem adds a humorous touch to the account. The man’s rough caresses are likened to a tile-maker working clay, his movements are compared to a mole scurrying about in the ground, and sexual intercourse is correlated with a boatman using a pole to move his boat along. Tying her lover’s actions to daily life creates a very believable image of this affair, and the humor allows a metaphoric depiction of the lovemaking.

Yet, not all women seemed to have enjoyed the sexual relations that they were forced to endure for one reason or another. Consider the following account:

Look at that stout and manly army servant; Wearing a narrow-cuffed shirt, red plumes, and throwing off his hat, he enters a woman’s room only at night; then, after rough sex throughout the night, his energy spent, he vomits the wine he had drunken. Really, if I wanted to catch a drunkard, I would start by grabbing that sot.8

The narrator of this poem,9 evidently an innkeeper or prostitute at a drinking establishment near a military post, has little use for her inconsiderate lover. He uses her simply as an object for his own pleasure with no regard for her needs, either emotional or physical. The narrator in this poem is not only dominated sexually by the drunken army servant who uses her as a vessel for his pleasure, she is also dominated by the patriarchal Chosŏn society that has forced her to serve in such a repressive occupation/role. Her dissatisfaction with having to submit to such men is clearly seen in the poem. Nonetheless, the poem is tinged with humor: the image of a macho man drunkenly having intercourse until he vomits, followed by the disgust and dissatisfaction of the woman who states that he would be the first drunk she would select if that was what she wanted. As such, the clear disdain of the narrator is softened by the humorous images she captures with her words.

The above two poems reveal quite different aspects of women and their sexuality. The narrator in the first poem enjoyed her night with an adept lover who sought to please his partner. The second poem, however, reveals the sexual domination of a woman by a man who had no concern whatsoever for her needs. The differing outlooks of the women, quite naturally, reflect their ability to maintain control over their bodies. When this basic human right is denied, sexual intercourse

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9 Similar to the first poem examined above, the author of this piece is given as Kim Hwajin (1728-1803) a minister in the Chosŏn government. Yet, given the content and voice of this work, it seems that his name was simply placed on the poem by an editor.
loses its emotional intimacy and instead becomes a mechanical act to fulfill a male need to dominate women through sex. Yi Yongja has stated that this type of sexual organ-centered intercourse is a means to “otherize” and degrade the woman partner (1994: 103). We can quite clearly see the resultant negative emotions of the woman in the above poem.

While I have only discussed two shijo poems—and I assure that there are many more that mirror these—I believe that we can see that the writers of these poems did not view sex as simply a means of reproduction. Women writers demonstrate their desire for enjoyable sexual experiences and moreover, their disdain for being treated as simply receptacles for men to vent their lust in. Thus, these narratives seem to belie any notion that Chosŏn society was devoid of sexual passion and activity. And keeping in mind that shijo were performed literature, we can imagine that both men and women enjoyed the performance of these humorous songs.

**Humorous Narrative Accounts of Sexual Liaisons**

I will next examine a few narrative accounts that will further demonstrate the extent of the “unofficial” discourse on sexuality in Chosŏn. These are taken from literary miscellanies or yadam (unofficial histories) collections, and while written by upper class yangban men, offer a very different glimpse of Chosŏn society. The fact that these are works of upper class men, demonstrates that even the banner bearers of the Neo-Confucian ideology sought refuge from its oppressive limitations on their personal freedom.

The narratives that I will discuss here center on the sexuality of women and provide, in my opinion, a far more realistic view of their lives and activities than what is found in the “official” literature of Chosŏn. In particular, the myth of the chaste and loyal married woman is effectively debunked by many of these stories. Instead, we are provided with images of women and men who enjoy and desire passionate love affairs outside of their marriages.

Yadam collections are often the work of known writers and are collections of stories from any number of sources—including oral narratives—designed to be entertaining reading. In the preface of one such work, Sŏ Kŏ-jong’s T’aep’yŏng hanhwawol jeŏn (太平閑話滑稽傳 Idle Talk in a Peaceful Era), the author informs his readers that he “wanted to sweep the worries of the world away” (1998: 45) through these entertaining works.

While the simple fact that nearly all of these writings are attributed to men poses a problem with the potential of a biased or gendered perspective, I believe that they can be productively analyzed in contrast to the established social norms of the Chosŏn period as they provide many narratives concerning the interactions, conflicts, and activities of humans. Consider the following narrative:

There was a blind man with a very pretty wife. In the neighborhood there

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10 The authorship of some yadam collections is not known. However, given that these works were largely written in Classical Chinese, it is fairly safe to assume that the writers were most likely educated yangban who wished to remain anonymous.

11 For example, Nachun (内訓 Instructions for the Inner Quarters; 1475), written by Queen Dowager Sohye, combines materials from works such as Xiaoxue (小學 Elementary Learning), Lienu chuan (烈女傳 Virtuous Women), and Myŏngshim pogam (明心寶鑑 Treasured Mirror for Enlightening the Mind) to instruct women how to live.

12 I am aware of arguments that contend male-dominated writings tend to emphasize gender bias and the superiority of males over females such as discussed by Bonnie G. Smith (1998: chap. 5).
was a young boy who wanted to bed the woman; one day he asked the blind man “There is this girl that I am very close to, and finally her husband has went out for business and she is home alone. I want to go to her house now and have sex, so I would be very grateful if you would cast your divinations in front of the main gate of her house and let me know if he is about to return.” The blind man agreed to the request, and the boy took him around the village and finally stopped in front of the blind man’s own house and left him at the gate to do his divinations. The boy went in the house and had sex with the blind man’s wife, while the blind man cast his divinations, not realizing he was in front of his own house. Suddenly the blind man called out to the boy “You must hurry and finish! Her husband is standing in front of the main gate!”

The humor in the above narrative is quite evident: the image of a naïve blind fortuneteller who could predict when a husband might return but failed to see that it was his wife that the boy was after is absurd and was undoubtedly well-received by the audience of this story. What is perhaps most interesting about the above narrative is the fact that it seems to demonstrate that passion was an important factor in Chosŏn society: the young boy desired the beautiful woman, and evidently, she also desired him. Hence, while monogamous marriage might have been the official discourse of Chosŏn, there seems to have been other outlets for sexual passion. It is also important to note that there is no trace of judgment in the narrative regarding the affair between the boy and the married woman—it is merely a story designed to arouse laughter from its audience.

We can view marriage in Chosŏn to have been largely an economic transaction between families, aimed at perpetuating a lineage by producing sons, strengthening social and political ties, and designed to reinforce the patriarchal system that dominated official society. Given the business-like nature of marriages, it should not be surprising that women often sought to fulfill emotional and sexual needs outside of their marriages (as men quite certainly did also). If they opted to run away from an oppressive situation at home, their choices were somewhat limited. Other women, however, simply pursed sexual fulfillment secretly as in the following narrative:

The wife of a scripture reader called her lover over when her husband went out on business. They went into the room and were about to have sex when they suddenly heard the sound of the husband entering the house. It seemed that they would certainly be caught, but the wife quickly jumped up, spread out her skirt and covered her husband’s face, playfully asking “Where are you coming from scripture reader?” and embraced her husband. The husband, knowing this game, responded “I’m coming back from a funeral at the Prime Minister’s house in the north” and hugged his wife and lay down with her. During this brief interlude, the lover was able to flee from the house undetected.

The women in the above narrative is said to be the wife of a scripture reader

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13 Recorded in Kimun (奇聞 Strange Tales; anonymous, n.d.), thought to be a late Chosŏn period work. Translations in this section were aided by renditions in modern Korean by Kim Hyŏn-ryong (1999) and Sŏ (1998).

14 Recorded in Yongjae ch’onghwaw (慵齋叢話 Assorted Writings of Yongjae) written by Sŏng Hyŏn (1439-1504) a scholar-official.
(kyŏngsa), so she is not an upper class woman. However, as the case of Kamdong described above in footnote four demonstrates, regardless of class, some women sought to find sexual satisfaction/adventure outside of their marriages. Thus, these narratives raise questions about the sanctity of marriage in Chosŏn, and at the same time the purity of the yangban lineages. Yet, humor allowed an otherwise taboo subject—at least for public discourse—to be shared publicly, and to subvert aspects of the official discourse, especially those that denied a woman control of her body.

Many other narratives (see Pettid 2001) demonstrate that sex was something that both men and women enjoyed, although this enjoyment was often outside of marriage. Moreover, this desire crossed class, age, and gender boundaries. Was this a common occurrence in Chosŏn? That is very hard to answer at this time, but sexual passion is a normal and strong human emotion, and there is little reason for us to assume that such emotions did not exist at every level of society in Chosŏn. After all, why should we imagine Chosŏn society and its people would be any different than our own?

Conclusion

I believe that the above poems and narratives demonstrate a clear contradiction between official Neo-Confucian society and its various controls on the lives of the citizenry and the actual lives of the people. While we cannot assume that these are non-fiction accounts, we can posit that they were based on factual happenings. Storytellers generally create their stories from actual happenings, and it seems reasonable to expect that most people knew or had heard of someone having an affair. Chosŏn society, thus, seems to match the two-tiered society that Bakhtin (1984: 154) described for the Middle Ages in Europe: an official society that was dominated by hierarchy and etiquette and an unofficial society that operated by a much freer set of rules. Research by Clifford Geertz (1973: 406) supports such a conclusion as he has argued that dominant cultural themes always have equally important “subdued opposites” and that the two tendencies are equally well-rooted in the community.

Although I use the terms “official” and “unofficial” to describe the different spheres of society, it is important to note that the interaction of various classes of people in both of these realms was very dynamic. Yangban did not live their lives solely in the official realm of society any more than commoners only existed in the unofficial sector. Both spheres were important to all classes of people, but for different reasons: adherence, at least superficially, to the conditions of the official sphere allowed one to interact with formal society, while interacting with one’s fellow humans in the unofficial sphere allowed for relaxation, release, and enjoyment.

Through reading (or hearing) narratives such as I have described above, the audience would have been provided with a release for the sexual repression that they experienced in daily life. This has been and remains a very important function of literature. While many sexual relationships are dominated by power relations, particularly the control of women by men in a strong patriarchal society such as Chosŏn, others fill different needs. Joseph Boone (1998: 1-2) has argued that both sex and fiction allow for the release of emotions, the need of humans to “let go.” The audience of these poems and narratives, regardless of gender, would have been provided a means to let go of their repressions and enjoy a common human expression

15 It seems pertinent to mention here that many scholars cite the uncertainty surrounding fatherhood—vis-à-vis the concreteness of motherhood—as a chief reason for the control and regulation of female sexuality in a patriarchal society. See Morris 1993: 20.
through these stories.

The vehicle for release in this case is almost uniformly made possible by humor. Without humor, these stories would have been difficult to share: humor allowed the authors/compilers of these stories to subvert the taboos against bringing sexual activities into the public discourse. The rigid and strict discourse of Neo-Confucianism stands in stark contrast to the activities described above. The authors/compilers were able to retell stories replete with sensuality and passion, emotions that, by the late Chosŏn period, had been purged from public discourse. Hence, we can argue that sexuality had become marginalized in the public sphere by this time. Humor allowed this oppressed emotion and need an outlet and a means in which to overcome and interact with the official dogmas and codes that had resulted in the suppression of a very natural human desire.

Accordingly, our perceptions of Chosŏn society should not be limited or focused on simply official Neo-Confucian discourse. Chosŏn should be understood as a multi-layered and intricate society, one where there existed many ways to subvert the official discourse. Sexuality, passion, and intimacy were, quite naturally, common emotions among the people that needed to be gratified. And this fact holds for all classes of Chosŏn and both men and women. While for some direct sexual activity served as a release for these emotions, others achieved satisfaction vicariously through narratives such as those discussed in this paper.

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Democratic capitalism and juche: common values and challenges

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I am the master of my fate
I am the captain of my soul.
William Ernest Henley, 1875

North and South Korea are two countries that shared the same 5000-year history up until this last century. From its partition in 1945 to the present, the two countries have essentially taken divergent paths politically, ideologically, economically and socially. The ideological dichotomy occurring in the two countries because of the installation of communism in the North and democratic capitalism in the South would seem to indicate that each country operates with a different set of values as dictated by their respective ideologies. These value differences cause great difficulty for North Korean defectors trying to adapt to life in South Korea and would no doubt clash on the path to reunification. However, with the development of North Korea’s unique Juche ideology and its man-centered philosophical foundation, a strict sense of self-reliance and self-determination was implanted in the minds of the North Korean people. The values expressed in the Juche idea have remarkable similarities to those values that are most often associated with democratic capitalism. Although Juche is often viewed as a controlling dogma with very little use in a democratic capitalist system, this paper will illustrate common values between it and democratic capitalism. Juche should not be discarded completely, as it will actually have value in bridging some of the ideological gaps existing between the two states. Also examined are the differences in the two value systems that pose challenges to compatibility. Juche is implemented at the macro-level of the nation and the masses and is not applied at the micro-level of the individual. This paper will suggest that, through an operational shift, Juche values can also be applied to the individual as a means of helping defectors who are struggling with the individualistic values found in South Korea’s democratic capitalist system. Drawing connections between the apparently opposing ideologies will also serve to fill in ideological gaps as the two Koreas explore possibilities for reunification. It should also be noted that when references to reunification are made there is the assumption that the democratic capitalist system in the South is preferable to the communist system of the North. Therefore, ‘reunification’ here implies the adoption of democratic capitalism as the dominant system of a reunified Korea.

The Power of Juche in North Korea

Ideology is powerful. It serves to unite and divide people, which is certainly illustrated by the Korean case. Ideology is a set of ideas and beliefs by which a group understands and makes sense of the world. Ideology should provide an explanation of how things have come to be as they currently are and, with a guide to action, indicate where things are going. There should be criteria for distinguishing truth from falsehood, valid arguments from invalid as well as a principle belief
whether in God, Providence, or History to which the adherents can make their final appeal if challenged by outside forces. (McLean 1996: 233). Through ideology, adherents are able to structure views with respect to their interpretation and moral attitude about society, history, and human beings and it is through this perspective that believers see and evaluate the existing and desired world( Yoo 1996: 37). Thus, ideology can be seen as a means by which an adherent’s world view is framed and it is through this ideological construct that a believer interprets and filters experience. The power of ideology in North Korea is no exception.

Many dismiss Juche as simply a controlling mechanism by which the North Korean leadership maintains legitimacy and demands strict obedience from the people. It is often viewed, it seems, as a kind of fragile and hollow ideological shell with little value that would crush in on itself if the North Korean regime collapsed or suffered the loss of its ‘dear’ leader. While one cannot ignore that Juche is indeed a means of controlling the North Korean people, maintaining legitimacy of the leadership, or propagating an almost xenophobic form of Korean nationalism, there is much more to consider when assessing the extent of Juche’s impact on the psyche of the North Korean people.

Juche is the eye of the storm around which every action, thought, and plan in North Korea takes place. As the supposed creation of Kim Il sung himself, it has taken on defining roles in virtually every aspect of North Korean life(Yoo 1996:29). Kim’s son and current leader Kim Jong il is the legitimate interpreter of Juche method and its implementation in all areas of state function. Juche is often translated, however inadequately, as ‘self-reliance’ or ‘self-determination’ and can be seen as a response to Korea’s history of domination and protection by stronger powers. Dae-Sook Suh has pointed out that the political socialization process to indoctrinate the North Korean people with Juche seems to have been so intense that the self-reliant attitude toward each other and the outside world has become a part of the culture. The people seem to have gained inner strength to confront hardship and find solutions independently. The North Korean people might have to endure economic hardships, indigence, and isolation from the technologically advanced and industrialized nations, but without hesitation, they will reject any attempt to compromise their independence. They will not tolerate the stationing of foreign troops on their land or become subservient to outsiders in order to solve economic difficulties(2000: 44).

It is not surprising that Juche is such a pervasive part of North Korean life and thinking when one realizes the extent to which citizens are required to study and even memorize authoritative teachings and messages. Officially, North Koreans are on a daily schedule to work for eight hours, study messages sent by the authorities for eight hours and sleep for eight hours( Kim H. J. 1998:22). Although this regiment may not be strictly followed by the average citizen, there is still a daily requirement for children and adults to have political study sessions in which Kim’s works are read and discussed. Such study sessions begin at the kindergarten level and continue throughout the rest of one’s life. Gauging the effectiveness of North Korean propaganda efforts is not easy, but almost all defectors indicate the overall effect of such indoctrination is powerful, especially given there are no other channels of information available(Oh & Hassig 2000: 140-142). Therefore, it is important to understand that as North Korean’s confront an environment of democratic capitalism they are likely to interpret their experiences-consciously or unconsciously- through
Juche ideas, so it is important to establish where connections exist. This will aid the assimilation process as North Korean citizens use the Juche concepts, already firmly inculcated in their consciousness, to navigate new ideological waters.

**Democratic Capitalism and Juche: Common Values**

Before examining Juche’s development and its connections to democratic capitalism, one needs to establish what values are meant by ‘democratic capitalism.’ While an in-depth study of the history and development of democratic capitalist values is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important, for the sake of comparison, to touch on the principle philosophical foundations that form such values. As this is done, both the democratic political system and the capitalist economic system will be juxtaposed to imply one complete ideological system as Juche involves both politics and economics. In addition, it has been noted by Robert Dahl that all countries with democratic systems have had capitalist economies and Peter Berger indicated that capitalism is a necessary -though not sufficient- condition for democracy(qtd. in Rhee 1999:151/155).

Although there are many different forms and theories of democratic capitalism, people relate to the consciousness of ideology and not theoretical distinctions. The consciousness of democracy is best described with such words as freedom, independence, self-determination, and self-reliance. Qualities like ingenuity and creativity in solving problems are valued. The importance of the individual is stressed and the idea of not depending on others is implicit. It embodies the notion that one has to forge one’s own destiny, despite that which might stand in the way or seek to thwart self-determination. One of the fathers of democratic thought, John Locke, noted in his “The Second Treatise of Civil Government” that man is the master of himself, “and the proprietor of his own person and the actions or labour of it…” (qtd. in Paek 2000: 91). Self government or the taking charge of one’s self illustrate essential democratic values( Rhee 1999: 105). These values apply both at the macro-level of the nation and at the micro-level of the individual. Even in an Asian country like South Korea, where society is largely influenced by collective Confucian values, the democratic capitalist values of the individual, self-determination, self-reliance, and independence have permeated the consciousness of its citizens.

As already mentioned, the word Juche is often translated as ‘self-reliance’ or ‘self-determination.’ When the word is dissected and broken into its two Chinese characters, one sees that the first character Ju means ‘owner’, ‘master’ or ‘lord’ and the second character che indicates ‘the body’, ‘the whole’ or ‘the substance.’ In essence, it hints at the idea of being the owner or master of your own body. The character che is also part of the word Chejae that means ‘system’, ‘organization’, or ‘structure.’ Thus, Juche can be viewed as the idea of being in charge of one’s own self or the system that one is a part of. With this understanding, it is easy to see, in light of Korea’s history of being dominated by other powers, why the concept of Juche became the ideological mantra for North Korea under the leadership of Kim Il Sung.

The historical origins of Juche extend from Korea’s colonial experience under the Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945. Particularly in its later years during the 1930’s and the early 1940’s, the first inklings of Juche began to emerge (Belke 1999:168). Also deeply rooted in the experience of the North Korean people, Juche
is a reaction to the past political subjugation, economic dependence, and need for military assistance from China and the former Soviet Union. Juche’s modern origins emerge from the Korean War as an anti-Soviet sentiment resulting from the Soviet Union’s failure to assist the North in “liberating” the southern half of the peninsula (Suh 2000:38). North Korea soon established an independent stance from the Soviet Union and began focusing on constructing a unique Korean revolution.

In his first speech alluding to the Juche idea on December 28, 1955, North Korean leader Kim Il sung began to set the tone for Korea’s need to develop its own revolution independent of those in other socialist countries. Kim states:

Devotion to the Korean revolution is Juche in the ideological work of our Party. Therefore, all ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean revolution. When we study the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the history of the Chinese revolution, of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, it is entirely for the purpose of correctly carrying out our own revolution (Kim 1975:150).

Kim would continue to emphasize an independent stance for North Korea and its revolution. Juche was then used as an effective instrument for engendering nationalism that served as a basis for regime legitimacy in establishing North Korea’s superiority over South Korea and in the further promotion of anti-foreign ideas (Park 1998:35-36). During this stage of its development, Kim Il sung begins to give a more formulated explanation of Juche. Juche takes on three of its most important characteristics which are chaju (independence) in political work, charip (self-sustaining) in economic endeavors and chawi (self-defense) in military affairs. Kim Il sung explains that only when a country exercises its legitimate right to political self-determination, can the country’s complete independence be guaranteed. Economic self-support serves as a material basis for political independence. If a country depends on others economically then it will also be dependent on them politically. National self-defense is a military guarantee for the country’s political independence and economic self-support (Kim 1975:395-398). These three important characteristics of Juche were further emphasized to ensure that the country as a nation would be in complete control of its destiny. Juche would more and more become a ‘We must do it ourselves’ philosophy to prevent once again the slipping into flunkeyism or coming under control of foreign powers with imperialist intentions. It would advocate that in order to ensure the freedom and prosperity of its people, every state must have the right to chart out and determine its future (Suh 1988: 303).

Juche became North Korea’s clarion call to build a truly independent and self-determined nation as these values would be the cornerstone of the ideology. Juche is applied to the nation as a compass to determine the country’s own direction and future. With the important national elements of Chaju or independence, self-sustaining economy, and self-defense, Juche makes its first connection to the values of democratic capitalism, self-reliance and independence. The values of self-reliance and independence imply that one is free to make choices that are deemed best. Although Juche takes the idea to an extreme level, early democratic revolutions were also calls for a nation to become self-determining and independent for the benefit of its citizen’s prosperity and freedom. A country should not be dependent on other nations for development or direction. It is at the level of the nation that Juche’s self-
reliance is actually applied with some persistence, which seems to have resulted in its current international isolation. Juche then, like democratic capitalism, calls on a nation to chart its own course and determine its destiny. Juche would then address the role and function of man in the revolutionary construction of a truly self-reliant and independent nation.

Taking its next step, Juche began to evolve into a world view or ‘weltanschauung’ with human-centered philosophical notions at its foundation(Park 1998:38). In this stage of Juche’s development, definition is given to what comprises a human being. Juche states that man is the master of everything and determines everything. Juche is presented as an original idea which gives a correct view of the world and shows people how to carve out their own destiny(Exposition of the Juche Idea 1983:16). The social attributes that man develops historically and socially are Chajusong or ‘independence’, creativity, and consciousness. Chajusong is man’s desire to live independently as the master of the world and his own destiny. Creativity is the attribute of man transforming the world and shaping his destiny purposefully. Consciousness is the quality of a man who determines all his activities designed to understand and reshape the world and himself (Kim J.I. 1985:5).

Kim Il sung and his son Kim Jong il would continue to emphasize the importance of the Juche idea and its definition of man as the master of the world. Man is seen as the most developed material being who has the ability to control and manipulate the environment to serve him where as all other creatures are subordinate and must adapt to the objective world. Therefore, man is able to transform the world and change it according to his own will(Kim J.I. 1985: 20-21). This transformation of the world translates into constructing the revolution. The revolution should be carried out with conviction and with the responsibility of the masses. Any problems arising in the revolution should be solved in an independent and creative way(Exposition of The Juche Idea 1983: 8). This purely Korean construction of the revolution emphasizes that Korea should be a self-made and independent nation, especially with regard to politics, economics, and defense.

In Chaouki Ajami’s “Juche: Theory and Application” he states that the independent stand has two concrete aspects. The first aspect is that one should reject dependence on others, think and judge everything with one’s own brain and solve problems by one’s self. The second aspect is that one should have faith in one’s own strength and solve all problems in a revolutionary spirit of self-reliance(1978:9). Other treatises on Juche go on to emphasize strict independence and self-reliance in forming one’s own destiny. North Korean leader Kim Jong il emphasized that consciousness is the awareness of being in charge of one’s own destiny and shaping that destiny by one’s own initiative(1985:37). Essentially, one is the master of one’s fate and the power to control that fate rests with one’s self(Suh 1988: 302).

Juche strives to develop independence and self-sufficiency for the nation and extends these values to man. It calls on man to be independent, self-sufficient, creative and determine his own destiny. In countries where governments do not provide for the people, citizens must learn to put these values into action. It is in democratic capitalist societies that people are to exercise independence in decision-making and the determining of one’s future. Juche’s very definition of man and his role involve the core values that lie at the heart of democratic capitalism. Connections are easily
made between the ideas of man as the master of everything and his own destiny. Also valued by both systems is a sense of ingenuity in using one’s own brain to solve problems and to be self-sufficient. Such democratic capitalist language and ideas are abundant and find almost \textit{ad nauseam} use in various treatises on Juche published out of Pyongyang. As was previously noted, the Juche idea is constantly studied by North Korean citizens and the core values that it inculcates are certainly present whether consciously or unconsciously. Despite the other manifold political and nationalistic ideas and concepts associated with Juche, its core values are in tune with the foundational principles of democratic capitalism.

Another area where Juche and democratic capitalism find a common connection is in the role of institutions. According to Juche principles, institutions are to serve the people (Park 1998:39). Kim Il sung would go on to explain that the government should consider it a duty to safeguard and protect the interests of the working masses and that government organizations should be the servants of the people. In order to serve the people, the government should give support to democracy in state activities. Democracy means that the state formulates policy in compliance with the will of the working masses and carries it out in their interests. The working masses are entitled by right to participate in the work of the people’s government as the masters of state power (1982: 322-324). Despite the connections that can be made regarding such shared values as independence, self-reliance, self-determination, and the role of institutions Juche is not free of certain ideas that pose challenges to commonly held democratic capitalist values.

\textbf{Challenges}

Compatibility of Juche values and ideas with those in democratic capitalism is certainly not free of obstacles. Although there are common core values between the ideologies, the process to help North Korean citizens realize connections that will aid their assimilation is not simple. North Korea still operates under communist guidelines, which emphasize a collective society and mentality. Branching out from this collective orientation are three Juche concepts that make compatibility between it and democratic capitalism difficult. These three concepts are the \textbf{suryong}, \textbf{party}, and \textbf{mass line} which result in the de-emphasis of the individual.

The concept of the suryong is considered essential to the functioning of Juche ideology. The word \textit{suryong} means ‘leader’, ‘the head’ or ‘the boss.’ In Juche, the suryong plays an almost God-like role as the ultimate or supreme leader. So far only Kim Il sung has held the title of suryong and it is expected that Kim Jong il will eventually gain the title as well. The leader or suryong is viewed as the highest brain of the people who guides the revolutionary struggle for independence. The leader occupies the same place as the brain in the human body. Just as the brain controls and regulates all functions of the human organism, so does the suryong control and regulate all functions of the state organism. The leader is seen as the embodiment of the interests of the masses and every thought and intention that the leader has represents the will of the popular masses. It is very important to note that the masses can only realize their intentions and demands when they act in accordance with the orientation and directions of the leader (Kim C.H. 1984: 178). In one of his treatises on Juche, Kim Jong il noted that the masses must be brought into contact with correct leadership in order to carry out their role as the subject of history. It is only under correct leadership that the masses will be able to perform their role as the
subjects of socio-historical development and further the efforts of the revolution (1985: 27).

Closely connected to the suryong is the party, which acts as the nexus or the central nerve of the organism. The party serves as a medium between the leader and the masses. The party also inspires loyalty of the masses for the leader. It helps in binding the system together as it emphasizes ideological education of cadres and discipline within the organization. The structure of the regime in North Korea is seen as a ‘socio-political organism.’ This kind of regime structure is collectivist in nature where individuals should serve the society they are a part of (Kim S.C. 1992: 162-163). Such a state organism is controlled by the brain (leader) who interacts with the masses through the party or ‘central nerve.’ The masses can be seen as a group of cells acting in accordance with the directives and wishes of the brain as he controls the whole system.

The North Korean emphasis on the collective effort of the masses results in a de-emphasis of the individual. Despite the statement that “Jucheism regards man as an individual being…” the overall emphasis is on the masses and the people working together as a collective unit (qtd. in Belke 1999: 32). Closely Hegelian in nature, Juche stresses that the success of the revolution and its construction depends on the creative efforts of the popular masses and that the strength of the masses is to be found in the social unit of the state (Kim J.I. 1985: 56-57). When the masses are not united, they are unable to exist as creative beings and cannot realize their strength to the fullest (Kim 1991: 101).

Juche defines man as a social being. People will not be able to transform nature and society as an individual and the characteristics of Chajusong, creativity, and consciousness are only available when one belongs to the social community (Exposition of the Juche Idea 1983: 23).

Kim Il Sung emphatically stated that selfishness, individualism, and egoism are petty bourgeois notions. The true meaning of ‘revolutionize’ is to root out egoism, individualism, and other bourgeois ideas. What must be done is to cultivate a proper communist ideological awareness by giving priority to the interests of the collective or the whole but not the individual. The truly transformed person is willing to fight for the masses and the people at the sacrifice of individual interests (1984: 417-418).

The Juche notions of the suryong, party, and mass line all result in a collective and mass mentality that does not allow for individual thinking or action. Despite the Juche concepts of self-reliance and self-determination, they are not applied at the individual level but only at the state level which is viewed as an organism. This presents a challenge to democratic capitalist values as more emphasis is placed on the individual rather than the group. The Juche notions of independence and solving problems creatively with one’s own brain also do not apply to the individual. This would explain to some extent why defectors have such a difficult time taking charge of their own lives when they begin their new life in South Korea. North Koreans, although their ideology stresses otherwise, are not used to making decisions for themselves as they have always relied on the party and the leader to determine everything. The Juche idea, while stressing initiative and self-determination, finds no application at the individual level for North Korean citizens. At the subconscious level, North Korean citizens possess the Juche ideas that man is the master of all things and decides everything but they have never considered acting on these ideas for
themselves. The notion of the suryong guiding for the masses prevents North Koreans from seeing through the lens of ‘I’ or the individual with respect to the revolution and its construction. The notion of being in charge of one’s destiny is not realized and what results is difficulty with the self-reliance and competition that a democratic capitalist system demands (Kim M. S. 1998:61). Extending from this difficulty adapting, is the challenge of taking responsibility for one’s own life and future (67). It is not an easy task to have defectors separate themselves from collectivist notions and the necessity of the all-guiding brain who will make decisions and direct the course of the people’s future.

**Conclusion: Juche and the Individual**

At the core of Juche values, are the notions of self-reliance, self-determination, independence and creativity which are in line with the values pursued by a democratic capitalist system. However, juxtaposed with these are communist collective notions that use control mechanisms such as the suryong, party, and mass line that are contrary to democratic capitalism’s notions of individual responsibility and initiative. Can the already present Juche world view help or assist North Koreans in their attempt to adapt to the values that are found in a democratic capitalist system? Can Juche ideas help one be independent and self-reliant at the individual level?

It is important to recall the power of ideology in North Korea and the intensity of the indoctrination process. North Korean citizens, as they adapt to a different ideological system, will likely interpret their new experiences through the Juche constructs they already possess. Therefore, it is important to help North Koreans use this knowledge in learning how to function in a democratic capitalist system. What is needed is to help them translate Juche values at the individual level. Juche and democratic capitalism share the values of self-reliance, self-determination, independence, and creativity but differ in the operation of these values. Juche translates these values at the macro-level of the state or the masses as one organism. Democratic capitalism translates the same values but at the micro-level of the individual where they can be personally realized.

Therefore, translation of Juche values at the micro-level should be one of the primary goals of education programs that endeavor to help defectors adapt to life in South Korea. The curriculum of such programs should utilize methods for achieving an operational shift of Juche values by first drawing common connections through which to establish a shared interpretive framework. Secondly, the actualization of those values at the individual level must be emphasized through a de-emphasis of reliance on the suryong or party to provide guidance and make decisions. North Korean citizens need to understand that self-reliance, self-determination, independence and creativity have their maximum potential at the individual level. A full deconstructing of the Juche world view is unnecessary as it has an important role to play in the assimilation process. Even for defectors who are completely disillusioned with Juche’s apparent false promises, the chance to see its values actualized may provide hope and lay foundations on which to stand in the new ideological system of South Korea.

Another possibility demanding further study is the so-called ‘neo-juche’ idea. The neo-Juche idea is considered progressive and seeks to apply Juche principles to capitalism and the individual. Neo-Jucheism opposes the governing ideology of the
North Korean regime. It states that a socialist central economy is not adequate and therefore promotes capitalist values and economics. Neo-Jucheism also opposes socialist collectivism and allows for individualism and capitalist views of society and people (Belke 1999:247). The highest level North Korean defector and chief architect of the Juche idea, Hwang Jang Yop, made this insightful observation concerning where Juche values may be best realized:

The market is a place where a man’s nature of self-reliance is associated with his creativity. Therefore, the development of the market makes enhanced creative ardors in a person. (qtd. in Belke: 247).

This statement certainly has neo-Juche overtones and illustrates the need to allow the Juche values of self-reliance and creativity to act within a market system where they can properly flourish. Neo-Juche creates the possibility for Juche values to assume their more appropriate actualization in the democratic capitalist environment where the individual is valued. It is in the democratic capitalist system where one must be self-reliant by applying creativity and solving problems on one’s own with little or no dependence on others.

Juche should be viewed as a valuable tool that can be utilized to help North Koreans adapt to democratic capitalism through realizing the values of self-reliance, self-determination, independence and creativity. Although the Juche elements of the suryong, party, and mass line serve as controlling mechanisms of the collective, a shift in the operation of Juche values to the micro-level of the individual is needed. The best environment for such a process can be found in education programs that assist in the assimilation work of North Koreans. Even in the event of sudden reunification, nationwide training programs to help North Korean citizens operate in the democratic capitalist system will be needed. Illustrating the shared values of Juche and democratic capitalism and educating to translate those values to the micro-level is one way this can be achieved. Pursuing Juche values at the individual level allows for self-reliance and full realization of human potential and capacity. Regrettably, in a ravaged and moribund economy where North Korean citizens are reportedly searching in the forests and fields for things to eat, people are already learning, in the harshest way, what it means to be self-reliant.

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Juche Idea and the alteration process in Kim Il-Sung's works:
A study on how to read Kim Il-Sung's works

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1. Introduction

Nowadays in the North Korea 'Juche-Sasang' (Juche Idea) passes for the best idea and at the same time the moral standard determining the guiding principles for the people in every field of a society and it also plays a role of religion distinguishing right and wrong.

Kim Il-Sung is revered as a founder of Juche Idea, and therefore the Kim Il Sung Jeojakjip composed of his speeches and writings is now used as a text-book for studying Juche Idea. However it is remarkable that until the Kim Il Sung Jeojakjip was born it has been written, rewritten, revised, and enlarged innumerable times in an effort of making it a sacred book. Therefore in this sense in the study of the North Korea, it must be borne in mind that we have to do something to confirm its academic credibility and to understand its characteristic structure of political discourse in it.

The purpose of this essay is two-fold: one is to examine the academic credibility of Kim Il Sung's works, and the other is to develop how to read out the political discourse in the works. For this purpose, this essay aims at examining the alteration processes of Kim Il Sung's works which stands for the officially published documents available in the light of observing how the Juche Idea has been formed and systemized.

2. The appearance of Juche Idea and the alteration processes of Kim Il Sung's works: an analysis on the aspects of the correction-revision

In the North Korea the establishment of 'Juche' was introduced firstly in the 28th of December, 1955 when Kim Il Sung was making a speech in front of the workers of propaganda-instigation on the subject of <About driving away the dogmatism & formalism from the ideological activities and establishing a 'Juche'>. But it was in December of 1962 it was presented in the name of Juche Idea in the circumstances of Sino-Soviet split. At that time Juche Idea that stood for establishing the independent line, was engaged in seeking an independent way of developing national economics and it was regarded as the strategy for survival of the North Korean Socialism for the solution of international and domestic demands confronting them.

And it transformed from the revolutionary thought of the Party that had laid a stress on collectivity to the Kim Il Sung's revolutionary one which meant Kim Il Sung's monopoly and it went from the Marxism-Leninism to the universal Kim-Il-Sungism. (Lee 1995: 69) Therefore North Korean leaders are supposed to
define the Juche Idea as the most exact Marxism-Leninism in 1968 and tried to make the chieftain ideology absolute through proposing of the 'revolutionary chieftainship' in 1969, and finally they formally proclaimed it as Kim-Il-Sungism in 1974. At the same time it goes without saying that these series of events came to reveal their own entities through the editing and systemizing the Kim Il Sung's works.

Kim Il Sung's works has been systematically published through some reediting processes. They were all collected from what had been written down sporadically in the various publishing issues in the days immediately after the Korean Liberation of August 15, 1945 and they edited the Kim Il Sung Seonjip(1st edition) after the Korean War, followed by the Kim Il Sung Seonjip(2nd edition), Kim Il Sung Jeojakseonjip and finally Kim Il Sung Jeojakjip.

In this process, his speeches and writings were ceaselessly looked over and corrected, and there some contents of them were revised, enlarged, and if necessary eliminated. Therefore in order to have a total perception of the Kim Il Sung's works it is necessary to look over previously what and how they have been corrected and revised in editing process.

In this context the differences between the alteration processes of the Kim Il Sung's works before the coming of the Juche Idea and those after its coming and especially the gradual changes of Juche Idea in their systemizing process are to be compared and examined.

2.1. In case of the Kim Il Sung Seonjip(1st edition)(1953-54)

The Kim Il Sung Seonjip(1st edition)(used for Seonjip(1) below) which began to be published in May, 1953 around the end of the Korean War contains 134 documents of Kim Il Sung's speeches and conversations expressed from December of 1945 to May of 1953. Here owing to the abolition movement of Chinese characters derived from the works of crusade against the illiteracy and ideological teaching in the year 1949. All the previous works transferred from being written in Korean and Chinese to being written only in Korean. Referring to the substances of the contents two points were corrected as follows: they made an interesting contrasts with those published after the coming of Juche Idea.

Firstly, there appeared a stress on the international line of proletariat and a disregard of national independent line. According to the special revision of the Seonjip(1) they showed their support for the international line toward China and Soviet Union and they intentionally used an expression totally different from the original one they used before. For instance, shown in the case of document named <A report on the 2nd anniversary of the 8.15 National Liberation carried in the city of Pyongyang>(Aug. 14, 1947), the expression of "the peoples of the allied powers of Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom" in the original text written in the Chosun Jungang Yonkam(1949) was changed to the expression of "Soviet people and their great leader Generalissimo Starlin."(Seonjip(1): 381)

Secondly, there appeared a reduction of the Southern Workers Party's guerilla activities. In particular the guerilla activities of the South-Korean Workers Party's partisans who had acted during the Korean War in the whole district of Mountain-Jiri were reduced a little.(Seonjip(1), 3: 204)

2.2. In case of the Kim Il Sung Seonjip(2nd edition)(1960-64)

The Kim Il Sung Seonjip(2nd edition)(used for Seonjip(2) below) published
between 1960-64 contains Kim Il Sung's 124 documents, of which 31 documents were selected from the Seonjip(1). Here according to the editor's statement that there is something seemingly revised, but the individual works were substantially a little bit revised and supplemented.(Seonjip(2): introduction) and the precious words and sentences were made more refined and at the same time its substances were largely added and modified in consideration of entire systems of the book as follows.

Firstly, there appeared the arrangement of documents for the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung's regime. According to the Seonjip(2) its contents and editing are characterized by the 31 re-included documents and newly added documents. They are also systemized as to get the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung's regime. Among them, newly added documents concerning the political activities such as <Our tasks for the construction of new democratic nation> were considered valuable as the grounds for the legitimacy of Kim's regime And what the expressions of "free independent nation" shown in the original text of the documents re-included such as <The 20 policy-creeds>(March 23, 1946) was changed into "completely independent nation" seemed to be considered their stands toward South Korea. And in addition the persons of the Yeonan faction as well as the persons of anti-Kim Il Sung faction such as Mr. Kim Doo Bong involved in the sanction strife accidents in August of 1956 were all omitted from the Seonjip(2).

Secondly, there appeared the formal raise of the Kim Il Sung's fighting activities against Japan and appearance of 'Juche' conception. While the Juche Idea was being formed as mentioned a little above, it is true that the Seonjip(2) firstly raised Kim Il Sung's fighting activities against Japan as the most essential instance. This fact was not to be seen in any book before but appeared at first in the Seonjip(2) in which they edited the document named <On the immediate political situation in Korea and the organization of the North Korean provisional people's committee>(Feb. 8, 1946) added the expression that early in 1930s by furiously fighting against Japan the Korean people showed up an indomitable spirit for the independence of Korea and Kim Il Sung's armed fighting has been formally made a historical phenomenon and at the same time a national instance of the revolutionary tradition.(Seonjip(2), 1: 42)

And in addition it is remarkable that they formally confessed the establishment problems of 'Juche' from the ideological point of view. As a concrete example it is notable that the document named <About driving away the dogmatism & formalism from the ideological activities and establishing a 'Juche'> (Dec. 28, 1955) was added in this edition. Through this measure North Korean leaders tried to seek an way for the national independent line in the midst of Sino-Soviet split and they sought to find a good reason why they should clean up the Russian factionalists & the Yeonan factionalists.

Thirdly, there appeared a careful appraisement of Soviet Union's role for Korean independence. Concerning the revision about the external policy not a few documents praising highly of Soviet Union and Stalin were written in the Seonjip(1) and no less than 21 documents were crossed out of the Seonjip(2). Among these the documents such as <A letter to Generalissimo Stalin>(Sep. 21, 1948) in which Stalin was plainly and unconditionally praised were totally eliminated This was understandable in consideration of then degradation movement against Stalin in the Socialist camps.

2.3. In case of the Kim Il Sung Jeojakseonjip(1967-87).

As mentioned above 1967 brought about a drastic change to Juche Idea and in this year the cult of Kim Il Sung became wholly active and by the making of
system-establishment what is called monotheism by dint of the requirement of the North Korean political power the Juche Idea was running up to the Kim-Il-Sungism and it is needless to say that this was reflected to making how the Kim Il Sung Jeojakseonjip(used for Jeojakseonjip below) was edited.

The Jeojakseonjip that began to be published from 1967 re-included 46 documents selected from the Seonjip(2) and they were added by the new documents published after 1960’s, and there 202 documents were included in all. Among them the number of documents which was edited continually after the Seonsjip(1), including the 6 selected documents, amount to no more than 15 documents in all. They had been published through several steps: the volumes 1-4 which had been edited mainly around the documents related to the Supreme-People's Assembly and the Party Conference produced in the year of 1967-68 was published ahead, and then the volumes 5-9 was published by the new kind of editing system covering systematically all the fields of entire society since 1972 which was regarded as the theorizing-step of the Juche Idea. Besides the special point of whole editing plans the remarkable revisions of the substances are to be summed up as follows.

Firstly, there appeared the systematic advocacy of the independent line. In order to understand the remarkable revisions in the Jeojakseonjip the documents edited in it is to know that they were carefully chosen after the exact examinations of them. This is why the distinguishing characteristic of the whole composition of editing has been examined before. Only the documents extremely limited to those published before 1960 were mentioned to have been regathered before in Seonjip. And the documents published after 1960 had no exceptions in determining the selection standards. The standards were based on how the Peoples' Committee had acted and how the Workers Party had worked. That is what is called independence in doing activities with which 'Revolution" and "Construction" are linked on principle.(Kim 1993: p.29)

Secondly, there appeared the intention for so-called the 'Unitarian System of Kim Il Sung.' One of the distinguishing points coming from the revisions of the Jeojakseonjip is that the independent line seen above shows the intention to set up the Unique System of Kim Il Sung. For example 47 documents in the Seonjip(2) show all but the result of Kim Il Sung's contributions, and most documents derived after the year 1950 were mainly about the outcome of the economic building brought about under the guidance of Kim Il Sung and they showed the peculiar interests in letting the people see the result of revolution and construction done under his leadership. And this circumstance increased until 1974 when there was an announcement of <10 principles to establish the systems of unitarianism> and owing to this indication of all the documents, speeches, reports and discourses were to quote always with civility the Kim Il Sung's teachings and their substances were ordered to be under the basis of the documents made by Kim's instructions, as a result of which they were made more solid and deep.

2.4. In case of the Kim Il Sung Jeojakjip(1979-92)

The Kim Il Sung Jeojakjip(uded for Jeojakjip from now) was systemized by the guidance of Kim Jong II to the effect of the Juche-Idealization of all society.(Jungang Yonkam 1986: 245) Therefore the Jeojakjip began to be produced again in 1970 and so the Kim Il Sung Jeojakjip(5-9) was edited according to the picture of system of Juche Idea. The Jeojakjip contains 1,228 documents in all and among them there were re-edited about 309 documents of Kim Il Sung's speeches and talks which included in the Seonjip(1)(2) and the Jeojakseonjip. Here of all these documents re-edited, 202
documents gathered from *the Jeojakseonjip* were all regathered, but the 28 documents omitted out in the course of editing *the Seonjip*(2), and a document omitted out in *the Jeojakseonjip* were excluded here. And here now that the editing system in itself in separably related to the system of Juche Idea the documents as possible as they can cover all the fields for 'the Revolution & Construction of the North Korea.' Therefore in *the Jeojakjip* much more documents were to be newly added.

The most remarkable thing is that the intentions of raising the Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese activities as a revolutionary tradition appeared systematically. As mentioned above, 20 documents on what was said to be carried, between 1930s and 1940s, by Kim Il Sung himself about his armed fighting activities against Japan were newly included. The mentions on the Kim's anti-Japanese activities of course firstly appeared in *the Seonjip*(2) but they were no more than a few lines were inserted in it, and here in order to prove them a historical fact some twenty documents were newly gathered. This fact that reveals their intentions to bring on revolutionary tradition, has very important implications in conjunction with the systemization of Juche Idea. It is shown in the documents, for instance, <The manifesto of the Independence-Council for fatherland> and <The duties of the Korean communists: the Korean revolutionists should have good notice> which were known to be written by Kim Il Sung in 1930's.(Lee,1982: 14; Kim 1993: 31; Suh 2001: 30-31)

Secondly, it is remarkable that the Kim Il Sung's monotheism was diffused and deepened systematically here. What is better in relation to the systemization of the Juche Idea is that the monopoly of the quotations was available only in *the Jeojakjip* which regulated that what was called the theoretical framework of the socialist thoughts came only from the sources of Kim Il Sung's works. As for *the Jeojakjip*, when necessary to mention the framework of theory. In the Stalin's works or the Lenin's works took the form of annotation and have to make a long story short they quoted only the Kim's works. What is remarkable here is the editing intention of *the Jeojakjip* which tries to point the monotint of the monotheism of Kim Il Sung but the intention didn't go farther than expected like this. To begin with any other name than Kim Il Sung was thoroughly prohibited in writing the history of revolution and construction.

Thirdly, it is remarkable that a stress on 'a literary-style of Juche' and an evaluation for the Non-Alignment Independent line. In view of the systemization of Juche Idea when we call the name of everything we speak in the form of saying about the Juche Idea. The loan words such as 'commintern','anti-grupa' and etc used in *the Jeojakseonjip* were all changed into Korean words 'gugje-gongsandang'(international communist party), 'bandangpa'(anti-party traitor) and etc, and to express the meaning of working men the words 'the labors' and 'peasants' were used instead of using the class-ideological words like 'workers' because they were supposed suitable to the Juche Idea.

3. The systemization of Juche Idea and the alteration aspects of Kim Il Sung's works: an analysis on the aspects of making sacred

As observed above, the alteration process of the Kim Il Sung's works originally goes on the same way with the systemization process of the Juche Idea. In accordance with the requirement of the Juche Idea the revision of the books were done and at the same time the Juche Idea was systematically arranged through this process and so did the Kim Il Sung's works naturally and at last what we call Kim's monotheism. For instance the Kim Il Sung's works are of the important contents of Kim's monotheism
and by means of the revolutionary chieftainship it has become a sacred book. And it is certain that the systemization of monotheism has been made successful by making the Kim's works of the absolute good.

In this context the next step is to see the systemization of Juche Idea, and as well is to pay attention to the work to make sacred the Kim's works showing the new mechanism and normative meanings.

3.1. The systematic deepening of the Juche Idea and the aspects of making sacred of the Kim's works

*The Jeojakjip* that began to be published in 1979 was the concluded syntheses of Kim Il Sung's works, a collection of Juche Idea and the result of revolution which were greatly revered by the people. This fact is to be proved clear by the prospectus of *the Jeojakjip*: "this book is specially published in memory of Kim Il Sung's 70th birth day by the peoples' strong demand and new request of the revolutionary development. Therefore all the members of the Party and workers should study this book concretely and get armed strongly with Juche Idea and revolutionary theories, by means of which they endeavor to do the historical works of making the entire society into the Juche Idea."

In the light of quotations above, the Kim Il Sung's, works, which is to be all cited at once in the peoples' daily-life of conversations including their public meeting, has become an original text-book of the thought and theory for the revolution & construction in North Korea.

The efforts of making the Kim's works into the revolutionary norms in the North Korea were made complete by compiling *the Dictionary of the Political Terminology*(1970), *the Dictionary of Philosophy*(1970), and in *the Dictionary of Politics*(1973) that were published in the early 1970's. Above all, the two dictionaries, published in April of 1970 were made to build themselves on the ideological basis of Kim Il Sung's unitarianism, which was announced in the 5th anniversary of the North Korean Labors' Party(November of 1970), which has been institutionalized through the Socialist Constitution in 1972.

Firstly, viewed from the introduction of the former(*the Dictionary of the Political Terminology*), this dictionary was published "for the purpose of making highly of chieftain comrade Kim Il Sung's teaching and of helping the members of the Party to learn." And secondly, the latter says "this is published for the purpose of propagandizing and teaching the excellent philosophical ideology of the genius Marxist-Leninist comrade Kim Il Sung to the high ranking members and all the workers be armed with the Kim Il Sung's great ideology for revolution and by giving the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism of becoming a strong revolutionists, the faithful communists."

We can recognize how well was going the efforts of making sacred Kim's every bit of speeches and phrases by examining the publishing objects of the reference books such as *the Indexes of Comrade KimIl Sung's Laborious Works*(1972) and *the Terminology Dictionary of the Great Chieftain Comrade Kim Il Sung's Laborious Works*(1981)

The former concentrates its attention to the thematical classification of the Kim Il Sung's conversations that were published until then and clarifying their sources while the latter as shown in the introduction of the publications "Let's let whole society be suitable to Kim Il Sung's revolutionary ideology and in order to arm strongly the Party
members and laborers with the revolutionary ideology of the Chieftain and to make them grasp the basic thoughts and their substances and to read every bit of sentences so hard as to accept the meaning of his speech, it was published.

As examined above, the Juche Idea which has passed by the systemization process in 1970's underwent a qualitative change in the course of the 6th anniversary of the Party. Here, Kim Il Sung formally declared that he would accept only Juche Idea, but he would not permit any other thought. There originally the Juche Idea which had implied anti-worship of the powerful, self-defensive political orientation began to be refracted in 1967. And in 1970 the Juche Idea was adopted as a 'Formal Ideology' and it was formed fixed 'the Unitarian ideology' in 1980's. But in North Korea until the Juche Idea was formally declared to be 'the Unitarian Ideology' which was supposed to surpass Marxism-Leninism, to it the series of theorization work were necessary. The most essential work to do was to accent the historical determinism: it was the historical viewpoint of 'the Revolutionary Chieftain.'

Owing to the Dictionary of Philosophy, the Chieftain is defined as "a distinguished and excellent leader of Party and revolution who plays a decisive role in revolution and construction." And at the same time, his position is defined as inviolable and absolute" as the most highly revered boss of the mass-people, the center at the unified unity". In this context it goes so far as to "Chieftain is absolute and he should be unconditionally raised" and defines that they are "the duties of the revolutionary fighter."

To be brief, the chieftain's conversations became estimated 'absolute.' His being revolutionary chieftain and at the same time the work of making him absolute is epistemologically becoming structured by trying to make chieftain's conversations absolute.

Here this paper has examined what is meant by the view of revolutionary chieftain which is written in the Dictionary of Philosophy(1985). The North Korean leaders began to manipulate the North Korean people's consciousness to have them do as they would do by means of the political manipulative works done by them. In such a context, a revised edition of the Dictionary of Philosophy published in 1980 is supposed to be very significant, because it ideologically not only formalizes Kim Il Sung's monotheism but also the theoretical structure of the unitarian ideology was finished up at this time. In the Dictionary of Philosophy of 1985, even the indirect quotation of Marxism-Leninism disappeared, because they might be self-evident passages.

3.2. The linguistic symbolism of the Kim Il Sung's works and its normative functions

In order to confirm the characteristic contents of the exact alterations concerned, let us here examine the Kim Il Sung's special way of political discourse of which his works are composed.

Firstly his special colloquial was seen so often in his conversation and it was that he is repeatedly using a popular and hackneyed expressions.

Secondly his conversation has not any mistake. His conversations and speeches published in his writings got examined so exactly as not to make any mistake. Through the continual work of correction, the unrefined or awkward expressions, words or sentences were eliminated from the first time. His monopoly of quotations was made theoretically and logically justified by means of the writings of chieftainship.(Jeon 2001: 37)
In fact this paper is to keep on eye on is that any mistake in his speech was covered by making an abstract and metaphorical expressions.

To avoid the mistakes of his speech the special method of colloquial study are used: his conversations given to the people in the form of 'Chieftain's Teaching' are not to make any error. For example when he says "Man is an animal" he never gives the concrete definition of what he has said. When only necessary he lets his hearers interpret it saying something like 'Man is an emotional animal.' (Kang 2001: 258)

Thirdly this paper points out that the structure of his conversation is characterized by the mythological symbol—a sort of the political mythology. It is to be summed up as follows.

"For thousands of years of history the people deprived of freedom and creative power have endured the long days of darkness. The people were regiven freedom and creative power by the help of our great leader Kim Il Sung and at last the glorious and hopeful world has come back to the people again by the creation of Juche Idea which would bestow glorious splendour on the people. In this hopeful and happy days the people were made the masters of the world who can manage their own destiny freely. What we are to define as follows the hero of mythology who has given us a New World." (Kim 1992: 1)

It is natural that belief in ideology comes from the appeals to the human reason but here it shows a special way to appeal to the instinctive and emotional conviction of the masses to have the solid belief in ideology and this goes to the distinguishing marks of mythological structure of thinking. Likewise, the linguistic structure of the Juche Idea as a mythological symbolic system rather a subjective and metaphorical features. In this case, the words Juche Idea are likely to give a suggestive and diverse comprehension. As said briefly before the essential unit conception of the Juche Idea came the word, 'Juche' implied the subject of the philosophical recognition and at the same time people's sovereignty of the socio-historical subject or national sovereignty from toadyism while it has got a meaning to maintain independence and creativeness which are essential core of 'Juche.' And so it has various suggestiveness

Here to make matters better in the 6th Congress of the Party in 1980's as 'what is called 'Juche-Idealization. of the entire society' was decided to become a goal-culture of the North Korean system. The Juche Idea has not become an object of judgement but become its references as such. And at the same time as the 'Juche' was made to rank with the 'Chieftain' the mythology of hero has come into being.

As observed in the summary and quotation the Juche Idea which considers itself to be the revolutionary ideology was combined with the revolutionary tradition against Japan to become a mythological system for the foundation of a country. Here the first step that constitutes the mythology implies that Kim Il Sung is a person actually living in the contemporary history, and secondly, the form of mythology is characterized by the courteous praises of Kim Il Sung and thirdly,, the mythological concept is the creed of Juche Idea which the North Korean system has made as an indigenous to it, and finally, the result of the mythological significance is the very sacred Kim Il Sung himself.

The basic structure of the mythologic system which is included inside the Juche Idea has been examined above. In this basis the Juche Idea declares itself to be the most scientific and revolutionary image of leadership, leading theory and leading way of fighting for the working class and for the independence of the people but it compels people to believe in it paradoically and unconditionally.

Therefore today in North Korea Juche Idea surpasses Marxism-Leninism so much that North Korean people worship that better than this. So the Juche Idea passes for
the only formal ideology in North Korea and it has been so repeatedly and so long a
time taught to the people that North Korean people can be brought into contact with
only Juche Idea and at the same time they have lost any criterion and standard by
which they can criticize it.

4. Concluding remarks

Now in the North Korea Juche Idea passes for the most revered ideology giving
the guidance to the people in the fields of politics, economics, educations and etc. It
gives also the standing rule of the people's every day life. And it even plays a role of
religion distinguishing right from wrong.

The Jeojakjip as examined above is covered almost with the Juche Idea and passes
for a collection of the Juche Idea which contains a basic ideology of politics,
economics, socio-culture, military affairs and etc and it passes for a text-book for the
revolution and construction of North Korea.

However, in this case until the Jeojakjip has been made it is necessary to note that
there has been not a few revisions and enlargements and at the same time not a little
endeavors to make it sacred. Therefore in the study of North Korea under the basic
data of this, there are what we should keep in mind. The one is to confirm the
academic credibility of the book as a science and the other is to know how to read the
discoursive structure of the books.

As examined above The Kim Il Sung's works were published several times one
after another: they have been systemized through these several processes especially
owing to the requirement of Juche Idea. Therefore the documents appeared before
1970 when the Juche Idea emerged as an official ideology of the Party in the North
Korea need to be referred to the documents before they were corrected. Otherwise it
did so as the credibility problems of the documents were presented. To be brief the
Kim Il Sung's works, especially earlier documents were published before the coming
of the Juche Idea, which needs to be compared with the original texts, in the Rodong
Shinmoon or the Chosun Jungang Yonkam and when the comparison is possible they
are to be acknowledged as the credibility of the academic data.

However it is remarkable that Kim Il Sung's works issued in the later days after
1970's no revisions were to be seen. This means that the focus of the alteration of the
Kim Il Sung's works was moved to the different points. As observed above, here
whole making the necessary documents adjusted to the systematically deepened
systems of Juche Idea of the Kim Il Sung's works was totally patterned and made the
collection of Juche Idea or the 'Text-book of Revolution' sacred and tried to make the
documents different from them. To make a long story short the alteration work of the
Kim Il Sung's works exceptionally transformed from the simple work of correction or
revision to the big one such as total patterning of it or making it sacred. Accordingly
through the documents collected in the Jeojakjip in the study of North Korea, except
for the confirming of the data credibility of the above mentioned documents there are
required what is called a literary style of chieftain, special way of speech and a special
way how to distinguish the documents data outward the discursive structure. And in
this context what is more important is that through the official publications in North
Korea we are to know only the leading principles of the Juche Idea which has got the
power to lead North Korea. Repeatedly speaking we must confuse the blue print of
the chieftain's own drawing for the socialist revolution and construction with the
empirical fact which constructs the objective reality of North Korea. It is reasonable
that it will become natural very soon owing to the Juche Idea or the chieftain's plan.
And here it is remarkable that methodological speaking this fact assuredly shows in North Korea what is the task to overcome in the internal approach through the official publications. For the academic objectivity or relevancy, which the elementary tasks to do in the study of North Korea corresponds to, can be obtained only through the systematic examinations of the objective realities. In the study of North Korea examining the 'normative realities' is of course not unimportant, but it is to satisfy the practical purpose effectively only under the conditions of due understanding about the 'objective realities'.

Bibliographies


The sweeping wave of de-Stalinisation, which began unfolding in the USSR after the historic Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (February 1956), could not but resound in academic circles of the respective countries. Soviet scholars of social sciences responded to this sea change by the immediate resumption of theoretical debates which had remained suspended since the early 1930s. The erstwhile controversies over periodisation of history, correlation between the “productive forces” and the “social superstructure”, Asiatic Mode of Production, and many other vexed questions of Marxist historiography were no longer considered dangerous and were even welcomed to contribute to the pluralism of the Khruschev era.

Radiating from Moscow, this new political whim encouraged scholars from fraternal countries to continue research in the tricky area of Marxist historical theology. Despite having its roots deeply inside the Soviet and Chinese academic traditions, North Korean academic circles arrived at quite an inimitable result: seeking ideological independence from the “big brothers”, historiographical issues in the DPRK were placed on the forefront of struggle against foreign influences. The resolution of old problems in historiography began to be carried out under the banner of ultra-nationalistic Juch’e ideology that prompted many significant changes in the understanding of history.

In the chilling atmosphere of struggle for power and with the worsening Sino-Soviet ideological rift, historiographical debates in North Korea could bring little clarity and ultimately put the scholarship in deep crisis. By the mid-1960s, historians in the DPRK found themselves in particularly difficult circumstances. Designed to legitimise the authoritarian power of Kim Il-sŏng and his family members, research on the national past began to be saturated with semi-religious tales. Finally, in 1967-1968 the leader-centred nationalistic approach of Juch’e ideology superseded the class-centred internationalist tradition of history writing. How and why it happened are the main questions to be explored in this paper. Examining the late writings of the Japanese-trained leftist Korean historians, I try to depict the reasons for the demise of the Socio-economic school of Marxist historiography in the DPRK.

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Back in the 1930s, while applying the Marxist historical scheme to Korea’s national past, the founder of the materialist Socio-economic school of historiography, Paek Nam-un, drew a number of crucial but barely justifiable conclusions. Relying on historical sources which merely stated that slaves existed in ancient times, Paek argued that the Three Kingdoms epoch (1st century B.C. – 7th century A.D.) in Korea exemplified the classical “slave-ownership society”, one of the four mandatory stages
on the way to communism. However, Paek was rather ambiguous in describing the formation, development, and decline of this particular mode of production.

Another protagonist of Marxist historical scholarship in colonial Korea, Yi Chŏng-won, generally supported Paek’s hypothesis of the slave-ownership society but assumed that this social order existed in Korean history until the establishment of Koryŏ (918-1392) dynasty, much longer than it was believed by Paek Nam-un. All attempts to clarify the matter only complicated the question and provided no satisfactory resolution. Moreover, when discussing the issues of ancient and medieval history, both Paek and Yi demonstrated strong attachment to the orthodox Marxist belief that feudalism in Asia was based on the state land-ownership. Despite the fact that this assumption had much to do with the idea of intrinsic Oriental backwardness and formed the basis of Japanese colonial historiography, it was adopted by most Korean leftist historians.

After WWII, while the Marxist scholar-politicians such as Paek Nam-un, Chŏe Ch'ang-ik and Kim Tu-bong occupied the highest positions in the DPRK, their scholarly views were adopted by the newly established historical circles and continued to dominate until the crisis of the Korean War (1950-1953). Only then did the North Korean leadership turn its face to nationalism for the first time. To remedy the shortcomings of the “old” historiography and develop a better understanding of the national past, historians and economists in North Korea began exchanging their views. It was at the special conference organised in 1953 by the DPRK Academy of Sciences that Pak Si-hyang, Kim Sŏk-hyang, Ch'ŏng Hyŏng-gyu and other “new” scholars for the first time raised their voices in disagreement with the findings of their elders.

Their criticism soon acquired the form of a well-coordinated attack on the Socio-economic school and its protagonist, Paek Nam-un. Kim Kwang-jin – Paek's college junior and long-standing opponent – was given full rein to proffer an alternative hypothesis whereby Korea, bypassing the slave-ownership stage of development, proceeded directly from “primitive communism” to “feudalism”. But exceptionally antagonistic toward Paek Nam-un and his research was historian Yim Kŏnsang. Yim’s vitriolic review of Paek’s Ancient History of Korea (1951) was directed at the mechanistic application of the Marxist-Leninist principle of historical “inevitability” [happopch’iksŏng, hapkyuch’ksŏng, kyegisŏng] to national history. YimŏK-sang accused Paek of lacking patriotism and stigmatised his work as a disgrace. Also, Yim complained that Paek used ambiguous language saturated with complicated and rare Chinese hieroglyphs that made the “dry and dull narration” of the textbook hardly comprehensible to the masses.

Only three months later, when delivering a report On Intensifying Class Education for Party Members before the April 1955 Plenum of the CC KWP, Kim Il-sŏng vigorously criticised the so-called “formalistic methods” in political and historical education of the Party cadres. Indoctrination work apparently had been conducted without taking into account the level of general knowledge or theoretical education of individual Party members. Interestingly, Kim’s report had much in common with the Decree of the Council of People’s Commissars signed by Stalin and Molotov in March 1934. This Soviet verdict pronounced the government’s disapproval of all “abstract and formal” history textbooks and teaching methods. As a result, the
Pokrovsky’s school of Marxist historiography was demolished in the USSR for advocating a “subjective conception of Marxism”. The Communist Party held the “old” Marxist scholars responsible for forcing the course of history into the “Procrustean bed of materialism”. Because of this campaign, the nationalistic trend began dominating the Soviet historiography and the concepts of “motherland” and “patriotism” returned to the daily Soviet vocabulary. In the 1950s, a similar shift to nationalism in historiography happened in the DPRK.

In April 1955, while suggesting some concrete ways of improvement in historical education Kim Il-sung paid special attention to the question of “correct” [orūn] understanding of socio-economic formations, periodisation of history and the “scientific” analysis of inter-connections between economic forms and classes at every stage of historical development. Next year, in April 1956, the duties for historians were again formulated at the Third All-Party Congress. Its resolutions unambiguously suggested that historians were to “eliminate dogmatism, regain Juch’e, study and creatively apply Marxism-Leninism, quickly and consistently and with enthusiasm produce scientific achievements, and maintain a diligent attitude toward research”. In other words, these two directives mobilised North Korean historians to establish a new, Juch’e-style historiography.

Responding to the Congress resolutions, the Institute for History Research (IHR) of the DPRK Academy of Sciences (DPRKAS) produced a Ten-year Plan for Scientific Development (1957-1966). Historians were to focus on the study of socialist revolution and fatherland unification, revolutionary traditions, patriotism, and Korean cultural heritage. Such issues as the socio-economic essence of feudalism, the genesis of capitalism, the formation of bourgeois nation, and the proletarian struggle for hegemony in Korea were mentioned as problems awaiting urgent resolution. The tasks of socialist construction and national unification required consolidation of all national forces under the openly nationalistic mottoes. Once it became important to overcome the conventional Marxist views on Korea’s history as "abnormal" and “backward”, the legacy of the Socio-economic school of historiography was to be regarded merely as outdated and harmful.

At that time, the complete rejection of Marxism-Leninism was impossible for political reasons and the so-called “creative” [ch’angjajojŏk] application of the Marxist historical inevitability concept was stressed. Inspired by the Party-approved vogue for self-reliance in ideology, the “new” North Korean scholars were called upon to launch a resolute attack against the forces of the “old”. Historians became involved in a sequence of theoretical discussions which resulted in harsh criticism of “old” scholar-politicians for “dogmatism” and “formalism” in research. Against the background of rampant political purges such search for historical truth soon transgressed the frames of a purely academic discourse and acquired the features of an ideological witch-hunt.

The first full-fledged “discussion” on history periodisation in North Korea took place at the IHR of the DPRKAS on 31 October 1956. Its participants divided into two quarrelling camps that reflected the aggravating conflict between the “old” and “new” forces in academia. One major group, which flocked around archaeologist To Yu-ho and included historians Yim Kŏn-sang, Han Gil-ŏn and Yi Nŭng-sik, supported the slave-ownership hypothesis in Korea’s history. The other group, which argued that there were no conditions for the development of slave-ownership in Korea, was led by
economist Kim Kwang-jin and supported by Chŏn Sŏk-tam, Kim Se-ik and Ôm Ch’ang-jong. Despite their striking differences, both arguments confronted many conclusions made by Paek Nam-un and Yi Ch’ŏng-won in their pre-war writings.

Undertaking active steps in self-defence, Yi Ch’ŏng-won tried to divert the course of the discussion by encouraging historians to focus their research on the nature of lingering remnants of the “primitive communal system”. By that time any references pertaining to “stagnancy” and “backwardness” in national history had become extremely unpopular. Considered as unpatriotic and destructive, such reckless comments predetermined the early sunset of the Socio-economic school in general and Yi Ch’ŏng-won’s academic career in particular. The text of his speech was never included in the Anthology of the Debate on the Socio-economic Organisation of the Three Kingdoms volume published by the DPRKAS two years later.

Anticipating a looming loss of face, Paek Nam-un was prudent enough to reconsider his views and finally acknowledged the defeat. On the final day of the debate, Paek held the floor and conceded that in Korean history the slave-ownership formation, akin to those that once existed in ancient Greece and Rome, could not be confirmed by any historical source. Such revelation, while supplemented by an appeal for assistance, demonstrated the most significant concession Paek ever made since 1945.

I plan to scrutinise and reconsider my views as expressed in the book which was written some twenty-four years ago and which sparked this discussion on the socio-economic organisation of the Three Kingdoms. I would like to appeal for assistance in this task and think that any sort of cooperation would be useful. I firmly believe that such effort can bring some positive results to the development of our academic front, part of the larger ideological front.

This statement marked the first major defeat of the Socio-economic tradition of history writing in North Korea. In the face of reviving nationalism in ideology, official historiography in the DPRK was no longer required to look back at what had been written by the Japanese-trained Marxist scholars. From this moment onward the Juch’e principles of self-reliance in earnest began dictating the work of historians in North Korea. Nevertheless, it was still a decade before the last traces of the “old” scholarly tradition were completely washed out from the official version of national history.

In the meantime, enthused by the easy victory the scholars of younger generation continued their campaign against “formalism” and “dogmatism” in history-wring. The new leader of North Korean historians, Academician Pak Si-hyang, cast doubt on the orthodox Marxist belief that feudalism in Asia had always been based on the state land-ownership. This time it was an attack against Chŏn Sŏk-tam’s hypothesis of “state land-ownership” [t’oji kugyu]. Like Paek Nam-un and other “old” scholars who adhered to the classical Marxist notion of Oriental despotism, Chŏn presumed that in feudal Korea a monarch was always the primary landlord. For this, Chŏn’s theory was slandered as “mechanistic” and “formalistic” in a vituperative editorial of Yŏksa Kwahak journal vilifying Chie Ch’ang-ik, Yi Ch’ŏng-won and other “pseudo-historians”.
While explicating the Marxist theory of the feudalism crisis, Chŏn claimed that due to the residues of intrinsic Asiatic backwardness Korean economy of the late Yi dynasty completely missed the appearance of capitalistic relations. In other words, he claimed that the earliest elements of capitalism did not appear in Korea before the 20th century, when the country fell prey to Japan:

The Korean society had not grown enough to become capitalist. ...During the nineteenth century, only sporadic evidences of capitalist relationships were visible but not even a single capitalist mill could be found.

But in December 1956, Chŏn Sŏk -tam’s beliefs on this issue began to change gradually. At the special conference convened by the IHR of DPRKAS to clarify the time of the formation of bourgeois nation, Chŏn presented his research paper where for the first time he dated the inception of Korean capitalism as being by the 19th century. Chŏn bitterly criticised anyone who tried to attribute this socio-economic phenomenon to earlier dates. Historian Kim Han-ju, with whom Chŏn Sŏk -tam co-authored the Socio-economic History of Contemporary Korea (1948), also claimed that before the 1870s Korean economy remained “backward and rural” with only some timid “sprouts” of capitalism.

Fearing reprisals for his landlord origins, Chŏn Sŏk -tam kept changing his position throughout the 1960s. First, he claimed that in the mining sector the “capitalistic elements” began developing as early as the 17th century. In April 1964, at the special conference which was held at the newly established DPRK Academy of Social Sciences (DPRKASS), Chŏn was ready to prove that “capitalistic relations” in Korea’s farming and agriculture also emerged this early. When talking about his research methodology, Chŏn especially emphasised the necessity to “rely on scientific understanding of historical regularity and frustrate the so-called ‘theory of stagnation’ utilised by official bourgeois scholars and revisionists”. As the DPRK historiography continued to push all crucial dates back in history, in 1966 Chŏn’s hypothesis acquired an official status. His last work published in 1970 created the final account on the problem of the inception of capitalism in Korea and exemplified the “correct” vision of history written from Juch’ě perspective. Chŏn insisted that both the decay of feudalism and the inception of capitalism in Korea were solely the results of internal developments and not of any foreign influence.

Along with the controversies on ancient and medieval history, North Korean scholars were also involved in discussions on modern and contemporary matters. As previously, the “old” scholars in such debates were to play the role of live targets left with little choice: to alter their scholarly views in accordance with political necessity or to perish in the carnage of reprisals. In some instances, when the “old” scholars tried to contradict or simply did not hurry to rectify their “mistakes”, the heaviest charges were pressed. Controversy over research performed by Yi Ch’ŏng -won can provide a telling example of how the Marxist scholars of the older generation were eradicated.

In 1955, Yi Ch’ŏng -won’s monograph entitled Korean Proletariat in Struggle for Hegemony presented a detailed story of the inception, formation and development of labour movement in Korea. In his book, Yi claimed that not a single proletarian organisation existed in Korea before the Bolshevik revolution and, therefore, regarded
the Korean Socialist Union [Chŏn Sahoe Tongmaeng] established in the Russian Far East in 1918 the earliest ideological group of Korean socialist movement. Yi Ch’ŏng-won lamented that even after that the movement retained its “spontaneous and uncoordinated” character. Instead of praising the anti-Japanese guerrilla groups in Eastern Manchuria, Yi Chŏng-won emphasised the leading role of Marxist-Leninist organisations in their struggle for proletarian hegemony in Korea and Japan. This could not but irritate Kim Il-sŏng and his partisan faction in the KWP. Attempts to present Kim's revolutionary activities in the most favourable light prompted Yi to replete his research with frequent allusions to the Association for Fatherland Restoration [Choguk Kwangbokhoe]. But Yi would judge Kim’s military and organisational talents only against the guiding wisdoms of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, praising him merely as a “true follower”. After 1956, when Kim Il-sŏng rushed to formulate his independent from the USSR and China line, such moderate compliments were by no means satisfactory.

The abortive coup of August 1956 erupted in the KWP under the pretext of a crusade against Kim Il-sŏng's rising cult of personality and ended in reprisals against the “old” scholar-politicians. On 30 October 1956, a special panel discussion was convened at the IHR DPRKAS where the first negative comments regarding Yi Ch’ŏng-won's book Korean Proletariat in Struggle for Hegemony were publicly uttered. The outcome of this debate had been predetermined by Yi’s affiliation with another historian-politician and the coup culprit, Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik. Thus, in the course of the discussion “serious shortcomings” of the book were disclosed; among the gravest were mentioned the “mistreatment of historical sources”, the “dispersion of research subject”, and the “weakness of theoretical analysis” that altogether would make the book “incomprehensible”.

Yi Ch’ŏng-won refused to capitulate and the open disagreement took place between him and other participants of the discussion. Firstly, there was a dispute over the date of the ultimate establishment of “proletarian hegemony” in Korea. Where Yi argued that the struggle for hegemony was accomplished well before August 1945, his opponents insisted that it happened only with the proclamation of the DPRK on 9 September 1948. Secondly, Yi Ch’ŏng-won’s evaluation of Sin’ganhoe (1927-1931) was questioned by many discussants. Yi’s critics were keen to credit Kim Il-sung’s Association for Fatherland Restoration with the merit of the being the first national united front organisation in Korea. For this purpose they tried to despise Sin’ganhoe as simply an anti-Japanese club.

Furthermore, there was a complex debate over the “correct” attitude toward the national bourgeoisie. In his book Yi Ch’ong-won asserted that Korean proletariat, while searching for a coalition with the peasantry, could achieve such alliance only through the “wholesale isolation of the national bourgeoisie from the masses”. In early 1957, this hypothesis sparked another debate which was closely watched by the Yŏksa Kwahak journal. Historian Kim Sang-ryong accused Yi of “mechanistic” application of foreign strategies formulated by Lenin, Stalin and Mao, whereas Korea was a country significantly different from Tsarist Russia or semi-colonial China. “When we discuss the Korean proletariat’s struggle for hegemony why should we emulate the policy of bourgeoisie isolation adopted by the Bourgeois-Democratic revolution in Russia?” – questioned Kim resentfully.
An attempt to find an acceptable solution to the problem was undertaken by a young scholar, Hwang Chang-yŏp. In a short but eloquent article Hwang confirmed that Yi Ch’ŏng-won’s book suffered from serious shortcomings. Hwang used his skills as a Moscow-trained philosopher and dialectically divided every policy into “strategic” and “tactical”. He presumed that Yi simply meant the “strategic isolation” of comprador bourgeoisie and, probably, was not against the “tactical union” with national bourgeoisie. This ambiguous explanation allowed the cluster of “new” historians such as Kim Sang-ryong, Hwang Chang-yŏp, Yi Na-yŏng and Chŏn Sŏk-tam, who sided with them, to accept a joint resolution that officially closed the debate on 16 October 1957. The positions of Kim and Hwang were granted official status while the views of Yi Ch’ŏng-won were collectively condemned.

Yi Ch’ŏng-won, the Director of the Modern and Contemporary History Centre of the IHR DPRKAS, was not even present at that final session of the discussion. According to the documents recently declassified in the Russian diplomatic archives, in early September 1957 Yi Ch’ŏng-won was arrested on suspicion of “involvement in conspiracy against the Party”. Along with Yi Ch’ŏng-won, historians Kim Chŏng-do and Ho Kap were also denounced as the “enemy of the people” and subsequently purged from academia. Analysing the topics and the issues on which Yi Ch’ŏng-won was working during the last two years of his academic career, one can conclude that Yi desperately tried to rectify his mistake. Most of his writings of that period were dedicated to patriotic themes with particular focus on the partisan activity of Kim Il-sŏng. Nevertheless, his association with the rebellious Yan’an faction left him no chance for survival.

* * *

Despite the damage which the “old” Socio-economic school of Marxist historiography suffered during the 1956 crisis, history in North Korea continued to be analysed from the viewpoint of consecutively changing socio-economic formations. However, the earlier trend to stress the backwardness and triviality of economic and social order in pre-1910 Korea became notably emasculated. Instead, the main emphasis in research and education now was placed on national uniqueness and fervent patriotism. The general tendency in research was to present Korea’s past as orderly, ancient, and glorious as it could be supported by historical fact.

Simultaneously, a “correct” approach to the vexed issues of national history continued to be developed under the supervision of “new” academics. In the late 1950s and early 1960s there was no topic in Korean history which was not a potential target for revision and correction in accordance with the current Party line. For this purpose, books compiled by the purged authors or defunct research institutions began to be rewritten. For example, designed to override Yi Ch’ŏng-won’s “erroneous” views on the history of labour movement in colonial Korea, *The Communists’ Struggle for Proletarian Hegemony in the Anti-Japanese National Liberation Struggle* was published by Kim Si-jung in 1957. To eradicate any memory of Ch’oe Ch’ang-ik and *The History of the National Liberation Struggle in Korea* (1949) compiled under his direction, a completely new book under the same title was published in 1958. In the preface of this book its author, Yi Na-yŏng, welcomed the decisions of the Third All-Party Congress (1956) and denounced “dogmatism” and “poisonous legacy of sectarian and anti-Party elements” in historical circles that “deliberately tried to
distort the revolutionary traditions of the Korean people, and underrate, diminish and obliterate the role of Kim Il-sŏng in this tradition”.

The problem of “distortions” in research on sensitive topics was solved in December 1956 when a new research body – the Institute for the Party History Research [Tang Yŏksa Yŏn’guso] (IPHR) – was established under the auspices of the KWP Central Committee in order to concentrate in the Party clutches all materials related to the Korean communist movement and the personal biography of Kim Il-sŏng. On 13 April 1957, some 4,000 volumes of documents on the national liberation struggle of the 1930s were relocated to IPHR custody. In 1959, the IPHR dispatched its second exploratory team to South-Eastern Manchuria to gather more facts on Kim Il-sŏng’s anti-Japanese armed struggle.

Based on those carefully selected materials, The History of the Modern Revolutionary Movement in Korea (1961) was co-authored by a group of “new” historians led by the Head of the New and Modern History Research Division of the IHR DPRKAS, Chŏn Sŏk-tam. This book was dedicated to the opening in 1961 of the Fourth All-Party Congresses and the centenary (1860-1960) of Korean revolution. Interestingly, the introductory article in this book, as well as in The History of the National Liberation Struggle in Korea (1958), emphasised only the importance of the “ever-victorious” revolutionary tradition created by Kim Il-sŏng. Despite containing an abundance of the most updated historical data and the relatively high level of research, several years later both books were proclaimed “erroneous” and their authors purged.

Arguably less sensitive to the ever-changing Party line were the topics pertinent to medieval and ancient history. Instead of tempting their fate by investigations in the tricky area of modern or contemporary history, many North Korean scholars voluntarily limited their responsibility to the duties of translator. To facilitate the translation of historical sources from classical Chinese into contemporary Korean, in 1956 the Division of Classical Research [Kojŏn Yŏn’gusil] was established within the IHR DPRKAS. However, even the academic publications designed for a narrow circle of specialists, such as Chronological Tables of Korean History (1957), were to serve the purpose of ideological indoctrination. The name of Kim Il-sŏng was placed there on a par with the great rulers of the past.

Discussions on the socio-economic essence of ancient Korean kingdoms were officially closed in 1962, when historical community in the DPRK ultimately settled upon the hypothesis suggested by Kim Sŏk-hyŏng and Pak Si-hyŏng. It was presumed that the Three Kingdoms were based not on the slave-holding but on feudal economy. Moreover, their establishing dates were pushed back to the 2nd century B.C. Instead, the mythical Old Chŏn (2333 -108 B.C.) was proclaimed the earliest slave-holding power state in Korean history. This newly accepted official position was recorded in the 1962 edition of the General History of Korea. Drastic variations from the earlier version of this book revealed another sharp turn in the DPRK historiography. While in 1956 the socio-economic level of Puyŏ and Chinguk tribes were defined as “declining and primitive classless societies”, in 1962 they were treated as the “classical examples of ancient slave-holding”.

Archaeology was also mobilised to function in support of increasingly nationalistic ideology. Trying to present Korean history as the longest and most sophisticated in
East Asia, North Korean historians rushed to find confirmation of the Palaeolithic Age in the peninsula. A large number of field discoveries made between 1963 and 1966 not only established the grounds for such claims, but also significantly expanded the geography of lands supposedly populated by ancient Koreans. The Sea of Okhotsk on the East and the Yangze River on the West now girded the territory occupied by legendary Old Cho'on, Yemaek and Palhae. Such passion for imperial grandiosity tempted North Korean scholars to presume that their ancient capital, P'yongyang, was initially established somewhere in Liaodong peninsula. However, at that time, the myth of Tan'gun was still treated as a “popular legend that reflected some serious changes in socio-economic life”.

The necessity to rewrite politically incorrect books and articles provided the ruling faction of the former anti-Japanese guerrillas in the KWP with a unique chance to doctor some details of modern and contemporary history that could not but bring many fantastic elements into its narrative. By that time, Kim Il-sŏng’s cult of personality had already reached an extraordinary height: his anti-Japanese guerrilla past was being depicted in the most heroic tones; his monuments and portraits were ubiquitous. Then, North Korean historians began deifying Kim’s family members. For instance, in describing the 1866 incident with the American ship “General Sherman”, Yi Ch’ŏng-won and other “old” historians usually stated that this attack in the waters of Taedong River was organised and guided by a retired officer, Pak Ch’un-gwon. However, after 1961, Kim Il-sŏng’s great grandfather, Kim Ŭn-u, began to be credited with this exploit.

The chain reaction of academic fraud, which began after 1956, finally plunged North Korean historiography into the dark ages of the 1960s. The “guiding recommendations” of Kim’s eldest son, Kim Jong-il, and numerous cousins brought even more havoc into historical scholarship. In 1960, when Kim Jong-il began his graduate course at the Kim Il-sŏng University, a number of historiographical articles were published under his name. In one article, the freshman Kim claimed that the kingdom of Silla had never unified the Korean peninsula. In another essay, Kim argued that the northern kingdom of Koguryo boasted the more advanced level of socio-economic development than the other two Korean kingdoms. Who stood behind these scholarly experiments is still not clear, but the implication was that historical scholarship had been taken over by the obscurantism of Juch'ŏ ideology.

This dramatic overturn affected the course of the last academic discussions. From the diminishing variety of academic opinions the Central Committee would choose one to become the official hypothesis. All other views would be outlawed as anti-Party and anti-revolutionary, leaving their authors little chance for survival. This was the time when even “new” historians, those who for a while assumed the leading role in academia, were removed from the scene. Nevertheless, while decimating the ranks of scholars the North Korean repressive machine normally refrained from immediate executions. Yi Na-yŏng, for example, kept writing a Leader-centred version of contemporary history in his prison cell until the 1970s. Some of them, like Chŏn Sŏk-tam, were later recalled to continue interrupted work, emptying prison space for the new candidates for political re-education.

At the Second Party Conference in October 1966, Kim Ch'ang-man, who for many years had been in charge of the KWP ideological section, was dismissed and put on
trial. Kim Il-sŏng purged most of his colleagues in the field of ideology and propaganda for being “bourgeois revisionists”. Simultaneously the mass purge of former Kapsan guerrillas took place in the KWP. Thus, the last potential opponents of Kim Il-sŏng within the Party were successfully annihilated. After all these incidents, the Fifteenth Plenary Meeting (May 1967) warned against "revisionist trends in ideology" which were allegedly caused by the American cultural invasion. In reality, it was the moment when the Marxist-Leninist ideology was effectively superseded by the Juch’ŏ ideology of Kimilsungism.

The process of discarding the “old” Marxist vision of national history which first succeeded in 1956, was also completed in 1967, when Hwang Chang-yŏp was forced to create a philosophical substantiation of Juch’ŏ historiography. Historian Kang Chae-ŏn remembers that at that time the portraits of prominent historical figures, except those of Kim Il-sŏng, were removed from the walls of classrooms and offices of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan [Choch'ongryŏng]. Every academic publication was expected to start with the words “As teaches the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-sŏng...” In such circumstances, the normal work of historical journal Yŏksa Kwahak and archaeological journal Kogohak Yŏngu was impossible and their publication was suspended.

As it has been established above, historiographical debates in North Korea of the mid-1950s began with the genuine attempts of the younger generation of scholars to mend the limitations of the “old” Socio-economic tradition in Marxist historical research. The further development of the DPRK official historiography after the 1956 political crisis, however, turned into deliberate demolition of this tradition. Desperate attempts to subjugate the studies of national history to the interests of nationalistic ideology created the situation when historical fact was valued only according to its ability to support the Party line. By 1967, most historiographical debates had been shut down as obsolete, while the atmosphere of constant purges and terror tamed historians and demoted them to the status of obedient scholar-bureaucrats.
1. Introduction

Does political ideology still matter, at “the end of history?” Yes it does, at least in North Korea. In a totalitarian society like North Korea, “the official ideology” of the single and ruling party plays very important roles: interpreting the history, the present situation, and the final destination of mankind; presenting the mission to be performed and the methods to be adopted; justifying the one party dictatorship and all its policies and practices (Friedrich and Brezezinski 1965: 88-89; Linz 1975: 191, 196; Schapiro 1972: 55). In North Korea, the official ideology, Juche Idea, has been the one and only guiding idea of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) since early 1970s. Since then “making the whole society into a society of Juche Idea” has been “the supreme platform of the Party,” by which they mean “all the party members and workers should think and act in accordance with the requirements of Juche Idea” (Kim Jong Il 1982)

I don’t know exactly how successful the North Korean leadership has been in making a Juche society. However the contents and the changes, major or minor, of their official ideology can tell us how they perceive their internal and external environments and what they are doing now and intend to do in the future. In other words, a solid study on their political ideology and its changes can provide us very meaningful clues and insights to its politics in particular and to the whole society in general, past present and future.

Juche was first introduced in the mid-1950s as “Juche in thinking.” Since then it has been enriched, developed, upgraded, and systematized. In the early 1990s, North Korean leadership was confronted with a new global environment: their “socialist brother countries” including the Soviet Union were dissolved or collapsed. Also in 1994, “the great leader” Kim Il Sung suddenly died. In addition, they suffered from several years of natural disasters including repeated drought and flood. Thus many observers predicted that a major change in their ideology (and policies) would occur accordingly. Actually there appeared some new slogans, concepts, ideas, and even philosophy such as “the red flag philosophy.” What are the contents of these? Do they constitute any meaningful changes in the existing ideology? What do they imply? I will attempt to answer these questions in the following sectors. Let me start with some comments on selected key words, which may, hopefully, give a better understanding, especially to those who have non-Korean speaking background.

2. Comments on selected key words

2.1. Juche, independence, self-sufficiency, and self-reliance

Juche (主體) is a Korean word written in English as it is pronounced. Literally it means “main body,” but it also means “subject” or “subjectivity” as opposed to
"object" or "objectivity," and "master" as opposed to "slave." In the context of international relations, it means independence or nationalism. Thus "Juche in thinking" means an independent way of thinking or creative interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, as opposed to dogmatic or revisionist interpretations.

Independence as shown in "independence in politics" is English translation of "Jaju" (自主), which literally means "self-master." It means self-determination as well as independence.

Self-sufficiency as in "self-sufficiency in economy" is a translation of "Jarib" (自立), which literally means "self-standing." I think that self-standing is a better translation than self-sufficiency, though it may be rather unfamiliar to native speakers of English. Anyway it means self-running economy even when assistance from outside is not available.

Self-reliance as in "self-reliance in defense" is a translation of "Jawui" (自衛), which literally means "self-defense." Here once again, I think self-defense is a better translation.

2.2. Philosophy, -ism, thought, thinking, idea, ideology and the hierarchy

Philosophy is used as a system of thought containing world outlook, like idealism vs. materialism and metaphysics vs. dialectic. In some cases it is used as world outlook itself. When they refer to someone’s philosophy, they call it someone-ism, like Marxism, Kimism.

However –ism is also used to refer to spirit, mentality, or way of thinking. For instance "Korean-Nation-Firstism" is not philosophy, but spirit.

Thought, thinking, idea and ideology are all translations of the same Korean word "Sasang." (思想) The translation differs as such, depending on the location of the word "Sasang" in a given text. Idea in "Juche Idea," however, is fixed one.

It should be noted that the North Korean writers are well aware of the hierarchy between "Juui" (-ism or philosophy) and "Sasang." As is the case in China, Juui is of fundamentals or principles while "Sasang" is of its adaptations, applications however creative or not, under given, particular conditions. Thus the former is something that cannot be changed while the latter can be changed. Juche Idea is just Sasang, not Juui, although every now and then they mention Kimism or Juche philosophy.

3. What was their ideology?

3.1. "Juche in ideology" and the four principles

It was in the year 1955 when the term “Juche” was officially introduced for the first time. In a speech delivered to party cadres, Kim Il Sung stressed “Juche in ideological works” and opposed dogmatism and formalism prevailing in the party at that time. He described Juche as “our style” of Marxism-Leninism. It was a creative application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism in accordance with concrete Korean situations and “Korean national characteristics” while adhering thoroughly to the principles. In describing “our style” in detail, he made a very interesting figuration: “It does not matter whether you use a spoon or chopsticks, your right hand or left hand when you are eating” (Kim Il Sung 1977: 145).

It should be noted that in the very first appearance Juche was related closely to Korean nationalism. In addition to his reference to “Korean national characteristics,” he emphasized Korean history, geography, and the customs and traditions of Korean people. He mentioned morality such as “respecting seniors.” He strongly accused some cadres of bad behavior toward their seniors. This was,
and still is, one of the old Korean traditions, Confucian one. However this sort of
Korean nationalism maintained a low profile in the shade of creative application of
Marxism-Leninism.

Since 1955 “Juche in ideology” has been developed, enriched, and systematized
year by year. At the end of 1960s, it became “Juche Idea” which was composed of
the four principles: Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-sufficiency in
economics, self-reliance in defense. This Idea became the only idea of the party at
the fifth congress of WPK in 1970.

Juche in ideology as one of the four principles was fundamentally the same as
when it first appeared in 1955. Independence in politics and self-reliance in defense
have no special meaning other than as the words themselves are generally understood.
However we may have to pay more attention to the concept of self-sufficiency in
economics. Sometimes this concept has been as “closed economy” by outside
watchers. Kim Il Sung himself made it very clear that the self-sufficiency did not
mean the closed economy. From the very beginning he emphasized the importance
of international trade and cooperation. He did not exclude even the possibility of
accepting foreign aid. In fact he said, “If you provide economic aid, we will accept
it, but if you don’t, we will be OK nevertheless. This is the principle of self-
sufficiency” (Kim Il Sung 1977: 208). This means that their choice of self-
sufficiency was rather a forced or negative response to the permanent economic
sanctions posed by the United States and the cut-off of economic aid from the Soviet
Union than a positive choice of their own. This way they don’t have to feel any kind
of uneasiness with the principle of self-sufficiency when they accept foreign aid or
economic cooperation.

Juche Idea as four principles was still claimed as an application of Marxism-
Leninism. But in its main thrust or values, it was something not far from Korean
nationalism. And it was rather a set of lines or principles of policy than a system of
idea or thought.

3.2. The philosophical principle and the all-in-one system of Juche Idea

“The philosophical principle” of Juche Idea was introduced in the early 1970s. At
an interview with Japanese news reporters in 1972, Kim Il Sung described man “as
master of everything who decides everything.” At another interview with Australian
reporters in 1974, he described the philosophical foundation of Juche Idea
unequivocally: “Juche Idea is based on the philosophical foundation that man is
master of everything and man decides everything” (Kim Il Sung 1977: 564-565).

From this time Juche Idea was claimed as having its own philosophical foundation.
However it took needed nearly one decade for the philosophy to be fully sophisticated.
And all the other fragments of Kim’s ideas that had been mentioned were collected,
modified, and systematized. As a result, Kim Jong Il’s treatise, “On the Juche Idea”
was publicized on Kim Il Sung’s 70th birthday in 1982. They call it “all-in-one
systematization of Juche Idea.”

According to this treatise, Juche Idea is composed of three parts: philosophical
principle, the laws of historical development and social revolution, and the guiding
principles. The philosophical principle is the principle of “man-centered philosophy
that explains man’s position and role in the world.” What is man? “Man is a social
being with independence, creativity and consciousness.” Therefore “man holds a
special position and plays a special role as master of the world.” That is, “man is the
master of everything and decides everything.”

The laws of history are as follows: the working masses are the subject of history
and the motive force of social progress, the history of human society is the history of
the struggle of popular masses to defend and realize independence, the socio-
historical movement is a creative movement of popular masses to transform and
change nature and society, and the revolution is propelled to victory by the conscious
struggle of masses of the people.

The guiding principles are composed of three parts: the independent stand, the
creative method, and enhancing the role of ideological consciousness. The
independent stand comprises the following four principles: Juche in ideology,
independence in politics, self-sufficiency in economy, and self-reliance in defense.
The creative method is “to solve all problems arising in the revolution and
construction in conformity with the actual conditions by relying on the creativity of
the people.” Enhancing the role of ideological consciousness is giving priority over
all works to the remoulding of ideology and the political work.

At this stage, they claimed that Juche Idea was not just an application of Marxism-
Leninism, but its “succession and development” or “succession and renovation.”
However it was no more materialistic and dialectical than the traditional
Confucianism of Korea. And they claimed the philosophical principle was “fresh
and unique.” However Korean people have been very familiar to the man-centered
philosophy from time immemorial. For instance, more than forty centuries ago the
first king of the first Korean kingdom declared a man-centered principle as his ruling
idea. And the Buddhism and Confucianism which were introduced later might have
reinforced that tradition of man-centrism. In this sense, their principle is neither
fresh nor unique. Furthermore they did not hide a very negative legacy of traditional
Confucian authoritarianism by saying that “If they are to hold their position and fulfill
their role as subject of history, the popular masses must be brought into contact with
leader. Only under correct leadership, would the masses, though creators of history,
be able to occupy the position and perform their role as subject of socio-historical
development.”

In its essence Juche Idea now has become a North Korean version of nationalism
that had grown from experiences of resistance against foreign invaders since the 19th
century, though it was officially denied. However in 1986 Kim Jong Il himself
emphasized “our-nation-firstism.” I believe that this has formed a turning point of
Juche Idea from covert nationalism to overt nationalism.

4. What is new since 1990?
4.1. The Sprit of Korean-Nation-First and the True Nationalism

Although there had been nationalist orientation in Juche Idea from the beginning, it
was hidden in the shade of proletariat internationalism. When necessary, it was
expressed as “socialist patriotism,” as was the case in the Soviet Union under Stalin.
However in 1986 Kim Jong Il mentioned “our-nation-firstism” in an open manner.
Further, he explained about this spirit in detail at a speech completely dedicated to
“the spirit of Korean-nation-firstism” in 1989. According to him, the spirit of
Korean-nation-firstism is a noble idea that is expressed in the pride and self-esteem
emanating from the greatness of Korean nation and also in high level of self-
consciousness as well as a will to enhance the greatness of Korean nation. He also
addressed that Korean nation is the greatest in the world because of the leadership of
the great leader and the great party, the great Juche Idea, and the supreme socialist
regime.

This spirit is still far from the nationalism that we ordinary people think of. Two
years later, his father closed the gap. Kim Il Sung made it very clear that nation
precedes class and “the true nationalism” should be differentiated from “the bourgeois nationalism.” He also stated that he himself had been a true nationalist, as well as his father. His true nationalism is the nationalism that defends “national interests.” National interests mean the independence, development and prosperity, and unity of the nation. He stressed that their political system and the whole society were built on the principle of nationalism, and also that this principle should be applied to the reunification process of both Koreas (Rodong Sinmun, 1 August 1991).

This “true nationalism” is what we are familiar with, just like the same old song of Arirang. Six years later in 1997, Kim Jong Il echoed another song of Arirang. In a lengthy treatise on “national character” (民族性), he declared “adherence to the Juche character and national character in revolution and construction is a fundamental principle.” He further explained that “sustaining the national character means preserving and developing their own fine national traits and embodying them in all spheres of social life.” “The fine traits of our people” are being resourceful and courageous, hating injustice, loving justice and truth, and valuing morality. This explanation of national character would not offend anybody, whether they are Korean or not. “The fine traits” here are quite different from the rationales of “the spirit of Korean-nation-first” in 1989.

Thus the great leader, founder of Juche Idea and his successor, the beloved leader became “the true nationalists” and their Juche Idea became “the true nationalism.” It seems to me that at this stage they didn’t have to rely solely on the appeal or attraction of severely damaged Marxism-Leninism, and that this stance will not be changed in the future. However this does not necessarily mean that they have given up adhering to socialism.

4.2. “Our Socialism” vs. other socialism

“Our style” or “our socialism” is also not new. Kim Il Sung emphasized “our style” in his speech in 1955, as mentioned earlier. However this time the term is acquiring a renewed importance by the fall of communism in Eastern Europe.

North Korean leadership has made great efforts to differentiate “our socialism” from other socialism. Kim Jong Il wrote at least seven major treatises on this single subject after 1991, which is very unusual. The seven works were devoted to theoretical elaborations and augmentation of his father’s one sentenced diagnosis in 1991: “The secret of the indestructibility and victory of our socialism lies on the fact that we have firmly established the Juche in the socialist construction” (Rodong Sinmun, 1 January 1991).

According to Kim Jong Il, “the secret of its durability and indestructibility is that it is centered upon the popular masses, that it has made the masses the genuine masters of society, and that it has devoted everything to the service of the masses. Because our socialism serves the popular masses, our people regard socialism as the cradle of their lives and of their happiness, and they entrust their destiny entirely to socialism.” (Kim Jong Il 1991) Therefore “the basic reason for the frustration of socialism in some other countries” is their failure in Juche (Kim Jong Il 1992a). Then the following question raises: where does this failure stem from?

Other socialists failed to overcome “the historical limitations of the communist theory of the previous age.” Marxism does not provide theories after the socialist revolution. Nevertheless some socialist applied Marxism dogmatically. After the establishment of socialist system, the economic factors do not play the role as a main force of historical development. It is popular masses equipped with socialism that play the decisive role. The economic factors do not automatically transform people
into socialists. Transforming people is in its essence remoulding their consciousness. So we socialists should give top priority to the transformation of people by remoulding their idea. The socialists of other countries could not understand this.

And some other socialists are accused of having denied the revolutionary essence of Marxism and pursuing a revisionist policy. It is indispensable to strengthen the working-class party and to ensure its leadership. This is a revolutionary principle, which must never be compromised. But some socialists introduced pluralism on the pretext of the “reform” and “restructuring” of socialism. Liberalism in ideology, multiparty system in politics, and diversity in the form of ownership which pluralism advocates are characteristics of capitalist society. These characteristics are something that can never be tolerated in a socialist society. Thus, “finally, the grave consequence of the ruin of the working-class parties themselves was incurred”(Kim Jong Il 1992a)

To be short, the differences between “our socialism” and other socialism lie on “Juche” on the one hand, and the one party dictatorship on the other. “Our socialism” succeeded in the transformation of man through ideological remoulding or revolution in accordance with Juche Idea, while other socialism failed. “Our socialism” adhered to the principle of proletariat dictatorship, while other socialism abandoned the principle. This is why North Korean Juche society, based on Juche Idea, survived as a strong fortress of socialism while other perished. Their logic implies that they have no intention to change their ideology, political system, and the whole society as long as possible.

4.3. The Red Flag Philosophy

If reality requires a new idea, thought or philosophy, the great leader and philosopher should present something new. Here is “the red flag philosophy.”

The red flag philosophy was presented for the first time in the New Year’s Joint Editorial of Rodong Sinnun(the worker’s newspaper), Joson Inmingun(the daily of the KPA), and Chongnyon Jonwi(the daily of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League) in 1996. Shortly later, the Rodong Sinnun described the philosophy just a little more specifically. The philosophy was founded by Kim Jong Il, and was composed of three parts: the revolutionary philosophy of Juche, the philosophy of single-hearted unity, and the philosophy of belief in socialism. The newspaper did not differentiated philosophy from thought(9 January 1996). But one year later in 1097 the newspaper redefined it as follows: “This idea is, in essence, absolute worship for the leader of the revolution and the spirit of defending him even at the cost of life and sharing weal and woe with him to the last”(1 January 1997). That was all. I mean there was no further explanation that would probably make someone believe it as a real philosophy. Since then, however, this “philosophy” or thought has repeatedly appeared in their major documents for three years.

“Red flag” itself is not new. It symbolizes communism, communist revolution, or communist party or country. Not surprisingly the national flag of North Korea is also red. Traditionally the color red implies a man’s loyalty toward his king, or a woman’s fidelity and devoted love toward her lover. What is new is the term “philosophy” or “thought.” For this reason some outside watchers speculated that it replaced Juche Idea thereby enhancing Kim Jong Il’s own leadership not inherited from his father.

However this speculation was proven to be premature. The content of the “philosophy” does not at all deserve the term philosophy. It is nothing more than a slogan, the slogan which did not last very long. Since 1999 the term has disappeared.
While the newspaper was trumpeting the “philosophy,” Kim Jong Il himself was busy preparing a treatise on the uniqueness of his father’s Juche “philosophy” (Kim Jong Il 1996). It seems to me that the red flag “philosophy” was an incident made by some party cadres without consulting with their seniors.

4.4. New slogans and old slogans revived

For several years after Kim Il Sung’s death, North Korea suffered from unprecedented and extraordinary hardship and difficulties. Their response was something like this: let’s endure and overcome the hardship with our spiritual power. Where does their spiritual power come from? Clinging to the greatness of the leader, Juche Idea, “our style” socialist system, and the red flag philosophy was not good enough. They needed desperately something more effective. Here appeared “The Spirit of Arduous March.”

“The arduous march” depicts a historical event that Kim Il Sung’s guerilla units suffered very severely from the imperial Japanese army’s massive and thorough anti-guerilla military campaign in the late 1930s. The revived spirit of the arduous march was defined as the revolutionary spirit of fulfilling revolution with its own power even in hardship, the optimistic spirit of overcoming obstacles even in difficulties, and the undefeatable spirit of fighting against hardship without any comfort (Rodong Sinmun, 1 January 1996). This slogan dominated their news media for at least two years. In the New Year editorial of 1998, they implied the end of the march. And a new slogan of “the forced march of socialism” seemed to replace the arduous march. But according to the New Year editorial of 2001, the arduous march was reported to have ended in 2000.

The contents of “the arduous march” are not new either. The march just shows how hard and difficult their situations were in the last few years of the 20th century. In the process of the march, their slogans or rhetoric became more and more militant, combatant and extreme, and the old Confucian morality became revitalized and re-emphasized much more than ever. It is easy to find such expressions as “even at a cost of life,” “death-defying,” “single-hearted,” “resolute,” “iron fists,” “steel-strong,” “fighting spirit,” “do-or-die spirit,” “spirit of human bombs,” etc. Also it is easy to find such Confucian expressions as “loyalty,” “fidelity,” “love,” “morality,” “conscience,” “justice,” “credibility,” “respect of seniors,” “comradeship,” “faith,” “belief,” “confidence,” etc. Among these, “comradeship,” or “love of comrade” was recently spotlighted as “philosophy of comradeship” (Rodong Sinmun, 24 April 2001). But Kim Jong Il has not been credited with a fatherly image which his father had long enjoyed.

In the meantime, the Rodong Sinmun suddenly declared building “powerful socialist state” in August 1998. In the New Year editorial next year, the newspaper explained that the “powerful socialist state” as an ideologically, militarily and economically powerful state. The emphasis was given to the economy. Although the arduous march continued until 2000, the powerful state became dominant slogan from this time. This seems to imply that their hardship became more tolerable since the mid-1998. Since 1999, their militant extreme slogans and Confucian expressions receded. This in turn implies that they can afford to be flexible only when their situations are getting better.

The year 1998 is remembered as the first year when “the army-first politics” was announced. This means “giving top priority to the military affairs and pushing ahead with the socialist cause with the revolutionary army as the main force” (Rodong Sinmun, 1 January 2001). Kim Jong Il said “the army-first politics is the basic
political style of mine and an all-mighty sword to lead our revolution toward victory” (Rodong Sinmun, 1 June 1999). His political style had often been characterized as “benevolence politics,” “big-scale politics,” or “music politics” in the past. During the period of the arduous march, though, he spent very much of his time on visiting army units, although we don’t know whether he really allocated more money and resources to the army or not. Anyway his army-first politics may be a product of a situation where he has to do so in order to maintain the existing system, as most outside watchers speculate. At the same time, however, it needs to be noted that the army, as a massive, well-disciplined and free labor force, for example, on many construction sites, has been exploited, and that visiting the army does not require much money.

5. Conclusion
North Korean official ideology was and is Juche Idea. At the beginning it was an application of Marxism-Leninism with nationalist orientation. In 1982 it became a systematic idea, as succession and development of Marxism-Leninism, but still maintaining nationalist orientation.

In 1990s they introduced a new name of Juche Idea, “the true nationalism,” which was hidden for a long time. They also tried very hard to differentiate their socialism from other socialism. The logic is like this: Juche Idea succeeded the revolutionary essence of Marxism on the one hand, and it overcame the historical limitations of Marxism and developed “fresh and unique” philosophy and theories suitable for the new era after socialist revolution on the other. This is why Juche society based on Juche Idea has survived as a strong fortress socialism, while others have perished.

However, after Kim Il Sung’s death they had to launch “the arduous march”, “the forced march of socialism.” This required more exciting, militant, extreme slogans such as the red flag philosophy, “the death-defying spirit,” “the spirit of human bombs.” Also many century-old Confucian virtues such as “loyalty,” “fidelity,” “comradeship,” and “conscience” were needed. In the meantime a blueprint of “the powerful socialist state” was presented in 1998. Accordingly the extreme rhetoric was toned down since 1999.

All the ideas, concepts, and slogans do not constitute any meaningful change in their Juche Idea. This implies that they have no intention to change their ideology as well as their society. However they tend to consider some changes if their situations are better. For instance, Kim Jong Il said “we must solve all problems from a new point of view and from a new height of view” (Rodong Sinmun, 4 January 2001). This remark was made possible after the successful arduous march. So if there is anyone who wants to see some positive and constructive changes without massive violence in North Korea, he/she might have to contribute to the development toward such direction.

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Civic Coalition in Transition to Democracy: The 2000 General Elections in South Korea

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1. Introduction

In South Korea’s recent and ongoing transition from a state-dominated to a citizen-driven society (hereafter civil society), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increasingly salient political actors. Despite a late start, they now figure heavily in the private pursuit of public purposes not only on the local but also national and international levels. They are steeped in such issues as economic justice, corruption, education, consumer protection, the environment, human relief, gender equity, human rights, and grassroots development. To protect and pursue the public interest, NGOs have become independent engines of policy development and monitor government and business policy implementation (Kim, H. 2001). More important, they are significant alternative providers of public services that markets and governments leave unmet (Clark et al., 1998; Etzioni, 1973; Fish, 1998; Kim, H. 2000, 2001; Korten, 1990, 1998; MaCarthy et al., 1992; Salamon, 1995; Salamon and Anheier, 1996; Weiss and Gordenker, 1996; Wolch, 1990; Wuthnow, 1991).

NGOs have most recently turned their focus on becoming politically relevant organizations that enable citizens to exercise the social responsibility required of them if government is to become and remain democratic (Cohen and Arato, 1994; Tocqueville, 1955). Participatory democracy is the watchword and theoretical framework that describes such direct citizen political engagement in political reformation (Cook and Morgen, 1971). Citizen initiative through NGOs in articulating and pursuing public purposes of government has brought new issues and values into the public domain and enhanced consensus on democratic principles.

In the 16th General Elections (2000), NGOs across Korea joined together to champion citizen sovereignty. On 12 January 2000 over 450 NGOs formed a coalition—Citizens’ Alliance for General Elections (CAGE)—to ensure that traditionally corrupt political practices would not determine the April 2000 general elections of assembly members. The number of participant NGOs reached to 1,055 when the CAGE concluded its activities. CAGE mobilized unprecedented public support as it undertook campaigns to reform the nomination process, to eliminate regional party monopoly, and to defeat blacklisted politicians. Despite controversy over its legitimacy and conspiracy charges, CAGE enjoyed considerable success, ousting 59 out of 86 listed candidates from office.

Nevertheless, behind the occasional spectacular CAGE victories lay significant institutional, organizational, and socio-cultural problems that impaired the coalition’s effectiveness. For one, CAGE remained illegal despite its election successes and enormous public acclamation. Also, its elitist internal structure and failure to offer...
alternative candidates diminished its ability to mobilize voters. Finally, CAGE was unable to overcome the chronic problem of regional party monopoly. Such difficulties brought to the fore constraints on Korean NGOs when they move beyond public issues in general to devote their interest in reform to the structure of politics itself. This represents an emerging paradox in the development of a civil, democratic society.

As civil groups and NGOs sought to become a political presence, they campaigned against bureaucracy and collusion in the political arena. Ironically, it appears that they needed in fact to become as skilled at networking and cooperation among themselves as the conventional bureaucracies and political actors they opposed. Adept at acting on discreet issues in limited arenas through direct channels and instruments, NGOs were not equipped to enter a forum that required networking and cooperation. Individual NGOs have pursued pending issues case-by-case, not in a systematic or coordinated manner that aggravated amorphousness of their behaviors and actions. Moreover, they failed to develop effective citizen networks. This reduced grassroots participation in collective action—as demonstrated in the drive for political reform engineered by CAGE. They simply attacked political institutions without providing alternatives but stood in need of becoming an effective institution themselves. Paradoxically, civil groups and NGOs became hyperactive in the process of political reformation, and their actions unintentionally degenerated the roles and functions of conventional political actors in society.

In this paper I address the roles of the CAGE alliance in the 16th General Elections. By assessing the significance and limitations of CAGE, I mean to cast a light more generally on NGOs’ efforts to create a participatory democracy. Accordingly, the first part of this paper focuses on the meaning of “participatory democracy” in emerging Korean discourse. I then turn attention to CAGE formation and activities and controversy surrounding it. Finally, I analyze the movement’s limitations, implications for the current phase of Korean NGOs, and possible future developments in social governance.

2. Transition in Search of Participatory Democracy

For decades Korea has been in a process of transition to democracy, moving from an authoritarian state to a citizen-driven, or civil, society. Initially transition was marked by intense confrontation between a repressive state and opposing grassroots activists. Only after the 1987 Democratic Movement did the movement toward democracy gain its stride (Lee, S., 1993; Kim, H., 1997, 2000; Kim, S., 1997). Since then, Korea’s transition has enjoyed a socio-political environment conducive to the rise of diverse interest groups. Active, comprehensive middle class support of the 1987 Democratic Movement was one of the most notable and important factors in its success. Middle class citizens joined the struggle convinced that true democracy required replacing indirect with direct elections and that economic development could not be at the expense of political freedom.

Activities of the citizens movement in the late 1980s contrasted notably with those of the militant and confrontational labor movement of the 1960s and 1970s (Lee, S., 1993). The change in movement issues and tactics derived from the policy reforms implemented by the Roh Tae Woo government in the wake of a hyper-repressive authoritarian regime. Under Roh, civilian repression declined substantially
(Lee, S., 1993; Kim, S., 1997; Burton and Ryu, 1997). In keeping with the promises of the June 29 Declaration—the symbol of Roh’s claim to legitimacy—Roh proved quite open to political opposition, as indicated in his tolerance of an independent and self-regulated mass media. Roh also restored the local political autonomy suspended by the military regimes of 1961. Government control over university policies and activities lessened as well.

Despite the 1987 government statement on democratic reform, citizen groups continued anti-government protests under Roh as two visions of democracy competed for ascendancy (Kim, S., 1996, 1997). One vision descended from the traditional people’s (minjung) movement of the 1970s. Supported by radical people’s groups, it emphasized comprehensive substantive democratic reform—such as socio-economic equality, Korean economic independence, and national reunification. Moderate and practical citizens’ groups invoked a narrower definition of democracy that stressed the procedural fundamentals of democracy.

When Kim Young Sam assumed power in 1993, most scholars and activists were deeply skeptical that he could break with the authoritarian past and promote democratic development. They anticipated a continuance of past military and quasi-military authoritarian practices. To their great surprise, Kim carried out a series of unprecedented reforms in 1993 and 1994 (Burton and Ryu, 1997). The Kim government not only tolerated but encouraged the activities of moderate citizen movements, announcing policy initiatives similar to those such groups suggested and augmenting the groups’ influence. The government recruited from the moderate groups to fill several high-ranking public positions and even sought to normalize relationships with radical movement organizers by publicly discussing proposals and policy and accommodating some demands. As a result, the Kim government seemed to win strong movement support.

In this environment moderate citizens’ groups prevailed in the struggle between competing visions of democracy. The class-based, confrontational strategies of the past were abandoned in favor of nonviolent and lawful tactics and specific policy alternatives. The relationship between civilian movements and the state was accordingly cooperative during the initial two years of the Kim Young Sam regime. Relations deteriorated, however, when Kim failed to adequately address several key issues raised in the politics of democratic consolidation.

The relation between the state and civilian groups entered a new phase when Kim Dae Jung assumed office in 1998. Not only academics but the popular press noted an explosion of citizen interest in securing democracy (Kim, Y. and Kim, H., 1999). The newspaper dailies reported on the growing power of civil groups, which had broadened their range of issues and moderated their tactics and goals, eschewing the radical and illegal activities of the past. Strong reader interest in civil movements caused the dailies to devote increased coverage to their activities.¹

The government sought to embrace movement leaders by co-opting them and appointing them to head or advise relevant organizations. As part of this tactic, the Second Nation Building Committee was organized to advise the president on means to

¹ In 1999, Donga Ilbo began to devote a section to the phenomenon called “The Fifth Power: Civilian Movements,” and JoongAng Ilbo launched “Simin Kwangjang NGO.” Kyunhyung Shimun reports on civilian movement activities in “NGO Madang” and Hankyoreh Shinmun runs “The Twenty-first Century, with the Power of Citizens.”
promote voluntary participation by civilian groups in political decisions. President Kim also recruited several of his ministers from the ranks of the movements in order to still more effectively engage with the them. In addition, the government and ruling party negotiated a bill on NGOs meant not only to assist them financially but with other several special benefits (JoongAng Ilbo, 12 July 1999). NGOs will be able to compete for financial support by submitting project plans to a screening committee. The bill secures NGOs free lease of buildings and offices, tax-exemption for donations, postage discounts, and more. These benefits will conspire to strengthen and broaden the activities of civil groups and enhance their efficiency and effectiveness.

With such gradual developments between the state and civilian groups, discourse on participatory democracy and the reform of government itself began to accelerate. Controversy centered around whether participatory democracy should be supplanted completely by representative democracy or whether it is a complement necessary to compensate for the limitations of representative democracy (Sung, 1997). Some argue that participatory democracy is a more broad political category or philosophy, not to be a replacement of or replaced by liberal or representative democracy. They would have discussion center, not on the concept of participatory democracy, but on how to institutionalize democratic ideals so as to enhance citizen participation. By focusing on the process of implementing and guaranteeing participation, the nature of participatory democracy, it is argued, is made clear. Discussion of representative democracy is subsumed by this broader discussion.

The development of NGOs seemed to offer the preconditions for participatory democracy. Milbrath and Goel (1977) argue that social diversity, institutional deregulation, and open communication networks can lead to democracy through encouraging participation in the determination of governmental practices and structures. The diverse NGO activities in Korea, it has been thought, offer a new forum for the expression of the manifold interest of civic actors. In turn, the more flexible and responsive government attitude towards the diversity reflected in NGOs fosters their development and, accordingly, participatory democracy.

3. Civil Coalition in the 2000 General Elections

3.1 The Political Reform Movement in the General Elections

Before the political liberalization of recent years, Korean politics had long been monopolized by politicians and bureaucrats to the exclusion of citizen involvement in political decisions. Politicians and civilians alike in Korea had for decades sought political reformation. However, demands heightened and came from more diverse sources as the 2000 General Elections approached, due to the crippled parliamentary proceedings and outcomes of the 15th General Elections, deepening mistrust between civilians and an authoritarian political regime, and greater awareness of institutional barriers preventing citizen participation in politics. Suggestions were put forward that

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2 Kim Myong-ja, co-representative of the Green Consumers’ Coalition, was appointed to the ministry of the environment; and Kim Sung-jae, committee member of People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and chairman of the Korea Federation of the Handicapped, was appointed to head the newly established civil administration office.
an organization comprising NGOs, academics, and the media be formed to monitor the elections. Political reform assumed top-priority in Korea, and on 12 January 2000, over 450 NGOs formed a coalition—Citizens’ Alliance for General Elections (CAGE)—mandated to eradicate corrupt and unscrupulous political practices and restore citizens’ fundamental right to participate in political reform.

On 10 January, Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), a leading NGO, released its first list of “unfit” politicians. It named 167 persons CCEJ considered undesirable candidates for 13 April parliamentary elections based on criteria such as corruption, embezzlement, involvement in past elections irregularities, resistance to reform, fanning regional antagonism, and incompetence (Korea Herald, 12 January 2000). As expected, political parties uniformly denounced CCEJ, impugning the legality, objectivity, and credibility of the list. Heated debate ensued, particularly fueled by targeted politicians.

Immediately after the CCEJ release, CAGE consecutively provided two lists of “incompetent, corrupt, and lazy” politicians. Seven criteria were invoked: involvement in corruption; participation in election irregularities; human rights violations; fanning regional antagonism; betrayal of duties; resistance to reform bills and policies; and negative findings of the National Election Commission (NEC) regarding such matters as property reports, military service, tax payments, and criminal record (Korea Times, 26 January 2000).

The first list, dated 24 January, cited 67 members of the 15th National Assembly whom CAGE targeted for defeat in the nomination process. It had major implications for the current political landscape as it comprised Korea’s most prominent political figure, Jong-pil Kim, honorary president and founder of United Liberal Party and dozens of political heavyweights in ruling and opposition parties. As with CCEJ, CAGE and the criteria were vehemently denounced.

Confident that the first list would figure prominently in party nominations, CAGE released a list of 47 additional incumbent or former assemblymen. The parties heedlessly selected numerous blacklisted nominees. Dismayed but undeterred, CAGE ratcheted-up criticism, demanding withdrawal of the nominations and denouncing the parties as undemocratic and steeped in backroom dealing. When the parties ignored the attacks, CAGE proceeded with illegal election activities. Promulgating a final list of 86 major targets for defeat in the 16th General Elections, it focused on 22 districts.

In view of the movement’s public support, other civic organizations and associations joined rank. CAGE also used the Internet to mobilize the 65 percent of the voting population who were young people. Practical Internet use contributed to establishment of M-tizen, a cyber community where the younger generation shared ideas and opinions about CAGE, political reformation, and general elections. CAGE did not communicate via the Internet exclusively with the younger generation, however. It broadcast press releases and related materials to all on-line. Its homepage reportedly was accessed nearly 900,000 times in three months. In addition, through bus tours CAGE improved collaboration with local NGOs. Through these varied activities it appeared to effectively exploit its national network of affiliated groups and organizations to demand an end to factional regionalism and party domination, backroom dealing, and corrupt politics. Subsequent events proved to the contrary.

3.2 Controversy Surrounding Citizen’s Coalition Activities
Questions as to the legality of the CAGE movement stirred as soon as lists of “unqualified” politicians were released. All major political parties sought legal action, alleging violation of election law, as well as character defamation. They invoked the 87th article of election law, stipulating that no civilian organization or association may perform or abet any activity in support of or opposition to any specific political party or candidate during an election period. The citizens’ alliance rejoined that any law barring civil organizations from electioneering is unconstitutional in a democratic state, as it restricts freedom of expression and the right to participate in political action. CAGE sought to broaden popular recognition of citizens’ constitutional rights by circulating citizen petitions to revise election law. Great public support and favorable comments by President Kim Dae Jung and the National Election Commission (NEC) conspired to achieve some assembly review of election law. Laws were subsequently revised, though to little effect, earning the excoriation of CAGE as an inadequate product engineered by politicians. Pre-election citizen campaigns, including petition drives, street rallies, and pamphlet circulation, remained illegal.

CCEJ was driven to amend the first release of “unfit politicians” twice after hearing appeals by those targeted (Korea Herald, 12 January 2000). The list was vulnerable to charges that it lacked objectivity and that it was unreasonable to judge politician as “unfit” simply on the basis of opposition a certain bill.

Conspiracy allegations flew as soon as the ruling party and President Kim Dae Jung commented favorably on NGO general election activity. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) accused the governing party of collusion with the blacklisting campaigns, with a “carefully designed political conspiracy” (Korea Herald, 22 January 2000). It cited the coincidence of ruling party financial support of NGOs and appointment of NGO leaders to state agencies with the breakout of citizens’ movements.

The United Liberal Party (ULP), many of whose members figured on the blacklists, similarly castigated the citizens’ alliance and ruling party. It claimed not only that the movement enjoyed ruling party support but that the party contrived it in order to ruin ULP. Resentment led to breakup of the coalition between ULP and the New Millenium Democratic Party that weathered the first two years of the Kim Dae Jung administration. CAGE dismissed conspiracy allegations, reaffirming its exclusive devotion to political reform and accusing critics of seeking to defame and destroy them by questioning their ethics and purpose.

4. An Emerging Paradox in the Transition to Democracy in South Korea

The short history of civilian movements in Korea would seem to offer little hope that they can achieve their goals. However, their two-stage strategy of campaigning to prevent parties from nominating blacklisted candidates and then enjoining citizens not to vote for listed candidates who won nomination over their objections managed to oust 59 candidates from the arena. Seventy percent of 86 listed candidates were defeated and a number of fresh figures with no history of corruption elected. The
citizen coalition also brought lawmakers to review election law and readjust electoral districts to preventing gerrymandering by political parties. These victories established the movements as a healthy antidote to the corrupt electioneering of the past. However, external and internal limitations of the movements warrant close scrutiny, as they have significant implications for the conduct and functions of NGOs and for the possibility of institutionalizing citizen participation in social development.

4.1 Institutional Limitations
CAGE was illegal throughout its tenure. As mentioned above, it sought to address this by proposing that article 87 of election law be revised. Despite favorable comments by the ruling party and President Kim Dae Jung regarding proposed revisions, only minor adjustments were made and NGO participation in campaigns remained illegal. Accordingly CAGE had no official authority to undertake its campaigns. This made it particularly vulnerable to challenges to its credibility. Judging criteria for blacklists were impugned as overly inclusive, as they ranged from involvement in corruption to being of “low-quality” such as prone to abusive language on the floor or resistant to reform. To judge a politician as “unfit” simply for opposing particular bills gave the appearance of intolerance of diversity of opinion. CCEJ’s two reworkings of its list only reinforced its image as incompetent and rash (Korea Herald, 12 January 2000).

For these reasons, some politicians charged that CAGE headquarters had exceeded its authority by purporting to represent the public interest when it actually had the mandate of only a small group. Similarly, some citizens opposed illegal actions of any kind, no matter what the goal. They were both distrustful of and disinterested in civilian organizations. Well-established tradition held that movements should remain neutral towards and uninvolved in political activities. Barring that, NGOs lacked credibility necessary for support and could not survive (Daehan Maeil, May 29, 2000).

For CAGE to secure legitimacy and trust in its objectivity, it needed to work for election law revisions prior to engaging in electoral affairs. It should have researched and analyzed its own legal status and monitored politicians’ activities before making nomination recommendations. Although some effort was made to engage with private organizations representing civilian groups, academia, and the press to jointly monitor assembly members and polls (Korea Herald, 17 December 1999), no adequate institutional structure existed to coordinate among the various groups with their differing agendas.

4.2 Organizational Limitations
Initially CAGE comprised fewer than 15 organizations (MBC PD Suchup, 18 April 2000). However, more than 400 claimed affiliation immediately prior to 12 January 2000 when CAGE formally announced its formation and intentions.

The fact that most members joined the movement right before its official debut caused some to doubt its organizational ability and democratic character. Its apparently hurried formation suggested poor management. Worse, it implied that discussion among participating organizations about the details of movement measures and strategies were shortchanged in a non-democratic process. In addition, circumstances surrounding CAGE activities were dynamic, unpredictable, and sometimes volatile, requiring the rapid response that only a strong centralized structure could provide.

The appearance of a top-down command-structure opened CAGE to criticism.
A centralized authority guided primarily by a single member organization—People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)—seemed to dictate its major strategies. Because media and the public focused on members noted for their decency, eloquence, and expertise, the impression grew that an elite organized, ruled, and monopolized CAGE. To all appearances, CAGE was every bit a bureaucracy as the organizations it opposed.

Moreover, of its more than 400 affiliates, only a fraction participated in most campaigns, which threw doubt on CAGE’s organizational ability and democratic character (Munhwa Ilbo, 2 May 2000). Also, civil groups intensely competed for dominance when CAGE was forming. CCEJ refused to join and undertook its own fair-election activities (Hankyoreh Shinmun, 2 June 2000). That such a highly renowned organization would not participate in CAGE heightened suspicion of power struggles among major groups and tainted the reputation and intentions of civil movements generally.4

Conflict among civil groups has not been confined to the CAGE movement. Power struggles between groups co-opted by the government and those intending to become their own political force have been continuous. Similarly, radical groups and conservative, “new social movement” groups have battled over ultimate goals and tactics. These two major types of conflict have created a more comprehensive hegemonic conflict within the general civilian movement. The outcome is a movement that flies the banner of collaboration for the public good but is itself racked by dissension.

Further, in part because CAGE urged citizens to not vote for blacklisted politicians but offered no alternative slate, voter turnout was the lowest in Korean history—this despite the movement’s prioritization of increasing voting rates (Donga Ilbo, 13 April 2000). Although 59 listed politicians were defeated, citizen apathy and distrust were clearly extreme. The movement had failed to restore faith in the possibility of establishing a true democracy.

4.3 Socio-cultural Limitations

The most remarkable failure of CAGE in the 16th General Elections was its inability to end regional party monopoly, a phenomenon most salient in the Youngnam area, long a GNP stronghold. GNP regional power was still greater after the election, despite public support for CAGE. Table 1 compares the number of seats occupied by each party after the 1996 15th General Elections and the 2000 16th General Elections. The 16th election shows greater party parity in most regions.

Table 1: The Number of Seats by Respective Party in the 15th and the 16th General

4 Competition was most glaring when CCEJ undertook to release its own list of “unfit” politicians just two weeks before the CAGE announcement. The list was hurriedly compiled without adequate investigation, earning it harsh condemnation and resulting in the need for two revisions. It is assumed that CCEJ refused to join CAGE because PSPD had usurped the leadership role in CAGE that it coveted. Also, CAGE excluded the Democratic Labor Party and Korea Teachers’ Union from membership, allegedly in order to remain politically neutral, yet many of their local branches actively participated in CAGE within their own districts (Munhwa Ilbo, 2 May 2000).
Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area/Party</th>
<th>GNP*</th>
<th>NMDP*</th>
<th>ULP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15th</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td>15th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudokwon</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56.3)</td>
<td>(41.2)</td>
<td>(31.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngnam</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(67.1)</td>
<td>(98.5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungchung/Kangwon-do</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29.3)</td>
<td>(21.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(97.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)
- (%) : Percentage of seats occupied by each party in each area
- GNP*: In the 15th elections, the party was named as New Korea Party
- NMDP*: The party name was National Congress for New Politics in the 15th elections.

GNP dominance in the Youngnam area, however, grew markedly to the total exclusion of the other two parties. Some took this to portend deepening regionalism with implications both for the economic future of the area and support for reunification (Hankook Ilbo, 20 April 2000).

Tables 2 and 3 compare the blacklisted candidates who were elected and defeated to reveal any change in the number of votes in the two elections. “Difference” in Table 2 is obtained by subtracting the voter rate of the 15th from that of the 16th elections. In the Youngnam area (Pusan, Ulsan, Taeku, Kyongbuk and Kyongnam) the average difference is 5.42 percent. This implies that blacklisted candidates had more support than in the 15th elections despite CAGE. The average of -20.88 percent in the Chungchung/Kangwon area and -6.11 percent in the Honam region indicates blacklisted candidates received fewer votes, though not enough to lose. CAGE also had little influence on citizens in the Youngnam area, and in fact may have fanned the regionalism that led to support of most listeded candidates.

Table 2: The Difference of the Number of Votes (The Winners)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>15th</th>
<th>16th</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudokwon (1)</td>
<td>41.10</td>
<td>49.06</td>
<td>7.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngnam (15)</td>
<td>51.45</td>
<td>56.87</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honam (2)</td>
<td>65.75</td>
<td>59.64</td>
<td>-6.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungchung/Kangwon (3)</td>
<td>52.97</td>
<td>32.09</td>
<td>-20.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52.53</td>
<td>53.22</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)
Note: The number in parenthesis is the number of candidates. Of 86 blacklisted by CAGE, only 27 were elected in the 16th elections. Among them, 6 were elected for the first time or had not campaigned in the 15th elections.
Table 3 shows the change in the number of blacklisted politicians elected between the 15th and 16th elections. The average is -21.83 percent in the Youngnam area, -0.9 percent in Honam, and -18.58 percent in Chungchung/Kangwon. The average across all regions of -15.08 percent implies that Youngnam citizens most strongly objected to the defeated candidates. However, those defeated in the region were not GNP, reinforcing the impression that party regional domination continued unabated, despite CAGE. GNP in fact fared still better in the 16th than in the 15th elections.

Table 3: The Difference of the Number of Votes (The Defeated)* (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>15th</th>
<th>16th</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudokwon (14)</td>
<td>37.31</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>-9.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngnam (11)</td>
<td>43.74</td>
<td>21.90</td>
<td>-21.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honam (3)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungchung/Kangwon (12)</td>
<td>39.17</td>
<td>20.58</td>
<td>-18.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38.61</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>-15.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Election Commission (http://www.nec.go.kr)
Note: The number in parenthesis is the number of candidates. Of the 86 blacklisted by CAGE, 59 failed to win in the 16th elections. Among the 59, 19 were elected for the first time or had not campaigned in the 15th elections.

GNP preference might have had a variety of causes. For one, announcement immediately before the election of plans for a summit meeting between the two Koreas may have bolstered GNP support within Youngnam. In any event, CAGE failed to accomplish its fundamental purposes and in fact may have contributed to regional division and domination, particularly in Youngnam. Koreans were confirmed in their belief that regional party monopoly was and would remain a formidable barrier to political reform.

Data for the 22 areas where CAGE focused on a relatively small number of candidates for defeat also demonstrated its socio-cultural limitations. Table 4 shows the difference between actual voter turnout and poll estimates for the areas. Sixty-eight percent of 22 candidates failed to be elected. This was not a particularly heartening result for CAGE, as the candidates in most areas acquired more than polls estimated at the end of March 2000. Only in the Honam area did candidates receive fewer votes than anticipated. In addition, 9 candidates in the 22 areas held their lead in polls immediately before the election. This suggests that competition remained fierce up until the end and that CAGE had no meaningful or apparent effect on citizens’ decisions. Floating voters appear to have been vital to defeat of blacklisted candidates and supporters were unswayed by CAGE campaigns.

Table 4: The Difference between the Poll and the Voting Turnout (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Poll</th>
<th>Voting turnout</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudokwon (0/7)</td>
<td>29.26</td>
<td>32.84</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youngnam area (5/8)</td>
<td>35.87</td>
<td>48.56</td>
<td>12.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honam area (1/3)</td>
<td>48.00</td>
<td>41.24</td>
<td>-6.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungchung/Kangwondo (1/4)</td>
<td>27.67</td>
<td>34.45</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4 An Emerging Paradox in Transitional Politics

Considering South Korea’s relatively short history of democracy, the CAGE movement made marked strides in disclosing what citizens desired by way of reform in the governing system. However, the NGO’s prospects for achievement in the political arena were less than was hoped. Citizens voluntarily and rigorously participated in activities independent of the government meant to improve social justice and the environment, either because they were deeply involved in those issues or would be direct beneficiaries of improvements. However, success in those areas led NGOs to overestimate their ability to become a significant force for political reform. Action on behalf of overarching improvement of the government itself, such as CAGE championed, attracted far less citizen interest than activities for the public good in such discreet areas as social service, the environment, and social justice. This implies that civil groups must tailor their manner of mobilization and degree of coordination to the particular objectives sought. CAGE embodied the effort to expand the scope and scale of civil action into the political arena. Its failure to practically and effectively do so has important implications for the future trajectory of civil movements and NGOs generally.

First, NGO engagement in public affairs was in its infancy when expansion into the political arena was taken on. Individual NGOs were accustomed to dealing with social issues on a discreet basis, without addressing any interrelationship among NGOs or issues. Civil movements had developed no institution or systematic network among NGOs or across the civil sector capable of engineering collaborative action across issues, regions, and social groups such as political reform required. The 450-plus NGOs of CAGE failed to cooperate, several releasing their own blacklists of candidates. The competition within and undemocratic organizational structure of CAGE especially betrayed its failure to effectively network for civil engagement. Ironically, the CAGE movement fell on its own sword in advocating the de-institutionalization and internal disruption of civil society. It offered no viable governing alternative, even in its own operations.

CAGE did manage to oust some corrupt politicians and some new blood entered the arena. However, in the process CAGE betrayed the institutional, organizational, and socio-cultural weaknesses of civil movements. A newly emerging political institution, civil society had searched for direct instruments through which to win not only comprehensive participation in political decision making but also political influence on the entire society. This notion of participation was hoped to be a complementary tool of representative democracy. Ironically, the means through which participation was sought diminished the role of traditional political actors and worked against representative democracy.
5. Conclusion

Korea’s state and civil society suffered a turbulent relationship over the last several decades. A series of authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s severely suppressed and controlled civil society. During those years, civil movements made defiance of the military regimes in favor of democratization their fundamental purpose. After the 1987 Democratic Movement, civil society partially enjoyed the democracy it sought. In the ensuing decentralized and deregulated environment, civil society and the NGOs it created flourished, expanding not only in scope and scale but also in general social impact.

In Korea’s democratic progress, NGOs have played an important role by addressing aspects of the general welfare neglected by the state. They have become policy initiators and institutions that monitor social development. Even so, desire for a substantial democracy rather than mere improvement of a procedural democracy has grown unabated. Citizens want to participate significantly and responsibly in governance.

Toward that end, Korean NGOs formed the Citizens’ Alliance for General Elections. CAGE meant to eradicate political corruption and establish a guarantee of practical citizen participation in governance. Politics were long the monopoly of political parties and politicians that believed citizen sovereignty inhered only in citizens’ periodic right to vote in elections—elections for which they largely determined what candidates would be in the running. In defiance of this undemocratic legacy, CAGE mobilized unprecedented public support for its movement to reform the nomination process, to end regional party monopoly, and to defeat politicians it blacklisted. CAGE ousted 59 out of 86 blacklisted candidates from the political stage despite attacks on its legitimacy and allegations of conspiracy. Citizens and media alike extolled the movement as “the only winner of the election.” This success encouraged some to hastily conclude that the conventional governance paradigm—in which legislation and enforcement were the prerogatives exclusively of parties and politicians—had been supplanted by a paradigm that incorporates civil society.

However, the impressive statistics only temporarily masked the movement’s institutional limitations. CAGE remained illegal to the end, which triggered distrust and apathy among citizens who eschewed actions without legal imprimatur. Also, its organizational ability was found wanting—CAGE failed to effectively mobilize voters because it provided no alternative candidates and mismanaged voluntary resources. Finally, CAGE failed to secure a democratic internal structure and was dominated by a small number of members. Ironically, in its campaign to create direct channels for participation in governance, CAGE so attenuated the influence of political parties and the National Assembly that the democratic forum in which it hoped to participate was undermined.

Civil society is sometimes called the third or voluntary sector vis-à-vis the government and business sectors (Kim, H., 1997, 2000). Its resource mobilization requires shared values, dedication, and volunteer effort, whereas the state can turn to regulation, legislation, or coercion and the business sector to trade, finance, and impersonal markets. Therefore, third sector constituents focus more on cooperation than competition, on horizontal relationships than vertical domination. The CAGE
organization, although located in the third sector and claiming to represent the public welfare, was excessively centralized and bureaucratic and racked by competition among NGOs for hegemony. Ironically, contrary to its founding ethic of participatory democracy in which democratic, decentralized, and participatory processes prevail, CAGE became an authoritarian structure, not unlike the state it attacked. In this sense, despite its early successes, CAGE inadvertently represented and created regression in democratic development towards a civil society. Civil organizations expanded too rapidly in number and agenda to meaningfully analyze the roles of citizens, civil organizations, and government in the search to create and maintain democracy. The most urgent task before civil organizations today is to stipulate their functions and to rearrange their internal structure and networks among themselves so as to become an effective factor in the move toward participatory democracy in Korea.

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Does Democracy Matter for Women? Evaluating Korean women-related policy-making infrastructure

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*University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

The literature concerning the impact of democratic transition on gender equality paints a decidedly mixed picture. While the transition period offered women a window of opportunity to mobilize and pursue both practical and strategic gender interests, democratic consolidation in many “Third Wave” democracies has often seen women marginalized from the political process (Jacquette and Wolchik, 1998; Funk, 1993). Women’s movements have become weaker due to declining resources as well as friction over strategies and/or party politics. Moreover, advances in women’s representation within the formal political arena have been disappointingly limited (Jacquette, 1994; Waylen, 1997, Craske, 1999). Perhaps surprisingly, the Korean case appears to offer a counter example – wherein women have made impressive – albeit far from complete—gains under the new democratic regime. In Korea, women’s groups have generally grown stronger since the transition from authoritarian rule in 1987, while women’s machineries charged with promoting gender equality have become further entrenched within the apparatus of the state (bureaucracy, legislature and political parties) and have seen their resources and influence expand (e.g. Lee, 2000).

Although there is a growing body of literature that traces the development of Korean women’s organizations and NGOs over the past 15 years (e.g. Cho and Chang, 1994; Cho, 1994; Chung, 1997; Gelb, 1994), there have been few attempts to systematically examine the manner in which state organizations have contributed to gender equality (Chun, 1996). The aim of this paper therefore is to examine the evolution and efficacy of these women’s policy machineries. I consider three main independent variables: a) the origins of the machinery; b) organizational structure and capacity; and c) linkages to civil society.

I argue that in the Korean case, the absence of strong ideological cleavages between political parties has elevated the importance of the President as the arbitrator of social change – including alterations in the power relations between men and women. Moreover, because women’s political machineries have largely been established on an ad hoc basis rather than as part of a coherent government policy aimed at advancing gender equality, their impact has been mixed. Earlier governments oversaw the improvement of women’s status in terms of health, education, fertility control etc. but not until the election of the Kim Dae-jung administration was it possible to talk about an elected official with a strong commitment towards improving the balance of power between men and women.

In terms of organizational structure and capacity, I argue that women’s political machineries have been hampered by an inability to implement their own policies, a dearth of resources (staff, funding), weak public relations efforts and less than optimal networking and coordination among gender-related agencies and
departments. On a more macro-level, the nature of the bureaucracy itself—i.e. Confucian, hierarchical, non-specialist, male-dominated—further hinders efforts to advance gender equality. Nevertheless, the recent establishment of a fully-fledged Ministry of Gender Equality in January 2001 with increased staff and funding would seem to suggest that given a combination of strong presidential commitment and active support from women’s movement organizations, that such historical weaknesses can be overcome.

The third strand of my argument concerns WPMs’ relationships with civil society. In Korea, earlier machineries had weak connections with progressive civil society groups, rendering it difficult for policy makers to develop policies that addressed women’s concerns. Moreover, without the active support and cooperation of the progressive women’s movement, policy implementation was limited. However, over time, linkages between the state and women’s organizations have grown increasingly more conciliatory and cooperative. As a result of dual pressures from within and outside the state, machineries no longer treat women as mere petitioners of the state but rather as an important negotiating partner in the formation, implementation and monitoring of gender-related policies.

Despite their limitations to date, I maintain that Korea’s current women’s political machineries constitute an important infrastructural mechanism through which to advance gender equality and realize the 1995 Beijing Declaration’s call to mainstream gender issues into national development. Future gains will be predicated on more strategic pressure from women’s organizations and their allies, better cross-institutional coordination, and ongoing efforts to secure greater resources.

My findings are based on field research carried out between May 1998 and 2001 including archival research (e.g. legislative records, political party and government documents) and in-depth interviews with government officials, party staff, women legislators and their support staff, academics and women’s NGOs. Although women’s policy offices also exist at the local government level, this paper will limit its focus to national level machineries.

Because of space constraints and in order to facilitate my discussion of the three explanatory variables under analysis, I have mapped out the main characteristics of Korea’s women’s political machineries between 1983 and 2001 in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name of WPM</th>
<th>Organizational Structure</th>
<th>Relationship with civil society</th>
<th>Mandate/ Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chun Du Whan 1983</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI)</td>
<td>Govt think-tank initially under Ministry of Health and Social Affairs; transferred to MPA2 in 1989; to PCWA in 1998 and made semi-autonomous and moved to Humanities Council under PM Office in 1999. 165 employees 1983; 105-2001. Fully govt sponsored until 1998; now 70% only.</td>
<td>Promotion of women’s leadership and networking; attempts to be neutral between bureaucrats and activists; informal participation in women’s groups in late 90s</td>
<td>Developing women’s abilities and societal participation; Making policy recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chun Women’s</td>
<td>Under PM’s office; Relatively weak; Policy evaluation;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

408
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Policy Evaluation Committee (WPEC)</td>
<td>1983, 20 members, increased to 35 in 1934 (Ministers + civilian experts) Annual or biannual meetings Replaced by Council of Commissioners in 1998. civilian experts often without strong connections to progressive women’s movement report to president annually and from 1994 reports on women’s status required of all ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Ministry of Political Affairs No.2 (MPA2)</td>
<td>Mini ministry; 20 staff in 1988 increased to 59 under Kim Young Sam; not full ministerial status – ie could participate in cabinet meetings but only comment on women-related issues; also unable to propose own legislation. Disbanded and replaced by PCWA in late 1997/1998. Relatively close connection with moderate KNCW but poor relationship with progressive KWAU under Noh. Improved somewhat under Kim Y-S, especially during preparations for Beijing Conference. Encouragement of women’s volunteer work but criticized for trying to mobilize voters/capitalize on women’s unpaid labor; some funding provided to women’s NGOs who registered with govt ministries- Operated within WID paradigm; concern with increasing women’s societal participation and human resources. Passage of Women’s Basic Development Act in 1995 which provides blueprint for future gender policy and establishment of Women’s Development Fund. Focus is primarily on collective socio-econ rights cf. individual rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Special Congressional Committee on Women’s Affairs (SCCWA)</td>
<td>Non-permanent, non-standing committee. Fewer members, smaller research staff, unable to veto legislative proposals – can only make recommendations; unable to participate in legislative evaluation of bureaucracy. Little influence over all impmt budgetary committee Not particularly strong; women tend to consult with individual legislators rather than committee as a whole; improving now with appointment of gender expert to head the research committee and former women’s leader as head of special committee. Moreover, gender-related legislation often dealt with in more powerful Environmental and Labor standing committee. Provide legislature with some level of gender expertise; discuss gender-related legislation; file reports on efficacy of women’s policy machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Presidential Commission on Women’s Affairs (PCWA)</td>
<td>Central hub organization under direct supervision of the President connected to women’s focal points in 6 key ministries with gender-related responsibilities. Small staff of 49; allowed to participate in Cabinet meetings but lack of full ministerial status; inability to propose Central hub organization under direct supervision of the President connected to women’s focal points in 6 key ministries with gender-related responsibilities. Small staff of 49; allowed to participate in Cabinet meetings but lack of full ministerial status; inability to propose Much closer relationship with progressive women’s movement than any of its predecessors. Entry of activists into the state – both central PCWA and focal points. More regular consultations (both formal and informal) with NGOs and greater Primary focus on policy coordination; however, passage of Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief Act in 1999 provided PCWA with jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate cases of gender discrimination. Strong emphasis on women’s human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Office/Committee/Expert</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Party Gender Expert</td>
<td>Establishment of gender expert in ruling and main opposition party. 1 gender expert with a staff of 3 researchers. Works closely with party women’s bureaus and with party’s general policy committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE)</td>
<td>Fully-fledged ministry with 102 staff and 32 billion won budget. Divided into four divisions: planning and policy coordination, gender equality promotion, women’s rights promotion, and cooperation (with NGOs and international agencies). Adoption of sexual and family violence prevention responsibilities (formally dealt with by MHSW) Retention of 6 women’s focal points.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1) Origins of Women’s Political Machinery

Research from advanced democracies suggests that a key determinant of the efficacy of women’s political machineries involves what Stetson and Mazur (1995) have called the “patterns of politics surrounding the establishment of women’s political machinery” –especially the ideological profile of the ruling party. Perhaps not surprisingly, the most influential women’s agencies have been created by left-wing social democratic parties, which are generally more sympathetic to the policy suggestions of WPMs. In particular, this literature emphasizes that the creation of strong institutions with a mandate to advance political equality is largely a matter of volition, i.e. less effective institutions were designed not to challenge the status quo in any fundamental way. In the Korean case, although political cleavages are largely regional rather than ideological, and political parties have historically tended to offer similar gender-related political platforms (e.g. Kwon, 2000, Kang, 2000), my research suggests that women’s political machineries have become more influential and effective under the Kim Dae-jung administration, particularly because his Millennium Democratic Party is relatively more progressive and proactively involved in forging connections with civil society groups (e.g. Chang, 2000, Han, 2000, Chun, 2000).

Considering Korea’s short democratic experience, inchoate party system, and historical strength of the presidency, however, I argue that the motivations behind the President’s establishment of women’s political machineries has generally been more important in determining its mandate and efficacy than has the ideology of the ruling party. Simply put, the strength of the President’s commitment towards improving gender equality, as well as the manner in which the machinery’s creation was placed on the political agenda, are broadly determinant of their success over time. In Korea, the political landscape has evolved such that successive administrations have become more committed to reducing gender inequality and have thus been willing to establish more effective women’s political machineries (e.g. Kwon, 1995, Lee 2000). Likewise, the transition to democracy, and concomitant increase in the political voice of women’s groups, has changed the process through which gender policy enters the political agenda. As a result, political leaders have been held increasingly accountable for the actual implementation of social reforms. “Window dressing” or symbolic changes pay fewer dividends with increasingly sophisticated women’s groups and international organizations (Kim, 1998, Kim, 1995, Lee, 1997).

My research suggests that the “patterns of politics surrounding the establishment of women’s political machinery” involves more than the ideological profile of the ruling party or president. Especially in the context of post-transitional polities, where state-society relations remain in flux, it is necessary to consider broader political/cultural notions of the state. Emerging from a 25-year military dictatorship, wherein regime legitimacy was predicated on economic development and national security, Korean political culture has been slow to expand the responsibilities of the state to include the provision of welfare or the defense of social justice (Shin, 1999). Traditionally, individual welfare has been seen primarily as a family or company responsibility, which has reduced the willingness of the state to devote resources to welfare policies, whether for pensions or childcare facilities (Kwon, 1999). Not surprisingly, given the Korean state’s historical propensity towards violence, individuals have tended to seek assistance
from civic or religious organizations rather than public officials. In terms of civil and human rights, citizens are only now beginning to view the state as a source of relief from discrimination and abuse (Mo, 1996, Shin, 1999). Although Korean political culture has changed remarkably over the past fifteen years, especially since the transition to civilian rule in 1992, this historic conceptualization of the state/society relationship partly explains why the political commitment of incumbents was generally weak prior to the election of Kim Dae-jung, while social groups tended to be unwilling to work with the state in developing social policy (Helgeson, 1998).

1.1 Chun Doo Whan (1980-87)

Although women’s bureaus focusing on marginalized groups (e.g. widows, prostitutes, unmarried mothers) had been in existence in welfare-related ministries since the 1950s, a government body devoted specifically to women’s concerns was not established until 1983 (KWDI, 2001). While clearly an important first step in the development of women’s policy infrastructure, the establishment of the Korean Women’s Development Institute (KWDI) and the Women’s Policy Evaluation Committee (WPEC) did not signify a proactive commitment towards improving gender relations. Rather, observers have suggested that Chun embarked on a public relations blitz to improve his political legitimacy and relationship with civil society groups (Kim, 2000, Kim 2000). Given this domestic environment, coupled with pressure surrounding the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which called for the creation of national machineries to address discrimination against women, women leaders and legislators had little trouble in convincing the president to support the establishment of the KWDI and WPEC (Kwon, 1995).

Women’s groups and legislators had been particularly concerned with the lack of basic data on the status of women in Korea and had pushed for a research institute that could develop policy proposals, which would provide the starting point for government thinking on women-related issues (Kim, 2000). As a government think-tank devoted to women’s issues, the KWDI’s mandate combined policy-oriented research as well as leadership training, vocational guidance programs and support for civic women’s organizations. The WPEC’s role was complementary. It was responsible for developing the KWDI’s research results into a concrete policy agenda as well as evaluating the impact of government policies on women’s status, including monitoring the implementation of women-related policies by relevant ministries (Kang, 2000).

The KWDI and the WPEC were largely successful in terms of their official mandate – collecting data points as to women’s position within the society and polity, as well as demonstrating Chun’s “commitment” to social welfare and progressive politics. For a regime desperate to redirect attention away from pervasive human rights abuses and to generate positive political capital both at home and abroad, even limited acts such as setting up a women’s research institute constituted a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, both of these organizations were rooted firmly within a “Women in Development” (WID) paradigm, which prioritized the importance of improving women’s status as part of a comprehensive economic development effort, without fundamentally altering power relations between men and women (Kim, 2001). In this regard, the mandate of the KWDI was in line with the basic assumption about the state’s
responsibilities towards society – i.e. development rather than redistribution or social justice (Kwon, 1999).

1.2 Noh Tae Woo (1987-1992)

Chun’s military but democratically elected colleague, President Noh Tae Woo, presided over Korea’s formal democratic transition. Accordingly, the pattern of politics surrounding the creation of the Ministry of Political Affairs No. 2 was quite different. At the macro-level, in the wake of the 1987 “People’s Uprising” and the military’s concession to hold democratic elections, Noh was anxious to distinguish his government from the old authoritarian regime and to present a softer, more democratic image (Kang, 2000). While Noh’s search for political legitimacy was in many ways similar to that of his authoritarian predecessor, because civil society had been much stronger politically, Noh was compelled to take a much more proactive stance vis-à-vis gender equality – at least at the formal legislative level. More importantly, a progressive and increasingly vocal women’s movement had emerged in the years prior to the transition and was demanding more substantial changes in gender relations – rather than merely commissioning ‘study groups’ (Nam, 1995, MPA2, 1995). Likewise, international organizations and NGOs, which were becoming increasingly critical towards public patriarchs, called upon governments to address widespread discrimination and violence against women (Chin, 2000). In both regards, the ‘standards’ by which the administration would be judged has been raised, thus requiring the initiation of more substantive policies if Noh was to improve his legitimacy.

Taking advantage of the relative flexibility of the transition period, civic leaders and women legislators urged the candidates for the first democratic presidential elections (1987) to establish a permanent women’s body within the executive. Their proposal sought to address the structural weaknesses and lack of enforcement power of the KWDI and to compensate for the precarious position of women legislators, most of whom were appointed rather than elected by their own constituency (Kim, 2000). In response to these demands, Noh not only retained and upgraded the status of the KWDI and the WPEC, but also agreed to convert the obliquely named Ministry of Political Affairs No. 2 (MPA2) (which had been set up to deal with the 1988 Seoul Olympics) into a ministerial body to deal with women’s issues and appointed a women minister7 (Gelb, 1994).

Initially, the MPA2’s mandate was to deal with women’s, elderly and youth affairs, but in 1990 its focus was narrowed to women’s affairs only (Kwon, 1995, Park, 2000). Its responsibilities included representing women’s issues in cabinet meetings, coordinating policy development with women-related divisions in other ministries, political parties and local governments as well as working with women’s NGOs and volunteer organizations with the aim of increasing women’s social participation. Until the mid-1990s, the ministry was primarily concerned with carrying out long-overdue domestic reforms--increasing women’s participation in all levels of government, improving women’s access to vocational training and educational facilities, and overseeing legislative reforms especially concerning equal employment, childcare and family law revision (MPA2, 1995). However, in large part because the origins of the machinery lay in Noh’s search for a democratic mantle, the MPA2’s achievements were primarily symbolic. For example, public relations efforts were focused on advertising a
“series of firsts” – i.e. the first ministry dealing with women’s affairs, the opening of educational institutions (e.g. military, tax office) to women (Kim, 2000) etc.

1.3 Kim Young Sam (1992-1997)

The 1992 election of former political dissident, Kim Young Sam, as president marked a major turning point in Korean politics and encouraged civil society actors to soften their opposition against the government (Shin, 1999; Cotton, 1995). The foci of his administration were a) institutional democratic reforms and b) leading Korea out of its self-imposed international isolation and embracing “globalization”, symbolized by the country’s ascension to the OECD (Kim, 1997). While not a personal advocate of gender equality, Kim’s keen interest in improving Korea’s international reputation provided a powerful motivation to strengthen the government’s record on women’s rights and showcase new laws and institutions that his administration had introduced to this end (Chang, 2000; Kang, 2000).

The MPA2’s focus during the Noh administration had been on domestic issues, but under President Kim Young Sam there was a marked shift towards the international arena, including the inclusion of women’s policies into the far-ranging set of reform goals drawn up by the special Globalization Committee in 1995. Similarly, strongly influenced by the 1995 UN Beijing Conference on Women, the Kim administration drew up a set of “Ten Policy Priorities” aimed at expanding women’s societal participation.

The government also pledged to enact the Basic Gender Development Act (1995), which would provide a blueprint or “Master Plan” for the future development and implementation of women’s policies. In order to facilitate women’s “development” within the family, society and the public sector, interim affirmative action policies were provided for, and both national and local governments made responsible for creating implementation mechanisms for the gender policies outlined in the law, including an annual execution plan (National Report on Implementation of Beijing Platform for Action, 1-2, 138).

Despite these changes, however, women candidates continued to fare poorly in both national and local elections, and the level of influence of women’s machineries remained disappointingly limited (Park, 1999). Accordingly, civic women’s organizations (led by the Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU)) started campaigning for the establishment of a special congressional women’s committee in 1993, which they hoped would push politicians to pay more attention to women’s demands (Kwon, 1995, 54). Women legislators took up the idea in the National Assembly, arguing that to effectively address widespread gender inequalities, it was crucial to develop national assembly representatives with expertise in women’s policies (Park, 2000), and in June 1994, 61 women’s organizations presented a petition to Congress. Shortly after, women members along with 30 men from both the ruling and opposition parties, presented the “Special Congressional Committee on Women’s Affairs Establishment Bill”, which was quickly passed by both parties, with the proviso that the committee would be in existence until “gender equality is reached” (Kwon, 1995, 54).

1.4 Kim Dae-jung (1997-2002)
The election of former dissident and opposition leader, Kim Dae-jung in December 1997 constituted an important shift in the relationship between the government and women’s organizations. Initially at least, the progressive women’s movement was very optimistic about Kim’s presidency because of his party’s track record for endorsing gender-related legislative reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Lee, 2000, Yoon, 2000) as well as his personal support for measures to promote gender equality. Due to widespread dissatisfaction with the MPA2’s capacity to effectively coordinate women-related policies, both major women’s umbrella organizations had called for the creation of a ministry of women’s affairs during the presidential election campaign in 1997, and during his candidacy, Kim Dae-jung had pledged to create such a ministry. However, his election coincided with the country’s worst economic crisis in decades. As a result, in the name of “smaller government” and widespread budget cuts, the MPA2 was abolished and replaced with a special presidential commission (Chang, 2000).

Formally, the Presidential Commission for Women’s Affairs (PCWA) was weaker than the MPA2 as it lacked ministerial status and thus the Commission head was unable to participate fully in Cabinet meetings. However, while the Commission was established in part for reasons of political expediency, its design as a coordinating body directly under the President with linkages to smaller newly created policy units or “women’s focal points” in strategic ministries was based on the rationale that women’s concerns are unique and cross-cutting, and that what is needed is an effective coordinating mechanism (Yoon, 2000). It was also strongly influenced by the principle of gender mainstreaming—introducing a gender perspective into all policy areas—which was popularized at the 1995 Beijing UN Conference for Women (Chang, 2000, Park, 2000).

Although the PCWA is generally recognized as having been more influential than the MPA2, from the outset of its establishment, women leaders as well as the Council of Commissioners itself, continued to lobby the government to establish a women’s ministry (Chang, 2000). In response to these pressures, and mindful of the mid-term April 2000 congressional elections, Kim Dae-jung announced in his millennium New Year’s speech that his administration would create a ministry to promote gender equality. Throughout 2000, public hearings were held to discuss the organizational form the ministry should take. Particularly controversial was whether the ministry should focus solely on gender-related issues or be combined with youth affairs – while the latter would result in considerably more resources it was finally concluded by PCWA staff and progressive women’s leaders that a joint ministry would dilute a gendered approach to policy-making (Kang, 2000, Park, 2000).

The early part of the Kim administration also saw several other important changes in Korea’s women’s policy infrastructure, including the establishment of a women’s secretariat in the Blue House, and the creation of a gender expert position in the ruling party. In order to provide the president with expert advice on gender-related issues, and to streamline relations between the Blue House and the governmental women’s policy machinery, a women’s secretariat under the Secretary for Culture and Education was established in 1998. While the secretariat’s influence and autonomy is limited because it can only communicate indirectly with the President through the Secretary for Culture and Education, it plays an important public relations role, communicating with journalists and
women’s organizations about current policy concerns. In addition, the secretariat’s status has been strengthened by the appointment of five (out of 40) women to high positions within the Blue House, several of whom have women’s activist backgrounds (Lee, 2000).

A “gender expert” position was created in 1998 in the ruling party (and soon after by the major opposition party, the GNP) to offer expert advice to the party’s policy committee on the gendered implications of issues being discussed in Congress as well as to suggest gender-related reforms that the party ought to undertake. The gender expert is also responsible for liaising with women legislators and the SCCWA, as well as women-related bureaucratic agencies. Given such a broad mandate, however, with only a single expert and a research staff of three, the position’s efficacy is understandably limited (Kim, 2000, Park 2000, Kang 2000).

In short, the history of WPMs in Korea has been characterized by hastily created bodies, that have not been subject to extensive public debate, e.g. through a formal commission of inquiry, nor close consultation with societal groups13. In the absence of an overarching policy framework, WPMs and measures to advance gender equality exist alongside policies informed by traditional notions of gender roles and a uniform (rather than diverse) family model.

They [the government] have mixed messages – women should go out and work in the labor force because that is you know what the time is demanding - 21st Century and information society but at the same time in terms of individual values or in terms of family relationships we are not yet prepared to meet these challenges….Even though the government has played a major part in these legislation, maybe they didn’t fully understand what kind of impact it would have. When you look at this legislation – it has a lot of implications and would have a lot of impact. But they weren’t very clear; they didn’t do any cost benefit analyses. They were just setting up these basic framework and in a hurry (Park Young Ran, KWDI researcher, 2000).

This piecemeal approach to policy development may also be traced to the non-programmatic, regionalistic party system whereby parties react to demands from women’s pressure groups to serve short-term gains rather than longer term substantive change.

2. Organizational structure

A second key variable—organizational structure of the political machinery—includes characteristics of the political machinery as well as the broader institutions of the state in which these machineries are embedded. In terms of the machinery itself, we need to consider 1) its institutional positioning (e.g. as a ministry, commission, etc), 2) resources (i.e. staff and funding), 3) public relations efforts, and 4) intra-bureaucratic linkages (e.g. the relative capacity to influence the agenda of other government bodies). Given that political power is always relative vis-à-vis other organizations and groups – it is also necessary to consider the broader set of political institutions in which the machinery is embedded. This ‘balance of power’ between government agencies and institutions is crucial, for example, in determining the number and type of “veto points” available to actors who are interested in defending the status quo against moves to
promote more egalitarian gender power relations. The broader institutional context can also help determine the type of political strategies open to civic groups to further their aims, i.e. whether they attempt to affect social change via political parties, connections with well-placed bureaucrats, the judiciary, lobbying legislators or direct social protest.

The discussion below will begin with a brief overview of the institutional positioning and resources of each of the principle women’s political machineries. It will then consider three common weaknesses, i.e. WPMs’ lack of capacity to implement their own policies, weak public relations efforts and sub-optimal intra-bureaucratic linkages.

2.1 Despite being under the auspices of the relatively low-ranking and poorly funded Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs between 1983-8, the **KWDI** began with a surprisingly large staff of 164, generous office and training facilities and a project-based budget (Kim, 2000). In 1988, it was moved to the Ministry of Political Affairs No. 2, where it could focus on a range of women’s issue areas, e.g. women’s human resources, prevention of violence against women, women’s political representation etc, rather than just women-related welfare concerns. After the MPA2 was replaced by the PCWA in 1998, it was moved again, but a year later due to pressures for smaller government and cuts in state-sponsored research institutes, spun off into a semi-autonomous, significantly smaller and only partially funded think-tank under the Social Sciences and Humanities Council in the Prime Minister’s Office (Park, 2000).

The KWDI’s legacy has been mixed. Although it has no power to enforce any of its policy proposals and has historically been viewed with skepticism by mainstream bureaucrats on the one hand, and women’s NGOs on the other, the Institute has provided the bulk of the research used to draft the wide range of women-related legislation enacted over the last decade and a half (Byun, 2000, Kim, 2000). Moreover, its staff have also been active participants in various government taskforces and committees. However, the extent to which the KWDI has been able to take a proactive role in advancing gender equality has been limited by several structural factors: a) project-based funding which encourages short-term, one-off studies rather than longitudinal research, b) the need to focus on policy proposals which are politically feasible in the short-term and which will not threaten ongoing relations with informants in the bureaucracy (Park, 2000).

2.2 Located in the Prime Minister’s Office, the **WPEC** was officially headed by the Prime Minister and two vice chairpersons (the ministers of economic planning and social welfare) and had a staff of 20 (later increased to 35 under Kim Young Sam) including ministers with women-related responsibilities and 10 civilian experts (KWDI, 2001).

Most observers agree that under the Chun administration the Committee had a mere symbolic role, meeting only annually or biannually. In an effort to increase its efficacy, under Noh the Committee began presenting its findings to the President on a yearly basis and in 1994 under Kim Young Sam, annual meetings were held where all government ministries had to report on policies undertaken to improve women’s status and participation (Kwon, 1995, 2000). These mechanisms helped to increase public officials’ awareness of gender issues (e.g. Lee, 2001), but lacking any clear targets or guidelines, substantive improvements were hard to measure or enforce (Yoon, 2000).

2.3 Although the Noh administration tried to take credit for the establishment of a
women’s ministry when it converted the MPA2 into an agency responsible for women and family issues, the label “ministry” was seriously undermined by the fact that the Minister was only allowed to comment on women-related issues in Cabinet meetings and unable to independently propose legislation. In reality, with a tiny staff (just 20 staff in 1988, increasing to 40 by 1991) and very small budget it was a mini-ministry at best with very limited potential influence. Moreover, staff were primarily recruited from the Prime Minister’s Office, and generally lacked any gender-sensitive training or connections with the progressive women’s movement (Kim, 2000).

Nevertheless, during the MPA2’s nine years of existence an unprecedented high number of gender-related reforms were enacted. The extent to which the Ministry should be credited with these achievements is of course debatable. Until 1995, legislative reforms were predominantly proposed by women legislators or civic organizations rather than originating from the bureaucracy (Cho, 2000). Moreover, the Ministry lacked a mandate to implement newly enacted legislation and was instead responsible for coordinating policy development and enforcement among other ministries. Because of its low status and resources, as well as insufficient political will on the part of both the Noh and Kim administrations, its efficacy was limited (although improved somewhat following the introduction of a “women’s policy promotion task indicator” under Kwon in 1994) (Yoon, 2000). Lastly, although part of the Ministry’s mandate was to improve societal awareness of gender issues, public awareness of e.g. family violence or the need to improve childcare facilities improved thanks to high profile demonstrations and petitions organizations by civic groups rather than through any public relations efforts of the Ministry (Nam, 2000).

2.4 As a special rather than a standing committee, the SCCWA is smaller than other Congressional committees, has correspondingly fewer research staff and significantly more limited functions. It is able to present opinion papers on women-related laws, and monitor and file reports on the extent to which bureaucratic women’s policy agencies fulfill their assigned duties, but unable to deliberate on or suggest new bills and cannot participate fully in the National Assembly process (Lee, 2000). Under the Kim administration, the SCCWA’s role was rather passive, serving primarily as a discussion forum; however, under Kim Dae-jung, thanks in large part to the appointment of women with gender expertise and strong links to the women’s movement to head the SCCWA’s research division and the committee itself, the committee now makes more activist recommendations on a wide range of issues with gendered implications, e.g. employment, environment, welfare, education (e.g. Park, 2000, Lee, 2000, Han, 2000).

2.5 The PCWA’s positioning under the President significantly limited its institutional positioning vis-à-vis regular ministries. Accordingly, although it was established as a coordinating body with hubs or so-called “women’s focal points” in six women-related ministries, it did not have the institutional clout to effectively influence mainstream policy agendas. The Commission’s authority was further weakened by a small staff of 51, and just six staff in each of the women’s focal points (Shin, 2000, Chung, 2000). Despite a far-reaching mandate, i.e. liaising with the focal points on specific policy issues, overseeing the implementation of the Five Year Master Plan on Women’s Policies (1998-2002) as well as expanding cooperative ties with domestic women’s groups (through
project-based funds) and international women’s organizations, a dearth of staff and limited budget created a major gap between its de jure and de facto efficacy (e.g. Chang, 2000, Chong, 2000).

Nevertheless, unlike its predecessors, the passage of the 1999 Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief Act, empowered the PCWA with the authority to investigate and judge cases of gender discrimination and sexual harassment. Whereas women’s political machineries could previously only encourage companies and government agencies to follow anti-discrimination legislation, e.g. the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, the new Act provided for the establishment of a Gender Complaints Office, where victims of gender discrimination could file formal complaints (Yoon, 2000). Complaints were investigated by the office’s staff and then discussed and adjudicated by the Council of Commissioners (see below). Although the “ruling” was not legally binding, the PCWA was able to negotiate with the offending party and to publish the results of its investigations in daily newspapers in cases of non-compliance (Chang, 2000).

To replace the WPEC, a 13 member Council of Commissioners comprised of seven civilian experts, the vice ministers of the six relevant ministries and Chairperson and General Secretary of the PCWA was also established. The Council differed from its predecessor in two important aspects: more active participation from civilian experts (who were more closely connected to NGOs than their predecessors) and more frequent meetings (monthly rather than annual or semi-annual). Charged with debating and approving the PCWA’s policy initiatives, the Council had the right to revise or veto policy proposals, and provided a channel for greater civilian input into the policy process (Chang, 2000, Chung, 2000).

2.6 In January 2001, the Ministry of Gender Equality (MOGE) bill, which provided for a considerably expanded staff (101) and greater budget resources than had been anticipated, was finally passed. The new body has full ministerial status, can initiate legislation, and has also taken over responsibility for violence against women policies and programs that had been formerly dealt with by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Given just six months of operation it is, however, too early to evaluate the Ministry’s efficacy to date.

2.7 Common weaknesses

Despite a gradual improvement in policy influence and relations with civil society, several common weaknesses of Korean WMPs can be identified. Until the establishment of the MOGE, Korean WPMs have all lacked the capacity to implement their own policies and have been designated instead as policy coordinators. While in theory such a structure mitigates against the marginalization of women’s issues and facilitates a gender mainstreaming approach, because of the low status within the government and very limited resources, their coordinating abilities have been severely hampered. This weakness has been exacerbated by the general tendency of Korean laws to be vague in content and subsequently concretized/specified by the “implementation order” or “sihaengryok” which are drawn up by individual ministries. As a result, while WPMs have some say in the development of general legislation, their influence at the implementation stage is much less direct.
WPMs have also been plagued by relatively weak public relations efforts, i.e. citizens’ knowledge of the existence and activities of these governmental organizations is very low (PCWA, 2000). Possible contributing factors include a dearth of resources, a lack of ministers and senior officials that have close contacts with civil society and a high public profile, a political culture that prioritizes backroom deals over public debate, as well as a tendency for the bureaucracy to remain aloof from civil society (e.g. Kim, 1998; Hahm and Plein, 1997; Lee and Darcy, 2000).

Third, while there are multiple WPMs in all branches of government—executive, bureaucracy, think tanks, parties, legislature—the coordination and personal networks among these offices, although improving over time, has been far from optimal. In the case of the KWDI, relations with women’s agencies in the bureaucracy have been mixed. Although the KWDI provided the bulk of governmental research until 1997, with the growing importance of NGOs and university women’s studies programs, it no longer enjoys a monopoly in the field and bureaucrats also consult regularly with academics and civil society leaders (Park, 2000). Similarly, the relationship between party women’s bureaus and the KWDI was primarily limited to election season until the recent establishment of the gender expert office (Kim, 2000; Kwon, 2000). Even linkages between bureaucrats in WPMs and women legislators (including the SCCWA since 1994) have been distant and more recently characterized by tensions. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the MPA played a reactive rather than proactive role, and legislative reforms were primarily initiated by women’s civic groups in partnership with sympathetic legislators (Shin, 2000, Cho, 2000). Under the current administration, the PCWA and now MOGE have taken a more activist stance to policy development, but this has also caused some conflict of interests between PCWA senior officials and SCCWA, who viewed the former as overly demanding.

Finally, within the bureaucracy itself, the relationship between affiliated councils and ministerial women’s focal points has not been as cooperative as formal appearances suggest. The relationship between WPMs central offices and the councils has tended to be more formal than substantive, with the WPMs central offices setting the agenda, and the councils tending to provide rubber-stamp approval (e.g. Shin, 2000, Chong, 2000). In the case of the central office’s relationship with women’s offices in other ministries, the relationship has been somewhat one-sided. While the PCWA called on individual ministries for policy information when needed, it provides few resources, whether financial or policy information to the women’s focal points, who viewed the monthly meetings as chances to share notes and vent frustrations rather than as important substantive exchanges (Nam, 2000, Park, 2000, Cho, 2000, Lee, 2000).

Nevertheless, although in the past women’s policy infrastructure could be described as a rather weakly coordinated amalgamation of organizations with frequently divided interests, with the appointment of increasing numbers of gender experts and former activists to these bodies and the greater ideological commitment on the part of the President and current ruling party, there is evidence that closer linkages are being forged. A good example can be seen in the Maternity Leave Law. Championed by the two main political parties, women’s bureaucrats, women legislators, and the MOGE, and backed up by research from the KWDI, despite vigorous and well-organized opposition from employers associations and conservative legislators, the bill (albeit a somewhat weaker
version) was successfully enacted in July 2001.

2.8 The nature of the bureaucracy

A second major limitation concerns the nature of the Korean bureaucracy. Despite the transition to democracy, the bureaucracy remains traditional, Confucian and rule-bound, whereby promotions are still based primarily on seniority rather than merit (Oh, 1998). Its highly competitive entrance exam encourages conformity and rote-learning over creativity, and once appointed, bureaucrats are trained as generalists rather than specialists (Shin, 1999). Not surprisingly, this status quo-oriented bureaucracy has not provided a conducive environment for enacting radical and far-reaching policy reforms, which would be needed to reshape existing gender power relations. Although outside recruits from academia and civil society organizations have been accepted under Kim Young Sam and increasingly under Kim Dae-jung, for the most part these newcomers have not been well integrated with career bureaucrats and have often found themselves marginalized from the locus of decision-making power.

The bureaucracy is also largely male-dominated and despite a quota system introduced in 1998, women in the civil service’s decision-making ranks (grade 1-5) are still very rare (about 5%) (NSO, 2000). Although the majority of staff in WPMs are women, their colleagues in other ministries are predominantly male, have little gender awareness and are seldom challenged to question their agenda-setting and decision-making criteria from a gendered perspective. Gender sensitive training programs have been incorporated into civil service education programs, but are non-examinable, and, moreover, few follow-up mechanisms are in place to see that the contents of these programs are actually put into practice (Lee, 2000).

Finally, while the relationship between the bureaucracy and presidency has become increasingly differentiated in the post-transitional period, the president still enjoys a dominant role compared to more advanced democracies (Hahn and Plein, 1997). Accordingly, whether or not a president prioritizes a particular issue, may have a significant influence on the status of the relevant government body and the resources available to it. While this can definitely enhance WPMs (as has been the case with the MOGE under Kim Dae-jung), it also renders these agencies vulnerable to presidential whims and turnover. For example, many women in the bureaucracy and civil society fear that if the current more conservative opposition party, the Grand National Party, wins the 2002 presidential elections, the MOGE may be dismantled or significantly weakened, particularly as Lee Hoi-Chang lacks Kim Dae-jung’s personal interest in advancing gender equality (Yoon, 2001).

3. Relationship with civil society

A third key characteristic of WPMs to consider is whether these bodies provide formal and informal channels through which women’s civic groups can influence the policy process, as well as the women’s movement stance vis-à-vis the state. Research shows that a key determinant of the efficacy of women’s policy machineries--both over time within the Korean case and across countries (e.g. Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Waylen, 2000)--is the degree to which machineries provide women’s groups with access to the decision-making process as well as the resources devoted to supporting women’s grassroots and NGO activities. The flipside of this involves activists’ view of the state,
i.e. whether or not the state is seen as a potential avenue for improving women’s status or as an instrument of male power that generally either ignores or co-opts demands for increased gender equality. The ability of women’s groups to adopt a dual strategy – in which they place direct pressure on state actors from civil society combined with attempts to penetrate the state apparatus and affect change from within--is a key determinant of the efficacy of women’s political machineries to promote social change (e.g. Alvarez, 1990, Waylen, 1997).

Whereas the relationship between the Korean state and women’s organizations was openly antagonistic during the authoritarian period, since the transition to democracy the relationship between governmental women’s machineries and women’s civic groups has become increasingly conciliatory and cooperative. The state’s definition of women’s interests has evolved from an emphasis on protecting “marginalized women” and promoting women’s social and economic participation in the name of national development in the 1980s and early 1990s, to a concern with advancing equal power relations between men and women and narrowing the gap between de jure and de facto gender equality in the late 1990s/2000s (Kim, 2001). At the same time, whereas the moderate, vocational-based umbrella women’s group, the KNCW, has long been supportive of the government (regardless of the regime type or president), the progressive KWAU’s stance vis-à-vis the state has undergone a significant shift from open opposition in the late 1980s to engagement with the state in the mid 1990s (Cho, 2000, Nam, 2000). Most recently, following the election of Kim Dae-jung, the KWAU’s view of the state has emerged as a flawed but increasingly important arena for advancing social justice (especially in terms of anti discrimination legislation) and source of funding and resources (e.g. Nam, 2000, Yoon, 2000). Lastly, women’s studies academics and cultural feminists have remained more skeptical and distant from the state throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless, their cooperation with the Kim Dae-jung administration has gradually increased, especially through participation in governmental committees (e.g. Chun, 2000, Chang, 2000).

I suggest that a useful way to conceptualize these shifting relations is as: 1) patron-client, 2) engagement with the state and 3) state/civil society partnership.

3.1 Patron-client relations

Under the Park and Chun regimes, the government’s relationship with women’s organizations was primarily one of patron-client. That is, in return for the KNCW’s loyalty and cooperation with government women-related initiatives, e.g. the KNCW received both funding and a sympathetic ear from state actors regarding its demands for legislative reform, e.g. the creation of women’s political machineries, revision of the Family Law act (Moon, 1998). Following the transition in 1987, the emergence of a vocal progressive women’s movement meant the government had to be more solicitous of an increasingly diverse array of women’s demands. To this end, the Noh administration strengthened women’s policy machineries and appointed more women to decision-making ranks in the public and educational arenas (Kim, 2000). However, these measures were more symbolic than substantive and until 1995 the MPA2’s role as a policy initiator was minimal (Kwon, 2000). Moreover, the government’s approach to women-related programs remained top-down, with little effort devoted to consulting with progressive
women’s organizations. Indeed, given an emphasis within the ministry on encouraging women’s volunteer work (read unpaid community service), many outside observers viewed the early MPA2 as a mobilization mechanism for the politically precarious ruling party (e.g. Chang, 2000). Finally, with the exception of the second minister, former KWDI head Kim Jung Chun, the appointment of women ministers with few contacts with civil society and a general lack of gender awareness among ministry staff exacerbated the women’s movement’s distrust of the MPA2 (Shin, 2000).

3.2 Engagement with the state

The appointment of civilian president Kim Young Sam, and a shift in the general social movement frame from a minjung (people/ the masses) to a shinmin (citizens) ideology led to the initiation of closer state-civil society ties (Kim, 1998; Kim, 1997). As part of a broader plan to eliminate vestiges of authoritarian practices and build greater trust between the government and people, Kim’s administration established a policy to provide project-based funding for NGOs in 1993. Although many women’s groups initially rejected the plan, fearing that obligatory registration with a particular ministry would compromise their autonomy, gradually a recognition developed within the movement of the need to change tactics to suit the new political environment and to “engage with the state” (Kim, 1998). In particular, despite fears that this change would lead to a bureaucratization of the movement, groups working with grassroots women emphasized that in order to appeal to ordinary women it was important for women’s organizations to lose their radical anti-government image (Yoon, 2001). Moreover, although relatively limited, government funding provided a key organizational resource to enhance the professionalism of the movement, and facilitated the receipt of funds from international foundations and groups.

State-civil society relations were also improved through the emergence of new issue areas, preparations for the 1995 Beijing Conference and Kim’s appointment of widely respected women leaders to high decision-making positions (KWAU, 1998). In terms of specific policy issues, the sexual and family violence legislative reform process provided an opportunity for greater cooperation between the government and NGOs as bureaucrats frequently sought expertise from women’s groups who were directly involved in the field (Lee, 2000, Shin, 2000). Second, as in many other developing world countries, the lead up to the Beijing Conference not only provided a major motivating force for government and civil society groups to meet on a more regular basis to discuss report requirements but also enhanced the government’s receptivity to women’s demands. For example, as discussed above the Special Congressional Committee for Women’s Affairs which women’s groups had campaigned for to increase legislators awareness of women’s issues was quickly passed in July 1994 and similarly, a specific section of the government’s ambitious globalization plan was devoted to women’s policy issues. Closer ties with the Kim administration were also facilitated through the appointment as MPA2 minister of several figures who were well respected by the women’s movement, i.e. former dissident and KWDI vice head, Kwon Young Ja as Minister of the MPA2 (1993-5) as well as NGO leader Lee Yong Sook (1997) (Yoon, 2000).

Despite these advances, however, many progressive women activists remained skeptical of Kim’s genuine commitment to promoting women’s rights and believed he
was more concerned with his own public image than achieving substantive gender equality (Chun, 2000, Cho, 2000). One key example cited is the top-down approach adopted to pass the Basic Women’s Development Act immediately after the Beijing Conference. Having announced its intention to develop a basic framework law for women’s policies in October 1995, the MPA2 hastily drew up a draft and despite many progressive women’s organizations initial protests, the ruling party rushed the “Women’s Basic Development Act” through Congress by year-end (e.g. Shin, 2000). As a result, the Act’s contents were very general and lacked sufficient concrete detail to really serve as an effective tool through which women’s groups could hold the government accountable for specific policy outcomes (Yoon, 2000).

3.3 “State/ civil society-partnership”

Reflecting the importance of the president in Korean politics, the election of Kim Dae-jung in December 1997 represented a watershed in terms of state-civil society relations in general (Oh, 1999) and with the women’s movement in particular. Voted in with only a 40% plurality and lacking the support of the powerful business community, the Kim administration placed a heavy emphasis on its “partnership with civil society”, recruiting many former activists into key positions within the ruling party, the bureaucracy and as presidential advisors (Lee, 2000). Women’s groups were encouraged by this new political environment and an unprecedented number of former activists chose to enter governmental women’s agencies and to work for change from within the state. Although there was less support for women leaders to enter political parties, which were still perceived as being run by powerful conservative party factions, NGO circles generally viewed the emergence of these “femocrats” quite positively (Na, 2000).

In addition to having more of “their own” within government ranks, NGOs noted a marked change in the degree to which government officers sought their advice on a wide variety of issues, both formally through the Council of Commissioners and informally (Yoon, 2000). Simultaneously, however, whereas Korean women’s policy machineries had historically reacted to women’s policy demands, given Kim’s personal endorsement of gender equality measures, the state became increasingly proactive in terms of legislative reform and policy development. The most significant example is that of the 1999 Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief Act, which the PCWA head, Yoon Hoo Jong, along with women legislators, campaigned actively to enact. Providing the PCWA with a more concrete mandate—i.e. official jurisdiction to handle and adjudicate cases of gender discrimination—as well as some level of enforcement power, PCWA backers of the law saw it as a mechanism to capitalize on Kim Dae-jung’s rhetorical commitment to equalizing gender relations and to compensate in part for the Commission’s disappointing organizational status (Yoon, 2000).

Another example of closer civil society-government relations involves the KWDI. Whereas the KWDI was historically viewed as a mere arm of the government by the progressive women’s movement, during Kim Dae-jung’s tenure, the number of researchers recruited because of their specific expertise in gender issues has increased, as has the rate of KWDI researchers’ participation in women’s NGO committees (e.g. Kim, 2000).

4. Conclusion
The limited success of Korea’s women’s policy infrastructure can be seen as reflective of Korea’s limited democratic deepening and policy-making in general. First, on account of Korea’s non-programmatic regionalistic political party system, parties have not served as conduits to aggregate competing public interests. Instead gender policy has been significantly influenced by the degree and source of presidential commitment, as well as Confucian, capitalist development understandings of the state.

Second, because WPMs have been established in a piecemeal fashion without a coherent policy framework, the ideological underpinnings of these multiple agencies are often contradictory and the linkages between policy officers rather weak. This has proven problematic, given that until the establishment of MOGE, women’s bodies lacked implementation powers and were first and foremost policy coordinators. Low staffing and budgetary resources as well as weak public relations efforts further hindered institutional capacity.

Lastly, although there has been a gradual improvement in terms of elites’ political will and the institutional structure of women’s policy agencies since the 1980s, the most dramatic change can be seen in the relationship between WPMs and women’s civil society organizations. A major reason for the increased efficacy of WPMs in the late 1990s lies in the closer ties forged with women’s groups and in particular the progressive and relatively cohesive umbrella organization, the KWAU. Not only are women’s voices being increasingly articulated within state apparatuses through the appointment of “femocrats”, but activist and grassroots organizations are also becoming increasingly confident in the state’s capacity to improve women’s welfare and address gender inequalities. In this regard, the Korean case provides a telling example of the importance of pursuing a dual state-civil society strategy to improve gender power relations.

List of interviewees in Women’s Political Machineries conducted between Sept – Dec 2000

**Political Parties:** Kang Hyun Hee, Gender Expert, GNP; You Sung Hee, Women’s Bureau Director, MDP; Kim Young Ae, Former Women’s Bureau, MDP; Kim Young Hee, Gender Expert, MDP; Kwon Hyang Yop, Women’s Bureau, MDP; Lee Hwa Young, Women’s Bureau Director, United Liberal Democrats;

**MPA2:** Park Woo Kwon, Director General, Policy Division; Hwang In Ja, Human Resources; Lee Ki Soon, Policy Division; Kwon Jung Ja, Minister/ Deputy Head, MPA2/ KWDI; Kim Young Chun, Minister/Head of KWDI

**PCWA:** Ha Young Sook, Cooperation and Liaison Division; PCWA/ WPEC, Kang Ki Won, Commission Head/ civilian expert; Chang Song Ja, Gender Discrimination Complaints Bureau Head; Na Young Hee, Policy Division; Chong Kang Ja, Council of Commissioners, civilian expert; Yoon Hoo Jong, Commission Head; Chang Pil Wha, Council of Commissioners, civilian expert;

**Women’s Focal Points:** Mok So Young, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; Yang In Sook, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; Soh Myung Sun, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare; Hwang In Ja, Ministry of Government and Home Affairs; Nam Sung Hee, Ministry of Education, Lee Ok, Ministry of Justice; Cho Hae Jin, Ministry of Justice; Park Song Ja, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; Park Song Tae, Ministry of Labor;
KWDI: Kim Young Hee, Social/Political Division; Kim Elim, Social/Political Division; Kim KyungHee, Social/Political Division; Park Young Ran, Welfare Division; Byun Wha Sun, Law Division, SCCWA/ MOGE; Han Myung Sook, MDP legislator, Minister; Lee Yon Sook, GNP legislator, SSCWA head;
Blue House: Secretariat of Women’s Affairs, Lee Sung Hee, Head of Women’s Affairs Secretariat
Local Government: Noh Mi Hye, Seoul, Women’s Bureau Head; Lee Jae-Chun, Chonju City, Counsellor; Chung Jung Ai, Chongju Provincial Govt, Women’s Bureau Head

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1 The “Third Wave” is a term first used by Samuel Huntington to describe the trend towards democracy in
developing countries that began with Southern Europe in the 1970s.
Even after the restructuring, however, some within the KWDI maintain that because of its excellent national information publication dissemination system which reaches both central and local government public officers, Korean national machinery for women—including the KWDI, PCWA and the six women’s focal points— is much better coordinated than its Asian counterparts. Senior Researcher, Byun Wha Son, who conducted a comparative study on the WPMs of Japan and Korea believes that the combination of a research institute, policy development agency and diverse policy implementation agencies in Korea have helped to ensure that Korean officials are more aware of gender equality concepts and the need for policy reforms than their Japanese counterparts. Lacking an equivalent research institute, those involved in women and family-related government agencies in Japan are often unaware of basic women’s concerns as well as the availability of relevant data (2000).

Although Stetson and Mazur are primarily comparing women’s political machinery across counties, this paper is concerned with changes across both administrations and regime types within the same country.

A president’s decision to endorse the establishment of a governmental body devoted to women’s issues may fall into one or a combination of four broad categories, including advancing a leader’s political legitimacy, domestic pressure (especially from lobbying groups), international pressure (e.g. from the UN or ILO) and commitment to improving women’s status and gender equality.

The Korean government’s legitimacy reached its nadir in the 1979-81 period with the combined assassination of Park, the Kwangju massacre and economic crisis, which had alienated the regime’s traditional backers (e.g. large business conglomerates known as ‘chaebol’).

The WPEC’s initial purpose was to prepare Korea for entry into CEDAW, but subsequently took on a more permanent policy monitoring role.

Noh’s administration placed considerable emphasis on symbolic changes, especially women “firsts” in previously male exclusive arenas of the public sector. For example, in response to women’s circles’ demands, the government made a commitment to appoint women as Minister of the MPA2. However, these appointments have been of mixed efficacy; while some appointees came from Women’s Studies in the academy or from the KWDI, other ministers selected had few ties with women movement circles or professional experience in women-related policy areas (Kim, 2000; Kwon, 2000).

Focusing primarily on collective social and economic rights (rather than individual human or political rights), the policy goals included the provision of better childcare and maternal services, improving women’s employment status in the public and private sectors, and expanding societal awareness of gender issues through various mass media and information networks.

Although activists initially paid little attention to this Act, increasingly over time, it is serving as an important tool to push for policy changes, especially in the area of gender mainstreaming (Yoon, 2001).

The timing of the establishment of the SCCWA did not go unnoticed by critics of the government; given that the Beijing Women's Conference was to be held the following year, the Committee was seen as another opportunity for the government to showcase its efforts to advance gender equality without a major commitment of resources (Cho, 2000).

It should be noted here that the two major women’s umbrella groups, the KWAU and the KNCW were not united in this regard. That is, the KWAU was very critical of the MPA2 as were progressive academics e.g. Chang Pilwha. However, former members of the MPA2 and the KNCW who had close ties to the ruling party were adamant that the older organization was better than its replacement, the PCWA, e.g. Lee, 2000, Kwon, 2000). In particular, supporters of the MPA2 called for a strengthening of the existing machinery rather than the creation of a completely new structure.

At the end of 1997 when the ruling party was debating whether to establish a women’s ministry or special presidential commission, it was suggested that Korea follow the decentralized Philippines WPM model reputed to be among the most effective in Asia (Na Yong Hee, 2000). Aspects of the Canadian and German models where women’s policy units are located at each local government level were also borrowed (Byun Wha Son, 2000).
For example, Stetson and Mazur (1995) emphasize the importance of commissions of inquiry in Canada in the establishment process of women’s machineries and the raising of public awareness. In the New Zealand case, Du Plessis et al. (1992) stress the importance of the consultation process with civilian experts in contrast to the Korean case where the decision-making process regarding WPMs’ organizational configurations have been largely carried out behind closed doors.

Moreover, while the ruling party and Ministry of Home Affairs initially tried to use the institute as a “dumping ground for surplus personnel”, the first head of the KWDI and former founder of the Ewha Womans University Women’s Studies program, Kim Young Chun, lobbied hard to ensure that the Institute would be able to recruit well-educated researchers and give preferential treatment to women.

This restructuring of the KWDI to focus primarily on research activities was partially in response to demands from NGO circles to have more direct involvement with government projects as implementing agencies. There were also significant staff cutbacks (to 91) and a reduction in government funding to just 70% of its total budget. Moreover, under the 1999 “Act on the Establishment, Management and Promotion of Government Sponsored Research Institutes”, the KWDI was transferred to the Korea Council of Humanities and Social Research under the Office of the Prime Minister. While this gave the organization greater autonomy, it also means that it is faced with increasing competition (both in terms of prestige and funding) from other government bodies and women’s NGOs, which want to have their own voice and research to support their action agenda (e.g. KWDI, 2001).

While the minister was a woman, the other senior decision-making staff were predominantly male and conservative (Lee, 2001).

According to a KWDI review of all gender related legislation and amendments, 100 out of a total of 287 reforms that were enacted in the 20th Century, took place under the MPA2 (KWDI, 2001,viii).

The make-up of the Committee is based on the proportion of seats each party holds in the National Assembly. However, in most cases committee discussions have been divided along gender rather than party lines. Almost all women legislators participate in the SCCWA, but until the April 2000 congressional election there were so few women that they did not even constitute half of the total number of committee members. Moreover, on a practical level, committee members tend to prioritize their participation in the more powerful standing committees and therefore attendance levels are often poor (Park, 2000).

All standing committees are linked to a corresponding ministry but as the MPA2 did not have full ministerial status, only a special committee could be established to deal with women’s affairs (Park, 2000).

In response to demands from women’s organizations, women’s focal points were established in six ministries: Labor, Health and Social Welfare, Justice, Education, Agriculture and Fisheries and Government and Home Affairs. With the exception of the larger Ministry of Labor women’s policy office, each focal point had six staff and was responsible for developing and coordinating the implementation of women-related policies throughout their specific ministries. In order to increase the level of expertise and women’s organizations’ confidence in the PCWA, a number of outside recruitments were made to the Commission and the focal points, primarily academics, women activists and women lawyers.

The Council of Commissioners was renamed as the Committee of Gender Equality Promotion but essentially retained the same functions, as did the six women’s focal points.

Typically, bureaucrats are rotated from department to department every two or three years, in order to minimize corruption opportunities.

It should be pointed out that this sentiment is not necessarily shared at the local/provincial levels where local women’s chapters still feel excluded from the locus of decision-making power (e.g. Kim, 2000).

“We all had to accept the need to transform our movement from an activists’ hit-task-force into a mass organization where ordinary people could participate” (KWAU representative quoted in Kim, 1998, 210).
Rewriting Rebellion and Mapping Memory in South Korea: The (Re)presentation of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising Through Mangwol-dong Cemetery

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1. Introduction

Climbing onto a local bus in downtown Kwangju City, the capital of South Cholia province, South Korea¹ (see Map on p. 3 for the location of South Cholia province), I ask the driver to let me off at Mangwol-dong, the Kwangju Uprising cemetery. As I sit down I notice an old man, one of only two other passengers, who nods in my direction and fleetingly smiles before turning back towards the window to watch as the urban sprawl of Kwangju turns slowly into the rural brown of South Cholla province in late November. After 20 minutes or so, towering in the distance appears a huge concrete memorial and, as we crawl further along the newly surfaced road, a large car park converging on a new but traditionally designed gate with the impressively embossed inscription ‘Democracy Gate’ [Minchuui Mun].

As we near what appears to he the stop for the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery [Sae Mangwol-dong Myochi], I look expectantly at the driver in his rear-vision mirror. Suddenly the old man calls from behind me to the driver in thick regional dialect not to let me off here. As I turn back and give him a questioning glance he is already chiding the driver for not thinking to take me two stops further up the road, where the entrance to the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery [Ku Mangwol-dong Myochi] is to he found. The driver, with growing irritation, shouts back that I (as someone not from the region) would find little of interest in the old cemetery, which, after all, doesn’t even contain the bodies of the victims anymore and is embarrassingly dilapidated. The old man retorts that everybody should see the “real”, that is original, cemetery. He looks towards me again with a nod that is, I suppose, intended to reassure me that I am being taken to the correct cemetery. In the end the bus driver concedes and I am taken about two kilometres further down the road where the old man taps my shoulder and says “here, here”, and, pointing towards the entrance to the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery prompts, “You go this way first, okay? ”.

This unexpectedly heated exchange between the old man and the bus driver would not have occurred if I had been visiting the cemetery five years ago. Up until 1994 there was only one Mangwol-dong Cemetery - what is now known as the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery. Since the completion of a New Mangwol-dong Cemetery in 1997 as part of a process of state-sponsored memorialisation of the Kwangju Uprising, the old cemetery, known officially as the ‘May 18 Movement Cemetery’, has become increasingly obscured and dwarfed by the elaborate concrete testaments
to the Uprising in the grounds of the new cemetery, officially titled the ‘5. 18 Memorial Cemetery’. What is more, the exchange I witnessed on the bus was not an uncommon phenomenon, but rather one instance in a seemingly endless stream of discrepant views and diverging meanings of the Kwangju Uprising and its memorialisation through sites of memory like the two Mangwol-dong cemeteries.

Thus, although 19 years have passed since the Kwangju Uprising of 18 May 1980, the event remains a deeply contested one in the modern history of South Korea. Since the mid-1990s, a new element in the ongoing contestation over the Uprising has emerged as people within Kwangju and South Cholla begin to articulate discrepant readings of the event’s meaning and significance. This increasing divergence in interpretations of the event emerging from both within and outside the province has been triggered in part by the changing political climate within South Korea. This climate has fostered increasingly open debate on public issues, and dissent (at least in some spaces) is no longer as severely condemned as it was under the authoritarian regimes of the past three decades.

Nonetheless, the increasing complexity in Cholla peoples’ views about the Uprising may perhaps be more accurately explained as a response to the state-sponsored memorialisation of the event, which is indeed itself a reflection of the growing democratisation of the country, as the government of Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) attempted to align itself with, rather than distance itself from, democratic and populist impulses in civil society.

This process of state-sponsored memorialisation and the officially designated memorial sites, or sites of memory, that are the tangible products of this shifting government identity have generated intense and passionate debate amongst citizens of Kwangju and South Cholla province. Consequently, the memorialisation process has been marred by divisions and conflicts over the meaning of the event and the way it is to be remembered. Seen another way, the Kwangju Uprising cemetery, Mangwol-dong, along with other sites that figured in the Kwangju Uprising, have recently become inserted into this ‘politics of memory’, generating enormous debate about the event within the region, of which the exchange between the old man and the bus driver is but one instance in an emerging narrative of the post-Uprising politics of memory.

This divergence in the meaning of the Uprising has come to be concretised in the textual markers of the (two) Mangwol-dong cemetery(ies) and is galvanised into three loosely cogent interpretations: the state-sanctioned (official), outside (non-Cholla) versions; the popular ( unofficial), endogenous (Cholla) interpretations put forward by social movements and civil groups; and the meaning attached to the event by the victims and victims’ families. The interpretations of the Uprising put forward by social movements and civil groups in Kwangju and South Cholla are proving the most contentious, as these groups assert claims for representational space in the new cemetery that is, at present, effectively denied them. The memorialisation of Mangwol-dong Cemetery has thus both triggered this contention and provided the main arena through which these different meanings are debated.

This paper looks at the process by which the Kwangju Uprising has become reinterpreted and contested in the late 1990s through a number of memorial sites. Mangwol-dong cemetery(ies), where the victims of the Uprising are buried, is the focus of the discussion since it is the only site where the memorialisation process has been completed and, not incidentally, the site which triggers the most impassioned debate amongst citizens in the region. Sites of memory, or memorial sites, including cemeteries, monuments, memorials, and other places for the public consumption of
history and memory, have recently been recognised as intensely political subjects, since “… the very substance (of a memorial) is a political construction of what is remembered - different for many groups in society”. Sites of memory, in short, convey political messages - consciously or subconsciously, intended or unintended - which, as Ritcher remarks, have been only very rarely studied. Focusing on Auschwitz, Charlesworth encounters such instances of conflict and contestation through his exploration of the ways Auschwitz figures as a site of commemoration of Nazi terror. Specifically, Charlesworth discusses the memorialisation of the Holocaust as a product of the needs of state power and religious forces. As he explains, this “… very act of memorialisation, of capturing memory so that we do not forget, can by its exclusivity push aside the claims of others for their own collective rights and identifies”. 6

Drawing on Nora,7 my argument throughout this paper rests on the conviction that memory and sites of memory, or symbolic spaces, are profoundly political. Further, this politics emerges largely from questions about who controls the representation and historical reading of events through sites of memory, or, in short, who authors these profoundly symbolic geographical texts. More broadly, the paper offers a productive engagement with the emerging interface between geography and postcolonialism, most comprehensively put forward by Jacobs,8 in which she acknowledges the need to transcend the metaphorical use of spatialised language in postcolonialism and “return it to ‘real’ geographies”. 9

I start by providing a brief background to the Kwangju Uprising in the broader context of South Korea’s postcolonial politics. Indeed, whilst the Kwangju Uprising is the subject of layer upon layer of interpretation, there are nonetheless certain indisputable occurrences that led to and defined the event. The discussion of uprising memorialisation through the Mangwol-dong cemeteries continues by briefly considering the various, competing interpretations of these events that marked the Uprising. I then discuss the creation of the Kwangju Uprising memorialisation industry under the aegis of the democratically elected Kim Young Sam government (1993-1997). This is followed by a brief outline of the main contours of South Korea’s minjung movement, which helps us to understand why the social movement and civil society groups in the region feel so uneasy about the construction of the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery. Finally, I explore the ways the two Mangwol-dong cemeteries figure as important sites through which these competing interpretations of the Uprising are brought to the fore, drawing on some of the textual markers in the cemeteries to illustrate the ways in which the South Korean state has managed to inscribe itself onto the terrain of the cemetery and thus insert itself into Kwangju Uprising historicisation. In the process, the Mangwol-dong Cemetery and other sanctified memorial sites, like the Uprising itself have become contested spaces.

2. The Kwangju Uprising and Democracy Denied

The Kwangju Democratic Uprising took place between 18 and 27 May 1980 (and is often referred to in Korean by the date on which it began, 5. 18, or o-il- pal). Whilst the meaning of the Uprising has become contested by various groups, the circumstances that led to the Uprising, which arose out of South Korea’s postcolonial political history, and the ‘events’ that marked the Uprising, are becoming clearer. 10
The Uprising occurred at an important juncture in Korea’s postcolonial political history. This juncture was marked by the sudden break from authoritarian rule that resulted from President Park Chung Hee’s assassination on 26 October 1979. Park’s death was the catalyst for a nationwide civil movement for the restoration of democracy in Korea. However, rather than bringing about democracy, the civil movement instead met with heightened repression, culminating in the imposition of martial law on 17 May 1980.

To appreciate the ramifications of the denial of democracy at this historic point in South Korea’s modern history, one must delve further back into the postcolonial political landscape of the country, beginning with the point of inception of the Park Chung Hee military dictatorship. On 16 May 1961, a military coup in which Park Chung Hee played a central role took place. The military junta that led the coup imposed Emergency Martial Law throughout Korea, forced the resignation of the previous Chang Myon civilian government, and seized legislative, judicial and executive powers. This began a 19-year period in which Park Chung Hee ruled Korea in what has been variously characterised as a bureaucratic-authoritarian, relatively autonomous or repressive-developmental state.

Whilst the title ascribed to the South Korean state is useful for characterising the economic prowess of the Park Chung Hee military government, the blatantly undemocratic nature of the regime was its other, less celebrated feature. In fact, the Park administration also acted to prohibit public gatherings and demonstrations, dissolved the National Assembly (as well as the regional assemblies), banned all social and political organisations that were not state sponsored, directly controlled and censored the media, and brought existing politicians under surveillance, which included a restriction of their political activities. All these measures acted to reinforce the political power of the Park regime through simultaneously denying the mobilisation and expression of organised political opposition.

These mechanisms for containing and repressing all political opposition continued to be invoked by Park throughout his term as President. Park continually revised the nation’s Constitution to allow himself to run in four consecutive Presidential elections. In 1971, he revised the Constitution to allow himself to run for a third Presidential term and, in 1972, he again revised the Constitution to hold Presidential elections in a special assembly that he himself controlled. Coupled with these legislative amendments were numerous extra-legal (repressive) mechanisms to contain popular/public dissent. As Lee notes, “Park side-stepped the legislative process and ruled through military ‘Emergency Measures’ that made everyone subject to arbitrary arrest, torture, and imprisonment on suspicion of subversive activity”.

In 1974, at the height of the authoritarian period, Park began targeting specific ‘subversive’ groups that, he claimed, were a threat to national security. He singled out for dissolution the National League for Democratic Youth and Students (NLDYS) [Chonguk minchu ch'omnyon haksaeng chongyangmaeng – minch’ong hangnyon for short]. The NLDYS became an easy target because its democratic orientation embraced principles of social justice and egalitarianism. The People's Revolutionary Party (NRP) was also targeted by the Park government, and accused of supporting the NLDYS in an effort to overthrow the Korean government. Members of the People's Revolutionary Party were arrested, tortured and even executed.

In late 1979, after the declaration of the Yushin regime, the government tightened its grip on democratic protests throughout the nation. It began by declaring martial

435
law in Masan and Pusan, where students, labourers and citizens were engaged in intense democratic protests. On 26 October 1979, amidst this dissent against authoritarianism, President Park Chung Hee was assassinated by his chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), Kim Chae-gyu. His death only acted to intensify the popular protests for democracy, to which calls for the revision of the constitution and direct presidential elections (rather than elections by the Yushin agency, the National Conference for Unification [T’ongil chuch’e kungmin hoeui] instituted by Park) were now added. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister, Choe Kyu-ha, chose to reject these popular demands and instead was elected President by the Yuchin agency. He promised to pursue constitutional reform later. Immediately following this election, on 12 December 1979, General Chun Doo-hwan, head of the Army Security Command [Kukkun poan saryong kwan], instigated a military coup and seized control of the government.

The political situation in Korea became intolerable to the general public and acted as a further catalyst to civilian protests. In the first five months of 1980, and particularly the months of March, April and May, democratic protests spread from university campuses to the general public. Protesters demanded the immediate resignation of de-facto President Chun Doo-hwan and Prime Minister Sin Hyon-hwak for obstructing constitutional reform. To these demands were added more general calls for the end of martial law and restoration of democracy and freedom of speech and association. These events culminated in an intense period of repression-resistance that was a precursor to the Uprising. According to Lee,

On the evening of 17 May 1980, armed forces from the Army Capital Garrison [Sugyong Sa] and military police [Sugyongsa byongdan] were stationed outside the Central Government Headquarters building [Chungangch’ong] where an extraordinary meeting was in session to approve a decision by Chun Doo-hwan and commanders of the army, navy, and air force to extend martial law nation-wide. At 1.45 am on May 18, soldiers from Regiment 101 of the 33rd Corps of the Capital Army Corps [Sudo kunsayeha 33 sadan 101 yondae] advanced on the National Assembly building with armoured tanks. Forty-five minutes later, Army Headquarters dispatched 25,000 martial law troops to the National Assembly and onto college campuses around the nation. Chun Doo-hwan assumed overall command of martial law troops and mobilised national military forces, under the leadership of the Army Security Command [Poansa], on the pretext of a need for “national defence”. The city of Kwangju was subject to particularly severe and violent repression by the military after martial law was imposed. The denial of democracy and the heightening authoritarianism that accompanied the coming to power of Chun Doo Hwan to replace Park prompted nationwide protests, which, because of Cholla’s historical legacy of dissent and radicalism, were most intense in that region. In Kwangju, about 200 students demonstrated at the gates of Chonnam University demanding the rescinding of martial law and the order to close campuses. The 33rd battalion of the Seventh Air Transport Brigade arrested 43 of them. On 18 May martial law troops reinforced by ‘Black Beret’ paratroopers surrounded student demonstrators who were demanding an end to Chun’s imposition of martial law, and began indiscriminately to bayonet them, killing several dozen. The 63rd battalion of the Eleventh Brigade of the Korean Special Forces opened fire near Kwangju High
School on 19 May, injuring a high school student, and it was through this incident that the general public in Kwangju joined the students in protesting against the brutality demonstrated by the Korean Special Forces.

Thus, the Uprising began on 18 May and ended on 27 May when, after over a week of intense fighting in which citizens took control of Kwangju, military forces finally re-took the city. 15

As with numerous other aspects of the Uprising, there is some dispute over the actual number of victims the Uprising claimed. Officially, according to the Korean government, 190 people were killed in the Uprising. However, unofficially, upwards of 2000 people were reported as dead. This figure is derived from Kwangju’s monthly death statistics, which totalled 2600 for the month of May 1980, which is 2300 deaths more that the monthly average at the time. 16 The May 18 History Compilation Committee, based in Kwangju, also contests the official numbers. “The victims of the martial law force’s brutality amounted to 3,421 all told: 154 killed, 47 missing, 2,711 wounded, and 509 placed under arrest. Actually, the number of people illegally taken into custody during the search period was more than 3000 alone, and nobody knows how many people were mercilessly arrested while they were demonstrating against martial law”. 17 This dispute over the number of victims the Uprising claimed is but one of the numerous arenas through which the Uprising continues to be contested. Immediately after the Uprising, however, 137 victims were taken in handcarts and garbage trucks to be buried in the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery by friends and family. 18

Several different accounts of the Uprising have appeared since the event, authored by numerous agencies with different interests. These can be divided broadly into two competing versions: the official (outside Kwangju/ Cholla, sanctioned), and the unofficial (within Kwangju/ Cholla, unsanctioned). Immediately after the Kwangju Uprising the Korean government labelled the event as “the Kwangju affair” “a riot” or “a rebellion backed by some seditious power scheming to overthrow the government”. 19 The severe repression of the Uprising was justified under the official interpretation of the event as a “communist backed plot”. Thus, by invoking broader national security imperatives, the government conferred upon itself a degree of legitimacy in its decision to repress the Uprising severely. Indeed, there are many Koreans who, even today, consider that the measures the state took to repress the Kwangju Uprising were completely justified since, at that time, the threat of invasion from North Korea was supposedly palpable.

For almost 20 years following the Uprising, the voices of Kwangju/ South Cholla citizens remained silent in discussions about the event. This is largely because versions of the event emerging from within the region were unsanctioned, departing enormously from those put forward by the various governments of the day. In addition, poems, narratives and biographies of the event to emerge from within Cholla region were not considered legitimate sources of information, and many were declared contraband. With the transition to a democratic polity in the early 1990s, however, Kwangju/South Cholla citizens were able, to some extent, to recover their voices in the narration of the Uprising. Indeed, the volume of material published on the Uprising in the post-1988 period is enormous. 20 This reclamation has helped to extend understandings of the Uprising - not only in the definition of the event itself, but also in what constitutes legitimate and acceptable sources of information.

Despite the multiplicity of experiences and fragmented narratives of Kwangju/South Cholla citizens about the Uprising, which are impossible to recount adequately here, it is fair to say that in the past a broad consensus existed amongst the
people of the city and region as to the meaning and significance of the Uprising. In essence, Kwangju/South Cholla people came to share the view that the Uprising was the cornerstone and founding event leading to the realisation of democracy in Korea. The May 18 History Compilation Committee encapsulates this position:

The Kwangju Uprising should not he considered the painful, frustrated chapter of an age, but should he placed in the modem history of this country as the starting point of democratisation. The Kwangju Democratic Uprising should go down in national history and national consciousness as an inspiring stand for human freedom and dignity.

With the inception of the Kim Young Sam government in 1993, there thus appeared a growing degree of convergence between state and endogenous meanings and interpretations of the Uprising as the major event that sparked the transition to democracy in Korea. Thus, whilst the official and unofficial versions existed at almost opposite ends of the spectrum in the immediate post-Uprising period, more recently, with the installation of civilian governments in the 1990s, these two different interpretations have moved more closely into line. In short, the passage of time has produced a degree of alignment in historic interpretations and a level of consensus about the Uprising that did not previously exist. This consensus has in large part derived from the re-interpretation of events by the Korean government (official versions) which fell increasingly more into line with the understanding of the Uprising held by the citizens of Kwangju/South Cholla themselves. The May 18 History Compilation Committee confirmed this increasing level of satisfaction with the government's position on the Uprising with the following statement:

In 1993 on May 13, with the start of the civilian government, President Kim Young Sam made clear his position on the Kwangju Democratic Uprising in his speech, '... the bloodshed of Kwangju in May 1980 has become the cornerstone of the country's democracy. Its victims dedicated their lives to democracy ... this government stands today in line with the Kwangju Democratisation Movement'. In this announcement, he did justice to the Kwangju Democratic Uprising.

In seeking to rectify the wrongs committed against the people of Kwangju/South Cholla, Kim Young Sam's administration thus also gained a certain degree of approval of the people of the region. It appeared that the rightful role of the Uprising in South Korea’s postcolonial political history was finally being recognised through official government sanction.

3. The ‘Memorial Industry’ and the Making of 5.18 Memorial Sites
The Seventh Republic of Kim Young Sam instituted three symbolic gestures, which together constitute the Korean government’s official apology to the citizens of Kwangju/South Cholla for the Uprising, and the rectification of the Uprising’s meaning and significance as a national movement heralding the realisation of democracy in Korea. These three gestures include the designation of a National Commemoration Day on 18 May (including a Memorial Ceremony) beginning in 1997, the establishment of a Kwangju Uprising Special Law (which specifically
allowed for the exoneration of some Kwangju Uprising leaders), and the (re)construction of a number of important sites that figured in the Uprising as memorials. Together, these three gestures comprise what many people in Kwangju/South Cholla are calling the "ginyom saop", or “memorial industry”. In addition, the 5.18 Foundation [5.18 Kinyom Jaedan] was formed in 1994 and many of the May Movement organisations that had been struggling to realise compensation claims and achieve official recognition and apology for the Uprising merged together in 1998 to join the Foundation.

The plans for memorialisation of the Kwangju Uprising, including the building of the new Mangwol-dong Cemetery, were laid out in two documents, one pertaining to Kwangju (1995), and one to South Cholla province (1996), including the towns/counties of Naju, Hamp’yon, Ch’angsong, Muan, Yongam, Kangjin, Haenam and Mokp’o. The documents were published by the Regional Development Institute of Chonnam National University [Chiyok Gaepal Yonguso], and were titled 5.18 Ginyom Saop Chonghap Kyehuik [The Memorialisation of the Kwangju Uprising]. The three major sites selected for memorialisation are Mangwol-dong Cemetery, which became designated as a National Cemetery in 1994; Toch’ung (the Provincial Hall, or South Cholla Provincial Capital Building) which was the site of the last stand of the Kwangju Citizens Army on May 27, before the city was forcibly retaken by the Korean Army; and Sangmudae, the Martial Law Branch Quarters for North and South Cholla provinces. The guardhouse at Sangmudae was used for the detention, beating and torture of those citizens arrested during the course of the Uprising, while the Courtroom served as a venue for military trials of members of the Kwangju Citizens Army. In the buildings attached to Sangmudae, including the Military Police Base, arrestees were tortured whilst being questioned. Toch’ung was the “central symbolic location” of the Uprising and the site of what became the “briefing room” of the citizens’ resistance leadership and headquarters of the civilian army.

Unlike the other two sites, Mangwol-dong has, through its relocation, already been reconstructed within the new context of official reinterpretation of the Uprising. To this end the project of relocating Mangwol-dong began in 1994, and was completed in 1997. This involved exhuming the bodies of the victims, and the construction of a new cemetery in which the bodies were reburied. Thus, in 1994 the graves of the victims of the Uprising, numbering 137 altogether, were shifted from the original site of their burial in the original, that is Old, Mangwol-dong Cemetery, to a new location, ‘New’ Mangwol-dong Cemetery, just down the road some 2 kilometres away.

In addition to the grave sites themselves, New Mangwol-dong Cemetery contains several memorials that together work towards the reconstitution of the Uprising through collective representations in the cemetery. The memorials contained there work to establish an overarching theme of democracy-memory-history, including Democracy Gate [Minjuui Moon], Democracy Square [Minjuui KwangJang], Remembrance Gate [Ch’unyom Moon], Memorial Square [Ch’ambae KwangJang], The May 18 Democratisation Movement Memorial Tower [5.18 Minjung HangJaeng Chumotapl], the Cemetery, Photographic Memorial House [Yboyong Bong Anso], History Gate [Yoksau Moon], History Place [Yoksakonggan], The Seven Bas-Relief Sculptures Site [Puchopik 7 kaemadang], Memorial Pavilion [Soongmoroo] and the Garden for Democracy [Minju Ttongsan]. In addition, there are numerous other 18 May historical sites, which have been laid out in the official Kwangju city government’s guide to the important sites of the Uprising.
The decision to relocate Mangwol-dong Cemetery was thus not one taken by the residents of Kwangju, or more specifically, by the families of the victims of the Kwangju Uprising themselves, even though some memorial groups in Kwangju/South Cholla were consulted in the process. Rather, the relocation of Mangwol-dong was the outcome of President Kim Young Sam’s desire to “heal the wounds of the Uprising” and the cleavage that it drove between the people of the southwestern Cholla region and the rest of Korea. The act of relocation was thus linked to the Kim Young Sam administration’s more general political objective of overcoming regionalism in Korea, which Kim himself identified as one of the most divisive and destructive socio-political factors retarding the development of the nation. Hence, the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery is at once the embodiment of the Korean government’s official apology for the suffering it caused the people of Kwangju, an appeal to the people of Cholla to place national unity before regional separatism and, perhaps most importantly, an attempt by the Kim administration to align itself with populist/democratic impulses in the country.

The government’s attempts to be identified with a broad-based democratic alliance in Korea is blatantly articulated in several of the textual markers of the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery itself. In the Photo Exhibition Hall, for example, a government-authored narrative of the Uprising appears written on seven large boards (in both Korean and English). These appear at various points as one wanders through the Hall perusing the photographs of riot police and paratroopers beating citizens, makeshift coffins draped with Korean flags containing the corpses of protesters, and screaming children and horrifically disfigured bodies. The first board one encounters headed, ‘Failed Dream of Democratisation’, thus reads,

The massacre was a brutal, premeditated military crackdown, the climax of a coup by forces of the so-called new military power ... On May 17... intense discussions at the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters took place. It was decided to extend the emergency martial law over the entire country. As the Martial Law Decree No. 10 was put into effect, the National Assembly was dismissed, political actions were prohibited, dissident politicians were brought into custody, and universities were closed. Units of paratroopers were dispatched to large cities and major universities all over the country. In this way, in the Spring of 1980, the young shoots of democratisation were trampled.

The description of the Uprising as “a massacre” and “brutal”, and the recognition of Chun Doo Hwan’s accession to power in Korea as “a coup” all represent a startling departure from previous official narratives of the Uprising. Similarly, the second board, ‘Operation: “Brilliant Leave”’, describes the killing of citizens as “murder”, and alludes to the fallacy of the old name given to the uprising as “the Kwangju Incident”, as well as refuting the official claim by previous governments that the suppression of the Uprising was “necessary for political and economic stability”:

The entire series of murders by the Martial Law forces was called the ‘Kwangju Incident’ for 18 years. Politicians and military men denounced the May 18 Democratic Uprising and claimed its suppression was necessary for political and economic stability.

Finally, on the fifth board labelled, ‘Kwangju - A Community Breaks the Bonds of Death, appears an excerpt from a speech made during the third pro-democracy Pan-
National rally held on 25 May 1980, just before the tragic end to the Uprising. This also signifies an important change in the government’s view of whose testimony and interpretation of events are considered as legitimate sources of information, as well as condoning the citizen’s resistance in the face of harsh police and military aggression:

“Why did we have to arm ourselves? The answer was very simple. We couldn’t stand the cruel brutality. That was why we armed ourselves. Alas! That was an unspeakable tragedy that nobody expected to happen. Our brothers and sisters were stabbed with bayonets. They were run over and killed. Even the breasts of our younger sisters were cut out. We couldn’t stand the brutality any more. We armed ourselves to protect our city and our family. Who were the rioters, the Special Forces, or the civilian army acting in self-defence? The civilian army will protect our security, at any cost. And if the negotiation progresses favourably, the citizens army is willing to disarm immediately.”

The scripting of narratives like these in the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery is one means by which the government of Kim Young Sam attempted to situate itself firmly within the trope of democratic politics, promote itself as the first truly democratic government in the hard-fought struggle for political liberalisation in Korea, and simultaneously distance itself from the authoritarian regimes of the previous three decades. The Kwangju Uprising was invoked extensively by the Kim government in this regard.

Thus, the insertion of state resources into the process of Kwangju Uprising memorialisation signified a change in the official (government) stance towards the event. Under previous Republics, the Uprising had been defined as a rebellion and a communist-inspired insurgency; memorial activities and popular commemoration of the event were illegal; and literature, photographs and other unofficial documentation of the event were contraband. Under the Kim government, however, the Uprising was re-named the Kwangju Democratic Uprising, (some) commemorative activities became officially condoned, and public access to and consumption of unofficial historical sources of the Uprising grew as the threat of arrest and reprimand waned. Although on the one hand these gestures proved conducive to healing the wounds of the Uprising in the eyes of some people in South Cholla, on the other hand they went some way towards both undermining and subverting the significance of the Uprising in ongoing democratic/populist struggles in Korea.

In this sense the official memorialisation of the Uprising unleashed a profound paradox in which the very act of official recognition failed to accommodate these populist claims. This emerging tension can only be understood through an appreciation of populist conceptions (and purposes) of historical memory in Korea. We turn now briefly to examine this populist historiography.

4. Populist Historiography and the Meaning of Kwangju Uprising

In the post-colonial period in South Korea, a cultural and political movement has emerged which is referred to in Korean language simply as the minjung undong, or populist movement, embracing various actors - both individuals and organisations - including in South Cholla, for example, social movement groups such as the Kwangju Future Society, Kwangju Citizens Solidarity and YMCA. Elsewhere I have suggested that minjung dissent is enacted through certain quotidian practices that
engage with Korean history and popular culture. I wish here to outline briefly the main contours of minjung engagements with history, which helps illuminate the reasons why social movements and civil society groups in South Cholla, such as the ones mentioned above, are so strongly incensed by the construction of the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery.

From the Tonghak [Eastern Learning] Rebellion of 1894, a peasant-led popular uprising, down to the Kwangju Uprising, the history of the Korean nation has been marked by violent confrontations between the state and forces representing a repressed and marginalised public. A large element in the practices of minjung dissent is thus devoted to the refashioning of these narratives of historical struggle in a way that posits the minjung as the central agent of historical change and progress. Official historical narratives on liberation, partition and economic modernity are subject to radical revision in which minjung forces appear as the central agents in history. Moreover, historical episodes of dissent and populist protest are assigned a currency in later struggles such that dissident figures contain and express this connectedness to (and through) history, so legitimising their central role in present struggles.

Much of this refashioning of history has been galvanised as a literary project resulting in a distinct genre of literature known as minjung munhak [populist literature]. In minjung literature, the Tonghak Movement and Rebellion in particular appear as major locators of minjung dissent. The Tonghak Rebellion was initiated by relations of domination, class division, and subsequent exploitation and inequality that became entrenched in Korean society in the late nineteenth century. In this literary politics, minjung narratives and commentaries posit populist forces as playing a central role in shaping Korea’s historical trajectory. This analogous and genealogical relation to the past enables the minjung to create what Abelmann (1995) describes as “lineages of dissent”, or what Jager calls “redemptive histories” (1996). Thus, “engaging in a literary politics that creates alternative imaginings of the past confers a sense of agency to the minjung that legitimises and motivates protest in the present moment of (post)coloniality. Historic protests, personages, deeds and sites figure as central tropes that animate and motivate minjung dissent”.

The Kwangju Uprising, like the Tonghak Rebellion, is one of the central events invoked in this minjung historiography, and the old Mangwol-dong Cemetery is (was?) one of the central sites where minjung narratives have become manifest geographically. The literary engagement with the Uprising has been prolific. In poetic endeavours by minjung writers, Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery, Toch’ung and Kumnam-ro are mentioned as important sites of popular struggle. Two of Choi Ha Lim’s poems devoted to the Kwangju Uprising, ‘The Sixth Republic’ and ‘Today, We Too’, include specific references to Mangwol-dong Cemetery. In ‘Today, We Too’, Mangwol-dong is located at the very of South Cholla, referred to in the poems as the “light province”.

We were the hope and we were the scream
We were warriors and we were apostles
We were blood and we were corpses
We were a light province and a light province’s Mangwol-dong and
We were a platanus and the bricks of Kumnam-ro, where the leave of the platanus flourish/grow

When darkness visits after sunset, over a barricade one, two gather
Bloody red, red lips lips kiss, joy
of kisses

The dream of the people who couldn’t help dying revives
We were a large ground and a chorus .... Kwangju.

In short, in the eyes of some of the radical civil movement groups and non-governmental organisations in Kwangju and South Cholla, the Uprising is to be defined within the trope of the ongoing struggle for democracy, social justice and human rights in Korea. At a broader level these groups wish to represent Kwangju as the centre for democracy in the Asia-Pacific region and one of the central sites/cities for democratic struggle in the world. The currency of the Kwangju Uprising is realised through the ongoing May Movement [0-wol Undong], which has continued each year since the 1980 Uprising. As one commentator heavily involved in the May Movement in Kwangju suggests, “... the May Movement is the engine for democratic change of the political regimes in Korea and has been influential for the human rights movement in other Asian nations ... The significance of Kwangju grows more, not less, every day”. Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery is thus promoted as the central symbolic location for democratic struggle in Korea.

Apart from Old Mangwol-dong’s literary construction as a symbolic place for democratic struggle, the cemetery also acts as site for activist politics. On 18 May every year, for example, as part of the commemorative activities for the Uprising, people march to the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery and have, until recently, met with a hostile reception from military police who surrounded the cemetery. Until 1988 when (some) commemoration activities were allowed and the memorialisation process achieved ‘semi-legal’ status, “... commemoration ceremonies ... were in and of themselves, a struggle as well”. Hence visitors to the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery were and are mainly people involved in the pro-democracy, human rights and social justice movements, both in Korea and internationally. The ‘Campaign for the Memorial Cairn to the Spirit of the Kwangju Uprising’, constructed near the entrance of the Old Mangwol-dong by the Kwangju Citizens Solidarity, is one means by which an activist inscription of the Uprising is invoked through place. The sign in front of the Memorial Cairn (emphasis added) thus reads:

When May comes with the bitter cry of cuckoos, countless pilgrims visit Mangwol-dong, an emblem of democracy. These people visit the graveyard to console and honour the holy spirits that passed away during the May 18 1980 cry for freedom, democracy, and peace. To placate the spirits of the innocent victims and to perpetuate the spirit of the movement, we build small towers by piling up the stones that pilgrims bring to Mangwol-dong from all over the country.

Offering a stone, we pray for the souls of the departed who sacrificed themselves for democracy in our country. Adding a stone to a tower, we pray for the day when true democracy will end the victims' cycle of severe demonstrations and tear gas. Piling hundreds and thousands of stones together, we assure that we will never overlook any machinations that would make the holy deaths of the martyrs fruitless ...
The currency of the Uprising contained in the spirit of the May Movement is also expressed in a second metal sign visible at the entrance of the Old Mangwol-dong, introducing the cemetery. Part of this sign reads,

The spirit of the May 18th Democratic Movement dwells in this cemetery; the spirits of those who died make it sacred. Those who survived, and who now enjoy the benefits of democracy, can come to pray and pay their respects to those who sacrificed.

Thus, the role of the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery is clearly expressed as a place where the spirit of the movement is to be felt, experienced and renewed. The Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery, in sum, is much more than a place for memory and mourning; it is also a place for social activism and democratic struggle.

The completion of New Mangwol-dong Cemetery thus prompted intensely critical and passionately scathing remarks, especially when viewed in comparison to the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery. According to Choi Hyup of Chonnam National University in Kwangju, the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery “has no meaning for us.” These sentiments were echoed by Park Jae-Man, a social activist working for the Kwangju Citizens Solidarity, who, contrasting his feelings when visiting the old and new Mangwol-dong cemeteries, made the comment that, “I feel nothing when I'm in the new cemetery”, but “here I can reflect on the meaning of the Uprising and it gives me hope for our future. I feel sad, but mostly I feel like I belong to this place.” Bell refers to this sense of being in and creating meaning from a place as “the language of ghosts”, which gives us “a way to speak generally about the specificity and meaning of a place”. Thus, for Bell, “... the ghosts of place are always presences and as such appear to us as spirits of temporal transcendence, of connection between the past and the future”. This connection is at the core of minjung practices of resistance and helps keep places alive in the face of their resignation to historical memory by statist forces.

5. Mangwol-dong Cemetery(ies) and the Politics of Memorial Sites

In the winter of 1993, a few months after the official memorialisation plans for the Uprising were publicly announced, a new, radical NGO, calling itself Kwangju Citizens’ Solidarity (KCS), was formed. Whilst this NGO currently focuses its activities on human rights issues in Asia, it was originally set up by 13 citizens’ groups in Kwangju/South Cholla as a focal point for opposition to the establishment of the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery. According to one researcher from KCS, when the government made the memorialisation plans there was a lack of public input into the process and no space for public discussion was created. The undemocratic nature of the process prompted the organisations that originally formed KCS to meet and develop an alternative plan for the memorialisation of the Uprising. In the lengthy discussions regarding the memorialisation process that took place amongst these organisations in early 1994, they agreed that the most important goal of memorialisation should be to preserve the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery as the symbol of democratic struggle in Korea. Subsequently they opposed the construction of New Mangwol-dong and its hegemonic rendering of the Uprising as primarily an event to be firmly placed in Korea’s postcolonial history in official nationalist-statist discourse.
How has the rendering of the Uprising in the two Mangwol-dong cemeteries through memorial sites and signs engendered such intense conflicts and debates over the activism versus historicism of the Uprising? Which specific memorials embody (and exclude) these specific meanings about the Uprising? Which sites are open to particular scrutiny, and why? The answers to these questions, in the first instance, can be drawn from the politics of minjung dissent which, as we have seen above, invokes historical continuity of populist struggles, personages and places as a means of igniting current dissident political practices and democratic/human rights struggles in Korea. In short, the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery effectively emasculates activist minjung historiography, promoting instead a reading of the Uprising, which firmly contains the event in the shackles of government-sanctioned Korean national history.

The textual marker contained in the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery that most blatantly historicises the Uprising is an outdoor sculpture park depicting ‘A History of Struggle in Bas-Relief’. This history of struggle is represented through seven bas-relief sculptures, each representing a particular ‘patriotic’ or ‘democratic’ struggle in Korea’s history. The sculptures are represented in chronological order, beginning with what is referred to as the ‘Patriotic Citizens Militia during the Japanese invasion of 1592, and ending with the Kwangju Uprising. Other struggles represented in park include, in chronological order, the Tonghak Farmers Uprising in 1894, the March 1 Independence Movement in 1919, the Kwangju Students’ Independence Movement and the April 19 Revolution (see Photograph 1). Each of these struggles were nationalist or populist and, often, anti-government. For this reason these struggles have become central to Korea’s minjung movement. In the Official Guide to 5.18 Memorial Sites, the historicisation of these struggles is confirmed in the statement that all of them, “… manifest the significance of the Kwangju Uprising in our history”.

There is also a marked contrast in the grave sites in the two cemeteries. In Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery the grave sites are replete with marks of identity of the victims, placed by friends, relatives and comrades in the Uprising. Small placards, containing epitaphs written by the family and friends, are situated next to each grave devoted to the memory of the person buried there (see Photograph 2). A small glass box containing markers of identity (a packet of cigarettes, drawings, photographs, school books and so on) sits on the other side of the grave.

Photograph 1. Bas-relief of the April 19 Revolution
One may wander between the graves with a growing sense of each victim’s role in the Uprising (often the placard contains details about how the person died), and fragments of their personal identity expressed through objects carefully chosen and placed in the glass box by friends and relatives. In the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery, the graves, which contrast starkly with the old ones, are a typical example of what Werbner describes as “the postcolonial [post World War Two] form of the modern memorial complex”.49 It is worth quoting Werbner's description of this complex,50 which he uses to locate Zimbabwe’s ‘Heroes Acre’ Cemetery, since it so closely resembles the government’s approach to the construction of the memorial landscape of the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery:

The state no longer tolerated that unsacralised oblivion for the dead, which left common soldiers anonymous ... and, worse still, beyond the pale of the commemorated nation. Instead, their names, their dates of birth and death, their bodies and last resting places all became the object of elaborate state remembrance, equally for all, on an unprecedented scale. This standardised practice, so distinctively the modern democracy of death, appeared most strikingly in the making for the first time of mass ... cemeteries with row after row of uniform graves on standardised plots for individuals.

In New Mangwol-dong Cemetery, this “modern democracy of death” through standardised grave sites for the victims of the Uprising, exhumed and removed from Old Mangwol-dong, in the officially tided ‘Project for the Consecration of the May 18 Cemetery’, serves to preserve and nationalise the individual victims but, at the same time, erases the etches of identity that marked the old grave sites.
There are no glass boxes, no memorial placards or epitaphs (see Photograph 3), and the photographs of the victims are displayed together at some distance from the actual graves in an eerily silent and darkly lit ‘Photographic Memorial House’ (see Photograph 4) that one can gaze at from behind a rope.

The preservation of the memory of the victims through the grave sites in New Mangwol-dong Cemetery thus differs markedly from that in the old cemetery. The lack of input by families and friends into the (re)construction of the graves echoes through the uniform sites scripted by the (indifferent) postcolonial state. Further compounding the namelessness of the victims buried in the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery are two statues depicting male members of the Kwangju citizens army brandishing weapons and flags (see Photograph 5). These statues grace either side of the towering concrete structure that has been labelled the Memorial Tower for the May 18 Uprising. The figures depicted on the two statues do not represent actual citizens involved in the Uprising and, like the graves themselves, do not bear the inscription of local memory.

Finally, the inscription of the wider landscape in the old and new cemeteries also differs markedly. In the old cemetery, banners placed by NGOs and social movement groups in Korea are tied to trees bearing slogans pledging solidarity with the May Movement and the May Spirit (see Photograph 6). No such banners can be seen in New Mangwol-dong, where the wider landscape of the cemetery is dotted with elaborately overarching monuments and statues which we might refer to as the ‘concretisation’ of the Uprising or, to borrow Charlesworth’s phrase, the Uprising has been “cast in stone”. 52 The Memorial Tower for the May 18 Uprising, for example,
is located at the centre of the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery, and leads to the apex where the grave sites themselves are situated (see Photograph 7). The two supporting pillars in the shape of embracing hands are supposed to represent “the desire that the May 18 spirit may proliferate and gather us all together as one throughout the world”. The egg-shaped cluster in the middle of the tower thus depicts a cluster of (nameless) people “symbolising the renewal of life”.

Questions about who the New Mangwol-dong is actually for also form an important point of contention in the memorialisation process. Apart from the May Movement groups who chose to join the 5.18 Foundation in 1998, there is a general feeling of dissatisfaction amongst people in Kwangju and South Cholla as to the way the Uprising has been memorialised through Mangwol-dong Cemetery. This feeling is bolstered by the perception that the New Mangwol-dong has not been constructed for the citizens of the city/province.

Certainly it is difficult to argue against this view since the vast majority of visitors to the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery are people from outside South Cholla, many of them international visitors, and the vast majority tourists. For them the new cemetery represents a means by which to learn about a previously unrecognised event in Korean history and/or to participate in a heritage tourism experience. The new cemetery and the promotional discourses, which surround it certainly entertain this purpose: a souvenir shop strategically located immediately outside the main entrance to the New Mangwol-dong, and several vending machines situated next to the shop, firmly root the new cemetery in commodified landscapes of the late twentieth century heritage industry.
Photograph 5. Representation (male) of Kwangju Citizens Army

Photograph 6. Banners and Slogans in Old Mangwol-dong
Whilst a general feeling of dissatisfaction with the new cemetery can be easily detected in Kwangju and the surrounding counties of South Cholla, for some other groups in the region the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery holds a vastly different meaning. The official Kwangju Uprising memorial groups, including the Bereaved Families Association [Yoochokkye], the Injured Persons Association [Pusangcha] and the Comrades Association [Kusokchahui], hold a much less celebratory view of the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery. These groups tend to view the central task in the memorialisation of the Uprising as the representation and celebration of the heroic deeds of those citizens who gave their lives in the struggle. In short, it is their view that the central role of the victims and comrades should be given precedence in memorialisation efforts.

Their opinion of the Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery is thus easy to gauge: the old cemetery does not do justice to the memory of the victims, since it remains obscured by increasingly dilapidated, albeit still carefully tended, grave sites, a site hidden from the main road which bypasses it, thus rendering it obscured to all but those who already know it is there, and few indicators of a visible state presence by way of memorial signs and monuments which, according to these groups, would act to acknowledge and so legitimise the legacy of the struggle and the victims' role in making the ultimate sacrifice of their lives to realise democracy in South Korea. The New Mangwol-dong Cemetery, highly visible from at least a kilometre down the road, replete with a barrage of elaborate memorial structures and immaculately kept graves situated at its apex, apparently redresses this lack of formal recognition and acts to instil a sense of pride and dignity to these memorial groups.

In sum, the construction of the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery has generated intense disapproval amongst some of the pro-democracy and civil movement groups
in Kwangju and South Cholla, as well as a large proportion of the general public in the region. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, the profound currency which these groups ascribe to the Uprising is undermined through an officially sanctioned process of Kwangju Uprising historicisation through memorialisation in the new cemetery. The textual markers (memorials) there render the Uprising an episode in the Korean history of democratic and nationalist struggles, such that the history of democratic struggle is represented as firmly embedded in the past. Second, the new cemetery removes the responsibility for the authorship of Kwangju Uprising memorial sites from local people and firmly locates it within the heritage and memorial apparatus of the Korean state. In appropriating Kwangju Uprising memorial sites, the Kim government effectively staged a strategic coup in the nation’s struggle for political liberalisation by presenting itself as the guardian of democracy. In the early twenty-first century, however, as Korea finds itself embroiled in an economic and financial crisis which is challenging the degree to which democracy is firmly consolidated in the country, one has to question, as no doubt those still struggling under the banners of social justice, democracy and human rights in Korea do, whether the marking of the Uprising as an historical event through its memorialisation is fitting.

6. Conclusion

Although the Kwangju Uprising took place over 20 years ago in May 1980, the event provokes as much heated debate now as it did then. The state-sponsored memorialisation of the Uprising through a number of memorial sites has recently become a particularly sensitive focal point for this debate and has created new cleavages and perspectives. The ongoing reinterpretation and contestation of the Uprising through Mangwol-dong Cemetery(ies) was the subject of discussion in this paper, and in particular the implications of state-sponsored memorialisation processes for local inscriptions of the event. In much recent writing on postcolonial spaces, the constitution of power relations of domination-subordination through discursive and textual representations is proving a subject of much import. The important questions are who authors the geographical texts that make sacred/memorial places and why that is so central to the process of memorialisation of sites in Kwangju at present. The appropriation of Mangwol-dong Cemetery as a memorial site by the Korean state in the mid-1990s has recently drawn the cemetery into the domain of official, sanctioned versions of the Uprising. In this process a narrative of the Uprising, which sees the event as central in forging the nation’s hard-fought struggle for democracy is rapidly becoming canonised. This official reinterpretation of the event has provided the opportunity for citizens’ groups in Kwangju to reclaim the Uprising and debate its meaning. Since the memorial plans were announced in 1994, the more radical of the pro-democratic civil movement groups based in Kwangju have repeatedly articulated the view that the Uprising is a central event in democratic struggle in Korea, and that it should continue to inform the quotidian practices of minjung dissent. The Old Mangwol-dong Cemetery enabled this ongoing connection between history, memory and resistance/dissent to be realised.

However, whilst Old Mangwol-dong acted as a site in which this role could be easily fulfilled - through visits to the cemetery by local democratic movement figures, its figurative location in minjung literature and pilgrimages to the cemetery by a wider community of social activists - the new cemetery appears to have been established for an entirely different purpose and audience. Hence, the insertion of state resources into
Kwangju Uprising memorialisation has created rather than resolved conflicts over the meaning and significance of the event through its effective muting of the voice of Korea’s *minjung* movement. For others, particularly the relatives of the victims of the Uprising, the new cemetery is seen as a means by which to restore the memory of the victims and do justice to their deaths, so that amongst some people in Kwangju and South Cholla, at least, the state’s memorialisation efforts have met with approval.

Mangwol-dong thus represents not only an arena in which this conflict is being played out but also signifies an intensification and extension of the conflict itself. Hence, sites of memory can come to act not only as spaces for representation and reinscription of political events, such as uprisings, rebellions and anti-colonial/liberation movements, but also as sites of contention in and of themselves. The cemeteries of Mangwol-dong have thus produced dissonant and increasingly polarised positions that I would describe as mourning versus martyrs and historicism versus activism. As other symbolic locations of the Kwangju Uprising are slowly being rendered as national heritage sites, it is likely that these real spaces of postcolonial conflict will only intensify.

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1 Hereafter Korea, unless otherwise contrasted with the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK), or North Korea.

2 Throughout this paper I have chosen to use the name ‘5.18 Kwangju Democratic Uprising’, which is the official title given to the event by the May 18 History Compilation Committee of Kwangju City, and will simply use ‘5.18’, 'Kwangju Uprising' or 'Uprising' for short.

3 The Uprising continues to be the subject of interpretation variously by Korean historians, (various) Korean governments, the poetic and literary endeavours of prominent populist [*minjung*] figures, the narrations contained in the unofficial histories, and eye-witness accounts and memoirs emerging from those citizens of the province who directly participated in or witnessed the Uprising itself. Even the naming of the Uprising triggers heated debate. Offhand I can think of at least five names attached to the Uprising: 5.18 (or o-il-pal, signifying the date on which the Uprising began), the Kwan & Massacre, the Kwan& Democratic Movement, the Kwan & Affair and the Kwangju Incident - each containing a distinct meaning and, often, one which avowedly contests or subverts another.

4 Political liberalisation has, according to some measures, increased in the 1990s. See Doh C. Shin (1999) *Mass Politics and Culture in Democratising Korea*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nonetheless, certain elements of authoritarianism persist in this new political environment, such as arbitrary arrests of labour and other dissident leaders. This situation has worsened considerably with the deterioration of national economic competitiveness in Korea in early 1998.


8 Jane Jacobs (1996) *Edge of Empire.. Postcolonialism and the City*, London: Routledge, p. X.

This clarification of the history of the Uprising is in large part due to the establishment of the 'truth committee to investigate the Uprising and clarify its history, itself linked to the compensation for families/victims.


Ibid.


Lee, 1997, op. cit

The May 18 History Compilation Committee (no date) *The May 18 Kwangju Democratic Uprising*, Kwangju, p. 61.

In addition to the 137 graves for victims of the Uprising, another 30 graves have been added for those who died in post-Uprising democratic movements in Korea. All 167 graves were moved to the New Mangwol-dong and since 1997 an additional 113 have been added, bringing the total number of graves to 250. Participants in the Uprising who survived will eventually be buried in the new cemetery along with other dissident figures deemed to have struggled in later movements inspired by the spirit of the Uprising after the May 18 incident" (A Guide to May 18 Historical Sites).

The May 18 History Compilation Committee, no date, op. cit., p. 62.

The sources of information on the Kwangju Uprising can be broadly divided into three: unofficial histories and biographies; official recorded histories from within Kwangju-Cholla; and official histories from the central government. Examples of each of these three sources follow. Hwangju Suk-yong, *Over Death, Over the Darkness of the Age [Ch’uk Eul Nom 0 Sitae ui Thum Ui! Nomol] Uae-Ui Lee is real author/ South Cholla Youth Association - Chonchonggryun*, published first in 1985, but copies immediately seized by the government, legally published in 1987, but achieved status as an underground bestseller before this; Jae-Ui Lee was a junior in college in May 1980 and personally witnessed many of the events recounted in the book - he had friends who died in the Uprising; today, Lee is a journalist with the *Kwangnam Ilbo*. The book is a complete reconstruction of the Uprising (intricate detail, incl. maps etc.) and includes narratives and anecdotes by those involved. Other such accounts include Im CWul U (1998) *Pom Nal* [Spring Day]; Comrades Association of the
May 18 Kwangju Democratic Uprising (1990) *Pusan-Masan eso, Kwangju kachi* [from Pusan-Masan to Kwangju]. Official histories from Kwangju include: The May 18 History Compilation Committee of Kwangju City (1994) *The May*


23 The KYS government's symbolic gesture of 'reconciliation' through the relocation of Mangwol-dong was accompanied by others as well. Most notably was the bringing to trial of former Presidents Rho Tae Woo and Chun Doo Hwan for their respective roles in the suppression of the Kwangju Uprising, amongst other charges. Convicted, the two political figures were nonetheless released soon thereafter. The feeling within Kwangju was that this gesture was hollow for two reasons: it came too late since both men had already lost any political influence and power they once held in Korean politics and the military; and the arrest, trial and conviction were linked not so much with retribution for the uprising, but rather to KYS's assertion of power within the Blue House (Parliamentary House).

24 Mokp'o was particularly prominent during the protests, since it is Kim Dae jung’s hometown, and thus citizens were particularly vocal in protesting Kids arrest immediately prior to the Uprising in 1980.

25 Monuments, cemeteries and memorial events have recently come to be recognised and discussed as sites for the construction of national identity and places in which a popular national imaginary can be forged. Johnson, for example, discusses the role which public monuments play in collective, popular participation in the politics and public life of towns, cities and states (see Nuala Johnson [1995] 'Cast in stone: monuments, geography and nationalis, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 13, pp. 51-66).

26 The Guardhouse of Sangmudae was a brick building that was suitable to detain only about 30 prisoners. During the Kwangju Uprising, however, it held over 150 arrestees at a time. These people were forced to share meals sufficient for only 30 people.

27 Toch’ung and Sanginudae are still in the process of (re)construction as memorial sites, and Sangmudae in particular is undergoing dramatic physical transformation as the old courtroom and guardhouse are being demolished and a new 5.18 theme park, called the May 18 Memorial Park and Theme Park, which is currently under construction, established in its place. According to the plans for memorialisation of this site, "The theme park will recreate the situation from those dark days and the Memorial Park will carry on and uplift the spirit of the May 18 Democratic Movement" *(Guide to Historical Sites of the 5.18 Kwangju Uprising)*. Toch’ung, while undergoing little in the way of physical transformation, is being renamed Memorial Hall and the City Square renamed the May 18 Memorial Square. Both the Square and Provincial Capital Building are to be designated as National Heritage Sites.

28 Other 5.18 Historical sites include: the Provincial Hall Square, in front of Toch’ung, which has been renamed The May 18 Democracy Square (and was the site of large citizen and student rallies for national democracy in May 1980, and in the post-1980 period); Sangmuugwan Building, located in front of the Provincial Hall, where the victims of the Uprising were temporarily laid; Kumnarn Street, which was the main road in downtown Kwangju in 1980 and the scene of the bloodiest and most intense fighting between Martial Law Forces and the Kwangju citizens' army (on 21 May 1980 [also referred to as "Bloody Wednesday"], the Martial Law Forces fired on thousands of citizens who gathered in the Street, killing at least 50 people and injuring over 500 more); the Former Kwangju MBC Building, which was set on fire by Kwangju citizens during the Uprising for reporting
distorted news about the struggle; the Former Kwangju YMCA Building, where important leaflets were printed denouncing the "brutality of the cruel suppression by Martial Law Forces at the beginning of the struggle" (the Former YMCA was located at the very beginning of Kuninam Street); the Main Gate of Chonnam National University, Kwangju, where the first dash between Martial Law Forces and students took place at 10 am on 18 May 1980; Kwangju Railway Station, which was also a major site of military brutality and civilian resistance on 20 May, during which at least 10 citizens died; Junam Village, where the military fired on a bus-load of 18 citizens and students on 23 May, killing 15 of the passengers; and Kwangju Prison, where arrested citizens were detained and where it is suspected that many victims were temporarily buried. These sites have been marked in the official Guide to May 18 Historical Sites. Represented on a map which is marked as a 'course', one can choose to follow either of two marked trails which pass the memorial sites, both of which conclude at the New Mangwol-dong Cemetery. See Kwangju City Government (no date) A Guide to May 18 Historical Sites, Kwangju.

29 Those citizens' groups consulted were the ones that joined the 5.18 Foundation in 1997, see below for details of this merger
30 The 'sub-tides' on the seven boards are: 'The Failed Dream of Democratization, Operation "Brilliant Leave", 'The Worst of Deception, 'A Planned Massacre of Unarmed Students and Workers', 'Kwangju - A Community Breaks the Bonds of Death 'A Day Always to Remember' and 'Bloody Lamentation Wandering Around May 18 Cemetery'.

31 See Kenneth M. Wells (ed.) (1995) South Korea@ Minjung Movement.. The Culture and Politics of Dissidence, Manoa: University of Hawai'i Press, for a discussion of the dimensions of minjung dissent.

32 Sallie Yea (1999b) 'The culture and politics of resistance in South Korea, Futures. 31 (2), pp. 221-34.


35 Yea, 1999b, op. cit., p. 229, emphasis added.

36 See, for example, Hwang Suk-Young (1985) Over Death, Over the Darkness of the Age, Seoul: Tosuchi’ulp’an (in Korean). In this commentary on the Uprising, for example, Hwang has managed to capture the genealogy of the participants in the Uprising when he writes: After October 26, the strong hope for democratization in the country reached a far greater level in Kwangju than in the other regions; and one can point to several reasons for this. First, from the Tonghak farmed rebellions through the Righteous Armies (of the nineteenth century) through the Kwangju Student Rebellion (of 1929) and other events, there had come into existence a family-like tradition of outstanding pride and self-awareness regarding the democratization movement. Among the proponents of democracy who were then out of power, there were many who had taken leading roles in the Kwangju Student Movement. Members of the younger generation, through the recollections of their families or grandfathers or great grandfathers who had been members of the Tonghak, or Righteous Armies, carried in
their blood the living vestiges of modern history. Thus in a single family might be found the personification of a full hundred years of modern Korean history.


38 According to the *Guide to Historical Sites of the Kwangju Uprising*, for example, Kwangju has long been known as a city of patriotism and justice. Whenever the nation has been in peril, Kwangju's people have courageously risen and taken the lead in defending our national sovereignty. Due to our people's commitment to end injustice, the tradition of patriotism and justice has continued to the present. The May 18 Kwangju Uprising, which happened in 1980, is based on this historical tradition of spirited resistance against injustice. The people of Kwangju city now play a leading role in bringing democracy to our daily lives and take pride in having contributed greatly to protect and develop Korean democracy. Kwangju’s citizens are making every effort to throw off the shadow of isolation, underdevelopment, and depression in order to make a future full of prosperity and hope under the new motto: 'Vanguard of Democracy. Vibrant New City' (*A Guide to the May 18 Historical Sites*, Kwangju City Government, no date). Hence, embedded in 5.18 memorialisation efforts is the desire to overcome the marginal position of the Cholla region within the Korean nation state. Cholla has long been positioned as a region that is comparatively backward, dissident, radical and isolated. In the 1990s, grassroots, academic and local government organisations are all actively participating in the remapping of the symbolic geography of Cholla. This remapping has involved a subversion of the dominant radical imaginary that defines the region. This imaginary is reforged through an alignment with international democratic, human rights and social justice precepts.

This reimagining of Cholla through the lense of democratic politics has come to be expressed in a number of intertwining efforts. In particular, the grassroots democratic movement in Cholla is making a concerted appeal to international, especially Asian, non-governmental organisations. To this end various events and conferences have taken place in Kwangju, including the signing of the Asian Human Rights Charter in 1994. Through these various events Kwangju is locating itself as one of the major democratic sites/cities of the world. In 1996 a book was published in Kwangju titled, 'Kwangju as a place for international democracy' [*5.18 Kwangju Kinyom Sappeul Uihanj*].

39 According to Keun-Sik Jung (no date) 'On the historical significance of the May Movement, unpublished paper, p. 4, the five principles of the May Movement are: the inquiry into the truth, the punishment of the guilty, the exoneration of honour, the compensation of the victims and the memorial activities to inherit the spirit of the Kwangju Uprising.


42 Personal communication with Jung Keun-Sik, June 1998.

43 Personal communication with Park Jae-Man, November 1998.

44 M.M. Bell (1997) 'The ghosts of place', *Theory and Society*, 26, p. 815


46 The stated objectives of the KCS are four-fold: promotion of democracy in Korea, protection of human rights and environment, promotion of regional development, and solidarity among international and domestic NGOs.
Personal communication with Park Jae-Man, November 1998.

No date, emphasis added.


Of the 21 individuals included in the two statues, only one is a woman

Charlesworth, 1994, op. cit.

To compound the location of the Uprising in heritage tourism, the official Kwangju City guide to May 18 historical sites includes four pages of information at the back of the booklet on hotels, bus and train timetables, and suggested tours, including a South Cholla “cultural tour” and a Kwangju "city tour", thus further inserting the Uprisings memorialisation into a heritage tourism arena. Interestingly, such a promotional exercise acts to orient the Uprisings memorialisation to those from outside the region, thus connecting the event to other nationalised places in South Korea.

Much of the rhetoric surrounding the Kwangju Uprising memorial sites projects this notion of the state's guardianship of democracy. Contained in the Guide to May 18 Historical Sites, for example, is the following claim that, "This place will stand as a stern historical reminder that we must never allow injustice and tyranny to flourish on the land again".
The Roles of Non-Governmental Organizations in Environmental Policy-Making Processes and Protection Works: A Case Study of South Korea

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Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

1. Introduction: NGOs and Civil Society

A society can be divided into various zones such as the state, market, and civil society. The civil society sector comprises the residual zone outside the domain of the state and market, which is sometimes referred to a ‘third sector’ or ‘voluntary sector.’ It involves a wide range of self-governing private organizations in which citizens can exercise their own rights for the common good (Salamon 1994). Even though the three sectors are different at the conceptual level, the clear distinction cannot be easily done in reality due to overlap. For example, the state sector provides administrative assistance, information, financial support, and necessary legal frameworks for the civil society. The civil society sector implements the actual public services assisted by the state, but regulated by the market. The civil society sector performs the role of interest groups through direct intervention in policy-making process. Thus, the civil society sector becomes both a supplement and a replacement for government in diverse issues for the public purposes.

Civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emerged as key agents with the character of ‘governance without government’ for the public good. Until the early 1980s, NGOs remained peripheral on worldwide issues. However, beginning in the early 1980s, the expansion in the NGO sector and its growing involvement in diverse issues across the world were remarkable. Depending on one's definition, the number of INGOs today ranges from 5,000 to 40,000. Recently, the Yearbook of International Organizations contains entries on 29,495 organizations active in 289 countries and territories. It profiles 24,326 international non-governmental and 5,170 inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). Their growth in the twentieth has been remarkable. By the beginning of 1990s they outnumbered IGOs by a ratio of at least ten to one.

NGOs can be classified by their functions—operational, educational, and advocacy NGOs. Operational NGOs provide services such as welfare assistance, technical advice, and resource allocation for relief and development. Educational NGOs focus on increasing public awareness to hold states accountable to their national and international commitments, in addition to highlighting the need for better policy formation and decision-making. Advocacy NGOs aim at the goals of agenda setting, program design, and the overall supervision of organizational activities (Weiss & Gordenker 1996). The majority of NGOs have economic purposes. These are followed closely in number by NGOs pursuing health and science objectives. Some of the larger ones have become well known to the world’s citizenry. These NGOs usually have purposes which reflect mass-based interests: for example, environmental
such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, humanitarian such as Amnesty International and Oxfam, economic such as the Club of Rome, cultural such as the World Council of Churches and fraternal such as the International Boy Scouts. Regional NGOs outnumber global NGOs by a ratio of about three to one. The average NGOs have a budget of US $1 million and a staff of ten.

Traditionalists have a state-centric view of the political world and have little interest in NGOs. They were international lawyers, idealist thinkers of the interwar period, and 'realist' and 'neo-realist' commentators on international relations. International lawyers have given extensive consideration to particular institutions. The League of Nations attracted special attention as lawyers played an important role in its drafting and it was believed to be a apparatus of international cooperation and for world peace and security. The realists or the power politics school which is represented by Hans Morgenthau thought that functional international organizations were not given any particular role in solving the problem of peace. They gave no real consideration to NGOs. IGOs are seen just as instruments of policy for states and NGOs are hardly considered. In contrast, the 'whole world' approach places emphasis not on the discrete requirements of groups, states or individuals, but on the well-being of the ecosystem in which these function—the planet Earth. This world view of the problems of 'the spaceship Earth' begged for global solutions. Functionalists claim that the proliferation of NGOs represents a historical trend which will ultimately contribute to some kind of global political authority. According to this view, NGOs signify the internationalization of the private sphere of everyday life. Their connections with IGOs strengthen the 'supra-nationalization' of politics, the flow of power from national governments to an international one (Lee, C. 1999).

There are some comments on strategies for establishing the NGO movement. The most important strategy is to appeal to public opinion. In order to do it the NGO could organize discussion sessions such as seminars, public hearings, etc., where not only representatives of the related parties but also the civilians should participate. In addition it would be done by demonstrations and campaigns. A civil movement should be organized because it has to fight not with individuals but with organized groups. Since the opposition groups produce information and preserve them, NGO needs experts who can analyze the issues scientifically and find the good solutions. So NGO should be composed of two kinds of people, the action group and experts group, at least. With only one group civil movement might not success. They could be either volunteers or permanent workers. Modern civil movement can be said as an integration of experts academism and aggressive activism.

In South Korea, there has been a recent trend of public interest in the roles of civil society and NGOs as alternative institutions to the government. Despite its late start, NGOs have rapidly increased in size and significance since the 1987 democratic movement and made large strides in collaborative efforts to form and propagate diverse social and even global agendas on both national and international levels (Kim, H. 1999).

The purpose of this paper is first to present the theoretical framework of NGOs and Civil Society. Second is to investigate the current situations of NGOs in South Korea. Third is to analyze the current environmental NGOs of South Korea, to discuss their potential roles in the environmental policy-making process and protection works. This study will then provide a better understanding of what the NGOs in South Korea has done.
2. Current Situations of NGOs in South Korea

Many scholars argue that civil society in Korea did not begin to form until the late 1980s. Citizen movements, in particular, did not openly appear until the 1987 Democratic Movement that passed through the threshold of democratic transition in Korea, and resulted in the presidential election of Roh Tae-woo. Although state repression of civil society reappeared soon after Roh Tae Woo’s inauguration, citizens’ movement organizations emerged and rapidly expanded. Despite differences and conflicts in strategy, ideology and goals, the organizations in various sectors were able to form an alliance and challenge the authoritarian regime. Political democratization since 1987, thus opened up the organizational space for the differentiation of diverse social interests in such issues as the environment, human rights, humanitarian relief, and women’s rights (Kim, H. 1999).

After the election of Kim Young Sam in 1993, state repression of civil society substantially declined. The government made a series of unprecedented political and socio-economic reforms, and further encouraged the activities of moderate civil society groups by recruiting several high-ranking public officials from the citizens’ movement organizations. In addition, the state addressed some of the prominent issues that civil society groups raised. The dramatic rise of citizens’ movements and NGOs since the late 1980s is due to the ongoing political democratization movement marked by the inauguration of the civilian Kim Young Sam administration. Undoubtedly, South Korean politics has been following a gradual progression toward consolidating democracy since 1987. Civil society has been rapidly expanding to represent a new generation of social movements, as in the cases of Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice, Korean Federation of Environmental Movements, and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, which are now recognized as the main representative NGOs in South Korea. These representative NGOs, as umbrella organizations consisting of smaller NGOs, are among the largest and the most influential of Korean NGOs. While differing in many respects, the three NGOs are similar in that they ultimately seek to participate in the provision of such public goods as economic justice, environment, and economic reform (Kim, H. 1999).

Korea has shown remarkable growth in the number of NGOs in recent years, as well as rapid development and branching off of existing NGOs. The rapid proliferation in numbers and types of NGOs in Korea is indicative of a worldwide trend. This study investigates NGOs listed in the Directory of Korean NGOs published in 2000. As was previously argued, 1987 democratization led to the rapid establishment of NGOs in Korea. The number of NGOs multiplied between 1970s and 1980s, and between 1980s and 1990s. During the 1990s, 56.5% of all Korean NGOs were established. About 16.2% were established during the Park’s regime. The sharp rise in the number of NGOs founded since 1990s verifies that the establishment of NGOs is highly correlated to the process of political democratization since the late 1980s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Founding Years</th>
<th>For All Korean NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1960</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Table 2, there are 4,023 NGO in South Korea, and 6,440 NGOs if academic associations and unidentified organizations are included. In the issues of civil society, social service, civic culture, economy, and environment, the ratios of NGOs establishment are 25.2%(1,013), 18.5%(743), 15.8%(634), 12.5%(501), and 7.1%(287), respectively. Environmental NGOs are the fifth in number of NGOs.

Table 3 shows the size of the NGOs through the number of full-time employees. The majority of NGOs (54.9%) reported 2-5 full time employees and most NGOs (86.2%) employed less than or equal to 10 full time employees. This shows the small size and the limitation of organizational capacity of Korean NGOs.

Table 2: Frequency and Percentage Distributions of Korean NGOs in Specific Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>Local Self-Governing</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Culture</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>Laborer/Farmer/Fisher</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>International Society</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>4,023</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,440</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Percentage Distribution of All Korean NGOs in Number of Full-time Employees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Full-time Employees</th>
<th>For All Korean NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 100</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-100</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-50</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-16</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The membership size of NGOs was compared to all of the organizations listed in the directory. NGOs with membership between 101-500 people consisted of 32.0%, while NGOs with membership less than 101 consisted of 24.9%. NGOs with less than 500 members accounted for more than 50% of all reported NGOs.
Table 4: Percentage Distribution of All Korean NGOs in Number of Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>For All Korean NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 10,000</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,001-10,000</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1,000</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-500</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 101</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In South Korea, 29.7% of the total number of NGOs spend 10,000,000 to 100,000,000 won as an annual budget. Only 10% of NGOs use more than 1,000,000,000 won annually. About 50% of NGOs spend less than 100,000,000 won.

Table 5: Percentage Distribution of All Korean NGOs in Financial Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Size (Korean won)</th>
<th>For All Korean NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 1,000,000,000</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000,000-1,000,000,000</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000,000-300,000,000</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000,000-100,000,000</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 10,000,000</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In summary, the average Korean NGOs were established in 1990s. They are concerned with civil society, social service, civic culture, economy, and environment issues. The NGOs have 2 to 5 full-time employees and less than 500 members. And, they spend less than 100,000,000 won annually.

There are some challenges to the action of Korean NGOs to hinder their development as follows: The first limitation is the lack of co-ordination between NGOs. Irrespective of whether NGOs duplicate each others' activity, NGOs with complementary programmes, preoccupations, common positions, or common operational problems have considerable difficulty in linking together. The absence of powerful inter-NGO federations with a common position considerably weakens their ability to act under certain circumstances and makes it easy to out-maneuver their separate actions and difficult to support their common position. The second one is duplication of NGO activity. In a significant number of cases, more than one NGO may be concerned with the same subject or problem area, or may have membership links with the same range of organizations, or may solicit funds from the same range of bodies. Such duplication may be accompanied by a total lack of co-ordination between the NGOs in question. This situation may be considered a waste of resources calling for rationalization and mergers. The third one is proliferation of NGOs. The number of NGOs and NGO-like bodies is increasing rapidly. This increase is perceived by some to be an unnecessary proliferation and a fragmentation of activity which could better be focused through a limited number of existing bodies.
The number of such bodies makes it difficult for anyone to quickly grasp their nature and potential and therefore constitutes a discouragement to some forms of participation (Judge 1999).

Most NGOs in South Korea conduct extensive grassroots organizing in the regions in which they operate. They pursue broad democratic participation and seek funding independent from the state. Given these characteristics of NGOs, they need to find ways of strengthening the institutional capacities and contributing more meaningfully to the solution of major problems without losing their popular base and flexible capacity for social reform. NGOs in South Korea need to construct organizational capacities in generic project management, which include appraisal, planning, monitoring, and evaluation. For this, NGOs need to develop technical and processing skills in specific program sectors and to extend the scope of their activities. This will include policy analysis, formulation and advocacy, participatory planning and management techniques. Furthermore, they need to pursue long-term strategic planning and management, while learning and institutionalizing fundraising techniques. For this, managers of NGOs must pay more attention to long-term institutional support rather than short-term project grants from private donors. Finally, NGOs in South Korea need to expand the developmental role of NGOs in inter-organizational cooperation within locality as well as across the globe particularly in the fields of environment and human rights NGOs (Kim, H. 1999).

3. Environmental NGOs in South Korea

In South Korea, 20 out of 67 investigated Korean environmental NGOs have about less than 100 members. Only 9 of them have more than 1,000 members. Thus, most of Korean environmental NGOs are small in size, and were established in 1990s.

Table 6 : Frequency Distribution of Korean Environmental NGOs in Number of Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>For 67 Korean Environmental NGOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Above 1,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501-1,000</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101-500</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-100</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Directory of Korean NGOs (2000)*

Table 7 : Chronological Characters of Korean Environmental Movements

|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|

463
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Issues</th>
<th>Industrial Pollution</th>
<th>Industrial Pollution / Pollution Disease</th>
<th>Living Environmental Pollution / Trash / Nuclear Pollution</th>
<th>Living Environmental Pollution / Trash / Nuclear Pollution / Global Ecosystem</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Damaged District Residents Organizations</td>
<td>Damaged District Residents Organizations / Environmental Movement Organizations</td>
<td>Damaged District Residents Organizations / Environmental Movement Organizations / Civil Movement Organizations</td>
<td>Damaged District Residents Organizations / Environmental Movement Organizations / Civil Movement Organizations / International Environmental Movement Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Actions</td>
<td>Compensation Movement for Damage</td>
<td>Compensation Movement for Damage / Professional Environmental Movement</td>
<td>Compensation and Preventive Movement for Damage / Green Consumers’ Movement / Life Movement</td>
<td>Compensation and Preventive Movement for Damage / Green Consumers’ Movement / Life Movement / International Cooperation Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Political Regimes</td>
<td>Authoritative Regime</td>
<td>Authoritative Regime</td>
<td>Authoritative-Democratic Regime</td>
<td>Democratic Regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chronological characters of Korean environmental movements can be classified into four periods—primitive (1960s-1970s), anti-pollution movement (1980-1987), environmental movement beginning (1988-1991) and expansion (1992-) period. Recent issues of Korean environmental movement are diverse from living environmental pollution, trash, and nuclear pollution to global ecosystem. Leading groups of the movement are civil movement organizations with international linkage including damaged district residents organizations and environmental movement organizations. And the main activities range from compensation movement for damage to green consumers’ and life movement. In addition, the growth in quality and quantity of Korean environmental NGOs could be possible under the democratic regime of 1990s in South Korea.

4. Conclusion: For the Future of NGOs in South Korea

Although the civil society sector in South Korea has rapidly expanded recently,
an institutionalized civil society has not yet been fully developed. The Korean government should work to reform the legal and institutional frameworks within which civil society can fully undertake its activities for public purposes. Although NGOs in South Korea have no formal standing with governments, they have become an integral part of the process of setting agendas prodding governments and other organizations to address diverse social issues. NGOs have become the vehicles of choice for private citizens to mobilize and affect public policies. In this context, this study shows that the democratic movement since 1987 opened up a socio-political space for NGOs to emerge and extend the scope of their activities in diverse issues. At the same time, political democratization and economic development has led to the expansion of organizational capacities of NGOs and their policy-related activities, which in turn provide a ground to have a feedback effect on the process of consolidating democracy in South Korea. After all, voluntary support is the foundation upon which civil society exists. NGOs in South Korea primarily concerned with empowering citizens via the strategy of strengthening civil society should focus not only on the primary level of association, but also on the higher levels of governance. Such emphasis will ensure an environment conducive to participation of citizens in all matters public in nature. Civil society and its prominent actors, namely NGOs outside the formal apparatus of the state have come of age in governing diverse issues and even global agendas. NGOs in South Korea should extend their vision toward global governance and global citizenship in the 21st century (Kim, H. 1999).

NGOs are distinctive entities with important skills and resources to deploy in the process of international environmental cooperation. Rather than undermining state sovereignty, active NGO participation enhances the abilities of states to regulate globally. The empirical pattern of NGO participation has been structured across time and functional areas to reap these gains. That NGOs are now more pervasive in international environmental institutions illustrates the expansion, not the retreat, of the state in addressing global environmental problems.

We are experiencing a major transition from Big Government to Big Society. If that transition is to be achieved in ways that serves the needs of the people, governments as well as individuals must take responsibility for strengthening the institutional underpinnings of civil society. Experts believe 'small government' and 'big society' are interdependent. If government is not reduced, its functions not transformed, it will be hard for society to develop, difficult for social organization to be complete; society's life as an organism will lack vitality. As Geithner mentions, the primary concern of government downsizing is to breathe life into society (Geithner 1999).

References


Changes in the social and regional basis of electoral support for Kim Dae-jung: a trend analysis of the 1987, 1992 and 1997 presidential elections∗

Sun-kwang Bae
Simon Fraser University

1. Introduction

Tainted though by the economic crisis that led to an intervention of the IMF, the victory of Kim Dae-jung (DJ) in the 1997 presidential election was a milestone on consolidating procedural democracy in South Korea (Diamond and Kim 2000). Korean voters finally handed the party in opposition executive power for the first time in their electoral history. DJ wound up winning enough electoral support over the presidency in 1997 after running in three consecutive elections since 1987: he won 40.3 percent of the popular votes, barely beating the first runner-up, Lee Hoe-Chang by a meager 1.6 percent of margin.

One of the obvious challenges for DJ had been to widen regional basis of electoral support over and beyond his traditional, regional stronghold of Jeolla, or perhaps to overcome the “regional antagonism” (see for the analysis of regional voting Bae and Cotton 1993; Bae Sun-kwang 1995; Lee Nam-young 1998; Lee Kap-yun 1998; Cho Ki-suk 2000). The regional vote returns for DJ in the 1987, 1992 and 1997 elections seemed to indicate that he had been most successful in winning over the voters of Chungcheong over time, but he had achieved somewhat limited success in the other regions, and in Gyeongsang no success at all (see Table 1). One would easily speculate that DJ’s alliance with Kim Jong-pil (JP), who had a strong tie with Chungcheong voters, might have helped him winning the support of the Chungcheong voters in 1997. But in 1992, in which JP had formed alliance with the winning, governing party candidate Kim Young-sam, the reasons for DJ’s utmost gain over Chungcheong voters seemed not to be clear-cut.

∗I am very grateful to Gallup Korea for allowing me to use its post-election sample survey data reported in this study. But I am alone responsible for the interpretations of the data, of course.
Table 1. Kim Dae-jung vote shares by region in the 1987, 1992, and 1997 presidential elections (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>+5.2</td>
<td>+7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeonggi</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>+9.8</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangwon</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>+6.7</td>
<td>+8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Chungcheong</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>+15.0</td>
<td>+11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Chungcheong</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>+16.2</td>
<td>+18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Jella</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>+5.6</td>
<td>+3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Jella</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>+2.1</td>
<td>+2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Gyeongsang</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>+6.4</td>
<td>+4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Gyeongsang</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>+4.0</td>
<td>+2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeju</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>+14.3</td>
<td>+7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National total</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>+6.7</td>
<td>+6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jungang seongeogwalli wiwonho [Central Election Management Committee].

In this study, however, we will not pursue to identify the factors that may have led to DJ’s victory or to discuss the political significance of his victory (Kim Yong-Ho 1998). Rather, we will examine changing patterns of DJ’s electoral support if there had been any changes at all. That is, borrowing the concepts of various types of ‘change and stability’ from developmental psychology (Golembiewsk et al 1976; Mortimer et al 1982), we will attempt to characterize changes in the pattern of electoral competition in this era of democratic transition. First of all, we will examine whether there had been “structural or qualitative” changes in the social basis of electoral support for DJ overtime by looking at the patterns of electoral support modeled by a series of multiple regression analysis. Then, we will characterize the changes of social basis of DJ support by examining DJ support among various social and regional groups overtime. For this study, we will use three cross-sectional post-election sample survey data collected by Gallup Korea in 1988, 1992 and 1997, respectively, on the variables of ‘regionalism’ and some of the ‘socio-economic characteristics’.

2. Data and methodology
2.1 Methodology

In order to characterize the pattern of electoral support for DJ across time, we incorporate the concepts developed in development psychology to characterize stability and change. For example, Mortimer et al argued that structural invariance, which refers to “the degree of continuity in the nature of the phenomenon under investigation,” is of foremost importance in the analysis of stability, not only because it is by itself a meaningful concept, but also because “establishing structural invariance is a necessary precursor to the investigation of other kinds of stability (e.g., change in level or persistence in the pattern of individual differences)” (p.267). That is, any characterization of change presupposes that the concepts to be compared are structurally invariant across time.
At the first stage of the analysis, thus, a series of multiple regression analysis were performed with DJ vote as the dependent variable for each of the respective elections. Standardized Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression coefficients of the explanatory variables were compared within and across the models in order to find out: (1) which were the variables of importance within the models and (2) whether there were notable differences in the pattern of importance ranking among the variables across the models. By doing so, it was aimed to identify whether there was ‘qualitative or structural’ change over time. Significant deviation from structural invariance may indicate a new stage of growth or development, which may be characterized by a “big bang” gamma change that refers to “a change from one state to another” (Golembiewsk et al, p.138). Golembiewsk et al noted that this kind of change involves “the basic redefinition of the relevant psychological space” (p.138, original emphasis). We would take a significant change in the R-square scores - which attest the variance explained by the model - as an indication of a structural change.

Independent variables included in the models were all dummy variables representing differences in gender, age, education, religion, occupation, and place of origin. These variables were chosen to represent ‘socio-economic characteristics’ and ‘regionalism’ of the respondents. ‘Place of origin’ rather than ‘region of residence’ was chosen to represent ‘regionalism.’ This choice was based on the consideration that ‘regionalism’ in Korea may in essence have stemmed from the power struggle among regionally based political forces who had been seeking a control over the center stage, i.e. Seoul (e.g., Henderson, 1968).

Once we identified existence of “structural variance/invariance” or “gamma change/lack of gamma change” by comparing the standardized regression coefficients across the models, we attempted to characterize the nature of the change by examining trends of the DJ votes for each of the ‘socio-economic’ and ‘regional’ variables. The trends of DJ support were examined by looking at cross-tabulation data of the voting choice variable for DJ and each of the explanatory variables overtime. T-tests and correlation coefficients were used to identify which type of change had occurred during this period, incorporating the concepts of “level stability” and “normative stability” (Mortimer et al), and “alpha change” (Golembiewsk et al). Normative stability, which is usually measured by the correlation between measures of an attribute across time, refers to “the persistence of individual ranks or differences on an attribute of interest” (Mortimer et al, p.267). Level stability, which may be indicated by the invariance of group means on successive occasions, refers to “persistence in the magnitude or quantity of a phenomenon over time” (Mortimer et al, p.269). Alpha change, which is conceived as occurring along “relatively stable dimensions of reality that are defined in terms of discrete and constant intervals (Golembiewsk et al, p.135),” indicates significant deviations from or the opposite of the level stability.

2.2 Data

The data used in this study were collected after the respective presidential elections. The data for the 1997 and 1992 elections were collected just after the respective elections, but for 1987, the data collected after the 1988 National Assembly election - in which the respondent’s voting choice in 1987 was asked retrospectively - were used instead, due to the unavailability of the 1987 post-election data. The substitution of the 1988 data for 1987 seemed not to cause a methodological problem, as both of the elections were fought on the same ground in terms of patterns of party
competition, and the time lapse was only a few months. The data for 1992 and 1987 were collected by face-to-face interviews, and the data for 1997 were collected by telephone interviews. The resulted sample size (N) was 1,500 both in the April 1988 and the December 1992 surveys, and 1,300 in the December 1997 survey. Appendix 1 reports a summary of the data.

3. Result
3.1 Structural stability or change?

Data presented in Table 2 provide the details regarding the pattern of social basis of DJ support over time. For example, the beta coefficients show that ‘regionalism’ exerted the strongest impact on the voting choice for DJ over time, especially for those of Jeolla origin who favoured DJ far more than the others. The negative, but strong effect of Geongsang origin on DJ support especially in 1997 (and in 1987 to a lesser degree) is also noteworthy. In addition to these strong effects of regionalism on DJ support, the effects of age, religion and occupation on DJ support are also notable. That is, the younger voters had somewhat favoured DJ over time, but Buddhists had shown somewhat negative level of support over time, net of other things. In 1997, those of primary industry workers and the self-employed somewhat favoured DJ significantly. Overall, the patterns of DJ support do not seem to indicate a significant change: i.e., regionalism has exerted the strongest effect, and some effects of age and religion has been present over time.

Table 2. Standardized OLS regression coefficient (beta) for DJ vote in 1987, 1992 and 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Female):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (Fifties and over):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenties</td>
<td>.048*</td>
<td>.098*</td>
<td>.087**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thirties</td>
<td>.060*</td>
<td>.061*</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forties</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.022</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (Primary):</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>- .003</td>
<td>- .003</td>
<td>.018</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior High</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.053</td>
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<td>College and over</td>
<td>.067*</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.076</td>
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<td>Place of origin (Others):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul/Gyeonggi</td>
<td>- .001</td>
<td>.066*</td>
<td>- .047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungcheong</td>
<td>- .025</td>
<td>.062*</td>
<td>.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jella</td>
<td>.657*</td>
<td>.673*</td>
<td>.450**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- .038</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
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<td>Religious (None/others):</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>- .037*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- .062**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the patterns of DJ support along the dimensions of socio-economic and regionalism variables do not indicate a notable deviation as discussed above, however, the change in the R-square scores between 1992 and 1997 is a notable one. That is, the variances explained by those variables in the models of 1987 and 1992 were around a half, but it went down to about one-third in the 1997 model. This is a clear indication of a structural change in 1997: i.e., there may have been more factors of importance that we were unable to specify in the models of 1987 and 1992 than in the 1997 model. This is of course not a conclusive evidence for $\gamma$ change, but this structural instability at least suggests that we may have to approach with caution in characterizing the nature of change between 1992 and 1997. Nevertheless, we may safely conclude that there had been no structural change between 1987 and 1992, which warrants further characterization of the types of stability between these elections.

3.2 The types of stability

Table 3 provides data on the DJ shares of vote among the social groups. For example, in 1987, 26.3 percent of the male respondents reported to have voted for DJ, which was not much different either from the national total (26.9 percent) or from that of the female respondents (27.6 percent). In 1992, male support for DJ rose to 35.2 percent and female 32.3 percent, which were also not much deviated from the nation total (33.8 percent). In 1997, male support again rose to 44.1 percent compared to female 40.2 percent - the national total support for DJ was 42.2 percent, according to the sample survey data.
Table 3. Kim Dae-jung vote shares by the socio-economic and regional groupings (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation Total</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>+ 6.9</td>
<td>+ 8.4</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>+ 9.0</td>
<td>+ 8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>+ 4.7</td>
<td>+ 7.9</td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenties</td>
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<td>39.0</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>+ 9.3</td>
<td>+12.2</td>
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<td>Thirties</td>
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<td>33.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>+ 0.8</td>
<td>+10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forties</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>+11.5</td>
<td>+ 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifties and over</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>+ 7.2</td>
<td>+ 8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>Primary</td>
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<td>33.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>+ 6.1</td>
<td>+ 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>+ 7.7</td>
<td>+ 9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior High</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>+ 6.9</td>
<td>+ 9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College and over</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>+ 7.3</td>
<td>+ 6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of origin</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul/Gyeonggi</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>+ 8.5</td>
<td>+ 7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chungcheong</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>+10.3</td>
<td>+18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jella</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>+ 4.4</td>
<td>+ 1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gyeongsang</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>+ 3.4</td>
<td>+ 5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (Gangwon, Jeju)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>+ 0.0</td>
<td>+22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>+ 5.5</td>
<td>+10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>+ 1.8</td>
<td>+13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>+ 6.4</td>
<td>+ 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None/Others</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>+11.2</td>
<td>+ 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming/Fishery/Forestry</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>+ 0.9</td>
<td>+12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>+ 9.7</td>
<td>+13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar work</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>+11.0</td>
<td>+ 7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar work</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>+14.4</td>
<td>+ 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homemaker</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>+ 3.3</td>
<td>+ 9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>+ 9.8</td>
<td>+ 1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data in the last two columns report the magnitudes of changes in vote shares of DJ by the socio-economic and regional groupings. For example, there appears to be the most notable change in the magnitude among the regional groupings between 1997 and 1992. That is, DJ vote share among the Chungcheong and other category of regional origins (i.e., Kangwon, Jeju, and North Korea) (disproportionately) increased far more than the share among the other regional origins.

In order to characterize the nature of change, the data in Table 3 were subjected to statistical procedures. Paired-samples t-tests were performed for the two pairs, i.e., between 1987 and 1992, and between 1992 and 1997 of all the variables in Table 3: the null hypothesis being that there is no difference between the pairs. T-score for the 1987 and 1992 pair was statistically significant (t=9.112 with 24 degrees of freedom, p < .001), and so was for the 1992 and 1997 pair (t=8.655 with 24 degrees of freedom, p < .001). So we reject the null hypothesis - there is a significant difference between the two pairs: i.e., the results indicate the lack of “level stability” and point to the “alpha change”. That is, there lacks persistence in the magnitude or quantity of the DJ’s social basis of electoral support over time.
As a next step, we also calculated correlation coefficients of the two pairs of data in Table 3. The 1987 and 1992 pair resulted in a very high positive correlation of \( r = .963 \), and so did the 1992 and 1997 pair (\( r = .931 \)). Strong positive correlations indicated that social groups who scored high or low at the first period retained the same relative positions in the second. That is, we have observed a clear indication of “normative stability” of these two pairs. In other words, the pattern of electoral support for DJ among those socio-economic and regional groups has been persistent over time.

4. Discussion

DJ’s running in three consecutive elections since 1987 provided us with a unique opportunity to investigate the nature of change in the pattern of electoral competition without raising a serious methodological problem involved in this type of research. That is, since DJ was a constant variable over time, we could avoid an important measurement issue in a longitudinal study - i.e., the compatibility of the concepts across time.

Overall, we were able to characterize the pattern or the structure of the competition in this period as stability rather than change. The characteristics of change had been kept at the minimal level - i.e., we only observed “alpha change.” That is, we were only able to reject the hypothesis of “level stability” - i.e., persistence in the magnitude or quantity of an attribute. This is not an unexpected result, given that DJ increased his support over time nationally to the level of garnering a majority of the votes after all.

What may be interesting though is the fact that we observed “normative stability” across time. That is, the pattern of DJ support may have not been changed over time despite of his quantitative success - no major changes in relative ranking of the social groups were observed. Perhaps, the voters might not have re-constituted their interpretation of the nature of political competition during this period.

However, it may be premature to conclude that stability characterizes the pattern of electoral competition during this period. There was an indication of “gamma change,” evinced by the fluctuations of the variance explained by our regression models, although the evidence was not conclusive enough since we only employed social structural variables as explanatory variables. A full factorial model incorporating the variables that may represent a full psychological space is in need to draw a firm conclusion on this point.

Appendix 1. A summary of the data: sample characteristics of the variables (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1987 (N=1396)</th>
<th>1992 (N=1293)</th>
<th>1997 (N=1174)</th>
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<td>Voting choice</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>DJ vote</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>50.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twenties</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>27.9</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forties</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
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<td>Fifties and over</td>
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<td>24.9</td>
<td>24.5</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>College and over</td>
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<td>Chungcheong</td>
<td>Jella</td>
<td>Gyeongsang</td>
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<td>13.2</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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</table>

References


Jungang seongeogwalli wiwonho [Central Election Management Committee] 1993. *Je 14 dae Daetongryeong Seongeo Chongram* [Election returns of the 14th presidential election].


Korean language program, Narrabundah College, ACT

Hee-Kyoung Lee
Narrabundah College

1. Introducing Korean program into the school.

The Korean program at Narrabundah College was first offered in 1996. According to the course accreditation document, there are expressed needs for the development of a Beginning Korean T course in the ACT College system. Firstly, Korean is one of 4 Asian Languages which have been targeted by the National Asian Languages/Studies Strategy for Australian Schools (NALSAS) as being priority languages in Australian schools. Secondly, there is a particular need for the introduction of script languages at an early level if Australian University graduates are to develop true functional proficiency by the end of their undergraduate courses. Canberra's position as the national capital with a significant international and public service oriented population indicated the need for a Korean course. Many students express an interest in travel and service in Foreign Affairs and Trade. For the Advanced Korean course, the college has a growing number of background Korean speakers. They come as migrants, international private students, or with diplomatic family backgrounds. Students from all three groups have chosen to study Korean.

2. Course

2.1 Course developing

Korean Courses have been developed by Alice Buckley, Head of Languages, Chun-Ja Han, the first Korean teacher, Hye-Kyung Kwon and Sue Bessell. The Korean Program was initially funded by NALSAS, the ACT Department of Education and especially the Australia-Korea Foundation.
2.2 Course presentation

Korean courses are presented under the Languages Other Than English (LOTE) Framework and the current requirements of the Board of Senior Secondary Studies (BSSS). Three levels of Korean, which are Beginning1-6, Continuing 1-6 and Advanced 1-6, for the T course are offered in the ACT college system. Each course consists of six units and it requires 2 years study to complete a course. A minor consists of at least three units and a major consists of at least five units. Students at beginning level normally are students with no previous background in Korean. Continuing students should have completed a course of study of Korean elsewhere. Students entering Advanced level are normally native speakers, have been educated through the language or have lived for an extensive period in Korea.

3. Korean Class

One line of Korean has four teaching hours per week and includes all levels within the one class. The enrolment in the Korean class has been around 11 to 13 students from Beginning level to Advanced level. Students have culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds such as Australian, Tai, Korean, Chinese and Japanese. Many students in this class study two or three Asian Languages, including Korean, and many have shown a high standard of language learning skills. A high percentage of these students also want to study Asian Studies at tertiary level. The Faculty of Asian Studies at the ANU give a credit to students who have studied the Asian language at college and this also encourages students to continue with Asian languages.

3.1. Teaching resources for year 11, 12

The school is in the process of extending its original small collection of Korean course books, texts, maps and videos. The National Library have holdings on Korea and the Korean community in the ACT has been providing cultural materials to support the course.

The teaching materials for this class are selected from various Korean Language books and audio-visual materials, which have been published in Australia and Korea. Particularly "Sugohaseyo" (Curriculum Corporation) and "Choayo" (NSW Department of Education) are frequently used text books by Beginning class. Korean newspapers, which have been providing by Korean Embassy, 20th C poems, short stories and novels are studied by the Advanced class.

Teaching this class is more like individual teaching and in order to maintain students' motivation to continue with Korean, their interests and abilities are carefully reflected on in class teaching. Even with such a small class, teaching 3-4 levels has presented difficulties. Using various technologies, eg. audio, video and computer programs, is a way to manage this complex situation, so that no learner is disadvantaged. Students enjoy learning Hangul using the "NDS Korean Language" computer program and producing documents using the Korean wordprocesser HWP. Audio tapes, "Korean through Active Listening" and conversation dialogue from "Choayo" are effective listening tasks for Beginning level. Dialogues from “Korean through Active Listening” are at normal native speaker speed and are very fast for beginners, so it is suitable as quick revision tasks for consolidating sentence structure by repetition. On the other hand, conversations from “Choayo” are used at the beginning of the topic.
These expressions have too many variations for beginner level but the expressions are so live in everyday life that students like listening to the dialogue.

3.2 Assessment in multi-level class

Each student is assessed at his/her level by following guidelines set out in the course and then ranked it in the class. LOTE moderation and other school assessing procedures are followed. Every student has a fair opportunity to get a good result that reflects his/her effort at his/her level of language. A background student does not have any particular advantages.

3.3 Problems

The current concern of Korean class is number of students. Until an enrolment of up to 25 students which is expected by school, is achieved it will be hard to solve the multi-level teaching situation. The other way is to seek funding for sources other than school, similar to some other languages which are funded by embassies and therefore have no set class numbers.

In Canberra, no other school offers Korean and students who don't take Korean have little or no knowledge about Korea. Most other languages are introduced in primary and junior high schools, whereas Korean is only introduced in Years 11 and 12 at Narrabundah College. Therefore it is difficult to expand the number of Beginning Korean students moving up from high schools.

4. Conclusion

The Korean Program has been at Narrabundah College since 1996. Courses are presented under the Languages Other Than English (LOTE) Framework and the current requirements of the Board of Senior Secondary Studies (BSSS). The School offers three levels of Korean on one line. Program has been growing gradually in respect of student numbers and resources. There is a need for greater funding in order to be able to offer more classes to encourage greater student interest.

References

1997  Beginning Korean T Course  Narrabundah College
1998  Continuing Korean T Course  Narrabundah College
1997  Beginning Korean T Course  Narrabundah College
2001  Languages other than English Course framework.
2002  ACT Board of senior secondary studies
1998-2001  Generic Course in Applied Language. Board of senior secondary studies
Pioneering the teaching of Korean in South Australia

Sabina Chang
Adelaide Tafe

1. Korean language teaching in SA

In South Australia, according to the Korean Community of SA's estimation, there is a Korean resident population of approximately 1,500 Koreans, 650 of which are permanent residents. Most of the Korean migrants are relatively new to SA, having arrived less than 15 years ago. And more than 50 per cent of the Korean population are members of the two Korean churches who conduct their own ethnic schools.

Three teachers are registered for teaching in Korean, though at their various schools. However, all are more occupied with teaching other subjects than with teaching Korean to native Korean students.

Currently, none of University courses, including Centres for Asian Studies, are offering Korean language and cultural studies. Primary and secondary schools are in a similar situation.

A few more obvious reasons for the slow development of Korean studies are:

- a small Korean population with little participation in the mainstream Australian community, both socially and vocationally;
- minimal active business exchanges between South Australia and Korea; and
- the lack of knowledge among many South Australians concerning Korea and the importance of Korea to Australia.

1.1 Chronicle

In 1991, Korean Language was first taught to people of non-Korean origin as a 10 week course run by the Workers' Educational Association (WEA). Although a few learned for hobby purposes, most of those attending were senior church members from several Adelaide churches who were planning exchange programs with some churches in Korea. The WEA course lasted for just over a year due to difficulties in meeting the requisite number of students to open a course.

In 1994, the SA Secondary School of Languages founded Korean in the Intermediate Course and this is still operating. But as the students are all Korean background speakers, the course has been run at a near specialist level, with little opportunity for non-natives to participate effectively.

Also in 1994, the Adelaide Korean Presbyterian Church opened the Korean Ethnic School for the second generation of Korean migrants as well as local community people, and the Korean
Uniting church opened a similar school in the following year.

In 1995, the Department for Continuing Education at Adelaide University began a Korean course for local community people, and this lasted until 1999 when it ceased due to low enrollment.

In 1998, Seaview High School commenced a Korean course as an out-of-school hour program. Some teachers, students and local community people have been learning Korean culture and language for their own interest and self-improvement.

In 2001, Adelaide TAFE introduced a certificate course and became the first formally accredited course.

Apart from the courses described above, there are a few primary and high schools who, at times, conduct Korean cultural studies during Asian weeks and the like.

1.2 Student composition

Even though trade and inter-governmental exchanges between SA and Korea are increasing, few people have the immediate need to learn Korean. Also, as there are no formal Korean subjects established in primary schools and universities, few students pursue academic study, though some university students learn with the aim of improving their future employment prospects.

Among Korean language learners, many adopted Korean children or their family members wish to learn Korean culture and language to understand their children's Korean heritage. Similarly, partners of Koreans learn as an attempt to understand their partner's culture. The second generation children of Korean migrants learn to establish their sense of identity. Many teachers and local people are interested in obtaining a greater understanding of Korea. Apart from the descendants of Korean migrants, most of them have had very little exposure to Korea or its culture, and possess very limited or no knowledge in Korean language.

1.3 Facilitating students' needs and sustainable strategies

While most of the students don't have many immediately pressing reasons to learn the language, often their life is closely engaged to Korea through adoption, marriage, future plans related to Korea etc. Hence, understanding Korean culture and gaining an insight into Korean life style is as significant as learning the language. Additional factors are that there is no pressure for results, a pleasant environment for learning as a hobby, and learners are motivated by self-improvement.

As Australia is where learners' culture is profoundly based and English is usually the learners' first language, Australian life style and English can often provide good learner-friendly and comprehensible tools in designing curriculums or strategies.

Therefore, with the conditions explained above - that learners usually don't have an imminent academic pressure from studying Korean, and most learners' everyday language is English, I have been endeavouring to accommodate the class using these two factors as the key. Therefore, I have derived a few base conditions in designing my curriculum:
Grammar should always be explained in comparison with English equivalence or start from a point of view in English;
If possible, use examples and situations from the learners' everyday life including news;
For cultural studies, choose practical topics rather than social issues and try to encourage students not to be judgmental i.e. public bath, singalong room, correct eating manners.
Always facilitate present disposition.

In the next section, I am going to share some of the programs designed and exercised on these assumption, and I have named this the learner friendly mode'.

2. Example of programs offered

2.1 Objectives

The following is an example of a 2-year certificate course for non-native speakers of Korean who have not undertaken previous studies in Korean. While the study can lead to future prospects and further studies in Korean, the main objective of the course is to provide a foundation and to improve understanding in Korean culture, society, and people through the Korean language. The course is operated 3 hours per week through modules.

2.2 Texts and lesson plans

Though there is no fixed text book, and students are provided teacher-edited booklets for each module, the main text used for Korean language is *The New Directions* written by Adrian Buzzo and Gi-Hyun Shin. Among other reasons, this book was selected because each step for building up verbs seemed to be more systematically approached than some of other texts available in South Australia for non-native Koreans, who often find learning verb conjugation a daunting task.

2.3. Teaching program

The program largely follows the structure of the main textbook *The New Directions* and was executed during the first semester 2001. Some extracts from the program will be discussed next (refer to appendix for an outline of the program).

2.4 Examples of the learner friendly mode' of education

a. An approach to Korean writing and pronunciation based on a comparison of stress-timed vs syllable-timed

The following is a program of verb conjugation modified from *The New Directions*:

English is a stressed-timed language, which means that, between syllables, there is varied stress and spans. On the other hand, Korean is a syllable-timed language, giving equal and regular stress and time to all syllables.

The following examples illustrate this point:

Question. How many syllables are there in the name 'Louis' in English?
Answer: Two, namely Lou/is
However, when you say Louis in Korean, you get *three* syllables by giving equal rhythm and stress to all syllables. Hence, Lou/i/s

In writing Korean, one syllable represents one character. In order to write Louis, we need three sets of characters.

Question. When we utter a more complex syllable such as 's in what order should we say the vowels used in this syllable? And why should we pronounce them in that order? Answer. +. Because we should compress all the letters in the same character into the one syllable.

b. An example of Korean particles in comparison with English

English doesn't have particles to identify the character of the words in a sentence. Therefore, in English, it is important to position English words in their right place through a sentence structure. Let's think of a simple sentence: 'Cats eat mice.' If we happen to change the place of the cats with mice, the meaning becomes distorted.

Korean language has particles that decide the character of the words within the sentence.

Let's take the example of the same sentence that we have just used. 고양이는 죄를 먹어요. In this sentence, the particles 는 and 을 shows that the cat is the subject and mice are the objects that the cat eats. Therefore, even when we change the position of the cat with the mice, the meaning of the sentence still remains the same. 죄를 고양이는 먹어요, 고양이는 먹어요, 죄를, or 죄를 먹어요, 고양이는.

c. An approach to writing

New learners of Korean often become confused in transferring to a new writing system from their habitual way. Therefore, introducing some simple routines and patterns was found to be easier to remember apart from giving them clear rules of writing such as 'always start to write from a consonant'.

As a routine work when the learners commence writing, four window types are introduced. The learners are asked to fill in the each panel of the windows following the number written. After they have familiarised themselves with the routine, they move to more complicated types of windows.

1. Basic patterns: CV C CV C C C: consonant V: vowel

2. Complicated patterns CV C CC V CC

d. Verb conjugation
The following is a program of verb conjugation modified from *The New Directions*. This conjugation program is focussed to give a sequential step by step development while attempting to elaborate verb expressions by coining similar structures.

The first part of the sequence is 합니다 and 입니다 to draw their question and negative forms. Then, expressions which ends with -세요 are introduced to order something or ask a favour politely. Casual polite terms 해요, 안 해요, 있어요, 없어요, are found to be convenient to transfer to other formats like past and perfect past tenses.

Verb stem + 자 which makes rather blunt form of suggestions comes next a serious of casual polite modes as an endeavour to smooth move to other Verb stem + forms such as 하+고 싶어요. 하+지 마세요. 하+f 수 있어요 etc.

입니다. 합니다. do/does, is/am/are 입니까? 합니다? question form 아니요, 아닙니다, 안 합니다. negation -세요. polite urge to do something 해요. 예요, 안 해요. casual polite 일해요. 공부해요. - 피곤해요, 필요해요. elaborating expression 있어요. 없어요. possession, exist 재미있어요, 맛있어요, 멋있어요. elaboration 했어요= 해 + 써어요 making past tense; casual polite form + 써어요.. 하자, 가자, 먹자, 보자 introducing verb stem 하 + 지 마세요. Please don't .....; verb stem + 지 마세요. 하 + 고 싶어요. I want to ..... ; verb stem + 고 싶어요.

e. A drama game: phonology exercise

Different from English, Korean letters are in the phonemical system, not in the phonetical system. Even when one writes the same Korean letter, it often has a different sound value according to its linguistic environment. For example, the q in 부산 is pronounced differently in 밤. One is p while the other is b.

This exercise was designed to help students gain more natural expressions in the phonemic Korean system and practicing expressions rather than stiff reading from a book, while enjoying the learning experience and improving social skills.

1. Introduction to students

Koreans are amongst those nations in the world who really enjoy singing. When you go to Korea, be prepared to sing. There are sing-along rooms in every corner of every street and singing is an unavoidable exercise if you wish to befriend Koreans. One of the most hated people in Korea are those who refused to sing when asked. And the next hated one would be those who sing the following song, which every 3 year old Korean child has learned. Indeed, this is an equivalent to 'Ba ba black sheep'. However, Koreans will still be appreciative if you
sing it, as you are special and you are demonstrating that you have done your homework before you came to Korea!

2. Learn the song ‘학교 종이 빙痹痹

학교 종이 빙痹痹
어서 모이자
선생님이 우리를 기다리신다.
Translation:
The school bell is ringing 'Dong Dong Dong'.
Let's go to school quickly.
Our teacher is awaiting us.

3. Acting the situation

Imagine a village in the Korean countryside. Every school day, the villagers can hear the school bell from their home, much like the village church bell can be heard within many Australian towns.

Then, think of the following situation and recite the lyrics of the song, thinking that you are saying the words in that situation.

Situations:
1) You just finished a fantastic but short holiday. You should go back to school today. The school bell is ringing and you don't feel like to going back.

2) All children from the school had a long interval as the school had to have closed due to a fire. You've been missing your friends and teachers. Besides, you didn't enjoy the interval as you had to work hard at your father's farm. You are happy to return to school.

3) The school has a new bell as someone has vandalised the previous one. Your teacher is investigating who was the culprit. You are nervous as you know who was responsible.

4) You are a big sister/brother of a very lazy child who is usually late for school. You need to convince him/her that school is a good fun.

f. exam questions to test understanding of sentence patterns - 은/는 입니다,을/를 합니다, 해요, 합니까? 하세요.

* Read and answer.

Oobladee는 pininio 입니다.
Oobladee는 sukopanam을 합니까?
아니요. Oobladee는 sukopanam을 안 합니다.
Ooblada는 Oobladee를 woonkiki 합니다.
Oobladee! kopanogo를 하세요.
"아니요. 나는 pinniohono하고 boniniopino를 해요. Ooblada!"
*Questions

What is Oobladee?

Does Oobladee do sukopanam? If not, what does Oobladee do?

What does Oblada do to Oobladee?

What did Ooblada ask Oobladee to do?

What is Oblada?
3. Challenges and suggestions

3.1 Challenges

Revisiting the short history of Korean teaching reminded me of the times I was grateful for helping hands, such as Australian-Korean Foundation’s support for the current Seaview High School Korean class and, unfortunately, the numerous occasions that classes have been cancelled due to lack of numbers.

For the moment, according to the information I have from contacting the SA Premier and various sources, such situations will be prolonged unless there is an epoch making turning point, such as the introduction of a Korean subject in primary school or university.

Working solitarily in designing and conducting the class, without a syllabus or exchange of information and views with other teachers, it’s difficult to have an objective estimation of student outcomes and progress. In addition, at times this has resulted in late corrections and updating important changes in the Korean language, such as in the information on romanisation.

Despite efforts in making and getting teaching aids and useful resources, those available resources are too limited and it’s difficult to know where to obtain these.

3.2 Suggestions

a. Networking to exchange information

Networks including webforums to exchange and address concerns and issues in Korean studies will be extremely helpful for teachers like myself working in isolation. E-mail newsletters to update information on Korean studies can be a productive idea as well.

b. An advisory body regarding issues on Korea

Living in Australia as a person of Korean background, on various occasions I discover confusing or incorrect issues regarding Korea or the Korean language. An example involves some official terms translated into or from Korean in some of the official materials:

.Korean versions of Adelaide - 아델레이드, 에델레이드, 아들레이드 etc
.Translations of South Australia - 남부 호주, 남 호주, 남 호주주 etc.

This is a confusing issue to Korean learners as standardisation of official Australian names and cities in Korean language is as significant as the correct romanisation of Korean. Therefore, an authority in Korean language to give advice and assistance regarding the Korean language would be ideal in resolving such confusions.

Likewise, in teaching Korean language and culture, I often receive questions for reliable dictionaries and resources from students and feel at a loss as to what resources I would recommend, suitable for each level. I am open to suggestions on recommendable resources and websites.
### Appendix

Lesson plan

#### Term 1

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<th>PRACTICE</th>
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<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>approval &amp; disapproval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
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</table>

#### Term 2

<table>
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<tr>
<th>WEEK</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PRACTICE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td><strong>GRAMMAR/CROSS DOMAIN</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taking about daily routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Quantities, prices, dates, phone numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Exchanging information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pronouns directions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Making personal arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Where are you from?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Nominative particles</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Finding locations</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Countries and people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Directions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Taking directions and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adverbs comparatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shall we...? Let's do it together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More conjugations &amp;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Talking in past tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Liked and dislikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Travelling Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Using 'How', some</td>
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<td></td>
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#### References

Practical issues affecting the promotion of Korean from Kindergarten to Year 12

Sook Hee McRoberts
NSW Department of Education and Training

Introduction:
I am privileged to have witnessed and participated in the development of the Kindergarten to Y12 Korean language program in NSW schools since 1994. During this period I have encountered a number of misconceptions and attitudes which I believe worthy of consideration. Principally my paper will comment on daily issues confronting trainers and teachers and accordingly I will provide a brief summary of the development of the Korean program in NSW schools.

1993-1996:
In 1993, under the direction of Howard Jacobs and Younghwa Kim the Korean Using Technology Project commenced at Training and Development Directorate, NSW Department of Education and Training. At the same time a Korean Pilot Project commenced in the Wollongong region in 3 primary schools using regular classroom methods. Meanwhile the Directorate was given the task of introducing the study of Korean to NSW Government schools. This was a professional development program for secondary non-background teachers and primary school teachers. It ultimately produced curriculum development material for lower secondary and primary students.

When the project commenced, two high schools became the first schools in NSW to offer Korean to non-Korean background learners. In mid 1994, four additional schools joined the project and upon completion of the pilot project, 100 students from schools located throughout NSW had completed 100 hours of Korean. Apple Macintosh and IBM compatible computers were used as the link-up method. The software was able to be used by all the participants in the lessons. Information entered on the Hub site teacher’s computer screen was able to be simultaneously viewed on all the other computer screens. By June 1994, 200 hours of material for non-background Korean learners in upper primary and lower secondary including audio-cassettes and curriculum support videos had been developed.

Besides the Korean Using Technology Project at Training and Development Directorate, the Curriculum Support Directorate at the NSW Department of Education and Training also commenced a Korean background students course for Y7-12 at the Saturday School of Community Languages. It now caters for approximately 500 students.
1995-1996:
The project was expanded from 6 to 36 schools including 17 primary schools. An Australian native-speaker support teacher from the school was appointed at each site. These teachers received intensive professional development in the delivery of Korean using innovative technology. Lessons with Y3-12 classes were provided throughout participating NSW schools. By the end of 1996 when the project concluded, approximately 80 non-background teachers in 40 schools had participated. Five hub teachers (Korean native-speaker teachers) carried out lessons with K-12 classes. Three text writers produced the course material for upper primary, lower secondary and secondary senior beginners classes.

Various training programs had also been carried out for teachers of Korean such as:
- Annual Intensive Language Training workshop
- After school hour link-up lessons
- In-country study programs
- Tandem Korean Teacher Exchange between NSW Department and the Seoul Metropolitan Office of Education
- Departmentally funded university correspondence courses
- School visits
- In-service courses

By the end of 1996, teachers who had received training were to attain proficiency in Korean at an appropriate level for their teaching requirement. Funding for the project was to terminate at the end of 1996. The training period however proved insufficient particularly for Y9-10 teachers who were intending to teach Y11-12.

In 1997 and 1998, despite lack of funding, the project continued on with only 2 project officers and a desktop publisher to complete the HSC course text books. The books were trialed by a project officer with Y11-12 students who were studying the HSC course via computer modem link-up. From 1997, for schools unable to form a viable class the Open High School offered Y9-12 classes. In 1999 staffing for the program at Training Development Directorate was reduced to a 2 day per week casual position which discontinued after 6 months.

During 1999, for the first time, the Curriculum Support Directorate offered a Korean Language Consultant position. This position dictated that 40 % of the consultant’s time was to be spent toward the production of a Continuers course book for distance education mode to be used at the Open High School. The position was unchanged throughout 2000 but ultimately changed to a fulltime consultant position in 2001. Term 2 in 2000 saw the introduction of the NSW Department of Education Korean Community Language Program at Campsie public school. Since then 3 more public schools have taken up the program.

**NSW Department of Education and Training Community Language Programs**
In 1981, Community Language Programs K-6 were established in NSW government schools. Currently, over 50 000 students and 29 languages are involved in the program. Due to its multicultural and multilingual nature, Australia needs people who possess an understanding of and an appreciation for the diversity of its various community languages and cultures. There is a need to enhance the self-esteem of students with a background in the target language through the recognition of their
language and culture in the normal school day. (NSW Department of Education and Training, Community Languages Program K-6: pp1 & 3)

The purpose of this paper is to bring to the attention of all parties with an interest in Korean language programs, the urgent need to address the decline in teacher numbers and the effect the decline is having on the future of Korean language programs in our schools.

With the exception of the learned papers from Sung-chul Shin, Ho-min Sohn and those papers being presented at this conference, there has been very little study or analysis carried out for Korean programs in NSW. There may well be studies relevant to the Australian need available from overseas. However it is my personal view, that without urgent attention being given to problems that exist for primary and secondary Korean programs, the tertiary program’s future will be severely affected.

I wish to divide what I have to say into two categories. Background speakers and non-background speakers. Firstly, in relation to background speakers:

1. Common generalisations:

1.1 Korean background parental attitudes
It is commonly held that Korean parents will be firm advocates of the study of Korean by their children. I have found this to be an erroneous generalisation. Many Korean parents believe the study effort of their children is best directed to career development and subjects other than Korean. In many cases it is adopting parents who are the most determined to give their adopted Korean background children a sense of identity, and thus enrol their children in classes that provide Korean language and cultural subjects.

Student numbers
In 2001 approximately 500 background speaker students are enrolled at 4 Saturday School of Community Languages (SSCL) centres and 240 students at 4 primary schools are enrolled in the Community Language Program K-6 for government schools.

According to the statistics, 4795 Korean background students were enrolled in government schools in 2000. 2663 in primary school and 2132 in high school. Korean background enrolment numbers are increasing year by year (Tab 1). I do not have the current figure for Korean background students enrolled at private schools. The number of students learning Korean at government schools is minimal compared to the total number of Korean background student (BS) enrolments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Primary school</th>
<th>High school</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>4795</td>
<td>2663 (2.5%)</td>
<td>2132 (2.8%)</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4643</td>
<td>2450 (2.4%)</td>
<td>2193 (2.9%)</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4291</td>
<td>2174 (2.3%)</td>
<td>2117 (2.9%)</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3383</td>
<td>1659 (1.9%)</td>
<td>1724 (2.6%)</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3188</td>
<td>1539 (1.8%)</td>
<td>1658 (2.6%)</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2996</td>
<td>1423 (1.8%)</td>
<td>1573 (2.6%)</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tab 1: Enrolment of Korean BS in NSW Government schools
According to the available information, there are approximately 27 ethnic Korean language schools mostly run by church communities teaching approx 2400 students in NSW.

Considering the number of Korean students enrolled in government schools (4795) and private schools (?), only a small percentage of Korean background students are formally studying Korean. (500 + 240 + 2400)

**Tab 2: Community Languages Programs K-6 Allocation by Language 2001**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Allocations 2001</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Allocations 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>Macedonian</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>Khmer</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>Samoan</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
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The extract below is from the paper presented at the first Korean Studies Association of Australasia in 1999 by Dr Ho-min Sohn, University of Hawaii at Manoa.

**Nurture of all heritage students as bilinguals**

“This has not been an issue in Australasia where immigration history is short. In the next decade on, however, this will become a most important Korean ethnic issue since Korean is the basis through which overseas Koreans maintain their national heritage, identity and pride. All necessary means and support must be mobilised for Korean language maintenance of all heritage students. This movement must be forcefully conducted in concerted efforts by the Korean community, Korean language educators, and relevant Korean government agencies.”

“…..It is imperative to devise ways to motivate all heritage students at all levels to learn Korean. The most essential condition is that we provide them with excellent education - interesting, fulfilling, relevant, and utilitarian. We also need community support.” (Sohn 1999:17) Clearly a more supportive attitude to the school language program by Korean parents is necessary to maintain the Korean cultural heritage and language in the broad Australian community. All heritage students should be encouraged to study Korean continuously from primary through to secondary HSC level.

**1.2 Cohesion and unity within the state-sponsored programs:**

It is clear with the benefit of hindsight that the Korean language programs could have been significantly improved had there existed at the time a greater recognition of the need for cohesion and liaison between the NSW Department of Education and Training, the various universities and the Korean community. In my personal opinion, the Departmental oversight of the potentially invaluable long-term contribution of the universities to primary and secondary programs was an unfortunate miscalculation. However misunderstanding within the Korean community and negativity to the Departmental project from within the universities proved equally detrimental. Fortunately recent efforts by all concerned has seen a
vast improvement. To provide a long term strategic plan we must capitalise on the present supportive and cohesive environment.

2. Teacher training issues and challenges
2.1 Teachers’ commitment to the program
Given the need to maximise the value of every teacher training dollar within the budget, a review of selection processes for the Korean teachers training program is warranted. Clearly, directing funds to teachers who may be unable through pending retirement or location to put into effect the training they have received, will not provide the optimum result. Some schools with a need to secure funds, training and technology, did commit to the program meeting their short-term contractual obligations. However, they did not necessarily show a commitment to the maintenance of the program in the longer term. Situations where primary school teachers had little opportunities to teach Korean to students other than in their own class.

2.2 The long-term benefits of teacher training incentives:
The incentives have brought to light some outstanding teachers committed to the Korean program. However it has been the experience of workshop coordinators and the facilitators of Korean professional development training that the training efforts are often applied to participating teachers who have no intention of specifically dedicating their training to continuously teaching Korean. Future training must be more selectively directed to ensure teachers awarded vocational study and career enhancement opportunities will be those who have a measurable commitment to long term involvement in the Korean program.

Sung-chul Shin identified in his paper four groups of teachers: A, B, C and D. I strongly endorse his groupings and assessments and would add the following comments.

Group A: “Overseas trained Korean native-speaker teachers who have had in-service training in Australia and/or whose qualifications have been approved to teach Korean in Australian schools. These teachers may need continuous English language training, along with on-going in-service training on the Australian education environment and practices, particularly for recently arrived Korean teachers.” (Shin 2000) Additional encouragement is needed to bring these teachers into the system. There is a pool of 24 Korean background teachers currently employed in the Saturday School of Community Languages. Within this group there are 8 NSW qualified teachers. These teachers could clearly be better utilised as fulltime/permanent teachers. However the Community Languages Program K-6 employing these teachers only commenced in 2000 introducing Korean at 4 public schools.

Group B: “Australian English native-speaker teachers who used to teach other languages or subjects and who have had in-service training in Korean in Australia and/or in Korea. These teachers are largely involved in teaching beginner-level Korean. Group B teachers would benefit from on-going extensive training in Korean, along with seasonal cultural training in Australia or Korea.” (Shin 2000) 80 teachers from this group have participated in Korean workshops, 40 of whom are active in program.
Group C: “Young Korean native-speaker teachers who have been educated and trained in Australia and are fluent in both Korean and English. These teachers will also need on-going training in Korean linguistics and area studies.” (Shin 2000) This group is one, which presents the most pressing need. Numbers are minimal, yet surprisingly they often have difficulty finding suitable employment as Korean teachers. As a result they often seek other career opportunities. Encouragement through incentives such as scholarships for university students who want to be Korean teachers is a partial answer, but most importantly the introduction of more schools willing to take up the Korean program will provide the best incentive.

Group D: “Young Australian English native-speaker teachers who have had intensive and Korean extensive language training in Australia and/or in Korea. Group D teachers are primarily involved with non-background Australian students. For group D teachers, it will be desirable to provide on-going language and cultural training lifting proficiency to a higher level, and to update their understanding of Korea, as it undergoes rapid change.” (Shin 2000) Group D teacher numbers are also very low and in particular the number of teachers from this group who are willing to work outside of the Sydney area. However, it is a fact that there are very few opportunities for employment as a Korean teacher, therefore they choose to teach other languages or subjects. All three teachers from within this group have taken up employment elsewhere and are now lost to NSW as Korean teachers. Qualified teachers who are seeking employment as a Korean teacher should not simply wait for a position to arise. My suggestion is that they introduce themselves to school Principals and negotiate to be given a chance to demonstrate the skills they possess and encourage the Principal to introduce the Korean program. We are losing trained teachers, and it is a vicious circle. The teachers who have qualifications cannot find jobs therefore the universities cannot attract the students wishing to be Korean language teachers. Departmental records show that available qualified Korean teacher numbers are very low and the Department therefore cannot expand Korean programs.

2.3 Workshop venues-suitability of location:
Dr Sohn mentioned in his paper. “Teachers must have access to continued professional development opportunities. Well-organised conferences and continuing teacher workshops are required for teachers to meet the wide variety of student needs. Korean language teaching staff must be exposed to current language pedagogy training appropriate for performance-based training.” (Sohn 1999:21) NSW schools teaching Korean are scattered all over the state. Therefore to hold a workshop in a central venue means the expenses for travel and accommodation are quite substantial. Tele-conferencing facilities may prove useful.

2.4 Impediment to appointment of Korean background teachers to remote areas.
For a variety of reasons group A and C teachers are not willing to work outside of Sydney despite incentives such as rapid career advancement opportunities being offered by the Department. This impediment needs indepth analysis.

2.5 Under-utilisation of skills by trained teachers
In some primary schools, due to budget constraints trained teachers are only teaching in their own classes. Much depends on the individual Principal’s support. In some
high schools, the Korean language is a less important subject for the school curriculum so the school executive decides not to offer the program. In other cases, not enough students are selecting Korean, therefore the schools are unable to form a class. Additionally, trained teachers are promoted to executive positions or retire or are transferred to non-participating schools. Thus teacher numbers fall through natural attrition. There are also instances where teachers have expressed a lack of confidence in their ability. This indicates to me that there are insufficient workshops or in-service visits to provide teachers with the required level of teaching comfort. If the Korean program is to continue in NSW there is an urgent need for new, trained young teachers, willing to take up appointment particularly in regional and remote communities.

2.6 Impediment to recruitment of Korean-trained teachers
Only 7 Korean background speaker teachers are employed in NSW public schools. 5 at primary, 1 at the Open High School and 1 at high school. Overseas-trained Korean teachers face difficulty upgrading their qualifications to gain NSW government approval. This comes about mainly from a lack of confidence in their English skills and perceived inability to complete the university course required. Support programs and focused preparatory trial exams may be one way of restoring the confidence of these potential recruits.

2.7 Practicum: lack of Korean-teaching schools in Sydney
There is a lack of practicum opportunities for university students who are training to be Korean teachers. Finding a participating school in the Sydney area is often difficult. There is an urgent need to attract more high schools or give incentives to existing high schools to take on practicum students in Sydney.

3. Other languages’ strategies:
Extensive national government and non-government support is provided for the languages listed below, making them an attractive subject for potential language teachers. Korean language teachers have benefited of late from receipt of support materials in the form of videos, books and awards etc. However support still lags significantly behind that provided to other languages. The following languages offer examples of the type of support required for the Korean program to succeed. Japanese, French, German, Chinese, Indonesian, Italian, Greek.

4. Other issues:
4.1 General decline of language study in schools
This problem is affecting all language groups, not only Korean. The Korean community is well placed to promote the value of the study of the Korean language.

4.2 School budget priorities
Using the Wollongong region as an example, specific funding was directed to teaching Korean in this region. The recipient schools have come to rely upon such additional funding and have stated that without such funding the project will cease. Other schools have prioritised Korean and funded from within their own budget.
5. Some solutions

5.1 Expansion of community language programs at public schools and high schools
Where there are more than approximately forty background students, Korean parents may, if they so desire, make a request to the Principal for a community language program at their school. The Principal will then consider implementing the program together with the staff and as a consequence, background speaker teacher’s employment opportunities may increase. Community language teachers are appointed to permanent positions in the same manner as other mainstream teachers. They must hold a current NSW government teacher’s approval in addition to a community language teacher’s approval which is gained after successfully completing the community language teacher’s test. The Korean community’s awareness of the program is patchy and a targeted promotion is warranted.

5.2 Stimulating interest in Korean programs
- Development of interesting and stimulating resources. ie, high quality videos and movies, cultural and sporting items, innovative on-line programs appropriate for primary and high school language learners
- Provision of e-mail connections
- Appropriate professional development opportunities
- Scholarship opportunities for students and teachers. There are none for high school students.

5.3 Improving language continuity
The NSW Department of Education and Training provides funding support for non-background students in Y10-12 to undertake intensive language study overseas. The program is called Student Language Study in Overseas Countries (SLSOC) and aims to increase students’ language proficiency and motivate students to undertake further language study. Since 1996, 48 students of Korean have participated in the program and undertaken intensive study in Seoul.

For background speaker students, considerable changes have been made to the HSC. “The new HSC syllabus’s key competencies are communicating ideas and information, collecting, analysing and organising information, ...working with others and in teams...”. (Korean Background Speakers Stage 6 Syllabus :P13). Second generation Korean background students are already familiar with this method of learning and will now not feel disadvantaged. Chinese script is omitted from the study and the speaking exam is assessed through an internal exam only. Therefore students can, if necessary, get help from their parents when preparing for their assessment tasks. Parts of the listening and reading exam questions are provided in both English and Korean, enabling students to answer either in English or Korean, thereby fully catering for 1st or 2nd generation Koreans. Most importantly the method of marking the HSC has moved to a standards-referenced approach, ie. no longer does the students’ achievements place them relative to other students in the group.

Korean background speaker primary students should be encouraged to participate in the programs at church based community schools and/or government community language programs. In this manner the necessary continuity of students could be achieved.
5.4 Government and non government funding to enhance teacher employment and the provision of scholarships

5.5 Utilisation of Korean community organisational resources in schools to stimulate interest

5.6 Improved selection of teachers for teacher training

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Community Languages Program K-6 2000, NSW Department of Education and Training
Board of Studies 2000, Assessment Support Document
McRoberts Sook Hee, 2001, NSW Department of Education and Training, KOLSA Teachers Forum

Empirical experience gained from
Feb 1994-June 1995 Korean Language Support Officer, Wollongong Cluster DEET-funded Pilot Korean Language Project
Mar 1996-Mar 1997 Korean teacher for Korean background students, Saturday School of Community Languages
Feb 1997-Jan 1999 Project Officer/Korean, Korean Project, Training and Development Directorate
Responsibilities:
Providing professional development support to schools teaching Korean.
Assisting district and school-based staff in the provision of advice, support in the implementation of the study of Korean
- Planning, organising, and conducting training and development programs for teachers of Korean using a range of delivery modes
- Delivering lessons to the schools where HSC 2 Unit Extended and 2 Unit Z Korean is taught in 1997-1999
- Management of the Tandem Teacher Exchange program with Seoul and Intensive In-country course for the teachers in Seoul
Jan 1999 – Present Korean Language Consultant, Curriculum Support Directorate, NSW Department of Education and Training (DET)
Responsibilities:
- Supporting Schools in the effective teaching of Korean K-12.
- Developing and disseminating materials to implementation of Korean language programs K-12
- Developing and presenting workshops on Korean teaching issues
- Liaising with teachers and the Board of Studies to support changes to the new HSC
- Providing advice for curriculum development in Korean