Intellectual Engagements with Korea: Diversity in Korean Studies in Australasia

Proceedings of the
Fourth KSAA Biennial Conference
14-15 July 2005

Edited by
Changzoo Song & Inshil Choe Yoon
The Korean Studies Association of Australasia

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Edited by
Changzoo Song & Inshil Choe Yoon
University of Auckland
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Editors' Note: Diversity in Korean Studies in Australasia

"Intellectual Engagements with Korea: Diversity in Korean Studies in Australasia" is the theme of the conference. The theme acknowledges the critical need for effective communication among scholars of Korean studies in Australasia, who are scattered in different regions and engaged in a variety of subjects. This involves not only the growth of Korean studies in Australasia, but also the dynamic development of close relations between Korea and Australasia, as seen in the programme and the proceedings of this conference.

The relationship between Korea and Australasia is dynamic. Not only has the trade volume between Australasia and Korea increased greatly, but there have also been active exchanges of human resources. Korean immigrants now form large communities in both New Zealand and Australia, and every year thousands of students from Korea travel to Australasia for study. Meanwhile, significant numbers of young people from Australasia work in Korea, many of them teaching English, and return home with a deeper understanding of Korea.

These trends coincide with Australasia's redefinition of its own cultural identity under the influence of steady globalisation. Interest in Korea has grown considerably over the last decade in both Australia and New Zealand, as economic and cultural ties with Korea have strengthened. Security issues on the Korean peninsula have long met with an informed and engaged local audience, and Australia and New Zealand have been at the forefront of Western nations in developing ties with North Korea and attempting to help ease geopolitical tensions. All of the above contributes to a positive and exciting environment for Korean Studies in Australasia, which is well reflected in this conference.

The Korean Studies Association of Australasia has played an important role of promoting Korean Studies in the region since its establishment in 1994. Its biennial conferences, which have been held since 1999, have proved to be valuable events for scholars in the region. The Fourth KSAA conference is the first of its kind hosted in New Zealand. About eighty scholars from all over the world have presented their papers. The proceedings consist of forty-four papers, which are divided into four sections: language and linguistics, humanities, social science, and business and economics. While case studies on Koreans, New Zealanders and Australians show distinctive features of the region, themes are not confined to these areas but stretch to Europe, North and South America, as well as China and Japan.

The ten papers on Language and Linguistics range from a study of a Korean suffix and the examination of whether Koreans' world view is conditioned by Korean verbs, to that of teaching English as a foreign language in North Korea. Comparative studies are not limited to language use by Korean and Australian expatriates. Studies comparing Korean and English are presented for Korean language learning and teaching, and for a more practical approach to translation and interpretation.

The fifteen Humanities papers range from issues of the Three Kingdom Period to those of the present. Studies on Confucian rituals, pilgrimage of Buddhist monks and the place of shamanism in Korea better illustrate religious and political aspects of Korean mentalities. Also examined are the changes in higher education in Korea during the period of Japanese colonialisation and the unique conditions that prevented an introduction of the 'critical thinking movement' to Korea in the age of globalisation. An interpretation of a Chinese classic and Korean Buddhist and women's literature add another dimension to the humanities section. On a practical level, valuable guides are available for efficient use of Korean references by specialists from Columbia University and Monash University.

The fourteen papers in the Social Science section examine several themes: the search for heritage in the time of Goguryeo and in the recent discourse on common ancestry of Koreans and Japanese, the examination of South Koreans perception of Koreans living in China, the government policies of recent emigration to South America, and the evaluation of practices and policies of North Korea. The Korea-Japan relationship is examined through the comfort women issue, recently built up tensions over Dokdo, and the impact of Korean pop culture. An examination of similar traits of 'low trust' among Koreans and Italians, and that of local
Koreans’ mentality were also made. New religious movements in Korea and Korean students’ culinary practices in Auckland are also examined.

The Business and Economics section has the smallest number of papers. However, the section includes quality papers with thorough examinations. They provide evidence of the high level of Korean Studies being carried out in Australasia.

The editors would like to thank those who contributed their papers. We would also like to thank the University of Auckland (School of Asian Studies and New Zealand Asia Institute’s Korean Studies Centre), the Korea Foundation, the Academy of Korean Studies and the Korean Embassy in New Zealand. Without their generous support this conference would not have been possible. This support encourages scholars in promoting the richness and diversity of Korean Studies to the world.

Changzoo Song & Inshil Choe Yoon
The University of Auckland

July 2005
CHAPTER I. HUMANITIES

Curriculum Project in Korean Studies: Baekje Study Guide

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Introduction

This paper is a preliminary report on a new curriculum development project undertaken within the Korean Studies program in the School of Humanities and Human Services at QUT, in association with the Department of History (College of Humanities and Social Sciences) and the Department of History Education (College of Education) at Gongju National University (GNU), South Korea. Over several years there have been ongoing engagements between these two institutions, culminating in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two universities in March 2004. This MOU provides the basis for an expanded program of staff and student exchanges, joint research and other projects between the departments in these universities.

The Baekje Study Guide is a project that has arisen from the intention to offer the unit Korean Cultures and Societies, currently taught on-campus at QUT, in a fieldwork mode in Korea. During the period in Korea students will be based and accommodated at GNU. The delivery of this subject will be a combination of classes taught on-campus at GNU and a variety of focussed fieldwork activities. Thus the origin of this project is situated in the location at Gongju, which was at one time the capital (Ungjin) of the Baekje kingdom. Within Gongju and the surrounding region are many Baekje sites that can be accessed by visiting students. Thus there are logical and practical reasons for a focus on Baekje culture as a learning pathway into Korean history and culture.

However, there are valuable educational reasons for promoting studies of Baekje dynasty as a learning pathway for foreign students engaged in Korean studies. The engagement of staff from the Departments of History and History Education, Gongju National University is driven by a motive to share understandings of Baekje culture with a broad international audience. This paper will take up a discussion of the learning possibilities of Baekje as a focus area in Korean studies, and present the general features and content of the Baekje Study Guide project.

Fieldwork studies

Recent trends and policies regarding teaching and learning within Australian universities have promoted the notions and practices of what is called (at QUT) flexible delivery. This has largely revolved around the goal to accommodate more student enrollments in courses without commensurate costly increases in staffing numbers. It is well recognised that staff:student ratios have risen significantly across the sector over recent years. Not only has this been caused by general enrollment increases, but also by the closure of subjects that have relatively low enrollments (at QUT the benchmark number of students in a 'viable' subject is 40). Thus students have fewer choices within their courses and the subjects on offer have significantly higher enrollments [reaching 800 students in some subjects at QUT. The pedagogical strategy employed by universities to teach larger numbers of students has been to develop 'smart' delivery of unit content, particularly through internet online delivery using computer technology which allows students to do much of their study without having to attend classes. Flexible delivery is also designed to provide various forms of other non-traditional modes of student learning, to cater for the requirements of students not to be tied to extended weekly hours on campus. Universities are encouraging staff to offer a wide variety of learning modes, which include summer semesters and intensive weekend modes. In these ways universities are providing greater choice to students, while also minimising their own costs of course delivery.
However, there are a number of negative effects of these new forms of delivery. Much of the impact falls on existing staff who are suffering from increased workloads, demands for continued upskilling to produce online learning experiences and content, including interactivity with students and greatly increased course administration burdens. Students also, while welcoming the flexibility of new learning styles, have reacted to a growing isolation and alienation from each other and teaching staff.

In this general context the notion of fieldwork experience or in-country experiences have emerged as popular learning options for students. This has been enhanced by a general lowering of international air-fares and travel costs. Thus such studies have become more affordable to students. Moreover impacts of globalisation have been in the area of rapid transportation so that travel has become faster and in many senses the world has become ‘smaller’ through enhanced communications (Synott, 2004). Thus the centrality of culture in the global perspective has heightened the demand for skills in cultural interaction that can only be met through study combined with experience. The contemporary physical and global cultural contexts, therefore, are conducive to the notion of experiential, fieldwork styles of teaching and learning.

Of course such modes of learning are not new. Language learning areas, geography, anthropology, geology, and archaeology are some disciplines that have long employed the notion of fieldwork as essential components of learning. English-language experiential study is by far the main reason Korean students visit Australia or New Zealand. However in-country learning in Korea for the express purpose of studying history and culture is not well developed. In addition, field-work studies of this kind bring two-way learning when there is a high level of interaction between the visiting students and local students in the corresponding in-country university.

I have been conducting a subject called Korean Cultures and Societies for about five years. This unit does not have a language component, regretfully (although we direct students in language to evening classes in Korean at Institute of Modern Languages, UQ, and provide alternative assessment for them). This has been a relatively successful unit, which had very modest beginnings (just four students) but has now become a well-recognised offering within the Bachelor of Arts course and has an enrollment of about forty students. Students in this class have been very successful in the tertiary/open section of the annual essay competition on Korea conducted by the Korean Consulate in Sydney, including in 2004 when students from this class won first and second prizes in the open section. Nevertheless, in teaching this class to students who generally have very little prior knowledge of Korea, and in spite of the fact that most students handle the content very well and become enthusiasts for Korean history, culture, politics and society, I am deeply aware that it is a huge leap from a high-school Australian education and Australian social context — where there is virtually no meaningful learning about Korea — to a realistic and well-informed understanding of Korea. It is a visceral and cognitive gap whereby Korea remains a distant ‘other’, and there are few points of comparison in the Australian landscape, history, culture or economy to which one can refer as points of comparison — only contrasts exist, in the main. To try and fill the gap I use films and there are a lot of excellent educational materials about Korea on the web. Sites such as Korea.net and many others offer visual as well as textual materials.

Other universities in Australia do have various forms of in-country experience in Korea. Griffith University, for instance has an in-country program conducted with Korea University where students attend lectures and undertake tours.

From 1998 to 2002 the Asia Education Foundation under the National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools Strategy (NALSAS) developed a project titled Studies of Asia Professional Development Modules. This project resulted in the production of ten modules across the following five areas: Teaching Asia (in which I was involved as a member of a QUT team); Arts learning Areas; English Learning Areas; Studies of Society and Environment; Asia In-Country Experience. The final one of these is relevant to the topic of this paper and a number of aspects from the Asia In-Country Experience modules are relevant to the fieldwork program in which the Baekje Studies Guide is a key part of the learning experience.

For instance in one of its early sections the Asia-In Country Experience document identifies the following elements to the learning process of in-country studies that are relevant to this project:

- Provision of opportunities for participants to develop effective observation, interaction, reflection and comprehension strategies while in-country;
- Consideration of the significance and impact of participants’ personal frameworks while undertaking in-country experience;

The Baekje Study guide will address both these areas, along with a range of informed learning experiences that challenge and extend participants; understandings of early Korean history and societies. It is important to insist that such a structured framework for studying Baekje kingdom has not existed previously for non-Korean students of Korean Studies. Partly, this absence can be attributed to the position that Baekje studies have come to occupy in Korean Studies.
The Study of the Three Kingdoms Period in the West:

A crude survey of the available material available in English as learning resources in Korean studies indicates a clear and deserved focus on modern history and culture. Nevertheless, publications, learning websites and films, as well as general discourse (such as newspaper columns and television programs) emphasise the deep and rich historical past underpinning contemporary Korean society. The Korean cultural tree of animism, Buddhism and Confucianism is based in early history. As well, a range of contemporary conflicts have their origins in quite old history, such as the dispute with China over Goguryeo.

Most commonly the treatment of the Three Kingdoms period in Korea is treated as a prologue—albeit an important one—to the emergence of what is important in the ideological discourse of Korean history—a unified Korea that remained so until the division at the 38th parallel in 1945. The existence, basic differences and similarities, struggles and eventual combination through conquest of the Three Kingdoms into United Silla is an interesting historical narrative. In this, the historical focus in Korean studies has always been upon the Silla dynasty. As one official online source from the US Library of Congress put it:

According to South Korean historiography, however, it was the glories of a third kingdom that were the most important elements. Silla eventually became the repository of a rich and cultured ruling elite, with its capital in Kyongju in the southeast, north of the port of Pusan. In fact the men who ruled South Korea beginning in 1961 all came from this region. (http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/6.htm).

The modern focus on Silla is not especially new. The long-standing Joseon dynasty and before that Goryeo, both showed an orientation towards Silla roots. The primary English-language literary sources for the Three Kingdoms period, *Samguk Sagi* and *Samguk Yusa* (Mintz, Ed. 1972), while providing valuable information about all kingdoms of the Three Kingdoms period are primarily focussed on the united Silla society from whence they drew their historical legitimation. *Samguk Yusa* was written late in the Goryeo dynasty and draws a cultural lineage directly from Silla, particularly of Buddhism.

In modern historiography there are recognitions of the role played by each of the Three Kingdoms and their contributions to the united society. However, these recognitions are not equally focussed and I would argue that the reasons for this are not simply because of different available sources of knowledge about the past (although I recognise this to be the case) but because in the process of ‘inventing’ (Hobsbawm, 1983) Korean history there have been justifications for differential attention to each of the Three Kingdoms. In particular, the focus on Silla has emerged in the context of nation-building and the conflict with North Korea. The quote offered above is an interesting testament to that. The argument and evidence for the traditional, thus ‘natural’, configuration of societies on the peninsula as a unified one has been important in the process of nation-building in South Korea and in the case for re-unification. In fact, the moral, political and cultural arguments for re-unification are hinged on this proposition of historical unity of the people. The achievements of the kingdom at Gyongju and the fact that modern Korean language stems from that of Silla (Anselmo, 1974) are important features that emphasise the depth and meaning of a united Korea. One could perhaps contrast this with the historical frames of difference between the regions that were emphasised in the break-up of Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the formation of new nations based on historical boundaries and sense of diverse ethnic identities.

At the same time there has been considerable focus on Goryeo society in recent history. Rightly so, in the sense that Goryeo was the first of the Three Kingdoms to form as a social, political and military organization. However, this interest has been accentuated even in the last few years with, for instance, a series of high-profile exhibitions of Goryeo tomb paintings. There are a range of identity and political interests being served in this attention to Goryeo. Firstly, because of its historical location in the Pyongyang region, where there are Goryeo tombs and other historical sites, the North Korean government and historians have promoted the notion of Goryeo as the hearth of Korean culture — and themselves as the custodians and heir-descendants of that cultural lineage. So the political imperative on historians and politicians in South Korea has been to assert their equal identity and recognition of Goguryeo as an important cultural hearth of the Korean nation, and the region formerly occupied by Goguryeo as the source of the founding legends of the nation (as in the Tungun myth).

Also there has been a promotion, with evidence in Goguryeo art and historical representation, of Goguryeo as a free spirited, shamanist-oriented, warlike, horse-riding culture linked to the plains-living tribes of Mongolia and Manchuria. Historian Han wrote of the ‘preoccupation of the Goguryeo tribes with war and conquest’ (1970,28). These characteristics have been heightened in the context of the current globally oriented promotion of ‘dynamic’ Korea. Thus we find current advertising and promotion campaigns using Goguryeo images in their advertisements and visual iconography.

The other important area where attention has been focussed on ensuring the Goguryeo kingdom is highlighted in Korean history and modern identity is because of the recent claims by Chinese historians that Goguryeo belongs to Chinese history and, implicitly, to Chinese territory. South Korean historians have been vigorous in refuting this claim by drawing out all the evidence that proves the Goguryeo kingdom indeed


basically there are four main places for visits to Baekje sites:

• Around Seoul

In its finished version the Baekje Study Guide will also incorporate at a later stage. In its finished version the Baekje Study Guide will also due to its base in the Gongju region, doesn't, for instance incorporate the resources available around Gwangju. The Baekje fieldwork trail maps out a learning path for students to explore Baekje culture. It will identify the principal sites which can be visited to learn about Baekje. The following material is necessarily provisional and due to its base in the Gongju region, doesn't, for instance incorporate the resources available around Gwangju. However these will be incorporated at a later stage. In its finished version the Baekje Study Guide will also include information on how to access these sites.
• Around Gongju
• Around Buyeo
• Around Gwangju (not covered in this paper).

Learning Elements at These Sites:

• Sites around Seoul
  In Seoul the principal places for learning Baekje culture are:
  The National Museum and National Folk Museum
  The Baekje fortress at Namhansansong (South Fortress)
  The Baekje wall/fortification within Olympic Park.

National Museum: Unlike many museums in Korea, the National Museum has substantial English language information on its displays, including Baekje culture. The museum provides a visual narrative on Baekje culture in the context of a unified Korean history. It opens insights into the broad technological, cultural flows that impacted on the peninsula prior to the Three Kingdoms period — such as the immigrations and settlements of stone-age human populations, and the technological revolutions of the Bronze and Iron ages. [This is most valuable to Australian students who do not have access to experiential learning sites of these revolutions in Australia, where Indigenous communities effectively were forced from stone to steel-age technologies, and the Australian museums display that]. The national museums in Seoul, also present good material on such aspects as the agricultural revolution that spawned Baekje society; displays of Baekje artefacts, reproductions of Baekje clothing and weapons, and dioramas of Baekje villages. The National Museum collection has, not suprisingly, a focus on the development of a unified Korea and its display can be used by students to develop some comparative understandings of the similarities and differences between the Three Kingdoms and emergence of Silla as the dominant line of development of Korean culture and history. Students are also encouraged to critically engage in the representation and historiographical constructions of the national history. Moreover, through this display they are able to gain some understanding of what happened after the destruction of Baekje, in the subsequent history. Baekje, thus, provides an angle, a point of view and platform to absorb and understand the evolution of subsequent Korean society.

In the Seoul district there are other useful Baekje sites where students may absorb valuable aspects of Baekje history and culture. The first Baekje capital Hansong was located here, and from this area have come important artefacts such as the early 5th century small gilt-bronze image of a seated Buddha, which is the earliest known extant Buddhist sculpture found in Korea, which was likely to have been a Baekje model of a Chinese image (www.metmuseum.org/toah/ht/04/ek/ht04ek.htm, accessed 12/04/05). In particular, the earth-wall fortification that runs across what is now Olympic Park marks the first Baekje capital. Hansong, located on the Han River. This incredible construction — dug painstakingly by hand — shows also the importance of strategic positions in securing the capital and also the direction of the enemies of the time: from the Goguryeo region in the north. The Namhansansong (South Fortress), about 30 km south of Seoul is another indicator of Baekje defences and presence in the area, although the current wall was built during the Joseon Dynasty about 1626 as defence against the Manchu invasion. Inspection of this site, thus, provides some insight into later Korean history, not just the Baekje period.

• Baekje Learning Sites around Gyongju.
  With Hansong invaded by Goguryeo in 475 AD and King Paero (r.455-475) executed, the Baekje survivors escaped south and established a new capital at Ungjin (current Gongju), which remained the capital for sixty-three years. Han (1970, 48) commented that Ungjin’s geographical location ‘had virtues as a military strong-point’, which made it favourable for a community that had been forcefully dislocated. Thus the strategic physical environment of Gongju is in itself of educational interest. This period marks the cultural growth of Baekje society and there are a range of sites around Gongju that present valuable learning experiences for students into Baekje history and culture.

  The historical narrative from this period is also very interesting. The Study Guide will carefully trace the Baekje historical narrative to identify the trends, highlights and significance of recognised events in Baekje history. For instance it will recognise the campaign to re-take the Han River basin from Goguryeo in the mid 6th century. Initial successes by Baekje troops there led to a false alliance between Baekje and Silla which resulted in Silla attacking and defeating Baekje and taking possession of the Han River valley. The upshot was a later retaliatory attack by Baekje King Soong on Silla’s western frontier, in which he was captured and killed. These events particularly signify the importance of the rivers in the consolidation and growth of the kingdoms. While the conquest of the Han provided the vital route for Silla to China, Baekje was able to re-group and expand due to its control of the Kum River, on which Ungjin was located in 475 and, henceforth, Baekje society was
oriented towards the south and west, along the strategic route offered by the Kum River. Various kings, however, spent vast national resources and many soldier’s lives trying in vain to recover the lost territory.

These are the main contemporary Baekje sites located around Gongju that provide a learning pathway of evidence and insights into Baekje society:

**Gongsanseong** (Fortress). The fortress was constructed in about 475 when the Baekje royalty retreated to Ungjin from the Han River area. The walls have been well-preserved, while the high-set and relatively small, defensive palace set within the fortress has left ruins in the form of pavilions, the palace site, and the structure of an artificial lake. The atmosphere of this ancient site is emphasised each afternoon with a changing of the guard ceremony at the fortress gates, with local citizens (usually students, as their part-time job) colourfully dressed and acting as Baekje soldiers.

**The Gongju National Museum.** This museum first opened in 1973 but was rebuilt and the new museum opened in 2004. The museum has a contemporary style of presentation, including computer touch-screen information and display. It is located near the sites of the high mounds that were the burial sites of at least six Baekje kings and nearly three thousand items collected from the tombs are in the museum collection. It contains two main collections: the Gallery of King Muryong’s Tomb and Gallery of Ungjin Culture. This is just a fraction of the wealth of the tombs, which were largely forgotten from history and became overgrown by trees and thick scrub over the centuries after the fall of Baekje, then re-discovered in a forced tree-clearing exercise during Japan’s colonial rule in 1935. They were heavily plundered by villagers and the invaders and many items were taken to Japan. The museum is dedicated to Baekje history and culture and offers an extensive display valuable Baekje artefacts, including exquisite gold decorations from the king and queens head crowns, bronze mirrors, shoes and many items signifying the Baekje court culture and unifying aesthetic values and skills. At the centre of this collection is a reconstruction of the burial tombs, particularly that of King Muryong (501–523 AD), whose tomb was discovered—entirely undisturbed 1450 years later—just in 1971 while maintenance work was being conducted on nearby tombs 5 and 6. Not only the construction materials and design of the tomb provide important information about Baekje culture, but the priceless artefacts that were found in the tomb (some 500 are on display) represent valuable sources of knowledge about Baekje. One of the useful features of the new museum over the old one is that information about Baekje is now presented in English-language, although not in sufficient details for in-depth coverage of the culture. King Muryong’s tomb nevertheless is one of the major historical sites in Korea. Close by the museum are the Royal Baekje tombs, including that of King Muryong (Historical Site No. 13), clustered on the hill at Sangesan-ri. Some of these are partially open to the public. As a group they provide valuable understandings into burial practices and beliefs from the early period.

**Temples and Other Sites around Gongju.** There are two temples, Sinwonsa and Magoksa, in the area that have their origins in the Baekje period, as well as pagodas and shrines. All of these impress on students the understanding of Baekje as a diverse and multi-faceted Buddhist kingdom, one of the most advanced societies in the world of its time.

- **Baekje Sites Around Buyeo.**

As Baekje society consolidated in the South West of Korea, and the armies of Silla threatened from the north, the capital was again re-located in 523 from Ungjin (modern Gongju) to Sabi, where the modern city of Buyeo is located. It was here that Baekje culture experienced a phenomenal century of flowering before collapsing under a tragic combination of politics and territorial expansion- self-indulgent and neglectful government under King Uija, a combined, carefully planned invasion from the south and north by massive forces of two neighbouring countries, Silla and Tang China. The last capital at Sabi was occupied and destroyed, leading quickly to the Baekje surrender to Tang Chinese generals on July 18, 660 (Han, 1970,p.82).

**National Museum.** The National Museum at Buyeo is a major site for Baekje culture. It houses an outstandingly-displayed collection of Baekje artefacts, including the magnificent gilt-bronze incense burner that was excavated by accident only in late 1993 from a new housing site in Buyeo. The harmony and design of the three-part incense burner—body, base and lid—are regarded by experts as the apotheosis of Baekje culture, a masterpiece of Baekje Buddhist craftsmanship and symbolism. The museum has many other aspects of interest on display, such as characteristic Baekje pottery. Its collection totals over 7000 relics, including the famous gilt-bronze Seated Maitreya (Buddha of the future) that is often represented in classic images of Korea. Unfortunately there is no English-language information in this museum. In courtyards outside the museum there are impressive displays of Buddhist stone images and other remnants of the Baekje kingdom.

**Other Sites Around Buyeo.** In Buyeo are some of the most significant monuments of the violent and tragic destruction of Baekje in 660, in particular the Busosan (rear garden of the Baekje royal palace including the rock cliff over the river at Nakwhaam (Falling Flowers – because of the colours of their hanbok), where hundreds of court ladies leapt to their deaths rather than be taken captive by the invading soldiers. There are pavilions,
Gungnam Pond of Baekje King Mu, the seven royal tombs of the Sabi Baekje dynasty, the shrine of General Gyeabaek, pagodas, sites for storing grain, Seonghung Sanseong (fortress), and other places for learning about Baekje culture and history in the Buyeo area.

Another major opportunity for learning is the annual celebration and reconstruction of Baekje in the Baekje Cultural Festival, a nation-wide attraction which takes place in October (9-12 each year, alternately in Buyeo and Gongju. The festival features some ninety cultural events, some of which recreate aspects of Baekje culture.

Elements of Baekje Culture

The various sites indicated above constitute the core of fieldwork sites for Baekje studies. Through them, it is planned that participating students can gain tremendous insight into Baekje society through fieldwork experiences. In the Study Guide, these learning experiences will be supplemented by a series of short papers on different aspects of Baekje society and culture. These materials will be jointly prepared by myself and the partners in this project from the Departments of History and History Education, Gongju National University, and where possible they will reference specific elements in the fieldwork learning, such as from the museum presentation of items from King Muryong’s tomb. Likely items on which short papers will be prepared are:

- The origins of Baekje and the great migration from the north
- The mythical origins of Baekje
- The lineage and experiences of Baekje kings and families
- Baekje legends and songs [such as Potato Boy; Warm Rock;]
- Baekje art, tiles and pottery
- Baekje fortresses
- Baekje goldwork, the style and symbolism
- Economy, agricultural revolution, the river and trade
- Community, marriage, families and life-paths
- Buddhism, governance and culture of peace in Baekje
- International relations, neighbours and enemies
- Language? Cultural practices
- The fall of Baekje.

In this process of educating about Baekje society the papers provide for students a framework for inquiry that informs and interrogates the learning experiences of the fieldwork. For instance the drama of the last days and fall of Baekje with the destruction of the capital at Sabi-song in 660 is an epic narrative that is barely recognised in Korean history books, or any other historical literature. Here we have a refined Buddhist kingdom that has lasted hundreds of years, but grown vulnerable under the rule of King Uija who lived ‘an idle and dissolute life’ (Han, 1970, p.81) under invasion by two of the greatest armies ever assembled. On one front, coming overland was the Silla army under the leadership of the legendary general Kim Yu Sin, who was the epitome of the Hwarang Do (FlowerYouth), and the foremost military figure of his times (see Samguk Yusa, 1971 pp.77ff.). He was married into royalty and his family stories would be passed down the generations. He would go on to conquer Goguryeo in the years ahead and bring about Unified Silla. He headed an army of 50,000 men, marching to destroy Baekje, in an uneasy alliance with the rulers of the Tang Kingdom, that had unified China. The Tang navy with 13,000 soldiers was sweeping from the south up the Baengma (lower Kum) River that had been the economic and cultural lifeline for Baekje for centuries. It was a powerful alliance, forged to destroy Baekje then surround and break the intransigent Goguryeo kingdom to the north which had beaten back every effort by China to invade across their common borders, but an alliance underlined with deceit, for both Silla and Tang had plans to occupy and dominate Baekje.

The Samguk Yusa records various portents and symbols of impending disaster leading up to the invasion(1971, pp.82ff.. While the king of Baekje wallowed in helplessness and self-preservation, making his plans to escape, one loyal leader, General Gyeabaek determined to defend his city and people with honour and without retreat. He committed himself to the task by killing his wife and children to spare them the certain tortures of the invaders, and to deny himself any surrender. Then he led out 5,000 Baekje soldiers to Charcoal Pass and they fought to the last man, holding back the onslaught for a few days before being overrun by the Silla army. Yu Sin took and sacked Sabi-song and witnessed the tragic spectacle of the court women throwing themselves to their doom at Nakhwhaam Rock, while Uija made good his escape upriver to Ungjin (modern Gongju). Finally Uija was apprehended and sent to the Tang Emperor in China, along with some 13,000 prisoners. Set free by the Tang Emperor Uija died of illness soon after and was buried symbolically on the same site as other rulers of former states incorporated into China. This epic drama represents a great narrative of
Baekje that captures the imagination of students of Korean history. The narrative and its cultural history provides the signification to the range of sites in the region, such as sites on the river, the port at Gudarae Park, the Naangwha Rock, the shrine of General Gyebaek and so on. [Note: this, admittedly, of course is the experience for most Korean middle-school children who on an almost daily basis visit these sites with their teachers - but such are the realities of the current stage of cross-cultural education. I would say this is an international phenomenon].

Baekje Bibliography, Maps and Timeline

The final aspect of the Study Guide will be a compilation of available resources on Baekje society, including research centres (e.g Baekje Culture Research Centre, Gongju National University; Baekje Research Centre, Chungnam National University); written sources; online sources. The Guide will also incorporate relevant maps and a chronological timeline of the Baekje kingdom.

Baekje Learning Pathways into Other Aspects of Korean Culture

One of the other important aspects of the Baekje Study Guide is that it sets out to identify how an understanding of aspects of Baekje society, history and culture may lead into other aspects of Korean culture. One image of Korean culture that I use in my classes is that of Culture Tree, which depicts a tree whose roots and trunk are labelled as Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism and animism, and from this base grows all the other elements of Korean culture including music, literature, crafts philosophy, social values and so on.

So too, a study of Baekje society can be employed as a learning pathway into the other Kingdoms and those foundational values of Buddhism, or institutions like temples, or the development of ceramics and other arts. For instance, the great fall of Sabi-song story I told above and its central character of General Yu Sin, can provide, in structured learning for students, insights into the Hwarang system of elite and noble warriors, and that can include not only values such as the O-Han (loyalty to King; filial piety to parents; sincerity to friends; bravery in war; mercy in killing) but inquiry into the martial arts in which the Hwarang excelled, from which the modern Tae Kwon Do has developed, with its 24 patterns, each symbolizing 'important or heroic figures or instances relating to historical events that shaped the course of Korean history' (www.fightingspirit.co.uk/article2.htm). In Tae Kwon Do there are two major sequences of martial movements named, respectively after Generals Gyebaek and Kim Yusin. In this respect the study of Baekje can be used as a linked learning device for investigating a range of interesting perspectives into subsequent Korean society and culture.

The fieldwork component has rich possibilities for contributing to these learning pathways, as there are many representations of subsequent dynasties and, of course, the modern society, within the range of the intended in-country experience. For instance a number of outstanding temples dating from the United Silla period are easily accessible from Gongju and Buyeo.

Baekje as a Study of Regional Relations

The study of Baekje society provides unique opportunities for study of early political, economic and cultural relationships in the East Asian region. Baekje had strategic relationships with Japan and China and is well-recognized as a source of cultural product and expertise that was exported to Japan through both exchange and appropriation (plunder) and also as a singularly important transition of knowledge from China to Japan, such as Buddhism. The links between Baekje and Japan are said to include the transfer of the grammatical structure of Baekje language to Asuka Japan (Anselmo, 1974). It is also claimed that Paekche introduced the fermented alcoholic drink ‘sul’, that is, saki, to Japan (www.soolsool.co.kr/English/koreanliquor.htm). Also steel and bronze swords, along with the technique of multi-folding that characterised samurai swords, were said to have been transmitted from Baekje to Japan. Moreover, the claims for lineage between a descendent of the Baekje King Muryong and the mother of Japanese Emperor Kammu (781-806) points towards inter-marriage between Baekje and early Japanese rulers (www.jref.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-41.htm). Additionally, indications that Japan was the destination of Baekje refugees after the Silla invasion, raises intriguing questions of historical links underpinning contemporary Korea-Japan relations. The presence and impacts of Japan on the peninsula is well understood from the Baekje platform. So too with China, the study of Baekje opens learning pathways into such areas as Chinese history, religion, art, technology and its relations with neighbouring societies through the first five centuries - Europe’s Dark Ages.

In short, the Baekje study guide will contain a series of written papers that focus on those aspects of regional interaction, and place the relations of this region in some frame of world developments at the same time.
Global Understandings: Patterns of Change and Interactions

A further aspect of the Baekje study guide is to locate Baekje within frameworks of world history. Contemporary patterns of globalisation invite students from the West to move beyond Eurocentric constructions of world history. As I wrote in my recent book: 'The framework of global history provides students as globally-oriented professionals with multiple perspectives and different reference points with which to solve contemporary problems and issues' (Synott, 2004, p.53). The 'international' roles of Islam, China and the Mongols, for instance represent significant forces in world history that are only beginning to gain recognition outside specialist historian circles. The experience of a small but specialised and highly developed culture like Baekje provides yet another framework for understanding world history. For instance, while the impacts of 'warrior globalisation' (Bayly, in Hopkins, 2002, p. 69) as represented for instance by Genghis Khan have been recognised, Baekje has at times been described as 'the peaceful kingdom' for its centuries of internal peace and harmony that characterised one of the most singularly developed Buddhist kingdoms. The model of an early history culture of peace and social benevolence can be a symbol of hope and enlightenment in the rapidly changing and frequently violent contemporary world. Moreover useful comparisons and contrasts can be made between Baekje and other kingdoms of its time, like European societies at that time under the control of the Roman Empire, or the emergence and expansion of Islam in the same period.

Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to explain the broad features of an innovative approach to some aspects of Korean studies. This curriculum project will establish new resources in Korean studies through a focus on Baekje culture in a joint project between a Korean and Australian university to produce an English language Baekje Study guide. The guide is intended to lay out the learning pathways for in-country learning experience in Korea, supplemented with innovative written resources. It will bring together curriculum development and content expertise from universities in Australia and Korea and, thus, represents a valuable collaboration of research and scholarship in the educational area. Funding for the project has been sought from the Australia-Korea Foundation and, pending that outcome, other sources will likely be approached. A further potential is that much of the Baekje Study Guide, including virtual visits to Baekje sites, and the textual items, maps, cultural learning paths could be developed digitally and online, given sufficient finance and expertise. In the meantime we hope to establish the basic design and contents for this structured learning experience in Korea as a distinctive experience of the Three Kingdoms period.

Notes on Author

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References


Yang Ch'on Kwôn K'un's Understanding of the Book of Changes

Dane Alston
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1. Introduction

Yang Ch'on Kwôn K'un (陽村 樺近, 1352-1404) was one of a number of Confucian bureaucrat/scholars who was deeply disturbed by what was regarded as the depraved and degenerative hold that Buddhism commanded over Koryô society. Kwôn and his colleagues sought political and social change at all levels of society and they drew heavily from Confucianism, in particular emerging Sung Dynasty interpretations of Confucianism, to formulate polemical attacks against Buddhism and to propose institutional, social and cultural change.

The remaining works of Kwôn Kûn provide not only some of the earliest extant writings on Confucianism in Korea, but are also a fascinating insight into this period of turbulent change and they reveal how he was actively engaged in trying to formulate a new society. Before setting his mind to this task Kwôn had already distinguished himself in the civil service examinations and spent 20 years working for the government principally in the divisions of education and literary composition. It was not until his year of exile commencing in October 1389 that he turned his hand towards writing about matters closer to his heart, in particular poetry, but also Confucianism. Once freed from incarceration in November 1390 he settled in Ch'ungchu Yangch'on (忠州 陽村) whereupon he took to teaching and writing. The duration of his stay in Yangch'on was only three years, yet during this period he composed the *Iphaktosôl* (入學圖說, Diagrammatic Explanation of Introductory Studies) in July 1390, designed principally to help his students understand the teachings of Cheng-Zhil Confucianism, then later in March 1391 he wrote *Ch'ŏnyŏnrok* (禮記箋錄, Record of Humble Thoughts), which is comprised of his analysis of the *Book of Poetry, Spring and Autumn Annals, Book of Documents* and the *Book of Changes*. Also during this time he started working on *Yeji Ch'ŏnyŏnrok* (禮記箋箋錄, Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Rites), a work started by his teacher Yi Saek (李楨, 1328-96), but which he did not complete until 1406.

Kwôn's *Iphaktosôl* is widely regarded as his interpretation of Chêng-Zhil Neo-Confucian teachings, however in my previous research (Alston, 2005, p.15-6) I have found that while Kwôn certainly addresses these teachings, his focus extends well beyond this particular interpretation of Confucianism and he does not dogmatically parrot their teachings. In fact, there is a sense that he is trying to explain these teachings to his students, while at the same time clarifying that they are not his thoughts (Alston, 2005, p.15). The scope of Kwôn's *Iphaktosôl* encompasses all of the major texts of the Confucian corpus, however of particular interest though is his presentation of the Five Classics – *Spring and Autumn Annals, Book of Changes, Book of Poetry, Book of Documents* and *Book of Rites*. Compared to the two chapters on Chêng-Zhil teachings, his work on the Five Classics comprises the greater proportion of the book. In two complimentary chapters Kwôn arranges the Five Classics according to the essence-function schema (體用) and explains their relation in the following manner (Kwôn, 1634, p.48):

I think the *Book of Changes* is the complete essence of the Five Classics, [and] the *Spring and Autumn Annals* are the great function of the Five Classics. The *Book of Poetry* through the way of governance [manages] affairs, the *Book of Poetry* through words [expresses] nature and feelings, the *Books of Rites* through respect [establishes] discretion and culture. Even if each [Book is regarded] exclusively as one text, they are still furnished by the essence and function of the *Book of Changes* and *Spring and Autumn Annals*. Alas they are called great! Sages [were the] complete essence of the Five Classics, [and] the Five Classics [were the] great function of the Sages. The *Book of Changes* is the way that has Heaven and Earth and the essence of Sages. The *Spring and Autumn Annals* is the way that has sages and cannot be different to Heaven and Earth. Therefore He (司) put forth the diagrams and the pictures of the *Book of Changes; Spring and Autumn Annals* was written and the rare was achieved.

Kwôn continues with this essence-function analysis and applies it to each of the Five Classics so as to highlight their key points. My conclusion to this was (Alston, 2005, p.14):

These two chapters reveal Kwôn's understanding of the Confucian corpus on the whole as both an overarching scheme that controls, orders and explains society, while also composed of distinct units dealing with specific issues. On a macro level the *Book of Changes* and *Spring and Autumn Annals*
represent the foundation of the cosmos and its ultimate embodiment. Between these two, on a micro
level, the Book of Documents, Poetry and Rites are the basic framework of society. They regulate,
epitomize and guide governance, society, culture and human conduct. The essence-function scheme is
again applied to each text so as to derive their key themes. Kwôn orders this scheme on both the
macro (합一) and micro (各分) level using the essence-function schema.

The aim of the present paper is to expand upon my previous research by further examining Kwôn’s
understanding of the Five Classics, focusing in particular on his understanding of the Book of Changes. Kwôn
locates the Book of Changes as the metaphysical framework underpinning the cosmos, society and mankind, and
in the remaining chapters of the Iphaktosol he dedicates more pages to aspects of the Book of Changes than to
any of the other texts. The present study will not be confined to the Iphaktosol alone, but will also include his
Chuyok Ch’ònkyønrok (周易淺見錄, Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes of the Zhōu Dynasty).
In approaching this analysis I will initially provide a brief account of the Book of Changes, its basic structure,
origins and history, and then I will briefly review scholarship done on Kwôn’s understanding of the Book of
Changes. After this I will examine Kwôn Kün’s understanding of the Book of Changes as found in his Iphaktosol
and Chuyok Ch’ònkyønrok.

2. Book of Changes – its structure, origin, history and interpretations

The Book of Changes is perhaps one of the most central texts of East Asian intellectual history. It has a long
history and its use and interpretations have had a profound impact throughout the ages. Edward Shaugnnessy
(1996, p.1) writes in his introduction that along with the Bible, the Book of Changes is “the most read and
commented work in all of world literature”. Even through to the present day it continues to occupy an important
position in East Asian societies.

The Book of Changes as we know it today is composed of two main sections; the main canon (本金) and its
appendices known as the ‘ten wings’ (十翼). The main canon is comprised of 64 symbols known as ‘gua’
(ḵwae/괘, 卦). Each gua is made up of six lines known as ‘xiāo’ (hyo/爻, 縫) and they are either full lines __ or
broken lines __, respectively called ‘yáng’ or ‘yín’ (yang/陽, 阳 or um/陰, 陰). The xiāo are arranged into
eight groups of trigrams, that are then added together to make a total of 64 hexagrams. The hexagrams are
arranged in the text, each with a brief explanation called a ‘tuán’ (単, 貫), attributed to King Wen of the Zhōu
(c. BCE -1150). In addition to the tuán there are six sentences called the ‘appended judgments’ (hyosa/宿史, 委
disc or kyesal/계사, 騎辭) that were purportedly written by the Duke of Zhōu (c. BCE -1100). Following the main
text there are ten appendices, the first two, “Treatise of tuán”, and the third and fourth, “Treatise on Symbols”,
are both attributed to Confucius. The fifth and sixth appendices are known as the “Great Appendix.” Appendix
seven is the “Explanation of the Sentences” and eight is the “Discourse on the Trigrams.” “Treatise on Ordering
Sequence of Hexagrams” and “Treatise on Oppositions of the Hexagrams” make up the last two appendices.

Scholars remain divided in their opinions as to the origin of the Book of Changes. If taken literally King Wen and
the Duke of Zhōu had an active role in its writing and Confucius is also attributed to writing some of the
appendices and even ordering the text. James Legge (1899), who offered one of the earliest English translations
of the Book of Changes, takes the text as originating long before the time of Confucius, even before the time of
King Wen and the Duke of Zhōu. In the Analects (7:16) Confucius is reputed as saying, “Given more years, if I
studied the Book of Changes, I could possibly make no big mistakes”. While Legge (1899, p.1, 3) recognizes this
quote of Confucius as possibly being a corruption of the Analects, he claims that, in conjunction with references
found in Ssu-ma Kuang (1018-86), it points to the Book of Changes existing long before the time of Confucius.
Legge (1899, p. 6) draws literally on a number of texts and claims that the Book of Changes was probably
written in 12th Century BCE.

Joseph Needham (1956) offers a far more pragmatic, if somewhat condescending, analysis of the Book of
Changes and its origins. While he recognizes that the Five Phases (五行) and Two Forces (Yin and Yang)
thories helped contribute to scientific and technological progress in early China, he condemns the Book of
Changes as being the text most responsible for inhibiting later Chinese scientific development. Of the Book of
Changes he writes (Needham, 1956, p.304):

Originating from what was probably a collection of peasant omen texts, and accumulating a mass of materials used in the practice of divination, it [the Book of Changes] ended up as an elaborate system of symbols and their explanations (not without a certain inner consistency and aesthetic force), having no close counter part in the texts of any other civilization.

Needham dismisses the ‘traditional’, literal interpretation of the book’s origins by Legge and even the idea that
the text was written during the Warring States period (3-4th Century BCE), as held by other scholars, by pointing
out that among other reliable texts of 3rd Century BCE there is no mention of the Book of Changes (Needham,
Instead, Needham suggests the Book of Changes originated from 7-8th Century BCE omen compilations which did not coalesce into its present form before the end of the Zhōu dynasty. The appendices he also locates as having been written by Chin and Han dynasty Confucian scholars, the latest being around 1st Century CE (Needham, 1956, p.307).

As far as its position as a divination text is concerned, the Book of Changes appears to be one of a variety found during this time. While it is thought that the text possibly derives from oracle bone or milfoil divination practices, Needham also points out that in the Zhōu Lì (周礼, Record of Rites of the Zhou), composed during the Han dynasty, the Book of Changes appears as one of a triplet of key divination texts know as the ‘Three In’ (三易); the other two being the Lian Shān and Gui Cāng. These two texts have since been lost and only the Book of Changes remains. Yet another text of similar appearance, complete with quadragrams and commentaries rather than hexagrams, and appearing around the same time is the Canon of Supreme Mystery (太玄经) by Yang Hsiung (BCE 53-CE 18). This text also has a long and rich history in China, however the Book of Changes appears to have been more popular and had greater appeal beyond China itself (Yang, 1993).

Further evidence pointing to the accretive origin of the Book of Changes can be found by looking at its linguistic and stylistic structure. Richard Rutt (1996, p.205) in the introduction to his translation of the Book of Changes, discusses at length the linguistic difficulties and complexities of the text and he describes its language as difficult, obtuse and evasive, and the internal structure of the text as having “no extended arguments, narratives or descriptions”, leaving the reader to “infer syntactic relations between clauses and sentences” much like in poetry. Rutt (1996, p.206-13) explains that most translations of the Book of Changes to date ignore or fail to recognize the change in vocabulary and nuances as the text passed through different dynasties.

Although the origin of the Book of Changes lies in its role as a divination text, its role soon expanded dramatically. Needham contends that as the Book of Changes accumulated its appendices, and later still commentaries, the focus of text expanded from mere divination to explaining cosmology and ethics. As this accumulative process continued, so the role of the text expanded (Needham, 1956, p.310):

The more abstract the explanations became the more the system as a whole assumed a character of a repository of concepts, to which all concrete phenomena in Nature could be referred.

As a ‘repository of universal concepts’ the hexagrams and their process of permutation then became a means by which people could understand changes in the natural and social world. Needham suggests this was developed principally by Han Confucians and the School of Naturalist who, “looking for peace of mind through classification” developed “a comprehensive system of symbolism containing in some ways all the basic principles of natural phenomena” (Needham, 1956, p.328).

Pung Yu-Lan (1996) offers yet another angle to the early development of the Book of Changes corroborating this development. He explains that the text’s newly expanded role corresponded to a general expansion in Confucian metaphysics and that one of the most distinguishing features was its understanding of the concept of Tao (道). He notes that with the inclusion of the appendices the concept of tao transformed from previous Taoist understandings of the tao being ‘nameless’ to the tao being nameable. He writes (Fung, 1996, p.167):

We may distinguish between the two concepts [of Tao] by referring to the Tao of Taoism as the Tao, and that of the “Appendices” as tao. The Tao of Taoism is the unitary “that” from which springs the production and change of all things in the universe. The tao of the “Appendices,” on the contrary, are multiple, and are the principles which govern each separate category of things in the universe.

This change in definition of tao to a ‘principle of things’ meant that a number of related issues such as regulating social positions and individual conduct came under the purview of the Book of Changes. For Confucians of all times and ages the issues of ruler ship, social order, conduct and so forth have been perennial concerns and increasingly the Book of Changes came to offer a metaphysical cipher to reinforce their arguments and interpret affairs.

From this understanding it is not difficult to see how the Book of Changes lent itself so easily to application in all fields from science to administration and even to cosmology, but still more, held great appeal to the concerns of Confucian scholars. It was simply a matter of an extension to formulate ideals of ethics and society based on an understanding of how phenomena in the world interact. Correct and appropriate actions were judged as conforming to the principles of how the universe was perceived to work and conversely, going against the grain of these principles meant going against nature and was deemed wrong, evil or simply tempting fate. This process of ‘correlative organismic thinking’, as Needham explains it, meant that the principles of Nature were not only decipherable, but that the principles of how Nature rightly worked could be projected into all facets of life and society. This in effect elevated the principle of Nature to the status of being a normative value and the Book of Changes to being a text for unlocking, deciphering and interpreting the moral weight of all phenomena and action.

An exhaustive review of the history of commentaries on the Book of Changes would entail a book in itself,
however looking briefly at its long history among the earliest commentaries were those of Wang Bi (王弼, 226-49). His commentaries were later compiled along with others into the Correct Meanings of the Five Classics (五經正義) during the Tang. Around the same time Yi Ding Zuò (李鼎祚) also compiled a collection Han Dynasty commentaries of the Book of Changes into the Collected Explanations of the Book of Changes (周易集解). From this time onwards the attraction of the Book of Changes extended well beyond scholars and Confucians with even Buddhists writing on it. During the Sung Dynasty we find the commentaries continuing, however Cheng Yi’s (程頲) Yi Chuán’s Treatise on Change (伊川易傳) and Zhu Xi’s (朱熹) Fundamental Meaning of the Book of Changes (周易本義) emerge as popular works. These works were widely accepted during the Yuan and were eventually combined during the Ming into what became regarded as the standard interpretation, the Great Treatise on the Book of Changes (周易大傳). This compilation gained widespread appeal and became the standard work of reference even in Chosŏn Korea. In Japan too the Book of Changes came to influence a variety of spheres within society. According to the research of Wai-Ming Ng (2000) the Book of Changes was instrumental in fields from politics and philosophy through to the formation of military tactics and stratagem. Throughout China, Korea and Japan the Book of Changes increasingly attracted commentaries and with this trend, its importance as a text became crystallized within each society.

It is unlikely that the origins of the Book of Changes are as distant and distinct as Legge first thought, and more probably constitute the accretive evolution as described by Needham and most present day scholars. Even still, as the origins of the Book of Changes appear to lie in the tangled roots of ancient Chinese agricultural divination texts, it is more than apparent that the scope of the Book of Changes, from at least the Han Dynasty onwards increasingly grew from a merely augurist text to encompass a method of abstracting the principle workings of Nature and using them to evaluate actions in a normative manner throughout all aspects of society.

The appeal of the text over the centuries points to its capacity for multifarious usages and readings, allowing it to adapt to the needs of specific individuals and times. Also Shaughnessy (1996) and Rutt (1996) both point to the nature and structure of the Book of Changes itself as further adding to its appeal. Shaughnessy (1996, p.1) explains that the enigma of the Book of Changes lies not only in its unique linguistic structure, but also in its incorporation of hexagrams and its applicability to philosophical thought:

The enigmatic images of its hexagram and line statements have been adapted to every imaginable life situation, while the world view of its Xici or Appended Statements commentary — integrating man and nature through the medium of the Yijing — is arguably the most sophisticated (it is certainly the most subtle) statement of the correlative thought that has been fundamental to all of China’s philosophical systems.

The layers within the text and the unique melding of text and symbols produce a peculiar text that continued to catch the imagination of East Asian scholars for centuries. Summarizing the ensemble of the text, Rutt (1996, p.214) suggests that perhaps a large part of the appeal of the text lies in its style: “In the Zhou-yi ambiguity is of the essence”. While this ambiguity and inconsistency led Needham to be quite dismissive of the Book of Changes, scholars generally recognize that it occupied an important place in East Asian society and informed the lives of a great many people, and accordingly must be treated with due respect and given careful consideration as a cornerstone of Chinese, Korean and Japanese societies.

3. Review of scholarship on Kwŏn Kŭn’s Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes Zhōu Dynasty

In 1391, at the age of 40, Kwŏn Kŭn set aside his completed Iphaktosŏl and turned his attention to working on his individual analysis of each of the Five Classics. In his personal chronology (年譜: anon., 1984, p.6) it states:

The 24th year of Hong Mu, at the age of 40: In January went to the capital and was pardoned [from his exile]. In March returned to Chungchu Yangch’ŏn. Investigated the meaning of the passages of the Book of Rites one after another and also wrote Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes, Book of Poetry, Book of Documents and Spring and Autumn Annals.

It took Kwŏn another 15 years before he was to finish his work on the Book of Rites, a task bestowed upon him by his teacher Yi Saeck. Interestingly, tracing the dates of publication of his Record of Humble Thoughts reveals a peculiar twist of events. Even though Kwŏn appears to have finished his Record of Humble Thoughts on four of the classics in the same year he started, it is difficult to pinpoint their first date of publication. On the other hand, records show that the King encouraged Kwŏn with his work on the Book of Rites in 1391 and 1392 (Ch’ŏn, 1991, p. 165), and later a memorial was presented to the throne in 1406 notifying of its publication (cited by Ch’ŏn, 1991, p. 166). It appears that after Kwŏn’s death his work on the Book of Rites was reprinted a number of times by his son (Ch’ŏn, 1991, p.167). However up until 1404 there is still no mention of the publication of the other four Records (Ch’ŏn, 1991, p. 165), in fact the earliest mention of them comes in 1433 (Sejong 15) when the Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes, Poetry, Documents and Spring and Autumn Annals are
cited as being published, however in the same sentence his Iphaktošol and Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Rites are also stated as being published (Ch'on, 1991, p. 167). The fact that the publication of his Records is listed separately suggests that his work on the Book of Rites was regarded separately to his other works. Tracing the events surrounding four of Kwŏn's Records and attempting to unravel the reasons surrounding their publication, or lack there of, is an important issue that will be addressed at a later point.

While the exact details of what happened to Kwŏn's Records remains to be uncovered, it seems as though they were more or less lost or disregarded until their recent rediscovery in 1960s. The Korean government promptly designated Kwŏn's Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes and Book of Poetry as treasures (賓物) respectively in 1971 and in 1973. In spite of this discovery, it took around a decade for interest in Kwŏn and his writings to take off, and even then it only covered certain topics. The earliest article to look at Kwŏn's writing on the Book of Changes was Kim Sŏng-hyŏn's (金承炫) "Kwŏn Kŭn's philosophy of classical studies as found in his Humble Thoughts on the Five Classics" in 1986.

From the 1990s the number of articles examining Kwŏn's writings on the Book of Changes swelled considerably. In 1991 Ch'on Hye-bong (千惠鴻) and Im Ch'ang-su (任昌洙) each published a paper in the Sochihakpo (서지학보) relating to Kwŏn's Records on the Book of Changes. Ch'on's article (1991) titled, "Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes, Poetry and Documents" looks at the complicated issue of when these Records were published, while Im's article (1991), "The academic meaning of the Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes", deals specifically with Kwŏn's understanding of the Book of Changes and highlights his understanding of the text in regards to Zhu Xi. Yuan Dynasty scholar Wu Chêng (吳澄), and also the issue of orthodoxy/heterodoxy. In 1993 Ch'oe Yŏng-sŏng wrote an article called "Kwŏn Kŭn's Philosophy of the Classics Seen Through His Record of Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes" in which he focused on revealing Kwŏn's critique of Buddhism. Two years later Choi Won-jin (1995) published an article examining the moral philosophy found in Kwŏn's analysis of the Book of Changes. Towards the end of the 1990s Cho Chang-yŏn (1997) published a general analysis of Kwŏn's analysis of the Book of Changes covering many of the issues dealt with by previous scholars. Lastly, Yi Kwang-ho (1999) offered the first translation of three of Kwŏn's Records into vernacular Korean.

With the turn of the century research on Kwŏn's Book of Changes continues unabated with Eom Yeon Seog (2003) writing about Kwŏn's interpretation of the Book of Changes and its relationship to morality. Lee Ki Hoon also published an article in 2002 comparing Kwŏn's interpretations of the elements of the Book of Changes with those of Zhu Xi and in the following year Kang Moon Sik (2003) provided a detailed and more contextual analysis with his article, "A Study on Kwon, Geun(WHli)'s Commentary about Book of Changes (周易)"(sic.). In the same year Seo Guen Shik (2003) broke rank with the trend of previous scholarship and published an interesting article examining the structure of the essence-function theory (體用論) in Kwŏn's studies of the Book of Changes.

Looking across the research conducted over the last decades the most obvious tendency has been to look at Kwŏn's work on the Book of Changes in regard to Zhu Xi. Following closely to this has been the attempt to reveal his moral understandings or even his anti-Buddhist position. Not surprisingly, this narrow approach and its reiteration of the same themes have done little to shed new light on Kwŏn's understanding of this text. In the following section I will highlight the main themes found in Kwŏn's interpretation of the Book of Changes, then discuss these themes in light of previous scholarship.

4. Kwŏn Kŭn's understanding of the Book of Changes

4.1 The Iphaktošol: As briefly outlined in the introduction, Kwŏn Kŭn introduces his understanding of the Book of Changes firstly in his Iphaktošol (1634). Kwŏn describes the Book of Changes as the complete essence (全體) and the Spring and Autumn Annals as the great function (大用) of the Five Classics (Kwŏn, 1634, p. 48). These two texts constitute the boundary and framework of his understanding of the Five Classics, which appear as an integrated and interrelated conceptualization of the world and society. Changes and Annals contrast with each other and contain the remaining three classics, which is best illustrated in Kwŏn's own diagram (1634, p. 48):

Diagram of the Unified Essence-Function of the Five Classics

Book of Changes(易經): Complete Essence (全體)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complete Essence (全體)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Book of Changes(易經)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Book of Rites(禮)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book of Poetry(詩)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Book of Documents(書)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture(文化)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Etiquette(禮儀)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reprimand(懲)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authority(勳)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punishment(罰)</td>
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<td>through governance</td>
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This concise diagram shows how Kwôn conceptualizes the Confucian corpus as an integrated whole with application to various facets of society, governance and culture.

Continuing with the essence-function framework, Kwôn applies it to each of the Five Classics. For the Book of Changes he (1634, p. 49) describes its complete essence as 'principle' (理), or "that which Heaven and Earth has", and its great function as the 'way' (道) and "that which the sage has". The Spring and Autumn Annals have the 'way' (道) as their complete essence and 'authority' (權) as its great function. In the case of the Annals the 'way' is described as, "originates from the principle of Heaven and Earth" and 'authority' as "action/conduct coming from the sage's mind" (1634, p. 49). Kwôn qualifies the connection between Changes and Annals in the accompanying text describing (1634, p. 48), "The Book of Changes is the way that has Heaven and Earth and the essence of Sages. The Spring and Autumn Annals is the way that has sages and cannot be different to Heaven and Earth". Kwôn is explaining that the Book of Changes represents the cosmological principle and its most complete physical manifestation is the Sage, as epitomized in the Spring and Autumn Annals. During this time the sages of antiquity best embodied the way of Heaven and Earth and their actions conformed to the principles of Heaven. Put another way, he is arguing that the complete essence of the Book of Changes is 'principle' (理), namely the principle of Heaven and Earth, and its function is the 'way' (道), which is possessed by the sage in their understanding of principle and is reflected though their actions, which conform to this principle. Taken more broadly, the principle of Heaven is also the complete essence upon which the phenomenal world is based and is the thread tying the Five Classics together.

In the remaining chapters of the Iphaktosol Kwôn's coverage of aspects of the Book of Changes covers three overlapping themes: explaining the principle of Heaven, showing the application of the principle of Heaven and explaining its numerical permutations. Looking firstly at his explanation of the principle of Heaven it is clear that one of his primary concerns is to explain the fundamental structure and components of the Book of Changes. In the chapter, "Diagram of Supreme Ultimate producing the Two Laws, Four Shapes and Eight Trigrams" Kwôn (1634, p. 54) gives a succinct summary explaining the basic formation of hexagrams from the Supreme Ultimate (太极) to the Two Righteousness (兩儀), namely Yin and Yang as represented by either a full or broken line. These in turn combine to produce Four Symbols (四象) which are composed of two lines of Yin and Yang. Lastly, these four symbols combine to create the Eight Hexagrams (八卦) which are the basis of the Book of Changes. Kwôn's diagram is clearly intended for the beginner and is obviously an important basis for understanding the theoretical foundation of the Book of Changes that also carries over into many related issues.

Aside from merely describing the formation of the hexagrams, Kwôn provides an understanding of the workings of the principle of the Book of Changes, to which he devotes several chapters. For example, Kwôn (1634, p. 52, 53) explains the basic function of the principle using "Diagram of Hé Tú's Five Phases of Mutual Production" and "Diagram of Lu Shù's Five Phases of Mutual Destruction". With these two diagrams and their accompanying text Kwôn shows how the Five Phases evolve through either mutual production (相生) or mutual destruction (相克). Each of the Five Phases corresponds to spatial quadrants of the compass, numbers represented by black or white dots and their process is described as "circulating, endless and producing" (1634, p. 52). The explanation for the latter diagram basically follows the same path as the former, except emphasizing extinction rather than production between the Five Phases. One notable difference in the latter diagram is that Yin and Yang are introduced in the explanation along with 'correctness' (正) and 'partiality' (偏). Kwôn explains these two qualities writing that, "Yang houses correctness. Yin houses partiality" (1634, p. 53). Following from this Kwôn proceeds to explain how the numbers relate to directions of the compass, the Five Elements and also Yin and Yang. These two diagrams and their accompanying explanations show how the basic nature or matter of phenomena forms and evolves through the Five Elements, Yin and Yang, and how they are morally colored as 'correct', in the case of Yang, or 'partial' in the case of Yin.

Among other issues, Kwôn provides a brief illustration of the basic eight hexagrams as they relate to heavenly positions in a circular fashion and earthly positions in a linear way (1634, p.56, 57). Here Kwôn is trying to show the movement and action of Heaven and the direction and sequence of the hexagrams on Earth. Expanding on the previous explanation of how the principle of Heaven relates to the fundamental nature of phenomenon, here without drawing the hexagrams themselves, Kwôn explains that using the Chinese characters for the hexagrams alone acts as a substitute for their meaning. In a similar manner to above, Kwôn relates Heaven and Earth to Yin and Yang, movement and quiet to show the integration of the hexagrams in a circular and linear manner.

Turning to the second of Kwôn's themes, showing the application of the principle of heaven, he specifically provides two diagrams: "Fúxí's (伏羲) Eight Trigrams Preceding Heaven" and "King Wen's Establishing the Directions After Heaven" (1634, p. 59-61). With these two diagrams and explanation Kwôn points to the sages
of antiquity who distinguished themselves in that they used the principle of Heaven once it was revealed, hence distinguishing between 'Preceding Heaven' (先天) revealing its principle and 'After Heaven' (後天) where the principle has been revealed (1634, p.59). In this chapter Kwón is seeking to describe the function of the sages who embodied the principle of heaven and he illustrates how in each case the quadrants of the compass were correctly aligned with the trigrams and the Five Phases, resulting in a period of fortuitous rule. Underlying this explanation, and even the previous ones too, Kwón is using the essence-function theory. In this particular case he is equating 'Preceding Heaven' to the essence of Heaven, and 'After Heaven' to the function, or the embodiment of the way by the sages.

The third theme Kwón focuses on is numerical permutations derived from the Yin and Yang. This analysis is applied to numbers in a handful of ways. One being, for example, numerals one to ten which he firstly divides into Yin and Yang numbers and then divide again into young (少) and old (老) Yin and Yang. (1634, p.63) The different ways of relating numbers to the properties of Yin and Yang appear in a number of chapters above, but also independently (1634, p. 62, 64-5).

In the Iphaktosol, aside from its overtly didactic theme, at first glance Kwón’s presentation of aspects of the Book of Changes seems to be merely ordering and explaining concepts that have long been circulating in Chinese intellectual history, however his ordering in relation to the other Classics seems to indicate a unique approach, especially as far as Korean intellectual history is concerned. Kwón is locating the Book of Changes in relation to the other classics, explaining its importance in relation to phenomena, the physical world and importantly, its capacity to be embodied. In short, Kwón’s endeavor is to establish the principle of heaven from the Book of Changes as being the basis of all phenomenon, or essence, and show its translation into numerical and symbolic relations that describe the transformation of the world, namely its functions. The result of this means that when the lexicon of terms derived from the Book of Changes is used in other texts and contexts they immediately refer to their philosophical locus classicus and its position as a metaphysical and theoretical framework.

4.2 The Chuyok Ch’ёнkyønroko: Kwón divided his Humble Thoughts on the Book of Changes of the Zhóu Dynasty into two main sections the first is the main cannon, which is further divided into an upper and lower section (上, 下), followed by a brief commentary on elements of the appendices. While there is no distinct introduction to this work, preceding his analysis of the hexagrams in the upper section he does provide a brief and general discussion of the Book of Changes.

From the outset Kwón clearly states his understanding of the Book of Changes. He writes (Kwón, 1999, p. 107):

[The Book of] Changes [means] change/transmutation. Transmutations of the Way of Heaven are sincerity (誠). Transformations of the Way of Man are equilibrium (靜). Sincerity is always the non-living principle, [while] equilibrium is change, but following the way of righteousness (義). This is the essence-function of [the Book of] Changes.

In the first sentence Kwón encapsulates his understanding of the Book of Changes with 'Change' representing transmutation or transformation, which is found in the way of Heaven through the quality of sincerity and in the Way of Man through equanimous action. The non-living principle of Heaven is the essence, while following the path of righteousness is the function of the Way of Man. Kwón’s adherence to the essence-function schema is also clearly seen here as structuring his thought at all levels from the abstract relationship between Heaven and Man, through to the explanation of their respective natures.

Kwón further clarifies his philosophical and theoretical understanding of the Book of Changes and its division of the Way of Man and Heaven by relating it to the upper and lower portions of the text. The upper portion, relating to hexagrams Qûn (乾坤) to Li (離) reflects the “extremity of the actions of the Way of Heaven” and the lower portion, from hexagram Xiûn (兌) to Wêijî (震) is the “utmost of changes of the Way of Man” (Kwón, 1999, p. 110-1). Thus Kwón’s basic conception of the Book of Changes, its structure and its fundamental message can be summarized in the following manner:

Change of Way of Heaven - sincerity - principle - essence - actions of Heaven - Upper
Changes of Way of Man - equilibrium - righteousness - function - changes of Man - Lower

In addition to relating the divisions of the text to Heaven and Earth and the essence-function schema, Kwón extends this manner of interpretation to the mind of Man (人心). Again employing the essence-function schema, he explains that the essence of man’s mind as having the ‘principle of Heaven’ (天理) as its nature and its function as having rightfulness of the principle of Heaven (Kwón, 1999, p.108). The innate connectivity grants all individuals the potential for sagehood, however Kwón (1999, p. 108) qualifies this by explaining that while the principle of Heaven in its singularity is universally within all humans, animals and things, it is their physical
composition (氣象) that determines whether they are sages, worthies or imbeciles.

Aside from these philosophical points Kwŏn also provides a more general explanation of the Book of Changes and covers its origins, composition and history. He (1999, p. 107, 109-110) explains King Wen, Duke of Zhōu and Confucius’s roles in the early formation of the text, the formation of the diagrams and their culmination into hexagrams. Following this he (1999, p. 111-2) gives a very brief account of the history of the Book of Changes from the Ch'in to Tang and to its more recent developments during the Sung Dynasty with Chéng Yì and Zhū Xì. In his evaluation he notes a handful of authors who have written commentaries including those he considers who have strayed from orthodox understandings. In this regard he (1999, p. 112-3) particularly singles out the work of Yuan dynasty scholar Wú Chéng (1249-1333).

Turning now to Kwŏn’s analysis of the upper portion of the Book of Changes, we see that a large part of his analysis is focused on explaining the meaning of the hexagrams, their constituent lines and commentaries. Throughout, his explanation follows his abovementioned distinction of the upper portion of the Book of Changes representing the Way of Heaven. Across the thirty hexagrams his analysis and explanations seek to illustrate the workings of the principle Heaven and highlight its connectivity to Man and he does this in a number of ways. For example, Kwŏn takes concepts from the Book of Changes, such as yin and yang, and correlates them to the roles of ruler and subject. In his discussion of hexagram Kūn (坤, 坤) he equates ruler and subject respectively to yang and yin and discusses their relationship in terms of power, subjugation and principle (1999, p. 125). In addition to yin and yang’s correlation to social roles, Kwŏn also uses them to describe the nature of a sage, who in “extolling is yang and in restraint is yin” (1999, p. 171). At another point he describes yin and yang as ‘responding’ (和) and ‘calling’ (應) and their interaction as affecting the weather and natural events (1999, p. 131-2).

A common means Kwŏn uses to illustrate the translation of the principle of Heaven into the social and political realm is with the allegory of the Superior Man and Sages. For example in hexagram Xiù (兌, 隨) he explains how the Superior Man, in spite of being angered, follows the principles of Heaven and listens to Heaven’s commands without calculation of life, death or reward (1999, p. 127). Continuing with the Superior Man, and even with the yin-yang bifurcation of sorts, Kwŏn draws attention to the two hexagrams Tāi (泰, 睿) and PT (丕, 彿) writing that the virtue of a Superior Man is that he is “internally strong and externally gentle”, while the Small Man following his emotions was, “internally weak and externally strong” (1999, p. 143).

In a similar vein Kwŏn frequently highlights the embodiment of the principle of Heaven and other such similar concepts by evoking the sage kings of the past, namely those found in the Spring and Autumn Annals. King Wen and Duke of Zhōu are often held up as exemplars and used to support his discussion of the application of the principle of Heaven in the social realm. Another interesting facet however in his commentary on hexagram Fù (復, 夫), where he explains how he regards these sages of the past. He explains that the way of the sages was embodied in the Spring and Autumn Annals, a time which has passed, however the Book of Changes looks to the future (1999, p. 172). Here Kwŏn is clarifying that as glorious as the time of the ancients was, it has passed, and that the key to its future embodiment lies in the Book of Changes and not necessarily in recreating past times.

Throughout his discussion in the upper portion Kwŏn is clearly attempting to illustrate the embodiment of the principle of Heaven and he attempts to correlate concepts and themes from the metaphysical framework of the Book of Changes to the real world. Accordingly, throughout his discussion he draws attention to yin and yang, principle, the way and so forth. He even evokes the ideals of the Superior Man and the sages of antiquity to prove his point, and the connection he articulates is inevitably morally coloured. For example, Kwŏn encapsulates this dynamic of connecting Man to Heaven by relating the heavenly virtues of origin (元), life (生), benefit (利) and purity (貞) to the four human virtues of humanity (仁), righteousness (義), propriety (禮) and wisdom (智) in the following manner (1999, p. 120):

In heaven they become origin (元), life (生), benefit (利) and purity (貞) and people become humanity (仁), righteousness (義), propriety (禮) and wisdom (智). 'The Superior Man embodies humanity ('仁') and so forth is spoken to men. 'The Superior man through performing these four virtues is therefore said to be origin (元), life (生), benefit (利) and purity (貞) of Heaven (乾)’ is said to a person mean the unification of a person with heaven. Saying the Superior man bases his actions in virtue is namely the four virtues of Heaven (元, 亨, 利 and 貞). This is the so-called unification of Heaven and man as one.

In the lower portion of the Book of Changes Kwŏn continues with his overall explanation of the hexagrams and their various facets, but also draws particular attention to its relation to human affairs. In the preamble to his analysis of the hexagrams he reiterates the point made above of the upper and lower portions of the Book of Changes relating to the Way of Heaven and essence, and the Way of Man and function (1999, p. 193). As seen in the upper section, Sages and the Superior Man feature frequently in the lower portion, however here Kwŏn uses them as an allegory, around which he describes responses to various moral, social and political situations. In his discussion of hexagram Xián (兌, 威) (1999, p. 195), Kwŏn emphasizes the Sage’s ‘natural response’ to people
and events being based on his unforced understanding of his mind, and by extension Heaven. This though does not mean that the Sage’s life is without worry or difficulties and Kwŏn explains that in such cases the Sage relies on his self-cultivation of virtue and holds firm to his beliefs of truth (1999, p.198, 202-3). The prime arena of the Sage in almost all Confucian literature is social and/or political, yet such areas in real life are inevitably fraught with difficulties, recalcitrant rulers and Men of lesser aptitude holding positions beyond their capacity. To illustrate how the Sage or Superior Man best adapts and capitalizes on his situation according to the principles of Heaven Kwŏn draws analogies with nature, such as the appropriate use of fire and water (1999, p. 238-9). Ample space and advice is also given to the complicated dynamic of the ruler and subject too, where Kwŏn advises rulers to keep their subjects at a distance so as not to taint the responsibilities of their respective posts (1999, 206-7). While Kwŏn generally maintains the yin-yang polarities of gentleness and hardness throughout in describing the Sage, he also cautions against dogmatically or over-zealously holding these ideals in statecraft and the family. If followed too strictly such things inevitably strain relations, if not destroy them, while in the case of the opposite he warns against being too complacent and diluting the importance of roles and relations (1999, p. 201).

Generally speaking, Kwŏn’s lower portion of the Book of Changes continues with the general explanation of the hexagrams and their meaning, however he places particular emphasis on explaining how the Sages and Superior Men, in spite of their resonance with the principle of Heaven, navigate the inequities of political life, duplicitous and wily inter-personal relations, and manage delicate family relations. Throughout his discussion Kwŏn is attempting to articulate how a sage would ideally act and underlying this is firstly the necessity of following the way of righteousness, and secondly maintaining equanimity (中) towards the world, one’s work, one’s family and one’s self. These two points, as seen in Kwŏn’s introduction to the Book of Changes, comprise his greater understanding of the way of Man.

Two further striking themes appear throughout both the upper and lower portions of Kwŏn work. The first is his use of Sung Dynasty Neo-Confucians Chêng Yî and Chêng Xi. Kwŏn uses their works, respectively Yi Chuan’s Treatise on Change (伊川易傳) and Fundamental Meaning of the Book of Changes (周易本義), in many parts to support his explanations. For example, we find no less than 15 hexagrams where he uses Chêng and 13 for Chêng. In many cases he quotes from the two of them in a manner which pre-dates even the Ming Dynasty compilation of these two texts. Kwŏn’s use of these prominent Neo-Confucian scholars has been well documented by almost all Korean scholars and is generally taken as being indicative of his position as a Neo-Confucian. It is clear that in many regards Kwŏn shares the views of Chêng and Chêng and to a large part drew on their work to support his own.

Just as Kwŏn draws on the works of Chêng and Chêng it must be pointed out that he is by no means obsequious or dogmatic. Kwŏn shows that he values their points of view and incorporates them into his own understanding, however he is also equally critical of them where they make mistakes or display misunderstandings. For example, in 11 hexagrams Kwŏn corrects their mistakes or critiques their understandings. For instance, in hexagram Bl (比) Kwŏn cites Chêng, who states that the shot phrase “Bl is fortuitous” is redundant, however Kwŏn insists the phrase is important and deserving of interpretation, which he then launches into (1999, p. 131). In other sections Kwŏn quotes from them and then explains his own interpretation. On the whole this shows Kwŏn to be a critical thinker with a distinct and engaging approach towards the Book of Changes and the Confucian tradition, and not one to simply accept things on the basis of tradition alone. Strangely, this point, while noted by some scholars, seems to have been largely ignored.

The second striking theme seen in both sections centers around his criticism of Wu Chêng and his commentary on the Book of Changes called the Yizuanydn (易纂言). Kwŏn repeatedly cites Wu Chêng and his criticism in some points, like hexagram Xiāochù (小酌, 小酌), is light, describing Wu’s interpretation of a particular passage as “novel”(1999, p. 135), while in hexagram Gū (郭, 鼬) Kwŏn chastises Wu for interpreting a passage with a kind of pseudo-Buddhist notion of an afterlife saying, “These are not the words of a Confucian”(1999, p. 158). Kwŏn also corrects Wu where he has misread characters such as 大人 instead of 丈人 (1999, p. 129-30) or 縁 instead of 縁 (1999, p. 128). While Kwŏn’s overall approach to Wu is quite negative it must be noted that there are occasional points where he does concur with his interpretations, such as in the appendices (1999, p. 256).

Another point of criticism is Buddhism. In hexagram Qiān (巽, 騫) Kwŏn explains that the way of Confucianism is “one principle, multiple manifestations”(理一分殊), while the way of heterodoxy, namely Buddhism, was “love for all without distinction” (兼愛無分)(1999, p. 147). Kwŏn continues his criticism emphasizing the moral importance of family relations and concluding with the importance of peace, or harmony in affairs, (中) and distinction (分) of roles (1999, p. 148-50). Other criticism of Buddhism include in Guimēi (観心, 聞心) where he criticizes Buddhist notions of the self, namely the doctrine of annihilation of the self (滅人論) and its ethical implications (1999, p.220) and in Līdaq (立下) where he criticizes Hwayen Buddhist philosophy (1999, p.219).

5. Discussion
Kwŏn Kun's *Iphaktosol* is a multifaceted text, yet his treatment of the *Book of Changes* shows that firstly he is trying to explain the basic principles upon which the text is founded. To do this he describes the formation of the basic hexagrams, then illustrates how they and their principle connect to the formation of basic matter through the Five Phases and then to a number of natural phenomena. He continues to show how this principle translates to socio-political work by demonstrating how the sages of antiquity aligned their actions in accordance with the principle of the Heaven. Underlying Kwŏn's project is the establishment of the key terms and concepts derived from the *Book of Changes*. From this he then relies on their lexicon, as they are after all very common terms used throughout all text, as an indicator to the overarching principle of the *Book of Changes*. Kwŏn Kun's treatment of the *Book of Changes* in these chapters clearly follows his overall prescription of it being the complete essence of the other classics and as an overarching metaphysical scheme. Furthermore, he uses the essence-function scheme at various levels to reinforce his argument.

In the opening portion of the *Chuyŏk Ch'ŏnkyŏnrok* Kwŏn Kun takes a different tack to that seen in his *Iphaktosol*. Here we find Kwŏn giving a basic outline of the history of the text, its formation and history of commentaries. Furthermore, he provides a more detailed explanation of the *Book of Changes*. His approach to the text follows the essence-function division, as seen throughout all his works, but he attempts to show how the principle of Heaven was embodied during the times of the sages and is present within Man. His following discussion in the upper and lower portions attempts to draw these points out in explaining the details of the hexagrams. More so than his presentation in the *Iphaktosol*, here Kwŏn Kun is clearly attempting to flush out his understanding of the essence-function of the *Book of Changes*, as summarized in the diagrams of the *Iphaktosol*, in particular its principle (理) of Heaven and its way (道), as embodied by the sages. In the upper portion of the *Chuyŏk Ch'ŏnkyŏnrok* Kwŏn's discussion of the principle of Heaven and sages attempts to shows the perfect embodiment of the 'actions of Heaven'. While in the lower portion Kwŏn attempts to show how the sage ideally deals with the harsh realities of political and social life and, in spite of these difficulties, maintains fidelity to the principles of Heaven and equanimity in his conduct.

In his discussion Kwŏn draws heavily on the works of Zhū and Chéng which has led many scholars to believe Kwŏn to be a fellow Neo-Confucian. Without a doubt he certainly shares some similar ground with these Sung Dynasty Confucians. Scholars by and large take these references as sufficient in themselves to qualify Kwŏn as a Neo-Confucian yet somehow they fail to recognize the importance signified by his criticisms of Zhū and Chéng. Furthermore, these scholars seem to focus exclusively on charting these references to Zhū in a predominantly a-historical, textual and non-contextual manner. This means that they fail to appreciate Kwŏn's overall positioning of the *Book of Changes* in relation to the other classics and the relative importance he assigns to the text. For the Sung Confucians too, the *Book of Changes* was important. Daniel Gardiner (1986, p. 13) notes, that for Chang Tsai and the Cheng brothers it was the basis for their philosophical studies and interests, however their interest was starting to shift away from the older classics to the Four Books. Chang was increasingly interested in principle (理) and the nature of things (性). This shift in focus was crystallized with the Zhū XI who devoted himself to the study of Confucianism. He studied the older classics critically, but his overwhelming concern was not with the older classics per se, but with the Four Books, which he believed to embody the method of cultivation for becoming a sage. Through cultivation, namely investigating the nature of things, the individual could understand the principle of Heaven and Nature, and in turn become a sage. The common ground here between Kwŏn and Zhū is clearly the concept of an all pervasive principle coming from the *Book of Changes*, however the glaring difference is that Kwŏn does not place emphasis on the cultivation component nor discovering nature, but more on the *Book of Changes* and its principle as a scheme for ordering and structuring society, and tying together the Classics. In the case of Zhū cultivation is at the forefront and principle is far more ephemeral. Also he emphasized the Four Books as the key to understanding the nature of man, discovering his inner morality and hence unlocking the key to the principle of the universe (Gardner, 1986, p. 15), over the older Five Classics, which he regarded as old, prone to error, difficult to understand and focused mostly on historical cases of morality, conduct and ritual in a well ordered society (Gardner, 1986, p. 13-15).

This difference between Zhū XI and Kwŏn Kun is significant, but it also points to their shared ground, namely as concerned Confucian scholars looking to the Confucian corpus as the key to providing answers to their respective political, social and cultural problems. Zhū XI faced the disconcerting rise of Taoism and Buddhism and their metaphysical appeal to the populace. He thus sought to fight them on their own ground of cultivation except with armour of a newly developed Confucian metaphysic. Kwŏn too was in a similar predicament with Buddhism entrenched within Koryŏ society. His approach though was not to challenge Buddhism as a theological or soteriological system, but instead to attempt to articulate an alternative political and social system. In the case of both these thinkers the *Book of Changes* provided an important pillar in supporting their arguments. The difference in importance placed on the Book of Changes and its relative location in their respective philosophies is significant.

In positioning the *Book of Changes* in this complimentary way to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, with the other three classics between them, Kwŏn appears to be suggesting that the essence and function of the *Book of Changes* underlies not just the time of the sages of antiquity, but is ever present and the other three classics are
the means by which to realize the embodiment of correct principles within society. Kwôn even says as much as noted above in his commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals* in hexagrams *Fu* (복, 復). Implicit in this is that the potential to achieve the perfect Confucian embodiment of society is ever present, and not necessarily a time of antiquity to which society must be dragged. Scholars have pointed to Kwôn’s approach to the *Book of Changes* and critique of Zhû and Cheng, Wû Cheng and Buddhism as representing a kind of ‘praising of the past’ (宗古主義), suggesting that Kwôn is attempting to recreate the society of the sages. Indeed, looking at Kwôn Kûn’s overall approach to the *Book of Changes* and he reads the text as though there is a very definite meaning to be derived from it, this hermeneutical approach suggests an essentialist approach to the Confucian tradition and the corpus, however he does not propose recreating the times of antiquity. He definitely lauds them as embodying the principle of Heaven, but there is no talk of winding back the clock with some form of Confucian revisionism. If anything, his argument points to the ever present principle of Heaven and its potential to be embodied in spite of the times.

Lastly throughout Kwôn’s overall presentation of the *Book of Changes* there is no mention of its use as a divination text. His focus is clearly towards understanding the principle of heaven and not attempting to predict it.

6. Conclusion

At first glance some of the facets appearing in Kwôn work on the *Book of Changes* do not appear to be new. In fact concepts of universal principle and the way of Heaven and Man have been in circulation for centuries in Chinese intellectual history. When Korean scholars have come to evaluate Kwôn they have usually made connections to Zhû, and located him as a Neo Confucian apostle in Korea. However in doing so they rarely note that these concepts and their underlying structures trace back through Chinese history, and through focusing on tracing quotes alone, they have tended to overlook the contextual factors which have shaped the writing of Kwôn and Zhû and given each of them their distinctive points.

In appreciating Kwôn’s understanding of the *Book of Changes* we must firstly keep in mind that his articulation, presentation and integration of the *Book of Changes*, so far, is the first of its kind in a Korean context. Secondly, we must remember that his work here on the *Book of Changes* represents the metaphysical basis upon which he bases his analysis of the Five Classics and presents them as a unified whole. This point also shares no precedent in the Korean context. Fourthly, in his *Iphaktosol* Kwôn outlines the basics principles of the *Book of Changes* through text and diagrams. In his Chûyûk *Ch’ôngkyônrok* he fleshes out the details of the Way of Heaven and Man, and articulates their relation and transition from abstract ideals to reality. Throughout his analysis he employs the essence-function schema and attempts to show how the ideals of equanimity and righteousness and following the principle of Heaven play out in real life. This points to Kwôn being not only a conscientious and consistent scholar in his analysis of Confucian texts, but also being acutely aware of the demands of real socio-political life and that merely abstracting metaphysics was insufficient in itself. Fourthly, while comparison with the Chêng-Zhû branch of Confucianism are inevitable, it appears that Kwôn most certainly was familiar with their writings and drew from them in his own writing and analysis. It is important to note that he was also critical of them too and did not dogmatically follow their thoughts. This points to Kwôn regarding Chêng-Zhû as a legitimate part of the Confucian tradition as a whole and fellow Confucians engaged in a similar plight. In fact the differences noted in their emphasis on the *Book of Changes* reveal that although their plight was similar in many respects, it was not the same. Zhû drew on the *Book of Changes* principally to support his interest in the Four Books and cultivation as the key to solving social and political problems. Through cultivation he reasoned that people could discern the principle of things and this understanding would in turn lead people to act properly and then achieve an ideal society. For Kwôn, the *Book of Changes* was a cipher of Heaven’s principle that permeated the natural and social world and unified the Five Classics into an integrated vision of an ideal society. While Kwôn respects the subtleties of the principle of Heaven he does not regard it as elusive and hidden, and nor does he place personal cultivation as the central tenant within his schema. Kwôn links the *Book of Changes* to the other four Classics with the intention of articulating a Confucian socio-political theory, the metaphysical framework for a Confucian utopia.

This research of Kwôn’s understanding the *Book of Changes* has shown that he paid great attention to explaining the details of the text as a metaphysical framework, but was equally concerned in articulating its translation into the realities of socio-political life and connecting it to the other Classics of the Confucian corpus. In doing so he frequently used the essence-function schema at various levels. Overall his objective is to not only articulate its intricacies, but to locate the *Book of Changes* as a metaphysical framework tying together the Five Classics in articulating an ideal Confucian socio-political world. Throughout his analysis of the *Book of Changes* he frequently quoted from key Sung Confucians to support his analysis, however the relative importance he placed on the text is notably different them. This points to Kwôn clearly respecting their works, yet not dogmatically following them. These points reinforce calls for more contextual sensitivity and looking beyond convenient, if not simplistic, categories and pre-conceptions in approaching the works of Kwôn to ascertain the nuances of his thoughts.
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King Mu—or, literally, the "Martial Monarch" (r. 600-41)—is the honorific title (Kor. shi) posthumously bestowed by the court of Paekche upon the ruler who reigned under his personal name of Chang. This pugnacious posthumous title presumably was chosen in recognition of the dramatic reversal effected in the kingdom's military fortunes in its bitter conflict with the neighboring state of Silla during the four decades of his rule. Mu's notable achievements were not, however, restricted to his armies' victories in battle; it is evident from both the written and the archaeological records that generous patronage of Buddhism was another hallmark of his reign.

In pursuing policies of aggressive military action and munificent support of the Buddhist faith, Mu was likely motivated in part by contemporary Chinese example, especially that of the Sui dynasty, the regime whose brief but historically critical sway overlapped with the formative years of his own rule. Having risen to power as suzerains of northern China in 581 and then vanquished the last opposing Chinese regime just eight years later in 589, the Sui emperors became the first masters of a unified China in almost three hundred years. Although the unification of the Central Kingdom had been accomplished through Sui force of arms, the dynasty's founder, the emperor posthumously known as Wen Di and who ruled from 581 to 605, made effective use of both political and cultural means to weld his long-divided country into a single mighty state. Although Wen Di also utilized Daoism and Confucianism to sanction his dynasty's authority and to foster ideological harmony within the empire, without question his lavish promotion of Buddhism was foremost in such efforts. This Sui emperor actively sought by proclamation and patronage to translate into actuality his vision of the empowering and mutually beneficial reciprocity between the authority of Buddhism and the authority of the state, especially as manifest in the person of the ruler. Through grand acts combining imperial largesse and personal devotion, Wen Di repeatedly and unabashedly cast himself simultaneously in two of Buddhism’s most revered roles for the pious potentate: the cakravartin, that is the devout all-conquering ruler, and the mahā-dīnāpati, the beneficent patron of the faith.

Like Wen Di of the Sui dynasty, Mu balanced a bellicose foreign policy with an assertive program of official patronage of Buddhism. At the start of his reign, Paekche’s military situation was vulnerable. The loss of the strategic Han River valley to Silla fifty years earlier had been shortly followed by Silla’s annexation of the territory of Kaya that had long served Paekche as a buffer against Silla aggression along its southeastern border. These catastrophes had not only seriously weakened Paekche, but also had left the kingdom for the first time in its history susceptible to incursions from Silla across all its land frontiers. By the end of Mu’s reign, however, Paekche’s military position had improved dramatically and, in fact, substantial conquests of Silla territory had been made both in the northeast and in the southeast between 623 and 627.

The written and the archeological records reveal that Mu’s aggressive military policy was paired with a program of lavish patronage of Buddhism. In 600 Mu’s father, King Pōp—literally, the “Dharma King”—had died just a few months after initiating the building of the Wanghong-sa or "Monastery of Royal Propagation," a major temple located in the Paekche capital of Sabi (the present city of Puyō). Mu continued construction on the Wanghong-sa after his father’s death and saw the project through to completion in 634. Texts also credit Mu with the building of two other important Buddhist temples, the Chesŏk-chongsa (or "Monastery of Indra") and the Mirūk-sa (“Monastery of Maitreya"), both located on the outskirts of the present city of Iksan (about thirty-five kilometers southeast of Puyō). Although no surviving record provides a date for the construction of either of these two monasteries, it is reasonable to assume that such major building projects would not have been initiated in the Iksan area until after Paekche’s extensive southeastern conquests of the mid-620’s. A seventh-century Chinese account concerning miracles associated with a disastrous lightning strike at the Chesŏk-chongsa in 639 states that Mu had intended to relocate the Paekche capital to the Iksan area. The construction of such a concentration of important temples in this region can thus be understood as preparation for the relocation of the capital that Mu planned, but evidently never fully realized.

Although none of these monasteries have survived intact, material evidence recovered from their sites supports the written evidence of their shared royal patronage. The lotus-flower designs on the circular rafter-end roof tiles unearthed at the Wanghong-sa site in Puyō conform closely to the decoration on tiles excavated from the sites of the Mirūk-sa and the Chesŏk-chongsa in Iksan. The lotus decoration on another rafter-end tile excavated from the site of the royal citadel on Mt. Puso in Puyō also conforms closely to this type. Given Mu’s marked advocacy of Buddhism, the apparent appearance of the lotus motif on the roofs of
palace buildings suggests more than mere happenstance. The application of this core Buddhist symbol on the roofs of royal and religious structures alike would have given silent, but eloquent, expression to the correspondence between the ordering of political power in the state and the universal power of the Buddha. Mu and his late father, Pop, like their Chinese contemporary, Sui Wen Di, sought through their unstinting support of Buddhism to project their conscientious striving for the ideal symmetry between the temporal and the divine.

Mu's intention to identify royal authority in Paekche with the sacred Buddhist authority of the cosmos was manifest on a spectacular scale through the erection of the monumental Mirûk-sa in Iksan. The Samguk yusa relates that construction of this monastery resulted from a miracle witnessed by Mu and his queen while they were returning to the capital after visiting the magician monk Chimyông, whose hermitage is said to have been located near Iksan on Yonghwa-san—or, literally, "Dragon Flower Mountain." As the royal couple were passing a lake near the foot of this mountain, three images of the Buddha Maitreya suddenly appeared above its waters. Moved by this divine apparition and the importunings of his spouse, Mu determined to build a temple at the very spot where the images had miraculously made themselves manifest. The Samguk yusa further reports that the resulting Mirûk-sa contained "Halls of Maitreya's Three Assemblies" (Kor. Mirûk Samhoe-jôn), each with its own pagoda and courtyard.

One of the most important results of the archaeological investigation of the Mirûk-sa's site in the 1980's was the verification of the Samguk yusa's description of the monastery's ground plan. Excavation confirmed that the Mirûk-sa was indeed possessed of three image halls, i.e., the "Halls of Maitreya's Three Assemblies," and that each was provided with a separate pagoda and courtyard. Excavation also revealed that the monastery's primary ritual compound measured approximately 155 by 175 meters, and that it contained three adjacent, parallel, and functionally separate ritual precincts. Each of these ritual precincts contained an axially aligned southern entry gate, pagoda and image hall, and each gave access to the single large lecture hall centrally positioned in the northern section of the compound's encircling wall. In effect, the Mirûk-sa thus constituted a tripling of the axially-arranged temple ground plan that had been standard in Paekche since, at least, the beginning of the sixth century. This ground plan is so characteristic of the kingdom's temples and exerted such a pronounced influence on early temple design in Silla and, especially, in Japan that modern secondary sources commonly term it "the Paekche plan."

The iconographic rationale underlying the unprecedented parallel tripling of the pagodas and image halls at the Mirûk-sa is clearly documented in the Samguk yusa. It was intended to provide three discrete ritual precincts to correspond symbolically to the three grand assemblies, or public sermons, to be held by Maitreya after he emerges as the next earthly Buddha from his meditation beneath a dragon-flower tree. As foretold in a number of sutras beginning at least as early as the Pili Ekoterrika, Maitreya is expected to initiate his ultimate mortal existence by being born into the family of a high official in the service of a mighty king, a true cakravartin. According to later and more elaborate prophesies of Maitreya's final incarnation, such as that found in the fifth-century "Grand Sutra on Maitreya Becoming a Buddha" (Kor. Mirûk taesôngbul-gyông), the particular dragon flower tree of Maitreya's enlightenment will stand within a grove of these beautiful trees located near the cakravartin's capital city. Sutras also prophesy that the three grand assemblies of Maitreya will take place within this same sacred grove. It is these predictions relating to Maitreya's last mortal existence that provide the iconologic justifications for the Mirûk-sa's unique architectural layout and for its siting beneath the "Dragon Flower Mountain" near Iksan.

It is these same beliefs that also provide the key to understanding both why Mu assumed the extraordinary expense of constructing the unusually large and complex Mirûk-sa in Iksan, and why he contemplated the even more challenging and costly project of moving the royal capital to the vicinity of the new monastery. As Kim Samnyong earlier asserted, in building the Mirûk-sa, Mu was proclaiming Paekche to be the cakravartin state where Maitreya was destined to incarnate. The visionary manifestation of the three images of the Buddha Maitreya could readily be interpreted as the sign that this place would be the future site of the Buddha's three grand assemblies. Hence, the unprecedented tripartite design of the monastery created at Mu's command can be comprehended not solely as being intended to honor Maitreya, but also to provide the setting for the Buddha's three Enlightening orations. The sutras declared that the dragon flower grove where Maitreya would both gain his enlightenment and give his three Dharma lectures would be located near the capital of a cakravartin king. To actualize this prophecy of the sutras and thereby to cause Paekche to be the land where the Future Buddha would preach and an all-conquering cakravartin ruler would appear, King Mu undertook both to build the exceptional Mirûk-sa and to relocate the kingdom's capital to the area adjacent to that monastery's supranaturally appointed site. Although Mu himself might not prove to be the promised cakravartin, the propitious victories of his armies lent reason to hope that one of his near successors on Paekche's throne might be the unifying conqueror whose advent the sutras had foretold.
Ritual and Politics: The Manipulation of Confucian Rituals in the Chosŏn Dynasty

Hyun-key Kim Hogarth

And what have kings, that privates have not too,
Save ceremony, save general ceremony?
And what an thou, thou idol ceremony?
What kind of god art thou, that suffer'st more
Of mortal griefs than do thy worshippers?
What are thy rents? What are thy comings in?
o Ceremony, show me but thy worth!
What is thy soul of adoration?
Art thou aught else but place, degree and form,
Creating awe and fear in other men?

- Henry V, by Shakespeare (Act IV, Scene I)

Introduction

This paper analyzes two of the most important ancient Confucian rituals of the Chosŏn dynasty, Chongmyo taeje, and Sokchonje, which are still performed in Seoul. The former, i.e. the Royal Ancestral Rite, takes place at Chongmyo (the Royal Ancestral Shrine), and the latter, i.e. ritual offerings to Confucius and other Chinese and Korean Confucian sages, is performed at Songgyun'gwan University (the National Confucian Academy).

Ritual is difficult to define, but is generally characterized by repetition, constant form over time and exact specification of what participants do or say, with reference to religious or mystical notions. The stylized formal language and symbolism of ritual make it inherently conservative, and therefore it neither involves creativity in participants, nor provides any leverage for critical assessment of the tradition it embodies. (Bloch 1975a, 1975b; Rappaport 1971, 1974) Therefore ritual is an ideal means through which tradition is perpetuated. But since 'ritual' and 'tradition' are concepts with multiple interpretations, I will start with their definitions, and then briefly discuss the relationship between ritual and tradition.

Ritual is manipulated by rulers to reinforce and perpetuate their power, because of its inherent conservatism and resistance to change. The most notable example is the elaborate pomp and ceremony of royalty. But it can also be manipulated by subordinates to limit the power of their leaders. Chongmyo taeje, and Sokchonje are good examples of the manipulation of ritual for political purposes by rulers and subordinates. Through analyzing these two Confucian rituals, this paper discusses the relationship between ritual and tradition, and who controls ritual, and how and for what purpose it is manipulated.

The Concepts of Ritual and Tradition

Ritual is defined by some anthropologists as a form of ceremony characterized by its religious nature or purpose. Thus Gluckman (1962) makes a distinction between ritual and ceremonial; ritual is characterized by its reference to religious or mystical notions, while the latter puts an emphasis on practicality and technicality.

However, since ritual involves complex symbolism (Lewis 1980) and 'religion' is a complex concept, ritual is inordinately difficult to define. Therefore most anthropologists find it ultimately unnecessary to make the distinction. Goody (1961), for example, defines ritual as 'a category of standardized behaviour (customs) in which the relationship between the means and the end is not intrinsic'. Leach (1954) maintains that ritual is not a category of behaviour but an aspect of behaviour, viz. it is the aspect of behaviour related to its symbolic value rather than to its practical utility. He suggests that a continuum exists between acts whose technical aspects predominate and those where symbolic ones predominate, but it is possible to analyze the technical aspect of predominantly symbolic acts or the symbolic aspect of predominantly technical ones. Bloch (1975a, 1975b) does not distinguish between the two, either, arguing that there is no difference between politics and religion, since religion is an extreme form of traditional authority.
The term 'ritual' is sometimes used to refer to behaviour, whose characteristic features are repetition, constant form over time and exact specification of what participants should do or say, although it has little religious or symbolic significance. For example, primatologists refer to the stereotyping and of fixed form as 'ritualized' animal signal (Cullen 1972); psychologists describe the 'ritualistic' repetitive behaviour of neurotics (Mather 1970); and we sometimes refer to routine activities such as regularly brushing our teeth as 'ritual'. On the other hand, the rites of passage, such as weddings or funerals, which, according to van Gennep ([1909]1960), are imbued with religious and symbolic meanings, are loosely referred to as 'ceremonies'. Also a seemingly obvious 'ceremony', such as a graduation ceremony, can be interpreted as a sort of 'rite of passage', i.e. a ritual. It is clear, therefore, that the categories of ritual and ceremonial are arbitrary distinctions among phenomena which are not always neatly classifiable.

It is interesting, however, to note that in Korea ritual and ceremonial seem to be clearly distinguished, the former being called 'che-je' and the latter 'shik'. The former is used to refer to the formality of a sacred or spiritual nature, such as chesa (an ancestral offering), kiu-je (a ritual praying for rain), etc., and the latter to refer to that of a profane nature, such as kyŏhnŏn-shik (wedding), changnye-shik (funeral), chŏrŏp-shik (graduation), etc. Chongmyo taeje and Sŏkchonje, for example, are never called 'Chongmyo taeshik', and 'Sŏkchonsik', although Confucian rituals are sometimes translated into English as 'ceremonies'. That signifies the existence of the clear distinction between ritual and ceremonial in Korea.

However, neither the definition of ritual nor the ritual/ceremonial dichotomy is necessary for the purpose of this paper, i.e. the relationship between ritual and tradition in terms of political power and authority, since the current argument applies to both 'ritual' and 'ceremony', whether the distinction is made or not.

In anthropology, 'tradition' is generally defined as 'patterns of belief, customs, values, behaviour and knowledge or expertise which are passed on from generation to generation by the socialization process within a given population.' (MacMillan Dictionary of Anthropology) Tradition appeals to ancestors; thus traditional authority is derived from the notion of the superiority of timeless 'other world' to 'this world'. In 'traditional' societies, secret knowledge is passed on by kings and elders, who are either sanctioned by, or closer to, ancestors, thereby giving them power. Therefore, tradition is most importantly a form of power.

Ethnologists, whose main concern was the study of 'traditional everyday culture' or folk culture, often used the term 'tradition' as a synonym for culture itself. Modern scholars (e.g. Hobsbawn & Ranger 1983), on the other hand, tend not to put too much emphasis on the centrality of 'tradition', since they are more concerned with the relationship between cultural continuity and change. As they have pointed out, this key problem is to be approached in terms of the historical process of social reproduction and change, as well as cultural elements per se, in the community concerned.

The notion of 'tradition' also has to be carefully examined; even traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented. (Hobsbawn & Ranger 1983) For example, many of the British royal ceremonies, which are seemingly linked to an immemorial past, are the products of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries to give new meanings to British monarchy in response to the changed domestic and international situations. Kilts, the embodiment of the Scottish tradition, were in fact invented by Thomas Rawlinson, an English Quaker from Lancashire in the 1730s. (Trevor-Roper 1983) In the nineteenth century many traditions of African tribes were creations of colonial settlers to define themselves as natural and undisputed master of vast numbers of Africans. (Ranger 1983)

The invention of tradition occurs more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which 'old' traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise eliminated. In short it occurs when there are sufficiently large and rapid changes on the demand or the supply side. Thus 'traditions' are not timeless, but are interpreted, and sometimes invented by people in authority or a community of people, to serve their specific purposes.

The Relationship between Ritual and Tradition

Ritual has overawed, beguiled, fascinated, mystified and baffled mankind from time immemorial. Bloch (1975a) has suggested that the extremely formalized language of ritual is 'impoverished' language, and the reason for this dramatic impoverishment in linguistic choice is the fantastic creative potential of natural language. By restricting the language, it provides no leverage for critical assessment of the content of ritual. Because the formalization of language is a way whereby one speaker coerces the response of another, it can be seen as a form of social control. No creativity is required in participants, nor any questions are asked; they just do what is prescribed for them. Therefore ritual is an ideal means through which tradition is perpetuated.

There also exists a related and complementary notion that leaders can use ritual to enhance their power because it hides the true source of power from those over whom it is exercised. Godelier (1977) develops this
idea with force, using data from the Inca Empire and present-day New Guinea. Barth (1975) has also shown how among the Baktaman of New Guinea, secrecy surrounding the male initiation rite is important, since it intensifies fear, making the ritual more dramatic and psychologically more powerful. No women or uninitiated males are allowed to witness it; the secret knowledge is taboo for all, except for the elders by virtue of being older, wiser and closer to the ancestors. Death is the penalty for breaking the taboo, making the knowledge potent and dangerous. Thus ritual is used to perpetuate the power and authority of one generation over the next and the male domination over the female.

In societies with more institutional structures, political power is often derived from tradition, which is legitimized by appeal to founding ancestors, and perpetuated ritual. (Kuper 1947; Evans-Pritchard 1962; Ahern 1981; Bloch 1987, etc.) Thus tradition is a form of authority, and ritual is a manifestation of traditional authority.

But as discussed earlier, traditions are not really 'timeless' after all, nor do they interpret themselves. Those who claim the right to interpret a tradition, on close scrutiny, actually reinvent it in a sense and may even transform it. (Habsbawm & Ranger 1983) And a reinvented tradition is enforced and perpetuated by strengthened ritual.

Bloch (1975a, 1975b) makes the stimulating suggestion that restricted codes are apt tools in the hands of those in authority because they severely limit and predictably control the responses of subordinates. Similarly Rappaport (1974) suggests that 'sacred' rituals (those that refer to entities whose existence cannot be verified or falsified), make arbitrary control mechanisms seem necessary. Their arbitrariness is hidden in a 'cloak of seeming necessity'. This encourages authorities to use the sacred as a tool to achieve compliance. Thus both Bloch and Rappaport suggest that leaders can use ritual to increase their legitimacy.

The most enduring rituals are those connected with royalty; even today when the ideologies of king’s divine rights to rule are mostly eroded, the ‘divine rites of kings’ continue to beguile and to enchant. (Cannadine & Price 1987) In traditional society, to perpetuate the myth of the king’s divine origin, a royal funeral is a display of national pomp unsurpassed even by the coronation of a successor (Geertz 1973, 1980), and ritual regicide followed by an elaborate funeral service also existed. (Frazer [1890] 1963; Evans-Pritchard 1962) Thus the difficult problem of the immortal kingship and mortal kings is solved, and the traditions and ideologies of kingship perpetuated through splendid royal ritual, particularly royal funeral.

Chongmyo Taeje: The Manipulation of Ritual by Royalty

The theory of the interplay between ritual and ‘tradition’ may well provide an answer to the frequently asked question (e.g. Deuchler 1987) why the complex Confucian ideology was adopted by the founder of the Chosön dynasty1, as the national guiding principle. Yi Sŏnggye, though a brilliant general, had no legitimate claim to the throne, which he took from the last king of the by-then corrupt Koryŏ dynasty (918-1392). The paradox lies in that a military man who actually usurped the throne from his own king, should demand absolute obedience from his own subjects and adopt a government system which puts scholars above military men in rank.

Myths with implications of divine births legitimize most ancient and medieval Korean kings (Gardiner 1985) as those of other Asian countries (Wolf 1974; Mabbett 1985). Therefore, when Yi Sŏnggye, a commoner, became king, resentment and antagonism of those loyal to the old dynasty was such that he was faced with many threats in the old capital city of Kaesŏng. Even today, over 610 years on women from Kaesŏng make tiny rice cakes in the shape of a strangled man, called choraengi ttŏk, which shows their hatred for Yi Sŏnggye. Apparently each time they strangle a piece of rice cake, they symbolically strangle the founder of the Chosŏn dynasty. Therefore he had to find ways to consolidate his precarious position.

The Koryŏ dynasty toward the end was morally corrupt, and confusion was rampant in all sectors of society. It was particularly evident in religion; Buddhism, the national religion, became highly secularised, and shamanistic practices prevailed. A distinguished Confucian scholar of this period, An Hyang (1243-1306), deploiring the state of affairs, wrote:

Buddha is prayed to in every lighted house,  
ghosts are served with drums and flutes,

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1 As Deuchler (1987:54; 1992) maintains, the kongshin (the ‘merit’ courtiers) who helped Yi Sŏnggye found the new dynasty) played a large part in its adoption, but ultimately it was the new king who held sway.
But, lo! The shabby shrine of Confucian stands
Untended in its yard, rank with autumn weeds.2

He firmly believed the condition of the country could only improve with the adoption of Confucianism as the
guiding principles to restore the social order. The Confucian cosmology of strict undisputed social hierarchy
s suited Yi Sŏnggye’s scheme of consolidating and perpetuating his usurped crown. He actively sought and
employed distinguished Confucian scholars for his new government, although he met with resistance from some,
such as Chŏng Mong-ju, whose loyalty to their old king was unwavering. His famous poem, Tanshimga (A song
of my loyal heart), which was written in reply to Yi Pang-wŏn’s jingle soliciting his help, clearly displays his
high Confucian ethics:

Though this frame should die and die,
Though I die a hundred times,
My bleached bones all turn to dust,
My very soul exist or not –
What can change the undivided heart
That glows with faith toward my lord?4

Chŏng Mong-ju and any others who opposed to the new regime were soon murdered or eliminated by Yi
Sŏnggye’s cronies.

Soon after the establishment of the Chosŏn dynasty, Yi Sŏnggy, now King T’aejo, moved his capital to
Hanyang (now Seoul) in 1394, which was supposed to be geomantically auspicious, and had a royal shrine built
adjacent to one of the royal palaces in the capital. The shrine consisted of (and still does) two buildings, 1) chongmyo (also called chŏnggjon - the Main Hall), the main building housing the spirit tablets of the kings and
queens up to the seventh generation and those whose achievements were great, and 2) yŏngnyŏnggjon, housing
those of all the others. There regular and temporary rituals were offered, the former being held at the beginning
each of the four seasons, and the latter on occasions of national celebrations or calamities.

In ancestor-worshipping societies in the Far East, royal ancestral shrines and rites held there are integral
parts of the state/royalty. The custom originated in Wu China (220-581 AD), and spread to Korea as early as the
Shilla period (57 BC - 935 AD). (Han’guk minjok munhwa tae paekwa sajŏn:731) But the royal ancestral
rituals grew more and more elaborate and complex during the Chosŏn dynasty. Some 300 years into the
dynasty, Chongmyo ŭige, books recording the ritual procedures for chongmyo and yŏngnyŏnggjon, consisting of
nine volumes (four original volumes plus five additional volumes) were published in 1697 (Sukchong 23),
followed by two more volumes in 1741, one more in 1819, and two more in 1842. The stupendous scale of
Chongmyo ŭige well testifies the intricacies of Chongmyo taeje.

King T’aejo also established elaborate ritual codes for all other occasions, based on those imported
from China, which are reminiscent of the Byzantine Book of Ceremonies (Cameron 1987), only even much more
intricate and elaborate in parts. Splendid but ponderous rituals, with colourful uniform costumes, monotonous
music, simple repetitive ritual dance and ritualized food and utensils, sometimes lasting several hours at a time,
were performed frequently at regular intervals. The rites of passage and ancestral rituals were performed on such
a grand scale that many scholars have suggested that they were responsible for the ruin of many of the less
affluent aristocrats towards the end, and eventually the Chosŏn dynasty itself (Han 1970). However, in a sense it
was largely by virtue of those resplendent and costly rituals that the Chosŏn dynasty, with such an uncertain
beginning, lasted 519 years. Thus the case of the Chosŏn dynasty gives credibility to the Confucian philosophy,
in which ‘music and ritual are considered as means for the establishment and preservation of social order, and
are regarded as superior to laws and punishments as means to this end.’ (Radcliffe-Brown 1952)

Chongmyo taeje was reduced to the mere offering of incense by the Yi clan heads during the Japanese
occupation, and even that was stopped in the confusion following liberation and the ensuing war. But it was
revived in 1969 by Sadan Pōbin Chŏnju Yi-si Taedong Chongyak-wŏn (the Chŏnju Yi Clan Limited Company),
and is regularly held on the first Sunday of May each year, attracting large crowds of people. Even in today’s
abbreviated ritual, there are no less than 302 officiants, 163 for chŏnggjon, 137 for yŏngnyŏnggjon and 2 for
kongshindang (an annexe).

The ritual has been declared Important Intangible Cultural Treasure No 56 by the government, and
follows the following procedures:

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3 Yi Sŏnggye’s younger brother who later became the third King T’aejong.
Sŏkchŏnje: The Manipulation of Ritual by Subordinates

Ritual can also be manipulated by subordinates to restrict the power of superordinates. Ahern (1981) has suggested, it can sometimes serve as a teaching function for peasants, illustrating vividly, frequently, and in a variety of contexts how one gets power, how one gets access to those with power, and how one limits those with power, as in the case of Chinese peasants. Tambiah (1973) has also, though obliquely, suggested the possibility that ritual might be like a teaching device.

A classic case of the manipulation of ritual by subordinates is Sŏkchŏnje, which is still performed bimannually at the National Confucian Academy of Korea in Seoul. It is arguably the oldest Confucian ritual surviving today (Paler 1984). Sŏkchŏnje, which began to be performed in the compound of the National Confucian Academy, roughly at the same time as the royal ancestral rites, has been held to commemorate not kings or the ancestors but Confucius, his disciples and 18 canonized Korean Confucian sages.

Sŏkchŏn originally refers to a ritual offered to rivers/mountains and myosa (shrine), or a ritual held at schools to commemorate sŏnsŏng/sŏnsa (venerable sages/teachers). 'Sŏk' means 'to place' or 'to put' and 'chŏn' mean 'to stop/halt' so sŏkchŏn means 'stop after offering food and drink', i.e. 'merely offer food and drink', and originally involved no elaborate ritual procedures.

Over time it came to refer to a ritual held at schools on sanjang-il (the first day) in the second and eighth lunar months dedicated to sŏnsŏng (holy predecessors) and sŏnsa (the late teachers). Later it changed to mean the large ritual offering to Confucius and distinguished Confucian scholars. According to some scholars, there are two kinds of ritual, 1) sŏkchŏn, in which meat such as beef and lamb is used as sacrificial offerings and music is played and 2) sŏkchae, in which only vegetarian food is offered and there is no music. Sŏkchŏnje is also called chŏng-je or sanjŏn-je, because it is offered on sanjŏn-il (the first day) in the spring (the second lunar month), and the autumn (the eighth lunar month).

The origin and meaning of sŏkchŏn appears in Confucian 'Scriptures' such as churye and yeji. In China, it was held even in the ancient times, regularly to sanchŏn (mountains/rivers) and myosa (shrines), and irregularly to sŏnsŏng and sŏnsa, which refer to distinguished sages and teachers of the bygone age.

In Korea, no records of the introduction of Confucianism exist, but the first national Confucian academy, called T'aehak, is supposed to have been established as early as 372 AD during Koguryŏ King Sosurim. In view of the appearance in Samguk sagi terms such as ogyŏng paksa ('PhDs' in five Confucian classics) appear, and, Ajikki and Wangin's (Paekche scholars) records stating that Confucian textbooks such as nonŏ and ch'ŏnjamun were passed on to Japan, sŏkchŏn ritual might well have been performed as early as the Three Kingdoms Period. There exist historical records that in 648 (Shilla Queen Chindŏk 2) Kim Ch'unch'u went to T'ang China, visited the National Institute, participated in a sŏkchŏn ritual and promoted the establishment of the national institute which was launched in 682. In 717 (King Sŏngdŏk 16) the portraits of Confucius and 72 of his disciples including 10 philosophers who earned special praise from Confucius (ship chŏl), were installed at the National Institute, and sŏkchŏn was offered to them.

During the Koryŏ period, myomyo (shrines) were established at Kukhak (the National Confucian Academy: later changed its name to Kukchagam or Sŏnggyun'gwan), and sŏkchŏn was held, with the king sometimes attending it and offering libation.

The sŏkchŏn rituals became more widespread during the Choosŏn period; in 1398 (T'aejo 7) the king (the government) established Sŏnggyun'gwan, the highest institute, where it was held on a large scale. The buildings and the ritual procedures are still extant. In the main building called Tae-songjon (The Hall of Great Accomplishment), are placed the 21 spirit tablets, which are those of Confucius, four other Saints [sasŏng: Yen Tzŭ, Tieng Tzŭ, Ssŭ Tzŭ, Mêng Tzŭ(Mensius)], ten distinguished students of Confucius (ship chŏl) and six Sung.
dynasty Chinese sages. In the east and west halls (tongmu and seomu), were originally placed 112 tablets, those of 18 Korean sages and 94 Chinese sages, but in 1949, the tablets of the 18 Korean sages were moved to the main hall, Taesŏngjŏn. Twice a year in spring and autumn, sókhŏn is still offered nationwide at numerous hyanggyo (provincial Confucian ‘research centres’) scattered in South Korea. In the provincial towns there used to be as many as 330 hyanggyo, but only 231 remain in South Korea.

The ritual procedures are similar to those of Chonggmyo taeje, although of shorter duration:

1) Ch’anghoi: Reciting the ritual procedure and taking respective places
2) Yongshin: Welcoming the spirits through the main gate.
3) Chŏn p’yerye: Offering incense and p’yeboaek (paying respects and offering libation)
4) Ch’ohŏn-rye: The first offering of libation
5) Ahŏn-rye: The second offering of libation
6) Chonghŏn-rye: The final offering of libation
7) Punhŏn-rye: Offering of libation to the rest of the tablets
8) Ŭmbokrye: Consuming ritual food and drink,
9) Mangryo-rye: Sending the spirits off and ending the ceremony by burning chungmun

Sókhŏn taeje was declared Important Intangible Cultural Treasure No 85 on 1 November 1986 to preserve it and other ritual procedure.

A close scrutiny of the 18 canonized Korean sages whose spirit tablets are replaced in taesŏngjŏn (the main hall) reveals some interesting points. They are:

1) Stŏl Ch’ŏng (8th century): Son of the famous Shilla monk Wonhyo, he is said to have preferred the Confucian classics to his father’s Buddhist Scriptures, and generally considered the father of Korean Confucian scholarship.
2) Ch’oe Ch’il-wŏn (857-circa 910): In 869 at the age of 12, he went to China, passed the T’ang civil service examination at 17. In 885 he returned to his native Shilla aged 28. Disillusioned with the corrupt politics of the time, he retired to Haeinsa Temple, and later disappeared. The death and mode of his death are unknown. The first Korean to be honoured by enshrinement in the National Academy in 1020.
3) An Haynag (Hoehon) (1243-1306): Of humble background, he is revered as one of the greatest literary masters of the Koryŏ period. Founded the Confucian National Academy in its present form. He went to Yuan China as a member of the royal retinue. There he discovered Chu Hsi, transcribed his Chu Tzu Shu by hand, and brought it back to Koryŏ along with portraits of Confucius and Chu Hsi (Chuja in Korean). In 1303 he sent an emissary to China to obtain portraits of Confucius and his 72 disciples, sacrificial instruments, receptacles, music, copies of the Confucian classics, histories of the sages, and the writings of Chu Hsi. He was canonized in 1319.
4) Chŏng Mong-ju (P’oun) (1337-1392): He strongly opposed to Yi Sŏnggye’s plans to usurp the Koryŏ throne. Yi actively sought the support of Chŏng Mong-ju, the most powerful retainer in the Koryŏ court. But he refused because of his loyalty to his king, with a poem, which is one of the best-known poems in Korea. Shortly afterwards he was assassinated by the Yi faction on Sŏnju, a bridge in Kaesŏng.
5) Kim Koeng-pil (1454-1504): He was a star student of Kim Chong-jik who was executed by the king for recording in official history a detailed account of the wrongdoing of the king’s great-grandfather, King Sejo. Banished from court during the literati purges of 1498 by Yŏnsan-gun, and was executed by poison in 1504. He was canonized in 1610.
6) Chŏng Yŏ-ch’ang (1450-1504): Another of Kim Chong-jik’s talented disciples, he was known as a neo-Confucianist scholar who refuted some points of Chu Hsi’s doctrine. He died in 1504 before the persecution, but his body was exhumed and his corpse beheaded during the turmoil.
7) Cho Kwang-jo (1482-1519): The leading spirit of a group of young ‘legalists’ scholars who criticized the futile, baneful effect of philosophic disputation and advocated the need for law, emphasizing realism and practicality. The Cho and his group petitioned to the king to delete 76 names from King Chunjong’s list of kongshin (courtiers who helped him gain his crown), nearly three-quarters of the whole list. They made powerful enemies, thereby increasing political factional wrangling. The Cho group later fell victim to their political enemies, and were either sentenced to death or banished to remote areas. Cho was executed. He was canonized in 1610.
8) Yi Ôn-jŏk (1491-1553): A victim of the political factional wrangling of his time, he spent much of his time in exile, and eventually died in exile.

5 For full biographies of the Korean sages, see Palmer 1984:63-88, and also Han’guk inmyŏng sajŏn.
9) Yi Hwang (T'oegeye) (1501-1570) Arguably the foremost neo-Confucian philosopher in Korea, he freely preached to the king to conduct his affairs with rightousness and reverence and according to the Confucian cosmic law. (Palmer 1984:77) He had a particular aversion to political life, and disliked the faction-ridden politics. He was canonized in 1610 together with four other scholars.

10) Kim In-hu (1510-1560): He was widely respected for his philosophical writings and for his knowledge of astronomy, medicine and law. He was canonized in 1796.

11) Yi I (Yulgok) (1536-1584): He belonged to the same clan as Admiral Yi Sun-shin. He was the son of Shin Saimdang, one of the most famous talent women in Korean history. When his mother died when he was 16, he displayed his great filial piety by living in a hut built next to her tomb for three years constantly wearing his mourning clothes. At 18 studied Buddhism at Kŭmgang Mountain. Later returned to Confucius, but it was said that ‘the smell of the Buddha was still on him (Palmer 1984:80)’ Yi I and Yi Hwang are probably the two most important Korean philosophers in the history of Confucian thought. Both belonged to the School of J, the school of moral law. First canonized in 1682, but his tablet was removed from the shrine in 1689 and reinstalled in 1694.

12) Sŏng Hon (Ugye) (1535-1598): He refused to accept a government appointment until the last years of his life. His canonization is influenced by the factional politics. He was first canonized in 1682, but his spirit tablet was removed 7 years later, and then reinstalled permanently in 1694.

13) Kim Chang-saeng (Sagye) (1548-1631): A follower of Yi I, and left many writings asserting positions contrary to those of Yi Hwang. He was canonized in 1717.

14) Cho Hŏn (Chungbong) (1544-1592): A student of both Yi I and Sŏng Hon (Sage 12), he passed kwagŏ at 23. On one occasion he lost his post for criticizing the king’s gift of incense to a Buddhist temple; another time he was impeached and removed as a county magistrate of T’ongjin county on the charge of meting out excessively harsh punishments. He was discharged from office a third time when he prepared a memorial to the king in opposition to the plans of an opposing faction to bring criminal charges against his two mentors, Yi I and Sŏng Hon.

15) Kim Chip (1574-1656): Son of Kim Chang-saeng (Sage 13), he carried on his father’s study of rites, and wrote textbooks of ritual observances. He is the last sage to be canonized in 1883.

16) Song Shi-yŏl (Uam) (1607-1689): A student of Kim Chang-saeng, he withdrew from court in protest against the policy of making peace with the Manchus and did not accept appointment again until Hyojong ascended the throne in 1649. He was also embroiled in factional wrangling. He incurred King Sukchong’s wrath in 1689 when he opposed the investiture of Chang Hŏbin’s (Sukchong’s secondary wife) baby son as crown prince, and was executed. A prolific writer, He left no less than 215 volumes. He supported Yi I, rejecting Yi Hwang’s dualism. He was canonized in 1756.

17) Song Chun-gil (1606-1672) Of the same clan as Song Shi-yŏl, he was also a student of Kim Chang-saeng. He often retired from the government, and took up residence in the country. He was famous for his calligraphy and literary style. He was canonized in 1756.

18) Pak Se-ch’ae (Hyŏnsŏk) (1631-1695). Leader of the Young Doctrine (soron) faction, he worked to overcome factional divisions. The author of a number of works on neo-Confucianism, he was also famous for calligraphy. He was canonized in 1764.

A study of their brief biographies reveals many interesting facts that give insights into people who commanded esteem and respect in Chosŏn society. First of all, they were people who were considered great Confucian scholars and left behind a large number of books and writings. That suggests that Chosŏn society was essentially a meritocracy, valuing scholarly accomplishments above all else. It is not surprising, since the dynasty itself was established by its founder’s excellent military and political prowess. The only irony there was that Yi Sŏng-gye, a military man, should adopt a government run by literati courtiers. Later that backfired, and the court became a restricting force in royal power, and a cause for the perpetual political factional wrangling, often with tragic consequences.

A closer scrutiny of their political and scholarly careers divulges another interesting point. They were people of high moral and ethical principles, who valued the Confucian ideals of honour, loyalty and integrity more than any worldly prosperity or even their lives. They were not afraid to oppose to their kings at the risk of their lives, if they considered a particular royal behaviour to be ‘wrong’, i.e. against the Confucian doctrines. We saw earlier, how Chŏng Mong-ju preserved his loyalty to his king to the death. Kim Koeng-pil (1454-1504) was put to death for supporting his teacher Kim Chong-jik who had minutely chronicled the wrongdoings of the current king’s great-grandfather Sejo in official historical documents. Chŏng Yŏ-ch’ang (1450-1504), another of his student, suffered posthumous beheading. Cho Kwang-jo, Yi On-jŏk, Sŏng Hon, Cho Hŏn, Song Shi-yŏl all incurred royal wrath at some points in their lives, and as a consequence suffered death/banishment, because they dared to point out royal wrongdoings.

The choice of the 18 Korean Confucian sages, whose tablets are now placed in the rarefied place of the main hall next to those of Confucius no less, has a subversive undercurrent. There is a sense in which the regular sŏkchŏn offerings to subversive Korean Confucian scholars as well as great Confucian sages of all time was a
reminder to the kings that they should always comply with the Confucian cosmological law. The sŏkchŏn taeje performed biannually at Songgyun'gwan University therefore was similar in form to chongmyo taeje, albeit less elaborate, on a smaller scale and of shorter duration. That suggests the royal power was doubtless much greater than the literati courtiers', but as significant. By offering sacrifices to Confucius, one of the greatest sages in human history, and canonizing Korean history's courageous scholars who dared to point out their kings' erroneous ways, sŏkchŏn taeje can be said to have had a highly subversive motivation.

Conclusion

Ritual cannot be separated from tradition, and is an integral part of the social and political process and structure. Ritual is not the mask of force but is itself a type of power, since through it people are often persuaded to acquiesce in a polity where the distribution of power is manifestly unequal and unjust. Geertz (1980) has taken this argument further and suggested that ritual can be the central structure of a society, as in the case of royal cremations of Negara, the pre-modern Balinese theatre state. They were not means to political ends; they were what there was; in other words, borrowing his words, 'power served pomp, not pomp power'. Geertz's argument is an extremely case and has been subjected to controversy, and this paper directly challenges that argument.

It is fair to say that ritual is inherently conservative because of its restricted language and form, so that it leaves no room for any critical assessment of the tradition it perpetuates. Also notions of ‘tradition’ have to be scrutinized; ‘traditions’ which appear to be ancient are often quite recent in origin, and sometimes 'invented'. Since 'traditions' do not interpret themselves, those who claim the right to interpret them do so to serve their specific ends, or sometimes reinvent them to suit their purpose, for example to consolidate or rebuild a social system or institution in a period of change.

Cross-cultural studies indicate that ritual is generally controlled by those in authority, most notably kings and elders to maintain and strengthen their social position. (Kuper 1949; Evans-Pritchard 1962; Bloch 1974, 1986, 1987; et al.) It has often been maintained that ritual conceals the true nature of authority from the ruled, thus enhancing the position of rulers. In contrast, Ahern (1981) has argued that in Chinese society the ritual system may have served a teaching function for peasants, thus limiting the power of those in authority.

Two of the most important Confucian rituals still performed in Korea, the chongmyo taeje, The Royal Ancestral Rites performed at the Royal Ancestral Shrine, and sŏkchŏn taeje, the ritual offerings to Confucius and other Chinese and Korean Confucian sages held at the National Confucian Academy (now Songgyun-gwan University) can be interpreted in terms of the manipulation of ritual. The elaborate Chongmyo taeje is a good example of the manipulation of ritual by the king to legitimize and perpetuate the Chosŏn dynasty founded on the usurped crown and to consolidate royal authority. Sŏkchŏn taeje is an example of the manipulation by the subordinates; it can be interpreted as a direct challenge to restrict royal power and authority, through symbolically emphasizing the superiority of Confucian scholarship and cosmologically sanctioned Confucian codes of conduct. Thus the Chosŏn dynasty polity was that of the weak king and the strong literati court, who through constant learned petitions to the king, restricted royal power and authority.

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Finding Full Text Articles in Korean Databases on the Internet

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Scholars working overseas sometimes find it difficult to obtain articles on the country they are studying. This paper discusses Korean databases that can be searched through the Internet and which provide full texts of articles required. The paper also provides examples of how to use three particularly useful databases.

Why need the Korean databases on the Internet

Owing to limited budgets, the Monash University Library, like many other university libraries, cannot afford to buy many Korean full-text databases. We also cannot afford subscriptions to many major Korean journals. Yet, the Library has to support our users in meeting their research needs. This difficulty faces librarians in many language areas.

This forces librarians to find free databases on the Internet. As Jacso (2000, p. 61) notes, finding free or partially free databases can substitute for fee-based information services in the daily lives of librarians around the world. Hundie (2002, p. 14) too has made the same point:

Access to most databases on the Web is fee-based and users need to pay subscription fees to use them. Some of them are very expensive for individual users. But there are a large number of databases that can be searched at no cost. Interestingly, many fee-based databases are also accessible free of charge on some Websites.

Thus, librarians, especially those in charge of small collections, continuously need to spend time to find and check information on free databases in order to provide resources for their academic researchers, students and other potential users. As information on the Internet can change fairly rapidly, librarians need to check reasonably often to make certain their information is up-to-date.

There are many free Korean databases available on the Internet in which people can obtain full text articles. Many of these databases, however, require that scholars become members before they can use the database.

Korean Internet usage trends and online databases status

The information revolution has radically changed many aspects of life in most modern countries. As is well known, Korea has pursued the development of both hardware and software and the usage of the Internet has grown dramatically in recent years. Korean databases have also grown and developed as part of this trend. According to the Ministry of Information and Communication and the National Internet Development Agency of Korea, 77.8 per cent of Korean households have computers and 86.0 per cent of these can access the Internet at home (http://isis.nic.or.kr/eng_report_down/upload/user_sum_200412_english.pdf accessed 23 May 2005).

The Korea Database Promotion Center (2005, p. 22) provides good data on databases in Korea. In 2004 they recorded 2679 online databases, an increase of 8.1 percent over the 2478 databases in 2003. These Korean databases include such areas as philosophy, religion, the social sciences, language and linguistics, history, literature, art, the natural sciences, applied sciences and information technology. The Korea Database Promotion Center (2005, p. 25) mentions that the number of education/occupation and academic/research databases dropped 29 per cent from 804 in 2003 to 567 in 2004, but the estimated sales of those databases increased from 34 billion won (about A$45 million) in 2003 to 65 billion won (about A$86 million) in 2004.

Fortunately, most of these Korean full-text databases on the Internet are well developed in Korea. The one difficulty is that one needs to know Korean in order to use them.

How to access and retrieve relevant Korean articles

To some extent, modern computerized databases can provide too much information. How do we avoid such information overload? Bernnard and Hollingsworth (1999, p.63) have said:
Even if the patron has a basic knowledge of how information is organized and accessed, Web-based full-text databases add another layer of complexity to information retrieval. We know that a basic knowledge of information literacy concepts helps patrons to retrieve relevant information from the library, so the authors wondered if they could find some new concepts that would apply to all Web-based full-text databases.

Carlson (2003, p. 28) has also noted:

Bell has watched students go to online databases, enter a few search terms, and get hundreds of articles in return. Swamped with information, and doubtless on a deadline, these students print out the first several articles—making no effort to evaluate their quality—and then run off to write their papers. Bell asks a question that might seem heretical for someone in his field: Is more information always better?

Ojala (2003, p.44) has also discussed the issue of quality. Does the user consider whether the retrieved information is from a reputable source?

The user clearly has to know whether he or she is using a good database or not. If the user does use an appropriate database, then the retrieved information is often of good quality.

Examining three Korean databases

In order to use databases which maximize the number of useful articles retrieved from the Internet, I will give illustrations from three Web-based databases:

1. The Research Information Service System (RISS4U) run by the Korean Education & Research Information Service,
2. The National Digital Library which has seven participating digital libraries in Korea, and

First, Research Information Service System RISS4U http://www.riss4u.net/index.jsp run by the Korean Education & Research Information Service.

This is the RISS home page:
Through RISS, the user can access union catalogs, overseas research information, the full texts of journal articles and dissertations from 230 Korean university libraries as well as some articles from databases outside Korea. Services are free after the user registers. The site is in Korean.

As an example, let us retrieve articles on "Family law (가족법)". With the Korean keyword, 가족법, this database gives 469 records from university holdings in Korea, 68 theses, 653 books, and 6 serials. This was accessed at 16 May 2005.

The user can sort the list by title, author, or publication date. When user would like to look at the full text article, the user has to login to open a new window with the free-of-charge icon (!?1) and they can then obtain their full text article free of charge. The users can also use the document delivery system of their own libraries to get full text articles for which fees are charged (icon $).

The RISS page giving retrieved results:

Second, the National Digital Library (http://www.dlibrary.go.kr) has seven participating digital libraries including the National Library of Korea, the National Assembly Library of Korea, the Supreme Court Library, the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information, the Korean Education and Research Information Service, the KAIST Digital Science Libraries, and the Korea Agricultural Science Digital Library in Korea.

The National Digital Library's full-text database search page:

Each of the seven libraries can be searched separately.

A. The National Library of Korea (http://www.nl.go.kr)

The full-text databases available at The National Library of Korea are Antique Books, the Official Gazette 1894-1945, data published by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism for culture-related data, newspapers before 1945, One Hundred Korean Classics, Korea-related data published in foreign languages before 1945, data of single editions published between 1945 and 1996 which includes 139,000 books, more than 7,500 doctoral dissertations in the humanities until 1997, academic journals from 2000, Korean Studies and other information center, eBook, and Article on treatise.

Unfortunately, owing to copyright law, users from outside Korea or from Korean libraries which have not made a copyright agreement with Korea cannot view full text articles. However, we expect changes in this area in the near future. At present, however, full texts of these materials may be obtained only at the National Library of Korea.

B. The National Assembly Library (NAL) (http://www.nanet.go.kr)
NAL has built a National Bibliographical Database includes full text databases. Its digital library makes it possible for users to access and search the bibliographic databases and full-text databases of NAL at its cooperative university libraries.

The available full text databases include the Book Catalog, Government Series, Social Sciences Doctoral and Master's Theses, Social Sciences Journals, Seminar materials, Old and Rare Books, ceased newspapers, Korean-related Overseas Materials, National Assembly Official Reports, Translated Laws, Ku Hanmal Choyak Hwichan Hanmal kundae pomnyong charyojip, Tonggambu pomnyong charyojip, National Assembly History, Follow-ups on the National Audits, Speeches of the Chairman of the Assembly and Analysis of Social Problems.

Among these full text databases, some materials cannot be accessed through the Internet due to the copyright law. In this case, users need to access the full-text databases at the NAL or at the various university libraries which are members of the Mutual Academic Information Exchange Agreement with NAL for cooperative digital library database exchange. All of these full text databases use Korean language.

C. Supreme Court Library (http://library.scourt.go.kr)

This library’s homepage provides information on major Supreme and Lower Court decisions since 1948, major Constitutional Court decisions since 1989; acts and subordinate statutes; legal publications; and regulations, established rules, and precedents including all related history. One can also access the Legal Information Database = Chonghap pomnyul chongbo 충합법률정보 (http://glaw.scout.go.kr). If a user would like to view or use articles in the Supreme Court Library databases, the user has to become a member of the Supreme Court Library of Korea. Then the user can download the Bubgoul LX-DVD from their homepage.

D. Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information (KISTI) (http://www.kisti.re.kr)

This library has bibliographical databases on science and technology, academic societies, books on science and technology, research report as well as Korea patents.

E. For KERIS (http://www.keris.or.kr), see RISS4U above.

F. Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) (http://library.kaist.ac.kr)

The digital science library of KAIST provides a local database of the KAIST Digital Science Library which includes bibliographic records for all collections, full page images (SGML rather than .pdf) of KAIST masters and doctoral theses, and bibliographic records of electronic journals.

G. Korea Agricultural Science Digital Library (http://203.241.52.68)

Available databases include PhD theses on agriculture and articles in agricultural journals published in Korea.

I retrieved articles on “Family law (가족법)” from the National Digital Library database. This database gave 1,550 records from the National Library of Korea, the National Assembly Library and RISS4U on 16 May 2005.

I also retrieved articles on family law from each of the seven libraries.

The National Library of Korea digital library databases give 450 records from articles of journals, 10 books and 1 journal.

The National Assembly Digital Library databases retrieved:

- 353 records including 34 full text records from the Book database,
- 111 records including 99 full text records from the Doctoral and Masters Theses database,
- 789 records including 510 full text records from the Index to the Periodicals database,
- 126 records including 120 full text records from the Journal database,
- 13 full text records from the Seminar materials database, and
- 26 full text records from the Government publications database and 2 records from non-book catalogue.

This gives a total 802 full-text records from the databases of the National Assembly Library.

Supreme Court Library database gives 370 records in the result list. It provides only record contents and citation information rather than full texts.
The databases of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and the Korea Agricultural Science Digital Library are not appropriate for the search term "가족법" (Family Law). They retrieved small numbers of items with no full text records.

Finally, the Korea Press Foundation has provided KINDS (Korean Integrated News Database System http://www.kinds.or.kr), a comprehensive online news database service since 1990. KINDS provides articles from 181 media including national and local newspapers, economic dailies, English-language dailies, television network news programs, magazines and professional newspapers.

The KINDS homepage:

Using the same Korean keyword to retrieve articles on "Family law (가족법)", I obtained 214 records for one year (24 May 2004 to 23 May 2005). Some articles can be opened without logging in, but users are also required to login to obtain and view the full text screen.

In addition, if one wants to search for "Family law (가족법)", one could go to the following on-line databases:

The Korea Legislation Research Institute (KLRI http://www.klri.re.kr) Digital Library. This site provides free access to full texts of research reports. Users who wish to search the book catalogue must pay a membership fee. In addition, those who wish to see a digitised book have to pay a fee.

Ministry of Government Legislation (MOLEG http://www.moleg.go.kr) has a vast on-line database called the Comprehensive Legal Information Service System which integrates legislative information and court cases. Created by the MOLEG in cooperation with the Supreme Court, it contains considerable information on legislative acts, regulations, court cases, and books on jurisprudence. It also has a database of law history.

For more information on Korean databases on the Internet, the user can access "AAS Roundtable: Electronic Resources in Korean Studies" at http://www.asianst.org/abst/korea/k-67.htm. At this session of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) Meeting in March-April 2005, Korean studies librarians at major North American academic libraries demonstrated the most important Korean electronic resources, both free and commercial.

Conclusion

In using on-line databases, it is important to choose the most appropriate databases for the topic and to use appropriate search terms. Sometimes, a bit of experimentation with search terms may be appropriate.

Most databases require that the user login to gain access. This means that users have to become members. Some databases require foreigners to contact them or to click a special foreigner’s box. A few databases sites are not available to users outside Korea. Users may need to install a viewer program from the corresponding agency to view full text materials.

The use of such databases greatly expands the Korean resources available to scholars and students in Australia and New Zealand. Knowledge of these databases will assist Korean studies researchers to use Korean resources more effectively and conveniently.

References


Changes in higher education in Korea
in the latter part of Japanese imperial rule

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The fact that the Korean nation was no more under the Japanese colonial administration reinforced Korean people's belief in history, and especially in ethnocentric history. Intellectuals of Korea, armed with nationalism, attempted to realize and embody their nation's existence through history during a situation where Korean sovereign authority was usurped by Japanese imperialism (Gibong Kim, 2001). This intellectual ambience exerted much influence after the liberation of Korea. Studies on education during the colonial period especially were influenced greatly by this ambience and even now adhere to traditional methods while being indifferent to active explorations for new research methodologies made by the field of study of Korean history.

Colonial education system and/or educational practices which were different from those of motherland Japan were alleged to be evidences of education based on ethnic discrimination, while colonial education system and/or practices which were same as those of motherland Japan were criticized as being assimilative. The predominant intellectual ambience was such that anything related to Japan was seen as oppression of Koreans and it was virtually impossible to interpret any events or institutions as meaning other than resistance to said oppression. Studies related to higher education under Japanese imperialism have also been overwhelmed with such intellectual ambience. Most studies had the following results in common. Japanese imperialism oppressed the chance for Koreans to obtain higher education during its regime. Professional colleges sanctioned educational standards to the lowest level possible but only to the point that would minimize the dissatisfaction of Koreans at the same time. Moreover, Gyeongseong Imperial University was established as an expedient colonial administration irrelevant to the will of the Koreans and was operated with discrimination against Korean people. Gyeongseong Imperial University was considered as a Japanese university built by the Japanese for the Japanese.

It is difficult even to bring up the matter of the roles played by approximately 1,000 of Korean elites who graduated from Gyeongseong Imperial University during the modernization process for discussion or the results of studies on Korean culture made by Gyeongseong Imperial University professors. The rapidly increasing number of Korean students studying in Japan during the 1920's and 1930's and continuing to the early 1940's, the period right before the end of war, is not that important in intellectual history.

A recent study on the establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University also states that "this university was a means to govern the colony, and the tendency of Korean educational history to negatively evaluate this university is natural in this sense" (Kyu-young Chung, 1998). This study also points out that this judgment is based on ethnic bias.

There are not that many research studies that reveal the true nature of higher education during the Japanese imperialism period due to ethnic bias that affects how one views Japanese colonial period as well as national and nationalistic historical depictions. It is especially difficult to find studies that investigate the changes in the field of higher education in Korea during the war years in the latter part of Japanese imperialism. As a result, history of higher education in Korea during the periods of Japanese imperialism, United States Army Military Government in Korea, and mid-twentieth century that transitions to the Republic of Korea is not continuous but severed and fragmented. Most education systems or developments are perceived to be severed from its historical background or to suddenly appear along with the liberation of Korea or with the establishment of a new government. Problems on education that are difficult to resolve are perceived as legacies of Japanese colonial education but without scientific basis or empirical explanations.

This study takes into consideration such succession of issues and attempts to verify the true nature of changes witnessed in the field of higher education during the latter part of Japanese imperialism and analyze it in a new way. Two subjects of discussion would be the establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University, the symbol of higher education in Japanese colonialism, and the important changes made in the field of higher education due to war.

I. Establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University

1. Background on Establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University

1) Most representative of this is introspection on nationalistic prejudice and on historical delineation based on ethnicity and nationalism.
Higher education in Korea began after the Ordinance for Professional colleges in 1913 and the regulations for professional colleges in 1915 were instituted. Based on such legal basis, several government-run and private professional colleges were established during the latter half of 1910s. Establishing a regular college was not even discussed at that time, because the predominant thought was that it was too premature for such actions.

Immediately after 1919, however, an active examination of a plan to establish colleges in Korea took place, and Gyeongseong Imperial University, representative of a Japanese imperial college, was established in 1926 as a result. There are several differing opinions related to the background for establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University. Prof. Umakoshi represents the viewpoint of the Japanese. He points out four factors in establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University. First is the revised educational policy of the Japanese Governor-General in Korea following the March First Independence Movement. Second is the enactment of “college ordinance” from Japan in 1918 and the resultant drastic increase in the number of institutions for higher education. Third is the movement by Korean people to establish their own colleges in Korea and the increasing number of students studying abroad. Last is the demand made by Japanese citizens living in Korea to their government to establish institutions for higher education for them in Korea. Emphasis is especially put on the founding of Gyeongseong Imperial University “as one form of ‘regional decentralization’ of colleges in motherland Japan and as a result of the alignment policy between Japan and Korea” (Umakoshi, 1995). When the demand for higher education increased quickly due to the rapid economic development in Japan during World War I, a movement to reorganize the college systems in Japan became visible. The establishment of more universities aside from five existing imperial universities became possible in 1918 because of the college ordinance. The point is that the establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University should be differentiated from colonial administration as a natural reflection of Japan’s revised higher education policy of the 1920s.

In contrast, the traditional interpretations made by Korean scholars are very political and nationalistic. In other words, the predominant opinions of Korean scholars on the issue of establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University by Governor-General of Japan in Korea are that it was “the best way to impede the natives from establishing their own college” (Ho-il Kim, 1972), that it was “a means to control popular sentiments of Korean people when their attempt to establish their own college failed” (In-soo Son, 1967), that it was “a substitute for the natives’ attempt to establish their own college” (Jae-chul Jung, 1972). To this day, one explanation still claims that Gyeongseong Imperial University was established “as a forced result of Koreans’ movement to establish their own college” (Yong-jin Han, 1996. Yong-ha Shin, 1998).

These interpretations made by some Korean scholars, however, need to be re-examined from several angles. The claim that the movement by Korean people to establish their own college had influence in founding Gyeongseong Imperial University lacks persuasion, because 1) the plan to establish Gyeongseong Imperial University came into effect in 1919 before the movement by Korean people to establish their own college took place, and 2) the movement by Korean people to establish their own college was aborted for other reasons prior to the establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University.

On the other hand, recent studies put emphasis on Japan’s alignment policy between Japan and Korea and Korean people’s zealous request for education as the basis for establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University (Kyu-young Chung, 1998). According to Chung, Japan adopted an alignment policy between Japan and Korea for two reasons. One is the conclusion reached by the Japanese government in Japan and the Japanese government-general in Korea on the discriminative education system and customs in Korea culminating in dissatisfaction among Korean people. Another is the inauguration into office of newly appointed Premier Hara, who was against colonial separatism, and the formalization of assimilation policy to make Korea an extension of motherland Japan. Affected by the March First Movement and the changing circumstances in Japan, specific programs for resolving differences in the education system between Japan and Korea were promoted in 1920, and its representative program was the establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University.

That is to say, this interpretation views the increased desire for higher education among Korean people, along with the alignment policy between Japan and Korea, as the cause for establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University. Korean people’s desire for higher education were seen in the form of rapid increase in the number of students studying abroad and the movement by Korean people to establish their own college. Only 678 Korean students studied abroad in 1919, but that number became over 4,000 in 1924, of which 3,500 studied in Japan, 500 in China, and 200 in the U.S.; the number of students studying abroad increased by at least 6 times in just five years. Japan was very apprehensive about the possibility of these students forming anti-Japanese sentiments.

2) This represents the transition from a military government characterized by oppression and discrimination to a cultural government based on understanding and assimilation.

3) Hasegawa, who served as the Governor-General of Japan in Korea until right before the March First Independence Movement, pointed out the ethnic discrimination policy and the urgent need to establish colleges in Korea. He used the March First Movement to support his point. And the Administrative-Superintendent also recommended a revised plan for higher education system in Korea at the meeting of the Protectorate-General on October 13, 1919.
Thus, the necessity for establishing colleges in Korea was discussed extensively so that these students may be prevented from studying in Japan.

Korean people's desire for higher education culminated in a movement by Korean people to establish their own college; this movement began in November of 1922 and continued for approximately one year. It is more convincing to interpret this movement by Korean people to establish their own college as that of a nationalistic response to the Japanese leadership's founding of Gyeongseong Imperial University, which was already in preparatory stage, than to interpret it as a cause for establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University (Kyu-young Chung, 1998). Chung also recognizes that the colonialistic nature within the alignment policy between Japan and Korea as well as the concern that Japanese government-general in Korea has of the emergence of private colleges in Korea influenced the founding Gyeongseong Imperial University.

Along with above arguments, attention must also be paid to changes in educational population and the significance of the development process of putting undue emphasis on academic backgrounds in Korea in the mid-1920s. According to the Second Educational Ordinance of 1922, the number of students enrolled in primary schools in 1919 was 80,632 and in 1920 increased to 107,365, and further increased in 1922 to 238,058; the number reached over 300,000 in 1923 and over 400,000 in 1925, which is over five times the number in 1919 (Hurugawa, 1990). The demand for secondary education and higher education could only explode like a chain reaction after students who were enrolled in primary school in 1919 graduated in 1923. Hence, there must have been a need for an education system that could absorb this situation. Thus, it was a natural move to plan on opening more colleges when explosive and continuous increase in applicants for enrollment in primary schools was clearly seen.

2. Objective in Establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University

Then what was the specific objective that was to be accomplished by establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University? The official objective released by Japan was to give Koreans the chance for higher education in order to accommodate Korean people's extreme zeal for higher education. Several agendas other than such superficial objectives were pointed out. First, the university was established in order to fulfill the chances for higher education as demanded by the steadily increasing number of Japanese living in Korea (Umakoshi 1995, Byung Hun Nam 1962, Yong-jin Han 1996). Second, the imperial university was established in order to hinder the movement by Korean people to establish their own college (Jae-chul Jung 1989, Yong-jin Han 1996). Third is to suppress the nationalistic awareness of Korean young elite and at the same time inculcate Japanese imperialism into them, and further, to cultivate pro-Japanese bureaucrats (Yong-jin Han 1996, Kyu-young Chung 1998). Above discussions generally agree that Gyeongseong Imperial University was established as an unavoidable choice in the changing situation of the time rather than Japan having a zealous purpose in mind when doing so. Especially, too much emphasis on the significance of the movement by Korean people to establish their own college resulted in hiding the active policy objective Japan desired to achieve through establishing an imperial university.

There are studies observing Japan's active purpose in establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University. Early on Yong-sup Kim has pointed out that the purpose of establishing Gyeongseong Imperial University was to "suppress situations that may inflame anti-imperial and anti-Japanese thoughts among Korean people and to formulate a theoretical system that will justify colonial administration through education (Yong-sup Kim, 1966). Joon-shik Lee takes this one step further and states that "Gyeongseong Imperial University itself excluded Korean people and it was a sanctuary composed of Japanese researchers" through analysis of the process of setting up the 'Department of Korean Linguistics & Literature' as well as through analysis of the teachers and students at Gyeongseong Imperial University (Joon-shik Lee, 2001). According to Lee, research and/or teachings conducted at Gyeongseong Imperial University under the so-called name of modern learning were nothing but "basic efforts by Japanese imperialism to rationalize and justify colonial administration." In other words, Gyeongseong Imperial University is defined as the tool of the Japanese government for "reproducing colonial administration ideology" just as Tokyo Imperial University performed the role of creating justification ideology for Japanese imperialism at home. For instance, the Department of Korean Linguistics & Literature actively contributed in disseminating negative perceptions of social practices related to the Korean language.

Such expectations did not materialize. The number of Korean students studying in Japan increased geometrically even after the establishment of Gyeongseong Imperial University. In 1923, a year prior to the inauguration of the preparatory courses at Gyeongseong Imperial University, 992 students went to Japan to study; that number increased to 3,275 in 1926, the same year that Gyeongseong Imperial University accepted enrollment for its undergraduate courses. This increase in students studying abroad slowed down in early 1930s due to economic crisis but accelerated again in mid-1930s; the number of students studying abroad was over 20,000 in 1940 and close to 30,000 in 1942 (Chan-seung Park, 2001).

By reforming the educational conditions of the colony, the alignment policy between Japan and Korea reflects Japan's goal of persuading Japanese living in Japan to immigrate to Korea.
under the justification of making language studies scientific. Soong-nyeong Lee, a well-known linguistics scholar who graduated from this department, hurled abuse at the Hangul movement, which is the focus of Korean Language Association, as being "unscientific chauvinism." (Joon-shik Lee, 2001).

It is more apt to view the establishment of Gyeongseo Imperial University as an educational policy that was independently planned and pursued based on the objectives Japan had in colonial administration and not as a reaction to the movement by Korean people to establish their own college nor to hinder said movement as is more commonly known.

3. Significance of Establishing the Department of Law & Literature and Excluding The Department of Sciences & Engineering

Various interpretations about the fact that the Department of Medicine and the Department of Law & Literature were instituted but not that of Sciences & Engineering when Gyeongseo Imperial University was inaugurated. Most Korean scholars claim that establishing the Department of Sciences & Engineering can assist in nurturing independence but fields that would interfere less with colonial administration such as the Department of Law & Literature and the Department of Medicine were established (Jae-chul Jung, 1989).

Yong-jin Han attributes the comparatively low number of Korean students enrolled in the field of law and literature to Japan's prevention of too many Korean students enrolling in the Department of Law & Literature which might create political consciousness under the colonial conditions of the time (Yong-jin Han, 1996).

During the deliberation phase of the plan for establishing Gyeongseo Imperial University, there were many debates in Japan and within the government-general in Korea and among the Japanese ruling class in Korea as to whether to create or not create the Department of Law & Literature and the Department of Sciences & Engineering. One opinion advocated the establishment of the Department of Sciences & Engineering before the Department of Law & Literature in order to assist the colonial administration while another conflicting opinion advocated the necessity for the establishment of law school from a broader perspective in order to reduce the number of Korean students studying abroad; this was due to the fact that the majority of Korean students studying in Japan were enrolling in law school. One must focus on the fact that some objected strongly to the establishment of the Department of Law & Literature, because there was concern that creating the Department of Law & Literature might promote anti-imperialistic thoughts among Korean students. While such debates were held, what was urgently needed was the practical necessity of reducing the number of Korean students studying in Japan, which was rapidly increasing. It seems that department of law, which was the most popular curriculum among Korean students, and the field of literature, which reflected the special characteristics of colonial Korean, formed the Department of Law & Literature and thus was created first.

The claim that establishing the Department of Sciences & Engineering was excluded because that can assist in nurturing Korean people's independence capability or that it will interfere with colonial administration is viewed as a representative example of a nationalistic explanation without support. It is too expedient to criticize Japanese imperialism's emphasis on practical education rather than on the humanities as a policy for training inferior colonials or as an obscurantist policy as well as to interpret the delay in creating the Department of Sciences & Engineering during the planning phase of the imperial university as a strategy to hinder the capability for independence.

The primary reason for deferring the establishment of the Department of Sciences & Engineering was of a financial nature. It seems reasonable when seen from the viewpoint that the sciences and engineering fields in fact require more investment in equipment as compared to the fields of law or liberal arts. Another reason was the trend of Korean students preferring courses in liberal arts. Japan argued that the reason for delaying the establishment of the Department of Sciences & Engineering was that, even if created, there would not be many Korean applicants. The trend in the courses preferred by Korean students studying in Japan at the time show that this is a plausible claim. Distribution of preferred courses among Korean students studying in Japan in 1930, which was four years after the inauguration of Gyeongseo Imperial University, were as follows: 30.7% (667 students) in the field of law, 19.9% (433 students) in the field of literature, and 13.3% (290 students) in the field of economics as opposed to only 6.3% (138 students) in the field of sciences and engineering. There is an indication that only extremely few people from the lower middle class in Korea in those days were detached from social reality and followed their individual inclinations and interests by studying scientific technology (Keun-bae Kim, 2001). In a word, it was difficult to find strong will and passion towards scientific technology among Korean people at the time.

By announcing its 'Emergency Plan on Education' in October of 1943, the government-general of Japan in Korea proceeded to expand professional colleges that specialized in the fields of sciences and engineering in order to assist the war effort, and private professional colleges that specialized in the field of liberal arts were converted into fields of sciences and engineering. The Department of Sciences & Engineering

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6 He did not present convincing reasons or materials

8 This ratio is even higher than when Gyeongseo Imperial University was established.
rather than the Department of Law & Literature would have been established first if the primary objective of establishing academic departments were colonial administration.

It is typical of a nationalistic historical viewpoint to explain the delay in creating the Department of Sciences & Engineering when Gyeongseong Imperial University was opened as colonial administration strategy or its attempt to obstruct the capacity to nurture nationalism in Korea. The decision to create departments at the time seemed to rely not on political considerations but on educational policies when series of debates are reviewed.

II. War and Changes in Higher Education

1. Mobilization of Military Troops and Higher Education

There were many changes toward modern education in the 1920s on systematic and practical aspects, so much so that Korean educational history can call this period the period of institutional establishment in modern education. Above all, educational opportunities increased in record-making proportions and student population rapidly rose during this time; this period also saw the establishment of basic education systems from primary education to higher education, and basic requirements in scholastic achievement necessary to move up to the next advanced educational institute and the like were standardized. In the higher education sector during this period, Gyeongseong Imperial University was inaugurated and private professional colleges were expanded. As well, the foundation for the growth of a group of intellectuals who possess modern knowledge was formed through the rapid increase in students studying abroad.

The Sino-Japanese War that began in 1937 and the beginning of the Pacific War in 1941 had great influence on all levels of education in Korea. It was difficult for education in Korea to develop normally in the dually oppressive structures called colonialism and war. However, it is as inappropriate and dangerous to explain all of higher education of those days in terms of war just as it is inappropriate and dangerous to explain by excluding war.

The general interpretation in Korea is that “all educational institutions became the tool for executing war rather than carrying out the innate duty to educate” (Yong-jin Han, 1996) so that troops could be mobilized for war and the intrinsic qualities of colonial education as expressed by assimilative education and discriminative education were strengthened. Most scholars of Korean history or educational history do not raise any objections to this view that claims that educational institutes degenerated into tools for training labor and military force for war. However, several instances show that new interpretations may be possible.

First is the educational meaning behind the volunteer system. The first plan to mobilize Korean people for war was executed by Japan in 1937 immediately before the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War. According to ‘the opinions on the volunteer system among Korean people’ as prepared by the Japanese army headquarters in Korea, the most important premise under which Japanese imperialism enforced the volunteer system in Korea was the education of Korean people (Yoo- ri Choi, 1997). Enforcement of compulsory education in Korea and thoroughness of moral education were understood to be the basic conditions under which Korean people could participate in the military voluntarily. Uppermost in the minds of the Japanese was concern over the possibility of unforeseen negative results by arming Korean people whose educational level and state of moral education were at a stage that could not be trusted. Therefore, according to the plan at the time, it seemed as if augmentation of conscription system in Korea would take at least 50 years, possibly 20 to 30 years if pushed hard.

Plans for military volunteerism and education plans were conceived together in this way, and ‘special army volunteer forces of Japanese protectorate’ and the third Educational Ordinance were consecutively proclaimed in 1938. However, the goal of introducing military volunteer system in Korea was certainly not only to mobilize Korean people (Yoo- ri Choi, 1997) into the military, as pointed out by one Korean scholar. More important was the fact that introducing military volunteer system acted as an indicator for completely Japranizing Korean people. Despite the fact that Japanese imperialism imposed strict requirements for Korean people to qualify as volunteers, which included 6 years or more of completion of primary school education, and despite the fact that Japanese imperialism was concerned that there would be a shortage of applicants, this system was successful because a lot of Korean people volunteered. The number of volunteers rapidly increased; there were 2,946 volunteers with 406 admitted during the first year in 1938, 84,443 volunteered with 3,060 admitted in 1940; in 1943, the year prior to the augmentation of the conscription system, there 303,294 volunteered with 10,295 admitted. It was of considerable interest to Korean people to be admitted into the Japanese military to the extent that the competition rate was 30:1 (Yoo- ri Choi, 1997). It is clear that the
attitude of Korean people toward the volunteer system was not resistant as was generally understood even though 55% of the applicants were coerced by various Japanese government offices in Korea and only 27.9% volunteered to express serious patriotism. Many young men of Korea responded to the volunteer system as an escape path to make ends meet or as a method to fulfill their desire for fame. The fact that the plan for military volunteerism resulted in expanding educational opportunities among Korean people should not be overlooked. After the achievement of the educational policy, so called "founding one primary school in each county", in 1936, Japan strengthened the policy. In other words, it was necessary to expand the opportunity for primary education in order for Korean people to obtain minimal education needed to qualify for military mobilization, and it is fact that such actions increase in investment or consideration to carry out this plan contributed to increase the level of education without regard to Japan's intentions. Chun-suk Oh explains this as the reverse benefit of war collaboration (Chun-suk Oh, 1974).

It is unclear as to what the direct loss in the field of higher education caused by the execution of volunteer system is. The educational requirement for volunteering was 6 years or more of primary school education, but cases in which applicants possessed scholastic achievement of secondary school or higher were very scarce in reality. The geographical distribution of applicants showed that many were from Chunla Province, Kyungsang Province, and Choongchung Province where there were numerous poor farmers; not that many applicants were from homes that could afford higher education.

Immediate execution of the conscription system targeting Korean people was announced in June of 1942 in order to supplement the shortage of military strength caused by the Pacific War that began in December of 1941, followed by an announcement in December of the same year on a compulsory education system to begin in 1946. The decision to introduce a compulsory education system was moved forward in order to augment the conscription system. One result of war was the change in the original plan for "augmenting the conscription system after introducing compulsory education system." The conscription system was not ready, but the war ultimately accelerated the augmentation of it, which resulted in opposition from and dissent of Korean people.

The Fourth Educational Ordinance of Korea redefined the role of the school under wartime regime in March of 1943. Thereafter, various persuasions and coercion took place in the fields of higher education, and colleges or professional colleges could not perform the usual functions of educational institutions. An example of this was the formation of a military organization called Student Military Troop in each grade at school (Korean Council for University Education, 1989). Restructuring of higher education to incorporate the system and contents as required by war proceeded quickly.

2. Restricted Academic Studies and Suppression of Educational Activities

With the Third Educational Ordinance of Korea in 1938, Japan emphasized that the function of a college was the cultivation of subjects based on the doctrine of the Empire rather than the study of undiluted academic theory. However, it is not clear as to what specific methods were used at the sites of higher education to carry out such ultra-nationalistic educational objectives given to institutions of higher learning. Most Korean scholars who firmly maintain nationalistic views point out that creating courses in moral training, Japanese studies, Japanese history, physical exercise, etc., in the curricula of private professional colleges from the late 1930s onward is an example of violating the autonomy of academic studies. There is no clear explanation, however, on why such courses were created. It is unclear as to whether these courses were mandated by Japan or whether the courses were created as an autonomous action to help prepare more effectively for examinations for various higher civil offices for which many Korean students were studying. We must pay even more attention to the fact that Gyeongseong Imperial University was not coerced into establishing these courses despite the fact that it was government-run.

More scientific and corroborative studies on undiluted academic studies and suppression of faculty activities under the Third Educational Ordinance of Korea are required; the fact that the heart of academic studies and faculty activities was the professors rather than the students, and Gyeongseong Imperial University was in charge of the pivotal role of academic studies, and most of the professors at Gyeongseong Imperial University in those days were Japanese must be taken into consideration. It is easy to find that teachings at these educational institutions except for religion were conducted as usual at the time if records written by foreign missionaries who taught at Gyeongseong Imperial University or professional colleges during the latter half of Japanese imperialism are reviewed.

The educational administration became confusing, because actions were taken to reduce class terms in colleges based on the Empire's troop mobilization requirements; graduation in 1941 occurred in December

8) Only 0.2% of the total volunteers had graduated from secondary schools when the research result on the level of academic achievements of applicants for voluntary military service was reviewed.

9) United States Army Military Government in Korea announced the enforcement of compulsory education at the beginning of the new school term in 1946 after Korea was liberated. This was inherited from a policy announced earlier by the Japanese.
because length of the school term in colleges and professional colleges was shortened by three months, and graduation in 1942 occurred in September because length of the school term was shortened by six months.

3. Reorganization of Higher Education Based on Practical Learning

The biggest change brought on by war in the field of higher education was the suppression of impractical learning and emphasis being put on the field of practical learning. In April of 1938, a decision was made to establish the Department of Sciences & Engineering at Gyeongseong Imperial University, and the capacity for science classes in preparatory courses was increased at the preliminary stage; the Department of Sciences & Engineering opened in 1941. Auxiliary branches of practical fields such as medical laboratory (1939), convalescent hospital (1942), training school for science teachers (1944), continental resources science research center (1945), etc., were also established at Gyeongseong Imperial University. This trend was reinforced with the outbreak of the Pacific War. On October 13, 1943, the government-general of Japan in Korea announced an 'Emergency Plan on Education' and decreased the capacity for preparatory courses in liberal arts but expanded the capacity for science courses, as well as opting to increase the capacity for the Department of Sciences & Engineering and the Department of Medicine. Thereupon, the capacity for the Department of Law & Literature was decreased from 80 to 60 students but the capacity for the Department of Sciences & Engineering was expanded by 50% as of 1944.

A large-scale compulsory reorganization of professional colleges in the field of liberal arts was carried out. Government-run Gyeongseong College of Law and Gyeongseong Commercial School for Higher Education stopped recruiting students in 1944 and was newly established as Gyeongseong Economic College. Yonhi College was forcefully changed to Gyeongseong Industrial Administration College, Bosung College to Gyeongseong Colonial Economic College, Ewha Women's College to Ewha Women's College for Training of Young Leaders, Sookmyung Women's College to Sookmyung Women's College for Training of Young Leaders, respectively.

Such series of changes were the direct result of objectives set by Japan’s imperialistic policy to train labor forces in the fields that can directly fulfill requirements for the war or these changes can be an indirect effect of objectives of said policy. However, changes in selection of majors chosen by Korean students began to appear in 1930 and must simultaneously be taken into consideration. This trend can be estimated by reviewing the changes in distribution in the field of studies among Korean students studying in Japan. According to one recent study, the number of applicants in the fields of law and economics decreased but the relative importance of majors in sciences and engineering, agriculture, and forestry and fishery increased[13] when comparing 1910s with 1930s. Of course, reorganization of higher education that focused on practical learning was the result of Japan’s compulsory policy due to war, but the trend in preferring practical learning among Korean students was already getting stronger even before the war.

4. Growth in the Population of Higher Education

Population of higher education suddenly increased in the five years between the announcement of the Third Educational Ordinance in 1938 and the enforcement of the Fourth Educational Ordinance in 1943. What initiated this increase was the number of professional colleges increasing from 13 (5 of them were government-run) to 20 (9 of them were government-run), the number of students increasing more than twice (2.2 times), and the number of teachers increasing more than twice as well. Such an increase was led by professional colleges that were run by the Japanese government. It is true that the number of Korean students enrolled in professional colleges run by the Japanese government decreased slightly, but the number of Korean teachers increased. How do we interpret this phenomenon? The dominant opinion is that increased chance of obtaining higher education did not encompass increased chance of obtaining higher education for Korean students or perhaps education based on ethnic discrimination intensified (Myung-sook Kang, 2002). A popular explanation considers that growth in the population of higher education was due to the necessity for educated Korean labor force to be mobilized for war. Continuous increase in Korean teachers was also understood to be the phenomenon created by mobilizing Japanese teachers for war (Myung-sook Kang, 2002).

Attention should be paid to the effect of zealous enrollment in primary schools during the 1920s. Zeal for education that began during the early 1920s no doubt led to the next stages of education such as secondary education or higher education among Korean people. However, it is possible to interpret that the demand for

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10) There is no data that states that these auxiliary branches were established in preparation for the war or that these institutions participated in the war.

11) Most recovered their original names and characteristics after liberation of Korea and most were accredited as four-year colleges.

12) In the 1910s, 68.0% of the students studying abroad majored in law, economics, and social sciences while 44.0% majored in law and economics in the 1930s.

13) When comparing the 1910s with the 1930s, fields in sciences and engineering increased from 3.3% to 6.3%, and agriculture and forestry increased from 1.5% to 6.8% (Chan-seung Park, 2001).
higher education cooled down momentarily from the second half of 1920s to the first half of 1930s due to the economic depression in Japan but the demand exploded during the latter half of 1930s. Japan's consecutive victories in Sino-Japanese War and job opportunities caused by expansions in battlefields may have influenced Korean people to prefer enrolling in professional colleges or colleges. In other words, not only Japan's conscription policy but also Korean people's voluntary desire to attain academic knowledge is seen as the main cause for the growth in higher education in those days. The biggest cause for the increase in Korean teachers was also probably due to the growth in Korean population that received modern education during the 1920s, thereby outputting increased number of Korean people who are qualified.

A similar trend occurred at Gyeongseong Imperial University. The increase in number was weak compared to professional colleges but noticeable; the number of students in liberal arts increased by 1.4 times and the number of total students increased by 1.6 times, and the number of teachers increased by 2.1 times when comparing 1938 with 1942. The percentage of Korean students also increased rapidly from 35% to 46%. The cause of increase in the number of students was the opening of the Department of Sciences & Engineering in 1941. The dominant interpretation is that increase in the number of Korean students is due to the naturally expanded chances for enrollment for Korean students following the mobilization of Japanese students into the military (Myung-sook Kang, 2002). However, one cannot overlook the fact that the primary cause was Korean students' voluntary desire to attain academic knowledge. In the case of those students who receive higher education, employment opportunities for steady jobs in the 1930s were greater than ever before, and such ambience led to great zeal for education (Jung-in Kim, 1998). Focus should be put on the trend that emphasized individual future, i.e., individual motives, rather than national future as important in selecting the students' academic course was prominent. (Jung-in Kim, 1998).

In other words, the biggest criterion by which educational selection of the individual was made was based on anticipation of upward mobility in one's social position via education in a capitalistic world and not the anticipation for independence to occur in some hazy future.

Unusual is the fact that the number of Korean teachers exploded from 2 to 20 and Korean staff increased by 2.1 times during the same period, thereby taking up 37% of the entire staff. As in the case of professional colleges, the cause should also be found in the general increase in the number of qualified Korean people. An example would be the unusually high concentration of Korean people employed in the Department of Medicine.

Another reason for growth in the population of higher education among Korean people after the augmentation of the conscription system is in the benefit of deferring the draft that applies to college students. Many applicable young men who fall under the age for draft pursued enrollment in college, because colleges were perceived as institutes where they can be free of draft for a short time.

Growth in the population of higher education from the mid-1930s to early 1940s due to diverse reasons and motives continued after the liberation.

5. Concentration of Higher Education in Seoul

Majority of the government-run, publicly run, and privately run professional colleges established after the announcement of Ordinance for Professional colleges in 1913 were located in Seoul. The three government-run professional colleges (Gyeongseong College of Law, Gyeongseong Medical College, and Gyeongseong Industrial College) and two private professional colleges (Bosung and Severance Medical College) were established in Seoul during the 1910s. Out of ten professional colleges established during the 1920s and early 1930s (four government-run and publicly run schools, and six private schools), six were also located in Seoul. And Gyeongseong Imperial University, which opened its doors in 1924, was also located in Seoul. Four out of six professional colleges that were established after mid-1930s were located in Seoul, and thus, 15 out of a total of 20 professional colleges were concentrated in the region of Seoul.

The trend in such concentration of higher educational institutions in Seoul, of course, was greatly influenced by Japan's centralized colonial administration system. This trend did not stop during the war period, nor did it stop after colonial administration went away. Rather, this traditional was strengthened even more under the United States Army Military Government in Korea, which immediately followed liberation of Korea. Public and private colleges in and near Seoul were forcefully unified and one great national university was established, whereby administrative and financial support was concentrated so that institutions for higher education in Korea were later differentiated into Seoul National University and other universities and again into universities in Seoul and in various other localities. This is the root cause of most of the issues in Korean education today.

6. Historical Meaning

14) It is true that the benefit of deferring the examination for conscription was granted to college students, but it is not very clear as to its criteria or principle.
The effects of war during the latter half of colonialism on higher education were examined above. Colleges were used as refugees to escape from the draft in the midst of the dangers of war, and studying abroad was another scheme to dodge the draft (Miyata, 2002). Colleges were no longer institutions solely for the pursuit of academic studies but were beginning to be used as institutions to prepare for employment or as a means to postpone enlistment, which left extremely serious repercussions in Korea's history and educational history of higher education. In the case of Gyeongseong Imperial University, academic fields that were the domain of undiluted academic studies such as literature, history, philosophy, and natural sciences had unexpectedly low number of applicants, but the number of applicants in those fields such as law or medicine that were lucrative in terms of employment had a high percentage of applicants. Study of law which led to power and study of medicine which led to financial wealth and the formation of hierarchy among the rest of the fields is the negative heritage that later created serious problems in higher education in modern Korea. It is more appropriate to view such a trend as the product of the period; rather than forming naturally, people made decisions based on what seemed to guarantee survival in a distorted and competitive structure called colony and war.

III. Conclusion

There are many who would point out that it is very hollow and dangerous to assert that the greatest task facing studies in educational history of Korea is overcoming the ethnocentric historical awareness. In spite of this, it is difficult to object to claims that advocate the necessity of supplementing ethnocentric historical awareness and nationalistic historical consciousness. Modern educational history of Korea, and particularly the educational history of the colonial period, is a field that requires such necessity above all. Historical delineation of schools, regions, and units on the micro level were few; most studies that were conducted are too comprehensive, and there was a tendency to criticize colonial policy and glorify resistive national education movement.

This paper examines a few disputed points related to higher education during the latter half of Japanese imperialism. Above all, claims that were based not on facts but on nationalistic sentiments were critically examined. The purpose of this examination was to show that not all policies on higher education in those days had their objectives in colonial administration and that not all changes were due to war. It is true that more materials and evidences as well as theories are needed to support most of these interpretations.

People were much intrigued by recently published books dealing with the realities of colonial period. "Allow Dance Halls in Seoul," "Modern Boy Strolls about Gyeongseong" are two of those. As the titles of these books imply, college students forgot about the war and studied at the library, played billiards in front of the school after class, or enjoyed cherry blossom viewing at night with their sweethearts. Other students spent most of their school time in order to prepare for the higher civil service examinations even during the period of Japanese imperialism. Resistance to colonial administration was not the only thing filling their mind. Bigger portion of the students' hearts and minds might have been full of desire to improve one's station in life, aspirations for fame, and romance. There should not be any reason, nor is there a necessity, to look at only one aspect when one is attempting to comprehend history as fact or as discourse.
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Wonhyo taesa: the “hidden transcript” of a Buddhist novel

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1. Introduction

From March to October 1942, the novel Wonhyo taesa (Great Priest Wonhyo) was quietly published in the Maeilsinbo (Daily Newspaper), whose associates toasted the Japanese early victories in Southeast Asia with a glass of champagne. Disregarding such war euphoria, its author Yi Kwangsu (1892–1950)7 looked into the dusty historical records about ancient Silla and spoke of the celebrated Buddhist priest Wonhyo and his Buddhist undertakings. What does this act of writing mean, pursuing a remote Buddhist subject in ancient history? Some say that the author detached himself from his colonial reality and escaped to the religious world in search of comfort.8 Another researcher disagrees, claiming that the author aimed to contribute to the promotion of Buddhism by dealing with a figure who is the pride of Korean Buddhist history.9 Was Wonhyo taesa an escapist novel or a propagation tool of Buddhism? Is this all there is to say about this Buddhist novel and its significance?

Wonhyo taesa is not a simple Buddhist novel which deals with the historical figure of the monk Wonhyo from the ancient Silla period and which conveys only Buddhist teachings through those means. Rather, it is, to borrow the notion of Poshek Fu (1993), like a “hidden transcript” in which the author subtly put into words the circumstances of the Pacific War, his (literary) collaboration, its elaborate justification as well as the spiritual torment that ensued from it, in which he propagated war and at the same time expressed defiance with regard to the oppressive assimilationism of the Japanese. Much of this could, of course, not be uttered straightforwardly under the severe surveillance and censorship of the Japanese authorities. That is why the author elaborately used the literary device of fiction and above all, the powerful disguise of “Buddhism.” It is very interesting to examine how the author raises various critical issues through Buddhist concepts and devices such as transgression of vinaya (p’agye), selflessness, compassion, and esoteric rituals. This is what I intend to do in this paper.

2. P’agye and Collaboration

The Silla Buddhist priest Wonhyo (617–686) was a giant in the history of Korean Buddhism, who contributed to both textual Buddhist studies and the propagation of Buddhism to the common people. As a great scholar he wrote important commentaries to the Wisdom (Prajna), Lotus, Nirvana, Amitabha, and Diamond sutras. His outstanding commentary on the treatise Taesiling Ilsillon (大乘起信論) was even quoted by Chinese Buddhists. To propagate Buddhism, he wandered around Silla, and composed and sang songs like “Muaega” (無碍歌) for the amusement of local folk. “It was also Wonhyo who was responsible for the widespread propagation of Pure Land Buddhism.”10 Wonhyo as the pride of Korean Buddhist had been already highlighted by Ch’oe Namsŏn in his paper on Korean Buddhism of 1930. Ch’oe created the myth of a Wonhyo who had embodied the whole development of Asian Buddhism in theory and practice. He aimed to “inform the world that Korea, though under the yoke of Japanese colonization, was yet a culturally advanced country.”11 Yi Kwangsu, however, did not highlight Wonhyo as a great Buddhist thinker who proudly represents Korean or even Asian Buddhism.

The protagonist Wonhyo in the novel first of all served to depict Yi Kwangsu’s own understanding of Buddhism. Yi emphasized the protagonist’s commitment of selflessness and compassion in this novel. Yi’s emphasis on selflessness is well expressed in the scene in which Wonhyo practices asceticism: “All of what

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7 Since he was kidnapped to the north during the Korean War, his death was in veil surrounded by some rumors. But it is assured by his third son that he died in October 1950 under way to the north and that his tomb was later exhumed and buried in P’yŏngyang in 1970. (In Chung’ang Ilbo, Choson Ilbo, 1991. Re-referred from Kim Yunsik’s Yi Kwangsu-wa kŭ-ål sidae.)
9 See Choi Jong-sok (1968)’s article.
10 Lee Ki-baik, 82.
11 Shim Jae-ryong, 174.
Shakyamuni said, in a word, is emptiness (空). This signifies nothing but that one empties the self.”

Through his ascetic ordeals of selflessness, the protagonist attains enlightenment. Yi’s emphasis on compassion is well expressed in a scene in which Wŏnhyo performs the bodhisattva practice. After attaining enlightenment, Wŏnhyo does not stop practicing but further carries out compassion. Yi wrote, “In the eye of bodhisattvas, all living beings are equal. Bodhisattvas evenly treat each living being as their only child. They sacrifice themselves to save even one living being. They would like to die a thousand times to save even one living being. This presents the great compassion of bodhisattvas.” Yi elaborated this in his description of Wŏnhyo as an acting bodhisattva, who goes to haunts of beggars and thieves. This emphasis on selflessness, salvation, compassion, and the practices of bodhisattvas and the way Yi explained these concepts in this novel exactly correspond to his general understanding of Buddhism which was based on the Lotus Sutra (法華経) and which he explained in his essays “Pulgyo” (1935) and “Sŏkka taesŏng” (The Great Sage Shakyaamuni, 1940).

In Yi Kwangsu’s view of Wŏnhyo there are some other aspects, however, which are more distinctive and also somewhat obsessive. He sees Wŏnhyo as a transgressive monk (p’agyešêng), who broke the precept forbidding sexual intercourse. Although everyone knows this legend, let me briefly summarize the story. According to the “Wŏnhyo pulgi” in Samguk yusa (三國遺事, Legends of the Three Kingdoms), Wŏnhyo one day proclaimed, “Who does allow an axe without handle? I want to construct a pillar to support the heaven!” (誰許沒柯斧 我許支天柱) Nobody comprehended this. The only person who fathomed his intention that he wanted to have a son from a noblewoman was King Taejong. The king ordered to usher him to the Yosŏk palace where a princess resided alone. When royal servants came to look for him, Wŏnhyo intentionally fell into the river and made his clothes wet. He was brought to the Yosŏk palace in order to dry his clothes and spent the night there. As a result, the princess gave birth to Sol Ch’ong. In this legend, Wŏnhyo’s transgressive act is merely implied. In Samguk yusa, the act of p’agye is not considered seriously. Although this is a famous tale, it by no means affects or eclipses the Buddhist exploits of the historical Wŏnhyo.

Compared with the account in the Samguk yusa, Yi Kwangsu’s interest in Wŏnhyo’s p’agye is indeed considerable and his attention to it may be called obsessive. Yi Kwangsu began this novel with the scene where Wŏnhyo breaks the precept. In fact, the transgression of the vinaya in this novel plays the crucial role of the Leitmotiv and leads the protagonist to asceticism and then to an active act of salvation. The author’s depiction of the act of p’agye differs somewhat from that in the historical legend, too. Princess Yosŏk in this novel is sick with yearning for Wŏnhyo. This provides the crucial reason why Wŏnhyo comes to sleep with her. Compared to it, the “historical Wŏnhyo” himself took the initiative. The protagonist in this novel is time and again confused and tormented by his transgression of the vinaya. Such an inner conflict hardly appears in the historical legend. Why did Yi regard this matter of transgression as so important and why he was so obsessive about it?

It is possible that Yi Kwangsu took an interest in p’agye in the strict Buddhist sense. He himself stated, however, that Wŏnhyo was a figure that appealed to him personally and that he had found similarities with Wŏnhyo in himself. If so, Wŏnhyo’s transgression may be similar to something in Yi’s life. This “something”, as Saegusa Toshikatsu (三枝壽懸, 1989/2000) argues, is Yi’s collaboration during the Pacific War, in the sense that he betrayed his Korean nation just as Wŏnhyo had betrayed Buddhism. Although Saegusa has not discussed this matter further, it will be more convincing if we look into the author’s collaboration more in detail. What, then, were Yi Kwangsu’s collaborationist activities?

In March 1940, he changed his Korean name to the Kayama Mitsuo (香山光郎). When the Pacific War broke out, Yi went on speech tours. His novel Wŏnhyo taesa self was published in the governmental organ Maeilsinbo. By the time in 1942 in which this novel was written and after finishing this novel, Yi Kwangsu’s collaboration became more overt. According to Yi Kyŏnghun’s study (1998), he also wrote poems, essays and short stories during 1941 and 1942 which ostensibly promoted the assimilation policy of naisen itai (Japan and Korea as a single body), service to the emperor, and the ideology of the Greater East-Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. In the novel Wŏnhyo taesa, one does not have to look far for aspects that reflect the Pacific War situation and Yi’s literary collaboration. This is, as long as we discuss this novel, more important than to look for external evidence of collaboration outside this novel. Yi, for instance, depicted Silla against the background of the wars to unify the Three Kingdoms. There were indeed wars to conquer Paekche in 660 and Koguryŏ in 668 in Wŏnhyo’s days. But interestingly, the historical figure Wŏnhyo was hardly involved in those wars in actual

12 Wŏnhyo taesa, 435.
13 Wŏnhyo taesa, 453.
14 What serves as the basis of comprehension is the poem “Fake” (伐柯) in the Chinese Book of Songs (詩經) : 伐柯伐柯 匪斧不克 取妻如何 匪媒不得 伐柯伐柯 其則不遠 我邇之子 簋豆有踄. This poem is about match-making.
15 “Naega wae i sosŏl’ol sŏnna?” CW (Collected Works) 10, 530.
16 His collaborationist activities continued in following years. In November 1942, Yi participated in the conference for writers of Great Asia. In April 1943, he was inaugurated as a board member of the Chosŏn munin pogukhoe and in December he went to Tokyo in order to promote the joining of the army by Korean students.
history. Most legends about Wŏnhyo are related to Buddhism. Nonetheless, Yi Kwangsu depicted Wŏnhyo as a person who is engrossed in highly political concerns in wartime. He wrote, "Wŏnhyo felt the urgency to unite Koguryŏ, Paekche and Silla into one. Otherwise, all would be ruined. For that goal, Silla should strengthen itself and go to war twice. Even though many people will die, one should pull out the root of evil all at once. Otherwise, people from the three countries cannot live in peace." Such political judgments or statements by Wŏnhyo are not found in historical records and were thus invented by Yi Kwangsu. If so, this elucidates the colonial war-time reality in which the author lived and Yi's understanding of his reality facing the war rather than the concerns of the historical figure of Wŏnhyo.

Yi Kwangsu's compromise, which implied that if war is unavoidable, one should carry out the war to end war and bring peace, looks very similar to that of most Japanese Buddhists in his days. They, too, maintained that the reason for war was not to continue war but to stop it. They claimed that war is evil but that if one cannot avoid war, one must fight. In particular, they asserted that the war Japan faced was a "just" war because it aimed to liberate people ("Japan's Asian brothers") and to bring world peace. Their claims or assertions basically aimed to support the war. As long as Yi's affirmative attitude to war looks similar to that of Japanese Buddhists, we may regard his view presented in this novel, too, as an expression of war support or war propaganda.

What more strikingly brings the matter of collaboration into light are the Buddhist concepts of selflessness (無我) and compassion (慈悲). As we have seen above, these concepts were core concepts in Yi Kwangsu's general understanding of Buddhism. However, the author did not confine selflessness and compassion to Buddhism only. The protagonist preaches, "The true character of Buddhism is to cut off attachment to the self...if so, what are our bodies and souls for? Loyalty to the king, filial piety to one's parents, and salvation of living beings are our tasks... This is the Buddha way. This is a bodhisattva's practice." In this paragraph, the author without any problem connected selflessness and salvation with the values of loyalty and filial piety. Moreover, he praised loyal and dutiful Silla soldiers such as Kojinnang and Pinyongja for bravely sacrificing themselves on the battlefield and embodying and practicing selflessness through this act. Yi Kwangsu, likewise, did not separate Buddhist concepts from the values of patriotism, filial piety and military prowess. Rather, he identified the Buddhist way with those values.

These notions of selflessness and compassion incorporated in Silla's national and military force are very similar to those of most Japanese Buddhist who ideologically supported the military actions of Japanese empire. Most Japanese Buddhists did not separate between the Law of the Buddha (buppo 仏教) and the Law of the Sovereign (kokutō 国法) as indicated in the slogan of "Imperial Way Buddhism" (Kōdo Bukkyō). They asserted that war was an act of compassion. Zen Buddhists particularly stressed that Zen spiritually had influenced Bushidō in terms of "sacrificial spirit and emptiness of the self." They proclaimed that to die on the battlefield was the way to attain enlightenment. All fervently supported the war using Buddhist concepts of selflessness and compassion. Seeing their similar Buddhist claims, Wŏnhyo taesa can be understood as support for the war, an incitement to serve the state and to sacrifice oneself for the state.

Moreover, it is striking that the emphasis on patriotism, filial piety and prowess in this novel eerily corresponds to the core of the contemporary book Kokutai no Hongi. (The Principles of National Polity) This book contained the crucial tenets of Japanese political philosophy during the Pacific wartime and had been concocted by highly esteemed political figures and scholarly intellectuals in Japan. It was used both as a textbook and as supplementary reading at schools. "It was constantly referred to in public speeches and was quoted in the ceremonies of national holidays and school assemblies." The gist of the Japanese national spirit

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17 The "Kii" chapter on King T’aejong in Samguk yusa might imply Wŏnhyo's involvement in the wars of those days. This chapter depicts Kim Ch’unsu (T’aejong)’s achievements as well as the current diplomatic and political situations in which Silla came to unite the Three Han with the help of the Tang military forces. When the Silla general Kim Yusin received a message from the Tang command of Su Dingfang nobody could decode it. So, they asked Wŏnhyo and he provided the interpretation. This act of decoding of Wŏnhyo, though, hardly constitutes an indication of political concerns on his part.

18 Wŏnhyo taesa, 429.

19 Victoria, 109-113.

20 Wŏnhyo taesa, 342.

21 Of course, we should not imagine "one" Japanese Buddhism standing in contrast with "Korean Buddhism." Japanese Buddhism consists of many sects and movements. Although the majority of Japanese Buddhist leaders supported the wars that their state faced, there was still a minority of Buddhists who embarked on anti-war movements and criticized the war support of the dominant Buddhist leaders. The Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism (Shinkō Bukkyō Seinen Dōmei) was such a group of layman Buddhists of the Nichiren sect. A Sōtō Zen monk of Kondō Genkō and an old monk of Higashi Honganji branch, Takenaka Shōgan, individually opposed the wars from their Buddhist convictions. (See Victoria, 66-78)

22 Victoria, 79, 89 and 90.

23 Victoria, 79.

24 Robert King Hall, 10-11.
exactly consisted of loyalty, patriotism, filial piety, harmony, the martial spirit, and Bushido.²⁵ Considering the Japanese Emperor as the head of the big family of Japan, this ideology identified filial piety with loyalty and dragged citizens into the war by spiritual means. It claimed that all Japanese during the Pacific War should be samurai and should have the samurai’s fervent patriotism and sacrificial spirit for their state. The majority of the Japanese sincerely believed what Kokutai no Hongi conveys.

The assimilation policy in colonial Korea, naisen itai (Japan and Korea as a single body) initiated by governor-general Minami Jiro (南次郎) in 1936, was first and foremost to apply this Kokutai no Hongi to colonial Korea, urging Koreans to worship the Japanese emperor as a living god and to become loyal imperial citizens of the emperor for the sake of the advancement of world culture.²⁶ Koreans had to show filial piety to the Japanese emperor as his children. It was nothing different from showing patriotism to the imperial state. Koreans were, accordingly, forced to be loyal and dutiful imperial citizens, to assimilate with the Japanese, to display the Japanese spirit of bushido as clearly indicated in Kokutai no Hongi, and to discard Koreanness, in other words, their Korean language, name, and religion.

Yi Kwangsu’s novel conveys and emphasizes values identical to the core of Kokutai no Hongi. For example, “Kuksŏndo [which might be translated as the Way of the hwarang] embodies patriotism and filial piety,” he directly said.²⁷ In the next page, he concludes, “The essence of p’ungnyu, hwarang, kuksŏn, and wŏnhwa [the predecessors of the hwarang] becomes clear. All of these symbolize patriotism and filial piety.”²⁸ In particular, Yi shed light on the counterpart of bushido: hwarang chŏngsŏn (Hwarang spirit). According to his own explanation, King Chinhŭng who had the ambition to unify the three kingdoms let young boys practice physically and spiritually. “The goal of [hwarang] practice is to think nothing of one’s wealth and comfort and to devote oneself only to patriotism, piety, sincerity, prowess, and benevolence. This is to be ready to answer the call of the country and to prepare oneself to die on the battlefield. Ch’unch’u [King T’aejong] and Yusin [Silla’s general Kim Yusin] both were of hwarang origins.”²⁹ The author, likewise, emphasized the aspects of the martial spirit and military action of hwarang institution.

Although it is a popular notion that “the most important function of the hwarang, after all, was military”³⁰ and that the core spirit of hwarang bands was found in the virtues of patriotism and filial piety,³¹ Richard Rutt (1961) points out that “the idea of hwarang as a military cult does not become prominent until the days when the Japanese are promoting the idea of bushido...it is at that time that the hwarang are presented as primarily military.”³² Yi Kwangsu’s explanation of hwarang spirit as a counterpart of bushido is surprisingly one of the beginnings of this interpretation during the Pacific War. If so, the emphasis on the values of loyalty, filial piety and martial spirit in this novel can be regarded as literary collaboration, aiming to promote the war ideology of “The Principles of National Polity” and its application of assimilationism. These are the collaborationist notions which we can find inside the novel.

3. P’agye, its justification, and the ensuing spiritual torment

With regard to Yi Kwangsu’s (literary) collaboration, there are other important aspects which should be examined before we venture to regard his collaboration as an object of rebuke or condemnation. In case of Chinese literary collaborators such as the Gujin group, their collaboration did not result from thoughtlessness, but was sophisticatedly justified by the philosophical logic of “survival” as human nature. On the other hand, though, they were guilt-ridden and felt their existence to be miserable, debased and meaningless.³³ Considering the political and literary collaboration of Yi Kwangsu, too, we can uncover self-justification on one side and a terrible feeling of guilt and moral conflict on the other side. Wŏnhyo’s transgression of the vinayā, which I argue should be read as a symbol of the author’s collaboration in this novel, is related to both justification and guilt.

Let us first have a look at the aspect of justification. When Wŏnhyo was led to Princess Yosŏk, she professed that she considered taking her life unless Wŏnhyo came to her. The seriousness of her yearning for Wŏnhyo implies that his transgression of the vinayā was inevitable to help her survive. Yi Kwangsu looks into her heart and reveals her feelings as follows:

25 Ivan Morris, Ed. 46-52.
26 Ch’oe Yuri, 43-47.
27 Wŏnhyo taesa, 408.
28 Wŏnhyo taesa, 409.
29 Wŏnhyo taesa, 418.
30 Lee Ki-baik, 55.
31 This is Yi Pyŏngdo’s view on the hwarang spirit in his book Han’guk Yuhaksa (1989). Referred from Kim Sŏnghye’s “Han’guk Yu’gyo yŏn’gu paeknyŏn.”
32 Richard Rutt, 30.
33 Poahek Fu, 160-161.
The princess thought that Wŏnhyo was not the kind of man to fall for her beauty or to be attracted by her status as a princess. Wŏnhyo had entered into relations with her out of compassion, merely to save her; she believed that he felt pity for her. She believed that he had fulfilled her wishes, even though he broke the precepts. She found Wŏnhyo on account of that even more precious, longing for him even more strongly. (*Wŏnhyo taesa*, 407)

In this paragraph, princess Yosŏk does not blame or belittle the transgressive monk. Rather, she expresses her deep gratitude towards Wŏnhyo. She pays homage to him and appreciates his transgression of the *vinaya* as a respectable act of compassion. She does not think that Wŏnhyo broke the precept because he was attracted by her beauty or noble status. It was, she thinks, because he felt pity seeing a suffering living being and to save her from her suffering. Through the princess’ mouth, Yi Kwangsu subtly spoke up for the transgressive monk. Par from condemning him, the author defends *p'agye* and even justifies it as a respectable act of compassion. The Buddhist concept of compassion is, surprisingly, used as a strong argument to justify Wŏnhyo’s transgression of the *vinaya*. Yi’s collaboration, which Wŏnhyo’s transgression of the *vinaya* symbolizes, accordingly, comes to be justified as a compassionate act, for which he did not shrank from abandoning his loyalty to his nation and did not hesitate to damage his fame as a national leader. His collaboration is justified as a compassionate deed intended to save the Koreans.

The appearance of the priest Taean in this novel adds a subtle nuance to Yi Kwangsu’s treatment of the problem of *p'agye* and the justifying concept of compassion. Seeing young raccoon dogs which have lost their mother in a flood, the protagonist Wŏnhyo chants some phrases of the *Expedit Means* chapter (方便品) of the Lotus Sutra for them, whereas the priest Taean gives milk to the hungry animals saying they cannot understand Buddhist phrases. This practical help, which is adjusted to the level of living beings, signifies the concept of *upaya* (expedient means). This is the way Buddha’s compassion takes shape and is delivered to living beings. In a way akin to giving milk to the hungry animals, Wŏnhyo gives romantic love to the lovesick princess. In this way, it comes to be plausible that Yi did what, he thought, could practically help Koreans survive. His acts of collaboration rather than the recitation of Buddha’s name was a concrete deed from which they could benefit.

Did Yi Kwangsu’s collaboration really help the Koreans or let them survive? We cannot answer this question at this moment. But one thing is sure: the fate of action for survival in the colonial reality, in particular in the late colonial period, was that the act itself could not exist without compromise. To live in the colonial system ceaselessly demanded compromises of some kind. The modes of life in colonial modernity could not avoid compromise. For instance, to go to the modernized schools, the students had to learn Japanese as the national language. Adrian Buzo (2002) has pointed out that from the mid-1930s, unless one was an exile or a guerilla, all activities in education, business, the civil or military services automatically implied a close relationship with Japanese authorities. “Neutrality was rarely an option for such people.” The same applied to literary authors. Literary figures who did not want to compromise with the Japanese authorities mostly had to stop writing or could not get a chance to be published, which meant death to them as authors. The literary figures who were in any way active in the early 1940s could not avoid compromising and all came to be literary collaborators. It was the way to survive as authors. Yi was in the vanguard of these active literary collaborators.

Rather than assuming, as is generally done, that literary collaborators were exceptions to the norm, who shamelessly compromised themselves by fawning on the authorities, we may attempt to discern the other side of collaboration. The more Yi Kwangsu attempted to justify his collaboration, the more he experienced a terrible feeling of guilt and moral conflict. The Buddhist concept of *p'agye* in this novel, which symbolically stands for the act of collaboration, allows the author to express this spiritual torment. The author describes the protagonist’s feelings after he leaves the Yosŏk palace as follows:

> The whole world seems changed. Wŏnhyo has lost his self-confidence with which he was able to announce, “I am a pure and undefiled priest”...He feels that if he were a bird, he would have broken wings and fall down to the earth. It has pressed him down....Somewhere the words “Apostate monk! Apostate monk!” are heard incessantly. How shameful to hear it! Is there anything more disgraceful in the world than this? (*Wŏnhyo taesa*, 405)

As we see, the protagonist Wŏnhyo is terribly afflicted by his transgressive act of *p'agye*. As a defiled monk, he feels dejection and shame. The whole world turns its back on him or laughs at him as an apostate monk. The protagonist even hears imaginary voices denouncing him: “apostate monk.” The author, likewise, projected feelings such as dejection, fear, pressure, and shame onto the protagonist of his novel. Elsewhere Yi Kwangsu wrote again, “Wŏnhyo was dejected by his transgression of the *vinaya*. One night spent in the palace had swept his ambitions and courage away...He could not look up to the stars for shame.” Yi even stated that Wŏnhyo’s

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34 Adrian Buzo, 49.
35 See Im Chongguk’s book *Ch’innil munhak non*. (1966/2002)
36 *Wŏnhyo taesa*, 441-442.
wound would never be healed.\textsuperscript{37} The author repeatedly depicted the terrible side of the transgression of the vinaya. This is actually irrelevant to the historical Wŏnhyo. It is also hardly found in the historical legends. Then, this obsessive expression of guilt or self-conflict of the protagonist is due to the author’s own experiences of spiritual torment, not that of the historical Wŏnhyo.

In other words, the cries of “P’agye sŏng! P’agye sŏng!” are nothing else but all the bad names Yi Kwangsu was called, such as collaborator, apostate or pro-Japanese stooge. The degradation of Wŏnhyo from an honorable priest to a defiled monk corresponds to Yi’s fall from being a respected national leader to becoming a despicable traitor. The protagonist Wŏnhyo is constantly haunted by the dilemma of his transgression: was it an expression of compassion or of sexual excitement? This exactly reflects Yi’s own dilemma: whether his collaboration was for the sake of the Korean people or was related to rewards and privileges for himself. In short, through an examination of the meaning of the Buddhist concept of p’agye in this novel, we can discern the author’s elaborate attempts to justify his collaboration to himself and to express his agony and moral conflict.

4. Defiance of assimilationism?

As we have seen, this Buddhist novel Wŏnhyo taesa has an unexpected subtext dealing with the author’s literary collaboration, its justification and the spiritual torment that ensued from it. But this is not all. As Choi Kyeong-Hee (1999) and Sin Hūgyu (2000) have demonstrated in their studies, collaborationist literature apparently delivers war propaganda, but in subtext delivers a multi-layered variety of messages which are sometimes irrelevant to collaboration. In the case of Wŏnhyo taesa, one more hidden aspect is defiance or the challenging of the assimilationism that was current in the late colonial period. To understand this, we need to take a good look at the scene in the novel in which Wŏnhyo undergoes ascetic ordeals.

First of all, this ordeal is apparently undertaken to realize the Buddhist teaching of selflessness. In Yi’s own words, it is called the practice of kăng’ama but it is, in particular, depicted as an “esoteric Buddhist ritual” with the chanting of mantras (真言) such as kanarasa, iōrasa, samara, sarang’a, aa, etc. The attendants who practice along with Wŏnhyo in the novel are also named in a similar way. Their names are Kagabasaga, Kagamanaba, Manabara, and Pagaganakara. Yi referred to Silla’s important deities with the syllables ka, na, ra, sa, and ada, which is reminiscent of the use in esoteric Buddhism of “seed-syllables” written in the variety of Sanskrit script called siddham to refer to Buddhas an bodhisattvas.

Esoteric Buddhism uses occult rituals, magic, diagrams, spells and songs. Mantras mean sounds which lead to Buddhahood and are particularly regarded as important in esoteric Buddhism. In Wŏnhyo’s days, Myōngnang, Hyet’ong, and Milbon were influential esoteric masters. However, there are few clues that Wŏnhyo practiced esoteric rituals or recited esoteric mantras.\textsuperscript{38} It means that the description of esoteric practice is Yi’s own imagination. Why did Yi choose to depict Wŏnhyo’s asceticism as a form of esoteric Buddhism?

There are more questions. After Wŏnhyo attains enlightenment, the religious leader gives him a brief sermon, “All of the eight volumes of the Flower Garland Sutra (華嚴經) and the Tripitaka Koreana (八勝大藏經) originated from the one letter I.”\textsuperscript{39} This kind of description shows familiarity with esoteric Buddhism on the one hand, because the sound “a” in esoteric ritual is regarded as one very important and profound sound. But this depiction, on the other hand, is anachronistic as Saegusa Toshikatsu has pointed out, because the sign of the so-called “arae a” is an old form of Korean alphabet which was only created in 1443. The Tripitaka Koreana was also compiled during the Koryŏ period (935–1392). So, it does not match the Silla period. Then, is this fanciful anachronistic description due to the author’s mistake or carelessness?

Yi Kwangsu depicted this scene of asceticism over more than six pages. This long depiction of asceticism demonstrates that the author felt the need to devote considerable attention to it. Why? The “arae a” is definitely the old han’gŭl letter and the magic spells and people’s (deities’) names remind us of the letters of the Korean alphabet “ka na da ra ma ba sa,” which seem to have been combined with one another in an arbitrary manner. If the author just writes down mantras, he does not need to write the sound of “a” in the particular way of “arae a”. It means that the author actually talked about the Korean alphabet under the disguise of esoteric practice.

Then, why did Yi Kwangsu, in particular, use the esoteric mantras to subtly talk about Han’gŭl? Is this attempt not too arbitrary? According to Yi Nūnghwā (1929), scholars during the colonial period who had done research on han’gŭl, used an old collection of mantras, Chinŏnip (真言集), as one of their important references. (See Fig.1) In this book, the pronunciation of mantras is written in parallel in three scripts: Sanskrit (siddham), han’gŭl, and Chinese characters. This helped scholars investigate how han’gŭl should be pronounced. They noticed great similarities between Sanskrit and han’gŭl and even tentatively assumed that Sanskrit was the origin of han’gŭl. Given this context, we can understand that it was no coincidence for Yi Kwangsu to use the form of

\textsuperscript{37} Wŏnhyo taesa, 479.
\textsuperscript{38} Wŏnhyo wrote a commentary on the Kūmguwangmyŏng Sutra (Suvarna prabhāsa Sutra) which is one of the esoteric sutras. But this was one of his extensive Buddhist textual studies in order to synthesize various Buddhist schools and their doctrines. It thus hardly demonstrates that he specially practiced esoteric Buddhism.
\textsuperscript{39} Wŏnhyo taesa, 430.
mantras (眞言) in order to subtly refer to han'gul and that in the preaching of the religious master, he exalted the old letter of han'gul, the "are a", as the highest value of universal or Buddhist truth. All this should be understood in the historical context of the year 1942 in which manifestations of the Korean language was strongly suppressed and in which the Japanese language was forcefully promoted. Therefore, this depiction of han'gul can be interpreted as a subtle defiance of the assimilation policy.

Fig. 1. Chinŏnjip (眞言集)
Source: BIBLIOGRAPHIE CORÉENNE (1896) 261.

Another instance of the defiance of assimilationism can be found in the scene in which Yi Kwangsu highlighted patriotism, filial piety and the martial spirit, along with the Buddhist concepts of selflessness and compassion.

"Kanadaramabasa'a - ㄴ ㄴ ㅁ ㅁ ㅂ ㅅ ㅅ ㅅ - all indicate the names of deities [of Silla] and numbers...Such deities are nothing but  uri minjok [our nation]'s genealogy, history, religion, philosophy, culture, and language." (Wonhyo taesa, 416)

In this paragraph, it becomes much clearer that Yi Kwangsu arranged the syllables of the mantras in the order of the Korean alphabet as "kanadaramabasa'a" and that he even subsequently presented the row of consonants ㄴ ㄴ ㅁ ㅁ ㅂ ㅅ ㅅ ㅅ. Moreover, he explained Silla's religious tradition and religious culture using the Korean alphabet. Han'gul is, Yi Kwangsu himself stated, presented as a symbol of Korean race, history, religion, philosophy, and language. The author in this way talks about not only the Korean language but also the Korean people's history, cultural heritage, and national identity. This articulation of Koreanness is opposed to the ideology of naisen ittai. That ideology literally means the integration of Japan and Korea, but de facto was intended to one-sidedly transplant Japanese culture to colonial Korea. Thus, this ideology aimed to deprive the Korean people of their language, religion, and history. The speaking of Korean language was in particular suppressed, because the Japanese authorities acknowledged its symbolic role in inculcating Korean identity. The Chosŏn hakhoe Incident in October 1942, in which the Japanese authorities arrested the members of this Han'gul study association, was the crucial evidence of this. Seen in this historical context, the author created a chance to survive as a Korean and to preserve Korean language and cultural identity in the critical situation of deprivation.

The last challenge against Japanese imperial ideology can be found in Yi Kwangsu's accentuation of the uniqueness of Silla. Yi claimed, "This [kuksŏndo] was by no means imported from Chinese thought or culture. It was Silla's indigenous tradition." The author underscored that loyalty and filial piety were Silla's indigenous spiritual values. This emphasis on the originality of Silla counters the assertion of the "originality and uniqueness" of Japanese culture which were the very foundation of Kokutai no Hongi. The authors of book Kokutai no Hongi state, "Our nation has...supported the Imperial Way, making possible the establishment of an original culture based on her national policy." On the basis of this originality and uniqueness of Japanese culture, they urged assimilation of colonial subjects. So, the attempt to relativize and to break Japan's originality and uniqueness can be seen as a head-on challenging of assimilationism and the core of imperial ideology.

5. Conclusion

40 Ch'oe Yuri, 46.
41 Wonhyo taesa, 408.
42 Ivan Morris, 50.
In the novel Wŏnhyo taesa a hidden message is presented under the disguise of a Buddhist story. As demonstrated, the author indirectly compared his own collaboration with Wŏnhyo’s breaking of precepts of the vinaya. Buddhist teachings of selflessness and compassion were on the one hand a reflection of the author’s Buddhist beliefs. On the other hand, however, they were linked to the author’s justification of his political choice to collaborate. This attempt is unlikely to have been understood by readers, although p’agye as a symbolic representation of Yi’s collaboration may have let readers notice the author’s feelings of guilt and the moral conflict he experienced. The Buddhist concepts Yi Kwangsu dealt with became entangled with war-propaganda or war ideology during the Pacific War which Japanese Buddhists and the crucial book Kokutai no Hongi presented with similar arguments. Yet, using the disguise of esoteric Buddhism, the author labored to effect a subtle preservation of Korean language, history, religion, and traditions. By doing so, he eventually challenged assimilationism, a challenge that will have seen more easily understood by his readers than his justification of collaboration. Seen in this light, the silent writing of Wŏnhyo taesa has a resonance that is worth listening to.

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The limited contacts between the Philippines and Korea in the early part of the 20th century must first be seen in the context of the rivalry between the United States and Japan for control of the Pacific region. In 1905, US Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura signed a secret agreement that involved both the Philippines and Korea. In this agreement Japan promised not to conduct any aggressive move toward the Philippines, then under American stewardship, in exchange for American recognition of Japanese suzerainty in the Korean peninsula.1 The impact of this secret agreement was significant for the Philippines and Korea as the histories of both countries would now be forever intertwined.

For Korea, it spelled the doom of its independence movement, with Japan subsequently annexing the peninsula in 1910.2 The implications of such an agreement would impact on the Philippines several decades later. When Japan invaded the Philippines during the Second World War, Korean men were conscripted to fight for the Japanese Army. As such, the Koreans were also implicated in the atrocities committed against Filipinos and Americans during the course of the war.3

Surprisingly possible Korean involvement in these wartime atrocities did not have any discernable effect on the gradual improvement of Philippine and Korean diplomatic relations after the war. The reason for this is best explained by David Bergamini, a former prisoner of war interred in the Philippines. He believes that this ambivalence is the result of Filipinos knowing that the Koreans and Taiwanese who served the Japanese Army were themselves brutalized and oftentimes commanded by Japanese soldiers to commit atrocities on civilians and prisoners of war.4

As evidence of this cordial relationship, the Philippines was one of the first Asian states to lobby for an independent South Korean republic. This was the position taken by the administrations of President Manuel Roxas and his successor, Elpidio Quirino, by virtue of the Philippines being an active member in the United Nations. As a member and signatory of its charter the Philippines is bound to abide by the decisions made by the UN Security Council and its General Assembly.5

On September 17, 1947 Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations Carlos P. Romulo suggested to the UN General Assembly that terms of reference be set to define the conduct of election preparations in Korea.6 This proposal by the Philippine representative was adopted by the General Assembly, thus giving birth to the United Nations Commission on Korea (or UNCO).7 By virtue of our active interest in Korean affairs, the Philippines was chosen as one of nine member countries of the UNCO.8

Lily Ann Polo observed that:

This role was facilitated by Philippine membership in the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCO). In the UNCO supervised election of 1948, the Philippines was represented by a delegation headed by Senator Melencio Arranz, the then Senate pro-tempore.9

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2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Polo, p. 64.
Philippine support for the establishment of an independent Republic of South Korea can likewise be explained by a postwar foreign policy that was closely linked to that of the United States. No less than Roxas himself expressed in his inaugural address on July 4, 1946 the belief that "his country was further committed to the cause and the international program of the United States".\(^\text{10}\) In the case of Korea, the administration of US President Harry Truman had been lobbying actively for the establishment of an independent and democratic state in the Korean peninsula.\(^\text{11}\)

Truman wanted to block further Communist expansion in the Far East.\(^\text{12}\) Since the members of the Roxas administration had publicly admitted that only the United States could provide "immediate and sufficient aid to their former dependency"\(^\text{13}\) it was in their interest that the Philippines align closely with the United States with regards to the Korean question. This was with the full knowledge that negotiations between the United States and the Philippines for war rehabilitation, economic and military assistance were still ongoing.\(^\text{14}\) William Stueck described this reaction by the Philippine government as the classic example of the effects of "US arm twisting".\(^\text{15}\)

When Syngman Rhee was proclaimed the new leader of South Korea, the Philippine government under Quirino immediately sent via wire transfer a letter which reiterated the country's support and recognition to the fledgling republic.\(^\text{16}\) The public support given by the Philippine government can be explained in terms of the prevailing politico-diplomatic intramural of the times. The establishment of a democratic republic in South Korea was vital to Philippine interests because it would provide the country with a new ally in its role as a democratic bulwark in the Far East.\(^\text{17}\)

The South Korean leadership was deeply elated by this public show of support. Throughout Quirino's term, regular wire correspondences between the two heads of state were exchanged. In one of these letters Rhee wrote:

As a nation which courageously and with high vision stood resolutely in the forefront of the international movement to re-establish the sovereignty resident in the people of Korea, your generous and forthright extension of recognition to Korea comes as a happy augury of cordial relationships of our two peoples.\(^\text{18}\)

Another factor which contributed to the improved state of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and South Korea was the striking similarities in their foreign policy, particularly their relationship with the United States. By the end of the Second World War, both countries have patterned their foreign policies to reflect their pro-American orientation. This is seen through their anti-Communist political ideologies, active participation in the United Nations and the establishment of ties with non-communist states.\(^\text{19}\)

Both countries had manifested their patron-client relationship with the United States through their reliance on American economic assistance and military aid.\(^\text{20}\) Contemporaneous with military aid was the existence of defense and bases agreements, inter-country cooperation on the training of troops and the transfer of surplus military hardware. The most obvious by-product of this dependence on the United States was the existence of American military advisory groups. In 1947 the US War Department established a group composed primarily of US military personnel called JUSMAG, for Joint US Military Advisory Group. It was tasked to perform the following functions:

1. Advise the military forces of the Republic of the Philippines on training organization, tactics, strategy, planning, service, supply procurement, administration, and other related military subjects.

\(^{10}\) Meyer, p. 31.  
\(^{11}\) Catchpole, p. 2.  
\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 3.  
\(^{13}\) Meyer, p 3.  
\(^{14}\) Meyer, p. 104.  
\(^{16}\) Letter of Elpidio Quirino to Syngman Rhee, date not legible, in Elpidio Quirino Presidential Papers File.  
\(^{17}\) Polo, p. 65.  
\(^{18}\) Letter of Syngman Rhee to Elpidio Quirino, March 27, 1949, in Elpidio Quirino Presidential Papers File.  
\(^{19}\) Polo, p. 40.  
\(^{20}\) The Philippines signed a Military Assistance Agreement with the United States in 1947. Korea on the other hand signed a treaty along similar lines in 1948.
2. Increase the efficiency of the military forces of the Philippines by advising in the training of their personnel in the military doctrine of the United States.

3. Promote the standardization of military equipment and encourage the use of material manufactured and designed in the United States.

4. Foster friendly relations and strengthen the ties of United States and Philippine solidarity.

5. Occupy the field of military cooperation in the Philippines to the exclusion insofar as possible of all other-than-United States participation and influence.

6. Function as a liaison group between US and Philippine military forces with reference to joint plans and joint operations of these forces.

7. Advise the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific on all-important matters pertaining to the military forces of the Republic of the Philippines.

8. Carry out such other duties, consistent with its primary mission as may be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific.

A similar group called the Korean Military Advisory Group (or KMAO) was established almost a year later in 1948. Just like their counterparts in the Philippines it was made up of US military personnel supported by a permanent detachment of 482 men. KMAO personnel were attached to the thirteen military training schools operating in South Korea, and they provided training and assistance to South Korea’s military establishment.

 Critics have claimed that these military advisory groups have oftentimes gone beyond their prescribed tasks and interfered directly with the internal affairs of their host nation. Nevertheless, most of the reforms recommended by these military advisory groups were readily accepted by leaders of the Philippine and South Korean governments.

When the war broke out between North and South Korea, the Philippines was under Quirino’s stewardship. He was a former Vice-President who assumed the presidency after the untimely death of Roxas in 1948. His contemporaries referred to him as a man who “had undeniable ability, personal charm and had many years of political experience behind him in various important elective and appointive posts.” Romulo had once called him a “reserved and proper man...ever conscious of the dignity of his office.”

Quirino had the ill fortune of coming into power and inheriting the problems of his two predecessors. Issues and concerns regarding post-war rehabilitation, reconstruction and internal security burdened former Presidents Sergio Osmeña and his successor Roxas. Quirino not only inherited these concerns but also bore the brunt of the consequences that resulted from the policies pursued by the previous administration.

During the Osmeña administration, the Philippine economy was in shambles as a result of the devastation it suffered during the Second World War. To address this pressing concern, the Philippine government requested for massive economic assistance from the United States. The United States responded with a $100 million aid package aptly called the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 1946.

Scholars have argued that with the exception of Warsaw in Poland, the city of Manila was the most devastated urban center in the Second World War. See also Gleek, p. 5.


22 Polo, p. 27. See also Joseph Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: McGraw Hill Company), p. 33.


27 Scholars have argued that with the exception of Warsaw in Poland, the city of Manila was the most devastated urban center in the Second World War. See also Gleek, p. 5.


29 Ibid.
When Roxas defeated Osmeña in the 1946 presidential election one of the very first things that he initiated was to lobby for the passage of the infamous Bell Trade Relation Acts. It was believed that this trade agreement would jump-start the local economy. Shirley Jenkins observed that:

Underlying the act was the assumption that Philippine economic revival depended on restoring trade with the United States and stimulating a flow of American investment into the islands. Hence free trade was continued, though on a temporary and gradually diminishing basis; special privileges were granted to American investors; and the Philippine currency was tied to the American dollar.30

A lot of individuals, both Filipino and American were opposed to the Bell Trade Act. Millard Tydings, author of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act, criticized the measure claiming that it was designed "to keep the Philippines economically even though we lose (sic) them politically".31 In the Philippines the most vocal opponents of the trade agreement came from members of the Nacionalista Party and the peasant-based Democratic Alliance.32 Teodoro Agoncillo observed that the problem with the Bell Trade Act was that it contained a provision giving Americans parity rights that would allow them to:

...have the right to dispose, exploit, develop and utilize all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the Philippines, together with the operation of public utilities and the exploitation of waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and mineral resources of the Philippines.33

Furthermore it set quota restrictions on key Filipino export products.34 No such quota restrictions were imposed on the Americans. The negative effects of the Bell Trade Act can be seen when one looks at the imbalance between Philippine imports and exports with the United States from 1946 - 1949. (See Table 1).

Table 1
Philippine Imports and Exports with the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports (million pesos)</th>
<th>Exports (million pesos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>939.2</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>938.6</td>
<td>363.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: History of Trade and Industry in the Philippines by A.V.H. Hartendorp

Besides the dysfunctional economy and domestic insecurity, the issue concerning the Hukbalahap, or Huks as they are popularly known, also proved to be a problem during the terms of Osmeña and Roxas. The Huks were originally made up of militant peasant and labor groups operating in Central Luzon. During the Japanese Occupation they were involved in guerilla activities directed against Japanese and their Filipino collaborators.35

Though the Huks fought bravely against the Japanese during the Second World War, the Americans and the Roxas government did not trust them because of their alleged ties to Communism.36 Furthermore, their refusal to turn over their weapons to the Philippine government after the war added fuel to the fires of distrust.37 Nevertheless, when Roxas was still campaigning for the presidency he tried to woo the support of the Huks by

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31 Meyer, p. 11.
32 Jenkins, p. 82.
34 These include copra, sugar, tobacco and abaca.
35 Agoncillo, p. 446-448.
37 Gleek, p. 84.
publicly saying that "he was more radical than they".\(^{38}\) The Huks however supported the campaign of Osmeña as they perceived the former as a fascist and a collaborator.\(^{39}\)

Thus when Roxas was elected president he waged an active pacification campaign to neutralize the Huks. This campaign culminated with the outlawing of the Huk movement on March 6, 1948 on the grounds that it was "an illegal association organized and maintained to commit acts of sedition and other crimes for the purpose of overthrowing our present government under the constitution."\(^{40}\)

Roxas' tragic and untimely death on April 15, 1948, immediately thrust the new administration of Quirino into this maelstrom of economic instability and internal unrest. These two problems would have a tremendous bearing on the Quirino Administration's response to the Philippine participation in the Korean conflict.

When the Korean War broke out, Quirino was initially reluctant to send Filipino troops into combat. The president believed that the war did not constitute an immediate threat to the external security of the Philippines.\(^{41}\) He likewise stated that he was more concerned with the country's problems with the economy and internal security.\(^{42}\) It was widely believed by high-ranking members of the Philippine military that the Huks received military assistance from subversive activities by Chinese Communists in the Philippines.\(^{43}\) Quirino argued that not only was direct military participation costly, he was likewise concerned that such a move might be misconstrued as an act of provocation to the Soviet Union or to Communist China.\(^{44}\)

Quirino's reluctance puzzled many political analysts who observed that in the months prior to the outbreak of the war his administration had publicly maintained an anti-Communist stance similar to that of the United States. In a speech at a joint session of the US Congress he called for "a re-definition of fundamental attitudes towards Asia" and advocated for the creation of a Pacific Union to counteract the spread of Communism in Asia.\(^{45}\) He likewise issued a joint statement together with US President Truman to resist "those perverted forces which would destroy the ideals to which the Philippines and the United States are dedicated."\(^{46}\)

Furthermore in March 11, 1950 after extending for three years the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 with the United States, Quirino expressed the need for a Philippine diplomatic policy to be closely tied to that of the United States.\(^{47}\)

But on the other hand, when asked by the local Philippine press about his position on the spread of communism in Asia, he expressed his ambivalence by saying:

Let China go Communist! Let Japan go Communist! We don't care. We will respect any form of government our Far Eastern neighbors choose to have. We are not anti-Communist. We are not non-Communist. What we in the Philippines are interested in is our economic prosperity and our happiness. We are happy under our present system of government. We don't care about others.\(^{48}\)

This statement by Quirino was surprising because not only did it run contrary to United States foreign policy, which he claimed his administration would closely pursue, but it also was the closest to a neutralist stance the Philippines would ever take against Communism throughout the period of the Cold War.\(^{49}\) When the United Nations passed Resolution 27 on June 29, 1950 it called on all member countries to provide all forms of assistance to South Korea to repel the armed invasion.\(^{50}\) Quirino and the members of his cabinet agreed that aid should come only in the form of food aid and medical supplies. Two weeks later he justified this decision by saying that to send Filipino troops to fight the Communist outside the Philippines would signify intervention in

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\(^{38}\) Agoncillo, p. 451.
\(^{39}\) Kerkvliet, p. 141.
\(^{40}\) Agoncillo, p. 453.
\(^{41}\) Polo, p. 78.
\(^{43}\) Meyer, p. 127.
\(^{44}\) Ibid., p. 129.
\(^{46}\) Ibid.
\(^{47}\) Lopez, p. 98.
\(^{49}\) Polo, p. 78.
the internal affairs of another country. Quirino believed that to send a “token force to Korea would constitute an overt act of aggression which might provoke war.

But months later, in a move that stunned both his political supporters and enemies alike, Quirino backtracked from his original position regarding direct military intervention in Korea. This was when he authorized the dispatch of Filipino military forces to the Korean War through Republic Act 573, the Philippine Military Aid to the UN Act, approved by the Philippine Congress on September 7, 1950.

What prompted this sudden change in foreign policy? The primary reason was the impact of direct military participation on the sagging fortunes of the Philippine economy and the Armed Forces’ ability to deal with the Huk insurgency.

From 1948 to the early part of the 1950’s the Philippine Bureau of Census and Statistics observed a noticeable slowdown of business conditions, particularly in merchandizing trade. Agricultural production was also on the downside and it resulted not only in high prices, but also high unemployment and disturbed labor conditions. These conditions were further compounded by the Philippine Congress’ failure to provide allocations for necessary public works projects. Furthermore, public outcry over the alleged irregularities in the 1948 presidential election and Quirino’s inability to curb corruption among his political appointees further aggravated the country’s sagging economic fortunes.

Because of this lack of confidence and the perceived corruption within the Quirino Administration, high-ranking US officials began to issue public statements threatening the suspension of economic assistance to the Philippines. The most vicious tirade against Quirino’s economic policies was a public condemnation issued by US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. In a statement dated January 25, 1950 Acheson was quoted to have said:

We have given the Philippines a billion dollars of direct economic aid since the war. We have spent another billion dollars in such matters as veterans benefits and other payments in the Philippines. Much of the money has not been used wisely as we wish it had been used... It is the Philippine government that must make its own mistakes. What we can do is advise and urge, and if help continues to be misused to stop giving the help.

Acheson’s statement caused serious delays in US Congressional approval for additional economic assistance for the Philippines. In line with this, the US State and Treasury Departments advised Truman to inform Quirino that unless the latter could take radical steps to put the local economy in order, no further American aid could be expected. This would have had catastrophic results on the Philippine economy which fundamentally relied on US economic assistance to offset its fiscal deficits.

To prevent this debacle from spiraling hopelessly out of control the Quirino Administration, in December 1949, sent a delegation led by Philippine Ambassador to Washington Manuel Elizalde and Col. Andres Soriano. They were tasked to contact key members of the US Congress and the State Department and explain to them the true nature of the country’s economic policies and to refute the allegations made by Acheson. Initially, this proved to be extremely difficult because of the hostile attitude of the American press towards Filipino politicians. The outbreak of the Korean War in June of that year presented a possible course of action that Quirino’s emissaries could not pass up.

When Soriano returned from the United States he immediately issued a press statement saying that if the Philippine Senate would support direct intervention in the Korean War, the gesture would be significant in influencing the American Congress’ decision to grant additional economic aid to the Philippines. To further highlight the need for immediate action on the part of Philippine Senate, Elizalde wrote a letter to Senator Jose Yulo, advising him that direct Philippine military assistance to Korea would be greatly appreciated by our American allies. Furthermore it would also be “obviously advantageous in our relationship with the United States and bring a more friendly atmosphere in the Congress.”

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51 Polo, p. 79. See also “EQ Will Not Embark PI on War against Reds Outside Country”, Manila Times, July 17, 1950, p. 1.
52 Ibid., p. 2.
54 Jenkins, p. 123.
55 Ibid., p. 124.
56 Ibid., p. 137.
57 Gleek, p. 99.
58 Shalom, p. 74.
60 Polo, p. 81.
Calls for direct military intervention were also voiced from other quarters. Pro-American legislators in the Philippine Senate demanded that the Quirino Administration take steps to directly intervene in the conflict. They argued that this course of action was necessary because the Philippines was bound by military treaty obligations with the United States. The most vocal of these Pro-US legislators, Senator Camilo Osias, publicly called Quirino’s foreign policy “effeminate” and declared that as a country:

We are drawn into the present conflict for reasons varied and sundry. But the most important is that this has clearly become a struggle between communism and democracy...we are on the side of the democratic forces of the world.61

On the other hand, Senate President Mariano Cuenco called the North’s invasion of South Korea a “communist plot for world conquest”.62 In his speech before members of the Philippine Senate, he demanded that the Quirino administration act decisively on the UN and American request for military assistance. He said that:

We are bound to America by more than a treaty of military assistance, more than our grant of military, naval and airbases, more than our ancient ties of commerce and economy. We are bound to American by a common belief in democracy, in the equal rights of nations to self-determination, in the equal interest of all people in the peace of the world. The Filipinos and Americans fought shoulder to shoulder in Bataan and Corregidor, in Balete Pass and Ipo Dam, and we won together. I am sure that our democratic cause will once again unite our enthusiasm and energies, and will once again emerge victorious, if it is ever threatened by the enemies of freedom.63

Though Quirino was initially hesitant to commit Filipino ground troops to the Korean War, the subsequent election of Romulo, as President of the 4111 Session of the United Nations General Assembly finally changed his mind. When called before the Philippine Senate, Romulo explained the need for direct military assistance:

Our country is similarly bound as a member of the United Nations to offer such assistance. But our special relations with the United States which have sprung from a common love of liberty, a shared allegiance to democracy and a battle-tested comradeship, contribute an elementary urgency to our obligation. Pervasive and powerful in peace, these relations exert an even more potent influence in times of war.64

On August 10, 1950 the Philippine Senate passed Concurrent Resolution # 16 exhorting the Philippine Government to render every possible assistance to the UN forces in the Korean conflict. The resolution also recommended the mobilization of Filipino troops and to render assistance in the shortest possible time.65 Though a majority of both Houses of Congress voted in favor of military participation, a small group of legislators from the Nacionalista Party voiced their opposition to direct participation in the Korean War.66 The most vocal critic against the Senate Resolution was Rep. Arsenio Lacson. In a privilege speech he argued that it was “silly” for the Philippine government to sent troops abroad to fight Communist aggression considering the government’s difficulty in containing its own local dissident movement.67

Nevertheless, these measures eventually convinced Quirino to re-think his foreign policy position. Thus when he made the formal announcement to commit Filipino troops into battle in Korea, the US government’s view on his administration changed dramatically. Historian William Stueck observed that “a commitment of troops to Korea helped silence criticism on the Quirino government by the American press and Congress and also provided leverage to the Philippines in its quest for external support.”68

Before the war the US National Security Council referred to Quirino as a man who was “weak, vacillating and bewildered”.69 They lamented his “failure to take vigorous action against official corruption and

61 Ibid., p. 80.
62 Text of Mariano Cuenco’s speech before the members of the Philippine Senate, August 10, 1950.
63 Ibid.
64 Polo, p. 82.
65 Philippine Senate, Concurrent Resolution No. 16, August 10, 1950.
66 Stueck, p. 72.
68 Stueck, p. 73.
69 Gleek, p.107.

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lawlessness\textsuperscript{70}. But with Quirino's decision to send Filipino troops to Korea, he was rewarded with a $30 million aid package requested by Truman from the US Congress for the Philippines and other friendly countries.\textsuperscript{71} This increased the country's local fiscal appropriation in 1951 almost threefold compared to the previous year's allotment.\textsuperscript{72}

The Philippine participation in the conflict and the massive economic and military aid that came with it resulted in a dramatic turn around for sagging economic fortunes of the Philippines. According to Salvador Lopez:

The Korean War had in fact begun to reverse a downward trend in the Philippine economy during the latter part of the 1950's. The eruption of hostilities in Korea generated an increase in local production and a shift in consumer preference in favor of locally produced commodities.\textsuperscript{73}

Furthermore, the Korean War had caused an international boom in commodity prices that greatly benefited Philippine exporters.\textsuperscript{74} (see Table 2)

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports to the US (millions of pesos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>363.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>491.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>567.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: History of Trade and Industry in the Philippines by A.V.H. Hartendorp

Statistical data also reveal an improvement in the general outlook of the Philippine economy because of its participation in the Korean War. (See Table 3 and 4)

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>National Income (million pesos)</th>
<th>Gross National Product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>6,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>6,146</td>
<td>6,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>6,770</td>
<td>7,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>6,865</td>
<td>7,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>7,234</td>
<td>8,229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: History of Trade and Industry in the Philippines by A.V.H. Hartendorp

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Revenues (million pesos)</th>
<th>Surplus or Deficit (million pesos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>345.8</td>
<td>-212.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>481.5</td>
<td>-49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>708.8</td>
<td>+54.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: History of Trade and Industry in the Philippines by A.V.H. Hartendorp

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{71} Polo, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{72} Shalom, p. 74.

\textsuperscript{73} Lopez, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{74} Shalom, p. 85.
Not only did the influx of American economic assistance help revitalize the economy but also had an impact on the AFP’s ability to deal with the Huk rebellion. Since the end of the Second World War, the Huks had constituted the biggest internal security threat to the Philippines. The rebellion reached its peak from about 1949 to the early part of 1951. Based on captured Huk records, the Huks had a manpower strength of somewhere between 11,000-15,000 rebel fighters by 1951. These numbers are significant because it gave the AFP only a 2 to 1 numerical superiority ratio over the rebels. Their confidence in themselves coupled by widespread mass support emboldened the Huks to launch several military operations against high profile targets.

During Roxas’ term, the Huks’ success had greatly annoyed the government that the military was ordered to launch major military operations against them. These initial attempts to crush the Huks failed miserably. When he came to power, Quirino tried to broker an amnesty deal with Luis Taruc, the Huk supremo (leader). In this deal the government was willing to grant amnesty to all leaders and members of the Huks on the condition that they surrender all their firearms. The deal was finalized on June 21, 1950 under Proclamation No. 76 and ratified by Congress on June 25, 1950. This initiative on the part of Quirino received much praise from the usually critical Philippine press.

Unfortunately, because of mutual distrust on both sides, negotiations broke down and fighting once again ensued. With the failure of the peace accord, Quirino ordered the military to use force to crush the rebels, a move painfully similar to that of his predecessor. These half-hearted military excursions likewise ended in failure.

Scholars like Cesar Pobre have argued that the downfall of the Huk rebellion in the latter part of 1951 can be attributed directly to the efforts of Ramon Magsaysay, Quirino’s Secretary of Defense. While there is truth to the fact that Magsaysay’s dynamic and charismatic leadership contributed to the success of military operations against the Huks, it must be taken in the context of the radical increase in the AFP’s budget for 1951.

In that year the AFP launched several Huk suppression campaigns on a massive scale. These major military operations code-named Marblehead, Omaha, Smile, Knock-out, Four Roses and Roll Up broke the back of the rebel movement and resulted in the capture or death of high-ranking Huk commanders and the surrender of most of their members. An ingenious “public relations campaign” (psychological warfare) succeeded in cutting off the mass base support of the survivors.

These complex military operations were inherently expensive. The AFP would not have had the resources to conduct these campaigns if not for the dramatic increase in the AFP’s defense budget as a result of US military assistance (see Table 5).

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense Budget (million pesos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946-47</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947-48</td>
<td>88.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-49</td>
<td>109.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>114.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>130.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 Meyer, p. 56.
77 Ibid.
78 Sun Tzu, argues that in the conduct of any successful military offensive, the attacking force must have a numerical superiority ratio of at least 5 to 1.
79 In April 28, 1949 the Huks ambushed a convoy carrying Mrs. Aurora Quezon, the wife to the former president, Mrs. Quezon, her daughter and ten other were killed in the attack. See also Kerkvliet p. 217.
81 Hartendorp, p. 349.
82 Ibid., p. 350.
86 Obaniana, p. 130.
What is even more surprising, if not suspicious, is that this influx of financial assistance happened months after Quirino made public his intention to send Filipino soldiers to Korea. Stueck observed that "the Philippines, whose government stood at a pivotal stage in talks with Washington on economic and military assistance was susceptible to US pressure."

When news leaked that Quirino wanted the military contingent to be made up of "volunteers", Malacañang and the Department of Foreign Affairs were besieged with a barrage of letters from different multi-sectoral groups indicating their desire to fight for the United Nations. These groups were made up of people from all corners of society, including WWII veterans, ex-guerrilla fighters, para-military groups, lawyers, doctors, factory workers, journalists and even unemployed Filipinos.

While it was heartening to see overwhelming public support for this endeavor, it was oftentimes difficult for the members of the Quirino administration to determine whether these volunteer groups could provide the service they claimed to offer. As in the case of most militia volunteer units, their numbers, level of training and military capabilities were oftentimes hopelessly exaggerated. Take for instance the letter of the Legion Commander of the so-called "Army of the Agno Veterans". In this letter Mr. Miguel Acosta claimed that his group was going to:

"...offer the service of 1 combat division (10,000 officers and men) which could be mobilized in two months. The bulk of this division will be made of regiments from the Army of the Agno, veterans of battles against the Japanese in the Second World War. With minimum training our troops could be sent into frontline action against the Communists. Our men are ready and only lack the arms and ammunition needed for combat purposes."

Other letters focus not only on the desire to volunteer but also bring to the fore mundane, often hilarious, personal concerns. Leonardo Agting, an employee of San Miguel Brewery wrote to Secretary Romulo indicating his desire to fight the Communists. In exchange for his voluntary service he requested that the Philippine government write a letter to his employer that he be re-hired immediately after he returns from his tour of duty.

Mr. Ernesto Villareal of Capiz expressed not only his desire to volunteer but also his willingness to fight for free under the UN flag. He likewise expressed in his letter his displeasure for the hesitation that Quirino earlier had over the decision to send Filipino troops to Korea. He complained that "Quirino is practicing isolationism and this behavior sends bad signals to the Americans. It is a dishonor and an ungrateful act if we do not help our American allies fight this war." On the other hand, a journalist named Romerico Flores suggested that the government publish blank application forms in local dailies so as to better facilitate the application of Filipino volunteers.

The South Koreans themselves were pleased when they heard the news that the Philippine government had finally consented to provide direct military assistance. In a letter sent to Quirino by the Korean National Assembly, they expressed their thanks and appreciation on behalf of the South Korean people for the assistance to be provided by the Philippines "to expel the Communist aggressors and to preserve peace and liberty in Korea." With a groundswell of public opinion tilted in his favor, Quirino was initially inclined to send an entire division of volunteers to the war-torn peninsula. Luckily cooler and saner heads prevailed. Secretary of Defense Ruperto Kangleon wrote a letter to the President updating him on the state of the country's military preparedness in the light of the Communist invasion of South Korea. In this letter Kangleon warned that while:

87 Stueck, p. 141.
88 Letter of Mr. Miguel Acosta to Carlos P. Romulo, July 22,1950, in Carlos P. Romulo Personal Papers File, University of the Philippines Main Library, Diliman, Quezon City.
91 Letter of Mr. Romerico Flores to Carlos P. Romulo, July 22,1950, in Carlos P. Romulo Personal Papers File.
92 Letter of Cho Bong Am to Carlos P. Romulo, no date given, in Carlos P. Romulo Personal Papers File.
A successful invasion of South Korea by the Reds may not be a direct threat to the Philippines, we cannot disregard its morale boosting effect on local Communists and dissidents who may be encouraged to intensify their activities and may cause a deterioration of our internal peace and order to the point of endangering the security of our Republic.93

He further added concern upon receiving intelligence reports from the field that:

Communist China has completed training of 1,000 paratroopers, known to have been specially trained for airborne operations against island objectives such as Formosa and the Philippines. Naval and air bases have been established by the Communists in Hainan; Communist agents have been dispatched to Southeast Asian countries for espionage work.94

On the other hand the JUSMAG strongly advised against the use of Filipino volunteers in the war.95 They believed that the volunteers were ill-trained and ill-equipped to competently deal with Communist forces. They also cautioned Quirino not to leave the country defenseless, considering that the Huk still represented a legitimate threat to the country’s internal security. This concern is best seen through a letter sent by the JUSMAG’s chief to Quirino. In this letter the JUSMAG chief noted that:

Such an offer is indeed laudatory, but creates serious questions as to the ability of your Armed Forces that would be available in the Philippines to accomplish their primary mission of insuring security within all the provinces of the Republic. This situation will be immediately sensed by dissident elements, with repercussions that would most adversely affect the prestige of your military establishment and the entire littoral of all islands of the Republic.96

Faced with this advice Quirino decided to forego the plan to send volunteers, and instead made the difficult task of selecting contingents from among the existing units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. These troops joining the multinational contingent of the United Nations were officially called the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK).

At this time the AFP was still in its infancy stage and was not yet divided into the three major branches (air force, army and navy) that we are familiar with today. The primary nucleus was the Philippine Army and its ten Battalion Combat Teams (BCT) tasked to provide for security against lawless elements and maintain peace and order in specific areas in the archipelago.97 Each BCT was made up of approximately 1,200 men divided into component groups, including a command section, a service company, three rifle companies, a weapons company and its reconnaissance arm.98

When it was reported that the Communist forces used tank divisions as spearheads for their attacks, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Mariano Castafieda recommended to President Quirino that the first unit to be sent to the Korean War would be the 10th BCT, since it was the only battalion trained and equipped specifically for mechanized warfare.99 This recommendation was endorsed both by the JUSMAG and the Department of National Defense. When President Quirino approved the proposal, the 10th BCT was immediately mobilized and put into active war status. The estimated cost of maintaining a BCT under war conditions was pegged at 142,000,000 pesos annually.100 The bulk of the logistical expenses was to be shouldered by the U.S. Army.101 To offset the loss of this BCT Quirino issued Executive Order # 336 transferring 5,000 men from different units of the AFP to the jurisdiction of the Philippine Constabulary as support units in lieu of the 10th BCT's conduct in anti-insurgency operations.102

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93 Letter of Ruperto Kangleon to Elpidio Quirino, July 6, 1950, in Elpidio Quirino Presidential Papers File.
94 Ibid.
95 Shalom, p. 75.
98 Ibid.
100 Hartendorp, p. 356.
101 Ibid.
On September 2, 1950 before 60,000 cheering supporters, the men and officers of the 10th BCT stood in full battle gear on the grounds of the Rizal Memorial Stadium.103 Affectionately called the “Fighting Tenth” by the Philippine Press, these soldiers listened to a send off speech by President Quirino. He said:

Today we begin to write a wonderful page in our history. Many of you have fought on our own soil to secure our freedom. You now go forth to a foreign land to fight for the preservation of that freedom. What you will do, will prove to all the world that this Republic and all of you who are part of it have the will and power to survive – to make our own lives as we want them to be, and to keep them that way…Your valor and achievement, will show that free nations faced with a common menace of loosing their freedom and their civilization have the will and the strength to join together to remove this menace forever. 104

A week later, on September 15, 1950 the 10th BCT boarded the US troop ship Sgt. Sylvester Antolak and the first of the famed PEFTOK battalions sailed into history.

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Why has the Critical Thinking Movement not come to Korea?

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1. Introduction: CT Pedagogy and the Korean Education System

In the preface to the third edition of *Critical Reasoning*, the authors point out that when the book was first published in 1982 it was one of relatively few texts designed to help students improve their ability to evaluate critically what they hear and read in a variety of everyday contexts (Cederblom and Paulsen, 1991). However, by the time the second edition was published in 1986, courses in informal logic and critical thinking (CT) had become common in universities throughout North America and had even been installed as graduation requirements at some. Since then, course offerings and enrolments in this area have continued to increase, and there has been a broadly based educational movement—known in the US as the critical thinking movement and in the UK as the thinking skills movement—to implement CT instruction across the curriculum.

Through this educational movement, which began to flourish in the 1980s, CT pedagogy has been promoted in virtually every academic field. It has featured prominently not only in areas in which one would naturally expect it, such as in science education (Ahern-Rindell, 1998) and academic writing (Rose and Kiniry, 1997), but also in less obvious areas, such as in social work (Kirst-Ashman, 2002) and nursing (LeMone and Burke, 2003). It has spread to the high school and even elementary school levels (Lipman, 1993) and has since passed beyond L1 contexts into the realm of TESOL as well (Atkinson, 1997). Universities, local education boards, and private institutions have established centers that offer CT instruction and assist educators and administrators in developing CT teaching strategies. Some universities have established entire academic programs based on CT pedagogy, others have established programs that take as their foundation the development of CT skills, and still others have embraced CT pedagogy in their conceptual frameworks and mission statements. At this point in time CT is clearly much more than just another undergraduate course; CT pedagogy has become a guiding educational philosophy of teachers, academic programs, and educational institutions throughout much of the Anglo-American world and beyond.

In Korea, however, the CT movement has yet to make significant inroads. Relatively few Korean universities offer courses in CT, and there have been no serious attempts in Korea to infuse CT across the curriculum or throughout the education system. Nor have many Korean educators or educational institutions embraced CT pedagogy as a guiding educational philosophy. A 1998 OECD study of the South Korean education system concluded that it continues to employ formal teaching methods that emphasize the “memorisation of fragmentary information” rather than teaching approaches that foster critical and creative thinking skills (OECD, 1998, p. 144). That the instructional methodology characterized in the OECD study is the antithesis of CT pedagogy will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with education in Korea. Critics of the Korean education system have been voicing these complaints for decades, and partly as a result of these criticisms there have been countless attempts to reform the system. Yet despite such efforts, the dominant educational philosophy in Korea remains focussed on the transmission of knowledge rather than on the nurturing of thinking skills. Indeed, the Ministry of Education officials who requested the OECD to examine and report on the Korean education system agreed that it is a “uniform and monotonous” system that is “excessively geared toward preparation for college [entrance] examinations” and that the “memorisation of knowledge ... [is] the rule rather then the exception” (OECD, 1998, p.25).

It is common to explain the relative absence of CT pedagogy within Korea’s education system in terms of the nation’s system for admission to university. According to Seth (2002, p.169), critics of Korean education argue that the university entrance exam is “driving the entire educational system,” which has been “reduced to little more than the preparation for and taking of multiple choice exams,” and that this exam-driven education system has “stifled creativity” and “hindered the development of analytical reasoning.” Breen (1998, p.66) concurs, describing the Korean entrance exam as “the tail that wags the educational dog,” since “the entire system accommodates itself to its needs.” The result, he asserts, is a system in which education is “what is in high school text books and what may be in the exam,” rather than “life experience, critical thinking and creativity” (Breen 1998, p.68).

There can be no doubt that the university entrance exam plays a crucially important role within the Korean education system and Korean society as a whole. It is equally clear that any education system geared towards such an exam, which consists solely of multiple-choice questions based mostly on matters of fact, would hinder rather than promote critical and creative thinking. However, it is ultimately a mistake to explain the relative absence of CT pedagogy within the Korean education system simply in terms of the university entrance exam.
One problem with this explanation is that it is only at the middle school and high school levels that education is geared towards preparation for the university entrance exam; at the university level, the purpose of education is obviously something other than to prepare for admission to enter university. However, with respect to CT pedagogy, there are no significant differences between instructional methodologies at the secondary and tertiary levels. In both cases, there is an over-reliance on approaches involving rote memorization, classes are teacher-centred, and students rarely challenge their teachers or what they teach in any serious way. Thus, in order to explain the relative absence of CT pedagogy at the university level in Korea, one must obviously appeal to something other than, or in addition to, the university entrance exam.

A further problem with the foregoing explanation is that it sheds no light at all on why the entrance exam has remained a permanent fixture of the Korean education system despite such widespread dissatisfaction with it. Seth (2002, p.4) writes that “Both the public and officials have widely criticized examination preparation as the center of learning... Yet a century of reform efforts has resulted in only an intensification of this phenomenon.” Exactly why have the Koreans been unable to extricate themselves from this “examination hell,” which ultimately oppresses the entire populace? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to look beyond the university entrance exam to the social forces that support and sustain it. What is needed is a deeper explanation, one that will shed light not only on the relative absence of CT pedagogy in the Korean education system, but also on the Korean fixation with the multiple-choice style entrance exam, which admittedly nurtures uncritical teaching methodologies based on rote-memorization.

Kim (1985) agrees that the “lack of critical inquiry in the [Korean] educational process is a serious problem,” which he explains it in terms of the following four factors: i) indulgence in preparations for the [university] entrance examinations, ii) [the] poor quality of teachers, iii) [the] lack of adequate and effective teaching materials, iv) and a long heritage of a passive, unquestioning role for students. (Kim 1985, p.10)

Of the four factors Kim mentions, we have already considered the first, and the third is relatively unimportant, since CT pedagogy does not require significant investments in teaching materials.

The second factor that Kim mentions suffers from the same problem as the first. If formal qualifications are any indication of quality, then there are indeed problems, as Kim suggests, with the quality of Korean teachers. In 1993, for example, 50 percent of university teachers in Korea did not have doctoral degrees and 18 percent did not have any graduate degrees at all (KEDI, 1995). This is a significant improvement from 1965, when roughly 90 percent of university teachers in Korea did not have doctoral degrees, but it still leaves much to be desired. Furthermore, as of 1995, 55 percent of high school teachers in Korea graduated from colleges that were not specifically designed for teacher education (OECD 1998, p.136). However, with respect to CT pedagogy, the blame cannot be placed on the teachers themselves, for even among those teachers who do have the appropriate formal qualifications very few have received any training in CT pedagogy.

Indeed, as the OECD study indicates, teachers in Korea are recruited at the local level on the basis of selection tests administered by the local educational authorities and, as a result, undergraduate students preparing to be teachers focus narrowly on preparation for these mechanistic tests instead of mastering critical or creative teaching methodologies (OECD 1998, p.136). Thus, the pattern of rote-memorization in preparation for objective-style tests that plagues the Korean education system at the primary and secondary level is just as much a feature of the teacher training programs at the university level. If Korean teachers do not in general employ CT pedagogy in the classroom, it is simply because they are not trained to do so, which is precisely what one would expect given that these teachers were educated within a system that does not make significant use of CT pedagogy. Accordingly, it is a mistake to blame the teachers for the lack of CT pedagogy in the Korean education system. Once again, a deeper explanation is needed, one that will provide some understanding of why Korean teachers are not typically trained to employ CT pedagogy.

The fourth aspect of Kim’s explanation—the long history of a passive, unquestioning role for Korean students—is more illuminating than the others. In speaking of “roles,” Kim suggests that the absence of CT pedagogy has something to do with the way in which Korean students are socialized. As we will see in more detail below, there is evidence that CT pedagogy is associated with Anglo-American patterns of socialization and that children of other cultures, including many Asian cultures, are socialized in ways that conflict with some of the goals or presuppositions of CT pedagogy. Furthermore, Kim is certainly right to point out that passivity among Korean students has a very long history. Indeed, as Seth (2002, p.13) notes, teaching methodologies based on rote memorization, the methodologies that promote passivity in students, were just as common in the education system of the Joseon period as they are today. What is interesting, then, in the fourth element of Kim’s explanation is that he relates the lack of CT pedagogy in the Korean education system to patterns of socialization stretching back over generations. The suggestion is a profitable one insofar as it leads us to reflect upon features of Korean culture in seeking to understand the relative absence of CT pedagogy in the Korean education system.

In what follows, I pursue this suggestion in an effort to provide a deeper explanation of the relative absence of CT pedagogy within the Korean education system, one that shows how the values implicit in CT pedagogy clash with important features of Korean culture. My approach is as follows. In Section 2, I briefly summarize the justifications that have been offered in support of CT pedagogy and identify the values implicit in
CT pedagogy. In Section 3, I show how each of these justifications is problematic within the context of Korean culture.

2. CT Pedagogy and its Justification

Eonis (1992, p.6) defines CT as “reasonable, reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do,” McPeck (1981, p.8) defines it as “the propensity and skill to engage in activity with reflective skepticism,” and Paul (1989, pp. 198) defines it as “disciplined, self-directed thinking.” Such definitions do not tell us very much, but they are not entirely uninformative either. At the very least, they draw attention to the fact that the standard concept of CT is that of thinking that is self-conscious and self-directed. As we will see presently, this emphasis on the self is significant.

We can learn more about CT by considering the skills, abilities, and dispositions that CT instructors attempt to nurture in their students. Included here are the following: recognizing reasons in written and verbal speech, identifying and questioning assumptions, tracing consequences, evaluating claims against evidence, weighing alternatives, clarifying terms, spotting fallacies, forming opinions for oneself, and avoiding prejudice, over-generalization, self-deception, and dogmatism.

Skills such as the foregoing are so central to the dominant educational philosophies in the contemporary West that their value or utility is rarely questioned, but it is worthwhile to ask why these skills are considered to be so important. Exactly why should we attempt to nurture these skills or abilities in students? The following is a list of some of the common justifications for CT pedagogy that can be found in the literature. It has been claimed that CT pedagogy:

1. provides one with a means of self-defence against manipulation,
2. promotes one's individual autonomy,
3. protects one against self-deception,
4. helps one to resolve ethical dilemmas for oneself,
5. enables one to take greater control of one's life,
6. enhances one's self-confidence,
7. increases one's intellectual independence,
8. improves one's linguistic skills,
9. increases one's persuasive power, and
10. promotes well-functioning democracies.

Clearly, the foregoing claims are not independent of each other. Indeed, the first seven claims are, to a large extent, variations on the same theme—that of individual autonomy. Furthermore, claims 8 and 9, which belong in a different group from the rest, are obviously related to each other. For the sort of persuasion mentioned in claim 9 is persuasion by means of language, as opposed to emotional manipulation or physical coercion. The idea is that by becoming a critical thinker one can improve one's mastery of the language and thereby use language more persuasively.

We may summarize the foregoing by noting that while proponents of CT pedagogy have offered a variety claims on its behalf, these claims can be organized around three basic concepts: autonomy, linguistic ability, and democracy. In response to the question, “Why should we teach critical thinking?” proponents of CT pedagogy have provided the following three answers: a) it enhances individual autonomy, b) it improves one’s linguistic skills and, hence, one’s ability to persuade, and c) it fosters well-functioning democracies. Let us now go on to consider the cogency of these justifications within the context of Korean culture.

3. CT Pedagogy in the Context of Korean Culture

3.1 CT Pedagogy and Individual Autonomy

Atkinson (1997, p. 80) agrees that the notion of individual autonomy and the primacy of the individual underlie CT pedagogy at a fundamental level, but he points out that “a vast amount of cross-cultural research shows that various cultural groups assume notions of the individual that are almost diametrically opposed to Western or at least mainstream U.S. assumptions.” In support of this point he cites, among other things, a number of studies that demonstrate that the Japanese are socialized in ways that are aimed at promoting group conformity more than individual autonomy. Clancy (1986), for example, shows that the two dominant values with which Japanese infants are socialized are empathy and conformity, and Carson (1992) similarly concludes that Japanese children are trained in school to “value group goals above individual interests.”

That the Japanese understand themselves in relation to groups differently than Westerners do is well documented. Reischauer and Jansen (1995, p.128), for example, claim that “Certainly no difference is more significant between Japanese and Americans, or Westerners in general, than the greater Japanese tendency to emphasize the group at the expense of the individual.” And Matsumoto (1988, p.405) writes that, in Japanese culture, “acknowledgement and maintenance of the relative position of others, rather than preservation of an individual’s proper territory, governs all social interaction.” However, it would be a mistake to think that the group-orientation of the Japanese is a feature unique to Japanese culture. There is documented evidence that the Chinese display similar attitudes and patterns of behaviour (Scollon, 1991), as do the Indonesians (Brantley, 2003). What about the Koreans?
Joh (2002, p.397) asserts that young Koreans display “a high degree of traditional group identification” and that “their preferred way of decision-making is not by majority based on each individual’s opinion, but rather on the traditional unanimous system that is focussed on its betterment as a whole.” Joh also notes that the strong bonding within Korean families has “resulted in feelings of interdependence and harmony” and has formed “traditional values against individualism” (2002, p.401). Similarly, Baek (2002, p.376) claims that obedience to one’s parents is a much more important characteristic of Korean culture than individual rights. She adds that “Korean society preserves a more traditional, conforming, authoritarian, and status-oriented culture compared with Western society” and she cites cross-cultural studies showing that Korean children are socialized to respect tradition, authorities, and appropriate role-behaviour more than their Western counterparts (2002, p.376). Park (1997, p.154) reiterates these views in asserting that Korea’s group-oriented culture stands in “sharp contrast with individualist liberalism based on the pursuit of self-interest.”

In describing themselves and their own culture in relation to Western culture, Koreans with an understanding of both cultures repeatedly point out that they are less individualistic, that they operate more in terms of groups, and that the most important group of all is the family into which one is born and raised. It is a familiar pattern throughout much of East Asia and one which surely related to the historical influence of Confucianism, since an individual’s subordination to the family is a cardinal precept in Confucian ethics (Thut and Adams, 1964, p.252). It would be wrong, of course, to suppose that the Koreans or Japanese are entirely lacking in any concept of self or that they see themselves only in terms of their relations to others. However, it would be just as great a mistake to ignore the significant differences regarding attitudes towards individualism and group behaviour that exist between Koreans and Americans. These differences, moreover, are clearly relevant to justification of CT pedagogy.

One of the chief aims of CT pedagogy is to train one how to think for oneself and how to avoid blind conformity. Consider, for example, the following passage from a standard CT textbook:

“Harmful conformity is what we do instead of thinking in order to belong to groups or to avoid the risk of being different. Such conformity is an act of cowardice, a sacrifice of independence for a lesser good. In time it dulls our ability to think creatively and critically (Ruggiero, 1995, p.45).”

It would be difficult to find a better example of the clash between CT pedagogy and patterns of socialization indigenous to group-oriented cultures. Like the Japanese, Koreans are socialized to have great concern for what others think and it is customary in Korean culture to make sacrifices for the sake of group harmony. However, Koreans generally do not view the sacrificing of one’s independence for the sake of group harmony as an act of cowardice; on the contrary, they see the sacrificing of group harmony for the sake of independence as an act of selfishness or arrogance.

In order to nurture and enhance one’s intellectual independence and autonomy, CT pedagogy attempts to wean one away from the influence of tradition, hierarchically based authority, and group-oriented conformity. But these are the very things that Koreans are socialized to value and respect. As such, the justification of CT pedagogy that appeals to individual autonomy is not nearly as persuasive in a Korean context as it is in an American context, where individual autonomy is regarded as the most fundamental social value. Indeed, insofar as the appeal to individual autonomy clashes with dominant values in Korean culture, one could argue that, from a Korean perspective, this justification of CT pedagogy is highly irrational.

3.2 CT Pedagogy and Language Skills

Hall (1976) is credited with drawing the distinction between “high context” and “low context” communication in order to mark the significant difference in the degree to which members of different cultural groups rely on verbal and non-verbal clues in their customary patterns of communication. In high context communication, non-verbal messages can be more important than what is actually said, status and identity are often conveyed non-verbally and require acknowledgement, meaning is largely implicit in the context, directness of expression is avoided, and criticism is generally considered impolite. Low context communication, on the other hand, is more direct and literal, and information is more explicit and verbalized. Hall and others believe that the dominant form of communication in many Western cultures, and in U.S. culture in particular, is of the low context variety, whereas high context communication is the norm in many Asian cultures. Interestingly, the distinction between high context and low context patterns of communication seems to overlap considerably with the distinction between group-oriented and individualistic cultures.

Consider, for example, Reischauer and Jansen’s description of typical patterns of communication among the Japanese:

“aragei,” “the art of the belly,” for this meeting of minds, or at least the viscera, without clear verbal interaction. They have a positive mistrust of verbal skills, thinking that these tend to show superficiality in contract to inner, less articulate feelings that are communicated by inference or nonverbal means. (1996, p.136)
The foregoing description of Japanese styles of negotiation is a perfect example of high context communication. Brantley (2003) gives a similar account of communication patterns among the Indonesians, and descriptions of the Chinese show that they too adhere closely to the high-context model (Tan 1999, p.142). What about the Koreans?

Kim (2003, p.94) notes that, as a result of the Confucian tradition that discourages verbosity, "Koreans have become accustomed to communication dependent on a given circumstance" and they tend to communicate "through indirect, implicit and non-verbal means." Furthermore, he writes that "Koreans tend to obviate the need to explicitly articulate their viewpoints and persuade others," and that communication in Korea is "geared to promoting bond rather than enhancing information exchange and developing persuasive skills" (Kim 2003, p.96). In a similar vein, Suh (1996) writes that:

The frequent use of elliptical expressions in Korean is a hotbed on which semantic implications flourish. The gap created by the use of ellipses is a space out of which a depth of meaning far beyond explicit statements grows. Koreans take immense pleasure in expressions such as ishim chonshim (communion with minds), a kind of telepathic communication, a contact of mind with mind unmediated by words. (p.45)

The descriptions given by Kim and Suh strongly suggest that the Koreans, like the Japanese, tend toward high context communication, and that the communicative characteristics of both cultures differ sharply from those of English-speaking cultures. This fact is clearly relevant to the second justification for CT pedagogy.

Kim (2003, p.96) points out that, as a result of their tendency not to explicitly articulate their viewpoints and persuade others, Koreans have found "no pressing need to develop Western-style argumentation, logic, and rhetoric." And Suh (1996, p.46) echoes this point when he notes that the Korean habit of ellipses in discourse reiterates itself in an ellipses in thinking, resulting in a tendency to put into practice "what the heart feels," while "bypassing the process of deliberating why and for what reason it should be done." As a result, he writes, "Koreans live by feeling, emotion, and attachment (all of which can be summed up in the word cheong) while relatively lacking in the so-called 'Western' qualities of reason, logic, and rationality" (Suh 1996, p.46).

Suh's point, as I understand it, is not that Koreans lack the ability to reason or to think logically, but rather that their typical patterns of communication, which make frequent use of ambiguity and ellipsis, do not manifest the clarity, precision, and logical progression of ideas that are normative ideals in other languages, such as English. But these norms of clarity, precision, and logical progression are the very qualities that CT pedagogy attempts to nurture. So if it is true that customary patterns of communication among Koreans do not manifest or even aim towards the standards of CT, then the idea that CT pedagogy will improve one's persuasive powers is false from a Korean perspective. Suh (1996, p.43) nicely illustrates this point when he notes that, while Koreans are not unaware of the advantage of precision in linguistic communication, the use of precision "gives them a chill as an expression of being too practical and calculating and of a mind of being too geared to maximum profit and efficiency." The Koreans are attracted, he explains, "to the hazy warmth of blanket terms, especially in everyday discourse" (Suh 1996, p.43). But if so, then the hapless critical thinker who attempts to persuade such people through the articulation of carefully constructed arguments is more likely to achieve rejection than persuasive success.

In general, the idea that CT pedagogy will improve one's linguistic skills and persuasive powers makes sense only in those cultural contexts in which CT skills function as normative ideals of linguistic communication. In cultural contexts in which this is not the case, such as in Korea and Japan, the idea is simply false. Thus, from a Korean point of view, the second justification for CT pedagogy is just as bad as the first.

3.3 CT Pedagogy and Democracy

Yet another clear difference between Korea and many Western countries relates to their respective experiences with, and attitudes towards, democracy. In the U.S., for example, democratic traditions are deeply embedded in the culture and stretch back well over 200 years. There are problems, to be sure, with American democracy, problems too numerous to mention. However, such problems are properly regarded as threats to the democratic traditions that have already been established and which are largely taken for granted among the American people, rather than threats to the establishment of democracy. In Korea, on the other hand, where the history of democracy is very short and the traditions relatively shallow, the situation is entirely different. It was only as recently as 1987 that Korea began its transition from military rule to democracy and only as recently as 1993, with the election of Kim Young Sam, that the country was transformed into a civilian democracy (Shin, 1999, p.15). However, while Korea has now fully established the "minimal architecture of procedural democracy"—free elections, multi-party competition, universal adult suffrage, civil liberties and a free press—it has yet to complete its journey towards a fully fledged democracy (Shin, 1999, p.15; Sonn, 2004). It has yet to complete the final stage of its democratization or what political scientists call the "consolidation phase" (Shin, 1999; Diamond and Kim, 1998). In the consolidation phase, it is anticipated that Korean political parties, which remain hierarchically structured, regionally-based, and dominated by the jaebol conglomerates, will become institutions of truly representative democracy and that, culturally, citizens will disassociate fully from the legacy of authoritarianism and internalize the values and operational norms of democracy (Shin 1999, p.263).
As a very recent democracy, a member of what Huntington (1991) calls the “third wave” of new democracies, it is clear that Korea has not yet reached the same level of democratization as the older democracies of Western Europe and North America. What is less obvious is when, or indeed whether, Korea will complete the consolidation phase of its transition to democracy. In order to answer these questions, Shin (1999) conducted a series of six national surveys over a period of ten years. Based on the results of his surveys, as well as evidence from a number of other researchers and academic organizations, including the Korean Political Science and Sociological Organizations, Shin concluded that “The signs are ubiquitous that democratization in Korea is rapidly turning into a highly uncertain, long march” (1999, p.263).

The reasons for Shin’s somewhat pessimistic prediction have very much to do with Koreans’ “authoritarian propensities” and “their age-old authoritarian habit of decision making” (Shin, 1999, p.94). Shin writes that, “Korea today remains a nation deeply plagued by the legacy of authoritarianism” and that “there have been no significant declines in the authoritarian political habits into which Koreans and their institutions have long been socialized” (1999, p.263). Indeed, his surveys show, remarkably, that “a large majority of Koreans (66%) remain subscribed to the belief that a powerful dictator, like General Park Chung-Hee, is more effective in handling those [national] problems than a democratically elected government” and that “a majority (58%) reject the democratic method of conflict resolution in favor of the authoritarian method” (Shin, 1999, p.254).

What are the reasons for this lingering commitment to authoritarianism among the Koreans? Shin cites several factors, the first of which is the fact that many Koreans were socialized to accept the cultural norms of the previous undemocratic regimes (Shin, 1999, p.263). Additionally, many Koreans have positive associations with authoritarianism because of the economic gains that Korea made during its three decades of military rule (Shin, 1999, p.254). Finally, and perhaps more fundamental than the others, is the lingering influence of Confucianism, which emphasizes authoritarianism, the supremacy of the group over the individual, the family over the community, discipline over freedom, and duties over rights (Shin, 1999, p.254). MacDonald (1991, p.258) concurs that one of the chief difficulties in consolidating Korean democracy is the fact that Koreans “have been conditioned by centuries of Confucian tradition to accept direction from a government hierarchy which is both respected and disliked, but viewed as beyond popular control.”

Whether the social conditioning that promotes respect and obedience for hierarchically established authority and prevents democratic attitudes from fully taking root goes back a few decades or several centuries is a difficult question, but one that we need not answer here. What is important in this context is simply that we acknowledge, and not deny, the existence of these authoritarian attitudes and propensities, which are very much alive in contemporary Korean society. Such propensities not only hinder the consolidation of democracy in Korea, they also complicate and weaken the third justification for CT pedagogy.

The idea that CT pedagogy will promote well-functioning democracies justifies the use of CT pedagogy only on the assumption that democracy, in the deep sense in which CT pedagogy promotes democracy, is a clearly accepted value of the community in which CT pedagogy is being implemented. In the context of American culture, the oldest democracy in existence and the birthplace of the CT movement, that is an assumption that no one seriously challenges. However, such an assumption cannot be taken for granted in the context of Korean culture, where citizens are “far from being committed to removing the residue of authoritarian rule and expanding the currently limited democracy-in-action” (Shin, 1999, p.264). One may attempt to justify the introduction of CT pedagogy in Korea precisely because it would be a positive force in helping Korea through its final stage of democratization. Indeed, Park (1997, p.154) points out that there are at least some people in Korea who have shown an interest in CT pedagogy precisely in regard to democratic citizenship education. However, such proposals are ultimately political, and are complicated by the fact that they are aimed at pushing Koreans in a direction in which, according to the evidence Shin (1999) presents, Koreans themselves are reluctant to move. Thus, the third justification for CT pedagogy is not nearly as cogent or straightforward in the context of Korean culture, with its conflicting attachments to democracy and authoritarianism, as it is when put forward in the context of those Western countries that are already fully committed to the idea of democracy as the only acceptable political system.

4. Conclusion:

It is certainly not by accident that educational philosophies and methodologies arise or are sustained through generations. No society continues to embrace educational methodologies and guiding principles over the course of generations unless they are supportive of the dominant values of that society. In order to understand the relative lack of CT pedagogy in Korea, it will not suffice to point to features of the education system itself, such as the university entrance exam or the quality of Korean teachers, for these things, as we have seen, are also in need of explanation. A deeper, more satisfying explanation is needed, one that relates the lack of CT pedagogy in the Korean education system to important values and social practices in Korean culture. In this paper I have offered such an explanation by showing how the values implicit in CT pedagogy clash with important features of Korean culture.

CT pedagogy is commonly justified in virtue of the fact that 1) it enhances one’s intellectual independence and individual autonomy, and 2) it increases one’s mastery of the language and persuasive powers, and
3) it fosters well functioning democracies. However, what is overlooked by many of those Western educators who hail CT pedagogy as constituting the very heart of education is the fact that these justifications are heavily dependent on culturally specific values and practices, which conflict with important features of certain non-Western cultures.

Within the context of Korean culture, each of these three justifications is highly problematic. The first justification of CT pedagogy is undermined by the fact that, in nurturing the intellectual autonomy of students, CT pedagogy weans students away from the influence of some of the very things that Koreans are socialized to value, such as tradition, hierarchically based authority, and group-oriented conformity. The second justification for CT pedagogy is belied by the fact that successful communication in Korean contexts is not nearly as dependent on the norms of CT as is communication in English and, indeed, that some of the norms of CT run contrary to customary patterns of communication among the Koreans. Finally, the third justification for CT pedagogy is weakened by the fact that Koreans are clearly ambivalent towards democracy as the preferred political system, with a majority of Koreans maintaining positive attitudes towards authoritarianism.

The Korean education system is not without its merits. However, one of the widely acknowledged weaknesses of the system is its over-reliance on teacher-centered instructional methodologies involving rote-memorization. Since the CT movement addresses this weakness, and aims to replace the methodologies that promote intellectual passivity with approaches that nurture students' thinking skills, one may reasonably wonder why Korean educators and educational institutions have not embraced the CT movement. However, when one recognizes that the goals and presuppositions of CT pedagogy clash with important values, attitudes, and practices in Korean culture, it should come as no surprise that the CT movement has not yet come to Korea. Nor is it likely to come anytime soon. The changes in values and customs that would be required in order for CT pedagogy to flourish in a major way in Korea are changes that occur over the course of generations, and cannot be quickly instantiated by mere policy changes.

Whether or not the CT movement should come to Korea is another question entirely, and one that I have not tried in this paper to answer. Within the Korean academic community, and especially within the Korean community of Anglo-American philosophers, there are at least some who believe that CT pedagogy should be vigorously promoted. Their reasons for holding this belief are entirely understandable, and are similar to the justifications for CT pedagogy described in the foregoing. However, those who seek to promote CT pedagogy in Korea must be aware of the significant cultural changes that would be required in order for CT pedagogy to flourish in Korea. It is by no means clear whether such changes would be beneficial, or rather detrimental, to Korean culture as we know it. But these are questions that lie beyond the scope of the present paper.

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Koguryo played an extremely important role in the cultural world of Northeast Asia. Its geographical location at the steppe of China and its historical significance as the first state in Northeast Asia to refashion its political structure on the Chinese model facilitated its ability to transmit Chinese ideas and institutions to the southern part of Korea and Japan between the fourth and seventh centuries. Scholars in South Korea did not, however, evince as much interest in Koguryo as in its two rival kingdoms, Paekche and Silla until 2003 when China launched the so-called Northeast project and sought to appropriate Koguryo as an integral part of its own historical tradition. The Five-Year Chinese project, initiated by the Academy of Social Sciences with the estimated budget of US $24 million, underscores the cultural, demographic and economic significance of the three provinces of northeast China and stresses the need for the Chinese scholars to engage in systematic research on the history and culture of this region. The project further points out that sustained academic interest in various historical issues concerning the region is necessary for meeting the new geopolitical realities and the related challenges in the era of opening and reform. The project is responsible for research on a broad spectrum of issues, including the history of Koguryo, Parhae and the Korean ethnic minorities in China, and is divided into three categories, research, translation and organization of materials. The project, as outlined on its homepage (www.chinaborderland.com), is clear in the objective of using its research findings as an ideological underpinning of social stability and economic prosperity in Northeast China. It is also interesting to note that the project emphasises the need of 'countering confusion derived from deliberate distortion of facts by scholars, research organizations and politicians of a certain country' and its advisory committee includes top cadre of the Communist party of China and other officials from the provincial administrations.

China's attempt to appropriate Koguryo became the most formidable irritant in the history Korea's diplomatic relations with PRC, established in 1992. Korean media covered this 'history war' almost daily for about a year, over one hundred books were published on Koguryo or on the related issue of Chinese expansionism and most of the prestigious academic journals on history such as Yoksa Pip'yong, Baeksan hakbo, Hanguk kodaesa yongu published special issues on this topic. The dispute over Koguryo’s heritage is primarily a issue of historiography, but in the wake of the controversy derived from the Chinese 'piracy', as several Korean scholars have described it, Koguryo became relevant to a range of disciplines in the areas of humanity and social sciences. The Western world did not take much notice of this debate, although Mark Byington and John Duncan touched this issue briefly in their recent essays. This paper represents a tentative attempt to address two concerns raised by the topic-- the legitimacy of the Chinese claim and the reason why Korea displayed hypersensitivity to the Koguryo issue.

Chinese Theories on Koguryo

The Chinese scholars of history mostly cite the evidence of tribute and investiture to argue that Koguryo ceaselessly maintained subordinate relationship with the Chinese dynasties (on the central plain). They interpret Koguryo rulers' receipt of investiture to mean that were officials under the rule of the Chinese state. These interpretations, however, disregard the historical character of this institution which primarily represented a mechanism to regulate the Chinese world order (Choe kwang-shik 2004). Furthermore, the inconsistency of the contention of Chinese scholars becomes manifest when the system of investiture is cited to justify the indigenization of only Koguryo and not the other states like Japan and Vietnam that were part of the Chinese world order in the early medieval period. The first major work on Koguryo, written from this Sinocentric parameter of understanding, appeared as early as 1984. Wang Jianqun’s book Haotaiwangbei yanjiu (A Study of the Stele of King Hota‘e) is the first book to provide a meticulous account of the circumstances under which the King Kwanggaet’o stele was discovered and the process through which early impressions of the inscription were made and circulated amongst scholars in China and Japan. Solid though Wang's scholarship is, he failed to overcome the predominant nationalist bias. He was firm in his preconceived notion that Koguryo was a vassal state of China, and when he encountered an uncomfortable evidence such as ‘yŏngnak’, an independent reign title of Hot’aewang, he dismissed it outright. He cited the evidence of the discovery of a brick, bearing the reign title ‘Taining’ of Eastern Jin, within the borders of Koguryo, and contended that it was inconceivable that King Kwanggaet’o employed his own reign title, emblematic of his independent status of the (Chinese) state on the Central Plain (Wang, 1984, 221-222). One may argue that the brick in question just shows that more than a thousand families who escaped to Liaodong
in 313 and settled within the Koguryo domain, may have continued to use the calendar of Western Jin, Dongshou, a prominent migrant to Liaodong in the early 4th century, is one such example. Besides, we need to remember that the dating of the brick inscription as ‘taining 4th year’ is not conclusive. Wei Cuncheng has suggested the correct reading as ‘taishou 4th year or 325 AD’ (Wei, 1996, 268-269). It is also significant to note that in the early fifth century, a prominent Chinese, introduced as a ‘Disciple of Sakyamuni’ bore Koguryo’s official titles and used the reign title of King Kwanggaetae. This is testified in the Dökhäng-ni inscription of 409. One may also note that independent reign titles were used by the other contemporary kingdom of Silla, It is obvious that Wang’s argument that ‘yöngnak’ was not a reign title but one of the royal titles of King Kwanggaetae, similar to Hot‘aewang, is too simplistic to be sustainable.

Chinese publications on Koguryo increased remarkably in 2003 when China launched the so-called Northeast Project. The political character of the project is evident in all its publications, including the multi-authored book, Gudai Zhongguo Gaogouli lishi xulun (Continued Essays on The History of Koguryo of Ancient China) which sets out to prove that Koguryo was a provincial administration of China and was ceaselessly bound to its Suzerain through faithful observance of tributary relationship (Ma, 2003, 3-13, 97-146).

Another relevant Chinese work, published under the project by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, is entitled Haotaiwang bei yi qian wu bai liu shi nian zai (1560th Anniversary of the King Hot‘ae Stele) by Geng Tiehua. It also looks at Koguryo from the same Sinocentric prism, emphasizing Koguryo’s status as a provincial administration of China.

Sun Jinji, a respected Chinese scholar, originally followed the identical line of argument, but later modified it and formulated his theory of ‘the shared legacy of one history’. He sought to authenticate the Chinese imagination about Koguryo by tracing its development as an early state to Xuantu, one of the four Chinese commanderies in the northeast, established by the Han dynasty. He argued that Koguryo originated in China and it was not until the fourth century that it started advancing towards the Korean peninsula (Sun, 1994, 290-292). Sun’s thesis about the Chinese lineage of Koguryo is based on the early Chinese sources that suggest close relationship between the early Koguryo tribes and the administration of Xuantu, whose capital prefecture was in fact known as Gaogouli xian (Koguryo Hyon). Apparently the prefecture was so named because it was responsible for dealing with the Koguryo tribes. To quote from the sanguo zhì: During the Han Dynasty it was the customs to present (Koguryo) with skilled players of the drum or trumpet, and (the tribes-people) always came to receive their court robes and caps from Xuantu commandery, where the prefect of Gaogouli (Koguryo) kept a register of their names.

Ken Gardiner has argued that, from at least as early as the original conquest of Choson in 108 B.C., the Han administration in this area perceived the Koguryo tribes as ‘a group of dependable clients’. It is, however, important to note in this context that perceptions do not constitute reality and the acceptance of the trappings of power by Koguryo’s tribal chiefs from the Chinese officials can not be justifiably interpreted as an evidence of Koguryo’s early status as a Chinese state. We also need to remember that the same source describes increasing discomfort of Koguryo with the prefecture administration that led to the rupture of relationship between them.

In his recent paper on the inheritance of the mantle of Koguryo, published in Pukbang yongu (vol. 1, 2004), Sun Jinji elaborated his theory of shared history by arguing that China, together with Korea, are legitimate successors of the history of Koguryo, because approximately two third of Koguryo’s territory falls within the present territory of PRC and the population and culture of Koguryo were also inherited by China after its fall in 668. Sun conceded the fact that the people of Koguryo were forcibly settled in China by the Tang rulers in order to obviate the possibility of a restorationist movement or rebellion against the Tang administration that they could have launched from their old base on the Koguryo territory, and although the diasporic Koguryo population was Sinicised, historical sources do not provide any clue to a reverse trend of acculturation process.

In the same issue of Pukbang yongu, Sun Hong, the daughter of Sun Jinji, published an article in which she noted that China was a large multietnic family which many minority races, including Koguryo embraced. If Koguryo was such a favourite member of the Chinese family, one wonders why China was consistent in labelling Koguryo as “Eastern barbarian”, and ranking envoys from this state together with those from Silla, Paekche, Japan and even India (see the Tang sketch of tributary envoys, now in Taipei National Museum). It is interesting to note that the Qing statutes of 1815 included Britain also as a tributary state and the British were also called “Yi” or barbarians from the East. Furthermore, if all the minority races were part of the big multietnic family of China, why did China use such pejorative terms to describe them as di (literally dog with red skin), man (a kind of snake in the south) or Fan (animal feet). Since Chinese historians invariably emphasize tribute system to stake their claim over Koguryo, it is important to examine this institution in greater depth.

Understanding Tribute and Investiture
Professor Chun Hae-jong has suggested, in Sino-Korean relations, the tribute-giving, investiture and dispatch of congratulatory emissaries by Korean kings as typical tributary relations appeared only spasmodically in the Pre-Tang period and Koguryo, in particular, often found its world view in conflict with the Chinese world order (Chun, 1970, 37-43). While the scope of this paper does not allow a full discussion of Koguryo’s relations with all the Chinese states on the Central Plain (Zhongyuan), one may note in passing that Koguryo derived its strength from its warfare with the Chinese states. In 12 AD, as has been noted earlier, the people of Koguryo launched their first major offensive against the Chinese state. In subsequent history Koguryo ceaselessly resisted the military pressure of various non-Han dynasts of the north who jostled for power, including the devastating attack by Wei in 244-245 and later by the Sui dynasty. Koguryo survived a series of fierce Chinese invasions, because they could not break its tributary structure that extended to Okcho and the lowland areas.

The authors, belonging to the Northeast project, perform the task of nationalising Koguryo by selective and discriminative use of Chinese sources and disregard of epigraphic evidence. The original Chinese source makes it apparent that Koguryo made a transition from its status of a weak tribal polity, tied to the Xuantu Commandery, to an independent early State during the reign of Wang Mang in 12 AD. In this year the people of Koguryo openly defied the order of the Chinese ruler to participate in the campaigns against Xiongnu, rebelled, raided and ransacked the Chinese settlements and killed the Chinese governor. Later when the Chinese General Zhuang Yu enticed Ch’u, the Marquis of Koguryo and assassinated him, popular anger against China and the attendant widespread revolt erupted on a large scale which Wang Mang was unable to repress. However, in the book, sponsored by the project, one finds only a truncated version of the event that suited the ideological agenda of the author. The authors just mention two facts: first, Koguryo was a vassal state and therefore, it was ordered to participate in a military expedition and second, since the Koguryo chief defied the order of the Chinese ruler, he was killed. This is one of the many examples of very selective use of data.

Sound historical scholarship on Koguryo also requires that materials on the state’s self-perception are examined. In Kwanggaeto’s inscriptions, Moduru inscription and The ‘Old Samguk Sag’i’ preserved in Tongguk Yi Sang-guk Chib, the royalty of Koguryo is described as a ‘Descendant of Heaven’ or the “Grandson of the Emperor of Heaven”. If we look at inscriptions and other materials carefully, we find many other instances of Koguryo’s independence vis-à-vis the Chinese World Order (No Ta’e-don, 1999, 356-391; Kim Chong-bae, 2004a, 13-20). Koguryo rulers employed their reign titles, imposed tributary obligations on several tribal settlements, and engaged in open hostilities with rulers on the Central Plain. The project’s publications on Koguryo also suppress China (Zhongyuan)’s perception of Koguryo. In Wang Mang’s edict Koguryo is described as one of the ‘barbarians beyond the four frontiers who have usurped the royal title and called themselves kings’. While all the Chinese historical annals counted Koguryo as an ‘Eastern Barbarian’ outside the pale of China, the Korean sources have been consistent in reckoning it as part of ‘Haedong’ (East of the Sea), Samhan or the Three ‘Han’ states (Kim Chong-bae, 2004b) and ‘Gu Han’ or the Nine Han states, as in evidenced by the record of the Nine-Story Pagoda of the Hwangmyong Temple. The Chinese project also shows ignorance of the recent Western scholarship on the principles and practices of Confucian World Order, and seeks to build a thesis of utter improbability on the premise that China has eternally been a multi-ethnic state and its present borders are sanctified eternally by historical memory.

It seems apparent that the project owes its genesis primarily to the pressure of contemporary political realities of China. The Chinese attempt to nationalise the history of Koguryo and other states that rose and fell within the contemporary Chinese border is meant to authenticate the political agenda of the contemporary Chinese leadership. In other words, indigenisation of Koguryo as a powerful ‘ethno-symbolism’ may, perhaps, be interpreted as a device to meet the threat of irredentist nationalism that may either originate in the region or spread from across the border.

Korean sensitivity towards Koguryo

When the Koguryo controversy erupted, South Korea’s foreign minister noted that his government was placing high priority on addressing the issue, as the history of Koguryo constituted “the roots and identity of Korea”. Korea’s opposition party suggested that the country needed to align itself with other Asian countries or territories, including Tibet, to ‘deal with China’s attempt to distort the history of the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo’. The outburst of popular emotion over the issue was indeed overwhelming in its intensity and scale. Korean scholars evinced extraordinary sensitivity towards this issue, apparently because Koguryo was central to the construction of Korean national identity in the twentieth century. It is generally believed that Modern Korean historiography was a radically nationalistic inversion of Japan’s Orientalist historiography, a counter-discourse of the assumptions implicit in Japan’s historical practice during the Meiji period. Korean intellectuals in the early twentieth century engaged in an impassioned quest for an alternative historiography in such a way as to “allow memory to usurp the estate of history”, as Ranajit Guha noted in the context of Indian historiography. Guha
further points out that nostalgia in itself does not constitute a sufficient condition for the production of historiography for a nation in the same way as it does not produce an autobiography for an individual, but what is common in the nostalgic urges in the life of a nation and an individual is that they are “informed by a notion of the Other”.

In fact it is the concept of the “notion of the Other” in nationalist historiographical urges which is relevant to our discussion of the Korean historiography, particularly as represented by Sin Ch'a-ae-ho (1880-1937) and Ch'oe Nam-son. Sin was the most representative nationalist historian of the early twentieth century, whose historical writings can be described as explorations of the interpretive “otherness” about the Korean past. They were particularistic histories charged with an intense realisation of Korea's unique racial identity and a sense of community. They were, furthermore, specifically addressed to the challenges of Japanese theories about Korean history, and were intended as a means to promote the national self-strengthening and enlightenment movement. For instance, Sin's emphases on Manchuria as an integral part of Korea's geographical self-identity and on T'angun as the symbol of racial uniqueness were an articulation of a nationalist historical consciousness and represented a response to the challenges of the imperialist historiography.

We need to remember that an important theory which governed the Japanese reconstruction of Korea's past was “geographical determinism”, which asserted that due to the peninsular character (hantosei) of Korea its historical development was inevitably manipulated by external forces and factors, and Korean history lacked autonomy. Shiratori Kurakichi, for instance, specified that the influence emanating from the continental lands of China proper and Manchuria constituted two of these forces, and Japan was the third such force. The political implications of these Orientalist myths were obvious—Korea could not shape its own destiny, and Japan as a “superior” nation had to bring “backward” Korea under its control and lead it forward on the path of enlightenment and modernisation. The ethno-symbolism of Koguryo that ruled Manchuria represented a powerful refutation of the challenges of Japanese historiography.

Sin's theory identified the conflict between self (a) and non-self/other (pi-a) as the major stimulus of the development of history, which implied that the early history of Korea was characterised by spatial dichotomies between Korea (self) and China (non-self), so that the indigenous culture of Korea had to wrestle with the imported Chinese civilization (non self/other) in order to retain its independent identity. This explains why Ulchi Mundok of Koguryo who fought the Sui army, emerged as an archetypal moral icon in Sin's historiography, and why Silla's reliance on external force for the accomplishment of so-called national unification is portrayed as “a dark chapter in Korean history”. It also explains why Sin mounted a vitriolic assault on the Sinicisation/Confucianisation of Korean society, believing it to have led to a gradual erosion of the indigenous values of the Korean people and the concomitant subjugation of the pattern of the Korean past to Sinocentric moral interpretations. Sin's historiographical framework magnified the significance of Tangun Choson, which he believed to be evidence of the indigenous origin of the Korean race, and whose territorial boundaries embracing Manchuria were emblematic of a vast theatre of early Korean history. Obviously, modern Korean nationalism was based on the premise of what Andre Schmidt calls “De-centering China”, and as is evident from the above discussion, Koguryo was pivotal to this nationalist project both during the late nineteenth century and under the Japanese colonial rule.

In pre-modern Korea Koguryo did not evoke the image of ‘splendid ancestors’, to borrow the expression of Benedict Anderson, used in a different context. During the Unified Silla period Koguryo did not represent a glorious symbol. Japanese monk Ennin wrote that the Sillan residents in Shandong province held an annual festival to celebrate their victory over “Parhae (Koguryo), and it is also interesting that when a candidate from Parhae, considered to be a successor of Koguryo, topped in the Chinese imperial examination for foreigners, Silla literatus Choe Ch'i-won was filled with rage. When Koryo rose on the ruins of Silla, its early rulers doubtless made an attempt to reclaim the lost territory of Koguryo. Koryo's claim of Koguryo's legitimate successor is also evident in an assertion by So Hai, a Koryo General who said to Khitans in 993, “Our country is the successor to Koguryo. That is why we call ourselves Koryo and we have a capital at P'yongyang” (Quoted in Duncan, 2004, 123; Pak Yong-un, 2004). Notwithstanding this piece of evidence, it is appropriate to understand early Koryo period as bipolarised into a dominant Silla-centered faction and a weaker Koguryo-centered faction, represented by Mych'ong who raised a banner of rebellion against the state when his demand for the relocation of capital to Pyongyang was rejected. The period of Mongol interference resulted in greater cohesion in the fabric of Koryo society. During the Choson period the memory of Koguryo as a historical entity assumed specificity, chiefly due to the efforts of scholars belonging to the Practical learning School (Duncan, 2004, 125-130). The image of Koguryo as the most dominant power in Northeast Asia is, however, a product of twentieth century historiography. As noted above, nationalist historians of the colonial period used the memory of this state as an ideological weapon in their fight against Japanese imperialism and the influence of their 'mythologised' Koguryo persisted in the subterranean consciousness of the Korean people in the post-colonial period. China's appropriation of Koguryo is partly a response to the employment of the symbolism of Koguryo as a backward linkage in the 'Janus-faced' nature of Korean nationalism. Tom Nairn defines nationism as 'Janus-faced', 'looking backward to a mythical past and forward to a future of development in freedom' (quoted in Aspinall, 2003). This evocation of Koguryo-centered Korean past, encompassing Manchuria, inheres
potential to generate into a political campaign to reclaim Manchuria and holds appeal to the Korean-Chinese, yearning for liberty and prosperity, enjoyed by people in South Korea. China must also have been alarmed at this prospect, as with the reality of loud slogans “MANCHU URI TTANG “ or Manchuria belongs to Korea” that often resonated at various Koguryo sites in China.

The upsurge of popular emotion over Koguryo also led to the publication of a large number of jingoistic books in 2004. These titles include “Koguryo: the Centre of the Universe” “The History of Great Imperialist Power Koguryo”, “The Story of Our Ancestors who Jolted China” “Ah, Koguryo” “The Valiant and Sovereign State in the History of Our Race” “Koguryo, Silla and Paekche Ruled China”, The History of Great Koguryo Does Not Exist in China”. Koguryo was doubtless a proud state that waged numerous battles with China in order to preserve its sovereignty and integrity, but historical sources do not attest to either its capacity or intention to expand its power over the Central Plain of China.

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Reformulating Shamanism:  
Shamanism as a Marker of Korean Identity

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Introduction and Historical Backdrop

We can understand the group of beliefs, practices and rituals oftentimes lumped together as "shamanism" from numerous aspects during the twentieth century. Such views are inevitably fraught and conflicted with ideas of modernism, cultural uniqueness, and identity. This is all the more true in colonial Korea as identity of what was Korean or was not were heightened in the face of loss of sovereignty and the massive inflow of Western concepts. This paper seeks to examine how shamanism functioned in literary works of the colonial period, especially in regards to what is portrayed as "true" Korean identity.

From a historic perspective, we can understand that shamanic beliefs have experienced many vicissitudes in terms of status. Various ancient documents inform us that shamanism once held a prominent place in early Korean societies. For example, the following passage in the "Dongyi chuan" of the Sanguo zhi [東夷傳 三國志 Section of the eastern barbarians, History of the Three Kingdoms; 3rd c. A.D.] allows us to understand early political leaders were expected to control the forces of nature:

An old Puyŏ custom dictates,  
Floods, droughts and irregular weather,  
Causing the five grains to not ripen.  
Whenever this comes about, the fault lies with the king.  
Some say it is appropriate to replace him,  
Other say it is fitting to kill him.

From records such as this, we can understand that the leaders of these early states were akin to shaman-kings. That is both political leaders and interner with the forces of nature. Yet, from this lofty perch, shamanism entered the modern era as a practice condemned as backward by many Koreans and foreigners alike.

However, it is probably a bit of a stretch to claim that shamanism was ever any sort of guiding ideology (let alone the ethos of the Korean people) for the peoples on and around the Korean peninsula. While I do not deny that shamanistic practices and beliefs seemingly underlie many aspects of society, I do not feel that this ever constituted a unified and conscious belief system that guided the actions of the majority of people in past Korean societies. Instead, shamanism served as a system—for some segments of the population—to provide explanations for the unknown (i.e., reasons for disease or calamities). It was the 'Little Tradition' that was chiefly adhered to by the folk and women, while state ideologies such as Buddhism (Koryŏ) and Neo-Confucianism (Chosŏn) constituted the 'Great Tradition.'

In the Chosŏn period (1392-1910) the place of shamanism was anything but that of the dominant ideology of the state. Confucianism was the ideological basis for Chosŏn and its doctrines clearly permeated every level of society and fundamentally altered the people's way of life. While this remaking of society took centuries to complete, by the advent of the modern period at the end of the nineteenth century the position of shamanism was one that can be characterized as base and something shunned by educated individuals. Nonetheless, this belief system continued to thrive among some groups and constituted an important alternative to Confucianism and a means of subverting this repressive ideology. With the fall of Chosŏn to Japan, however, the perception of shamanism among some intellectuals was to undergo a major transformation.

In the last century or so marks perhaps the first time that shamanism was provided with a doctrinal basis, and this construction was largely achieved by scholars seeking to discover the archaic origins of humankind's religions. The desire to discover universal values among all peoples was at the core of many of these studies carried out by largely Western scholars. In Korea, the onset of the colonial period sparked interest in native Korean traditions or that deemed to be purely Korean (as opposed to introduced culture such as Confucianism and Buddhism). Representative of these studies are works by Yi Nánghwa (1927) and Ch'oe Namšin (1926), both of which approached shamanism as something indicative of 'Korean-ness.' The desire of scholars to create an archaic and far-reaching sphere for shamanism can perhaps be seen best in Ch'oe's thesis establishing Tan'gun (the mythical founder of Kojošon) as the central figure in all of eastern and central Asia. Without a doubt, attempts such as these were fueled by a nationalistic zeal, aiming to establish the historical roots of the Korean nation.

Thus, it was from the colonial period that shamanism began to be elevated and promoted as the
essence of Korean culture, the aspect that established a tangible difference between Japan, China, and Korea. In regards to Japan, shamanism served as a means to rebuff the assimilationist goals of the colonial government; concerning China, shamanistic traditions represented a break with the China-orientation of the elite classes in past times. Thus, shamanism came to be idealized by some intellectuals of this period as the uniquely Korean belief system that had and would continue to persevere against ‘foreign’ belief and social systems.

Conversely, we also have a large-scale dismissal of shamanic beliefs and folk practices in this same period sparked by the desire to modernize Korea. As mentioned above, accounts by Westerners in Korea on shamanic practices are uniformly critical and dismissive of these “superstitious” and “backwards” practices. The following account by the gentlewoman traveler Isabella Bird Bishop typifies the impression of the Western visitor in late Chosŏn.

The demons whose professed servants the Shamans are, and whose yoke lies heavy on Korea, are rarely even mythical beings, who might possibly have existed in human shape. They are legion. They dwell in all matter and pervade all space. They are a horde without organization, destitute of genus, species, and classification, created out of Korean superstitions, debased Buddhism, and Chinese mythical legend.

Bird adds in her discussion on shamans and shamanic practices the vast amount of resources wasted on pacifying these spirits the Koreans themselves do not even understand.

If Western observers held shamanic practices to be benighted superstitions, the Japanese colonial overlords saw belief in shamanic superstition as being the chief contributor to the retarded mental development of the Korean people and the major obstacle to be surmounted by Koreans before they could develop a spirit of self-reliance. Japanese investigators further criticized the role of shamans in preventing the spread of modern medicine and hygienic practices as the people sought out shamans when ill rather than proper medical treatment. Finally, the immense amount of money squandered on shamanic rites was also heavily condemned as being the source of much financial ruin and poverty in the colony. While we should expect to find such critical comments by the Japanese in their attempt to justify their colonization of Korea, the fact that shamanic beliefs were targeted demonstrates the pervasiveness of these practices at the time.

Not surprisingly, literary works of the colonial period echo the diverse sentiments found in the scholarly or political discourse of the day. On one side, we have advocates of modernization who saw the “old” practices as being destructive to creating a new society. Opposed to these advocates of change were those writers who saw shamanic practices and folk customs as embodying the spirit of Koreans and as something worthy of preservation.

Shamanism in Colonial Period Literature

An undeniable theme in much literature of the colonial period is that of enlightenment and the need for social reform. Perhaps foremost among such writings are those by Yi Kwangsu (1892-?) that prominently feature themes centering on education and embracing more-or-less Western values such as Christianity, love-based marriages, and the elimination of the vestiges of the old, and backwards, society. Mujong [Heartless, 1917] is a primary example of this pattern of veneration of Western society and debasement of past Korean traditions. In fact, this particular work borders on a blind idolization of the West. Other of Yi’s works, particularly Hük [Land, 1932] demonstrate a similar devotion to the West.

Folk customs, although not necessarily shamanic practices, are prominent in the works of other colonial period writers. In many of the works by Kim Yujong (1908-1937) readers enter the world of rural colonial Korea and the lives of common folk, a far cry from the sophistication that Yi Kwangsu attempted to depict in his writings. Characters in Kim’s writings often grapple with what we can term more-or-less “traditional” lifestyles in a rapidly changing world. We also see a similar theme of struggle with tradition and modernization in T’angnyu [Muddy waters, 1937] written by Ch’ae Mansik (1902-1950).

There is no writer of the colonial period whose works dwell in the world of shamanic practices more frequently than those of Kim Tongni (1913-1995). While Kim’s ideological stand shifted periodically in the course of his lengthy writing career, he featured shamanic beliefs and folk customs in the lives of the people throughout his career. He was, in the words of one critic, an anti-modernist who utilized shamanism as a means to demonstrate his views. In Kim’s own words he desired to “pass on to eternity the mind and spirit of our people [i.e., Koreans].” Many of Kim’s works contend with shamanic practices in a rapidly changing world, and the confrontations between his characters reflect the clashes between an old way of life with a new one.

Shamanism in the Works of Kim Tongni

One of Kim’s best known colonial works and, for all practical purposes, the beginning of his literary career is Munyŏ-do [Portrait of a shaman, 1936]. This piece seems to have always been in Kim’s thoughts as he revised and expanded the work many times over his life, culminating with Urhwa [Urhwa] that was published in 1978. Kim believed this work to carry a motif matching the situation of the Korean people during the time it was written. The central theme of this work revolves on the conflict between shamanic and Christian beliefs.

Munyŏ-do is fashioned from the discord that arises when a shaman’s son, Ugi, returns home after
having converted to Christianity. The mother, Mohwa, cannot come to terms with her son’s conversion and his
dogged attempts to convert her. Neither Ugi nor Mohwa can stop trying to change the other’s beliefs.
Clearly to Mohwa, Ugi seemed as if he had been possessed by some evil spirit. Likewise, Ugi thought
that both women—Mohwa and Nangi (his half sister) were under the influence of a demon.
The conflict between the mother and son escalates after she burns his Bible and performs a rite to exorcise the
spirit—the Jesus-ghost (yesu kwisin)—that is plaguing him. The two fall into a physical struggle which
culminates with the mother stabbing her son with a knife, a wound that will eventually kill him.
Yet neither Christianity nor shamanism prevails in this oftentimes dark work. The son dies and the
mother eventually drowns trying to perform a last rite and reestablish the efficacy of her powers to the village
people. The finality of Munyŏ-do demonstrates the depth of the conflict between Christianity and shamanic
beliefs.

Kim also highlights the tremendous chasm between these two belief systems in his descriptions of the
mother and son. The dark and fetid description painted by Kim of Mohwa’s home reveals the decay that many
saw in shamanic beliefs,

The house was old and crumbling on one side; green fungi grew on the roof tiles and a fetid odor came
from the decaying earth. A stone wall, enclosing the house like an ancient fortress, was crumbling at
places. The large empty area inside was the house’s garden and always covered with bog moss; the
drains were blocked and within blackish rainwater grew goosefoot, foxtail and other nameless weeds
in a tangle the size of a person. In this were earthworms nearly as large as snakes and ancient toad-like
frogs, wriggling and only awaiting nightfall. The house truly looked like the lair of hobgoblins,
abandoned by humans decades or centuries earlier.

In contrast to the dank and rotted image of the shaman’s house are the Christians who were to take Ogi to
America with them. Their home is described as,

...a place of joyful hymn-singing, the sound of organ music, Bible-reading, gathering in prayer, and
mirthful laughter and smiling faces before delicious meals.

Kim vividly depicts the vitality of Christianity against the putridness of shamanism in these scenes. In this
manner he makes the obvious connection between the common perception of the day regarding the vigor of
Christianity and all that it represented and the negative light in which traditional shamanic and folk practice were
viewed.

The death and or failure of many of Kim’s shaman protagonists is also indicative of the decline that the
shamanic belief system suffered during the colonial period. Regardless of the official policy of the Chosŏn
dynasty regarding the suppression of shamanic rites and prohibitions on members of the upper status groups
from attending such rituals, shamanism did hold an extremely important place in the lives of the people. Aside
from being a space where women and men could find a degree of comfort with their fellow humans, shamanism
also provided explanations of the supernatural and events in their lives. Thus, we can see that shamanic beliefs
provided significant psychological support for people of all classes in Chosŏn.

Kim’s narratives often begin with a depiction of a shaman as a highly important component of a healthy
and well-functioning society. One such example is found in “Tanggogae mudang” [The shaman of Tanggogae, 1959]. While this short story was written after the colonial period, it is set in the 1930s and describes what can
be called the typical relationship between a successful shaman and her clientele,

As Tanggogae mudang (i.e., shaman) performed rites well and had a good voice, there was nobody in
the area that did not know her. Especially in the large village, everyone thought they had a special
bond or tie with her. This was due to the fact that each year she performed a village cleansing rite and
thus all felt a debt of gratitude to her. Of course if there was one who was ill or if some minor event of
discord arose, the people would habitually summon Tanggogae mudang and have her perform a
cleansing or other rite.

Yet, as this narrative unfolds, the shaman’s two daughters become high status kisaeng (female
entertainers) and wish their mother to stop engaging in what they see as an embarrassing and degrading
profession. They daughters go so far as to confine their mother to prevent her from performing rites for the
village and perhaps causing them to be objects of ridicule. The mother’s suicide at the close of the narrative
reflects a complete turnaround from the healthy depiction of the village seen in the above passage.

The onset of modernization resulted in many practitioners of shamanism to be devalued by both their
families and community members. Kim captures this fall quite well in the oftentimes tragic lives of his shaman
protagonists. His narratives also question the efficacy of shamanic rites and the ability of shamans to actually
perform good in the community, echoing the sentiments of those who condemned shamanism as backwards
superstitions. This questioning of shamanic ability is seen in “Tal iyagi” [The story of the moon, 1948] when a
shaman is asked why she cannot use her powers to find her dead son. Likewise, in Munyo-do, the value and usefulness of the shaman is brought into sharp relief.

Shamanism as Korean-ness

Much was lost by the Korean people in the colonial period, including not insignificantly cultural practices. And among the culture lost or devalued, shamanic and folk practices suffered the greatest. The attack on shamanic beliefs was twofold with Western ideas embodied in science and religion on one side and the Japanese colonial policies aimed at eradicating Korean culture on the other. It is no small wonder that shamanism and its adherents soon found very little space in which to practice their beliefs.

In the writings of Kim Tongni we find this discord well-depicted. His shaman protagonists are uniformly defeated by their families and communities that question the value of their contributions and worth of their belief system. Nowhere is the confrontation as vivid as in Munyo-do where the clash between Christianity and shamanism is highlighted in the mother-son dissonance. This chasm was one played out many, many times in early twentieth century Korea.

Kim captures the conflict in an atmosphere of losing a tradition. Shamanism was part of the harmonic human relations that governed village life in premodern Korea. Like the relationship described above in "Tanggogae mudang," shamans performed needed services for the people and existed in a symbiotic manner with their community. Life was built upon reciprocity and mutual help. Shamans were charged with the supernatural and thus provided psychological support and comfort for the people. However official society might have viewed their social status, in reality they were essential components in healthy societies. This is the Korean-ness represented by shamanic beliefs in Kim's works.

The initial harmony in Kim's stories is soon shattered by the disaccord between the in-place belief system and a changing society. Shamans are portrayed as individuals who cannot change and cope with a new society and are thus left behind. While such a dichotomy of the premodern harmony and utility of shamans and twentieth century discord and uselessness might be overly simplistic, it does demonstrate the great change that occurred to what we might term as "traditional" Korean culture in the colonial period. It is this transformation that is vividly depicted in Kim's works and is his attempt to preserve part of a fast-vanishing culture in his writings.

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Hyewŏl and Talmok
Two Koryŏ pilgrims in Yüan China

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1. Introduction

The notion that Korea has borrowed many aspects of its culture from China is widely accepted. The process of cultural borrowing from China is also viewed by most as a unidirectional one. The field of Buddhism makes no exception. Such a view, however, is too simplistic, and ignores the fact that when two different cultures come into contact, influences are necessarily reciprocal. While it is true that Korean Buddhism was transmitted from China, and continued to borrow from China in the course of time, it is also true that some important developments took place within Chinese Buddhism thanks to the work of Silla and Koryŏ monks in that country.

Going back to the Silla period, for instance, we find many monks that were active in Tang China, like Hyech'o, who wrote the diary of his travels to Western countries and spent the rest of his life in China, Sinbang, who was one of the most important monks in Xuanzang’s translation team, or Wŏnch’ŏk, who exerted no small influence on the development of the Faxiang school, his work having been translated even into Tibetan. During the Koryŏ period, the work of monks like Ch’egwan and Ui’t’ong gave no small a contribution to the development of the Tiantai School, the activities of National Preceptor Uich’ŏn helped the revival of the Huayan School in the Song, to quote just a few examples.

The influence Korean Buddhism exerted on Chinese Buddhism was by no means limited to the presence or the activities in China of a few great monks, but included the exchange of books, of ideas through correspondence, works of religious art like paintings and statues, the transmission of copies of the Buddhist canon, the stay of Chinese monks in Koryŏ for study reasons, and so on.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze an episode relating to the reparation of a collection of sūtras engraved on stone in the Small Western Paradise Huayan Hall, at Fangshan County, south of Beijing. The work was undertaken by two Koryŏ monks who were traveling on a pilgrimage to Mount Wutai in China during the Yüan dynasty. I shall try to verify the sectarian affiliation of the two monks, what political and religious background made their initiative possible, whether the work they undertook at Fangshan was casual or planned, whether the contents of the sūtras they engraved had any relation to their work, or to the main trends in Koryŏ Buddhism at the time. Finally, I shall try to understand the historical significance the initiative had as an episode in the activities of Koryŏ copist monks in Yüan China. As far as I know no specific study on this subject has been done to the present, notwithstanding its historical significance.

2. Koryŏ opens up its borders

Cultural contacts between the Korean Peninsula and China thrived during the Tang but became more difficult during the Southern Song due to the belligerent state of the country first against the Liao and then against the Jin. The Song were afraid that contacts with Koryŏ might turn as an advantage to their northern neighbors and therefore also religious exchange could take place only on a reduced scale compared to the Tang. The situation changed completely with the inception of the Yüan dynasty.

In fact, the breakdown of all frontiers that separated Koryŏ from the rest of the Eurasian continent opened a whole range of new possibilities to the Koryŏ Buddhist community. The aspirations of many a monk who dreamt of visiting China became a concrete possibility. In fact, any monk having the necessary financial means could realize such a dream.

Koryŏ Buddhist circles were laid open to all outside influence, which came through visits by Chinese monks, Tibetan monks who tried to propagate their version of Tantric Buddhism in Koryŏ, but also through the importation from China of books, sacred images and other paraphernalia.

Koryŏ pilgrims visited China by the hundreds, perhaps thousands, flocking to places that had been famous for centuries in Korea, some of them even to the extent of giving their name to places in Koryŏ, as it was the case with Mt. Wutai, called Odae in Korean, believed to be the abode of Mañjuśrī, the bodhisattva of wisdom.
Many monks from Koryŏ held lectures at the Yüan court and preached at the most important temples of the capital, like Hyeyŏng, Haewŏn, Hyegŏn, Pou, and some of them even became abbots of Chinese temples in Dadu, like Ûisŏn, Haewŏn, Pou, etc., to quote just some of the most eminent examples.

With time Koryŏ monks managed to found a great number of temples both in the Yüan capital and in the most important communication centers. These temples were patronized by Koryŏ communities in China, both the elite and the common people and answered to their religious needs.

Perhaps the first monks to visit Yüan China after the establishment of the "pax mongolica" were copist monks, sent to the Yüan court upon official request of the latter to copy entire sets of the sūtras in gold and silver on special paper. These requests were repeated in time due to the refined workmanship of Koryŏ copist monks who boasted a glorious tradition that went back to the Silla dynasty. The work of Koryŏ's amanuenses is believed to have exerted a strong influence on later developments in the handwriting tradition of the Buddhist canon in Yüan China.

3. A pilgrimage to Mount Wutai

From the inscription "Record of the reparation of the scriptures at Huayan Hall!", included in the Collection of Titles and Inscriptions of the Stone Sūtras at Fangshan, we learn the story of the monks Hyewŏl and Talmok, who set out to visit Mt. Wutai in order to revere and offer their prayers to Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. Besides the above collection, which has been used here as the basic reference, we kept into account also the text in the Shike Shiliao Xinbian, which includes the Jinshi cuibian weike kao, written by Lo Zhenyu. The text copied by Lo is also included in Chang Tong-ik’s Collected Records of Koryŏ Historical Materials of the Yüan Period, which introduced the inscription to a wider public of scholars in Korea.

Hyewŏl and Talmok set out to visit Mt. Wutai in the year 1341. But why among the many mountains of China did they choose Mt. Wutai? This mountain is widely known as the abode of Mañjuśrī. Now, Mañjuśrī occupies, together with Samantabhadra, a special place in the Tiantai and Huayan pantheons, and both these sects, but especially the Tiantai, were very popular in Koryŏ at the time. Besides, Mañjuśrī has enjoyed a prominent place in Korean Buddhist tradition in general since antiquity as we can gather also from the Samguk Yusa. This can help us to understand the great interest of the two monks in going on a pilgrimage to Mt. Wutai.

Mount Wutai was widely known since ancient times in China as the abode of Mañjuśrī. This tradition gained wide currency also in Silla, where a Mountain in Kangwŏn Province, Odae-san, was named after the Chinese mountain. References to it are contained in the Samguk Yusa, which dedicates to the subject several records, especially in the 3rd Book, and in the Biographies of Eminent Korean Monks, written by Kakhun.

In the “Fifty thousand real images of Mt. Odae”, Iryŏn refers that in 636, during the reign of Queen Sŏndŏk, priest Chajang went on a pilgrimage to China in order to visit Mt. Wutai and pay his respects to Mañjuśrī. According to the record, Chajang first went to Daihe Pond, where he prayed for seven days in front of a stone statue of the Bodhisattva. Suddenly, in a dream he saw a saint giving him a poem in four sentences, which he could well remember when he awoke. However, as the composition was in Sanscrit, he could not understand a word. At daybreak a monk came to him bearing a robe of red silk with gold decorations, a begging bowl and a bone relic and asked him why he was silent. Chajang answered explaining the dream he had had the previous night and his difficulty in understanding the meaning of the poem. The monk explained to Chajang that the first sentence meant “Understanding all the dharmas”, the second “Non-existence of the self-nature”, the third “Thus I understand the Buddha Nature”, and the last “Soon I shall encounter Locana”. The monk then gave to Chajang the robe and the other articles telling him “These objects were used by our master Śākyamuni. Keep them with care”. He then added “In your country, bordering Myongju, there is a mountain called Odae, where Ten Thousand Mañjuśrī Bodhisattvas permanently reside. Go there and meet them”. Having said so the monk disappeared.
Chajang examined the place where such visions occurred and made all preparations to go back home. Suddenly a dragon arose from Daihe Pond and asked him to offer services for seven days. Afterwards the dragon informed Chajang that the old monk who translated the Sanscrit poem to him was none other than Mañjuśrī, and asked to erect a temple and a stupa in his honour.

After his return to Silla, in 643 Chajang went to Mt. Odae hoping to have visions of Mañjuśrī. However, for three days it remained cloudy, so he went back without having had any visions. Some time later he moved to Wŏnyŏng Temple, where he had visions of the saint.

Chajang is credited with the foundation of Wŏlechŏng and Yŏnggam temples on Mount Odae. After Chajang, many other famous monks retired on Mount Odae, founded or rebuilt temples and started religious movements on the mountain. Among them were Pōmil’s disciple Tut’a Sinŭi, and two sons of King Sinmun (r. 681-691), Poch’ŏn and Hyo’myŏng. Hyo’myŏng was later crowned as king (Hyosŏ-wang, r.692-702), and actively sponsored religious activities on the Mountain. His successor, Queen Sŏngdŏk (r. 702-737), in 705 built Chinyaŏ-wŏn and travelled to the mountain together with the officials of the court, had a statue of Mañjuśrī made out of clay and placed in the main hall, and requested five monks, including Yŏngbyŏn, to hold indefinitely lectures on the Avatamsaka-sūtra. Funds were donated regularly and a Huayan Society was inaugurated under the patronage of the queen. Iryŏn further states that according to what people say, Mt. Odae is one of the most beautiful in Koryŏ and the Buddhist Law will prosper in that place.

Such a background helps us to understand how the tradition inaugurated (but most probably just revived) by Chajang on Mount Odae continued down to the Koryŏ period until Iryŏn’s time, and many monks and laymen from Korea must have always felt a profound desire to go on a pilgrimage to Mount Wutai in China.

Hyewŏl and Talmok were imbued with this tradition and the opening of the frontiers which followed the establishment of peace with the Mongols gave to monks like them, but certainly also to laymen, the opportunity to satisfy their much cherished wish to visit the famous Chinese mountain.

When Hyewŏl and Talmok set out to Mount Wutai in 1341, Shundi was emperor of the Yuan. He had crowned as Second Empress a Koryŏ lady, named Ki, who begot a son, Ayuushridar, chosen as crown prince. The Yuan court was crowded with Koryŏ ladies and eunuchs, besides regular court officials from Koryŏ who were posted in China. Especially after the crowning of Empress Ki, Koryŏ eunuchs gained much political and economic power at court. This enhanced position at the Yuan court was also reflected in the quality of their activities as Buddhist patrons.

Monks from Koryŏ came often, both officially and privately, to China to hold lectures at temples in the capital, to study under famous monks, to produce works of art under the patronage of the Yuan court, to found temples where people from Koryŏ could gather and attend religious services in their own language.

We do not know with certainty whether Hyewŏl and Talmok came directly from Koryŏ or had been living in China for some time. Judging from the fact that Talmok was a copist monk and the interest both he and Hyewŏl showed towards the inscriptions at Fangshan, we cannot exclude the possibility that they were part of some official delegation, possibly sojourning in the Yuan capital for quite some time in order to copy some collection of the Tripitaka. At any rate, the presence of so many of their brethren in China, especially at the capital, must have given them the necessary connections to embark on the pilgrimage.

On their trip to Mount Wutai, the two monks made a detour to visit the Small Western Paradise Huayan Hall on the Eastern Peak of Xixiang Village, Fangshan County. The Huayan Hall contained stone inscriptions of the Avatamsaka Sūtra and other scriptures, twelve in all.

The stone inscriptions at Fangshan had been carved starting in the Tang dynasty, when the monk Jingwan in 628 gathered a group of brethren and laymen and undertook the task of engraving the stone slabs wishing that the sacred texts could be preserved for eternity. He was convinced that 1500 years after the Buddha’s parinirvana, in the 2nd year of the Zhenguan era (628), the world had already entered the stage of the Decay of the Law 75 years since. Jingwan therefore gathered several of his disciples and laymen, established a
group of donors and started the enterprise of carving the canon on stone slabs. The activity of engraving stone scriptures at Fangshan continued also during the following dynasties, reaching its peak during the Liao (907-1125) and Jin (1125-1234) dynasties.

With the passing of time, however, due to the state of abandonment and to the carelessness of people, the temple had become at times temporary refuge for herdsmen and animals. Consequently, some of the stones had been severely damaged, many became corroded and unreadable, some were even totally destroyed and only the pedestals remained.

Hyewol was disturbed by the condition of the inscriptions and was deeply moved by Jingwan's purpose. He embraced therefore the idea of repairing them, but certainly did not have the financial means needed to start an enterprise of such a scale. He decided therefore to resort to his connections at the Yuan court to find economic support. He went back to Dadu and explained in detail the matter to the commissioner of the Empress Household Administration, Ko Yong-bo, and the commissioner for artisans Sin Tang-ju, who were both Koryo eunuchs in service at the Yuan court and asked for their support.

The two eunuchs donated 1,000 min to help in the repairation of the inscriptions. Besides them, other members of the court also supported the initiative, like the abbot of the monastery Siman, who heads the list of donors, the grand minister Essen Boge, the route commander Boge Temur, the route commander Li Wulan, the former superintendent Tumandir, the commissioner of the Empress Household Administration Bai Temur, a Lady of Wangtan, two monks from the West, Zhidi and Taerbao, and finally the Koryo Tiantai scribe Talmok, the superintendent of Gold and Jades Yi Tuk-chon and Yi Tuk.

The most important donors were the eunuchs Ko Yong-bo and Sin Tang-ju. Ko's biography is included in the Koryosa. He was very close to Empress Ki and her family in Koryo, siding with them even at the expense of the Koryo king. He was a very strong supporter of Buddhism, as he financed, together with the Prince of Chinnong, Kang Yung, the construction of the pagoda of Kyongch'on Temple, the reconstruction of Pogwang Temple in Chonju, and oversaw the construction of Changan Temple on Mt. Kumgang. During his last years he became a monk and retired at Haein Temple. He was, however, killed by Chong Chi-sang, a general sent by King Kongmin (r. 1351-1374) to punish him for his past deeds against the Koryo crown.

Sin Tang-ju was also a eunuch of Koryo origin and must have entered early the service of the Yuan court. In 1337 he was entrusted by Empress Budashiri with the reconstruction of Longquan Temple, in Dadu. He was also sent to Koryo the following year to represent Empress Budashiri at the inaugural ceremony of the reparation of Hunggyo-won, an annex to Hwangwang Temple. Besides this he helped, together with Cho Pun, in the construction and reparation of a Tiantai temple in the Mongol capital, the Fawang si, which had been originally rebuilt by another Koryo eunuch, Yi Sam-jin. On that occasion, Sin Tang-ju donated 7,000 in paper money.

We do not know much about route commanders Boge Temur and Li Wu-lan, but the person referred to as "former superintendent" Tumandir must be the same person quoted in the Yulanshi as having introduced Lady Ki, the future empress, to Emperor Shundi when she was still a lady-in-waiting at the Yuan court. His original name was probably Chong In and he started service at the Yuan court in 1300 at the age of eleven, soon becoming a favorite of Emperor Chengzong (r. 1294-1307), who sent him to study at the Daxue. He had a brilliant career and seems to have been close to Yi Kok, one of the foremost literati of later Koryo. Bai Temur probably was also a eunuch, and the Lady of Wangtan could possibly have been his wife. Likewise, the superintendent of Gold and Jade Yi Tuk-chon seems to have been a eunuch, judging from his post.

Information is scanty also concerning the two Koryo monks. From the inscription we can understand that Hyewol had the necessary contacts at the Yuan court, while Talmok was a copist monk. It is possible that both of them were on some official mission to China, of which Hyewol could have been the head. A mission to
China for the Yuan court must have given them ample opportunity to establish relations at the Yuan capital and also to organize trips outside of Dadu into the Chinese provincial areas.

Besides this, from the inscription we know that Talmok was a copist monk. He had participated to copist enterprises also back in Koryo, in the Tiantai temple, Posong-sa, on Ch‘onma-san. This is very interesting, as we may understand that the visit to Fangshan was not casual but planned. The two monks probably wished to visit the temple in order to admire a work of art such as the Buddhist canon engraved on stone, which must have been one of the marvels of the Buddhist world at the time.

Unfortunately, we do not know anything about Hyewol apart from what we learn from this inscription at Fangshan. What we understand for sure is that he must have been of very high standing for he had contacts with court eunuchs of the importance of Ko Yong-bo and Sin Tang-ju.

Thanks to their connections with Koryo officials at the Yuan court, the two monks were thus able not only to repair the damaged inscriptions of the Huayan Hall, but also to engrave two new sutras, the Śrīmālā-devi-simhanāda-Sūtra and the Maitreya Ascent Śūtra.

The Śrīmālā-devi belongs to the Yoraejang thought (Tatagatha Garbha) tradition. The work has been produced in South India in a Mahasanghika environment. The Śrīmālā-devi is an elegant exemplification of the basic tenets of the Buddhist religion and an indication to the laity of the way to be followed in practicing the way. In this sūtra the message of the Buddha is presented in such a way that it can be followed both by clerics and laics, without privileging the ones over the others. The Śrīmālā enhances the function of women within the Buddhist religion, represented as it is by the figure of Queen Śrīmālā, who is the most important of the actors. Scholars think that the sūtra has been always very popular, especially among women.

The transmission of the sūtra to Korea seems to have taken place in 576 and is attributed to priest Anhong [Samguk Sagí, Book 4, King Chinhung, 37 year], who donated it to the king together with the Lankāvaitāra Sūtra and other relics. The fact that Queen Śrīmālā plays a fundamental role in the sūtra, exalting the role of women in the Buddhist religion, is undoubtedly one of the reasons of its great popularity in Silla, where a few years after its introduction two queens, Sŏndok (632-646) and Chindok (647-653), ascended the throne. Their names before being canonized were Dongman and Sŏngman, a clear reference to the Śrīmālā-devi. The popularity of the sūtra is also evident from the number of commentaries written on it. We have the titles of Wŏnhyo’s Sŏngmangyŏng-so (2 books) and Toryun’s Sŏngmangyŏng-so (2 or 3 books), but the texts have long been lost.

In Koryo the Śrīmālā probably did not reach the popularity it enjoyed in the Silla period, as references to it in official chronicles and in the Tongmunson are almost lacking, but it seems reasonable to imagine that it managed to preserve a certain degree of popularity especially among women. Besides them, it must have been quite popular also among monks of the Tiantai, Huayan e Faxiang sects, as it was included in the study curriculum as one of the important texts in their various stages of doctrinal advancement.

The Maitreya Ascent Śūtra, whose complete title is Guan Mile Pusa Shangsheng Doushuaitian jing, is one of the texts of the set of the Six Maitreya Sūtras, together with the Maitreya Descent Sūtra and the Maitreya Reaches Buddhahood Sūtra, which are the most important. The sūtra describes the marvels of Tusita Heaven and stresses the fact that the monks who meditate on it will be reborn beside Maitreya. The sūtra describes also the circumstances of Maitreya’s relation to the Tusita Heaven and Maitreya’s good deeds. The Maitreya Ascent Śūtra has enjoyed great popularity with the monks of the Faxiang sect, as the figure of Maitreya is central to the Faxiang pantheon.

Unlike the Maitreya Ascent Śūtra, which is mainly directed to the small community of monks, the other Maitreya sūtras are directed to the laity in general and have a strong salvationist character. For this reason this last sūtra was very popular during the Three Kingdoms (57 B.C.-668 A.D.) and Unified Silla (668-918).
periods, and in China before the Tang dynasty, as we can ascertain from the sculptures at the Yungang and Longmen caves.

The engraving of the *Maitreya Ascent Sūtra* can be explained with the growing role played by the Faxiang sect both in Koryŏ and in China also thanks to the activities of copist monks. The first group of amanuenses, which was sent to China in 1292, in fact was headed by the Faxiang high priest Hyeông. In this period three Faxiang monks rose to the rank of National Preceptor, starting with Hyeông, and this gives a measure of the revival of the prestige of the sect. After Hyeông, Misu and Haewôn received such high honors, and especially Haewôn must have been very popular in China among the Koryô community, as he lived most of his life in the Yuan capital, becoming one of the reference points for the Koryô faithful who lived there.

On the one hand, while it is understandable that the figure of Maitreya, though not specifically as portrayed in the *Maitreya Ascent Sûtra*, is related to millenarian cults, the same cannot be said of the *Srimála*. On the other hand, however, upon close scrutiny of the text, one finds a short paragraph where the queen tells the Buddha: “Lord, at the time of decline of the Doctrine, when monks, nuns, male and female laymen quarrel with each other to break up into many sects, whatever good son of the family or good daughter of the family delighting in the Doctrine which is without deceit of falsehood, for the sake of maintaining the Illustrious Doctrine, creates a Bodhisattva group of those who have the Doctrine would certainly be the good son of the family or good daughter of the family to obtain a prophecy from all the Buddhas because of that activity”. From this passage we understand that maintaining the Illustrious Doctrine and forming a group of believers is a sure way to accrue glorious merit and better face the uncertainty of the times ahead.

From the above, we can see that almost all of the sponsors quoted in the inscription are Koryô people and the majority of them are eunuchs, which gives us an idea of how deeply-rooted was their belief in the Buddhist religion and how important a role they played in upholding Koryô religious traditions in Yuan China. Probably these Koryô eunuchs were also instrumental in enlarging the number of benefactors, which includes some court officials, probably of Koryô descent though they bear Mongol names, foreign monks and court ladies, as we can see from the inscription. Undoubtedly, besides the monastic community, also Koryô eunuchs in service at the Yuan court and the laity participated in such an atmosphere and were probably also aware of the existence of the literature on penance produced by Koryô religious circles.

In late Koryô the Faxiang sect came back to the front stage and played a very important role in the relations with the Yuan on the religious field, especially thanks to the activities of the copist monks, and this could account for some gain in popularity of the *Maitreya Ascent Sûtra* among a wider public of monks. At the same time, Koryô court women played a role much more conspicuous than at any time in the past in Koryô society thanks to their family relations, as many of them were married with important Yuan court officials or were in service at the Yuan court. Thanks to this they had also the financial means to patronize important Buddhist initiatives both in China and in their homeland, and this could help to understand the popularity enjoyed by the *Srimála* at this time.

We should not underrate the devotional aspect of the initiative, as expressly stated in the inscription itself. Hyewôl and Talmok held in high esteem the work of Jingwan, who gathered his disciples and laymen to engrave the sacred message of the Buddha so that it would not be destroyed in the confusion and degeneracy of the period of Decay of the Law. This is therefore one of the most important reasons which moved Hyewôl and Talmok to undertake such an enterprise. In fact, even in Koryô at the time people were convinced to live in a period of Decay of the Law. Consequently they were engaged in performing good deeds, celebrate rites of penance, making acts of faith of all kinds to reap enough merit in preparation for the end of the world.

Such a character is well reflected also in the religious literature of the time, like Hyeông's *Paegilhae*, Wôch'am's *Hyŏnhaeng Sŏbang-gyŏng*, Misu's *Descriptive Explanation of the Principles of Expiation in Mercy Rituals*, Mugi's *Sŏkka Yŏrae haengjoksong*, Chogu's *Expounded Collection of Commentaries on the Principles of Expiation in Mercy Rituals*, and so on. An important contribution to such a religious atmosphere was given.
undoubtedly by the long wars against the invading Mongol armies and the condition of political subordination of the country for about a century after the war. A side effect of the war was the continuous celebration of Tantric rites and the invocation of dharanis and mudras to keep the enemy away and the country safe. This trend saw its culmination in the re-editing and publication of the Buddhist canon in 1251, followed by the publication of a set of the Tantric canon in 1328. The continuous publication, both printed and hand-written, of copies of the canon might have been determined by the fear that, after such a long state of belligerence and the destruction of the Puin-sa canon, the transmission of the Buddhist Tripitaka could be jeopardized. The conviction to be living in a period of decay of the Law, the long war and the calamities that went with it contributed to the creation of an atmosphere and a sense of impotence on part of the single individual and the need of divine intervention to solve problems that were considered beyond human reach.

3. Hyewŏl and Talmok as copist monks

In order to fully understand the background of Hyewŏl and Talmok’s presence in Yuan China we must spend a few words about the tradition of which they were part. Korea, in fact, had a long amanuensis tradition, its production going back to the Silla dynasty. The oldest extant specimen is a copy of the Avatamsaka Sūtra of the Unified Silla Period (678-918). The Korean production must have been very popular also abroad since ancient times, for the Chin dynasty writer Wang Ji reports to have seen between the years 1190-’93 hand-written copies in silver characters of the entire canon and the Prajñāparamita Sūtra written in the years 946 and 952 respectively. The copies were preserved at Fanzhao Hermitage, Yi Prefecture, Liaodong Province.

A hand-written copy of the canon was also completed at Chikchi Temple before 1185, year in which a stone inscription was engraved to celebrate the event. The reason for this enterprise was to ask pardon to the Buddhist deities for the atrocities caused during the coup d’etat of 1170. Hand-written copies of the canon must have abounded in the country and many temples even had their own scriptoria. Such enterprises were sponsored by the state, court nobles, well-to-do commoners and the monastic community. A case in point is the three sets of the canon preserved at Pomun Society, on Kanghwa Island. They were respectively written in gold, silver and ink. The last copy, which had been patronized by prime minister Hŏ P’yŏng and his wife, Lady Yŏm, was donated to the Chinese monk Shaoqiong in 1304 upon request of the latter.

Many hand-written copies of the canon must also have been taken away as boot by the invading Mongol armies. As soon as peace was established in 1258, one of the first acts of the ruling Mongol empire in the religious field was the institution in 1272 of the Office of Inlaid Lacquer Boxes (Chŏnham Chosŏng Togam) to oversee the production of lacquer boxes where sūtras were stored and sent to the Yuan court as part of the tribute. Soon afterwards, in 1273, the Yuan reaffirmed their commitment to the Buddhist religion by establishing the Board for Temple Construction (Sawŏn Chosŏng Pyŏlgam), perhaps to rebuild and repair temples that had been destroyed during the war.

The establishment of the Office of Inlaid Lacquer Boxes in 1272 makes us think that shipment of hand-written copies of the canon to the Yuan must have taken place starting a few years before that date. We have now specimens of hand-written sūtras sponsored by the court that date to the years 1275, 1278, 1284, 1325, etc. References in the Koryŏsa to other editions sent to the Yuan court abound. At times the Yuan court sent emissaries to check the quality of the work, as in 1290, 1310 and 1348.

Groups of copist monks were also sent to the Yuan court to copy sets of the sūtras in the capital of the Mongol empire as in 1290, when a group of 100 monks headed by the Faxiang high priest Hyeŏng went to Dadu and stayed there for about two years. Another group was sent in 1297 upon request from the Yuan court, which sent an emissary for the purpose, in 1302 and 1305. The Koryŏsa does not mention any more dispatches, but they must have taken place quite regularly. The presence in China of a copist monk such as Talmok is an indication to this effect, as he was most certainly part of a copist team sent to Yuan China as many had been in the past.

The Mongols’ conversion to the Buddhist faith came quite late, though it seems reasonable to suppose that their familiarity with the Buddhist religion must have dated back several centuries, due to their frequent
contacts with the Liao (907-1122), Song (960-1279), Xixia (982-1227) and Jin (1115-1234). Their adoption of Buddhism in its Tibetan version as the state religion, must have taken place around the year 1260, when Qubilai (r.1260-'94) put 'Phags-pa (1235-'80) at the head of all the Buddhist clergy and named him National Preceptor.

As supreme rulers of a multinational empire, the Mongol khans tried to strike a balance among the different religions, in order to gain the support of their subjects. This is the reason why, to a certain extent, Buddhism coexisted with Taoism, Confucianism, Islam, Nestorianism, Catholicism and Judaism in the Yuan dominion.

The Mongols, as a minuscule number of people were at the head of very populated countries like China and in control of a vast expanse of territories and foreign cultures. As a consequence, they must have felt their rule somewhat precarious depending, as it was, mainly on the use of military force and the ability of their commanders. On the spiritual level, therefore, they must have felt the need to ingratiate all possible divinities, and Buddhism was no exception. Religious functions were regularly performed at major Koryo temples to celebrate imperial birthdays and to wish the well being, long life and prosperity of both the Yuan emperors and their families.

For this reason the Yuan imperial family patronized all kinds of Buddhist activities, like the construction of temples, the erection of stupas, the fusion of bells and statues, the painting of sacred images, the publication of as many editions of the canon as possible, and so on. The activities of Koryo copist monks must be understood in this light. The regular requests of hand-written copies of the canon that came from the Yuan must have given a great impulse to this kind of religious activity in Koryo. On the other side, the activities of Koryo copist monks in China and the propagation of hand-written copies of the Koryo canon must have given great impulse to the production of hand-written versions of the Buddhist canon in the Uighur, Mongolian and Manchu languages, as we can infer from the Yiannshi.

Only if we consider such a background we can understand the reason and the scope of the presence in China of these two Koryo monks. Only if we think of them as copist monks we can explain their deep concern in the state of ruin of Fangshan's stone inscriptions and their ability to restore them.

5. Conclusion

We have seen above how two Koryo monks started on a journey to Wutai Shan during the Yuan dynasty and, on the way made a detour to Fangshas, undertaking the reparation of the stone inscriptions at the Western Paradise Huayan Hall before continuing their trip to the sacred mountain. We have also analyzed the international political conditions that made their trip possible, the reasons behind their stay in China and their connections with the Yuan court.

One important thing to note here is the fact that Hyewol was able to gather so much economic assistance to realize his purpose of restoring the stone inscriptions. This was made possible by the particular conditions of the time, as Koryo officials, court ladies and eunuchs were in service at the Yuan court due to Koryo’s condition of subordination to the Mongol empire.

The visit to China by Hyewol and Talmok and their stay there were facilitated by their being part of an official amanuenses’ mission to the Yuan capital. The reproduction of copies of the canon was one of the most conspicuous manifestations of Buddhist faith at a time when people were convinced to be living in a period of Decay of the Dharma, and such an atmosphere is well reflected in the Buddhist publications of the time, besides Buddhist functions and other acts of faith.

On the one hand, while we are sure that Talmok was a Tiantai monk and a scribe, concerning Hyewol we can only surmise that he was a high-ranking monk, but we have no means to ascertain his sectarian affiliation.

Probably the two monks were part of a much larger group of which Hyewol must have been the head, or one of the most important members, and Talmok one of the assistants doing the real work. Their stay at the Yuan capital could have been the pre-condition for them to organize their journey to Mt. Wutai. Their pilgrimage gives us a glimpse of the importance of the cult of Matlusir in Korea and its relation to Odae-san, in Kangwon Province. At the same time, we can understand how strong was the craving people had in Koryo to see the original Wutai Mountain in China, the place where the Silla priest Chajang had had the visions of Matlusir, which had become very popular especially among the monastic community also thanks to the publication of the Samguk Yusa.

This short chapter in the relations between the two countries has its historical meaning in that it shows to us that Koryo people in China had great freedom of movement, and it is also to be understood as part of the
religious relations that encompassed the activities of Koryo copist monks in Yuan China. At the same time it is one of the examples of collaboration between monks and Koryo eunuchs in service at the Yuan court. Eunuchs had a very strong tradition as patrons of the sangha and also this time they played a decisive role in gathering the finances necessary to fund the initiative.

We believe that the presence in China of the two monks can and should be understood in this historical context. We can draw this conclusion from the fact that Talmok was a copist monk and from the interest both of them took in the reparation of the inscriptions at Fangshan. Not only they took great care in the reparation of the stone inscriptions, which they did by rallying the support of Koryo court eunuchs and other monks, but they also engraved two new sūtras, the *Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā* and the *Maitreya Ascent Sūtra*, in order to link for ever their names to the great and centuries old Fangshan tradition of engraving the Buddhist canon. By doing this, they appropriated the vow of the Tang monk Jingwan to perpetuate the message of the Buddha in a period of decay of the Law.

Such religious activity is perfectly in line with the trends in Koryo Buddhism at the time. Convinced as people were to be living in a period of Decay of the Dharma, salvation by divine intervention became for most people the only hope of redemption. Accordingly, the publication of books that stressed the need of repentance, of acts of charity, accumulation of good deeds, calling the name of the Buddha Amitabha, the fusion of Buddhist statues and painting of sacred images, the copy of the sūtras, and so on, received great momentum.

| Anhong | 安弘 |
| Ayuushidar | 愛猷識理達觀 |
| Bai Temür | 伯帖木兒 |
| Bai Temür | 伯帖木兒 |
| Böqe Temür | 不花帖木兒 |
| Chajang | 禦藏 |
| Changan Temple | 長安寺 |
| Chegwan | 趕觀 |
| Chengzong | 成宗 |
| Chikchi Temple | 直指寺 |
| Chindok | 至德 (勝曼) |
| Chinhung | 至興 |
| Chinnyong, Prince of | 景寧府院君 |
| Chinyo-won | 景如院 |
| Cho Pun | 趙芬 |
| Chong Chi-sang | 鄭之祥 |
| Chong In | 鄭仁 |
| Chonham Chosong Togam | 券函造成都監 |
| Chonju | 金州 |
| Ch’onma-san | 天馬山 |
| Ch’ungmok | 忠穆王 |
| Ch’ungnyŏl | 忠烈王 |
| Ch’ungsŏn | 忠宣王 |
| Ch’ungsu | 忠肃王 |
| Dadu | 大都 |
| Daihe Pond | 大和池 |
| Empress Ki | 奇皇后 |
| Essen Böge | 也先不花 |
| Fangshan County | 房山縣 |
| Fanzhao Hermitage | 返照巖 |
| Fawang si | 法王寺 |
| Faxiang | 法相 |
| Haein Temple | 壽印寺 |
| Haewŏn | 海園 |
Ho P’yŏng 話評
Huayan 華嚴
Hŏnggyo-wŏn 興敎院
Hŏngwang Temple 興王寺
Hyecho 慧超
Hyegun 惠勤
Hyewol 慧月
Hyeyŏng 惠永
Hyomyŏng 孝明
Iryŏn 一然
Jin 金
Jingwan 貞璜
Kang Yung 姜融
Kanghwa Island 江華島
Kangwŏn Province 江原道
Ko Yong-bo 高龍普
Kojong 高宗
Kongmin 恭愍王
Koryŏ 高麗
Koryŏsa 高麗史
Kŭmgang Mountain 金剛山
Kyŏngch’ŏn Temple 敬天寺
Lady of Wangtan 王丹夫人
Lady Yŏm 廉氏夫人
Li Wulan 李五蘭
Liao 遼
Liaodong Province 遼東省
Longmen 龍門
Longquan Temple 龍泉寺
Misu 歸授
Mount Wutai (Odæ-san) 五台山
Myŏngju 漢州
Poch’ŏn 貝川
Pogwang Temple 普光寺
Pŏmil 梵日
Pomun Society 普門寺
Posŏng-sa 寶成寺
Pou 普愚
Puin-sa 符仁寺
Qubilay 忽必烈
Samguk Sagi 三國史記
Samguk Yusa 三國遺事
Sawŏn Chosŏng Pyŏlgam 寺院造成別監
Shaoqiong 紹瓊
Shundi 順帝
Silpa 新羅
Siman 斯滿
Sin Tang-ju 申黨住
Sinbang 神昉
Sinmun 神文王
Small Western Paradise Huayan Hall 小西天
Sŏndŏk 蒼德(偽曼)
Song 宋
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The Naebang Gasa Revisited: Yangban Women's Discourse As A Means for the Confirmation of Self-identity

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D. The Socio-Cultural Background of the Flourish of the Naebang Gasa ("inner-room gasa")

With some disputes on its formation, name, regional distribution, the naebang gasa or "inner-room gasa" is widely believed to be a poetic form which was mainly composed by anonymous yangban women of Yongnam Province and flourished in the late Choson period. This study begins with going over the socio-cultural background of the flourish of the naebang gasa. The clue can be found by examining some phases of the changes in the late Choson period.

For various reasons, the social ranking system was destabilized in the late Choson period and yangbans or the ruling class began to feel a sense of crisis in maintaining their social status and already-acquired privileges. It was, therefore, needed for the ruling class to strengthen the Confucian practical ethic of personal autonomy and responsibility, distribute and infuse commoners with it in order to facilitate their governing act and overcome the critical situation. It is one of their reactions to cope with the situation to inspire gamun uisik ("a sense of family") or hyultong uisik ("a sense of blood") into the hearts of family members. The yollyo chon ("Biographies of Faithful Women") and the gamun sosol ("Family Saga") by yangban male literati and the naebang gasa by yangban women, all of which came out with a large quantity in this period, should be understood under this historical context.

As another socio-cultural background, the rise of "individualism" should be considered. After experiencing two major wars against Japan and China, neo-confucianism, which had placed more weight on community than the individual, began to reveal its limits. These historical events, followed by the efflorescence of shirak sasang, became impetus for the awakening of self-identity of the individual. When, compared to the case of men, the self-discovery of women is slow and weak of strength, but the stream of the dramatic change of society was strong enough to infiltrate even the deep inner rooms of the yangban women of the Yongnam Province. Certainly, this social trend can be said to become an impetus to awaken women's self-consciousness as well as men's.

In brief, the naebang gasa should be understood as a literary product of the interaction of the two socio-cultural factors.

D. The Categorization of the Naebang Gasa

It is common to naebang gasa researchers to classify the extant 5000 poems into three groups according to their main themes: the gyanyo ga ("song of admonition"), the jatan ga ("song of lament"), and the hwajon ga ("song of an outing for flower-viewing"). Of these, the last one is a slight variation on the second in terms of there being nothing different other than the shift of the main background of composition from naebang, that is, inner room of a household, to outside where they go out for flower-viewing. On this basis, the present study works with first two categories.

The first thing to be considered in understanding the naebang gasa is that even though in most cases, it was composed by an unidentified female poet and sometimes it assumes the form of a joint-composition or a communal production, it constitutes one of the rare cases of women's discourse in the late Choson period. As well known, throughout the Choson period, to be silent and self-effacing were considered womanly virtues. It is apparent from a multitude of proverbs concerning the interrelatedness of women and speech that women of few
words were conceived virtuous and reserved. Given that literature is the most effective means for self-expression, it should not be overlooked that under the Confucian ethos, women, notably the very women of Yongnam Province, opened their mouths and started voicing their inner thoughts, opinions, and emotions.

As male-centered Confucian creeds such as *samjong jido* ("the three tenets of obedience for women") and *namjon yobi* ("elevation of man and subjection of woman") reveal, a women's life in the Choson period was a series of hardships. However, after having led dozens of difficult years in which they had been expected to be little more than servants, they could accomplish their entry into a powerful position, that is, a substantial matriarch of the household, who was served as a mother by her children and could take over the financial power of the household.

In light of women's life pattern above, we can characterize the *gyenyo-ga* as "the song of 'I' as a mother" who successfully has completed her entry into the position of a matriarch, and the *jatan ga* as "the song of 'I' as a woman" who, in a sense, has failed to carry out the task.

1. The Song of 'I' as a Mother: The *Gyenyo ga*

As the word "*gyenyo,*" which literally means "to admonish daughters," implies, the main contents of the *gyenyo ga* are admonitions addressed to daughters facing marriage by mothers. The *gyenyo ga,* numerically the largest, are formulaic in content. The *gyenyo ga* usually include the eleven prescriptive items along with the prefatory and closing verses, which function as a manual of exemplary behavior for a young bride: how to serve her husband, how to fulfill her filial duty to her parents-in-law, how to perform ancestral worship, how to raise and educate her children, and how to deal with servants, etc., most of which were related to Confucian creeds to force women to obey.

From the background in which a mother, a successful matriarch of the household, composed it for her daughter facing marriage, some literary characteristics of the *gyenyo ga* were derived.

First of all, since the *gyenyo ga* presupposes a vertical relationship of a mother—the poetic speaker—and a daughter—the poetic listener—the voice of the text naturally assumes an authoritative tone. It is for this reason that there are a lot of imperative sentences in *gyenyo ga* texts.

Secondly, with a brief glance we can readily find that many of the sentences of this type of *naebang gasa* texts are written in an epistolary and dialogic style. These stylistic characteristics are intimately related with "the mother speaker – daughter listener pattern."

Thirdly, since the *gyenyo ga* assume the form of an instruction on how the daughter must conduct herself in her new home, this type of texts mostly comprise future-oriented contents.

The literary devices above are well illustrated in the passage below:

Listen, my dear child,  
Tomorrow is the day of your leave-taking.  
Leaving your parent's home,  
You will be entering your husband's.  
...  
As I send you off out the gate,  
I have much advice to give you.

This is a typical and standard beginning of the *gyenyo ga,* and this passage is followed by detailed instructions on the bride's new life in her husband's home.

When the *gyenyo ga* can be defined as 'the song of 'I' as a mother,' the two elements of "I" and "mother" constitute the essential points of that. We, however, come to find that in most of the *gyenyo ga,* descriptions of the role of "a mother" are maximized and those of the self-consciousness of "I" as an individual are minimized. We, thus, can redefine this type as "the song of the role" based on the *gaman uisik.*

2. The Song of 'I' as a Woman: The *Jatan ga*

As "*jatan,*" which literally means "lament by herself," implies, the contents of this type of *naebang gasa* comprise a woman's grieving about her misfortune and adverse circumstances that had continued throughout her life. Most of the *jatan ga* were composed by comparatively young women, who had failed to construct her own "uterine family" to successfully stand upright on the center and who were retrospecting her life and present adverse situations. According to a research, the contents of the lament are divided into two kinds: the lament of "a mother" are maximized and those of the self-consciousness of "I" as an individual are minimized. We, thus, can redefine this type as "the song of the role" based on the *gaman uisik.*
For what wrongs committed in our previous life,
Are we born a woman in this?

Though all things between heaven and earth undergo changes,
Unchangeable is my fate,
The life of loneliness in an empty room.

The jatan ga were mostly composed for the self-consolation of ill-fated women to the extent that the addressees of the text are usually poetic speakers themselves or other companion women who were placed in a similar situation. In other words, the relationship of the addressee and the addressee is horizontal. Accordingly, the speaker’s voice tends to be more monologic and less authoritative, imposing, and outspoken than the gyenyo ga’s.

Furthermore, we come to find that this characteristics of the speaker’s voice affects the sentence mode of the jatan ga texts; there are much more exclamatory sentences and interrogative sentences in this type of the naebang gasa than in the case of the gyenyo ga whose sentences mostly are comprised of the assertive and imperative modes.

Another literary mark derived from the composition situation of the jatan ga we have to note, is its past-oriented contents. Since most of the texts were composed on the basis of her retrospection of her life from the past up to the present, her past experiences, notably bitter experiences, comprise most of the contents.

A simple examination so far reveals that the jatan ga are the records of a woman herself as an individual who laments her misfortune and adverse circumstances, not those of someone as a role figure in a family or a community. In other words, in the jatan ga, descriptions of self-consciousness are maximized and those of a role figure in a family are minimized.

Thus, we may conclude that if the gyenyo ga is the song of a role, the jatan ga is that of a female individual.

□. Conclusions:

This study began with examining two factors—the rise of individualism and the strengthening of a sense of family in the late Choson period—as the historical and socio-cultural backgrounds of the flourish of the naebang gasa. Indeed, it can be said that the naebang gasa is a literary product of the interaction of the two factors. Furthermore, the naebang gasa can be defined as a yangban women’s discourse which constitutes an effective means for the confirmation of self-identity in the late Choson period.

The gyenyo ga and the jatan ga, two subtypes of the naebang gasa, differ from each other in that the focus of the former is given to foreground the role of mother and that of the latter is given to display the laments of an individual woman. Going a little further, we can say that, of the two factors, the former which has greater affinity with “a sense of family” and the latter with “the rise of individualism.” All in all, the two kinds of women’s voices are likened to the two sides of the same coin.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In the last ten years, Korean collections and support networks across North America have greatly strengthened through the consortium program with the financial support of the Korea Foundation (KF). This paper focuses on the Korean Collections Consortium of North America (KCCNA), with an emphasis on its activities and achievements, and discusses possible concerns with suggestions for improvement in the future. As a case study, it will also describe the collection and library services in the C.V. Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University. The aim is to provide valuable insight as to how the Consortium member libraries work together to develop the Korean collections regardless of their geographic location. This information is particularly helpful to libraries with limited access to Korean materials, seeking for a cooperative collection development.

1. Korean studies and Korean collections in North America

The growth of Korean Studies and Korean library collections in North America has developed concurrently with one another in North America. Interest in Korean studies in the United States began and developed after the Korean War. Prior to the War, Korea as a subject was taught by a Japanese and Chinese specialists in the East Asian Studies Department. Launched by the America's army special training program in the 1950s, the Korean language program initially met a practical need for Korean language skills during the War. This interest in Korea, however, gradually grew into a field of study that included Korean history and culture, and other Korea-related classes outside of language began to appear at several universities. From 1960 through the 1980s there was a steady increase in Korean studies in the U.S.; a more expansive increase in Korean studies in many institutions in North America commenced with the establishment of the Korea Foundation in 1991 43, and presently there are more than 100 institutions offering Korean studies in North America.44

Before 1950, there were no Korean collections in the region and no academic libraries were acquiring Korean language materials. However, with the growth of Korean studies programs, collections of Korean language materials slowly accrued in some institutions, starting with the Library of Congress in the 1950s and followed by the Harvard Yenching Library, University of California at Berkeley, University of Washington, University of Hawaii, and Columbia University.45 Spurred by the increased interest in Korean studies and by demand for materials to support the programs, the number of Korean language materials acquired by academic libraries in the U.S. has grown rapidly since the 1990s. In response to the growth of Korean communities, public libraries have also collected Korean language materials to satisfy the need of their community and three public libraries, particularly, the Seattle Public Library, the Los Angeles Public Library and Queens Borough Public Library in New York are actively expanding their Korean collections. As of June 2004, there are approximately 52 libraries that hold a total of 1,026,876 volumes of Korean language materials in North America.46


45 Choe, see note 1.

2. History of the Consortium

2.1 Establishment of the Consortium

Since the number of scholars and students in the Korean studies programs have increased considerably in many institutions, there has been a large increase in the demand and expectation for a comprehensive collection of Korean language materials. However, because of the small acquisitions budget that most Korean collections receive from their base institutions, it has not been possible for each institution to have a collection that is comprehensive enough for all their research on Korea. Furthermore, there has been a considerable amount of duplication, because many libraries have focused on acquiring essential materials of the field.

To solve this problem, Yoon-whan Choe, Korean studies librarian at the University of Washington, proposed a cooperative collection development program for Korean language materials at the Conference on "Enhancing Korean Studies: Scholarship and Libraries", held at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. in October 1992. Consequently, representatives of the KF and Six Korean librarians with the most developed Korean studies programs and Korean collections met to organize a cooperative collection program. As a result of this meeting, the idea to form a consortium arose to further develop Korean collections in North America and to allow students and scholars conducting research on Korea greater access to a wider amount of Korean language materials.

The Consortium's purpose was to build a comprehensive collection in North America, strengthening under-developed areas of the Korean collection while avoiding duplicates between the individual collections. The KF selected the six founding member libraries based on the following criteria: 1) the affiliated Korean studies program; 2) collection size; 3) the parent institution's willingness and ability to sustain and develop its Korean collection; and 4) availability of a professional librarian solely dedicated to Korean language materials. The founding member institutions were Columbia University, Harvard University, University of California, Berkeley, University of Hawaii, University of Southern California, and University of Washington. As a result of this effort, the Korean Collections Consortium of North America, initiated and supported by KF for a five-year grant, was founded in 1994 with the goals of establishing a comprehensive collection that covers a variety of subjects for Korean studies scholars and students; preventing the purchase of duplicate materials at member libraries; and sharing the resources freely to support the entire Korean studies community nationwide.

Since its establishment, four more libraries, the University of Chicago, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Toronto (Canada), and University of Michigan, joined the Consortium in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2003, respectively. Currently, the KCCNA consists of ten members.

2.2 Grant Agreements and member libraries' assigned subject areas

With the initial grant, the Consortium's plan consisted of ways to improve its current situation. An agreement was reached among the KF and six founding members and the details of the Consortium Agreement is as follows:

The KF agreed to provide each member library five years of support, from 1994 to 1998, in the amount of US $20,000.00 per year. Following the economic difficulties of the IMF in 1997, however, the funding for the final period of the agreement (1998-99) was modified for two years, and each member library received US $10,000.00 each year.

Each library was responsible for maintaining and/or increasing their budgets for their Korean collections from its own university to complement the funding by KF. The universities also supplied the appropriate personnel to organize the Korean collections.

Each member library was given a specialized area of study in which to collect materials. The subjects were decided on by considering the following criteria: 1) the fields of research in each institution's Korean studies program; 2) the characteristics of each member libraries' current holdings; 3) the academic sphere of

expertise of each institution; 4) the surrounding environments of the institutions; and 5) the cultural, scholarly, and regional characteristics of each institution. The goals were to guarantee the acquisition of at least one copy of each Korean publication important to research and prevent duplication. Therefore, the existing collections would be able to more effectively fill research gaps.48

Member institutions and their designated subject areas are as follows:

1) Columbia University
   - Publications on/about Kyonggi-do and Seoul
   - Korean history, 1861-1945
   - Performing and fine arts
   - Popular culture
   - Publications on Korea published in the New York area

2) Harvard University
   - Publications on/about Ch'ungch'ong-do
   - Business history
   - Law
   - Publications on Korea published in the Boston area

3) University of California, Berkeley
   - Publication on/about Kangwon-do
   - English language materials
   - Government publications
   - Modern Korean history, 1945-
   - Transportation & traffic
   - Publications on Korea published in the Bay area

4) University of California, Los Angeles
   - Archaeology
   - Buddhism
   - Christianity
   - Folklore
   - Library and information science
   - Publications on Korea published in South East and Mountain area

5) University of Chicago
   - Education
   - Environmental studies
   - International relations
   - Korean culture and history in China
   - Korean industry
   - Welfare studies
   - Publications on Korea published in Chicago area

6) University of Hawaii
   - Publication on/about Cheju-do
   - Architecture & urban planning
   - Foreign language materials
   - Modern social condition
   - Traditional music
   - Publications on Korea published in the Hawaii area

7) University of Michigan
   - Auto industry

48 Kim, see note 5.
• Historiography
• Human rights and student movement
• Immigration and emigration
• Korean unification
• Koreans in Japan
• Labor relations
• Publications on Korea published in Detroit and Mid West area

8) University of Southern California
• Publication on/about Cholla-do
• Cinema
• Journalism & mass media
• Linguistics
• Publications on Korea published in Southern California area

9) University of Toronto
• Korean intellectual history
• Korean literary fiction and essays
• Local and regional government
• Military science and history
• Publications on Korea published in Canada

10) University of Washington
• Publication on/about Kyongsang-do
• Microfilm collection of Korean newspapers
• Modern Korean poetry
• Women's studies
• Publications on Korea published in Pacific Northwest area

Each member library was restricted to and responsible for collecting materials in their specialized subject fields and the KF grant was only used to purchase materials within the members’ specialized subject fields. These materials were cataloged not only in each member’s individual local database, but in national databases, such as the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC) and Research Libraries Information Network (RLIN), which allow scholars and students free access to the materials through ILL. The member libraries provided an annual report each year to the KF describing the consortium activities carried out with the KF grant.

2.3 Renewal of the grant

It was agreed earlier that the KF would evaluate the results at the end of the five year funding period and discuss the possibility of a renewed contract. After the first five-year term (1994/5-1998/9), the results of this program proved so successful that the grant was renewed for another five years in 1999 (1999/0-2004/5). Since its inception in 1994, the Consortium’s contributions have resulted in: 1) the enhanced quantity and quality of Korean collections in North America; 2) the obtainment of secure personnel support for collection responsibilities; and 3) the sharing of resources via ILL nationally as well as internationally. The Consortium has also been able to perform extremely valuable functions, such as providing consultation services to small/medium libraries, and fostered ongoing, regular communication between the Korean studies librarians.

3. Activities and achievements of the Consortium

As shown in the previous section, the Consortium has matured and changed since its inception. The first five years were devoted to start-up activities such as identifying and collecting their assigned resources, obtaining personnel for the collections, etc. After two five-year terms, there is now a better understanding of the consequences, both positive and negative, of maintaining and sharing a large Korean collection. The Consortium has achieved significant successes in its mission, and these are outlined below.

3.1 Growth of Korean collections in North America

There is no doubt that Korean collections in North America have annually experienced noteworthy quantitative growth during the grant periods. According to the Journal of East Asian Libraries, the total holdings
of all the Korean collections combined have increased from 581,427 volumes to 1,026,876 volumes from 1994 to 2004, which is an increase of 77%. Comparatively, Chinese and Japanese collections show an increase of 17% and 12% respectively. Since the Consortium member libraries' Korean collections make up 58% of the entire Korean collection in North America, the considerable increase in the Korean collection, compared to the growth rate of Chinese and Japanese collections during the same period, can be viewed as a result of the Consortium's concerted efforts to fully utilize and implement the purchasing power allowed by the grant. In other words, the grant contributed to the overall increase in Korean collection holdings in North America.

It can be also said that the Consortium has anticipated and is abreast of the trends and changes in current research topics and has already proceeded in collecting under-represented subject areas. Fields such as religion, women's studies, and popular culture that have not been explored in the past are now heavily researched subjects. The Consortium has and continues to broaden their specialized areas while meeting these new needs; and Consortiums' efforts to match the trends show the growth and strength of the Consortium in the field of the Korean studies.

3.2 Accessibility of the Korean collections

Cataloging is to organize materials in order to make it readily available to library users and without cataloging, library patrons can not find materials nor borrow the Korean materials through ILL. Since it is futile to possess materials but not the means to provide them to our clients, Consortium members have placed high priority on properly cataloging materials purchased by the KF grant.

By member libraries' cooperative effort, the Korean materials acquired with the KF funding have been promptly and accurately processed for cataloging in each member's local database as well as in the two national databases, OCLC and RLIN, which facilitate ILL and reference services. Although most of the materials are specialized and unique, requiring original cataloging, over 92% of new materials acquired by the KF grant were cataloged within the fiscal year, according to their annual reports to KF. The Korean cataloging records in both OCLC and RLIN from 1994 to 2004 have more than doubled during the ten years of the Consortium's existence and as of January 2005, the OCLC consisted of 225,127 Korean records, and the RLIN contained 246,082 Korean records.

Because such a large number of Korean records have been added to the databases during the grant period, more records of Korean materials are now available on OCLC and RLIN. Consequently, cataloged materials by member libraries have been a great help to the small/medium non-member libraries that are establishing their Korean collections as well as cataloguing their materials.

3.3 Sharing resources via ILL

ILL is the most established and reliable of the resource sharing operations in North America. One of the Consortium's initial goals was free access to the materials acquired with the KF grant, via ILL, and this agreement has been implemented in the member libraries.

Sharing resources through ILL has gradually increased within North America, although there is insufficient data to evaluate the Consortium's contribution to the ILL service. The Korean collections have also been circulated through other regional interlibrary borrowing systems, such as Borrowdirect in the East Coast and Melvyl in the West Coast. Furthermore, scholars and students from nearby institutions which are mostly non-member libraries often visit and borrow the Korean collection directly from the member libraries. There are

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51 Hisako Kotaka, Email to author, May 20 2005

52 Karen Smith-Yoshimura, Email to author, May 20 2005
no available data monitoring the usage of the latter two. However, observation by Consortium libraries' personnel has noted the increase in both cases.

The Consortium has also provided services that are immeasurable by standard means. For example, non-book format materials, such as videos, DVDs and microfilms, which are not normally loaned out, have also been frequently made available through ILL nationally and internationally as a benefit of the collaboration of the Korean Consortium.

3.4 Library budgets and staffing for Korean collections

One stipulation of the Consortium's agreements required that member institutions that received funding must also report an increase in funding from their base universities. The condition agreed upon between the universities and KF in the establishment of the Consortium have been fulfilled, and as a result there is now an overall budget increase for Korean collections across North America. Consortium members' annual reports have reported that their annual budgets had increase by an average of $15,000.\textsuperscript{53} Although there has been a steady increase in university funding, what is most important to the Consortium's success is continued financial support by both KF and universities on a permanent basis for the Korean collections.

As agreed with KF, a substantial number of competent and efficient personnel has been added to the staffs of member libraries during the grant periods. Total staffing for Korean collections at the member libraries was reported to be 33.44 full-time employees (FTE) in 2004, which is a 59% increase from 20.91 FTE in 1994.\textsuperscript{54} A positive effect can be seen in the timely and efficient manner in which materials acquired with the grant are processed and cataloged, particularly within the last five years. Indirectly associated but still relevant is the increase in attendance of librarians at every annual meeting of the Committee of Korean Materials (CKM) of the Council on East Asian Libraries (CEAL).

3.5 Reaching small/medium Korean collections of non-member libraries

The establishment of the Consortium and its activities has reached out to smaller libraries through various channels: 1) Small/medium libraries have access to records that the Consortium cataloged online in national databases; 2) KF funded materials are available through ILL services free of charge; 3) An annual report on the Consortium's activities and policy changes, compiled by the chair of the Consortium, is presented at the annual CKM meeting; 4) The Consortium member libraries have also been identified as major collections by library users within and outside the campus; 5) Reference questions via phone and email in the member libraries have also increased considerably regardless of geographic location.

Promotion of the Consortium program has been publicized through the Consortium's website and mailing lists such as Eastlib and Korean Studies. Recently the Consortium's homepage (http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/KConsort/) has been redesigned with new resources and links to the member libraries' webpages, where people can easily find information regarding Consortium materials and receive help from Korean librarians. The webpage is user-friendly and has proved to be a great benefit to patrons and librarians alike.

3.6 Awareness of the Korean collection

Awareness of the Consortium has grown along with interest in Korean studies at many universities in North America. The number of attendees at the annual meeting of the CKM, for example, has risen steeply since the establishment of the Consortium.

The Consortium has also gained a great deal of attention from library management within university library organizations due to the grants and the growing importance of Korean collections in the members' institutions.

\textsuperscript{53} The Korean Collections Consortium of North America Grant Renewal Proposal, submitted to the KF, April 29 1999.

\textsuperscript{54} Consortium Member Libraries' Annual Reports, submitted to the KF during the periods, 1994/5-2003/4.
The Consortium has also publicized the members' efforts in building a stronger Korean collection cooperatively in North America. In the article "Segye wa sot'ong han'ün Hang'ukhak ūl hyanghayŏ" (Yŏksa pipyŏng, 2002), professor of politics at Sŏnggyungwan University, Tong-t'aek Kim notes that one of the important issues supporting Korean studies is cooperative use and distribution of limited resources through library networks and consortium programs. He cites the KCCNA sponsored by the KF as a productive and useful system which supports Korean studies and suggests that the program should be adopted nationwide.55

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The Korean language is regarded to be difficult particularly because of its pronunciation. While the pronunciation of a number of vowels and consonants continue to pose as a challenge to learners, more challenging are sound changes: assimilation, deletion, addition, and weakening of sounds.

Learners of Korean as a foreign language are not the only ones that find Korean difficult because of complex phonological rules. Korean descendants and those who acquired Korean by listening found reading and writing Korean hard because of the diverse sound changes: the spelling of words do not always match their sounds even if Korean is written as an alphabet.

Celce-Murcia emphasised the importance of ESL/EFL teachers' understanding of the correspondences between English phonology and English orthography, which enables them to teach students "how to predict the pronunciation of a word given its spelling and how to come up with a plausible spelling for a word given its pronunciation." (Celce-Murcia, 1996: 269)

The understanding of the correspondences are generally needed both by the teachers and learners of any language. This is even more so with Korean especially in dealing with the variety of sound changes, which complicate the relationship between the phonology and orthography.

In recent publications more interest is being expressed in the teaching and learning of Korean Pronunciation. Publications on Korean pronunciation education include monographs and articles. Among them are suggestions of contrastive methods of teaching the Korean segmentals and suprasegmentals with those of English, Chinese and Japanese languages. There are also instruction methods for specific phonological rules and those for learners of specific language backgrounds. However, no method was suggested for teaching comprehensive sound changes in relation to sound and writing which learners of all language backgrounds can benefit from.

While interest in the teaching of pronunciation is growing, teachers still have to overcome difficulties including a lack of concrete methodology, audio-visual resources, explanation in textbooks, systematic teacher training and others. (Han, 2003: 348-357).

This paper aims to present an instruction method using visual aids to promote an easy learning of sound changes in Korean. First of all currently used textbooks for learning Korean as a foreign language will be examined to find out how and how much visual aids such as drawings and charts are used in explaining sound changes. Then, the possibility of making a systematic presentation of visual aids will be discussed. Finally a way of instructing sound changes using visual aids will be suggested.

I. Korean language learners and sound changes

The instruction of sound changes is carried out mostly in classes of adult learners with various language backgrounds. The learners encounter Korean sound changes from the beginning of their study. Even beyond this beginners' level, they will still encounter many new words which require their discernment in pronouncing the words. Apart from a few classes designed solely for recognition and pronunciation, most learners learn in integrated classes where the recognition and pronunciation are taught along with the four skills of listening, speaking, reading and writing. Among them are heritage speakers who are yet to master the correspondences between the sounds and spelling of Korean.

In their learning of correspondences between Korean sounds and scripts, learners at a beginners’ level occupy themselves in recognising and pronouncing each phoneme. They are most concerned with 'how can this word be
pronounced? When they advance to a higher level, however, students are eager to know the environment in which a certain sound change will occur. They like to know how sounds change and make predictions of the pronunciation of words.

II. Illustrations used in Korean textbooks

It is a well-established fact in the field of teaching and learning that the effective use of visual aids enhances the process of learners' cognition. Visual support has always been encouraged to be used in the instruction of pronunciation.

In the present situation where most students learn pronunciation in the integrated class setting it is important to examine textbooks for the explanation of the relationship between the sounds and scripts. This is because particular classes designated to pronunciation are not readily available and textbooks have been used by students often as the sole reference.

All of fifteen textbooks that I examined used tables to show the individual sound values of vowels and consonants and the order of writing before the regular lessons start. Pictures of an opening mouth when particular vowels are pronounced are contained in one textbook. A vowel chart is used in three textbooks. The shapes of five basic consonants are illustrated in four textbooks. A consonant chart is shown in three textbooks for reference.

When it comes to the sound changes, however, no visual aids can be found except for a table or two in two textbooks. Instructions of the sound changes can be aided by visual support which illuminates sound-spelling relationships. It is, therefore, desirable to attempt to find visual aids which can be connected to those used for individual phonemes in several textbooks.

III. Instruction method

Teachers need to prepare comprehensible input for the learners by selecting, simplifying and systematising sound changes. As one of this article’s aims is to produce visual aids which can coherently represent sound changes I will limit the kinds of rules which we will deal with to the ones that can be visualised coherently.

Simplifying is an inherent character of visual aids and concerns the main points of the rules, and not the exceptions. Almost all phonological rules have exceptions. The exceptions must be pointed out at stages, especially for advanced learners. However, these exceptions can be explained verbally without using visual aids.

The examination of current textbooks in the previous chapter reveals that several kinds of visual aids are used in the explanation of sound of segmentals but not in that of sound changes. Among the visual features consonant charts can be used for a systematic explanation of sound changes because Korean consonants often change their sounds as groups related to the place of articulation.

Present Korean pronunciation instruction is generally carried out in two ways:
1) an overall introduction of Korean sound along with the Korean alphabet at the very first stage of learning and;
2) an isolated introduction of particular features in meaning based discourses. In the first occasion of learning pronunciation, input is mostly dependent on teachers. In occasions of the second type, however, learners’ contributions are increasingly valuable (Yoon, 2004:112).

I have suggested that the instruction of pronunciation can be made in three stages after the initial stage of introducing Korean pronunciation with hangul, as follows (Yoon, 2004:114):

1) consciousness raising with familiar words with particular sound changes
2) discovering patterns in words and explaining sound changes with aural and visual analysis
3) practice and feedback

In the above instructional frame, both teachers and learners actively involve themselves in their interaction. Both a teacher and learners can initiate stage one. The teacher pronounces the example or picks up on either good or bad pronunciations made by learners. In the second stage, both the teacher and learners find patterns behind the examples and clarify the pattern using pictures. In the third stage, the teacher gives either positive or negative
feedback to learners who practice either given examples or words and phrases already learned. When using visual aids in the second stage teachers can involve learners in creating visual aids. In this way the effect of internalising the rules can be enhanced (Dale, 37-52).

**Syllable-initial consonants**

Knowledge of the consonants' place of articulation is especially important for understanding the way the sounds change. Korean consonants come in both the syllable-initial and syllable-final position, and they sound different depending on their position in a syllable. Therefore, a separate chart for each position could be helpful.

The sound of consonants pronounced at the initial position of a syllable can be presented as below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>obstruent</th>
<th>gum</th>
<th>hard</th>
<th>soft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(voiceless)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plain</td>
<td>빌</td>
<td>띠</td>
<td>ㅈ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aspirated</td>
<td>빌</td>
<td>띠</td>
<td>ㅈ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tense</td>
<td>빌</td>
<td>띠</td>
<td>ㅈ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sonorant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(voiced)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nasal</td>
<td>ㅁ</td>
<td>ㄴ</td>
<td>ㅇ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>liquid</td>
<td>ㄹ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*' ㅇ ' in the syllable-initial position does not carry any sound value.

**figure 1.**

In this chart, 19 consonants are presented using the minimum terminology necessary for explaining sound changes to learners. While the places of articulation are indicated, not all the manners of articulation are mentioned. ㅇ and ㅊ, which are also pronounced at the gum ridge, are placed right next to ㄹ and ㅌ (Yoon, 2004:108).

**Sound changes**

The sound changes that are covered in this article will be confined to those which can employ charts and diagrams that are relevant to the position or the way of articulation.

1. **Voicing**

Before the explanation of voicing it is advisable to go through the following examples with learners for conscious raising.

나비 비다 바지 아기 잡기 안경 문건 경기 이자리

1) Write down the plain obstruents, 빌, 띠, ㅈ, ㄱ in the middle.
2) To the right of the plain obstruents enter 'Vowel'.
3) Ask students how the consonants sound with vowels giving examples such as '비', ' đa, 지, 기' from the sample words given above.
4) To the left of the consonants enter 'ㅁ, ㄴ, ㅇ, Vowel $. Explain that '.orm' symbolises the end of a syllable and draw a horizontal line under the diagram created in 4).
5) Ask students how the consonants sound in between the voiced sounds as in the sample words given above. The changed sounds are indicated in bold.
Teachers might want to elaborate by saying that voicing also applies to syllable-final consonants when they are placed in between the voiced sounds and to give some examples.

2. Syllable-final Unrelease and Neutralisation

Sample words for explaining neutralisation:

받 반 받 받
박[박] 박[박] 부여[부여]

1) Create the syllable-final consonant chart by erasing 'ㅂ, ㅃ, ㅉ' from figure 1.
2) Enter $ next to the chart and draw a horizontal line under them. This action symbolises that the consonants are now used in the syllable-final position.
3) Ask students how each final consonant in the sample words sounds.
4) Circle the obstruents of same position of articulation to make three groups and connect 'ㄷ' to the 'ㄷ' group. Make 'ㅂ', 'ㄷ', 'ㅅ' in bold and explain that these three are the sounds that represent each group. Explain that there are only seven sounds in the syllable-final position, which are shown in bold.

3. Resyllabification and $ deletion
Sample words for explaining resyllabification:


1) Place the lower part of figure 3, which represents the sounds of the consonants in the syllable-final position.
2) Add ' + Vowel' to the right of the diagram indicating a syllable starting with a vowel follows.
3) Draw a horizontal line under the diagram created in 2). Place all the consonants except ㅎ to the right. Point out that all of the consonants except ㅎ have their sound values when resyllabified.

4. Tensification

Tensification occurs in several environments. The most common and representative environment is when 'ㅂ, ㄷ, ㅅ, ㅈ, ㅌ' is preceded by obstruents. The following samples can be pronounced with learners

맞다[만따/마따]  뜨시[열씨/며시]  어쩔습니까[어쩔습니까/어쩔습니까]
학생[학생]  식당[식당]

The diagram of neutralisation serves the base for creating the diagram of tensification.

1) From figure 2 erase the sonorants as only the tensification caused by preceding obstruents will be presented here.
2) To the right of the diagram prepared above, add ㅂ, ㄷ, ㅅ, ㅈ and ㅌ. Explain that this represents the meeting of the obstruents with one of these five consonants in the following syllable.
3) Draw a horizontal line and make arrows under ㅂ, ㄷ, ㅅ, ㅈ and ㅌ. Ask students which sound each group will change into.
4) Insert ㅂ, ㄷ, ㅅ, ㅈ and ㅌ respectively under each arrow. Emphasise that these sound changes occur in the same place of articulation.
5. Aspiration

Two environments for aspirations can be dealt with one at a time.

1) 좋다[조타]  그림자만[그리치만]  이형계[이리케]  이형계[이리께]

\[ \text{\&} + \text{\&}, \text{\&}, \text{\&}, \text{\&} \]

figure 6 a.


\[ \text{\&}, \text{\&}, \text{\&}, \text{\&} + \text{\&} \]

figure 6 b.

6. Nasalisation

Before the explanation of nasalisation, the following samples can be pronounced with learners


히응만[히응만]  부엉문[부엉문]

The diagram of neutralisation serves the base for creating the diagram of nasalisation.

1) From figure 2 erase the sonorants as only the nasalisation of obstruents will be presented here.
2) To the right of the above diagram add \& and \&. Explain that this represents the meeting of the obstruents with one of the two consonants in the following syllable.
3) Draw a horizontal line and make arrows under each group of obstruents. Ask learners which sounds each group will change into.

4) Insert $p$, $L$, $O$ respectively under each arrow and $p$ and $L$ to the right. Emphasise that the change to nasal sounds occurs in the same place of articulation.

5) Group the obstruents of same position of articulation into a circle and connect ‘$g$’ to the ‘$c$’ group.

6) Make ‘$b$’, ‘$d$’, ‘$g$’ bold and explain that these three are the sounds that represents each group. Explain that there are only seven sounds in the syllable-final position.

7. ‘$L$’ addition

‘$L$’ addition often follows with nasalisation. The following samples can be pronounced with learners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>심육[심득]</th>
<th>나뭇잎[나무잎]</th>
<th>한국 여자[한국여자]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>담요[담뇨]</td>
<td>두통약[두통약]</td>
<td>무손 요일[무손요일]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) From the top part of the diagram of neutralisation, erase ‘$e$’.
2) To the right of the diagram prepared above, add $i$, $ə$, $o$, $o$ and $ʃ$. Explain that this represents the meeting of the final consonants with one of the vowels with a ‘$L$’ sound in the following syllable.
3) Draw a line under and make arrows under $i$, $ə$, $o$, $o$ and $ʃ$. Ask learners which sounds each vowel will change into.
4) Insert $n$, $n$, $n$, $n$ and $ʃ$ respectively under each arrow in the right and explain that ‘$L$’ addition to the vowels occurs.
5) Insert $p$, $L$ and $O$ under each arrow in the left and emphasise that nasalisation occurs after the ‘$L$’ addition.

8. Place Assimilation

In fast speeches preceding consonants are often assimilated to the following sound and are pronounced the same as the following sounds. This kind of sound change is not accepted as a standard pronunciation of Korean.
Learners, however, hear this spoken by Koreans and they themselves often pronounce in this way. One type of the place assimilations is shown here for example:

![Diagram](image)

This diagram showing the 'diagonal' shift of place of articulation exemplifies the sound changes which are not accepted as standard Korean pronunciation. Teachers can review the previous sound changes which are presented as vertical shifts remaining in the same place of articulation.

9. Palatalisation

![Diagram](image)

This sound change can be highlighted by pointing out the change of the position of ㄱ and ㅅ in the word-initial consonant chart. In addition a specific visual support such as the following will enhance the understanding of palatalisation, which involves a vowel.

![Diagram](image)

10. Lateralisation

Using the diagram of neutralisation, it is advisable to point out the position of ㄴ and ㄹ, which are pronounced at the same position. The following examples can be used for drawing diagrams.

1) 연락[열락] 편리[렬리] 한라산[할라산]

![Diagram](image)

2) 설날[설달] 일요일날[이요일탈]

![Diagram](image)
IV. Conclusion

The aim of this article is to present an instruction method using visual aids for sound changes. Various sound changes, which result in the discrepancies in the pronunciation and writing, make it difficult for Korean language learners to pronounce and spell. An examination of visual aids used in Korean textbooks reveals that a number of pictures and tables are used for consonants and vowels. However, few visual presentations were used for explaining sound changes.

In this article a way of instructing sound changes is suggested using visual aids developed from the characteristics of Korean sound changes: a group of consonants related to the place of articulation often change their sound in the same manner. Along with the presentation of visual aids, a method of creating them with students is also suggested.

It is found to be advantageous to specifically create the syllable-initial consonant chart. As all the consonants in the chart are pronounced in the syllable-initial position, a part of the syllable-initial consonant chart can be used for the explanation of voicing and aspiration. From the syllable-initial consonant chart the diagram of neutralisation and syllable-final unrelease is developed. The diagram proved to be useful because either a part or the whole of it can be used for instructing tensification, nasalisation, addition and place assimilation. The visualisation of these rules is thought to enhance learners’ cognition of groups of consonants in a systematic way and aid their reading and writing skills as well as their prediction of pronunciation and spelling.

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Language Audit for international assignment of expatriate representatives:  
A comparative examination of Korean and Australian expatriates

Hyun Chang  
Curtin University of Technology

INTRODUCTION

Language plays a prominent role in culture and it manifests unique cultural representations, with which we understand the people of the target culture think, interact and behave. The changing nature of global community and interactions require more cross-cultural understanding and learning the target language is becoming popular amongst expatriate representatives. One can ask the very question why do you learn Korean, for example, and the answers might be coming from various backgrounds, associated with Korean War, child adoption, teaching English, nice Korean friends, business promotion or their long and rich cultural traditions. Also, the same question arises in relation to the background behind learning English, which might include such as wealth, power, immigration, children's education, or job and business prospects. Regardless of its reason, the importance of learning the target language lead to the very outcomes of understanding them, hence accelerating expatriates' cross-cultural adjustment and organisational business outcomes.

Expatriates' effectiveness depends largely on how much expatriates understand the target environments and how well they adjust their behaviour suitable to the target culture. Expatriate adjustment is influenced by many variables including personal, social, family, language and cultural factors. Many of such factors can be effectively assisted by cross-cultural and language training in order to increase communicative competence and cross-cultural adjustment of expatriates. Overall, such trainings can provide realistic expectations of life and work in the host country, thereby reducing culture shock but increasing their adaptational capacity and business performance. However, many expatriates are not provided with adequate level of language and cross-cultural training, thus increasing the chance of misunderstanding, misinterpretation, inappropriate attitudes and behaviours, and affecting personal, family, or organisational interests.

If an organisation is to succeed in the global marketplace of the future, a clear corporate language policy is required in reflection of a broad spectrum of individual and organisational needs and objectives. This research considers the strategic issues of language training in order to achieve corporate objectives and investigated the two expatriate communities: the Australian expatriates working in Korea and the Korean expatriate communities working in Australia. The most exploited pair for comparing the East and the West has been between the U.S. and Japan. However, there is a strong need for external validity requires an extended pair, Australians and Koreans, for example. A language audit is important in assessing the needs and objectives of language training in order to address the necessity of establishing a corporate language strategy for expatriate management. A comprehensive language audit was conducted in order to find out the details of expatriates' language background and skills, from what they had learnt before the departure to how they have maintained the skills after they arrived. Findings have important implications for language education, policy, organisations' expatriate policy and Korean language teaching in Australia.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTICES

Cross-Cultural and Language Training for Expatriate Success

An effective way of ensuring a successful expatriation, in terms of personal and organizational effectiveness, is to provide enough and adequate training for expatriates to prepare themselves better for their assignments. Such expatriate training programs come in many different forms, nature and capacity, and Bennett (1996: 317) provided a long list of those elements necessary for training program including 'target country information, housing, educational and medical facilities, living conditions, social norms, language training, local business practices and regulations, performance targets and tasks, methods for communicating with head office, country visit, briefings by recent returnees, and training family members'. More common topics in cultural training by Hodgetts and Luthans (1997:424) included 'social etiquette, customs, economics, history, politics, and business etiquette' and they identified ethnocentric, polycentric, regio-centric, and geocentric positions, as the four basic philosophic positions for managing expatriate training program.

Recently, Expatriate related services are increasing in number and the types of services are expanding to incorporate the changing nature of expatriate assignment in the global business world. Many multinational
corporations are also increasing their investments in cross-cultural trainings in order to better understand, communicate and negotiate with their stakeholders in the target environment. At the request of Nippon Corporation of Japan, Goldman (1992), for example, provided training programs in order to facilitate cross-cultural communication between Japan and the U.S., which provides a didactic and experiential laboratory for eight Japanese managers requesting intensive training on contrasting Japanese-U.S. negotiating styles. Mobility Services International is another organization to advertise that they are confident in delivering cross-cultural training, intercultural services, expatriate management services, expatriate repatriate services, global or international relocation services, etc.

The diversity of complexity of overseas assignments expands the necessity of diversifying not only the sources of training but also the recipients of such cross-cultural training programs. The value of contributions made by host country nationals was recognized in achieving successful cross-cultural training for expatriates (Vance and Ensher, 2002). It was emphasized by Harvey (1997) that it is important to train third country managers for assignments within an organization's home market. Kealey and Protheroe (1996) emphasized the importance of relating to specific kinds of training, while Befus (1988) stressed the need for adding psychotherapeutic techniques so that sojourners can cope with different aspects of culture shock: intellectually, emotionally, behaviorally, and physiologically. Specifically for preparation and adjustment, expatriate assignees can be assisted with various cross-cultural training programs. Tung (1981) suggested 5 types such as (1) area studies, (2) culture assimilators, (3) language training, (4) sensitivity training, and (5) field experiences.

Irrespective of training types, the main focus of global training is to prepare expatriates to work effectively in other cultures and it is important to address the changing needs of various training programs. Different methodological approaches expanded the perspectives of effectiveness in cross-cultural training. In an investigation of 260 college courses and professional training programs conducted by Milhouse (1996:69-95) who identified that '88 percent of these programs were judged as integrating multidimensional goals (cognitive, affective, and behavioral), content (culture general and culture specific) and process (intellectual and experiential) orientations,' where he used Krippendorff's (1980) content analysis procedures in analyzing nine categories of education and training programs as intercultural communication, language and culture, international and global communication, human relations, inter-group, interracial, cultural diversity, multicultural education, cross-cultural psychology, and cross-cultural research.

Importantly, in the end, expatriates need to communicate and negotiate effectively with their counterparts. Interpersonal communications in cross-cultural settings require a set of interrelated and complex perspectives. In relation to expatriates' communication problem, Usunier (1998) reported that expatriates experience a loss of oral pleasure related to the absence of their native language and eating and drinking habits in the host country, and that this deficiency affects their overall satisfaction with the expatriation experience and duration. Therefore, training in the host country language can be particularly useful for expatriates who have to interact and communicate effectively with locals, and many expatriates are given language training with varying degree of personal and organisational commitment. Although the importance of language the target language is increasing recognised by business organisations, language training continues to be a weak link in the development of an effective cross-cultural and international human resources strategy for many international organisations.

Learning the target language is costly and requires a high level of commitment to individual expatriates and their organisations. Therefore, it is important to establish the cost-effective language policy that is appropriately addressed within organisational objectives and capacity. Assessment of language proficiency required for expatriates may be achieved by conducting a language audit, which can provide qualitative and quantitative extent of language skills present with the organisation. Language audit can be, as suggested by Woodhall and MacKay (1991), not only an effective way of diagnosing language proficiency and capacity but also it provides an essential step in developing corporate language policy. They suggested that there are five options in planning to operate effectively in foreign countries: self-study, open learning, individual tuition, commercial providers, and group courses by educational institutions. However, learning a language requires a long-term commitment for both individuals and organisations. It is therefore important to be realistic in their expectations of making progress up the learning curve of language proficiency.

FINDINGS ON LANGUAGE AUDIT

This research targeted two expatriate communities for conducting language audit. Korean expatriates working in Australia and Australian expatriates working in Korea. Expatriates in this research only included overseas assignees from various organisations, such as business representatives and diplomats, without including individuals on their own interests, such as teachers or long-term visitors. Research questionnaires were sent to the entire population of 138 expatriates, out of which 28 Australian expatriates and 52 Korean expatriates
responded, achieving 64.5 percent response rate. In this paper, two sections are reported to address the details of language audit within the broad perspectives of various expatriate training programs.

The first section asked questions to find out how much training and support were provided before departure. Respondents were asked to tick yes or no for such a support, followed by questions asking how effective it was and how useful they are at work.

1. Pre-Departure Training Supports

Table 1 summarizes the results responded by Korean and Australian groups with the combined mean scores over the three areas such as availability, effectiveness and usefulness. In the columns for effectiveness and usefulness, responding cases decrease on the basis of availability.

Table 1: Pre-Departure Training Supports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Job Adaptation</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Case</td>
<td>Mean Case</td>
<td>% Case</td>
<td>Mean Case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job previews (Verbal)</td>
<td>70.6 36</td>
<td>3.33 42</td>
<td>3.45 44</td>
<td>66.7 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job previews (Written)</td>
<td>49.0 25</td>
<td>3.06 33</td>
<td>3.31 35</td>
<td>45.8 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job related training</td>
<td>43.1 22</td>
<td>3.50 30</td>
<td>3.56 34</td>
<td>43.5 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language training</td>
<td>37.3 19</td>
<td>3.41 29</td>
<td>3.68 31</td>
<td>50.0 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural familiarisation training</td>
<td>20.0 10</td>
<td>2.88 24</td>
<td>3.14 28</td>
<td>37.5 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Induction programs</td>
<td>68.6 35</td>
<td>3.69 39</td>
<td>3.90 40</td>
<td>29.2 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A named mentor in the new job situation</td>
<td>36.0 18</td>
<td>3.17 30</td>
<td>3.44 32</td>
<td>12.5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>46.37</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>40.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Availability of Training Supports

Overall, in terms of availability of pre-departure training supports higher rate of Korean expatriates at 46.37 percent was given pre-departure trainings than Australian expatriates at 40.74 percent. Only ‘verbal job preview’ was fairly high for both groups, at 70.6 percent for Korean and at 66.7 percent, and ‘induction programs’ only for Koreans at 68.6 percent and ‘language program’ only for Australians at 50 percent. Looking at the combined average, the results indicate fairly poor supports overall, having less than 50 percent except verbal job previews (total 69.3 percent have said ‘yes’) and induction program (total 56.0 percent). Cultural familiarization training and mentorship recorded less than 30 percent level. Australian expatriates had higher level of supports on job-related training, language training and cultural familiarization trainings than Koreans, who had higher percentage of having job previews (both verbal and written), induction program and mentorship on assignments.

Effectiveness of Training Supports

With regard to the evaluation of effectiveness on training supports, Korean expatriates (overall mean score of 3.29) showed a significantly higher level of effectiveness on all the seven programs, approximately 28 percent higher, than Australian expatriates (overall mean score of 2.37), particularly with a large difference for more than almost 20 percent in the following four programs (listed in the order of higher scores on Korean expatriates). Findings on program effectiveness support the views that that Korean expatriates were given more training opportunities as well as having more effective operations of such programs.

- Induction program (Korean mean at 3.69 > Australian mean at 2.08)
- Job related training (3.5 > 2.6)
- Language training (3.41 > 2.25)
• Mentorship program (3.17 > 1.89)

Usefulness of Training Supports
Similarly to the effectiveness assessment level, Korean expatriates found such training supports much more useful at 3.50 than Australians at 2.40 with a wider gap than the case of effectiveness almost with approximately over 30 percent difference. The following 5 programs, including written job preview, showed a wide gaps of approximately over 20 percent, which are listed in the order of higher scores on Korean expatriates.

- Induction program (Korean mean at 3.9 > Australian mean at 2.25)
- Language training (3.68 > 2.25)
- Job related training (3.56 > 2.47)
- Mentorship program (3.44 > 1.89)
- Job preview (written) (3.31 > 2.38)

Therefore, the above findings strongly indicate that Korean expatriates get more pre-departure training supports overall for their expatriate assignments than Australian counterparts. In terms of program effectiveness, a much higher number of Korean expatriates responded that they were effective in all 7 programs, with a lead of approximate 28 percent. In terms of usefulness, even a higher proportion of Korean expatriates responded that they were useful, in all 7 programs, with a lead of 30 percent over Australian expatriates. Therefore, Korean expatriates tend to get more and better organized training supports that are useful for their expatriate assignments than Australian expatriates. The next question asks how important they regard various skills on the target environment, such as language, cultural and business practices, in comparison with their self-assessed familiarity of such skills.

2. Your Familiarity with the Target Environment

Overall results in Table 2 indicate that both groups have good level of recognition on its importance with mean score of 3.76, closer to '4 = very important' and also with mean score of 3.12, higher than '3 = competent understanding' in their familiarity with 5 areas of the target environment. Table 32 shows the findings that their subjective assessment of familiarity at 3.12 is well short of the importance level at 3.76 on the objective importance, thereby suggesting efforts to be made to reduce the gap.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Your familiarity</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Importance</td>
<td>Familiarity</td>
<td>Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52 cases</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business practices</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>3.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values/belief systems</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-verbal behaviours</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>3.858</td>
<td>3.158</td>
<td>3.568</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of recognizing its importance, Korean expatriates lead Australian expatriates overall at 3.86 over 3.57, especially with a strong lead in recognizing the importance of learning language and business practices, and also slightly higher in familiarity at 3.16 over 3.06. Korean expatriates are much stronger in recognizing the importance of understanding language and business practices than Australians, which suggest that Korean expatriates regard understanding of values and non-verbal behaviours as less important than language and business practices, and practical and immediate skills for their expatriate assignments. However, Australian expatriates indicate higher levels of familiarity in all the items except language, which suggest that learning Korean language is not essential, with mean score of just 2.0 (limited understanding), in their expatriate operations.

3. Language Audit

The third topic for investigation is ‘Language Audit’, which was intended to establish the qualitative and quantitative extent of expatriates' target language skills. This section includes a number of questions: 'how many foreign languages have you studied or can you speak/understand?', followed by language fluency, the details of
learning Korean and English, and organisational support and personnel evaluation. Also, there are specific questions on four language skills: listening, speaking, reading and writing, by employing two dimensional approaches of asking importance with familiarity and perceived skills and current utilisation.

Table 3 (Number of Languages Learned) shows the number of expatriates who are said to have learnt different languages than the native tongue. There are seven missing cases reported, five (20 percent of 25 in total) of which are from the Australian group and the other 2 (3.8 percent) from the Korean group. If the two Korean expatriates who had put Korean on 'Language 1' are excluded, then the total Korean respondents count to four (7.69 percent of 52 in total). In the Korean group, every one was ethnically Korean and therefore Korean needs to be excluded. However, 4 Australian expatriates who had put English on the list (3 in 'Language 1' with fluency level 1 = very good and 1 in 'Language 3' with fluency level 3 = fair) were included although Australia has a large pool of migrants who have learnt English later in their life. Overall, both groups show a high level of linguistic versatility having 90.9 percent for second language and 54.14 percent for third language. Korean expatriates record a significantly high rate of having second language, very likely English, at 96.15 percent. Australian expatriates are much more diverse than Koreans for 4th and 5th languages, perhaps due to its multicultural nature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Number of Languages Learned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 shows the number of respondents with the level of fluency, without showing language type. Since each respondent listed one or more languages, the table simply indicates the proportion of fluency level over the total cases responded in this section, being 50 cases from Koreans and 20 cases from Australians. In the case of Korean expatriates, only 26 percent (13 out of 50 people) regard the fluency level of the language they list in 'Language 1' very good and 44 percent (22 out of 50 people) regarded 'good,' making 70 percent above 'good' level. However, in contrast, the Australian expatriates showed 25 percent (5 out of 20 people) regarded 'Language 1' very fluent and only 5 percent (2 out of 10) regarded it good, making just 30 percent above 'good' level in total, compared 70 percent from the Korean group. The reason can be related to the fact that English is a compulsory unit in education system for at least 10 years, and therefore they outperform Australians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Language Fluency - Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (case)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Scales of measurement used: 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = fair, 4 = poor, 5 = very poor)*

Table 5 shows that all Korean expatriates have learned English and the overall mean score of fluency level reads 2.14, which is closer to the Level 2 (good). Only 22 percent (out of 50 cases responded, excluding 2 missing cases) felt that the level of their English skills is '1 = very good', but those who said that their level of English is 'good (Level 2)' was as many as 23 cases (equivalent to 46 percent of 50 cases).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5: Language Fluency – Korean Expatriates (n = 50)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Japanese  | 4 cases | 5 cases | 9 cases | 6 cases | 24 cases (3.70)  
Chinese  | 1 case  | 1 case  | 3 cases | 5 cases | 7 cases (4.0)   
German   | 1 case  | 5 cases | 1 case  | 7 cases | 2 cases (4.0)   
French   | 1 case  | 1 case  | 2 cases | 2 cases | 2 cases (4.0)   

(Scales of measurement used: 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = fair, 4 = poor, 5 = very poor)

Learning foreign language is essential part of school curriculum and also an important quality for one's career in Korea, and is continually encouraged to build up throughout one's career. English is taught at school for 10 years from Year 7 (beginning of Junior High School for 3 years) to Year 12 (end of Senior High School for 3 years), and, the number of primary schools that teach English is increasing as well, in compliance with the Government policy to start teaching English from Year 3 since 1998. In most of the senior high schools in Korea, second foreign language is also compulsory, where they used to concentrate on German or French to choose from, but the choice is widened to include Chinese and Japanese. In fact, most popular second foreign language nowadays is Chinese and then Japanese, at the cost of French and German. Japanese was not taught widely in the school system until the 1970s but it become widely available afterwards in many private language schools since it is a popular and strategic language for international trade and communication, which is why 48 percent of the respondents have learned Japanese with the mean score of 3.7 (closer to 4 = 'poor') in terms of fluency.

The reason why there are only five expatriates, even lower than that of German, who have learned Chinese was because the popularity of Chinese language did not really start until late 1980s, until which time it was neither part of the school curriculum nor was readily available in private sector. All the Korean expatriates had completed their formal secondary education before the period. Naturally, the level of fluency is 'poor (Level 4),' although Korea is also using Chinese character as part of their written system in a limited way, mainly for recognition. French and German languages are hardly practiced in Korea, neither for trade nor for cultural activities. They used to be regarded as the tools for learning advanced technology and civilizations, French for humanities area and German for law or science areas. However, much of the mediums to learn from overseas are now changed to English and Japanese, therefore their relative importance have been decreased.

Did you have a chance to learn Korean before you came to Korea?

More specific questions were asked to Australian expatriates in order to find more details with the background of learning Korean. Australian expatriates were to answer yes or no whether they had a chance to learn Korean before departure. Further, those who have answered 'no' were asked to explain why they hadn't learned Korean before they arrived. 52 percent of Australian expatriates said to have learned Korean before arrival. In total, Australian expatriates out of 12 who said 'no' provided brief explanations. Three Australian expatriates expressed 'no desire,' two have said that it was 'not available,' another two have said 'unnecessary,' and one due to the nature of short-term assignment, but five expatriates out of 11 (45.4 percent) who have said 'no' with explanations, indicated that they didn't learn due to lack of time before they leave.

How long did you learn Korean language (if yes, n = 15)?

Some Australian respondents have given specific details, such as the number of hours a day and one respondent, whose mother seems to be an ethnic Korean, replied 'since birth' and the teacher was one's mother. In order to establish consistency, the raw data from respondents has been interpreted with the following adjustments. A year at educational institutions, such as TAFE or universities courses, is regarded to be equivalent to 26 weeks, a normal teaching period being 13 weeks per semester. In the case of intensive course (case 11), 4 hours a day is regarded as one week, making its 60 hours of intensive to 15 weeks, slightly over one semester load.

Altogether, 14 Australian expatriates provided details, where the average length of study, before they arrived in Korea, is 7.14 weeks, which is approximately 55 percent load of one semester (half a year) at education (tertiary or TAFE) institutions or 71.4 percent of private language institutions. Typically, students would have one 10-weeks term at an elementary or survival level, hence their preparation for Korean before they arrived was not up to the minimum operational level. However, the other 10 expatriates have never taken any type of formal Korean language study at all. So, 44 percent (10 cases) of the target population did not take any Korean language lesson, one (4 percent) was near native, but the level of language preparation by the 14 expatriates (56 percent) was not good enough to say that they reached even to the elementary level of Korean language. These results are supported by the level of language fluency on Korean at mean score of 3.615, which is close to '4 = poor'
Where did you learn? (n = 15) / How did you learn? (n = 13)

In terms of the place where learning Korean took place, before they arrived in Korea, there were 15 expatriates who answered to this question. In terms of place occurred, four were trained in Canberra, one in Melbourne, and one in Sydney. Three expatriates (including case 6 with 'since birth' 'by mother') took the lessons at home by private tutor, two as part of their undergraduate degree course (Swinburne University of Technology – case 23, case 16 - unknown), one at TAFE, two at Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Canberra (in liaison with Australian National University), and one at UTS (University of Technology in Sydney, offering non-award community language course). Therefore, 40 percent (6 out of 15) of Australian expatriates took Korean lessons at tertiary institutions in Australia, either as award (2 cases) or as non-award (4 cases) courses. In terms of arrangement, five expatriates were given as part of on-the-job training, four off the job, two at academic institutions and two on private lessons.

Materials Used before Arrived (n = 12) / Materials Used after Arrived (n = 10)

With regard to materials or resources used in learning Korean, they have used texts, tapes and some structured degree materials, and two used 'Myondo's Korean' by Francis Park and one used 'Learning Korean' by Adrian Buzo. Interestingly, 25 percent (3 out of 12) expatriates did not write anything on 'after arrival,' which might mean that they have stopped studying Korean after they arrived in Korea. There was a big change after they arrived in terms of materials or resources used, which is, they turn much to local contacts, newspaper/magazine and TV viewing, but many of them still using the types of materials they used before.

Koreans Expatriates Learning English

Korean expatriates learned English at school for a considerable period of time, amounting to 9.6 years on average, which does not include 5 missing cases out of total 52. Such a long period of learning English is well matched with the perceived level of fluency at 2.14, being fairly close to 'good' level (Refer to Table 5: Language Fluency – Korean Expatriates). Such a long period of 9.6 years can be explained by the Korean education system where Koreans learn English for 6 years during junior high and senior high periods, plus their tertiary education for 4 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Average / Availability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years at school</td>
<td>9.6 years n = 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months in person</td>
<td>6 months n = 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in person</td>
<td>4.53 years n = 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months at work</td>
<td>4.2 months n = 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years at work</td>
<td>6.947 years n = 19 cases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 6, in relation to pre-departure preparation for English, 5 expatriates responded that they had organized private lesson for 6 months on average, whereas 13 expatriates prepared for a much longer period for 4.53 years on average. Korean multinational companies or government organizations encourage their employees to study English continuously, and many hopeful candidates for expatriate positions do prepare well in advance before a selection process starts, hence such a long period of preparation for English as much as 4.53 years. Once they are selected or come to the rank eligible for such a selection, they get more organized supports from their organizations. Ten expatriates responded that they had 4.2 months of pre-departure training on English, and 19 expatriates had nearly 7 years of training at work before they arrived in Australia.

Many Korean organisations provided in-company training for English, as much as almost 60 percent (28 cases of 47). Also, Korean expatriates had various supports as cost contribution for English tuition (51 percent, 24 cases) and material cost (14.8 percent), and time allowance during office hours (6.4 percent, 3 cases). 13 Expatriates reported that some form of English language training has been provided even after arrival in Australia. Many Korean expatriates who responded to the question have included one or more items and therefore the overall indication is that Korean expatriates tend to get strong supports from their organisations. The number of organisations that reflect English proficiency to personnel evaluation was slightly higher than that of organisations providing in-company training (Table 7).
Table 7: Organization’s Policy on English Language Support (n = 47)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-company training</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost support for English tuition</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflection of English ability to personnel evaluation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (unspecified)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language training in target country</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allowance for private tuition during office hours</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance for purchasing English language materials</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specify - Details</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 shows further details on those 29 cases (61.7 percent of 47 cases responded) that reported that their organizations consider the fluency of English language into personnel evaluation, which can be for promotion, salary incentives or expatriate selection. Four expatriates reported that their organizations provide them with full supports, both in-company training and cost support, without using English language skills as part of their personnel evaluation systems. There were 2 cases where their organizations do not use English as part of their personnel evaluation although they were provided with in-company training, not cost support, and 3 cases where they were given the cost support for English tuition, not in-company training, and did not have the evaluation taken place. A closer examination on 29 cases that were positively responded on evaluation shows that 12 cases get both supports and evaluated, 9 cases get just in-company training and evaluated, 4 cases get material supports and evaluated, and, interestingly, these 4 cases do not get any such support but they are still evaluated. Overall, findings indicate that English language skills are regarded important by Korean organisations not only to provide various supports but also to incorporate the level of fluency into personnel evaluation.

Table 8: English Fluency into Personnel Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Not Evaluated</th>
<th>Evaluated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Both supports</td>
<td>4 (n = 28)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just in-company training</td>
<td>2 of 11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just cost support for English tuition</td>
<td>3 of 7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No supports</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 (n = 29)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 displays the relationship between supports and evaluation on English language skills. There are 12 missing cases, treated 'uncounted,' which could be just 'not answered' or 'no supports and no evaluation.' Among 40 cases reported, 7 combinations such as 4 for evaluation and 3 for non-evaluation are presented. Of the total 52 expatriates, 23 percent (12 cases) indicated that they had both types of supports and their organizations used English language skill as part of the evaluation system, and 55.76 percent (29 cases) reported that, regardless of support, they had the skills evaluated and reflected in their personnel system.

Although their skills were reflected in their personnel evaluation, 15.38 percent (8 cases) had only in-company training and 7.69 percent (4 cases) had just cost support. The chance of having the skills evaluated is twice as much as with in-company training than with just cost support, which is understandable since in-company training requires much high level of commitments in terms of revenues and resources for organization. Also, five cases (9.61 percent) reported that they were evaluated although they were not given any such supports and equally 5 cases (9.61 percent) were, on the contrary, not evaluated although they were given both in-company training and cost supports. In total, 6 cases were reported that they were given either of the supports but not evaluated.

Table 9: English Evaluation (n = 52)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>In-company training</th>
<th>Cost support for English</th>
<th>English for evaluation</th>
<th>Cases (n = 52)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>both supports with evaluation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>just training with evaluation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>just cost with evaluation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no support with evaluation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, there were 12 missing cases (23 percent), 11 cases (21 percent) for no evaluation, but 29 cases (55.76 percent) were evaluated, which indicate the quality of English language skills are not only well supported, in the form of in-company training or cost support for materials, but also monitored through evaluation in order to used in their personnel management considerations. The following three tables provide the comparisons between the two groups over four language skills, listening, speaking, reading and writing. The following three tables compares two columns to highlight the level of utilisation of such skills, the first column indicates how skilful they are with those skills and the second column on how much of such skills are utilised at work.

In the case of Australian expatriates, the importance of using verbal communication skills is at mere 1.31 on average being close to 'a little only' and these skills at 1.53 are nearly non-operational level. It is mainly for casual conversations and simple instructions, rather than making public statements or for business meetings. However, Korean expatriates regard their verbal English skills at a fairly competent level with 2.41, and they seem to use their skills at 2.44. A more serious engagement like making public statements scored only at basic level of 2.08, but, in terms of conducting conversations, giving instructions and having meetings in English, they are at fairly competent levels, all over 2.5 points. Overall, Korean expatriates' English skills and its utilizations far exceeds the Korean language skills of Australians' by 45 percent on 'skills' and 37 percent on 'used' accordingly. In the following three tables, 10 - 12, four language skills (listening, speaking, reading and writing) are analysed in specific situations, asking their skill level and the current use.

**Table 10: Listening/speaking skills (5 items)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Audit – Listening/speaking</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conversations with customers face to face</td>
<td>2.52 2.65</td>
<td>1.42 1.67</td>
<td>2.17 2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversations with visitors</td>
<td>2.44 2.62</td>
<td>1.38 1.62</td>
<td>2.11 2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-house business meetings</td>
<td>2.51 2.42</td>
<td>1.25 1.46</td>
<td>2.10 2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving verbal instructions</td>
<td>2.51 2.65</td>
<td>1.25 1.50</td>
<td>2.11 2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Making statements in public on behalf of the organization</td>
<td>2.08 1.88</td>
<td>1.25 1.38</td>
<td>1.81 1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.41 2.44</td>
<td>1.31 1.53</td>
<td>2.06 2.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Writing skills in Korean are the worst among the three areas for Australian expatriates scoring only 1.15 for their skill levels and 1.12 for utilizing Korean, under-performing at 46 percent lower on writing Korean and 48 percent lower on utilizing their writing skills in Korean than Korean expatriates using English. In both 'skills' and 'used' categories, their skills (1.15) are very limited and their usages (1.12) are almost not used at all. In the case of Koreans, however, their overall writing skills are higher than basic level (2.15) and they are fairly confident in business correspondences but somewhat limited to basic level in more demanding nature of writing such as writing reports, publishing articles and producing specialized materials in English. In managing routine correspondences, they use quite confidently but, in writing articles and specialist material, their skills are under-utilized (Table 11).

**Table 11: Writing skills (6 items)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language Audit - Writing</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Routine correspondence</td>
<td>2.43 2.73</td>
<td>1.21 1.13</td>
<td>2.04 2.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-routine correspondence</td>
<td>2.00 1.92</td>
<td>1.22 1.17</td>
<td>1.75 1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company fax, notes, etc.</td>
<td>2.59 2.71</td>
<td>1.22 1.09</td>
<td>2.16 2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles for publication in journals</td>
<td>1.76 1.60</td>
<td>1.09 1.22</td>
<td>1.54 1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Korean Managers</td>
<td>Australian Managers</td>
<td>Total Respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>Used</td>
<td>Skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Routine correspondence</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-routine correspondence</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructions</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fax, notes, etc.</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal articles</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public relations releases</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special material (contracts,</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>patents, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both groups, there is not much difference between their reading skills and its usages, but they are much higher than their writing skills by approximately 12 percent and its usages by approximately 12 percent as well. Similar to the two previous areas, verbal and writing skills, the skills of Korean expatriates far exceed Australians' by 49 percent on 'skills' and by 47 percent on 'used.' Their reading practices outweigh their skill levels except 'instructions' with a slight lower score. Although the skill level is very low, Australian expatriates are able to read Korean in all 8 types of materials beyond their skill level without exception (Table 12).

**DISCUSSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS**

Comparisons of Australian and Korean expatriates highlight some interesting similarities and differences, which can be useful in understanding the role of target language proficiency within the context of cross-cultural training and corporate language policy. Overall, in the 7 categories of pre-departure training programs, Korean expatriates were given more training opportunities as well as having more effective operations of such programs. Although Australian expatriates had much higher supports on both language and cultural familiarisation trainings than Korean expatriates, the level of effectiveness and the degree of usefulness in both language training and cultural familiarisation training, Korean expatriates reflected a much higher level of confidence.

In terms of the need to be familiar with the target environment, both groups regard language, cultural and business understandings fairly important for their expatriate assignment. Of course, Koreans are much more familiar with English than Australian do with Korean, but both groups feel that the target language is more important than the level of their current familiarity. Overall, Australian expatriates show higher level of understanding on business practices, customs, values and behaviours than their Korean counterparts, thereby suggesting that, although they recognize its importance less than Koreans, they have achieved higher level of understanding on all aspects, except language, after they arrived.

Australian expatriates are linguistically more versatile than Koreans, but Korean expatriates record a higher rate of having first and second foreign language. Also, Korean expatriates indicated a significantly higher level of fluency with the first three foreign languages than Australians do. Those languages that Korean expatriates felt fluent were, of course, English and two Asian languages, Japanese and Korean, rather than European languages.

Interestingly, out of 50 Koreans expatriates who responded to the question, almost all of them regarded their English fluent except two. In contrast, only 52 percent of Australian expatriates said to have learned Korean before arrival and the other 44 percent did not take any Korean language lesson, the level of language proficiency of those who have learnt Korean was not good enough to say that they reached even to the elementary level of Korean language. Australians have learnt Korean mostly at tertiary institutions and as many as 25 percent of Australian expatriates who had learnt Korean before departure discontinued learning Korean after arrival.
Typically, many Korean expatriates reinforced their English skills before departure. After selection, they get more organized supports from their organizations in terms of organizational policy and financial support, including in-company training on English. Also, there was a strong indication that many Korean organisations (61.7%) consider the level of English into personnel evaluation and many organisations (55.76%) had the skills evaluated and reflected in their personnel system regardless of support.

Overall, in all four categories of language skills, the level of skills and used capacity by Korean expatriates far exceeds the Korean language skills of Australians. In terms of listening and speaking skills, both groups use the target language beyond the perceived level of their skills, but Australians tend to make better use of their skills in practice than Koreans. In terms of writing skills, Koreans are able to utilise their writing skills at higher level than the perceived level of writing skills, but Australians are performing less than their skill level. In terms of reading, both groups are similar showing confident use of their skills, although the skill level of Australian expatriates is very low.

In conclusion, two group analysis on cross-cultural and language training provided insights into how expatriates and their organisations prepare for international assignments before departure and after arrival. Learning target language should be understood, in the case of expatriates, within the broad context of cross-cultural understanding and adjustment, for the purpose of achieving organisational objectives. Language learning involves a whole system of individual, educational, organisational and environmental variables, all of which contribute to achieving language proficiency. Whichever the option may be chosen, one has to be aware that there are both advantages and disadvantages in each option. Language training is not cheap either. Therefore organisation and individual expatriate need to be clear with the purpose of learning a language, understand cost-effectiveness in achieving required language competence, and finally a clear corporate language policy, supported by measures of motivating language learning, has to be established in the context of a broad spectrum of cross-cultural effectiveness and corporate objectives in business.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

Human languages are produced linearly so that word order has long been thought to be related with the order of thought, and these days this relationship is being explained by information structure theory (Doherty 1996; von Heusinger 2002). This close relationship between word order and information flow makes it very challenging to translate or interpret one language into another, in particular, if there are significant differences in word order. As in many other languages, there has been much word order related research in English to Korean translation and interpretation. For example, inanimate subject was examined by Lee (2001), relative clause by Lee et al. (2002: 160-164) and Lee (2004) and passive constructions by Kim (1996: 142-150) and Lee (2000).

Little research, however, has been done on the translation and interpretation of English finite and non-finite adverbial clauses into Korean despite a striking difference between English and Korean. Although the translation of English adverbial clauses were mentioned in Ahn (1996: 102-103) and Seo (2004: 250-256) their focus was on translation techniques based on their experience rather than on theories. Furthermore, their discussion did not go beyond the level of individual sentences. In order to translate adverbial clauses properly we do have to analyse not only the sentence with an adverbial clause but also its surrounding sentences.

This paper investigates differences between sentence positions of English and Korean adverbial clauses and their implication for translation.

FINITE ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

In English finite adverbial clauses can precede or follow the main clause as shown in (la) and (lb).

(1a) At the end of only six days we had to close down our mock prison because what we saw was frightening.

(1b) Because what we saw was frightening we had to close down our mock prison at the end of only six days.

This choice over the position is not just stylistic but is very closely related to the organization of the text. Whichever clause comes first, it tends to have given information, referred to in the preceding text (Biber et al. 1999: 835). For example, if the text in (2) came before either of the above sentences, we would choose (1a) for the better flow of information. However, if the text in (2) continued to the text in (3) before either of (1a) and (1b), then we would choose (1b).

(2) We created a simulated prison in the basement of the Psychology Department at Stanford University. Into this "prison" we brought a group of normal, mature, stable, intelligent young men. By flipping a coin, we designated one-half of them prisoners and one-half of them guards, and they lived as such.

(3) Although it was a simulation, we saw some boys ("guards") treat other boys as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty, while other boys ("prisoners") became servile, dehumanized robots who thought only of escape, of their own individual survival, and of their mounting hatred of the guards.

In contrast to the flexible positions of English finite adverbial clauses, Korean finite adverbial clauses cannot come after the main clause. This constraint on Korean finite adverbial clauses tends to cause both of (1a) and (1b) to be translated into type (1b) only in Korean as shown in (4) below.

(4) 우리는 그 곳에서 무서운 것을 보게 되었기 때문에 단 6일 만에 그 가짜 감옥을 폐쇄하지 않을 수 없었다. (Back Translation: Because we saw frightening things there we had to close down our mock prison at the end of only six days.)

This difference in word order between two languages can cause the distortion of the original information flow, making target language texts more difficult to understand and, sometime, even causing significant parts of
the original messages to be lost. This is exactly what happened in the translation of (5a) below, (5b) is its existing translation and (5c) the modified one. To help the discussion, some sections of the texts have been given a superscript number and underlined. These sections will be called 'Underlined Section No. x' (henceforth 'USN x'). Another thing to be mentioned is that the existing translation was modified only in the parts directly relevant to our discussion to avoid any confusion which may arise from the modification of unrelated parts.

(5a) Josephson's experiment suggests that youngsters who do not have aggressive tendencies to begin with do not necessarily act aggressively - at least, not on the basis of seeing only one violent film. That last phrase is an important one because it may be that even youngsters who are not prone toward aggression will become more aggressive if exposed to a steady diet of violent films over a long period. That is exactly what was found in a set of field experiments performed by Ross Parke and his colleagues.

(5b) Josephson의 실험은 어초에 공격적 경향성을 가지고 있지 않은 어린이들은 2적어도 단 한 가지 폭력영화만을 본 것을 근거로 해서는 1반드시 공격적으로 행동하는 것은 아님을 시사한다. 3의 마지막 구절은 4공격적 성향을 가지지 않은 어린이들조차도 일정기간에 걸쳐 폭력영화에 계속 노출되면 좀더 공격적으로 될 것이기 때문에 5 중요한 구절이다. 이것은 정확히 Ross Parke 와 그의 동료에 의해 수행된 일련의 현장실험에서 발견된 것이다.

(5c) Josephson의 실험이 시사하는 바는 어초에 공격적 경향성을 가지고 있지 않은 어린이들은 1반드시 공격적으로 행동하는 것은 아님을, 즉 2적어도 단 한 가지 폭력영화만을 본다는 것이다. 3의 마지막 구절은 중요하다 4그 이유는 공격적 성향을 가지지 않은 어린이들조차도 일정기간에 걸쳐 폭력영화에 계속 노출되면 좀더 공격적으로 될 것이기 때문이다. 5 이것은 정확히 Ross Parke 와 그의 동료에 의해 수행된 일련의 현장실험에서 발견된 것이다.

In (5a) the second sentence is of our first interest since it has a finite adverbial clause beginning with 'because'. In the existing translation (5b) the corresponding clause USN 4 was placed between the subject of the main clause (USN 3a) and its predicate (USN 3b). Although this translation is better than the adverbial clause being placed at the beginning of the sentence, it cannot be ideal since it is easier to understand when the subject and its predicate are placed close to each other (Park 1998:140; Chang 1999:69-70). Furthermore, in (5a) the USN 4 is referred immediately by 'That' (USN 5) in the next sentence but in (5b) these two sections are interrupted by USN 3b, further making their understanding difficult. To solve this problem, the sentence with the 'because' clause should be translated as shown in (5c) following the original information flow.

A more serious problem however lies in the information flow between the first and the second sentence. In (5a) 'That last phrase' in the second sentence refers to USN 2, while in (5b) the corresponding part '의 마지막 구절은' refers not to USN 2 but USN 1. The author of the English text even used the dash (·) before USN 2 to help readers to find the phrase to which 'That last phrase' refers. The existing translation also used a dash not just once, but twice. This use has however made it more difficult to connect USN 2 with USN 3.

This distortion of the original information flow has happened because of the prepositional adverbial phrase at the end of the first sentence. In English the position of prepositional phrases in a sentence is also closely related to the organization of the text, as is the position of finite adverbial clauses. Prepositional phrases can be placed either at the beginning or at the end of a sentence to improve information flow of the text. Corresponding Korean adverbial phrases however cannot be placed at the end of a sentence. Therefore, the translation should be done not at the level of syntactic equivalence but at that of information flow as shown in (5c).

NON-FINITE ADVERBIAL CLAUSES

English non-finite adverbial clauses can be realized in several ways such as ing-clauses, ed-clauses, to-infinitive clauses and verbless clauses (Biber et al. 1999:767). This paper however focuses only on ing-clauses since it is too extensive to cover all these types and the other three types seem to behave similarly to ing-clauses from the text organizational point of view.

Like English finite adverbial clauses, ing-clauses can come either of before or after the main clauses as shown in (6) and (7a) below. However, unlike finite clauses, the position of ing-clauses is decided by its relationship with the main clause rather than by which clause carries given information mentioned in the preceding text. They tend to carry information which supplements the information in the main clauses. This supplementary nature of ing-clauses seems to make them strongly prefer sentence final position. Non-finite clauses come after the main clause over eighty five percent of time (Biber et al. 1999:831).

(6) Watching him as the days went by, the guilty collector had noticed signs of physical and moral decline.
(from Biber et al. 1999:783)
(7a) Three weeks ago Swedish and Scottish police searched Talb's flat in Uppsala, removing fifteen bags of clothing. (from Biber et al. 1999:793)

The major problem with the translation of ing-clauses into Korean is that Korean does not have any syntactically equivalent grammatical structure that is flexible in its position. As a result, ing-clauses are generally treated like English finite adverbial clauses and translated as such. In other words, sentence final ing-clauses are translated into Korean sentence initial adverbials, possibly more often than sentence final English finite clauses. This repositioning of ing-clauses will be equivalent to changing (7a) into (7b). This sentence does not sound logical since the action in the main clause should precede the one in the ing-clause.

(7b)*Removing fifteen bags of clothing, three weeks ago Swedish and Scottish police searched Talb’s flat in Uppsala. (from Biber et al. 1999:793)

This type of translation is not difficult to find in existing translations and such an example is (8b) which contains two ing-clauses. The first one is USN 2. Although USN 2 does not begin with a USN 2, this relationship has been reversed in (Bb) in which English USN 2 was translated as a sentence initial adverbial, making USN 2 a cause for USN 1. It is more logical that the subjects immersed themselves in their roles so that they were “no longer able to clearly differentiate between role-playing and self.” This sentence should therefore be translated as in (8c) following its original clause order.

(8a) At the end of the only six days we had to close down our mock prison because what we saw was frightening. It was no longer apparent to us or most of the subjects where they ended and their roles began. The majority had indeed become “prisoners” or “guards,” no longer able to clearly differentiate between role-playing and self. There were dramatic changes in virtually every aspect of their behaviour, thinking and feeling. In less than a week, the experience of imprisonment undid (temporarily) a lifetime of learning; human values were suspended, self-concepts were challenged, and the ugliest, most base, pathological side of human nature surfaced. We were horrified because we saw some boys (“guards”) treat other boys as if they were despicable animals, taking pleasure in cruelty, while other boys (“prisoners”) became servile, dehumanized robots who thought only of escape, of their own individual survival, and of their mounting hatred of the guards.

(8b) 우리는 단 6일만에 그 가짜 감옥을 폐쇄하지 않을 수 없었다. 우리는 그 곳에서 무서운 것을 보게 되었기 때문이다. 이 판험자들이 일한 역할이 어디에서 시작되고 어디서 끝나는지에 대한 한계가 우리 연구진에게나 판험자들에게나 불분명해지게 되었다. 말은 역할과 실제의 자기를 더 이상 분명히 구별할 수 없게 되었으며, 판험자들은 대부분 절말로 절정적인 “죄수”, 절정적인 “교도관”이 되었다. 그들의 행동, 생각, 감정, 그 모든 측면에서 극적인 변화가 일어났다. 일주일도 채 안 되는 그 가짜 생활은 그들이 일생동안 받은 교육을 (절정적이지만) 해체해버렸다. 인간적 가치는 유보되었으며, 자아-개념은 무시되었고, 인간 본성의 가장 좋고 가장 비열한, 병적 측면이 표면에 드러났다. 7 “죄수” 학생들은 “교도관”에 대한 고조되는 증오심, 자기 자신의 생존, 그리고 도망가는 것만을 생각하는 비글하고 비인간화된 로봇이 된 반면, 6 학생 “교도관”들은 자기 자신 속의 폭력을 즐기며 5 “죄수” 학생들을 마치 비슷한 동물처럼 다루는 4 것을 보고 3 우리는 공포에 질렸던 것이다.

(8c) 우리는 단 6일만에 그 가짜 감옥을 폐쇄하지 않을 수 없었는데 그 이유는 그 곳에서 무서운 것을 보게 되었기 때문이다. 이 판험자들이 일한 역할이 어디에서 시작되고 어디서 끝나는지에 대한 한계가 우리 연구진에게나 판험자들에게나 불분명해지게 되었다. 판험자들은 대부분 절말로 절정적인 “죄수”, 절정적인 “교도관”이 되어서, 말은 역할과 실제의 자기를 더 이상 분명히 구별할 수 없게 되었다. 그들의 행동, 생각, 감정, 그 모든 측면에서 극적인 변화가 일어났다. 일주일도 채 안 되는 그 가짜 생활은 그들이 일생동안 받은 교육을 (절정적이지만) 해체해버렸다. 인간적 가치는 유보되었으며, 자아-개념은 무시되었고, 인간 본성의 가장 좋고 가장 비열한, 병적 측면이 표면에 드러났다. 6 학생 “교도관”들은 “죄수” 학생들을 마치 비슷한 동물처럼 다루면서 5 자신의 속의 폭력을 즐긴 반면, 7 “죄수” 학생들은 자기 자신의 생존과 탈출과 “교도관”에 대한 고조되는 증오심만을 생각하는 비글하고 비인간화된 로봇이 되는 4 것을 보고 3 우리는 공포에 질렸었던 것이다.
The second ing-clause is located in USN 6 and its main clause is USN 5. As happened in the translation of the first ing-clause, the second one was also translated before USN 5 as shown in (8b), resulting in the distortion of the original meaning. As Biber et al. (1999:783, 820) revealed that the relationship between ing-clauses and the main clause could be ambiguous and multiple, English USN 5 and 6 could be interpreted that the action in USN 5 concurs with the one in USN 6 or that USN 6 is a result of USN 5. The Korean translation could also be considered having a concurrent time relationship and a result relationship. However, the latter relationship is reversed compared to the one in English. In the translation, USN 5 is a result of USN 6. It should be the other way around.

The same type of translation has also occurred with USN 7 with the 'while' finite clause. Although USN 7 is a result of USN 5 & 6, the Korean translation placed USN 5 & 6 before USN 7. The English text has another finite clause beginning with 'because' and its sentence initial main clause (USN 3) was also translated into the end of the whole sentence but this does not seem to cause any distortion of the information flow.

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that this study has examined only the small number of adverbial types. However, notwithstanding its limitations, this study does suggest that translation of English adverbials into Korean requires special attention to information flow. In other words, translators should consider not only individual sentences with adverbials but also the text containing these individual sentences.

It seems that the tendency to translate at the level of individual sentences has been caused by learning English as a foreign language in school. School language teaching generally focuses on helping students to understand sentence structures, not text organization. Translation students should be taught to pay attention to text organization. This issue also applies to teaching of Korean to foreigners since for their Korean writing tasks learners of Korean tend to think or write in English first and then to translate their English thought or writing into Korean.

REFERENCES


Please quote as:
Korean/English parallel concordancer and its application to Korean language learning and teaching

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The recent development of information technology has brought new opportunities to Korean language learners who are confronted with insufficient learning resources. One of the fundamental issues concerning insufficient learning resources is that there is no on-line dictionary for Korean language learners available, so Korean language learners have to rely on dictionaries designed for Korean native speakers. In order to find a word in a dictionary, Korean language learners must have a knowledge of grammar. As learners with low Korean proficiency are very dependent on the dictionary, their very limited vocabulary and grammatical knowledge tend to cause problems. Yet this issue has not gained much attention.

This article reports on empirical research in progress into the development of a Korean/English parallel concordancer and its application to Korean language learning and teaching.

Concordancer in Korean Language Learning

Corpus and concordance have been regarded as one of the most useful ideas in computer assisted language learning (Johns, 1986; Cobb, 1997; Sun, 2003). Corpus is a large collection of text which is usually stored in electronic format. The concordance provides a list of the occurrence of a word or phrase in a corpus.

Concordancing software has attracted attention for its pedagogical value in various aspects of language learning because of its unique function in showing the usage of certain words in several contexts. There are many examples of its application in teaching English as a foreign language, though these mainly use a monolingual English corpus (Aston, 1997; Flowerdew, 1993). A parallel concordancer, with a bilingual concordancing software, has been developed and used for translation studies and some pedagogic implications have been discussed (Barlow 1995, 1996; Cobb 1997; St.John, 2001). As a consequence of this kind of research, there has been a general shift of interest to a Data Driven Language approach which provides a very large number of examples while leaving the learner to work out the usage rules and the meaning (Johns, 2002; Wang, 2001; St.John, 2001).

Yet there has been very little research applied to Korean as a foreign language. One of the reasons for the lack of research in this field is that the Korean concordancer has been developed only recently and it is not yet widely known to language teachers and learners. There is some research that suggests the need of a learners' corpus to assist in understanding the difficulties faced by learners of Korean as a Foreign Language and the possibility of using a concordancer for learning or teaching Korean. (Seo, Yoo and Nam, 2000; You, 2001) Another reason is that the main concordancer developed in Korea is designed for the need of researchers who are Korean native speakers, so it is not easy for most Korean language learners to use. For example, a Korean –English parallel concordancer ‘Hepman’ displays all the menu and instructions in Korean, so Korean language learners with low Korean proficiency have difficulties understanding them. Also it contains large corpora, search results of frequent words can easily become too long and meaningless and this can become very demotivating for the learners with low language proficiency (St.John, 2001, p.188).

The main research interest in this paper is based on the Data Driven Language approach, which concerns learners' inductive language acquisition on grammatical rules and lexicon, especially the difference between the target language (Korean) and their own language (English). In order to carry out this research, an on-line Korean-English parallel concordancer “MOA” was developed in 2003 as part of The Korean Language Education Clearinghouse project funded by the Korea Foundation.

The development of an on-line Korean-English parallel concordancer

The recent development of information technology has brought new opportunities to Korean language learners who are confronted with insufficient learning resources. One of the fundamental issues concerning insufficient learning resources is that there are very few basic learning resources such as dictionaries and grammar books available.
The Korean–English parallel concordancer MOA was developed on the Internet, so that learners or educators who are confronted with insufficient learning resources can easily access it. Unlike the Korean–English parallel concordancer 'Hepman', MOA is specially designed for Korean language learners. Development of MOA therefore overcame many of the difficulties low proficiency learners faced using a dictionary. In order to find a word in a dictionary, Korean language learners must have some knowledge of grammar. As learners with low Korean proficiency are very dependent on the dictionary, their very limited vocabulary and grammatical knowledge tend to cause problems using it. In order to find the word “ washington” in a dictionary, they have to know that the stem of this word is “wash”, but this is not easy for the learners with low Korean proficiency.

As the use of the concordancer involves searching for the forms, learners would be able to find meaning of the word “ washington” in MOA without grammatical knowledge. Searching for the word “ washington” is a simple matter of selecting a file ‘mykorean01-30’ in ‘Select file to search’ dialogue box and entering the word “Washington” in the ‘Search for’ dialogue box. The searched word, which is highlighted and underlined in a sentence is displayed along with the translation equivalent of that sentence as follows:

Figure 1 Searching a word in MOA

Another problem of using a dictionary designed for Korean native speakers is that the examples in those dictionaries are English ones translated into Korean. This means that the examples in the dictionary are selected for Koreans learning English and naturally reflects the culture of an English speaking country. The Korean usage in these examples is often not authentic. For example, the Yahoo dictionary which is available on the web has a searching function, so Korean language learners can use it after acquiring Korean vocabulary like ‘ search (searching)’ and ‘ example (example)’. This searching function is very useful for the Korean language learners, but some examples in the texts are not ideal for Korean language learners. They contain unnatural Korean and situations which could not possibly occur in Korea.
I have no cash on me. May I pay by cheque?

Jenny's not here at the moment. Can I take a message?

I'm afraid not. But we do have it in a beautiful shade of green. Could I show you that?

Figure 2 Example of Yahoo dictionary

The corpus in MOA is thus based on Korean textbooks which are developed for English speakers. Due to difficulties of obtaining copyright clearance, the texts contain only some authentic texts. The remaining texts were written as close as possible to authentic texts and situations. As textbooks are graded according to learners' proficiency level, texts naturally cover various levels of vocabulary and grammar and also contain both of written and spoken sentences.

There is a limit to the volume of information learners can process at once. As Miller’s famous term ‘the magical number seven plus or minus two’ (Miller, 1956) describes, the capacity of the working memory to deal with distinct items is very limited (cited by Cho, 2001). The size of text files is therefore very important, especially for the beginner level. Learners can acquire vocabulary or grammar through various examples, provided that the amount of examples is not too large to cause confusion. The size of file is not only related to students’ vocabulary and grammar acquisition, but also to loading time. For example, the number of matches for the word ‘어서 (in; at)’ in a bigger file is 72 but 11 in the smaller file. As MOA is a parallel concordancer, the assimilation of texts in a big file takes a longer time than a monolingual concordancer, and it can easily lead to frustration for learners who use a slow modem at home. It is also well known that the download time which people can stand is very short (Cho, 2001 p.69). Thus files in MOA consisted of many small size files as well as a big file ensuring accommodation of users’ needs and time.

The application of Korean/English parallel concordancer to Korean language learning and teaching

The most use of the concordancer engages searching for a meaning of a word which learners wants to know or investigating the use of the word which they want to know in the target language. In order to find the word or phrase in MOA which is illustrated in Figure 3, the user is required to select a file from the list in the dialogue box and type a search word and click ‘go’ and the result of a search will display in the window as illustrated in Figure 4.
1.1) 밖에서 바지를 사요.
1.2) I am buying a pair of trousers in the department store.

2.1) 모나시 대학교에서 한국어 공부해요.
2.2) I am studying Korean at Monash University.

3.1) 읽어서 돈을 찾아요.
3.2) I'm withdrawing money at a bank.

4.1) 서점에서 책을 사요.
4.2) I'm buying a book at a bookshop.

All the instances of the searched word that are found in a sentence appear with numbers in the window along with the translation equivalent to those sentences. The searched word is highlighted and underlined, so it can be easily identified. This will help learners to attend to the position of the word in a sentence.

There is another function in MOA, which can be used in learning Korean. If learners want to consolidate what they learnt through reviewing the examples, they simply choose the 'Korean' button in the 'Switch to:' section. All the examples will be retrieved without English translation as illustrated in figure 5. While going through these examples, the learners can test their learning by themselves. If they find that they do not fully understood, they simply click the 'Both' button to retrieve Korean examples with English translation.
1.1) 택화점에서 비자를 사요.
2.1) 모나시 대학교에서 한국어 공부해야.
3.1) 음행에서 돈을 찾아요.
4.1) 서점에서 책을 사요.
5.1) 회사에서 일 해요.

Figure 5 Korean only search results

It is also possible to use MOA as a teaching or testing tool. It enables teachers to get numerous of examples for a word or phrase and to create cloze exercises with ease. First, run a search on a word and phrase with the gapping function on as illustrated in figure 6.

Second, copy and paste the search results into your own word processor and do whatever editing is necessary. Finally, distribute the completed exercise to students and ask them to supply the word or phrase needed to complete the sentences given.

The concordancer serves not only to search for single words but also for word combinations such as idioms. As a search string is basically a continuous set of characters, and a blank space is also regarded as a character by the computer, a search string such as "<>\" is as easy to locate as the string "\". On the other hand, if one uses a short string of characters, it is possible to get unwanted words which contain the same string of characters the user is looking for. For example, when trying to look for the subject particle '가', not only the word '가' is presented but also words such as '가요', '가끔' are presented at the same time (Figure 7). Therefore, to minimise the frequency of occurrences of unwanted words, MOA has three search options: 'Exact match', 'Starts with', and 'Ends with'. For example, when looking for only the subject particle '가', the
'Ends with' search option can be selected. As figure 8 shows, the words such as '가요', '가끔' are not displayed in the search results.

27.1) 멜버른에 자주 가요.
27.2) I often go to Melbourne.

28.1) 한국 음식을 가끔 먹어요.
28.2) I sometimes eat Korean food.

29.1) 물을 많이 마셔요. 그래서 화장실에 자주 가요.
29.2) I drink lots of water. So I go to the toilet often.

30.1) 가끔 시내에서 영화를 봐요.
30.2) I sometimes see a movie in the city.

31.1) 주소가 어떻게 되세요?
31.2) Please give me your address.

32.1) 종로 삼간해요.
32.2) We are at Jongno 3-ga. (It Is Jongno 3-ga)

33.1) 영화가 별씨 시작했어요. 돌아가요.
33.2) The film has already started. Let's go in.

34.1) 서울 식당에 가요.
34.2) Let's go to Seoul restaurant.

35.1) 한국 식당에 가요.
35.2) Let's go to a Korean restaurant.

Figure 7 Search results for '가'

5.1) 저녁에 갑자기 친구가 찾아 왔어요. 그래서, 못 했어요.
5.2) My friend unexpectedly came over to look for me last night so I couldn't

6.1) 누가 구두를 사요?
6.2) Who is buying the shoes

7.1) 누가 이 컵 씻었어요?
7.2) Who broke this cup

8.1) 면세가 어떻게 되세요?
8.2) Would you mind telling me your age

9.1) 주소가 어떻게 되세요?
9.2) May I have your address

10.1) 전화번호가 어떻게 되세요?
10.2) May I have your phone number

Figure 8 Search results using the 'Ends with' option
One of the drawbacks of current dictionaries is that the examples in the dictionary are isolated from the context and they are all sentence level, so it is difficult for learners to see how a word can be used in a larger context. The concordancer ‘MOA’ provides a system to expand the example beyond the sentence level. For example, if the learner found examples of “는 데” from the concordancer and wanted to see the context in which the word used, it is only necessary to click the highlighted word and the popup window which contains the dialogue with the example appears (Figure 9).

The above examples show that the Korean English parallel concordancer can complement existing dictionaries. This is very useful to Korean learners using it as a learning tool. The application of this concordancer, however can be more beneficial if learners themselves discover grammatical rules and lexicon through multiple examples, especially the differences between the target language (Korean) and their own language (English). To investigate if this kind of Data Driven Language approach is effective for learners with low proficiency, a case study was conducted in 2005.

Participants
Six university students who are currently enrolled at second year level of Korean at Monash University in Australia participated. Students at this level consist of three groups: Students who studied first year Korean at the university, students who studied Korean at a secondary school and joined the second year level of Korean at the university and a student who studied Korean in Korea. Some of them are English native speakers and the rest speak English but English is not their first language. None of them are Korean heritage students. Some of them study Korean as their major and some of them as a minor or single unit.

Procedure
The following procedure has been carried out for investigating the effectiveness of using a Korean English parallel concordancer as a learning tool.

1. Students received a brief overview of the concordancer and an explanation of how to use it.
2. The handout explaining the use of the concordancer with illustrated examples was provided and two tasks were given to students as a self-study material.
3. Students were given one or two weeks to complete the tasks.

All students had a certain amount of general practice computing skill to carry out these tasks without assistance. They learnt how to input Korean in English windows either in the first year at university or before carrying out these tasks.

Tasks given to students were not part of the regular assignments, so students were told to submit anonymously. The reason for not including this task among their regular assignments was to prevent students from feeling threatened by using new technology (St. John, 2001, p.188). Moreover, there is more chance to obtain honest feedback when students submitted the tasks without providing their names.

Tasks and Analysis
Two sets of tasks consisted of lexical and grammatical exercises usually encountered by students.

Task 1
This exercise is to help you to learn the usage of the Korean word ‘것’.

- Go to the following website.
- Select the file ‘myKorean01-30’ and search the word ‘것’.

1. List the English words which are equivalent to ‘것’.
2. Can you explain when Korean word ‘것’ is used? Do Korean examples have something in common?
3. How useful did you find this exercise?
   Very Useful         Fairly Useful         Not useful
4. Any comments?

Task 1 was answered correctly by all of students. They found Korean word “것” is translated as ‘which, what, how (many)... how old’ in English and concluded that it is used in questions and usually refers to something with numbers. Two students out of six students replied that it was ‘very useful’ and four replied ‘fairly useful’. A student who replied this task was very useful made comments that the task made understanding the meaning of words clearer and it was a good way to learn about the word. Another student who replied this task was fairly useful also made a similar comment.

Task 1 was relatively easy for 2nd year level of students. They had studied about the word at some stage, so they had some familiarity with this word. The search produced only 19 hits and only three different English equivalent words, so identifying the meaning through examples was not very complicated. This kind of lexical learning task is a good example of a task which the learners can handle with ease.

Task 2
This exercise is to help you to learn the difference between the English word ‘will’ and its Korean equivalents.

- Go to the following website.
- Select the file ‘myKorean01-30’ and search the word ‘will’.

1. List the Korean words which are equivalent to ‘will’.
2. What is the difference between the English word ‘will’ and its Korean equivalents?
3. How useful did you find this exercise?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very Useful</th>
<th>Fairly Useful</th>
<th>Not useful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Any comments?

Task 2 was apparently more challenging than task 1. Some students found this task was confusing. Only one out of six students carried out the task successfully and evaluated it as 'very useful'. On the other hand, a student who replied that task 1 was 'very useful' evaluated task 2 less positively. The list all the Korean words which are equivalent 'will' was not very useful in fully explaining the grammatical difference between Korean and English. This task was described as 'can be confusing' and evaluated as only 'fairly useful'.

Two students evaluated both tasks as 'fairly useful'. One of them carried out the task successfully but did not provide any comments and the other student did not carry out the task successfully but still described this exercise as 'fairly useful'. The latter student did not seem to go through all the examples and only listed two Korean words which appeared in the first window. This finding supports the previous research on the concordancer which argued concordances of frequent words in a large corpora can easily become too long and very demotivating for the learners with low language proficiency (St.John, 2001, p.188)

A student who replied that task 1 was 'fairly useful' replied that task 2 was between 'fairly useful' and 'not useful' and the other student who replied that task 1 was 'fairly useful' replied that task 2 was not useful.

A student who carried out task 2 successfully evaluated it as very useful. It indicated that it could be beneficial to students who are very motivated and like a challenge.

One student commented on this task “I’m confused… I think it would be more helpful to look at the different Korean equivalents separately to see patterns more clearly, to understand how these Korean equivalents work…” and another student also made similar comment about the complication of finding Korean equivalents.

The complication encountered by students can be analysed and suggest that the students were overloaded by the amount of information gained and the amount of processing required to get a result. The number of different Korean/English equivalents was 8 in task 2 and 3 in task 1. The number of hits was 44 in the task 2, compare to 19 in task 1.

The indication by students that the usefulness of task 2 was lower than task 1 suggested that the beginning learners were cognitively overloaded and could not pay attention to so many meaningful differences at once. Attention is a crucial concept in the explanation of the development of L2 fluency which can be connected to the psychological concept of automaticity (DeKeyser, 2001, Schmidt 1992). The research indicates that tasks and data for beginning learners should be simple and small so that they can develop the capacity to attend to details and gradually notice the forms and meanings.

Conclusion and implications for pedagogy

This study aimed to introduce the development of a Korean/English parallel concordancer and explore the possibility of the using parallel concordancer as a learning or teaching tool at beginner level. It should be noted that the concordancer does not contain ample authentic data, and this study has examined only two tasks with a small number of students participating. The findings below however are useful for language educators and researchers in this field:

1. MOA, a Korean/English parallel concordancer could complement the existing dictionaries.
2. Beginning-level learners can acquire vocabulary or grammar through various examples using a parallel concordancer, provided that the amount of data they receive is not too large.
3. The mismatch between target language (Korean) and English seems to affect learners’ information processing procedures. An English word which has several meanings in Korean is harder than a Korean word with several meanings in English.

References


Nante as a Sentence-final Suffix in Korean: a Relevance Theory Approach

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1. Introduction

Previous semantic or pragmatic studies on the suffix nunte, such as those by Sohn (1978), Tsai (1985), Jeon (1989), Yi (1996), Park (1996, 1997, 1998), etc., identify it as a conjunctive suffix. In particular, Tsai, Choi, Jeon and Yi treat the [X-nunte Y] sequence as a nunte-conjunction, and share the view that semantic relations between the two propositions linked by nunte constitute semantic meanings of the connective nunte: e.g. circumstance (1), time (2), reason (3), contrast (4), concession (5):

(1) i rationun hankuk chep'umi-nte chili achu chohsugnpita
   'This radio was made in Korea. Its quality is very good.' (Tsai 1985: 139)

(2) naeka kinkuneke muosinka somyongul hae chuko iss-nunte pakkuni takawassta
   'When I was explaining something to Mr. Kim, Mr. Park came to me.' (Tsai 1985: 163)

(3) kusaram hyongpyoni dryounte chom towachwora
   'Because he is badly off, please give him a hand.' (Jeon 1989: 193)

(4) apochinin k'ika k'unte atulun k'ika chakta
   'The father is tall, but his son is short.' (Jeon 1989: 64)

(5) kongpuril yolsimhi haess-nunte sihome ttochyeossta
   'Although I studied hard, I failed an examination.' (Jeon, 1989: 73)

Sohn (1978) and Park (1996, 1997, 1998) consider the [X-nunte] construction as the [X-nunte(Y)] sequence. The following example shows that the elliptical Y such as ‘What shall you do?’ can be recovered:

(6) pika wass-nunte
   'In the circumstance that it rained ...' (Adapted from Sohn, 1978: 203-204)

However, not all examples sustain them. First, let us examine (7):

(7) (M & U)
U: s nonsaengnim
   'Teacher.'
M: ye ye
   'Yes yes.'
U: cho taum chu wolyoinal sihom isskotunjyo
   'It's that I have an exam next Monday.'
M: [ok
   'What!'
naeil
   'Tomorrow?'
U: ai anyo kukka tolaonun
   'Oh, no, I mean the coming one.'
M: ye ye
   'Oh I see.'
U: kaeraekachiku nonsaengnim mwochi

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M: com tō sstō hasyŏsŏmyen chokess-nūntē
    ‘So teacher, it would be good if you would do a little more (Could you do that?).’

M: [ye ye
    ‘Yes yes.’
    chal toessta
    ‘That’s good.’

According to Park (1996: 137), the arrowed nūnte signals the speaker’s stance that causes the hearer to make the relevant inference about the speaker making a request to get tutoring once more due to an examination on the following Monday. However, this stance is not the request that the omitted Y indicates in that X encodes the following implicature:

(8) I need you to help me prepare for an examination on the coming Monday as a tutor.

Park (1997: 183, 1998: 49) insists that the [X-nūnte (Y)] sequence appears to communicate the preliminary action that X indicates to the main action that Y does. If this argument is correct, this sequence indicates a tautology. The reconstructed Y, such as ‘Could you do that?’, encodes the same implicature as X does. Therefore, nūnte in (7) is identified as a sentence-final suffix rather than as a conjunctive suffix. Second, let us consider (9) extracted from my data:

(9) SH & YH – From ‘When I was an elementary school student’)
    [Context: SH and YH are talking about the milk that they drank in their elementary school days.]

SH: kūnte
    ‘By the way.’
YH: hūln uyuman p’anūn ke aniku
    ‘We didn’t get only white milk.’
YH: urito issŏsŏ
    ‘We could get other flavors of milk.’
    chumun paltu su issŏsŏnūnte pissasŏ tŏ
    ‘We could order other flavors, but they were expensive.’
SH: küraessnā
    ‘Is that so?’
YH: o tō pissan kŏsstu issŏsŏ ôtŏn tăenūn
    ‘Yes. There were more expensive ones, sometimes.’
    aninka
    ‘Don’t you think so?’
SH: urin ḍŏsŏsŏ
    ‘There was no white milk in my class.’
    molra yochŏm pakkwiŏsŏ kŏrünchī
    ‘I don’t know. Nowadays it’s changed.’
YH: kūrīku uyu tu kaessik mŏktnūn aetŏ issŏs-nūnte
    ‘And there was a student who drank two milk everyday.’
SH: mchŏ kkok kkok pumonimī inche uyuhara kūraesŏ tomūn naessnūnte
YH: o
    ‘Yeah.’
SH: mak kkok an kachku kantūn aetŏl isschanha
    ‘I remember some students didn’t pick up milk, although their parents paid for it.’
    chi chakika an nāen chul aikū
    ‘Because they thought they had not paid for it’

In the arrowed [X-nūnte] construction, YH conveys the fact that a certain student drank two containers of milk everyday. If I assume this construction is the [X-nūnte (Y)] sequence, I cannot retrieve the elliptical main clause Y using my intuition as a native Korean speaker.

Using relevance theory, I will attempt to analyze the meaning of nūnte. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes ‘procedural meaning’ of connectives in general. Section 3 proffers examples of each procedural meaning that nūnte encodes. Section 4 examines Blakemore’s (1987, 1992, 2002) ‘constraints on contextual effects’ and describes that which enables a hearer to identify each procedural meaning of nūnte. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Procedural and conceptual meanings of connectives

The theoretical framework for this paper is relevance theory. Wilson (2004) divides connectives into truth-
conditional connectives that affect truth conditions (e.g. and, or, if ... then, because, etc.), and non-truth-conditional connectives that do not affect truth-conditions (e.g. after all, so, but, etc.). Consider the following example:

(10) Tom ate the condemned meat. Because of that he fell ill thirteen hours later.
(11) Tom ate the condemned meat. So he fell ill thirteen hours later. (Blakemore, 1987: 88)

So in (11) does not indicate a causal relation, which because of that in (10) does. According to Blakemore (1987), it is only acceptable on the condition that the hearer assumes that anyone who ate the condemned meat would fall ill thirteen hours late. She gives the rationale of the discrimination as follows. First, the causal connection established by because of the fact constitutes the propositional representation. Second, the above contextual assumption enables so to establish the inferential connection. Blakemore (1992, 2002) adds that this assumption is identified as a contextual implication in which the first segment is interpreted as a premise, and the second segment as a conclusion.

In relevance theory, truth-conditional connectives are analyzed as encoding concepts but non-truth-conditional connectives are not. Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 83-93) treat concepts as elements that constitute logical forms, especially propositional forms of assumptions, and define an assumption or a propositional representation as a structural set of concepts. The notion of assumption is divided into ‘explicature’, which is communicated explicitly, and ‘implicature,’ which is communicated implicitly. According to them, concepts give access to three types of information (i.e. lexical, logical and encyclopedic entries or files) that are stored in memory. First, lexical entries contain information about the related word, e.g. its syntactic category membership, co-occurrence possibilities, phonological structure, etc. Second, logical entries contain a set of deductive rules that describe a set of input and output assumptions, i.e. a set of premises and conclusions. Third, encyclopedic entries contain information about the objects, events and properties, which concepts extend and/or denote.

It is noted that not all concepts contain three types of information (Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995; Wilson, 2004). For example, truth-conditional connectives have a lexical entry that describes the word and or or and a logical entry that contains deductive rules related to the concept AND (\(\land\)) or OR (\(\lor\)). However, these connectives do not contain an encyclopedic entry on the ground that they do not extend or recognize objects or events in the way that linguistic forms such as dog and run do.

Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2002) further divides linguistic meanings of connectives into ‘conceptual’ and ‘procedural’. The first is a truth-conditional meaning that encodes concepts. The second is a non-truth-conditional meaning that does not contribute to propositional representations, but rather encodes instructions on how to interpret these representations. Blakemore (1987, 2002) analyzes non-truth-conditional connectives as encoding procedural meaning. So, what is the definition of procedural meaning that Blakemore intends to give?

Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 108-117) argues that ‘relevance’ is specified by contextual effects, and that contextualization of \(\{P\}\) in \(\{C\}\), which is a deduction based on the union of new information \(\{P\}\) and old information \(\{C\}\), brings about the following three types of contextual effects:

(12) Contextual implication:
A synthesis of old and new information and a result of interaction between them.
(13) Strengthening:
Strengthening a previously held assumption.
(14) Contradiction:
Displacing or erasing a previously held assumption.

As described above, Blakemore (1987, 1992, 2002) claims that non-truth-conditional connectives such as after all, so, but, etc. encode procedural meanings. Moreover, she (2002: 95) argues that these connectives also encode immediately contextual effects. Therefore, it is inferred from these two insistences that the notion of ‘procedural meaning’ is identical to the one of ‘contextual effect’.

3. Contextual effects encoded by nûnte

In this section, I provide examples that show types of procedural meanings, i.e. contextual effects, which nûnte encodes.

3.1 Type 1: Bridging implicature

The first type shows that nûnte encodes a bridging implicature. In terms of relevance theory, Matsui (2000: 20) characterizes bridging reference, as follows:
there is not explicitly mentioned antecedent in the previous discourse; the antecedent must be added to the listener's mental representation using clues given by the explicit content of the discourse"

**Nün-te** gives a hearer an instruction that there is an implicature that bridges each referent of two segments. Let us analyze **nün-te** in (15):

(15) (DS & HK – From ‘My excursion’)

[Context: HK is telling DS about events involving butter that she picked up from a certain pub. She went to a certain pub with one of her friends. They took packets of butter from the pub.]

HK: körnte ku naengchangko yö-nün-te kõke õpsõchín kõya
‘By the way, I opened the fridge. They had disappeared.’

First, the hearer DS assigns the referent kõke ‘they’ as butter from contexts. Second, DS attempts to interpret (15) with the assumption such as that butter is stored in a fridge. This assumption is easily accessible to encyclopedic entries in DS’s memory. Finally, in order to bridge two referents, naengchangko ‘fridge’ and butter, DS recovers an implicature like that there was no butter in the fridge that HK opened.

3.2 Type 2: Conclusion implicature

The second type proves that **nün-te** encodes a conclusion implicature.

(16) (DS & HK – From ‘My excursion’)

[Context: DS tells HK about what he is cooking at his dormitory in Australia. DS says that he tastes the same flavor as he did in his home in Korea when he eats *kimch’i* cooked by him.]

HK: a kimbh’i-nnte õti kana ku masi naonõn kõn tangyõnhachi
‘Kimch’i is *kimch’i*. So, it makes sense that everywhere *kimch’i* tastes the same flavor because *kimch’i* is *kimch’i*.’

The explicatures of two segments in (16) can be recovered, as follows:

(17) (a) The thing which DS is making in his dormitory is *kimch’i*.
(b) People taste the same flavor wherever they eat *kimch’i*.

If it is assumed that anyone tastes the same flavor of *kimch’i* (i.e. ‘pickled cabbage’) everywhere, clauses (a) and (b) establish the inferential connection, premise and conclusion. So, **nün-te** in (16) is established as encoding a conclusion implicature.

3.3 Type 3: Temporal implicature

The third type shows that **nün-te** encodes a temporal implicature.

(18) (DS & HK – From ‘My excursion’)

[Context: DS is telling HK of his experience when his front teeth were broken during his childhood. DS says that his two front teeth were broken and fell out while he was eating shrimp crisps. However, HK expresses the feeling that she cannot understand why his teeth fell out.]

DS: ani sœukkangõl mõk-nün-te ippali ppachyõssõ
‘No, while I was eating shrimp crisps, I really lost my teeth.’

The explicatures of two segments in (18) can be recovered, as follows:

(19) (a) DS was eating shrimp crisps.
(b) DS’s front teeth dropped.

In (19), DS’s eating shrimp crisps, in clause (a), and DS’s losing his front milk teeth, in clause (b), overlap temporally. Thus, **nün-te** in (18) is established as encoding a temporal implicature.

3.4 Type 4: Contrast implicature

The fourth type proves that **nün-te** encodes a contrast implicature.

(20) (SH & YH – From ‘My excursion’)

[Context: SH and YH are talking about how students and teachers arrived at the excursions. They state
that students had to arrive for their excursions early as the appointment time was usually 9 o’clock and they could not be late. YH describes how teachers traveled to the destination and compares ordinary teachers with teachers in charge.

YH: tamimüli ilpurö aetüirang kat’i kalryöko kürüñ aetü sön sōnsaengnimtül issökachiku sōnsaengnimtülün kat’i t’ako kake toe-nünte kődii taeppun sōnsaengnimtülün chachönkö chaki ch’a t’ako ochi ktike tő p’yŏnhaniikk’a ‘Teachers in charge with there by subway to go with their students, but most teachers went there by their car for convenience.’

The explicatures of two segments in (20) can be recovered, as follows:

(21) (a) Teachers in charge went to the excursions by subway in order to have their students not be late.
(b) Ordinary teachers went to the excursions by their car because they do not think it convenient to go to excursions by subway.

Each explicature in (22) is accessible to the following assumptions, respectively:

(22) (a) A Subway is one means of public transportation.
(b) A private car is not public transportation.

So, nünte in (20) is established as encoding a contrast implicature.

3.5 Type 5: Contradiction

The fifth type shows that nünte encodes a contradiction.

(23) (HY & JS – From ‘My excursion’)

[Context: JS is telling HY about an experience when he visited a certain Jewish asylum that was built by Nazis. JS explained that he met an old guide who was in the Jewish asylum in World War II, and that the guide’s older sister was executed in front of him.]

JS: solchikhi nato sūlp’ŏss-nünte nan kılŏhike nunmul’n an natô ‘To be frank, I was also sad, but I didn’t cry.’
[an] nassnünte ‘I didn’t cry.’
HY: [um] ‘Yeah.’
natu kılôn kŏe nunmul’n chal an hŭlryŏ ‘I don’t cry about that.’

The explicatures of two segments in (23) can be recovered, as follows:

(24) (a) JS was sad at the story that a poor Jewish girl was executed by Nazis in front of her brother.
(b) JS did not cry.

The presupposition in (25) can be inferred from clause (24a):

(25) (a) If someone is sad (Premise) (b) he cries (Conclusion)

Example (24b) denies the conclusion in (25b). Hence, nünte in (23) is established as encoding contradiction.

3.6 Type 6: Backward implicature

The sixth type proves that nünte encodes a backward implicature.

(26) (HY & NY – From ‘My hobby’)

[Context: NY is explaining why she likes being alone at home.]

NY: wŏnrae honcha issmûn kŏ chohahakin ha-nte ‘Originally, I like being alone.’
maennal honchasă [mak] omankachi saengkak ta haku ‘Everything, I daydream very much. And I imagine lots of things. And.’
The explicatures of two segments in (26) can be recovered, as follows:

(27) (a) NY likes being alone at home.
(b) NY can forget the ennui of everyday affairs if she imagines a lot of things at home.

In (27) NY's belief in clause (b) presents a reason for NY's preference for being alone at home in clause (a). This 'backward' relation is obtained by inference. So, nünte in (26) is established as encoding a backward implicature.

3.7 Type 7: Strengthening

The seventh type shows that nünte encodes a strengthening.

(28) (HY & NY - From 'When I was an elementary school student')

[Context: HY is telling NY about the types of institutions she attended in her elementary school days.]

HY: hakwön toeke manhi tanyøss-nünte
'I attended lots of educational institutions.'
søye hakwöntu taniku
'I attended an institution of calligraphy. And.'

NY: üm
'Yeah.'

HY: sük'eit'titu taniku panghak ttae [suyøngchang]tu taniku
'I attended a school of ice skating. And, in the holidays I attended a swimming pool.'
NY: [a natu]
'Me also.'

HY: tto suyøngchangirang yøngøhoeohwa hakwön taniku
'And I attended a swimming pool and private English conversation classes.'

The explicatures of segments in (28) can be recovered, as follow:

(29) (a) HY attended many institutions in her elementary school days.
(b) HY attended an institution of calligraphy, a school of ice skating, a swimming pool and private English conversation classes

In (29), clause (b) gives evidence of clause (a) in order to make the hearer, NY, believe clause (a). So, nünte in (28) is established as encoding strengthening.

3.8 Further example

In this section, I examine the [X-nünte] construction in which the main clause cannot be retrieved. Example (30) shows that a contrast implicature is caused by the deduction between new information (i.e. the arrowed [X-nünte] construction) and old information (i.e. the arrowed previous utterance).

(30) (HY & NY - From 'When I was an elementary school student')

[Context: NY is telling HY about an event that NY experienced when she attended educational institutions in her elementary school days.]

NY: misul hakwönestønün an kasstaka chipe chønhwaka wakachiku kú twironün chøltae an ppačhiku kkopakkkopak kasschi
'On one occasion I didn't go to fine art class. The teacher telephoned my parents, asking why I was absent at the class. Then I attended the class always.'

HY: üm
'Yeah.'

NY: kú ttae solchikhi kûrøn hakwön mak tanyøsschanha
'We attended fine art classes very much.'
I attended institutions for calligraphy and fine art classes, but they weren't very useful to me.'

They were useful to me.'

I did quite well in fine art and calligraphy when I attended those institutions. But, I didn't after I left them.'

The explicatures of the arrowed two utterances in (30) can be recovered, as follows:

(a) Getting instruction for calligraphy and fine art classes did not help NY do calligraphy and fine art well.

(b) Getting instruction for calligraphy and fine art classes helped HY do calligraphy and fine art well.

So, the contextual effect of the deduction between the two utterances in (30) reflects a contrast implicature.

3.9 Summary

Using relevance theory, we have analyzed the meaning of nunte. The results of analyses show that nunte encodes seven types of procedural meanings, i.e. contextual implicature (bridging, conclusion, temporal, contrast, backward), strengthening and contradiction.

4. Polysyem of procedural meaning

Blakemore's (1987, 1992, 2002) analysis implicates that connectives such as so, after all, but, etc. encode only a unitary procedural meaning:

(a) Ben can open Tom's safe. (b) After all, he knows the combination.

(a) Ben can open Tom's safe. (b) So he knows the combination.

There's a pizza in the fridge, but leave some for tomorrow.

First, in (32) after all encodes strengthening segment (a) on the basis that segment (b) is understood as providing evidence for segment (a), by inference, i.e. that segment (b) is a premise for deducing segment (a). Second, in (33) so encodes a conclusion implicature in that segment (b) is interpreted as a conclusion by inference, i.e. that segment (a) is a premise for deducing segment (b). Third, in (34) but encodes a contradicting assumption (35) to have been made manifest by the first segment in (34):

You can eat all the pizza in the fridge.

Blakemore's analysis shows that connectives that encode only a unitary meaning function to lighten a hearer's burden for interpreting non-conjunctions. For example, non-conjunction (36) encodes implicitly three types of contextual effect:

(a) Barbara is in town. (b) David isn't here.

Blakemore (1992: 85) points out the fact that how a hearer interprets (36b) in the context of (36a) is not transparent as a problem, and that in (37) to (39), connectives such as so, after all and however are used to constrain the interpretation of clause (36b) against clause (36a):

Barbara isn't in town. So David isn't here.

Barbara isn't in town. After all, David isn't here.

Barbara isn't in town. However, David isn't here.

Blakemore's analysis reminds us, therefore, that the connectives constrain contextual effects, i.e. the interpretation of non-conjunctions, in relevance theory.

What is the relationship between 'constraint' and 'relevance'? Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 123-132) define 'relevance' as a function of two factors, i.e. contextual effect and processing effort, and regard the second as a negative factor that is a certain consumption of energy for mental processes. They (1986/1995: 124) describe
the correlation between these two facts, as follows:

"other things being equal, an assumption with greater contextual efforts is more relevant; and, other things being equal, an assumption requiring a smaller processing effort is more relevant"

Based on relevance theory, Blakemore (1992: 137) argues that inserting connectives into non-conjunctions constrains a hearer’s selection of context, which identifies the contextual effects of non-conjunctions. In other words, the use of connectives gives a hearer an instruction of interpreting utterance, i.e. non-conjunctions, at minimal processing effort. This implies that a unitary procedural meaning of discourse connectives is a prerequisite for their use as constraints on contextual effects.

However, Traugott (1988, 1989) and Hopper and Traugott (2003) proffer examples in which connectives such as while, since, etc. are polysemous. First, Traugott (1988, 1989) insists that in the case of while two meanings, temporal and concessive coexist. This shows that while does not only encode contradiction and there is another. Second, Hopper and Traugott (2003: 80-81) rebut Blakemore’s unitary account of connectives on the ground that since in (40) has polysemies, i.e. temporal and causal meanings:

(40) Since Susan left him, John has been very miserable.

Therefore, Blakemore’s theory, i.e. ‘constraint on contextual effects’ is not applied to polysemous connectives such as while and since.

5. Conclusion

Traugott (1988, 1989), Hopper and Traugott (2003), and my analysis of nunte in section 3 prove the existence of polysemies in both suffixes in Korean and connectives in English. I assert that non-conjunction, such as (36) that encodes three types of contextual effects, provides a clue to account for polysemies of nunte. In other words, a particular kind of context in non-conjunctions enables a hearer to select one of contextual effects that these conjunctions encode implicitly. In conclusion, in the case of polysemous suffixes such as nunte in Korean, contexts enable a hearer to identify contextual effects that these suffixes encode.

References


Perception of Korean Nasal Sounds by Chinese Learners of Korean

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years an increasing number of Chinese students are choosing to study the Korean language at tertiary level in Australia. Therefore, there is an emerging need to describe their inter-language development at various linguistic levels to gain a better understanding of L2 acquisition difficulties and to generate an optimal learning strategy pertaining specifically for this new learner group. Casual classroom observation indicates that one of the more readily observable areas of difficulty for the Chinese learner group seems to be the perception and production of the Korean nasal sounds (i.e., /m/, /n/, and /ŋ/). The main purpose of this paper is to examine more systematically the apparent difficulty for Chinese students studying Korean and then attempt to describe the nature of this problem in more precise terms.

In order to address the above objectives, data from two different types of experiments are needed. One type of experiment generates information on how well learners categorize or identify the target sounds in L2 (experiment 1: Identification task). Identification and patterns of misidentification reflect the primary performance of learners accommodating to a new sound system. However, most studies of second language sound accommodation require discrimination data to complement the results obtained from identification experiment (Best, 1995; Ingram and Park, 1998). The relationship between identification and discrimination as perceptual tasks has long been an issue of interest (Stevens et al. 1969). Hence, an AXB discrimination task (experiment 2) on the same set of L2 tokens used in the identification experiment was utilised.

These two perception experiments were conducted with three subject groups (i.e., native Mandarin Chinese speaker group, native Australian English speaker group and native Korean speaker group, henceforth MA, AE and KO). The inclusion of the AE subject group in this study was motivated by the need to examine whether there are any signs of cross language performance variation. Subjects were tested on multiple exemplars of the contrasting nasal sounds produced in varying carrier frames by a native Korean speaker.

METODOLOGY

The AE and MA subjects were learners of Korean enrolled at Griffith University (completed 120 hours of formal learning of Korean). The KO group consists of two Korean language tutors and three Korean students doing their undergraduate studies at Griffith. None of the subjects were reported to have any hearing problems. An identical number of subjects participated in each of the two experiments and the table below (table 1) shows the composition of each subject group. Age data was not collected in both experiments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MA</th>
<th>KO</th>
<th>AE</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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Table 1. Number of AE, MA and KO subjects participating in the experiments

All of the pre-recorded stimuli were delivered binaurally through a pair of loud speakers at a comfortable listening level. The recording of stimuli was initially done in stereo on a DAT recorder (SONY TCD-D80 using ECM900 microphone) at 16 bit 48 KHZ. It was then encoded as a PCM mono wave format file at 16 bit 22 KHZ. All encoding and editing works were done using COOL EDIT Pro software. From the resulting PCM wave file, each stimulus was extracted as a separate file. These stimuli were then combined to generate trials with a set of fixed inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) time for each experiment. Once inserted with ISI and joined together, all trials were then combined with a set of fixed inter-trial interval (ITI) time. Each experiment contained a series of familiarization trials. Both experiments were conducted on the same day with a half hour gap in-between them. A small amount of assessment credit points were given to each of the MA and AE participants. Subjects were
reminded prior to each experiment that they should complete all trials and make a guess if they were uncertain about their choice.

The main purpose of the experiment 1 (identification) was to elicit listener categorization of stimuli with respect to L2 phonological categories. The experiment contained 72 trials that were arranged in a pseudo random order. Three Korean nasals in 5 different contexts (i.e., coda, intervocalic, pre-bilabial, pre-alveolar and pre-velar) matched with two Korean vowels /a/ and /i/ generated 30 trials. They were then repeated once, thereby generating a total of 60 trials (3 x 5 x 2 x 2). Added to this list were 12 trials involving one additional context (i.e., onset position) where two Korean nasals /m/ and /n/ were placed before 3 Korean point vowels /i/, /a/ and /u/ and repeated once (2 x 3 x 2). The ISI was half a second. Subjects made their responses by circling a chosen L2 keyword from a series of word lists that were given on the response sheet. The IIT was 4 seconds.

Experiment 2 (discrimination) was designed to systematically track how the subjects discriminated the contrasting L2 sounds from one another. An AXB oddball procedure, which places less demand on auditory memory (Polka, 1995), was utilized. In an AXB procedure A and B are always different and the middle token is identical (phonemically not physically) to either A or B. A total of 132 trials were generated. All three Korean nasal sounds were placed in the same five contexts with two different vowels /i/ and /a/, as was the case with the identification experiment. Each nasal sound was contrasted against the other two (e.g., /m/ against /n/ and /p/) for discrimination and all trials were presented twice, thereby yielding a total of 120 trials (i.e., 3 x 5 x 2 x 2 x 2). An additional 12 discrimination trials involving /n/ and /m/ in onset position were generated by matching the nasals with 3 Korean point vowels with one repetition (2 x 3 x 2). They were added to the 120 discrimination trials already generated. In order to invoke phonemic and not acoustic coding, a relatively longer ISI of 2 seconds was used. IIT was again set at 4 seconds. Subjects were instructed to circle either A or B on the response sheet after hearing a sequence of three tokens. The trials in the second experiment were also arranged in a pseudo random order. The results from both experiments were then coded using Microsoft Excel for a basic statistical analysis.

RESULTS AND ANAYSIS

Table 2 summarizes the overall results of experiment 1. Each of the AE and KO groups had 5 subjects, thereby generating a total of 360 trial responses, whereas the MA group with its 24 subjects produced 1728 trial responses. The table below shows the overall results of the experiment by each group. Given the fact that the AE and MA groups had the same amount of formal exposure to Korean, the result indicates a certain amount of cross language variation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1 Group</th>
<th>Correct Identification</th>
<th>Incorrect Identification</th>
<th>Total Number of Trial</th>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KO</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>70.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Overall results from identification experiment

One can regard the KO group's performance as a desired target level (i.e., a native like performance), a kind of ceiling level for identification performance. That assumption would put the AE group's identification performance near the ceiling level. One obvious question that immediately sprung from the result of the MA group was whether the poor performance was evenly spread over different identification tasks or more markedly concentrated on a particular nasal sound and context combination. As mentioned in the introduction, all three Korean nasal sounds were tested in the following contexts except for the onset position where /n/ is not allowed.

1. /m/ and /n/ at onset with three point vowels /a/, /i/ and /u/ (CV syllabic frame)
2. At coda after three point vowels /a/, /i/ and /u/ (VC syllabic frame)
3. Intervocalic positions (V1CV2) where V1 is either /a/ or /i/ and V2 is always /a/
4. At coda after either Vowel /a/ or /i/ and followed by a /pa/
5. At coda after either Vowel /a/ or /i/ and followed by a /ka/
6. At coda after either Vowel /a/ or /i/ and followed by a /ka/

The overall percentage correct figure (i.e., the last column) in table 2 indicated that the MA performance was on average at 76% level of the KO group's performance. In order to map more accurately the source of the MA group's poorer performance, data filtering was applied to the identification results of the MA group in the upper mentioned six contexts to extract only those instances where the performance level was lower than the average
performance level of 76%. Table 3 shows those filtered out instances where the MA identification performance level was below 76% of the KO group’s performance. The cases identified in Table 3 can be regarded as the areas of worst identification performance for the MA group. The figures in the brackets indicate the percentage relative to the KO performance (i.e., figure for the KO would be 100).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Onset</th>
<th>Coda</th>
<th>Inter-Vocalic</th>
<th>Pre-bilabial</th>
<th>Pre-alveolar</th>
<th>Pre-velar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/ma/ (64)</td>
<td>/an/ (27)</td>
<td>/ama/ (53)</td>
<td>/anpa/ (21)</td>
<td>/anta/ (60)</td>
<td>/anka/ (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/mi/ (54)</td>
<td>/in/ (8)</td>
<td>/anpa/ (38)</td>
<td>/iŋpa/ (42)</td>
<td>/aŋta/ (29)</td>
<td>/aŋka/ (23)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Identification trials with a low performance level by the MA group

Even though /ŋ/ was the least frequently tested nasal sound (i.e., not allowed at the onset position), even a cursory examination of the results shown in table 3 would reveal that more than half of the cases involved the Korean velar nasal. A rank ordered list (i.e., worst from the top) of the cases identified in table 3 is given in table 4 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank order</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>/in/ (8)</td>
<td>Coda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>/anpa/ (21)</td>
<td>Pre-bilabial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>/iŋta/ (21)</td>
<td>Pre-alveolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>/aŋka/ (23)</td>
<td>Pre-velar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>/an/ (27)</td>
<td>Coda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>/aŋta/ (29)</td>
<td>Pre-alveolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>/iŋka/ (29)</td>
<td>Pre-velar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>/iŋa/ (34)</td>
<td>Inter-Vocalic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>/aŋa/ (38)</td>
<td>Inter-Vocalic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>/ima/ (39)</td>
<td>Inter-Vocalic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>/aŋka/ (40)</td>
<td>Pre-velar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>/iŋpa/ (42)</td>
<td>Pre-bilabial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>/iŋka/ (42)</td>
<td>Pre-velar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>/ama/ (53)</td>
<td>Inter-Vocalic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>/mi/ (54)</td>
<td>Onset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>/iŋka/ (58)</td>
<td>Pre-velar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>/aŋta/ (60)</td>
<td>Pre-alveolar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>/ma/ (64)</td>
<td>Onset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Rank ordered list of cases with the worst level of identification performance

The table shows that the six worst identified cases also contained /ŋ/. In the identification experiment, each nasal sound was to be identified 20 times (excluding the onset context). In the case of /ŋ/, 10 (i.e., 50% of all occurrences) were listed as poor instances of identification while 3 cases of /m/ and /n/ were listed as poorly identified stimuli. These observations can be taken as an indication that Korean /ŋ/ was not a well categorized L2 sound for the MA subjects.

It is not entirely clear why /ŋ/ is apparently the major factor beneath the MA group’s poor identification performance. All three languages have /m/, /n/ and /ŋ/ sounds. None of the three languages allow /ŋ/ in an onset position. Furthermore, in Mandarin most of the stimuli involving /ŋ/ in table 4 (e.g., /ŋŋ/, /an/ are phonotactically possible. Mandarin differs from Korean and English with regards to the placement of /m/ in coda position. Mandarin does not allow /m/ in syllable final position. The overall performance result, especially that of the AE and MA groups does indicate possible L1 influence. However, the answer to the question of what actually caused the cross language performance variation may require more than a simple comparison of phoneme inventories and phonotactic rules.

In the discrimination experiment each of the AE and KO groups produced 660 (5 subjects x 132 trials) responses, whereas the MA group with 24 subjects produced 3168 responses altogether. Table 5 shows the overall results of experiment two by each group.
Table 5. Overall result of experiment two (discrimination)

The resulting score for correct discrimination was higher than the score from the identification experiment. While the result for the groups as a whole was 66.2% correct for the identification experiment, the discrimination experiment result was 77.5% correct. The AE group performed better than the MA, as was the case in the identification experiment, possibly indicating the existence of cross language variation. Although the difference is only marginal, the AE group even outperformed the KO group as well. On average the MA group’s performance level was 88% of the KO group’s results. Those cases where the performance level was below 88% of the KO group were extracted by applying a data filter to the MA group’s results obtained in 6 different contexts. The results are given in table 6 below. The figures in the brackets indicate the percentage of performance relative to the KO group’s performance (i.e., 100).

Table 6. Discrimination trials with a poor performance level by the MA group

It was observed from the identification experiment results that Korean /ŋ/ was most likely to be the least well categorized nasal sound for the MA group. Of the 27 cases listed in table 6, we can safely ignore the two cases involving onset position since /ŋ/ cannot occur in that position in Korean. From the remaining 25 instances, 19 of them were worst discriminated trials involving the /ŋ/ sound. On the other hand, cases involving /n/ was 15 and /m/, 16 out of 25. The level of cross language difference observed from the results was not as marked as the identification results. However it still provided some additional support to the notion that Korean /ŋ/ can be the most difficult nasal sound to acquire for MA subjects.

Another comparison table (i.e., table 7) was generated using the results given in table 6 to see more clearly whether the least successfully discriminated pairs actually contained any of the least successfully identified stimuli given in table 4. One would normally assume that a discrimination task containing one or two poorly categorised stimuli would be harder to distinguish than the trials where both stimuli are more readily and easily identifiable. The results in table 7 indeed showed that most poorly identified stimuli (right column) were also appearing prominently in the least successfully discriminated contrast pairs (left column). In table 7, the column under the heading of ‘least successfully identified stimuli’ exhibits heavy concentration of stimuli containing /ŋ/ sound (i.e., some appeared more than once). The figures in the brackets in both columns of the table represent the percentage of performance relative to that of the KO group.
Table 7. Comparison - least successfully discriminated and identified stimuli

One aspect of the results shown in table 7 that needs to be explained would be the existence of the four cases in the left column that do not contain any of the least successfully identified stimuli by the MA group. They are /inpa/ - /impa/ (ranked third least discriminated), /antu/ - /antu/ (13th), /lanpal/ - /ampal (19th) and /limta/ - /linta/ (20th). In Mandarin Chinese both /antu/ and /linpal/ are possible syllable types and as such it was not clear why this pair came up with such a poor discrimination score. A closer examination of the identification scores obtained for these stimuli actually showed that they were indeed badly identified not just by the MA group but also by the other two groups. However, these stimuli were not initially recognised in the analysis as cases of poor identification because the performance by the KO group on the same set of stimuli was only marginally better or in one case even worse than the MA group. In other words, they were filtered out automatically during the coding process because their identification score was not below the threshold point set in relation to the KO performance. Table 8 shows the relative performance score by the MA, KO and AE groups on these stimuli and it was apparent that there was not much cross group score difference.

Table 8. Comparison of identification scores for filtered out cases

The scores shown in table 8 clearly indicate that there was not much variation among the subject groups. All three groups performed badly except for the identification of /antu/. One possible explanation for the poorer discrimination performance would be that /antu/ before a bilabial sound is likely to be assimilated to /antu/ thereby indistinguishable (i.e., both /inpa/ and /impa/ realised as [imba]). However, it is unlikely that /antu/ before an alveolar would assimilate in terms of place. One possible conjecture could be that there may have been at least some partial distortion in the quality of /antu/ due to a coarticulation effect before /antu/ thus making it harder for the subjects to identify or discriminate then against each other.

CONCLUSION

The results from the identification experiment seemed to highlight that Korean /antu/ is the least well categorised nasal for the MA subjects. The overall identification performance levels by the three L1 groups show the possible existence of cross language variation. Given the fact that all three languages have /antu/, /antu/ and /antu/ in their phoneme inventory and share similar phonotactic constraints, it was not possible to determine exactly what could have caused the observed variation in cross language identification performance. The MA group's performance average was only at 76% of the KO group's performance level, providing support for the cursory classroom observation regarding the MA subjects apparent difficulty with the Korean nasal sounds. However, the prominent problem in relation to the Korean velar nasal /antu/ observed in the present study needs to be empirically checked with natural spontaneous Korean speech data from the MA subjects.
Although slightly less dramatic, the discrimination experiment data also showed cross language variation where the AE group again performed better than the MA group. Although the difference was only marginal, the AE group even out performed the native Korean speaker group. There were substantial differences in the overall performance levels in terms of the percentage correct for identification and discrimination experiments (i.e., 60.2% and 77.5%). This was to be expected because there is always a possibility that acoustic coding (i.e., using short term phonetic memory) is utilised by the subjects even with a relatively longer ISI. The examination of the discrimination data also revealed that the trials involving stimuli containing /y/ were the least successfully discriminated ones. This would provide support for a close relationship between identification and discrimination performance regarding L2 sound categories.

Although most of the main objectives raised at the outset were dealt with, some more adequately than others, the present study was limited in a number of crucial ways. The list of contextual frames used in both experiments was not exhaustive. Furthermore, the number of subjects in each group was not ideally balanced in that the AE and KO group sizes were too small in comparison to that of the MA group. A simple taxonomic phoneme comparison did not seem to provide adequate explanation for the cross language performance variation, because all three L1s have the same three nasal consonants. Perhaps one needs to examine in more detail the exact nature of the perceptual mapping between the target L2 vowels and their matching L1 counterparts. One way of doing that would involve another experiment where subjects actually rate the perceived similarity of the L2 speech sounds in relation to native sounds and also rate prototypicality of L2 sounds as L1 targets. The inclusion of another L1 group in the experiments with a reduced number of nasal sounds and different phonotactics (e.g., Japanese) would produce a more interesting cross language performance comparison.

REFERENCES


Non-Koreans learning Korean in Aotearoa New Zealand: A Case Study of a Community-based Korean language class

Richard Lawrence
Waikato Institute of Technology

1. Introduction

The paper first outlines the nature and context of the research behind this study of a group of non-Korean people learning Korean at a Saturday morning Korean school in a community-based setting (rather than in a university, polytechnic or school) in Hamilton, New Zealand. The paper then outlines findings in relation to the motivations of the teachers and students, with quotes and final comments.

The research was limited to just one group of 15 people, five teachers and ten students. It is, then, qualitative and ethnographic, rather than quantitative, research. It was carried out in early 2005.

2. The Context of the Research:

(a) Korean people resident in New Zealand

Most New Zealanders in my experience have sketchy knowledge of Korea, with fragmentary knowledge of the Korean War; the struggles for participatory, civilian government; the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988; the financial crisis and the IMF intervention of 1997; the hosting of the Soccer World Cup in 2002, and so on.

However, broader knowledge of Korea and Korean culture has grown in New Zealand in some communities as Korean people have come to this country in significant numbers. In 1995 and in the following three or four years, the number of Korean immigrants in New Zealand rose sharply. Many Korean people opened restaurants, cafes, hair salons and other businesses that made Korean culture visible in new ways. The Korean language, Hangul, was visible on signs outside businesses and churches in New Zealand from around 1995 onwards.

The statistics of Korean immigration to New Zealand account for the increasing visibility of Korean culture and language through the 1990s. In 1990 there were just 930 Korean people resident in the whole of New Zealand. In the 2001 census 19,023 Korean people were recorded as living in New Zealand. This was the largest percentage increase of any Asian ethnic group between 1990 and 2001. Korean people now form the third largest Asian ethnic group, after Chinese and Indian people, in New Zealand.

While the number of Korean people living in New Zealand increased between 1990 and 2001, and Korean people were the third largest Asian ethnic group in New Zealand, they formed just eight per cent of the total Asian resident population within New Zealand, compared with 44 per cent who identified themselves as Chinese and 26 per cent who identified themselves as Indian. After Korean people, the next largest Asian ethnic groups are Filipinos (4%), Japanese (3%) and Sri Lankan (3%).

Just over two thirds of all Asian people in New Zealand live in the Auckland urban area. It is probable that the proportion is about the same for Korean people specifically. The Asian population of New Zealand is expected to double in size by 2016.

Of the 19,023 Korean people living in New Zealand, according to the 2001 statistics, 5% were born in New Zealand. It is fair to assume that by 2016, a greater percentage of the Korean population in New Zealand will have been born in this country. (1)

(b) 'Hangul' teaching and learning in New Zealand communities
Based on the 2001 figure that 95% of Korean people resident in New Zealand were born outside New Zealand, one can assume that all Korean adults resident in New Zealand speak their own language fluently and nearly all Korean teenagers and children as well (a total of at least 20,000 people.) A growing number of children born to Korean parents in New Zealand will be the first generation of Korean people in New Zealand to grow up in a predominantly English-speaking environment. Aware of this, a number of community schools in Auckland (at least three), Hamilton (at least one) and Christchurch (at least one) are active in teaching the Korean language to Korean children from school age, usually on Saturday mornings. There are almost certainly other such schools in other cities and communities. A government curriculum document outlines essential language points and learning strategies for learners of Korean. (2)

The focus of this paper is, however, on non-Korean people learning Korean in New Zealand. The majority of classes in which Korean teachers teach Korean to non-Korean people are classes attached to schools whose primary purpose is the teaching of Korean with Korean children.

The 2001 census has figures for the number of people in New Zealand who indicated that they speak Korean. There is no indication of the level at which they speak the language. The following figures are given in the 2001 New Zealand census. I have put them into table form.

Fig. 1 New Zealand resident non-Korean speakers of Korean (2001) (3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group and Sex by Language Spoken</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand European males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand European females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that, according to the 2001 statistics, the number of non-Korean speakers of the Korean language was less than a thousand.

3. Opportunities to learn Korean: Different contexts

Numbers are changing and the 2006 census figures will probably show that an increasing number of non-Korean people are learning to speak Korean. There are formal courses and classes in the Korean language at universities and schools in New Zealand. Formal courses and classes are offered, for example, at the University of Auckland and Victoria University of Wellington, as well as at the Waikato Institute of Technology in Hamilton and the Christchurch Polytechnic. Outside such tertiary courses and papers there are at least five community-based classes offering Korean language in Auckland (three), Hamilton (one) and Christchurch (one). There are very probably others throughout the country.

4. The class
The class meets on Saturday mornings from 9.30am to 12.15pm during school term times. There is a 20-minute break for morning tea. More recently, the class has been divided into two groups, with a beginners group and another group at a slightly higher level, with five students in each group. In 2005 the ten students have been attending regularly and the teaching staff has been constant. Students pay a modest fee for tuition. Some of the teachers receive some money for teaching, but it is not much than a reimbursement of costs. Each teacher discounted the possibility that money is a motivating factor in his or her teaching. Essentially, they are volunteers, giving their time and skills generously and patiently.

There is one main teacher, and two assistant teachers. The principal of the school takes an active interest in the classes. The other teacher interviewed is from another school. The perspectives and comments were similar in a number of ways, suggesting that community-based classes have many characteristics in common.

Research questions and findings:

My particular interest was to find out the motivations of non-Korean people who have attended community-based Korean language classes and, similarly, to explore the motivations of the Korean people who voluntarily act as teachers for community-based classes. The focus is on community-based classes and on non-Korean learners and their Korean teachers.

The interviews were conducted with students and teachers of a class that has existed for nearly two years as part of a Korean school in Hamilton. Since the research group is small I cannot generalize or extrapolate from the research data. I can, however, present findings from this group as part of preliminary research in a case study, ethnographic approach, in which I am a participant observer. I interviewed five teachers. Four of them are based in Hamilton, and one in Auckland. I interviewed ten students from the classes in Hamilton.

All the students have shown commitment to learning by steady attendance. Four of the students (S2, S4, S7 and S8) have travelled in Korea and have been motivated by that experience to learn more of the Korean language and culture.

The teachers are all Korean people living in New Zealand. The students in the class all reside in New Zealand and have the following ethnic backgrounds:

1 M Japanese; 2 M European UK; 3 M Vietnamese; 4 M European New Zealander; 5 F Japanese; 6 M European New Zealander; 7 M European New Zealander; 8 M European New Zealander; 9 M Chinese; 10; M Chinese.

(a) Students - Questions

After preliminary questions on age group, nationality and education of students, the central questions asked of students were:

(1) How long have you been learning Korean? (2) Why do want to learn Korean? (3) Please comment on your level of motivation (4) Do you do homework during the week? If so, how much homework do you do each week? (5) What is your perception of your progress in Korean language? (Poor, satisfactory, good, very good or excellent). (6) Do you have any learning strategies in place for learning Korean outside the class? (7) Do you have any comments about the relationship between the Korean language and Korean culture?

The central question was the one on motivation (2). I deliberately spent more time on this question in each case.

(b) Students - Findings
All students had been learning in this class for 18 months or less. Responses on the question of motivation revealed a number of different types of reasons for learning the Korean language: personal, professional and social. The personal responses were from two interviewees (S2 and S4) who want to learn Korean in order to ‘get on with’ their future parents-in-law. One interviewee (S5) wants to learn Korean for professional reasons, wanting to meet and greet Korean people in their own language in his capacity as a JP. The other interviewees (S1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) named social reasons. All these students named ‘friendships with Korean people’ as important. Two students (S6 and 7) have been members of churches with both Korean and non-Korean members. One interviewee (S1) named the building of world peace and understanding as his motivation for learning Korean. One interviewee (S7) named an admiration for the Korean language itself as the motivation for learning to communicate well with them. With each interviewee who named primarily social reasons for learning Korean, it is evident that a primary motivation is to be able to greet and welcome Korean people in the Korean language. Each interviewee hopes to go on to be able to converse with Korean people.

It is clear that the motivation for learning Korean arises mainly from personal relationships of family, friendship, employment situation or student-home stay situations, rather than for career or professional reasons.

Four students (S1, S6, S7, S9) reported that they took time to do homework. The others claimed that they had no time to do more than attend the class once a week.

One student (S1) described his progress in Korean language as excellent, two described theirs as good (S6, 7) and the others claimed that their progress was satisfactory or poor.

(c) Quotes on motivation from field notes - Students

"Korea is a neighbouring country. We are physically close but emotionally distant. Korean people have been nice to me, without exception. Learning Korea is my ‘world peace’ project.” (S1)

"I want to be able to communicate with my future ‘in-laws’. They like it when I greet them in Korean, don't they honey?" (S2)

"I am retired but I want to keep my brain going. And I want to greet Korean people who come to me as a JP in their own language." (S3)

"I want to communicate with my parents-in-law." (S4)

"For me, wanting social interaction with Korean people is my motivation." (S5)

"New Zealand is an isolated little country. It's easy to be ignorant about the rest of the world. This is one way of showing commitment to others. I think it's important to greet people and welcome them in their own language. Most Korean people have learned English, so I want to show them that Kiwi people can learn their language as well." (S6).

"I like the history of the Korean language, and its distinctiveness. Also, I like the challenge of learning to communicate. At first the Korean language for me was like a code I wanted to crack. Little successes bring further motivation." (S7)

"I actually knew more Korean before, when I was travelling in Korea. I don't like to think that I have regressed. I want to learn again and to learn more." (S8).

"I used to work in a Korean restaurant. That got me interested in Korean culture and language. Now I want to continue. For fun." (S9)

"I was working in a Korean restaurant with a Korean manager and staff. I really wanted to know the language and culture of the Korean people." (S10)

5. Language and culture:
Yueh-Hung Tseng describes the relationship between language competence and culture in this way:

From a sociolinguistic perspective, competence in language use is determined not only by the ability to use language with grammatical accuracy, but also to use the language appropriate to particular contexts. Thus, successful language learning requires language users to know the culture that underlies language. (4)

In the Korean language social relationships are written into the grammar of the language, mainly through suffixes. For example, one greets a child in one way and an older adult in another, with the same root word but with a different suffix. In a community-based language group within a Korean school, non-Koreans can not only learn such greetings but see and hear them, as Korean people interact, young and old. One advantage of a community-based group is that the learning takes place in a rich social and cultural context.

Quotes on Korean language and culture from field notes - Students

"Language is culture to me. I'll learn Korean culture and history in the course of learning Korean, in the same way that I've learned something about Christian tradition just by learning English." (S1)

"As I learn Korean, I'm also learning about social relationships in Korea and the way they're expressed in the language itself." (S6)

"I admire the Korean people very much. I like their emphasis on education. I like their own love of their country and language. I've enjoyed reading about the way the Korean language was formed, by King Sejong." (S7)

Quotes on learning Korean from field notes - Students

"Korean is totally different from any other language I've done, like German, for instance. Some Korean vowel sounds are very difficult for me. You have to be patient." (S7)

"Korean is more difficult for me than any other language. I already speak Vietnamese, French, English, Mandarin and Japanese." (S3)

6. Teachers

(a) Questions to teachers:

(1) Please tell me why you give your time to teach Korean language and culture voluntarily with non-Korean learners. (2) Do you have any comments about the level of knowledge about Korean language and culture amongst non-Korean people in New Zealand? (3) Do you have any comments about the relationship between the Korean language and Korean culture?

Again, the central question was the one on motivation.

(b) Findings - Teachers

The teachers are all Korean people, four women and one man. All five teachers spoke of their love of their own language as a prime motivating factor for their teaching. Three described the Korean language as 'scientific'. Secondly, four of the five spoke of wanting to see Kiwi people gain more knowledge of Korean culture and language.

(c) Quotes on motivation from field notes - Teachers
"Kiwis can't discern amongst Asians. Kiwis see Asians as Chinese. People ask me if I speak Mandarin. When I tell them I'm from Korea, they ask me if we Koreans have the same language as China. But some older people have knowledge of Korea from the time of the Korean War. If Kiwis got to know Koreans better then the New Zealand culture would be more ... embracing. My motivation for teaching is that I enjoy the social interaction and I want Kiwi people to know more about my language and culture." (T1)

"Kiwis know a lot more about Japanese language and culture than Korean language and culture. I'm happy to encourage Kiwi people to learn Korean. Not just the language but also the culture, to build friendships. Deeper friendship is my aim." (T2)

"By learning the language you also learn the culture. So my aim is that Kiwi people can learn the language and culture of Korea. I guess that fewer than 5% of Kiwis know much about Korea and Korean culture. My motivation is to get Kiwi people to know more about Korean language and culture." (T3)

"My motivation comes from wanting to teach my own language. I think that Korean is unique and scientific. I'm proud of my language. I want Kiwi people to know more about my language and culture." (T4)

"I'm enthusiastic about teaching. I trained to teach English to Korean people but now I'm enjoying teaching Korean to non-Korean people. I love my own language. I spend a lot of time preparing. It feels good. Teaching well is a great feeling. My motivation comes from the enjoyment of teaching." (T5)

Additional comments:

1. Fewer than half of the students (4) are doing regular homework. Learning Korean for just one morning a week is not enough to sustain progress in the language without learning strategies and homework during the week. The teachers and students acknowledge this. Most students said that another teaching and learning session during the week would be ideal, but only two said that they would take the time to attend regularly, having other responsibilities and priorities. The students who are progressing well do homework regularly and have strategies in place for their own learning. They have dictionaries, books to work from, and take opportunities to speak with Korean people during the week.

2. While it may be difficult to progress with just one morning a week on teaching and learning, it is a context in which the students are learning a lot about Korean culture. They eat and drink Korean food and drink during the morning tea break, observe Korean parents and children, and interact constantly with Korean people during the morning.

3. The teachers have different teaching styles. They introduce the Korean alphabet first. Speaking precedes writing. Various communicative activities follow, along with vocabulary lists and introductions to some Korean grammatical structures. The teachers use a variety of teaching styles, with little equipment other than a whiteboard. Handout sheets for grammar and vocabulary are used extensively.

4. The teachers observe that most students are not gaining proficiency quickly yet they are motivated by the continued enthusiasm of the students and by their own love of their language and culture, and their keenness to see non-Korean people learn more.

5. Other language learning activities inside and outside the classrooms have included interviewing Korean children, singing, and doing prepared speeches at end-of-term parties.

Final comments:

Community-based language classes provided a richly textured cultural environment in which non-Korean people can learn Korean. With increases in the number of Korean children being born and raised in New Zealand there may be a greater need for Korean language teaching to Korean children, and an increase in associated groups where non-Korean people can learn the Korean language. It is very probable that the number of non-Korean learners of Korean will increase in the future. Community-based schools and classes have an significant and perhaps so far unacknowledged role in the teaching and learning of Korean, particularly for
adults who are working full-time during the week and do wish to attend, or cannot attend, classes at universities or polytechnics.

It seems that social and personal motivations will be more influential than professional reasons for learning the language in community-based classes. People who set out to learn Korean in order to engage in a career in trade, translation, or diplomacy, for example, would enroll in university courses.

Without the strict curriculum and assessment structures that one expects in tertiary institutions, the informality of community-based classes is both strength and a weakness. The class is set in a culture-rich Korean environment, so students can observe and learn in many aspects of Korean culture, such as social relationships, greetings, food and games. On the other hand, for the students to gain and practise Korean language proficiency they need more than motivation: they need to have learning strategies for study outside the Saturday morning classroom.

Further research in one year or so may be useful in determining more accurately the number of community-based classes for learners of Korean. In the absence of strict assessment criteria, it is difficult to be precise about students' progress. It would be worthwhile to do further research into the students' and teachers' perceptions of the students' progress in this class and school.

References:


The Irregularity of Tense and Aspect in -고 있는 줄 알다/모르다*

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In Korean, the modifier endings -(으)ㄴ, -(으)는 or -(으)ㄹ modify a noun56 or a noun phrase with different tense or aspect meanings. Typically, as illustrated in (1), being attached with a verb stem, the modifier -(으)ㄴ carries the meaning of past tense or perfect aspect, while the same morpheme -(으)ㄴ with an adjective stem has the unmarked present tense meaning. -(으)는, which is used exclusively for verbs, usually denotes present or present progressive meaning, while -(으)ㄹ indicates either future or prospective/probability meaning:

(1)

a. 먹은 밥 the rice that someone ate/has eaten vs. 예쁜 여자 pretty woman
b. 먹는 밥 the rice that someone eats/is eating vs. *예쁜 여자

c. 먹을 밥 the rice to eat vs. 예쁠 거야 will be pretty

As shown in the examples in (2), however, the tense or aspect interpretation of the modification ending -(으)는 seems to be not that straightforward like those of (1). Notice that there is a discrepancy between the meaning (revealed in the English translation) and the form in Korean—i.e., the examples in (2) take the present progressive form for the intended past progressive meaning.

(2)

a. 나는 그 때 네가 나를 보고 *있었/있는 줄 몰랐어.
I didn't know that you were watching me at that time.

b. 나는 네가 거기에 가고 *있었/있는 줄 몰랐어.
I didn't know that you were going there.

c. 나는 네가 자고 *있었/있는 줄 알았어.
I knew that you were sleeping.

*Draft only. Please do not quote.

This paper aims to describe such irregularity of tense and aspect interpretation of the so-called processive modification ending -(으)는 in the expression -(으)고 있는 줄.57

The examples in (2) may let us think that the irregularity may have something to do with the progressive construction, -(으)고 있다. However, as we look at the examples in (3), it seems to be the nature of the existential verb 이다 itself, because both forms behave the same, while other verbs behave transparently. Compare the examples in (3) and (4) for this point:

(3)

a. 나는 네가 거기에 *있었/있는 줄 몰랐어.
I didn't know you were there.

b. 나는 네가 집에 *있었/있지 줄 알았어.
I thought you were not at home.

56 This includes post-modifiers, often called bound nouns or formal nouns. Formal nouns include 지, 줄, 것, 깨, 데, 드, 만드, 데림, 바람, 펼, 빚, 수, 채, 터, and 덕. Go (1989: 85-104) classifies 57 “formal nouns” into various categories, such as ones which take (1) attributive adjectives such as demonstrative pronouns, and modification endings, (2) all three modification endings of -(으)ㄴ, -(으)는, and -(으)ㄹ. -(으)는 and -(으)한 only, -(으)ㄹ only, -(으)고 only, -(으)ㄹ only or -(으)ㄹ only, and (7) attributive adjectives like demonstrative pronouns or possessive case.

57 The usage of the formal noun 줄 is limited with the main verbs 알다 or 모르다, and it can conjoin with all three modification endings -(으)ㄴ, -(으)는, and -(으)ㄹ, e.g., 그는 내가 운전한/운전하는/
운전할 줄 알아. ‘He knows that I drove/am driving/will drive.’
(4)
a. 나는 미희가 미국에 간 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know Mee-Hee went to America.
b. 나는 미희가 미국에 가는 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know Mee-Hee is/was going to America.
c. 나는 미희 그 파티에 온 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know you came to that party.
d. 나는 미희 이 파티에 오는 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know you are/were coming to this party.

Notice that, in (4b) and (4d), the interpretation of the processive modification ending -는 can be either present or past progressive according to the real situation: In (4b), if the reference time is after Mee-Hee's departure to America, the interpretation is past progressive, and if the reference time is before Mee-Hee's departure to America, it is present progressive. Also, in (4d), while most likely interpretation is past progressive, assuming the speaker is talking to a person who has already come to the party, if the speaker is talking to a person who is on the way to the party over the telephone, the interpretation is present progressive.

Similarly, the processive modification ending -는 can be interpreted as present or past progressive according to time expressions like 요즘 'these days' and 그 때 'at that time' respectively.

(5)
a. 난 요즘 경제학을 공부하고 있는 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know these days you are studying economics.
b. 난 요즘 그 경제학을 공부하고 있는 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know at that time you were studying economics.

In fact, the examples in (2) can also get present and present progressive interpretation with different time adverbials like 지금 'now' or 요즘 'nowadays'. Notice also that at the absence of any time adverbial like the cases of (2b) and (2c), natural/unmarked interpretation of -는 is past progressive.

(6)
a. 나는 지금 네가 나를 보고 있는 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know that you are watching me now.
b. 나는 네가 지금 거기에 가고 있는 줄 몰랐어.
   I didn't know that you are going there now.
c. 나는 네가 지금 자고 있는 줄 알았어.
   I knew that you are sleeping now.

Here, I maintain that such irregularity of tense/aspect interpretation of the processive modification ending -는 in the progressive construction derives from the 'durative' nature of the progressive construction. In other words, the 'continuity' of an action does not go in hand with the perfect aspect (or the meaning of 'completion') of the modification ending -(으)ㄴ.

Notice that there is a minor difference between the two constructions. That is, while -(으)ㄴ is rejected in the progressive construction for the meanings of past progressive as in (2) and (3), for the existential verb construction like (7a), there seems to be freedom between the past/perfect modifier -(으)ㄴ and the processive modifier -는, although -(으)ㄴ is used as in (7c) when the speaker wishes to emphasize on the past experience.

(7)
a. 지난 여름방학 동안 우리 아들은 집에 있던 날이 거의 없었어.
   During the last summer vacation, my son rarely stayed at home.
b. 요즘 난 집에 있는 시간이 거의 없다.
   Nowadays, I seldom stay at home.
c. 지난주 동안 네가 집에 있던 날이 머칠이나 됐니?
   For the last week, how many days did you stay at home?
References

Is Koreans' worldview conditioned by the Korean verbs?

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Introduction

If we were observing the same phenomenon in the world, the description would be grammatically varied according to the language used. Whether we describe natural occurrences such as a tsunami or talk about relatives in one's family, the speakers have no choice but to express their views and experiences using grammatical categories available in their native language. Whorf's linguistic relativity hypothesis in the 1950s inspired many scholars to debate the relationship between language and thought - an ongoing intellectual inquiries. The pursuit of the theory experienced some setbacks in the 1960s due to the rise of cognitive psychology with the view that human cognition is universal across languages therefore structures of a specific language have little impact on the 'thinking process' of speakers of that language. The debate however has moved again to linguistic relativism in the late 1970s, posing the question of whether linguistic differences between languages have any influence on thoughts of the speaker.

In considering the inseparable relationship between language and thought, the central question that we ask is how each of us forms a worldview. Do we have some sort of concepts in our heads first and then speak about them or we speak about our experiences in the language, which was preconceptualized by the grammatical categories of that language? In other words are we conditioned by the language?

This paper aims to examine the existential verb *issta* in the context of the categorization of Korean verbs in comparison with English and to analyze the grammatical and semantic structures in order to establish the connection as to how reality is conceptualized in the Korean language.

Linguistic relativity

Whorf's linguistic relativity hypothesis (1956a) was influenced by Boas (1858-1942) and Sapir (1884-1939) who tried to explore the relations between language studies and anthropology: Boas (1966a [1911]) had three important points regarding the nature of the language: 1) language classify experiences; 2) languages vary in categorizing experiences of the world; 3) linguistic phenomena are unconscious in nature and produced automatically. However, his view was tentative in relating the role of language to shaping thought as he saw language as primarily reflecting culture and thought.

Sapir (1949) advanced his teacher Boas's view on language and thought, extensively comparing languages and demonstrating how two languages differ in categorizing the same experience. In his view, this was due to the 'formal completeness of the language system' in any given language. Sapir acknowledged that our experiences of the world are interpreted by grammatical categories of the language, through conceptual reality, which channels thought. Sapir explains the relationship between language and thought:

> From the point of view of language, thought may be defined as the highest latent or potential content of speech, the content that is obtained by interpreting each of the elements in the flow of language as possessed of its very fullest conceptual value.

> ... It is, indeed, in the highest degree likely that language is an instrument originally put to uses lower than the conceptual plane and that thought arises as a refined interpretation of its content (Sapir, 1949 [1921]: p.14-15).

Whorf was not a professionally trained linguist, but his study on the American Indian Hopi language in comparison with English lead him to develop a firm view that language influences thought. Hence he proposed the linguistic relativity hypothesis. His main arguments consists of 1) that language vary the way it classifies experiences of the world; 2) that when we use limited linguistic categories for expressing infinite experiences of the world, linguistic categories are used as guides in habitual thought; 3) that therefore speakers of different languages have different views of the world (Whorf, 1956a, p.221).
The categorization of experiences

When humans are presented 'a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions', we categorize those impressions in order to make a sense of the world - we divide and dissect things to satisfy our understanding of nature, relationships and ultimately the cosmos and we do this through 'the linguistic systems of our minds' (Whorf, 1956a:213). The range of classification is endless: from the concrete division (i.e. male and female; humans, the animals and plants) to the abstract division of ideas and concepts. This ability is vital to human cognition as Lakoff (1982:142) states, “any adequate account of the human conceptual system must provide an accurate theory for all our categorization, both concrete and abstract”.

The process of classification is claimed to be automatic, as it never rises into consciousness nor give secondary reasoning or to re-interpretation (Boas, 1966a [1911]:63; Lakoff, 1982). For example, the native speakers of languages with gender distinction do not think about whether a noun is masculine or feminine but use words automatically. The complex kinship terms in the Korean language is a good example of how Koreans categorize family relationships by distinguishing paternal and maternal relatives and use them from very early age while there is no equivalent kinship categories and terms in English.

Languages vary in expressing a state of affair as they categorize the same experience differently. Boas gives a classical example from the words for snow in Eskimo. Eskimos have many different words for categorizing snow, e.g. 'one word, aput, expressing SNOW ON THE GROUND; another one, qana, FALLING SNOW; a third one, pikiirsipq, DRIFTING SNOW; and a forth one, qimuqsuq, A SNOWDRIFT. (Boas, 1966a [1911]: 21-22). Whorf found that in the Indian Hopi language the tense is irrelevant as the Hopi people perceive time and space completely different from the English speakers.

Speakers of Korean and English have different ways of describing joining objects (Choi and Bowerman, 1991). For example, when English speakers say,

(1) I put a ring on my finger.
Or
(2) I put a ring on the table.

There is no difference in describing the containment sensitivity relationship (i.e. tight versus loose) between the object and the referent whereas Koreans distinguish the relationship whether a ring can fit tightly or loose into containment using the verb accordingly. The experiment shows this spatial concept was instilled to Korean children as they encounter successive use of the word. Consequently when describing spatial events, Koreans are much more sensitive towards the spatial relationship i.e. kkita 'fit in' as in (1a) and nohta 'put on' as in (2a), whereas English speakers give more attention to the properties of the objects i.e. "This one is made of glass", "This is a tall object." (Choi and Bowerman,1991:416).

(1a) panci-lul songalak-ey kki-n-ta.
ring-ACC finger-to fit-in-PRES-END
'Fit a ring to the finger.'

(2a) panci-lul chaysang-wui-ey noh-ass-ta.
ring-ACC desk-on-LOC put-on-PAST-END
'Put a ring on the table.'

Methodology

Languages differ in their grammatical structures and the way organizing grammatical categories. In order to make comparisons between languages to identify the interrelationship between language and culture, Whorf noted that in "Standard Average European" languages i.e. English, French and German, there are few differences (1956a:138) and argued that the best approach is to make a comparison with an exotic language and to pose the questions:

(1) Are our own concepts of 'time,' 'space,' and 'matter' given in substantially the same form by experience to all men, or are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular languages? (2) Are there traceable affinities between (a) cultural and behavioural norms and (b) large-scale linguistic patterns? (Whorf, 1956a, p.138)
Korean is one of the exotic languages, and this study should be able to illustrate how differently Koreans perceive the existence of an entity by examining the existential verb issta. The study also attempts to establish the connection between the Korean language and its speaker's thought and cultural beliefs because, "When we are studying semantics of natural language, we are by necessity studying the structure of thought." (Jackendoff, 1983:x).

The diagram below underlies the methodology of this study.

![Diagram showing the relationship between reality, language, thought, and culture.](image)

Figure 11 Whorf's formulation of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Lucy, 1992b, p 259)

The categorization of Korean verbs

When Koreans observe an entity or a phenomenon, a significant segment of their experiences are inevitably expressed in the verbs. There have been different views on categorizing verbs in Korean. For instance, H.P. Choy (1937) treated the existential verb as a descriptive verb and some (Nam and Ko, 1985) classify the copula as a predicative particle. However, because of the particular characteristics of the existential verb, issta and distinctive functions of the copula, ita, it is generally accepted that it is better to have four verb types including these two (Suh, 1994). The four verb types; the existential verb, the copula, the descriptive verb and the action verb are related to the most primary human perceptions. In the English verb, the existential, copula and descriptive categories often share the same verb 'to be' and are thus not so readily distinguished semantically.

Imagine a situation - we see something is moving in the garden: first, we observe and perceive the existence of an entity and express the experience by using the existential verb issta:

(3) cekli(ey) mue-ka iss-ta.  
there-(LOC) what-NOM exist-END  
'There is something.'

And then we wonder about it and then utter what it is - to identify the entity by the copula ita:

(4) muet i-ci?  
what is-END  
'What is it?'

(5) koyangi-i-ta  
cat-is-END  
'It's a cat.'

Next, we describe a state of the entity by the descriptive verb:

(6) koyangi-ka ku-ta.  
cat-NOM be-big-END  
'The cat is big.'
Finally, we predicate what the entity is doing by the action verb.

(7) koyangi-ka talana-n-ta.
cat-NOM run away-PRES-END
'The cat is running away.'

Among the four verb types, the existential verb *issta*, the copula and the descriptive verb are categories that are fused in English as seen in the use of the verb 'is' in the English equivalents shown above. In the following section, the semantic structure of the verb *issta* is examined in detail to trace conceptualizations and thoughts that are particular to Koreans.

Existential verb *issta*

The existential verb, *issta* is the second most frequently used predicate except the verb -*hata* ‘to do’. If we exclude ‘Noun+*hata*’ form, *issta* is the top of the frequency scale in all predicates (Yonsei Malmwungchi, You, 1998). The existential verb is treated separately because of its particular syntactic characteristics: sometimes it behaves like a processive verb, taking the relativizer *-nun*; but sometimes it is more like a descriptive verb, in not taking *(u)n* for the past tense. The existential verb is known for denoting two different meanings, existence and possession. There are only three words in this category; *issta* is the basic form, *epta* is the antonym and, the honorific form is *kyeysita* (Sub, 1994; You, 1998). Although this verb generally describes a stative situation, when the subject is animate, the verb can be used as a processive verb as shown in the following examples (K.D. Lee, 1993:163):

(8) a. na-nun onul cip-ey iss-ta.
 I-TOP today house-LaC is-END
 'I will be home today.'

b. na-nun onul cip-ey iss-nun-ta
 I-TOP today house-LaC is-PRES-END
 'I will stay home today.'

The verb in (8b), *issunta* indicates the subject's intention to stay home but the situation may change over the time, which makes this verb a processive verb, whereas (8a) denotes a stative situation. Because of this processive nature of the verb, D.J. Lee (1992) argues that *issta* should be divided into three categories based on the semantic interpretation; 'stay', 'exist' and 'have'.

When *issta* has the semantic interpretation of either 'existence' or 'possession', it has a different syntactic structure. As we can see from Table 1, the existential *issta* has an inanimate noun with the location particle-*ey* at the beginning of the sentence whereas possession is expressed by having an animate noun with the location particle *eykey hanthe* at the beginning of the sentence, which indicates that semantic constraints are manifested as syntactic constraints.

Table 1 Summary of syntactic characteristics of *issta*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Existential <em>issta</em></th>
<th>Possessive <em>issta</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP1(Inanimate) <em>-ey</em></td>
<td>NP1(Animate) <em>-eykey hanthe</em> /nun/kak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP2-<em>ka issta</em></td>
<td>NP2-<em>ka issta</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Head Noun for relativization</td>
<td>NP1-<em>ey</em> and NP2-<em>ka</em></td>
<td>NP1-<em>eykey</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Honorific</td>
<td><em>kyeysita</em></td>
<td><em>iss-usi-ta</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>3. Resumptive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The following section analyzes how the syntactic structure enables the construction of the intended meaning of ‘existence’ or ‘possession’. English is compared without detailed structural analysis.

1. NP-i/ka issta

The most basic syntactic structure of the verb issta requires only the subject, and its semantic structure is to express the existence of an entity or a state. The noun phrase ‘NP-ey’ is unnecessary because it requires only a single reference location, which Jackendoff explains as the existential field:

Existential field:
   a. [THINGS] and [STATES] can serve as theme.
   b. There is one reference region, called [EX], expressed by “existence.”

(1983:202, (10.32))

For example in (9), whether or not, there is a ghost is expressed by issta therefore i seysang-ey ‘in this world’ is not required.

(9) kuisin-i (i seysang-ey / Ø) cengmal iss-ul-kka? (Nahm, 1993:21, (20a))
ghost-NOM (this world-LOC/ Ø) really exist-PROS-END
‘Does a ghost really exist?’ ‘Is there really a ghost?’

Also when the subject is a dependent noun such as, cek ‘case’, ttay ‘time’, or nouns like somwun ‘rumor’, il ‘work’ and yaksok ‘promise’ as in (10), it does not require a noun phrase with the locative particle -ey because the subject noun does not need to have a ‘place’ to exist. (Nahm, 1993: 21)

(10) yaksok-i iss-ta.
engagement-NOM exist-END
‘I have an engagement.’

2. NP1-ey NP2-i/ka issta

NP1-ey NP2-i/ka issta
(11) edi-ey nwu-ka/mue-ka iss-na?
where-LOC who-NOM/what-NOM exist-END
Where is who/what?

In this sentence structure, ‘NP-ey’ is required to indicate the location of the subject as in (12). The static locative particle –ey is used with inanimate nouns only and indicates the spatial boundary of the location and ‘-ey issta’ denotes the maintenance of that position.

(12) mikwuk-ey tongsayng-i iss-ta
America-LOC brother-NOM exist-END
‘My brother is in America.’

The verb kyesta is used only for human existence as a fossilized honorific predicate as in (13a &b) however, if the ‘NP-ey’ is omitted then, it indicates ‘existence’ only, which means ‘the parents are still alive’. The word order of NP1 and NP2 is interchangeable.
'My parents are in Korea.'

'My parents are in Korea.'

'Who has what?'

This is the typical syntactic structure expressing possession in Korean. In NP1, the static locative particle -eykey, -hanthe and the honorific form -kkey can take only animate nouns. In this syntactic structure, the NP1 is obligatory with the particle -eykey which indicates a location-goal. The semantic structure is to denote 'NP2 (something) exists with NP1 (somebody)'. Here we have the key question of this study as to how the [NP1-eykey NP2-i/ka issta] structure is used for expressing 'possession' first and foremost in Korean and what is the significance of this concept?

Jackendoff defines possession largely in two different notions: "inalienable possession - the way one possesses one's nose, for instance-and alienable possession - the way one possesses a book" (1983:191). The Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH), which was first proposed by Gruber (1965), provides clues as to how the semantics of motion and location has major implications in the overall of the semantic fields. Jackendoff (1983:188) has extended the TRH theory and gives a summary as below:

Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH)
In any semantic field of [EVENTS] and [STATES], the principal event-, state-, path-, and place-functions are a subset of those used for the analysis of spatial location and motion. Fields differ in only three possible ways:

a. what sorts of entities may appear as theme;
b. what sorts of entities may appear as reference objects;
c. what sort of relations assumes the role played by location in the field of spatial expressions.

Jackendoff argues that the concept of alienable possession is constructed when the grammatical elements i.e. theme, reference object and location satisfy the terms stipulated as below:

Alienable possession:
a. [THINGS] appear as theme.
b. [THINGS] appear as reference object.
c. Being alienably possessed plays the role of location; that is, "y has/possesses x" is the conceptual parallel to spatial "x is at y."

In the light of the Thematic Relations Hypothesis, we can see how the [NP1-eykey NP2-i/ka issta] structure is interpreted as possession. Let's see in the following example:

'Youngsoo has an apartment.'

In (15), the conceptual relations between the theme, reference object and location is that Y, Youngsoo is PEOPLE which implies that PEOPLE can act on and apply physical force to an OBJECT (Schank, 1975) and claim an ownership of that object. Consequently Y (NP1) has a possession of X (NP2) thus, the interpretation is that Youngsoo has an apartment. Schank (1975) argues that a conceptualization is built by the relations between concepts; i.e. ATRAN: to change abstract relation with respect to an object, e.g. possession.
We can apply other object references such as *ton* ‘money’, *yecachinkwu* ‘girl friend’, *hameni* ‘grand mother’ *maylyek* ‘charm’ as the object reference and there are no problems in establishing an alienable possession. However, (16) is unnatural because nose is inalienably possessed by *PEOPLE*. We can confirm that “Thematic structure is the only means available to organize a semantic field of events and states coherently – it is an indispensable element of everyday thought.” (Jackendoff, 1983:209)

(16) *Youngsoo-eykey ko-ka iss-ta*
   NAME-LOC nose-NOM exist-END
   ‘Youngsoo has a nose’

However, the concept of ‘possession’ expressed by the verb *issta* is limited to certain grammatical structures thereby unable to express some semantic functions. For example, *issta* cannot take an object nor make imperative, propositive, desirative and intentional expressions. These particular characteristics clearly demonstrate that the semantic structure of the verb *issta* is different from English possessive, ‘have’.

The verb *kacita*

The verb *kacita* is a transitive verb, which requires an object. The difference in the semantic structure with the verb *issta* is that *kacita* makes the spatial relationship closer to the theme and denotes that the subject is able to ‘keep’ the object and the object ‘belong’ to the subject. The below examples demonstrate that the verb *kacita* ‘to have with (on) one, to own’ can be used for grammatical and semantic functions that *issta* is unable to perform:

Imperative

(17) i-ke kaci-si-e yo.
    this-thing have-HON-END
    ‘Have this.’

(17a) *i-ke iss-usi-e yo.
    this-thing exist-HON-END
    For ‘Have this.’ compare above (17)

Intentional

(18) na, ne(lul) kaci-lke-ya.
    I you(ACC) have-am going to-END
    ‘I am going to make you mine.’

(18a) *na, ne(ka) iss-ul ke-ya
    I you(NOM) exist-am going to-END
    For ‘I am going to make you mine.’

(19) na-nun ai-lul neyt kaci-keyss-ta
    I-TOP children-ACC four have-will-END
    ‘I will have four children.’

(19a) *na-nun ai-ka neyt iss-keyss-ta
    I-TOP children-NOM four exist-will-END
    For ‘I will have four children.’

Desirative

(20) Kwuyanye-lul kaci-ko sip-usi-pnikka?
    NAME-ACC have-want to-HON-END
    ‘Would you like to make Kwuyanye yours?’

(20a) *Kwuyanye-ka iss-ko sip-usi-pnikka?
    NAME-ACC exist-want to-HON-END
    For ‘Would you like to make Kwuyanye yours?’

Propositive

(21) kkum-ul kaci-ca.
dream-ACC have-PROP
Let’s have a dream. (=Be ambitious.)

\[(21a) \ast \text{kkum-i iss-ca.}\]
dream-NOM exist-PROP
For ‘Let’s have a dream.’ (=Be ambitious.)

‘Not being able to’

\[(22) \text{aki-lul kaci-ko sip-eto kaci-l swu ep-nun chinkwu}\]
baby-ACC have-want-to-even though have-not being able to-REL friend
‘A friend who wants to have a baby but can’t’

\[(22a) \ast \text{aki-ka iss-ko sip-eto iss-ul swu ep-nun chinkwu}\]
baby-NOM exist-want-to-even though exist-not being able to-REL friend
For ‘A friend who wants to have a baby but can’t’

The above examples show very different grammatical and semantic characteristics of ‘possession’ compared to English. The Korean possessive issta denotes that an entity is already being existence in observable objective state and located at someone therefore the spatial relationship is alienated from the subject. It is a temporary alienable ownership of the object by a mortal animate such as human beings. This appears to be Koreans’ view on possession, which is markedly different from English.

4. NP1-i/ka NP2-i/ka issta

Finally the [NP-i/ka NP-i/ka issta] structure is also used for expressing possession. The semantic difference between [NP-eykey NP-i/ka issta] and [NP-i/ka NP-i/ka issta] has not been made clear. Syntactically the difference is that the locative noun phrase ‘NP-eykey’ is shifted to the nominative case ‘NP-i/ka’ functioning as the subject to make the ‘double subject sentence’.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{NP1-eykey NP2-i/ka issta.} \\
\text{NP1-i/ka NP2-i/ka issta.}
\end{align*}
\]

Yang (1995:218) suggested that it may be that [NP-eykey NP-i/ka issta] expresses possession but in temporary control whereas [NP-i/ka NP-i/ka issta] mainly expresses an alienable possession but in more permanent basis. But when comparing (15) and (15a), we cannot find such a semantic difference.

\[(15) \text{Youngsoo-eykeyapat-ka} \]
NAME-LOC apartment-NOM exist-END
‘Youngsoo has an apartment.’

\[(15a) \text{Youngsoo-kaapat-ka} \]
NAME-NOM apartment-NOM exist-END
‘Youngsoo has an apartment.’

In my analysis, in (15), the focus is ‘What does Youngsoo have?’ whereas in (15a) it is ‘Who has an apartment?’ therefore the difference is not in semantics of possession rather, it is focus of grammatical elements.

Conclusion

This study has shown how Korean speakers have different worldviews regarding ‘existence’ and ‘possession’ compared to English speakers. The existential verb issta is categorized separately and known for denoting two meanings, ‘existence’ and ‘possession’. However, the analysis of the grammatical and semantic structures of issta reveals that the semantic function of issta is ‘existence’ only. The conceptual structure of possession is constructed when the theme, reference object and location make thematic relationships; the meaning of ‘alienable possession’ is inferred. Guided by the categorization of the verb, Korean speakers use the verb issta repeatedly on a daily basis over time hence, it becomes a habitual thought. As examined, issta is limited in
admitting certain grammatical structures i.e., imperative, propositive, desirative, etc., consequently unable to express possession with certain semantic functions. To Koreans, possession expressed by issta is not an event but an observable objective state by which the subject making an alienable spatial relationship with an object reference. In order to express any coactive ownership, the verb kacita is used. The spatial relationship of kacita is much closer to the subject hence it denotes a strong sense of ‘keep’ and ‘belong’ between the subject and the object. It is fascinating to realize that “all one’s life has been tricked, all unaware, be the structure of language into a certain way of perceiving reality, with the implication that awareness of trickery will enable one to see the world with fresh insight.” (Whorf 1956a:27). Further studies on this subject will confirm Koreans’ various cultural beliefs associated with possession.

Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ATTR</td>
<td>Attributive</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>Accusative particle</td>
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<td>END</td>
<td>Sentence ender</td>
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<td>Honorific suffix</td>
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<td>Nominative case particle</td>
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<td>PROP</td>
<td>Propositive ender</td>
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<td>PROS</td>
<td>Prospective</td>
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<td>REL</td>
<td>Relativizer</td>
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<td>TOP</td>
<td>Topic marker</td>
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References


English Language Teaching in North Korea

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1. Introduction

This article discusses English Language Teaching (ELT) in the educational system of North Korea (also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). English is at present taught at secondary and tertiary levels in North Korea, but it is not unlikely — in view of primary-level ELT being available in South Korea and other countries in the region — that English will be taught in North Korean primary schools. Education in North Korea has over the decades placed a great of emphasis on the idolisation of its leader Kim Il Sung and his own brand of ideology, children being the prime target of this emphasis. Not surprisingly, North Korea's ideological and political imperatives have also dictated the nature and role of ELT in North Korea to date.

North Korea is arguably "the world's most closed, impenetrable [society], with a totally controlled press, sharp restrictions on travel in and out of the country" (Cumings 1990: 53). The people have no access to basic information about the rest of the world, let alone alternative political views or ideologies. In fact, "[t]here is no debate on policy, or readiness to criticise past mistakes, since all decisions emanated from one who was supremely wise [i.e. Kim Il Sung, the Great Leader]" (Lone and McCormack 1993: 180). Moreover, virtually no contact is permitted between North Koreans and the few foreigners allowed into the country. It thus comes as no surprise that in this totally controlled monolithic society education has been exploited to serve as a major medium through which leaders' authority, power relations and the like are legitimised, propagated and maintained. The goal of education in North Korea is "to rear students as revolutionaries, equipped with a revolutionary outlook and the ideological and moral qualities of a communist" (Kim Il Sung's Theses on Socialist Education, 1977). More importantly, education in North Korea must at the same time serve the interest of the Kim family regime. What comes as a surprise is that English is the most important foreign language in North Korea. English is without doubt the global lingua franca, and there is evidence that even North Korean leaders are cognizant of this fact. But what is the point of teaching and learning English when there is no contact, direct or indirect, between North Korea and the rest of the world?: Why do North Korean leaders think it necessary to teach their students English, the language of North Korea's arch-enemy, the United States of America (US)? In order to answer these and other related questions, it is important to have an understanding of North Korea's political and ideological history and foundation.

The article is organised as follows. First, a brief history of ELT in Korea before independence from Japan in 1945 and of ELT in post-1945 North Korea will be provided. It will then discuss how North Korea's ideological and political imperatives gave rise to the initial elimination of English from the school curriculum and then of the subsequent reinstatement and promotion of the language, and also how these imperatives have over the decades determined ELT itself. English being taught only at secondary and tertiary levels in North Korea (Huh 1990, H.-C. Kim 1990b), little or nothing can actually be said about ELT in North Korean primary schools but the article will seek to address some of the challenges and issues that ELT in North Korea is likely to confront if and when in the future North Korea decides to extend ELT to primary school education.

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58 I am grateful to Kyung Min Lee, who kindly pointed me in the right direction when I was having trouble finding information on ELT in North Korea and also provided me with a copy of Park et al. (2001), and to Penny Lee, who had put me in touch with her. This article was originally published as Song (2004).
Finally, it must be borne in mind that this article may be slightly out of date, as North Korea is so closed a society that published materials will take a considerable amount of time to reach the outside world, if indeed they ever do. Fortunately, however, there has appeared since the late 1980s a reasonable amount of comparative research on ELT in both North and South Korea, notably H.-C. Kim (1990a), Baik (1994) and Park et al. (2001). Thus, it is not impossible to draw interesting inferences or conclusions about ELT in North Korea from these scholarly works, in conjunction with recent news reports on North Korea and the personal accounts of political refugees from North Korea.

2. ELT Before the Political Division in 1945

English was first introduced into Korea around 1882, when Korea signed a treaty of amity with the US, but for the next eighty years or so had little influence on Korean. Rather, Korean came under the direct influence of Japanese, especially during the Japanese occupation (1910-1945). It can be said of these years, however, that there was at least indirect language contact between Korean and English, as English words were imported into Korean through Japanese as an intermediary. Between 1882 and Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, English-language education was accessible only to a very small number of Koreans through government (language) schools or a few private schools run by American missionaries. During the Japanese occupation, English was initially taught as an optional subject only at boys’ high schools, and subsequently as a compulsory subject at boys’ high schools and an optional subject at girls’ high schools. However, ELT was discontinued immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War between Japan and the US in July 1941 (see K. M. Lee 2004).

3. ELT in North Korea: 1945 - Present

In 1945, Korea was partitioned into communist North Korea and capitalist South Korea as a direct result of global polarization after World War II. Until 1948, North Korea remained under the direct control of the Soviet Union, and South Korea under the direct control of the US. In North Korea, Russian rapidly emerged as the most important and prestigious foreign language, as did English in South Korea, because political and military affairs were supervised by Russian military personnel. English, however, continued to be taught at secondary level for two or three years after the liberation from Japan but, after the Korean War (1950-1953), it was completely removed from the school curriculum, making Russian the only foreign language taught in secondary schools. This hardly comes as a surprise. English was — and is — the language of the US, North Korea’s arch-enemy or, in the eyes of North Koreans, the world’s No. 1 imperial power.

This state of affairs continued until 1964, when the Central Committee of the North Korean Workers' Party issued an edict on the promotion of foreign-language education. One dramatic consequence of this edict was the reinstatement of English in the secondary school curriculum. Thus, from 1964 until the early 1970s, Russian and English were taught on a 50-50 basis, i.e. one half of all students taking Russian and the other half English — regardless, it may be added, of students' preferences (Daehan Ilbo 'Korean Daily', March 3, 2000). By mid-1970s, however, English had emerged as the main foreign language in the secondary school curriculum (Baik 1994: 127).

By 1980, English had undisputedly established itself as the most important and popular foreign language in North Korea — so much so that 80 percent of North Korean students learned English and only 20 percent Russian (D.-K. Kim 1993, cited in Baik 1994: 211). In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, Russian was completely removed from the school curriculum, with only English being taught in secondary schools (Daehan Ilbo, March 3, 2000).59 Without giving his source of information, Baik (1994: 128) reports that in 1985 ELT was extended down to the fourth grade, i.e. the final year of North Korean primary education, although it seems to have come to an end in 1992 (cf. Lee 1999: 1, Park et al. 2001: 46). Huh’s (1990) detailed study of North Korea’s school curriculum, on the other hand, does not indicate that English — or any foreign language for that matter — has ever been taught in North Korean primary schools. Thus, there seems to be an

59 It has been reported that Chinese is also gaining popularity among North Koreans. But little information is available on the extent of Chinese-language education (Daehan Ilbo, April 18, 2000).
inconsistency in the literature. Unfortunately, not much more can be said about this at present, because no details are available in the published literature. (What has been reported in South Korean newspapers — presumably based on political refugees’ personal accounts — seems to support Baik’s claim that English was once taught in the final year of North Korean primary education (K. M. Lee, personal communication).) If English was indeed taught at primary level in North Korea during the specified period of time, a number of questions remain to be answered, such as: Why was it introduced into North Korea’s primary education as early as in 1985, especially in view of the fact that it was only in 1997 that South Korea introduced English-language education into its primary school curriculum, and why was it discontinued seven years later when South Korea was gearing itself for ELT at primary level.60

It is worth noting that since the 1964 edict of the Central Committee of the North Korean Worker’s Party the importance of foreign-language education, especially English-language education, had been reiterated by the Great Leader himself. Thus, in his 1980 address to a group of North Korean educators, Kim Il Sung declared:

“The great significance of the strengthening of foreign-language education lies in the development of science and technology of the nation.” (quoted in H.-C. Kim 1990b: 275-6)

Reference to foreign-language education in Kim Il Sung’s remark here is reference to English in particular because, as pointed out earlier, it had by 1980 become the most important foreign language in North Korea. This was indeed a most remarkable change: the language of the arch-enemy brought back as it were from the wilderness, and then promoted as the most important foreign language. There may have been a number of reasons for this change of attitude.

First, the emphasis on ELT seems to have been significantly motivated by North Korea’s need for scientific and technical knowledge. Indeed North Korea has traditionally placed strong emphasis on science and technical knowledge in its school curriculum — under the influence of the Marxist-Leninist thinking that theory and practice are to be inextricably intertwined in socialist education in order to enable the masses to participate in the (re)building of the nation and also in the nation’s production of goods and services (also see H.-C. Kim 1990b: 256-257). Most scientific and technical knowledge, however, originated, and still does, from the US and other English-speaking nations. Direct access to such knowledge — without the medium of translation — would help North Korea remain in competition with, if not ahead of, South Korea, which, with US support, was actively laying the groundwork for modern industrialisation in the 1960s. Kim Il Sung and his closest associates may have come to the unavoidable conclusion that modern scientific and technical knowledge would be more easily obtained directly through English than any other foreign language, as indeed was the case in the rest of the world.

Second, there was the need on the part of Kim Il Sung and his supporters to propagate the idolatry-based Juche ideology, which was proclaimed in 1955. (Juche means ‘self-reliance’ in Korean.) When it came into existence in 1948, North Korea’s political underpinning, because of Kim Il Sung’s strong Soviet links, had its roots in Soviet communist ideology. By the mid-1960s, however, North Korea had begun to reduce its dependence, ideological or otherwise, on the Soviet Union, and to put its own Juche ideology in place, as the death in 1953 of Joseph Stalin — Kim Il Sung’s own leader — allowed the North Korean leader to gain political autonomy from the Soviet Union, and also to consolidate his own hold on power by means of bloody purges of his rivals and opponents.

This home-grown ideology is an extreme example of leader cults in modern world history.61 It is based crucially on the idolisation of Kim Il Sung as the Great Leader, whose authority and legitimacy arose from “his virtue and

60 Park et al. (2001: 46) are of the view that North Korea’s elimination of ELT from its primary school curriculum may have been due to its financial crisis and a lack of competent teachers.

61 Leader cults are one of the commonly used methods of dealing with political instability “in transitional phases of national development”, especially when the nation is “faced
benevolence" and whose "tactics and strategy amaze[d] even God" (Lone and McCormack 1993: 179). North Koreans have indeed long been led to believe that, thanks to the virtue and benevolence of their Great Leader, "they are the wealthiest and happiest people in the world" — even in times of privation and starvation (Clark 1991: 174 citing Radio Moscow, April 10, 1990). It also "forms the guiding ideology of the country, the central philosophical tenet of which is that everyone has control over their own destiny and according to which the people are responsible for, and are the prime mover in, the country's social and economic program" (Chang 1994: 3155). But, as Lone and McCormack (1993: 181) point out, the Juche ideology is "a paradoxical principle, according to which people became 'masters' only to the extent to which they faithfully served their leader".

From the 1960s, North Korea sought to participate in the Non-Aligned Nations movement as part of its diplomatic initiative, one objective being to propagate the Juche ideology. Such propagation was very important to Kim Il Sung and his supporters because it also gave them a perfect opportunity "to persuade [North Koreans] that their leader was also recognised as world leader, genius, hero and statesman", thereby "reinforc[ing] the domestic importance of the [leader] cult" (Lone and McCormack 1993: 199). Now, Kim Il Sung was not only the North Korean leader, but could also be looked up to as the leader of the Non-Aligned Nations.

To propagate the Juche ideology to the rest of the world, however, would undoubtedly have led North Korea's leaders to realise the importance and role of English in international communication (Baik and Shim 1995: 125). These pragmatic considerations may have influenced North Korea's decision to bring English back into the school curriculum. Thus, it may not be a total coincidence that the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party issued the edict on foreign-language education at the same time as North Korea "pursued [the] vigorous diplomatic initiative towards the Third World as part of the Non-Aligned Nations movement" (Lone and McCormack 1993: 198).

Finally, what has been propagandised as the inevitable confrontation with the US — which still maintains its military presence in South Korea — was also put forward as one of the main purposes of learning English. Kim Il Sung is reported to have urged North Koreans to learn English in order to have a better chance of winning the war with the US. For instance, it is reported that students were forced to memorise an English conversational booklet containing expressions such as "Hands up", "Drop your weapons", "Surrender or you will die", etc. (Daehan Ilbo, March 3, 2000).

with legacy of political repression and the absence of liberal or democratic traditions" (Lone and McCormack 1993: 178).

62 The extent of inculcation of the Juche ideology is best exemplified by one estimate in the 1970s that sixty five per cent of 1300 class hours at Kim Il Sung University, North Korea's top university, was devoted to teaching the Juche principles and Kim Il Sung's ideas (Lone and McCormack 1993: 182), or by the fact that nineteen out of forty chapters of the fourth grade Korean language textbook (1984-), for instance, are concerned with the praise or idolisation of Kim Il-Sung or his dynastic family (Park 1991: 32-36).

63 In reality, Kim Il Sung "failed dismally in his foremost objective, projecting himself as leader of the Third World. Although he entertained lavishly, established Centers in remote African countries to study his ideas, and hosted elaborate conferences to disseminate his brand of socialist patriotism at great expense to the [North] Korean people, he won few converts. Except for those he supported financially, none of the Third World leaders looked to him for inspiration" (Suh 1988: 250).
The reinstatement of English in North Korea’s school curriculum may thus seem to have been motivated by pragmatic considerations. But in reality English is not taught in North Korea to enable North Koreans to have access to scientific and technological information in English or to explain the Juche ideology to foreigners. As Baik (1994: 164) points out, it is extremely doubtful — North Korea being arguably the most tightly controlled country in the world — that foreign materials in English, scientific or otherwise, are freely imported into the country and then made readily available to the general public. In fact, North Koreans, with their radios or TVs pre-set to receive only local broadcasts, cannot even tune in to foreign radio stations or TV channels. The Internet is also out of North Koreans’ reach even if its existence is known to them. English words or expressions are rarely used in North Korea’s mass media, (newspapers, movies, TV, etc.), let alone in North Koreans’ speech (cf. Lee 1999, Shim 1994 and Song 1998 about the common use of English in South Korea’s mass media and in South Koreans’ speech). Moreover, contact between North Koreans and foreigners is strictly prohibited. Foreign visitors are not allowed to travel freely and talk to North Koreans, but, under the watchful eyes of official minders, they must visit only designated places.

In North Korea, English is confined largely to English-language classrooms. Thus, it is not inaccurate to say that most North Koreans are exposed to English only through the medium of English textbooks produced and distributed by the North Korean government. This indeed makes one wonder, as does Baik (1994: 164), if the need to learn English in North Korea has been overly exaggerated, insofar as the general public is concerned. To explain this apparent anomaly, Baik (1994: 165) argues that North Korea’s promotion of English “as the medium of science and technology is essentially a dissimulation of the hegemony of English” in the world.

In North Korea, ELT has actually been carried out — or, more accurately, exploited — merely as one of the many conduits for the Juche ideology and Kim Il Sung’s ideas being inculcated into the minds of North Korean students. ELT in the North Korean context thus places far more emphasis on the content than the form of English textbooks or ELT materials (Baik 1994: 137). Lessons on grammatical rules, pronunciation and the like — never mind pragmatic or sociolinguistic conventions — take a backseat to lessons on ideology.

Moreover, North Korea’s English textbooks give priority to the Juche ideology over such topics as the English-speaking peoples and their cultures. Even when dealing with the latter, they never fail to “portray only the negative and repressive aspects of capitalist countries and emphasize revolutionary activities as inevitable” (Baik and Shim 1995: 127). In fact, as Baik (1994), Baik and Shim (1995) and Park et al. (2001) demonstrate by means of text analysis, North Korean secondary English textbooks are written in order to embellish the reality in North Korea and totally distort the reality outside of North Korea — so much so that, for example, one textbook makes the claim that “[t]he weather conditions in North Korea are optimal with good climate all year round”, whereas “[t]he weather conditions are bad, changeable, and awful” in capitalist countries (Baik 1994: 158, 160, Park et al. 2001: 87)! Baik (1994: 162) comes to the unavoidable conclusion that this kind of embellishment or distortion of reality is intended to legitimise and maintain the current regime.

Major themes highlighted in North Korea’s English textbooks include the idolisation of both the late Kim Il Sung and his heir Kim Jong Il, the Juche ideology, and inter alia the constant class struggle against the bourgeoisie. For example, the following extract from a secondary English textbook concerns Kim Il Sung’s ideological instruction and his revolutionary activities (H.-C. Kim 1990b: 277):

“Have belief in our victory. Grow up fast and quickly. And become excellent workers of our revolution! ...” This is a teaching of Marshall Kim Il Sung, the great leader of revolution and the benevolent father of our youth and children. It happened when the main unit led by Marshall Kim Il Sung advanced to Mt. Maan-san. The Marshall met many children there whose parents had been killed by the enemy. Though their lives were saved by guerillas, they had almost nothing to eat or to wear. Their faces were swollen with hunger. Their clothes were torn to rags and they were shaking with severe cold. At the sight of the children the Marshall felt his heart aching very much. “Come to me! Quick!” the Marshall said.

The purpose — or the justification — of English-language education in North Korea is manifested most clearly in the following extract from another secondary English textbook (Park et al. 2001:85-86):
Teacher: Now close your books everybody. Han Il Nam, how do you spell the word "revolution"?

Student A: R-e-v-o-l-u-t-i-o-n

Teacher: Very good, thank you. Sit down. Ri Chol Su, what’s the Korean [word] for "revolution"?

Student B: hyekmyeng

Teacher: Fine, thank you.

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Teacher: Have you any questions?

Student C: No questions.

Teacher: Well, Kim In Su, what do you learn English for?

Student D: For our revolution.

Teacher: That’s right. It’s true that we learn English for our revolution.

In common with H.-C. Kim (1990b: 278), one cannot help calling into question the learning outcomes of North Korea’s English-language education. It is doubtful whether North Korean students, by means of such ideology-laden textbooks, will ever be able to learn much practical English or much about English-speaking peoples and their cultures.

Kim Il Sung made an interesting comment to a group of Japanese visitors in 1991: “We are one of the countries on this earth, and we will act in accordance with what happens in the world” (Lone and McCormack 1993: 173). English has become the global lingua franca, and that is one of the things that have happened in the world. North Korea had no option but to act in accordance with that reality. Seen in this light, the status and role of English in North Korea’s school curriculum, at least on the surface, may perhaps seem to have a strong pragmatic basis. But, as has been demonstrated, in North Korea English-language education is merely part and parcel of ideological education, the primary objective of which is to help sustain Kim Il Sung’s — now his son’s — absolute power and authority.

4. ELT in North Korean Primary Schools: Prospects and Problems

In North Korea, English has been taught at secondary and tertiary levels, although, as noted earlier, from 1985 till 1992 ELT may have been available also in the final year of primary education. It needs to be reiterated, however, that there appear to be no published discussions of ELT in North Korean primary schools apart from a few passing references to it; it awaits scholarly confirmation and documentation. Those scholars who claim that English was taught at primary level in North Korea also believe that it was discontinued in 1992 (Lee 1999: 1, Park et al. 2001: 46). Thus, it is correct to conclude that at present no foreign languages including English are taught in North Korean primary schools.

It is within the realm of possibilities that North Korea will consider teaching English in primary schools in the not distant future. There may be at least two reasons for this. First, North Korea’s language policy has over the decades been formulated and implemented in full awareness of what has been happening across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) in South Korea (for further discussion, see Song 2001). For instance, North Korea introduced the teaching of basic Chinese characters into secondary and tertiary education in 1966 at the behest of Kim Il-Sung, who believed that Chinese characters should be taught in the light of their wide use in South Korea. In South Korea, English began to be taught at primary level in 1997 (Lee 1999: 1). If this development is seen by North Korea’s leaders to put their own students at a disadvantage, it is possible that some form of English-language education may be introduced into North Korea’s primary school curriculum. North Korean leaders’ heightened awareness of the role of English in the age of internationalisation and globalisation may even lead them to conceive of this as more than a possibility.'
Second, North Korea has traditionally placed more emphasis on secondary education than tertiary education, and more emphasis on preschool and primary education than secondary education. By 1947, for instance, North Korea had put comprehensive preschool education in place, something that South Korea at the time could not even dream of. There is a strong pedagogical philosophy behind North Korea’s emphasis on early childhood education: The younger students are, the more effective and successful ideological education can be (Chung 1989: 330, Park 1991: 36).

If North Korea’s leaders come to believe that English-language education as a conduit for inculcating the Juche ideology into the minds of their students can also be carried out more effectively in primary than secondary schools, ELT at primary level may possibly be a question of when, not a question of if. Of course, whether English, a foreign language, can be used as such an effective conduit in the context of primary school education remains to be seen. Nonetheless it can be said that ideology-based ELT would at least reinforce or augment the ideological education that primary school children receive in the rest of their curriculum. For instance, the fact that the Great Leader and his achievements can be discussed in a foreign language (e.g. through English-speaking people in English textbooks) would no doubt make a strong impression on young minds: Kim Il Sung and his family revered not only in North Korea but also elsewhere in the world.

However, there will be problems or issues that need to be addressed or resolved, should North Korea decide to teach English in primary schools — especially on a full scale.

First of all, it is not clear whether North Korea has ever produced a sufficient number of teachers of English. Even if it has, it will take years, if not decades, to train and produce enough teachers of English to go round for all primary schools — never mind the development of ELT materials. This is precisely the same problem that South Korean primary schools were beset with — and are still finding it hard to cope with — when they started to teach English on a full scale in 1997 (also see Scott and Chen 2004 about the shortage of qualified English teachers in Taiwan, where English-language instruction became a required part of the primary school curriculum in 2001).

But the problem will no doubt be much greater in North Korea than has been the case in South Korea. In South Korea, English has always been the most important foreign language since the independence in 1945, and the country as a whole — not only the government but also private institutions and individuals — has invested much more time and money in English-language education and English teacher education (see Shim 1994, and Song 1998) than has North Korea. Moreover, South Koreans have over the decades been heavily exposed to English not only through school but also through the mass media, readily available English materials, direct contact with native English speakers, almost unrestricted overseas travel and study, and the like.

Should North Korea decide to abandon its ideology-based ELT (and also ideology-based English teacher education) in favour of practical English, the lack of competent English teachers will be an intractable problem to overcome. As demonstrated, the primary objective of ELT in North Korea has always been to reinforce ideological education prevalent in the rest of the school curriculum. To teach ideology-laden English lessons must thus have required the ability to teach the Juche ideology as much as, if not more than, the ability to teach the English language itself. This would mean that at least two generations of English teachers would need to be trained or retrained by means of reformed ELT. Moreover, in North Korea there are no private ELT providers to complement the state’s ELT and to expedite the (re)training of English teachers.

There is now some indication of North Korean leaders coming to the realisation — in the wake of recent rapprochement with the West — that there is something wrong with their ideology-driven ELT, and that the objective of ELT should be to teach English for purposes of practical communication. For instance, North Korea’s present leader Kim Jong Il himself, dissatisfied with his own interpreters, is reported to have made a special request for native English teachers to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright during her historic visit to North Korea in October 2000 (The Korea Times, 14 November 2000). In November 2000, a North Korean delegation paid a visit to a university in Los Angeles to explore possibilities of inviting American teachers of English to North Korea and of opening English courses for North Korean university students. Whether the US will positively respond to North Korea’s need for native English teachers remains to be seen, especially in view of President George W. Bush’s hostile position towards North Korea. President Bush went so far as to include North Korea in
recently reported that, in an unprecedented move, English-major university students were now permitted to visit harbour areas in order to practise English with English-speaking foreign sailors (*The Korea Times*, 21 November 2000), presumably under supervision. North Korean leaders seem to have recognised the exigencies of teaching their students to be able to use English for practical purposes.

But is North Korea willing and ready to abandon its ideology-laden ELT in favour of practical ELT? Such education would inevitably allow North Koreans to learn about the capitalistic value systems and 'decadent' cultures of English-speaking countries, and it would thus be out of step with the rest of the ideology-based curriculum. Practical ELT — or any foreign-language teaching for that matter — cannot be carried out without exposing students to cultural, political, and social contexts in which the language is used: doing business, buying and selling property and the like. This could threaten, indeed jeopardise, North Korea's ideological foundation. For this reason alone, North Korea's leaders will retain ideology-laden ELT as long as they can — that is, for as long as they stay in power. North Korea's recent rapprochement with the West will no doubt result in the exposure of North Koreans — no matter how meagre, insignificant or controlled — to the West. This may in fact force its leaders to intensify ideological education and tighten their control on the country even more.

What is more likely to happen is that, while maintaining the status quo of ELT in the mainstream school curriculum (i.e. ideology-laden English-language education), North Korea will confine ELT reforms to existing (secondary) special schools of foreign languages (or oikuke hakkyo). These special schools — part of North Korea's special education for gifted children — have been established for students selected to learn important foreign languages (D.-K. Kim 1990: 357). The English curriculum in this special education may thus be radically reformed so that students can actually learn practical English and also have access to accurate, unbiased descriptions of English-speaking peoples and their cultures instead of being bombarded with ideology-laden English lessons. The potential conflict between reformed English-language education and the rest of the ideology-laden curriculum may not be a serious problem for the regime provided that only a carefully chosen few who have absolute faith in the Juche ideology and a demonstrated sense of loyalty to the Kim family are admitted into these special schools, and also provided that their allegiance to the Kim family regime is closely monitored. Native English teachers whom North Korea may be able to attract from English-speaking countries, for instance, through the United Nations Development Programme may also be deployed to teach only at the special schools, just as a handful of native English teachers are at present allowed to teach only at special universities. To wit, two-tiered ELT may be a likely option for North Korea. Moreover, to the extent that total dedication to the Kim family regime can be fostered and monitored, special English-language education may even be extended downwards into primary level (while ideology-laden mainstream English-language education may at the same time be extended likewise).

The North Korean leaders have clearly realised "the need to open the country to new technology, capital, ideas and trade", but that does not necessarily mean that they will open the floodgates, jeopardising their "carefully

what he called "an axis of evil". His hard-line position is unlikely to change in the wake of the events of September 11. It will probably depend on how the US will negotiate with North Korea over the latter's recently reactivated nuclear-weapons programme.

This desperate measure is understandable because North Korea is now too strapped for cash to do what it used to do: to send a carefully selected few to friendly nations to learn English. This contrasts with the situation in South Korea, where the government, universities and schools — not to mention numerous private English-language schools — have been recruiting English teachers from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the US and the United Kingdom.

North Korea was admitted into the United Nations in 1991. Thus, it will be able to have access to the latter's aid programmes including (English-language) teacher training.
constructed system of control and the prospects for long dynastic rule” (Lone and McCormack 1993: 200-201). Too much is at stake for them. In North Korea, ELT — as normally practised in the rest of the world (but see Tollefson 1991, Phillipson 1992 and Pennycook 1994 for a critical appraisal of ’normal’ ELT practices) — may thus be very likely to be carried out on a very small scale in a strictly controlled environment, if at all.

5. Conclusion

Notwithstanding its seemingly pragmatic motivations, ELT in North Korea has over the decades served as one of the many conduits for inculcating the idolatry-based Juche ideology into the minds of North Koreans. North Korea’s leaders have clearly realised the importance and role of English in this age of internationalisation and globalisation. However, they will be foolhardy to run the risk of reforming English-language education across-the-board. It is thus more likely for the two-tiered ELT system already in place to be revamped, whereby not only the practical need to produce a small number of faithfuls with an excellent command of English, but also the political need to sustain the dynastic rule through ideological education can safely be met. Needless to say, what has been said in this article about the prospects of ELT in North Korea is nothing more than speculation. One thing can be said with confidence about ELT in North Korea, however. Like almost all other things there, the future of ELT will depend very much on Kim Jong Il’s way of thinking, as almost everything in the past depended on his father’s way of thinking. How much longer that will be the case, of course, is another matter altogether.

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The Search for Goguryeo Heritage in the Legends of Hogyeong and Jakjegeon from Goryeosa segye

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1. Introduction

Currently, China and Korea are locked in a dispute over the history of Goguryeo (BC37-668), the once powerful kingdom which spread over most parts of Manchuria and the northern half of Korean peninsula. Both countries claim that Goguryeo is a part of their national history. The Chinese claim of Goguryeo history is based on the fact that the greater portion of the Goguryeo territory became a part of the present day People’s Republic of China, while Korea retained only a small portion of its territory. China also claims that it absorbed more of the Goguryeo people than Korea did, when the dynasty collapsed.

The Chinese claim of Goguryeo history seems to be based on the application of presentism in history. Presentism is a metaphysical argument that only the present is real (Crisp 2003: 212). When presentism is deliberately applied in history writing to justify or glorify the present, the past is distorted, anachronised or misinterpreted for the sake of the present. In such a case, a historian commits a great sin of fabricating historical reality. On this issue, David Livingstone perceptively wrote (Livingstone 1993: 4):

---The past, in other words, is only contemplated in terms of the present. The result is that history is written backwards – from the present to the past and this is what historians refer to as ‘Whiggish’ or ‘presentist’ history.

Indeed the Chinese claim of Goguryeo history seems to write the history backwards from the present to the past by projecting the map of the present day China’s territory to Seventh Century East Asia when China’s territory then was much smaller. Goguryeo has never existed as a part of China. During the Goguryeo times, most of the territory north of the great wall belonged to non-Chinese people and was not part of China. If Goguryeo is claimed to be part of China because most of the Goguryeo territory presently belongs to China, such a claim neglects the historical context and misinterprets the past by imposing the map of the present day Chinese territory to the Goguryeo time (BC 37 – 677). Such a claim is an act of presentism.

In order to counter China’s presentistic claim of Goguryeo history to justify their present territory, Korean scholars may need to point out how China inappropriately uses presentism in their claim. At the same time, Korea needs to document how and what Goguryeo heritage has been retained throughout Korean history. In documenting Goguryeo heritage to modern Koreans, Goryeosa segye can provide an important clue, because the folklorised version of Wang Geon’s genealogy in it seems to have implicitly emphasised Goguryeo heritage in promoting Wang Geon as the legitimate ruler of Korea. The aim of this paper is to identify and analyse the signs of Goguryeo heritage as reflected in the stories of Hogyeong and Jakjegeon in Goryeosa segye (Folklorised Genealogy of the Founder of the Goryeo Dynasty). Before analysing these two stories, I will briefly comment on the source of Goryeosa segye and then introduce the relevant stories that appear to reflect the Goguryeo heritage in an abridged translation.

---This presentism is often seen in the history of an academic discipline that is written for students to enlighten the present position of their discipline by providing a suitable historical background. On this issue, George Stocking (1968: 8) effectively pointed out:

---the author may attempt to legitimize a present point of view by claiming for it a putative “founder” of the discipline. Or he may sweep broadly across the history of a discipline, brushing out whigs and tories in the nooks and crannies of every century. Inevitably the sins of history written “for the sake of the present” insinuate themselves: anachronism, distortion, misinterpretation, misleading analogy, neglect of context, oversimplification of process.
Pyonnyon tongnok and Goryeosa segye

Goryeosa segye (the Genealogy of Wang Geon, the founder of Goryeo in the History of the Goryeo dynasty) includes stories relating to Kaesong and the ancestors of Wang Geon. From these mythical legends, one can detect signs that the ancestors of Wang Geon’s cultural heritage and genealogical line might have derived from Goguryeo. These stories are quotes from the Abridged Chronological History (Pyonnyon tongnok) by Gim gwanui during King Uijong (1146-1170) that is now not extant. It was written some 260 years after Wang Geon, the first king of Goryeo. However, we should not assume that these stories were created by him, for his book merely indicates a terminus antiquem ‘the time before which concrete evidence exists’ of these tales. It is difficult to accurately date the exact occurrence of orally transmitted folklore materials. The concrete evidence of a tale’s existence is often a written record. In the case of the stories of Wang Geon’s ancestors, Gim Gwanui’s book is the terminus antiquem, for it provides concrete evidence of the existence of these tales by the time of his recording. By considering these characteristics of folklore, I share Na Kyongsu’s view that these folklorised stories of Wang Geon’s ancestors must have existed before Gim Gwanui, and the stories in his book may well represent edited and collated versions of tales that were retold by different people through the generations (Na Kyongsu: 84). The folklorised version of Wang Geon’s genealogy in Goryeosa segye is the result of turning Wang Geon’s family history into myths and legends. Gim gwanui’s work was the main source of Goryeosa segye in this regard, while some quotations from the Classified Chronological History (Pyonnyon gangmok) by Min Ji (1248-1326) became a complimentary and auxiliary reference. While exploring the stories of Kaesong and Wang Geon’s ancestors, the authors of Goryeosa segye sometimes cited a different version of Min Ji’s work to compare and contrast Gim Gwanui’s story, thus adding a new perspective and extra information.

Among the studies of these tales, Yi Pyongdo’s study is probably the most important, as it inquired how geomancy was used for the social construction to glorify the images of Kaesong and the Wang family (Yi Pyongdo: 1980, 85-89). Yi Pyongdo interpreted the Goryeosa Segye tales as having little value as reliable historical records. Murayama Chijun’s work on this topic is extensive and perceptive, but is focused on interpreting the importance of geomantic history as folk belief in Korea (Murayama Chijun 1990: 585-613). Two other recent studies on the tales by Choi Pyong-hon and Kim Ki-duk are both based on Yi Pyongdo’s work (Choi Byong-hon 1989: 79-85; Kim Ki-duk 2001: 66-75). Choi examined the ideological background for founding the Goryeo dynasty, while Kim examined the geomantic values in the tales. Two other works by Na Kyongsu and You In Soo study these tales as oral literature and examine their literary style and structure (Na Kyongsu: 67-86; You In Soo 1989).

In 1982 Michael C. Rogers published substantial research on the quoted parts of the Abridged Chronological History (Pyonnyon tongnok) by Gim Gwanui in Goryeosa segye. In this article, he accepted that the prime purpose of the narratives by Gim Gwanui was “the glorification, indeed the sacramisation, of the dynastic line” (Rogers 1982-1983: 19). He presented an unorthodox view that the folklorised genealogy of Wang Geon was written by Gim Gwanui by selecting material transmitted from the time of Wang Geon.

2. A summary of the main points of the narratives as related to Hogyeong and Jakjegeon in Goryeosa segye

a) Hogyeong, Wang Geon’s first ancestor settled in Kaesong
Once upon a time a person named Hogyeong (虎景: Tiger Scenery) called himself Songgol changgun (聖骨將軍: Hallowed-bone General, highest bone rank of Silla). He travelled from Mt Paektu [through various mountains] and arrived at the left valley of Mt Puso (another name for Mt Songak) where he settled and married a local woman.

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68 For the abridged and translated version included in this paper, I used the North Korean translation of Goryeosa into modern Korean: Translated by Pak Sihyong & Hong Hwoiyu, Goryeosa (History of Goryeo), vol 1, (Pyongyang: Gwahakwon Chulpansa, 1962) reprinted in Seoul by Arum Chulpansa.

Michael C. Rogers translated the full text quoted from Pyonnyon tongnok in Goryeosa Segye and discussed the ideological, geomantic and other religious backgrounds of the text in his article. Rogers’ translation of the text includes parts that seem to be the translation of literal meanings of each word, rather than the meaning of an entire sentence in context. For the full text of narratives quoted from Pyonnyon tongnok, see Michael C. Rogers (1982-83), pp.3-72.
He was rich but had no sons and often went hunting. One day, he went hunting at Mt Pyeongna with nine other villagers and happened to stay overnight in a cave. A tiger appeared in front of the cave and roared ferociously. The ten men were all scared that the tiger would devour them. They decided to throw their hats in front of the tiger and whoever’s hat was bitten first had to confront it. Once they had thrown out their hats, the tiger bit Hogyeong’s hat and he went out to fight it. However, once he got out of the cave, the tiger had disappeared and the cave collapsed killing all nine villagers. At the funeral of the nine victims he prepared sacrificial offerings to the mountain guardian spirit. Then the mountain spirit, who identified herself as a widow, appeared to him and told him that she wanted him to be her husband. She consecrated him as the king of the mountain. No sooner had she spoken the words when both Hogyeong and the mountain spirit disappeared. After this event Pyeongna County folks worshiped him as the king of the mountain and made a shrine for him.

b) Jakjegeon, -The grandfather of Wang Oeon, the first king of the Goryeo dynasty
Jakjegeon boarded a merchant ship bound for China at the age of 16 to meet his father. Due to bad weather, he was left on the bank where the dragon king of the West Sea lived. The dragon king asked Jakjegeon to kill a wicked fox which had been the cause of a severe headache.

Jakjegeon killed the disguised fox as a Buddha (Chiseonggwangyeore) with a bow and arrow and the dragon king granted him a wish as a reward. Jakjegeon told him that he wanted to become the king of Korea. The dragon king told him that he was not yet qualified to be so and asked him to wish for something else. Jakjegeon told him that he wanted to marry his daughter. The Dragon King agreed and as a wedding gift gave seven treasures and a sacred pig to Jakjegeon. When the newly wed couple arrived home, people from the four districts of Gaeju, Chongju, Yomchu and Baeju, as well as the three counties of Ganghwa, Gyodong and Haum, built Yongansong Palace and a defensive wall around it for them.

When the dragon lady (龍女), Jakjegeon’s wife, arrived at Kaesong, she dug a well at the north-eastern slope of the mountain and collected water from it with a silver container. This place has now become the Great Well of Kaesong. One day, after they had lived at Yong’ansong for a year, the pig refused to get into its pigsty. The owner told the pig that if this was not a suitable place to live, he would follow it to a better place. The next morning the pig went to a site on the southern slope of Mt Song’ak. Because of this, Jakjegeon and his wife moved to the site and built a new house there. This happened to be the place where Kangchung used to live. Jakjegeon lived there for 30 years, commuting between his new home and Yongansong.

3. Tracing Goguryeo heritage in the stories of Hokyong and Jakjegeon from Goryeosasaegye
I will now analyse and interpret some Goguryeo heritage as reflected in the two stories from Goryeosa Saegye, the folklorised stories of Wong Oeon’s ancestors. As early as 1947 Yi Byongdo perceptively interpreted the Goryeosa segye tales and declared that they were seen to mystify Song’ak (Kaesong) as the origin of the Wang family and to glorify Wang Oeon as having a heavenly mandate to unify Korea and establish the Goryeo dynasty (Yi Byongdo 1980: 87). It is interesting that in such stories, Goguryeo heritage is detectable. Perhaps the story of Jakjegeon shifting houses to an auspicious site using a pig as a divine guidance reflects Goguryeo heritage the most obviously. The mythical legend of Wang Oeon’s first ancestor, Hogyeong also possibly reflects the fact that he was a descendant of the Goguryeo people. I will discuss the story of Jakjegeon before that of Hogyeong:

a) Jakjegeon
Jakjegeon was born and lived in Mahagap, but moved back to Kangchung’s old house site in Kaesong, the future capital site. His action implied that Kaesong was a more auspicious site than Mahagap or Yongansong castle. With the mysterious guidance of the ‘golden pig’, he returned to and reoccupied the most auspicious spot (geomancy cave) chosen by his grandfather.

This story shares the same type of tale motive as the earlier story of Goguryeo’s moving the capital to Gungnaesong from Jolbonsong. The story of finding and moving Goguryeo’s capital to Gungnaesong during

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69 Michael Rogers claims that Gim Gwanui made use of this Goguryeo style story of the pig as a discoverer of an auspicious site, because his basic purpose was “to proclaim the supremacy of Gaeseong as the capital city, invalidating any claims that might be advanced by partisans of Pyongyang, the Western Capital.” See Rogers, Op. Cit., pp.46-47.
On the Third Moon of the 21st year of the reign of King Yuri (2 A.D.), the pig chosen for sacrificial rites escaped and ran away. The king ordered Seolji, the officer in charge of sacrificial rites to chase it. He chased it and caught it at Gungnaewinaam and arranged a local resident to look after it. Then, Seolji reported back to the king; “When I chased the pig to Gungnaewinaam, I found that the place was both well protected by mountain barriers and suitable for growing crops. It was also rich in game animals and fish. If you move the capital to this place, it will be advantageous for the people’s economic wellbeing as well as defence from the enemy.” During the 9th Moon of the same year, the king went to Gunngae to have a look at the place and in the 10th Moon of the following year (3 A.D.), the king relocated the capital to this site.

The story of Jakjegeon finding an auspicious site on the southern slopes of Mt Songak is remarkably similar to the Goguryeo story of Seolji finding a new capital site. Jakjegeon’s ‘golden pig’ story seems to be a rearranged story of Seolji’s in a different context; in both cases the sacred pigs run away and are caught at the auspicious site which is to be the new capital. The finding of an auspicious site by animals is an important theme in Korean geomancy tales. There are a number of Korean legends and folktales in whichigers and other animals point out geomantically auspicious sites for good people. However, except for the Goguryeo and Goryeo dynasties, no Korean dynasties or kingdoms ever had stories of using a sacred pig (or any other animal) to find an auspicious capital site. And as far as I know no Manchurian or Chinese dynasties have a similar story of using a pig for finding and shifting to an auspicious capital site either. For this reason, one can conjecture that Jakjegeon’s move to an auspicious site is an indication of the transmission of the Goguryeo tradition to Goryeo.

I would like to consider why a sacred pig rather than, for example, a tiger or a human being, finds an auspicious capital site in the Goguryeo and Goryeo legends? What does a pig symbolise in Korean culture? Although these questions can not be fully addressed here, one can quickly point out the well known fact that a pig symbolises ‘good luck’ or ‘wealth and prosperity’ in Korean culture. Many Koreans still believe that dreaming of a pig on New Year’s Eve is a good omen for the New Year. Perhaps, to a Korean, finding a lost or an escaped pig was a sign of good luck, and the location where it was found, a lucky place. Using an animal to find a geomantically auspicious site can be seen as a result of the merge of traditional Korean symbolism and geomantic ideas.

On this issue, Choi Byong-hon drew our attention to the Chinese historical source, the Tung’i section of ‘the Book of Wei’ in the (Chinese) History of the Three Kingdoms (Sankuogi). The book recorded that the Upru people who are related to ancient Koreans favoured rearing pigs and used pig meat for food, pig skin for cloth and pig fat for protecting them from the cold by applying it to their skin (Choi, Byong-hon 1975: 127; Rogers 1982-1983: 46). He then conjectured that the belief in pigs as good finders of auspicious places might have been widely spread among the ancient Puyo people who were later incorporated into Goguryeo (Choi Byong-hon 1975: 127). Although Choi Byong-hon did not declare that this story reflects the Goguryeo heritage, he suggested that it is interesting that the tale motive of ‘pigs as finders of auspicious sites’ was repeated in the story of Wang Geon’s ancestors who inherited the traditions of Goguryeo (Choi Byong-hon 1975: 127). His conjecture is reasonable, although it is yet unknown whether such a belief was widely spread among the ancient Korean people. For further research on this issue, the analysis of Korean geomancy tales could provide some insight, for Korean folk narratives have a number of legends and folktales about animals finding auspicious sites for good people.

Roger’s thoughtful conjecture seems to be somewhat illogical, because Gaeseong is to Goguryeo’s Jolbon what Pyongyang is to Guknaewinaam. The story of the pig running way from Jakjegeon’s house and finding an auspicious house site (his ancestor’s old house site) can be interpreted as an allegory advocating to move Goryeo’s capital from Gaeseong to Pyongyang (the old capital of Goguryeo, ‘the ancestral state’) rather than to proclaim the supremacy of Gaeseong as the capital city.

70 Here, I have abridged and translated the information relevant to Seolji’s finding of Gungnaeaeong and moving the capital only. See, Gim Busik, pp. 256-257.

71 In many traditional cultures, pigs are a highly valued commodity. Pigs are considered to be one of the most valued items as a gift or the most important food for celebrations and festivals of many Pacific Island cultures.
With the story of Jakjegeon moving to the southern slopes of Mt Song'ak by rediscovering and reoccupying his ancestor's old house site, the legend may intend to exercise an important process of social construction of the Kaesong Palace site being reconfirmed as the most auspicious location in Kaesong.

b) The Mythical Legend relating to Hogyeong.
The Story of Wang Geon's ancestors in Goryeosa segye begins with Hogyeong, his first ancestor who settled in Kaesong. According to the story, Hogyeong travelled from Mt Paektu and eventually arrived at the Kaesong District. Mt Paektu is the most sacred and highest mountain in Korea where it is considered to be the patriarch of all Korean mountains. So to speak, it is the source of vital energy which flows out to the various parts of Korea. Therefore, this part of the story implies that Kaesong's main mountain, Mt Songak is a part of the mountain range that is dispatched from Mt Paektu in the northern end of the Korean Peninsula. Hogyeong (literally meaning 'Tiger Scenery'), who travelled a long way from this patriarchal mountain, is effectively described as an immigrant from the north, Mt Paektu District. This might imply that he was a descendant of the Goguryeo People. Wang Geon cherished Goguryeo heritage, as evident in the name of the kingdom he founded, "Goryeo", which is an abridgement of Goguryeo. He claimed that Goryeo, his new kingdom was the successor of Goguryeo. The recovery of the old Goguryeo territory had always been an important national policy of Goryeo.

The fact that Hogyeong married a local woman in the story may signify the marriage between the northern immigrants and the local inhabitants. In the story Hogyeong became the mountain king (god) with divine power. This story may intend to describe Wang Geon's family as having a supernatural power, perhaps implying that they were destined to be the royal family of Korea. The son of Hogyeong, Kangchung married the daughter of a rich man. This story signifies the elevation of the Wang family's socio-economic status as the leading local gentry. At the same time one can interpret this story as the successful settlement of a Goguryeo descendant in the Kaesong District after migrating to the south.

In the story, Hogyeong liked hunting and often went hunting. He is implicitly described as a brave man. When Hogyeong went hunting and stayed overnight with nine villagers in a cave, he was the only one who confronted a tiger that challenged the whole group. From the story one can interpret that for his courage in confronting the tiger by himself he was rescued from the cave before its mysterious collapse, while the others were left to perish in it. We can conjecture that Hogyeong was a physically well built and strong man. Tiger hunting or hunting in general was an important aspect of the Goguryeo lifestyle as shown in Goguryeo tomb paintings, whereas Paekje and Silla people depended more on agriculture during the three kingdoms period. Therefore, we can conjecture that the story of Hogyeong, especially his migration to the south from Mt Paektu, his hunting life style, the inferred strong physical stature and courage all indicate that he was a person who inherited the Goguryeo heritage both physically, spiritually and culturally.

Judging from the story of Hogyeong and his descendants, one can conjecture that Wang Geon's ancestors had a humble family origin. Not having been members of the royal or aristocratic family of Silla, they were probably migrants from the north and descendants of the Goguryeo people.

4. Conclusion

The tales of Wang Geon's family background in Goryeosa segye justify Wang Geon as the person designated to establish Goryeo by unifying Korea. In doing so Wang Geon's ancestors were mystified and glorified to legitimise the Wang family as the worthy royal family of Korea. In the process of glorifying the Wang family in the tales, the heritage of Goguryeo was incorporated. Hogyeong, the first ancestor of Wang Geon, is implicitly described in the story as a descendant of the Goguryeo People: an immigrant from the north, the heartland of Goguryeo, with a passion for hunting in mountains and being a strong and brave man. Jakjegeon's move to a more auspicious site that later became the palace site using a golden pig is remarkably similar to the Goguryeo tale of King Yuri's moving the capital to Kungnaesong from Cholbonsong. These stories are important parts of establishing Goryeo as the legitimate successor of Goguryeo along with other evidence including the adoption of the name of Goryeo from Goguryeo.

Among all East Asian nations including Han-Chinese dynasties and Manchurian dynasties, the Goryeo dynasty claimed to be the successor of Goguryeo most strongly and has certainly inherited the Goguryeo culture the most. Present-day Korea is the direct successor of the Goryeo dynasty and thus the Korean People can legitimately claim Goguryeo history as a part of Korean history.

72 For the discussion of Goryeo's state founding ideology being the succession of Goguryeo, see Michael C. Rogers, 17-19.
George Stocking rightly suggested “to understand the past for the sake of the past” by suspending judgment so as to present utility (Stocking 1968: 12). If we apply this historicist orientation in the understanding of Goguryeo history, it is plainly clear that Goguryeo was not a part of China, but was an independent Korean kingdom. Koreans value Goguryeo heritage and have claimed Goguryeo to be one of their ancestral states much more intensely and much earlier than the Chinese.

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Migrations and Conquests: Changing Assertions of Common Ancestry of Koreans and Japanese

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It has been pointed out that prewar Japanese scholarship of Korea was strongly biased against Korea, arguing Korea's economic and political backwardness and historic reliance on impacts from China and Manchuria. The aspect of the prewar Japanese scholarship criticized most by Korean scholars is the theory of common ancestry of Japanese and Koreans (Nissen dósoron), which provided an academic justification for Japan's annexation of Korea and attempt to assimilate its people into the Japanese empire by eradicating their identity (Pai, 2000, p.36; Ch'oe, 1980, p.17-18).

A closer look at the theory of common ancestry reveals that it in fact consisted of two contradicting schools of thought. On the one hand, conventional Japanese historians relying on the Japanese chronicles from the early eighth century, the Kojiki (Ancient Records) and the Nihon shoki (History of Japan), contended that the two countries shared the same roots because ancient Japan had subjugated and controlled Korea. On the other hand, a group of Japanese scholars in the newly adopted Western disciplines of anthropology, archaeology, and linguistics wrote that early northeast Asians had migrated to Japan via the Korean peninsula and formed the ancestors of the Japanese people. Although both schools reached the conclusion of common ancestral origins shared by Koreans and Japanese, their processes were far different from each other. After World War II, the discussions of the peninsular origins of early Japanese were revived in the form of the theory of horserider invasions. Soon, a number of Korean scholars put forward their views that emphasized Korean contributions to early Japan.

The Conventional Japanese View

The notion of early Japanese rule over Korea was not new in modern Japan. Some Japanese National Studies (Kokugaku) scholars of eighteenth-century expressed that Susanoo, the sun goddess Amaterasu's younger brother, had been the true founder of Silla based on the Nihon shoki account that he had resided in Silla and pulled a piece of Silla land to Izumo, an early political center in western Japan facing the East Sea. Others discussed that Susanoo had become Tan'gun, the founder of the first Korean state Choson (Hosaka, 2000, p.167).

These ethnocentric views undoubtedly affected late-nineteenth-century Japanese historians who continued to rely on the Japanese chronicles in their study of the early period. Kokushi gan (Survey of Japanese history) and Nikkan koshidan (An outline history of early Japan and Korea), two representative works published in 1890 and 1893 respectively, argued that Sosanoo had controlled Korea and Empress Jingu had invaded and subjugated Silla (Shigeno et al, 1890, p.17-18). The latter book in particular contended that Koreans and Japanese had been one people in early times, and prominent figures in early Korea had originated from Japan. For instance, Hogong, the prime minister to the first ruler of Silla, and Sok T'arhae, the fourth ruler of Silla, arrived from Japan because "Wa" and "tap'ana" mentioned in the Samguk sagi (History of the Three Kingdoms) could correspond to Kyushu and Tamba or Tajima (Yoshida, 1893, p. 4-5, 85-89).

Migrations from Korea to Japan

In the late nineteenth century, the Japanese government hired Western scholars to teach in its newly established academic institutions. Some of these scholars took interest in shedding light on prehistoric Japan, initiated archaeological excavations, and speculated that the indigenous people responsible for Japan's Neolithic artifacts had been ethnically different from contemporary Japanese (Higuchi, 1971, p.27-28; Saito, 1995, p.101-102). Soon, Japanese archaeologists and anthropologists, now trained in Western theories and techniques, began asking questions concerning the origins of the Japanese people. Among them was Torii Ryuzo, a product of the newly-established anthropology department at Tokyo Imperial University. He conducted extensive fieldwork throughout East Asia, utilizing archaeology, physical anthropology, and ethnology (Higuchi, 1971, p.38-39; Saito, 1995, p.159).

By 1918, Torii concluded that Koreans and Japanese were ethnologically contiguous based on the similarities in prehistoric artifacts, physical characteristics, and linguistic features. He hypothesized that this was due to large-scale migrations from the peninsula to the islands in prehistoric and protohistoric times. According to him, the Ainu people, though their origins were still unknown, first reached the islands and developed the Jōmon culture many millennia ago. About 300 B.C., northeast Asians living in Korea, Manchuria, and Russian Far East moved to the islands en mass, bringing with them the more sophisticated Yayoi culture. Although Malay-Indonesians from the Philippines, Taiwan, Borneo, and Sumatra as well as the Miao tribes from southern China also reached Japan from southwest, they were limited in number. From the late third century, northeast
Asians once again moved to the islands via the Korean peninsula, with sophisticated metal culture at this time, and developed the Kofun (tumuli) culture in Japan. A small number of Chinese also came and joined at the same time. In sum, the northeast Asians who arrived via the Korean peninsula in the Yayoi and Kofun periods contributed most to the making of the Japanese people while other groups also blended in (Torii, 1918, p.45-46, 206-207).

Torii then attempted to make a link between this theory and the foundation myths in the Japanese chronicles. He thought that the northeast Asians who had arrived in the Kofun era were the so-called heavenly tribe (ama tsu kami) that the chronicles said had descended from heaven and built the first unified state in Yamato. The members of this tribe, according to the myths, were dressed like northeast Asians with long-sleeved jackets, baggy pants, long leather shoes, glass beads around the neck, and daggers on the waist, and fought like northeast Asian warriors with swordsmanship and archery (Torii, 1918, p.208).

Kida Sadakichi, a historian and geographer working for the Ministry of Education, is considered the foremost advocate of the theory of common ancestry due to his enthusiastic support of the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 (Hatada, 1969, p.244-245). Just as Torii, he thought that the Japanese people had emerged as a result of blending of various peoples, though he relied primarily on the Japanese and Korean chronicles. In his view, the Yayoi culture was developed by the “country tribe” (kuni tsu kami) or the Izumo tribe mentioned in the chronicles, along with the indigenous peoples of the Hayato living in southern Kyūshū and the Wa spread in northern Kyūshū and southern Korea. The Izumo tribe was a large group and related to the people in the Korean peninsula as its primogenitor Susanoo had lived in Silla. Later, the heavenly tribe, though smaller in number, came and occupied the predominant position in the islands thanks to their advanced culture and technology (Kida, 1921, p.370-390).

Kida hypothesized that the heavenly tribe was related to the Puyo people, who had lived north of the Korean peninsula and later moved south to build the kingdoms of Koguryo and Paekche, based on the following reasons. Both the heavenly tribe and the peninsular people originated from Puyo worshipped the sun as their ancestors. They both had myths revealing their belief that the founder had descended from the sun god and his wife from the water god. And, they both pronounced basic numbers, such as three, five, seven and ten, in similar ways. Because the Korean people emerged from a mixture of the indigenous Wa, the Puyo from north, and Chinese refugees, Koreans are very similar to Japanese. If there was a family tree of the human species, Koreans and Japanese would represent small branches adjacent to each other, which could potentially merge into one (Kida, 1919, 1921). Thus, Kida linked the Japanese people to Puyo for the first time, but he did not discuss further details.

Kanazawa Shōzaburo, a linguist knowledgeable in many Asian languages, dealt with questions concerning early movements of peoples from Korea to Japan in his monograph titled Nissen dosoron in 1929. He thought that an analysis of directional nouns could indicate the general movement of the speakers of the language. In Manchu and Mongolian, nouns for south, north, east, and west respectively meant front, behind, left, and right at the same time, reflecting the general southward movement of the speakers in the ancient past. By the same token, because arp’ (ap’ today) and tuit, the archaic Korean nouns for front and behind, also meant south and north, Kanazawa conjectured that early Koreans had come from north and moved southward into the Korean peninsula. Kanazawa conjectured that they had continued moving southward to the Japanese islands across the Korea strait (Kanazawa, 1978, p.52-60).

Kanazawa found in many of Japanese place names furu (or furu) and kohori, which were variant forms for pōr or kopōr, the old Korean term for village (Kanazawa, 1978, p.142-148). Further, the term So or Sō, was related to the term soi (iron or metal) and the original name for Silla, as seen in its capital name Sŏrabŏl, and its varied forms with prefixes, such Aso (Asa), Iso (Isa), Susa, Usa, and Yoso (Yosa), were found in place names in many parts of Japan. The male names Sotsubiko and Sachihiko that appear in the Japanese chronicles simply meant the man of Sō. Even Isanagi and Isanami, the names of the god and goddess pair who created the Japanese islands in the chronicles, should be broken down to Isa no agi and Isa no ami, the man and woman of Sō, because agi and ami (or ōmi) meant boy and girl in early Japanese. Kanazawa thought that Susanoo had moved from Silla to Izumo, and not the other way around, and Soshimori in Silla, the place of his residence that the Nihon shoki referred to, should be considered a variant of Sŏrabŏl (p.65-68, 185-215).

Nevertheless, Kanazawa did not make a clear statement about early Korean-Japanese relations. Despite the ample evidence for early migrations from Korea to Japan, he simply concluded that the core group of Japanese ancestors had come from a far-off place in Asia (p.249-250). In his confession to his nephew after WWII, he admitted that he had resorted to ambiguity because he had been afraid of creating a controversy with his true findings (p.i).

Prewar Japan dominated the rest of Asia politically and militarily, and Korea was a mere addition to the Japanese empire. The Japanese attempted to project this contemporary relationship on the early period to create the view that early Japan had been the original center and Korea an offshoot. Koiso Kuniaki, while he was the Governor-General of Korea between 1942 and 1944, stated that “the twenty-five million natives of Korea undoubtedly descended from Susanoo and thus share the same ethnic roots with Japanese who are offspring of Amaterasu” (Hosaka, 2000, p.167). Japanese policy makers, as well as the general public, apparently did not
fourth century. Thus, in Egami's view, Ninigi's heavenly descent to Kyoshii in the chronicles was a

We i) and speculated that this king and his descendants had originally come from PuyO on horseback,

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The Horserider Invasion Theory

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The Horserider Invasion Theory

In 1948, Egami Namio, a Japanese scholar specializing in Central Asian history, began expounding the

horserider theory that redefined the early relationship between Japan and Korea. According to this theory,

continental horseriding invaders landed in Japan via Korea and established a conquest dynasty in Yamato by the

late fourth century. The primary impetus of the theory came from Egami's perception that the nature of grave

goods from the Japanese tumuli suddenly changed from "agricultural and Southeast Asian" to "equestrian and

skills necessary for navigation improved and spread over time. A group of migrants who entered the

southwestern part of Japan in a late stage came to dominate other groups and ultimately became rulers of the

early Japanese state sometime in the first millennium A.D. Residents of the peninsula continued to trickle into

the islands even after the Japanese state was formed. A good example is Ameno hihoko, a Silla prince, who is

said to have arrived in western Japan with various goods, as recorded in the Japanese chronicles. Ch'oe also

discussed that the Korean people had come into being through the blending of the Puyo people and others who

had migrated into the peninsula at different times (Ch'oe, 1973, p.168-172).

Although Ch'oe was not a trained archaeologist or anthropologist, he synthesized theories put forth by

Torii and Kida and presented an overall picture of northeast Asian migrations that had shaped both the Japanese

and Korean peoples. He clearly identified Korea as the cultural prototype and predecessor and Japan as the

follower and late comer. And, peninsular migrants moved to Japan not to be subjugated or ruled, but to build

their own settlement and take the lead of the natives.

Sin Ch'ae-ho and An Chae-hong also emphasized Korean contributions to the Japanese state in their

writings. In Toksa sillon (A new reading of history) published in 1908, Sin criticized the Japanese assertions that

placed Japan above Korea in early times and deplored the fact that Korean history texts had unsuspectingly

adopted Japanese views. He disagreed, for instance, that Susanoo had anything to do with Tan'gun, or that

Empress Jingu had invaded Silla and received a hostage, and emphasized that Silla provided Japan with

advanced culture, technology, and the state organization (Sin, 1977, 1, p.471, 495-497). In 1931, he argued in

Choson sangosa (Early Korean history) that the Silla king Tongsoong (r. 479-500) had attacked and

subjugated Japan, based on his interpretation of a phrase in Jiu Tang-shu (Old records of Tang) (Sin, 1983, 2,
p.314). In the same vein, An Chae-hong wrote "Yuk Kara kuk sogo" (A brief thought on the six Kara states) in

1937 and underscored the role of peninsular immigrants as bringers of advanced culture and technology to early

Japan. According to him, immigrants to Japan, who were said to have descended from Han and Qin Chinese


These publications in the colonial era placed early Korea above Japan and served as an important precursor to

the recent studies by Korean scholars.

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late fourth century. The primary impetus of the theory came from Egami's perception that the nature of grave

goods from the Japanese tumuli suddenly changed from "agricultural and Southeast Asian" to "equestrian and

north Asian" in the middle of the Kofun era. Knowing Kida's comparison of Japanese myths, legends, and

language to those of Puyo, Egami hypothesized that it was a group of Puyo warriors who had invaded and

established a political power in western Japan. He then singled out Emperor Sujin, the tenth Japanese ruler on

the traditional list, as the conqueror from the Korean peninsula on the ground that his original names were

Hatsukuni shirasu ("the first to rule") and Mimaki iri hiko ("man entering Mimana or Imma-Kaya"). Egami

conflated Sujin with the king of Chin, a third-century ruler of southern Korea, mentioned in the Wei-shi (Records

of Wei) and speculated that this king and his descendants had originally come from Puyo on horseback,

dominated native polities in southern Korea, and invaded Japan's northern Kyushu via Imna-Kaya early in the

fourth century. Thus, in Egami's view, Ninigi's heavenly descent to Kyushu in the chronicles was a
Thus, the first ruler Jinmu's "eastward expedition" to Yamato in the chronicles was none other than Ojin's PuyO troops in southern Korea, launched a grand invasion of Japan. He crossed the Korea strait, landed in the PuyO origins of Ojin and his followers, Ledyard mentioned linguistic and mythological similarities already peoples in and around the Korean peninsula that had stimulated migrations of peoples to southern Korea and suddenly increased in the first quarter of the fifth century. Finally, horse trappings began to appear in the middle century and even earlier. The notable continuities include the keyhole shape of tombs, rather unique in Japan, formidable nomadic Hsien-pei tribes, which dominated the Liao River basin and later took over the eastern part of China's central plain. Then, Koguryo, located just south of PuyO, destroyed the Lelang and Taifang Chinese commanderies in 313 and gradually began moving south into the Korean peninsula. Threatened by the two aggressive neighbors, PuyO moved south to the Han River basin, established Paekche sometime in the middle of the fourth century, and set up a base further south in the peninsula. By the late fourth century, Ojin, the leader of the PuyO troops in southern Korea, launched a grand invasion of Japan. He crossed the Korea strait, landed in northern Kyushu, and immediately marched east to conquer Yamato in the main Japanese island. To argue for the PuyO origins of Ojin and his followers, Ledyard mentioned linguistic and mythological similarities already mentioned by Kida and Egami (Ledyard, 1975).

Although Gari Ledyard, a Western scholar of East Asia, generally agreed with Egami's conception of horserider invasions, he threw Sujin out of the picture and attributed to Ojin the invasion of Kyushu as well as the overthrow of Yamato. Drawing on the Chinese annals, Ledyard paid much attention to the movements of the peoples in and around the Korean peninsula that had stimulated migrations of peoples to southern Korea and western Japan. In 286, the PuyO, farmers and stockraisers in the Sungari River valley, were defeated by the formidable nomadic Hsien-pei tribes, which dominated the Liao River basin and later took over the eastern part of China's central plain. Then, Koguryo, located just south of PuyO, destroyed the Lelang and Taifang Chinese commanderies in 313 and gradually began moving south into the Korean peninsula. Threatened by the two aggressive neighbors, PuyO moved south to the Han River basin, established Paekche sometime in the middle of the fourth century, and set up a base further south in the peninsula. By the late fourth century, Ojin, the leader of the PuyO troops in southern Korea, launched a grand invasion of Japan. He crossed the Korea strait, landed in northern Kyushu, and immediately marched east to conquer Yamato in the main Japanese island. To argue for the PuyO origins of Ojin and his followers, Ledyard mentioned linguistic and mythological similarities already mentioned by Kida and Egami (Ledyard, 1975).

Revisions by Contemporary Korean Scholars

The horserider theory not only readdressed the questions concerning Japanese origins but clearly reversed the conventional Japanese view of early Japan and Korea as the conqueror and the conquered. Naturally, some Korean scholars adopted the basic conception of the theory and made adjustments in accordance with their divergent views. Wontack Hong echoed Ledyard's hypothesis on Ojin's invasion of Kyushu and Yamato from a base in southern Korea, but thought that Ledyard's emphasis on PuyO connections had only obfuscated the gist of the events. As Ojin was a Paekche prince and had his king's blessing for the invasion, he had little to do with PuyO (Hong, 1988, p.220-224). Yamato's unusually intimate relationship with Paekche in fact began in Ojin's reign. According to the Nihon shoki, for instance, the two Paekche kings Asin and Chonji successively resided in Yamato as crown princes, and upon the death of the former, Ojin personally consoled the latter and supplied a hundred soldiers to ensure his safe journey home and accession to the Paekche throne. Important Paekche individuals migrated to Yamato also beginning in Ojin's reign. They include the Lord of Yutsuki (Kingwol in Korean) who brought his people from a hundred-twenty Paekche districts by way of Kaya, Wani (Wangin in Korean) and other Paekche scholars who taught Chinese writings and classics, and groups of Aya (Anra Kaya) people who were skilled artisans originally from Paekche (Hong, 1994, p.53-57, 105-107).

Ch'on Kwan-u thought that the invasion of Japan had nothing to do with PuyO or Paekche, but had been initiated by Kaya. The Kaya states and Japan were geographically and culturally close, and their founding myths are similar to each other. In Kaya's founding myth as recorded in the Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms), a purple rope descended from heaven with a golden box wrapped in a red cloth upon Mt. Kuji, north of present-day Kimhae. Inside the box were six golden eggs, which transformed into boys at the homes of village chiefs. One of them was Suro, who soon became the first king of the Karak (Imna-Kaya) at the lower Naktong River. In the Japanese myth, a god's grandson Ninigi, wrapped in a thick blanket, descended from heaven upon Mt. Kushifuru or Sohori in Kyushu. Ch'on pointed out the absence of Kaya records from soon after the death of Suro in 199 to the rise of the Tae (great) Kaya state in the upper Naktong River late in the fifth century and attributed that to the decline of Karak after its loss of many residents to northern Kyushu (Ch'on, 1980, p.17-51).
Many Korean scholars have envisioned early migrations from the peninsula to the islands, rather than invasions. Ch'oe Chae-sŏk, through his reinterpretation of the Nihon shoki accounts, suspected that large groups of Paekche immigrants had arrived in Yamato and run the Yamato government under Ojin. Paekche continued to control Yamato through dispatching princes and officials until its own demise in the seventh century. Even the Yamato soldiers sent to assist Paekche in its final battle against the joint Silla-Tang forces were placed directly under the command of two Paekche princes. Ch'oe emphasized Japan's continuous subservience to Paekche, but made no mention of conquests (Ch'oe, 2001, p.103-111).

The North Korean scholar Kim Sŏk-hyŏng introduced unique perspectives on early Korean-Japanese relations, which impacted on the academic circles in Japan and South Korea. According to him, early peninsular migrants arrived and settled in Japan in groups, maintaining their loyalty to and communication with their home countries of Kaya, Silla, and Paekche. Thus, semi-independent states affiliated with respective Korean kingdoms developed in various parts of western Japan by the late third to early fourth centuries. For instance, Kyūshū had a Kaya-affiliated state in the east and a Paekche-affiliated state in the west. The area of Izumo-Kibi had a Silla-affiliated state, and Yamato was divided by a Silla-Kaya-affiliated state and a Paekche-affiliated state. Then, in the late fifth to the early sixth centuries, troops from the Paekche and Kaya affiliated states departed northern Kyūshū and took over the Yamato area. In Kim's view, the Nihon shoki incorporated the records of relations between the peninsular kingdoms and the corresponding satellite states in Japan. The Paekche princes, for instance, resided not in Yamato but in the Paekche-affiliated states in Kyūshū as viceroys. The satellite states were finally absorbed by the Yamato state when their home countries were destroyed by Silla that finally unified the peninsula (Kim, 1969).

Kim's idea that the migrants were not united but represented competing Korean states was bolstered by Kim Tal-su, a Korean novelist residing in Japan. Kim identified remnants of peninsular names, such as Karak, Kaya, Koguryŏ, Paekche, and Silla, in numerous Japanese towns, cities, temples, and shrines through his etymological and historical studies (Kim, 1976, p.22-30, 85-88). Thus, certain affiliation and identification with Korean kingdoms may have existed among those living in Japan, and a model of such divisions may be helpful in understanding the political reality of early Japan. However, we must keep in mind that traveling between the peninsular and the islands remained challenging throughout pre-modern times and therefore maintaining regular communication would have been extremely difficult.

Today, no one questions that early peninsular peoples came and brought advanced cultures to Japan. The questions remain if they were invaders or migrants, how and when they came, and where they came from. As our knowledge from archaeological findings expands, we may eventually be able to answer some of these questions. For instance, according to Kim Ki-ung, a Korean archaeologist who studied Japanese burials in the Kofun period, pit-style stone chamber burials, very similar to third-century Kaya burials, were predominant in Japan until corridor-type stone chamber burials, apparently from fourth-century Paekche, appeared in northern Kyūshū in the first half of the fifth century. The latter type eventually spread elsewhere in Japan in the sixth century. Similarly, the majority of the grave goods in Japan, including weapons and horse equipment, were almost identical to their counterparts in Kaya and Silla until Paekche-style grave goods began to appear in northern Kyūshū in the first half of the fifth century (Kim, 1989, p.127-134). These data indicate that peoples from Kaya and Silla and their predecessors reached and dominated the Japanese islands with their culture including equestrian goods during much of the protohistoric period. Paekche’s cultural influence did not even reach northern Kyūshū till the first half of the fifth century. This seems to indicate that a significant number of Paekche people arrived after the time of Ojin.

Looking for Invaders and Migrants into Korea

In the 1990s, Korean archaeologists began looking into the possibility that their early states may have been founded by invaders and migrants from north. Sin Kyŏng-ch'ŏl studied the structure of the royal tumuli of Karak in Kimhae and noticed that the wooden-board burial chamber construction of the Lelang style had been replaced by the round-timber chamber construction of a northern type around 280. The burials of the first type yielded Chinese and Kyūshū-made mirrors while the second type contained both human and horse sacrifices. Because the shift to the latter type seemed drastic, he suspected that this had been caused by a migration of peoples instead of through trade. Although his opponents argued for trade, he went on to identify the source of this northern culture as Puyo. In Silla, there were two major types of stone burials, “pit-style stone chamber” burials and “stone-piled wooden chamber” burials, and scholars have agree that the latter originated in north. While many attributed the northern style to influence from Koguryŏ, Ch'oe Byŏng-hyon suggested that possible migrations of the Kurgan people who brought the features of wooden chamber, piled stones, high earthen mound and outer kerb stones as a set from Central Asia (Barnes, 2001, p.186-187, 203-218).

The theories of foreign invasions and migrations concerning Kaya and Silla have stronger evidence than the Japanese horserider theory. Whereas Japan saw no change in burial structures at the time of alleged invasions, both Silla and Kaya saw changes in burial structures along with the introduction of northern artifacts. Nevertheless, according to Gina Barnes, an archaeologist of East Asia, the changes in Kaya and Silla burials took place incrementally. In the case of Silla, the long wooden coffin burials first appeared before the lesser stone-piled burial emerged. Then, a particular style of stone developed out of Kaya style before the Inner Asian-
style royal tomb style and gold-working tradition finally emerged. The first three changes took place between the late third and mid fourth centuries, and the fourth sometime between the mid fourth and mid fifth centuries. She consequently suggested gradual migrations of Central Asians and northeast Asians into Kyŏngju and Kimhae and the availability of iron in the region as their motivating force (Barnes, 2001, p.219-220).

The theory of common ancestry has been abhorred by many because it was used to justify Japan’s political claim over Korea and cultural assimilation of its people during the colonial period. As we have seen, however, the contention of early Japanese rule over Korea and consequent Japanese ancestry of Koreans was only a part of the theory of common ancestry. A group of Japanese scholars who were trained primarily in anthropology, archaeology, and linguistics revealed that early migrations of people and culture had taken place in the opposite direction. They understood that different peoples migrating into the islands constituted the Japanese people, and the largest and most important group had come from the Korean peninsula. Although these studies came under the same label of the common ancestry theory, they in fact implied that Korea was the cause and Japan the result. This thesis was adopted and developed by Korean nationalist historians of the colonial era.

If these prewar studies did not make their conclusions crystal-clear, the postwar horserider theory made it clear that early Japan had been a receiver and not a giver. The latter took certain points from the former and developed them into an elaborate hypothesis of Puyŏ invasions to Japan. The Puyŏ origin of the invaders in this theory, however, did not adequately address the early relations between Korea and Japan. Puyŏ was located north of the peninsula although many believe that its people constituted an important element in the formation of today’s Koreans. Since the conquerors allegedly came from southern Korea, it was natural for Korean scholars to revise the theory to make Kaya or Paekche the real originator. Thus, the studies by recent Korean scholars completed the reversal of the prewar Japanese argument. Instead of Susanoo or Empress Jingu of Japan crossing the sea to subjugate the peninsula, we now have a Kaya or Paekche prince crossing the strait to conquer the islands.

We may not be able to disprove invasion theories as there are no records that deny such possibilities (Farris, 1998, p.63). Nevertheless, when we consider the complexity and time-lapse of changes in grave goods in Japan, as pointed out by archaeologists, a model of long-term migrations from southern and southeastern Korea, and perhaps from other regions later, seems more plausible than a model of abrupt invasions (Edwards, 1983, p.292). Located at the eastern end of the Asian continent, both the peninsula and the islands must have served as destinations for numerous groups of migrants in the early period when there was no national border to stop them.

Early in the twentieth century, anthropologists routinely referred to invasions and migrations; later in the century, they turned to internal factors for explanations (Chapman, 1997, p.12). Thus, archaeologists today may not be fully prepared to assess the evidence of migrations in any given area and time. Yet, we cannot afford to dismiss possible effects of migrations and invasions when discussing cultural development and state formation of early Korea and Japan, which are intricately intertwined with each other.

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Home Takeaways: local and global familiarity in the culinary practices of South Korean international students in Auckland

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(KollaBbomeun Ddanddara)
Gyeongchal 1: Kolladeul johahagineun... Guksanpum jom aeyonghaera, jasika.
Gyeongchal 2: Hayeoteun yojem jeolmeun saeggideuleun... Ya!! Bumodeuli saebbajige
beondon nideuleun dagejda waeguknomdeulhanite bachinyam! Meori ggoraji hagoneun, e-I
jaesueobsneun saeggideul
Ddanddara: Ajeossi, igeo guksani-eyo!
Gyeongchal 1: Meoga guksaninya. Im-ma, geuge? Pepsiga guksaninji mijenjido
moreunyamma?
Ddanddara: Taegukmakeu an boyeoyo? Taegukmakeu...
Gyeongchal 1: I saeggiga igeo, neo jigeum narang nongdanchigi hajaneun geoya? Imma?^73

(Ddanddara gets a cola from the machine)
Officer 1: So you like Cola huh... use Korean products kid.
Officer 2: Ahh, young bastards these days... hey! Your parents work so hard for that money
and you are giving it away to those foreign bastards! What a hairstyle, you freak...
Ddanddara: Sir, this is a Korean product!
Officer 1: How the hell can that be a Korean product, idiot? You don't even know whether
Pepsi is Korean or American?
Ddanddara: Can't you see the Taeguk mark (the symbol on the Korean flag)? Taeguk mark...
Officer 1: You cheeky little bastard, are you trying to joke with me? Damn bastard!!

This interaction from the movie Attack the Gas Station (Figure 1) is in part an ironic reflection of the of the interplay between the local and the global in South Korea. Pepsi is of course an American brand and the audience knows this but Ddanddara’s suggestion that it is Korean because it is adorned with Taeguki, the Korean flag, highlights the entangled nature of global and national symbolic capital. It reflects the contention of Ulf Hannerz that the contemporary world is composed of “an intense, continuous, comprehensive interplay between the indigenous and the imported” (Hannerz, 1996: 5). Put in another way, Ddanddara’s attraction to Taeguki as a

symbol of Korea illustrates the way that products, regardless of their symbolic or material origin, can be encoded as local because they are familiar elements of the landscapes of everyday lives.

To illustrate another example of the interplay between the indigenous and the imported this paper draws on current research to describe the culinary practices of South Korean international students in Auckland. Referring to both quantitative and qualitative data I illustrate that these students engage in culinary practices that are dominated by products culturally encoded as either Korean or global. In order to present this data in an informed manner I will provide a brief background on the interplay of ‘the nation’ and ‘the global’ in South Korea with specific reference to culinary experience and then broadly describe the context of Korean students in the development of international education in Auckland and New Zealand. Following this introductory section the paper will describe the culinary practices of Korean international students, illustrating the overlapping role that ostensibly local and global products play in constructing familiar landscapes for these sojourners.

Culinary Nationalism and Globalism in South Korea
Since the end of World War Two, and particularly of late, North and South Korea have followed relatively different paths. While North Korea has continued to hold out as one of the last bastions of resistance to global capitalism South Korea has in the last two decades tentatively embraced increasing globalisation (D. H. Kim & Kong, 1997). The experience of globalisation in South Korea has taken a unique form where discourses surrounding ‘the nation’ and ‘the global’ have been employed for diverse purposes (Pai & Tangherlini, 1998). In terms of culinary consumption increasing global interconnectivity has led to the introduction of a whole range of new food-ways into South Korean society predominantly from North America but also other national cuisines (Bak, 1997; Nelson, 2000; Pemberton, 2002). At times this increasing connection to the rest of the world has been heralded by politicians, academics and others as the way for South Korea to become a more globally successful nation. However counter-currents to such globalisation from within South Korea have also emerged to create highly nationalistic sentiments surrounding particular foods that are deemed uniquely Korean or to epitomise the Korean character

Sintoburi originates as a Buddhist phrase that means that a person’s karma and their environment are inseparable. In more recent years the phrase has been employed by the South Korean government and foodstuff producers to build national identities and ideologies through companies and products that are seen as inherently Korean (Bak, 1997; Pemberton, 2002; Walraven, 2002). In this counter-current to foreign influences, Sintoburi is taken to literally mean that “the [Korean] body and [Korean] soil are not two” (Walraven, 2002: 97), Korean grown or produced products, particularly foodstuffs, are widely considered to be healthier for Koreans than imported products. In South Korea Sintoburi has been articulated in ways that are sometimes paradoxical but that continue to have discursive weight. The somewhat problematic interplay of concepts like Sintoburi alongside declarations by South Korean leaders that the nation must be oriented towards the rest of the world is what makes the South Korean experience so interesting for academics. It is also a very useful example of how the complex experience of globalisation materialises in everyday lives.

South Korean international students in Auckland
It is worth noting for the reader the context for the discussion that follows. According to the most recent statistics available there are now approximately 13,000 South Korean international students in New Zealand, approximately 5500 reside in the Auckland area and of that number approximately 3000 fall into the research group as students over the age of 18 studying at tertiary or language institutes (EducationNewZealand, 2003). South Korean students make up the second largest group of international students behind students from the Peoples Republic of China. While international students have been coming to New Zealand since the Second World War it was not until 1989 that changes to legislation allowed this to become a primarily economic exercise

Even more significantly, it is only since 1999 that students from mainland China and South Korea have come to dominate student numbers and as a result turn the industry into New Zealand’s fourth largest export earner. The presence and more importantly practices of significant numbers of Korean international students in Auckland has had a notable impact upon the experience of the urban landscape, particularly the inner city. The broader project I am currently conducting is investigating the everyday practices and encounters of Korean international students to consider the way that they experience and contribute to Auckland’s urban landscape. Previously I have discussed the changing landscape of Auckland’s inner city (Collins, 2004) and the representation of Korean students, marked as Asian, in Auckland’s popular media (Collins, forthcoming).

In this paper I follow the terminology of the participants in this research who describe aspects of nationality and ethnicity as Korean rather than as South Korean. The term South Korea is only used in comparison to North Korea or to describe the official terms like the category South Korean international students.

Prior to this date international students paid either no fees or very similar fees to domestic students. “Education was not considered a business” (Tarling, 2003).
The Culinary Practices of Korean international students in Auckland

The research that I discuss in this paper is drawn from broader research on the everyday urban encounters of Korean international students during their sojourn in Auckland. Methodologically it has included: a questionnaire survey, key informant interviews, in-depth interviews with students, student diaries and photo-diaries, a participatory mapping exercise, and an interactive website.

Two questions from the survey relate specifically to the discussion of South Korean students' culinary practices. In the first, students were asked how many times each week they ate at restaurants; 89% indicated that they ate at restaurants two or more times a week and over 50% indicated they went to restaurants three or more times a week. Of the students who regularly go to eat outside their homes 57.5% indicated that they usually go to Korean restaurants when they eat out. The second (although significantly smaller) category was students who go to global franchises (examples given were McDonald's, Burger King or Starbucks); 13.3% of students regularly go to these restaurants. In addition a large number of questionnaire respondents also named franchises like McDonald's and Burger King, but predominantly Starbucks as places where they met their friends.

It was apparent during analysis that the results would have been more informative if students had been given the opportunity to rank the places they patronised. Nevertheless, the qualitative elements of this research provided ample indication of students' preference for Korean restaurants and global franchises. The qualitative results are of a much more nuanced manner and hence must be articulated in an equally nuanced fashion. In the following section I discuss three different elements of the practices of students: eating out, staying at home, and "having coffee with friends..."

Eating Out

Reflecting the results from the questionnaire all but one of the twenty students I conducted formal semi-structured interviews with said that they regularly ate at Korean restaurants. Often students said that they went to restaurants for more than just dinner often spending an entire evening eating, drinking and socialising with friends. The restaurants that cater primarily for international students, which tend to be in the inner city, are often almost indistinguishable in appearance, menu and service. Unlike restaurants in Korea, however, most of these restaurants do not specialise in one type or style of food production but rather provide a diverse range of Korean dishes. Unsurprisingly when I asked students which specific restaurants they patronised there was a wide range of responses. Nevertheless, there were a small number of restaurants that were consistently referred to by almost all students, and one which was almost universal, San-Su-Gap-San.

San-Su-Gap-San (Figure 2) is positioned on Auckland's main thoroughfare, Queen St. The restaurant's signage has large hanmun script and a small English sign say "restaurant and sake bar". Inside San-Su-Gap-San there are some similarities with typical neighbourhood drinking establishments in Seoul or other Korean cities. It has an expansive dining area that is surrounded by large booths that can seat 6-8 persons. The main bulk of the room is taken up by basic wooden tables and chairs. The sills above the tables all around the restaurant have empty soju bottles on them. The Kitchen is on the right side of the entrance. San-Su-Gap-San is usually very busy, a hectic environment with customers and staff crisscrossing around the room.

During interviews, students often referred to the atmosphere, arrangement and service of San-Su-Gap-San as a restaurant. When I asked students about why they went to San-Su-Gap-San instead of other Korean restaurants most just referred to the restaurants popularity among students, its lively atmosphere or its central location.

Figure 11: 'San-Su-Gap-San Restaurant and Sake Bar' on Queen St.
Many simply responded with statements like "when I came here first one of my friends took me to there [San-Su-Gap-San], yeah, that’s it". In contrast, when I asked students about why they went to San-Su-Gap-San instead of non-Korean restaurants their answers were much more revealing. Students suggested the following: "we easily eat or have the Korean food there"]; "in a group it’s easily fine, because San-Su-Gap-San table is bigger"; "atmosphere is very similar to Korean pub, and we can drink soju so many people want to go there". Because drinking was often a big part of going out for the evening, students would often compare the Korean style of drinking with the New Zealand style. "Ahhh, well I think just standing [like in mainstream bars] is just strange for Korean. You should be eating as well. Most Korean young people if they have a drinking they sit and eat". While discussing another Korean restaurant/bar, ‘Po Chang Ma Cha’, one respondent provided useful insights to the reasons why students go to Korean restaurants and bars; "there’s lots of ‘Po Chang Ma Cha’ in Korea and so like there’s only one ‘Po Chang Ma Cha’ in here so to get that feeling of sitting outside and everything, that’s the closest...you go there because you want to feel that experience". It seems clear that it is this sense of familiarity and desire for what is known that lies at the heart of much of this patronage.

Staying Home

The respondents to the questionnaire were also asked where they lived during their studies in Auckland. Out of the 120 respondents, the largest proportion live in rental accommodation (54.6%), followed by Homestays with New Zealand families (23.5%), Hostels (11.8%) and those who live with a member of family 76 (10.1%). I will concentrate on two groups: students that live in rental accommodation and students that live in homestays with New Zealand families.

It is important to note that students living in rental accommodation tend to live with other South Korean international students. While some students do live with other international students (usually Chinese or Japanese students) none of the students I spoke to lived with someone who would identify as a New Zealander. There are two major reasons students gave for this; the first was that they were too shy or didn’t know how to meet other people to live with and the second was food. Many students who now lived in rental accommodation had previously lived in homestays. Most of these students commented that one of their biggest problems was the food served in their homestay; they usually found it to be too fatty and too blandly flavoured. As a result the choice to move into a flat was in part a desire to consume Korean food. Most of the students living in rental accommodation cooked together and almost always cooked Korean food. Some groups of students told me that because they had their own place they would often invite friends around for Korean meals together, particularly social meals like Samgyeopsal. When I asked these students where they purchased their food most indicated that they went to one Korean shop for specifically Korean products and went to a supermarket for more generic products.

76 A member of family may be the student’s mother and/or father staying in New Zealand on a Guardian Visa, an older sibling or a more distant relative.
Students who stay in homestays do not have the luxury of being able to cook their own food and are often disappointed with the different culinary practices of New Zealand families. While most students (particularly English language students) begin their sojourn in a homestay most of the students I met left after one or two months, usually citing differences in food, heating or social practices as the reason. When I spoke to students who were living in homestays they did not want to speak badly about the family they were staying with but always felt it necessary to mention that they found various aspects of living in the homestay, including the food, uncomfortable. When I asked them how they dealt with these problems most said that they often went outside the homestay for meals at least once a week. Some of these students would go out to restaurants in the manner discussed above as a way to get "real Korean food" which had to include rice and Kimchi with whatever the main dish was. In other situations they went to the houses of friends who were in rental accommodation; anytime they did this they would always eat a Korean meal together. These practices were ways to feel better when they missed Korea, or just as a way to enjoy themselves in a more relaxed and familiar setting than the homestay.

"Having coffee with friends..."

As I have indicated above many Korean students feel that eating Korean food, particularly the staples of rice and kimchi, is crucial to a substantive meal. However, this does not mean that students never voluntarily choose to eat or drink something that's not Korean. Nevertheless it does reflect a wider sentiment and set of practices in relation to western food, and for my purposes here western fast food. Sangmee Bak (Bak, 1997) in her discussion of the operations of McDonald's in Seoul has illustrated the problems that the American chain had with maintaining its standard approach to food sales in Korea. McDonald's found that many young Koreans did not treat McDonald's food as a complete meal (for a number of reasons) and as a result tended to spend very little money but lots of time in the restaurant, utilising the clean and comfortable environment to chat with friends. McDonald's in this way provided an alternative to the ubiquitous coffee shop in Korea (for description see Nelson, 2000), where patrons also spend very little money but lots of time.

In Auckland, Korean students partake in similar practices. When I asked students where they usually met their friends, they either referred to public places or to locations like McDonald's, Burger King or Starbucks. They never referred to Korean restaurants as a place to meet friends. The students said that they liked to meet at these places because they could spend very little money and still sit and talk for a long time. One group of female students who lived outside of the inner city said that each time they came to the city they went to Burger King to get a soft serve ice-cream because "it's cheap and we can easily talk". In many cases students enjoyed going to global coffee chains, usually Starbucks, but sometimes Gloria Jeans or Esquires. Most students stated that they had often gone to these franchises when they were in Korea and because of this decided to go to them while they lived in Auckland. When I asked students why they didn't choose to go to local coffee shops most students just said that they didn't know about these local coffee shops so didn't go there. One student said she went to Starbucks because it had a balcony where she could smoke, I responded by saying that most local cafes also had comfortable areas outside for smokers, her response was "I don't know about them".
The Familiar in the Local, the National and the Global

Taken in isolation the culinary practices of South Korean students may seem to be part of two familiar processes: The patronage of Korean restaurants and the preparation and consumption of Korean foods could be viewed as a form of 'banal nationalism' (Billig, 1995) and the patronage of global franchises as 'banal cosmopolitanism' (Beck, 2002) or 'banal globalism' (Szerszynski & Urry, 2002). However, conceiving these practices in this dichotomous local (or national) vs. global manner ignores the displaced nature of food and people involved in this phenomenon. In this sense it employs a "methodological territorialism" (Lamer & Le Heron, 2002: 754) that unreflexively conceives the world from a single geographic lens. Although there are undoubtedly both local and global connotations and implications to these practices it seems that they may not be as distinguishable as they initially seem. Indeed, I will argue in this section that the patronage of Korean restaurants and the preparation and consumption of Korean foods described above are as much a global practice as they are a local or a national one. Similarly, students' patronage of global franchises like Starbucks can be viewed as a form of local remembrance as much as an engagement with the global economy.

The Korean restaurants that cater for international students in Auckland are not a replication of restaurants or eateries in South Korean cities. In Korea, restaurants and eateries tend to specialise, usually providing a particular type or style of food. Many of these restaurants are of a fairly basic design, looking and feeling much like a dining room with some advertising and pictures of menu items that are available (Nelson, 2000). In Auckland, however, Korean restaurants that cater primarily to international students are a veritable smorgasbord of the Korean culinary and cultural landscape. With few exceptions most of these restaurants provide an identical menu of Korean dishes that vary only slightly in cost and quality. The interior of these establishments is also unlike their counterparts in Seoul or other Korean cities. In Auckland most restaurants have an amazing array of things Korean on their walls, including masks, paintings, calendars, advertisements, or even soju bottles, all expressing the very Korean-ness of the place. In an iconographical sense the interior design of Korean restaurants in Auckland constructs a landscape that is not based upon restaurants in Korea but rather is based upon signifying the very Korean-ness of these restaurants through national cultural symbols. Similarly the diverse menu at these restaurants seeks to subsume regional variations in Korean food in order to identify the restaurant with the nation rather than with a local style of food. The final product of these elements is the Auckland Korean restaurant that is not associated with a particular region or class in Korea but rather with the nation itself, it is a veritable Korean place. Therefore while these restaurants are replete with national and sometimes local elements of South Korea they are in effect a product of the material and symbolic transnational connections between South Korea and Auckland. Similar sorts of locations might exist in cities like New York, Los Angeles, Toronto or Sydney but would be an unlikely sight in the urban landscape of Seoul, besides certain similarities with tourist restaurants. As such the patronage that Korean students give these locations engages them simultaneously with the banal nationalism of South Korea and also with the banal cosmopolitanism that constructs and maintains an imaginary of the South Korean (culinary) nation. It is an example of how ethno-national cuisine "only becomes a self conscious, subjective reality when ethnic boundaries are crossed" (Bell & Valentine, 1997: 114).

In a like manner Korean students' preparation and consumption of Korean meals within their homes can also be considered a product of national and local identities that comes into existence primarily because of their
transnational journey to Auckland. Lisa Law’s study with Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong is a useful comparison in this case. Law illustrates the role that the preparation and consumption of familiar meals plays in the construction and then maintenance of these women’s local and national identities and connections. Like the Filipino domestic workers in Law’s study Korean international students also use the preparation and shared consumption of ethno-national food as a way to connect with practices and places that were part of their lives before they came to Auckland. To parallel Law it could be said that these practices incorporate “elements of history and memory, of past and present times and spaces, helping create a familiar place where memories of life in [South Korea] and migration to [Auckland] might be explored from another perspective” (Law, 2001: 278).

Like the women in Law’s study these students come from sometimes diverse class and regional backgrounds in South Korea. The shared practice of food preparation and consumption becomes a way to overcome these sometimes pronounced differences. In contrast food preparation and consumption also serves to reinforce other differences, like gender, that seem to be more resistant to change. In the discussions and my own experience with students only females were involved in the preparation or clean up of meals. When I asked either male or female students to explain why this was they often reasoned that only the female students knew how to prepare Korean dishes. While this is probably a valid point it serves to remind us of the way that normalised banal practicalities can reinforce social and spatial differentiation through the rearticulation of national or other identities. In this way while food preparation and consumption provides individuals with a new sense of belonging while sojourning in New Zealand, a product of their transnational journeys, it also reinforces existing differences in the experience of Korean national identity.

In contrast to the Korean restaurants in Auckland the different outlets of global franchises located here are not strikingly different from their counterparts in Seoul. In the case of Starbucks, the ‘third place’ design of the now ubiquitous café franchise intentionally replicates iconic environments that will be familiar to patrons regardless of whether they travel across a city or the world (Laurier & Philo, 2002). It is this familiarity that is expressed in the practices of Korean international students through statements like “I went there in Korea so I go there now”. Amongst the rise of consumer culture in Korea Starbucks, like McDonalds before it has become a part of everyday experience for many individuals in cities like Seoul (Business-Editors, 2000; Hau, 2002; Sung, 2002). Indeed, Starbucks has not faced the same difficulties as McDonalds because the coffee giant does not challenge the three central elements of the Korean diet; rice, kimchi and meat (Walraven, 2002). The place of Starbucks in the everyday lives of many young urban South Koreans in Korea exemplifies how “the foreign has become the familiar, [and] the different has become the domesticated” (Scapp & Seitz, 1998: 2). It is as a result of this normalisation of a global institution in the local environment that Starbucks should be understood as both global and local for Korean international students in Auckland. Students’ engagement with the symbols and products of global franchises like Starbucks employs the full sensuality of experience to construct a familiar space and time through which students can replicate past practices of meeting friends and chatting. Just like the patronage of Korean restaurants and the preparation and consumption of Korean food students patronage of Starbucks coffee shops engages with their “history and memory, of past and present times and spaces, helping create a familiar place” (Law, 2001: 278) in what is otherwise a foreign location.

Sintoburi ‘The body and soil are [still] not two’

It should be clear from the discussion in this paper that the traditional separation of the global from the local in even the most nuanced globalisation debates is problematic. The practices of South Korean international students in Auckland are exemplary of this point. The students’ culinary consumption while sojourning is always based upon memories and familiarities of past life exemplifying how culture (and its representation through culinary products) sits in people not just in places (c.f. Escobar, 2001). As a result Korean students are able to recreate an everyday life in Auckland that while not identical to lives lived in Korea is sensually reminiscent of those lives and acts to create a sense of belonging and familiarity that might overcome the distance between what is here and what is home. The fact that this belonging and familiarity is derived from products that are local yet globalised (Kimchi) and global yet domesticated (Starbucks Coffee) is what illustrates the inseparability of the local from the global. It is a manifestation of the “intense, continuous, comprehensive interplay between the indigenous and the imported” in everyday life (Hannerz, 1996: 5).

At the beginning of this paper I introduced a scene from the movie Attack the Gas Station that satirically questioned the sometimes paradoxical expression of the concept Sintoburi; this seems an equally appropriate place to close the paper. As Ddan-dda-ra’s declaration makes clear the premise of Sintoburi, that the “the body and soil are not two”, is sometimes ambiguous. The South Korean flag, Taegukli, is certainly an artefact produced of and inscribed into the experience of South Korea. As a symbol it has often been the marker of commercial products that are produced on or claim to be produced on South Korean soil. In the process it has developed a metonymical status in regards to what is and what isn’t considered Korean. The nearly identical Pepsi trademark unintentionally confuses this relationship by associating the symbol of national product with an unambiguously foreign good. The scene illustrates how symbols (‘the ephemerality of goods’) and the products they represent can so easily slip both in an out of local imaginaries. In a like way the very familiarity of the
Starbucks coffee drinking experience for Korean international students illustrates the ease with which an unambiguously global franchise has become part of the everyday memories that students bring from Korea to Auckland. At the same time the re-enactment of familiar consumption practices at Korean restaurants and in students’ homes serves to globalise what students may consider to be inherently local or national artefacts and practices. Together, these two phenomena show that while sojourning students have unquestionably distanced themselves from the physical soil of South Korea they continue, through these consumption practices, to reinforce in the realm of the imagination that “the body and soil are [still] not two”.

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Kim, S.-J. (Writer) (1999). Juyuso Seubgyuksageun (Attack the Gas Station) [DVD]. South Korea: SpectrumDVD.
Mothers of the revolution: rhetoric versus reality for the women of North Korea

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Introduction

Reports of famine and human rights violations have contributed to a growing interest in the nature of North Korean society. Yet this society is rarely researched due to the country's isolation and repressive political system. The paper seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of ordinary life in the 'hermit kingdom', particularly focusing on the role and status of women and how gender and gender relations may have changed since the food crisis which began in the mid 1990s. The paper argues that, since the food crisis, women have become both victims and agents in a process of transition. Many have suffered a great deal, particularly due to the impact of starvation and famine-related disease, infant mortality and morbidity, family breakdown and an increase in sex trafficking and prostitution. However, recent reports also suggest that women, more than men, have become active players in emerging market processes, particularly those centred on local markets, thus creating new opportunities for themselves and new challenges for the regime.

Since 1994 North Korea has suffered successive years of food shortages. Due to the combined effects of a shortfall in supplies of fertilizer and fuel, successive natural disasters, and structural constraints — such as little arable land and a short growing season — staple grain output has been significantly reduced. By 2001, North Korea received more food aid from the UN World Food Program's (WFP) and US government than any other country. International aid agencies predict that it is likely North Korea will need to receive international relief and food supplies for some time (Snyder and Flake 2004).

In response to the food shortage and subsequent economic crisis there has been a dramatic increase in the number of North Korean refugees entering China and, a small proportion of these, to South Korea. According to figures prepared in late 2004, some 300,000 North Koreans were estimated to be living illegally in Northeastern China while approximately 6,000 North Koreans now live in South Korea (Ministry of Unification 2005). The exodus of North Koreans has created a valuable new source of data on North Korea. Now it is possible to base research on the testimonies of North Korean refugee women or even those that support and advocate on behalf of these refugees. This development has, in turn, stimulated significant research activity, principally in South Korea where, since the early 1990s, there has been a noticeable increase in the amount of Korean language literature devoted to the subject of North Korean society.

Some of this more recent literature deals with the subject of North Korean women. Among them are studies that focus on: women in general (Kim 2000 et al, Koo & You 2004, Ryan 1999); the experiences of North Korean refugee women (Kim & Chi 2003); women's representation in the North Korean media (Lim 2003); the change in the role of women since the food crisis (Lee 2004, Lim 2004); studies of North Korean family life (Park 1999); and, more general pieces on the methodological challenges facing those who wish to conduct women-centred research (Cho 2004, Choi 2004). Most of these studies are based on interviews with female defectors living in either South Korea or China while one study has been written by a defector (Choi 2004). The suffering of North Korean children and women has also been the subject of a number of South Korean and international media reports and publications by international aid organisations (Amnesty International 2004, Good Friend 2004, Citizen's Alliance for North Korean Human Rights 2002, WFP 2002, 2004).

The breadth and quality of much of this new research highlights the value of access to first hand accounts of life in this repressive political system. However, questions have been raised about whether the testimonies are reliable or 'representative' given that they are those of a minority that have managed to escape (Cho 2004).

To bring some of the newly released Korean language research to an English speaking audience while, at the same time, attempting to overcome the limitations associated with the exclusive reliance on refugee testimonials this paper critically analyses and synthesises a range of material to inform a more comprehensive understanding of the context and current issues facing ordinary North Korean women. It utilises existing studies on North Korean society; interviews with refugees, workers supporting these refugees and those who visited North Korea; and, analysis of official North Korean documents such as its constitution, the writings of Kim Il-sung and various pieces of legislation and policies as they relate to women, to build a more nuanced picture of the role and status of North Korean women.

77 The authors wish to thank Young-ju Cho, Researcher, Korean Women's Institute, Ehwa Woman's University, for her valuable assistance in data collection.
The following discussion is in two parts. In part one, there is an overview of the current situation in North Korea; an analysis of discourse regarding women based on official documents, including various pieces of legislation and policies; and, a historical overview of women's policy from 1948 to the present. In part two, the overall position and role of women in the larger social arena is assessed in relation to three aspects: work, family and marriage, and sexuality. In each of these sub-sections particular attention is paid to the impact of the recent food crisis on the role and position of women.

The paper concludes by observing how recent hardship has created both crisis and opportunity for many North Korean women. While many are occupied in a daily struggle to survive, for others the recent economic crisis has created new opportunities. In particular, women have become actively involved in small-scale economic activities which are a key feature of a broader economic transition in the country. It is impossible to predict the long term consequences this involvement will have for the status and role of women in North Korea but given the consequences - not only for gender relations but for the future of the regime - further research is warranted.

PART ONE: THE CURRENT NORTH KOREAN SITUATION AND GENDER IN JUCHE AND NORTH KOREAN LAW AND POLICY

1.1 The current state of North Korea

The North Korean economy suffered a steady decline during most of the 1990s. The cumulative and interrelated effects of the sudden demise of Soviet aid, the collapse of the socialist world market, structural problems of the command economy, and the massive amount of resources diverted to maintain a huge military and glorify the Dear Leader, plus the droughts and floods of the 1990s have all reflected and affected a succession of negative GNP growth with the result that the North Korean economy contracted by about 30 percent in the period 1991-1996 (Lee and Pollack 1999, p. xi.).

The famine is responsible for suffering on a massive humanitarian scale and it is estimated that up to three million people have died from famine-related causes. Evidence suggests that Korean children have been the most deeply affected section of the population. According to WPF reports, North Korea has one of the highest rates of acute malnutrition in the world, with over 60 percent of North Korean children suffering malnutrition (WFP 2002, 2003).

In response to the food and economic crisis, in 2002, the regime introduced new micro and macro economic policies centred on experimenting with marketisation and inflationary measures to stimulate economic activity. Analysts point out that the initiatives are unlikely to improve matters and may instead create hyperinflation (Noland 2003, 1997). Moreover, these "reforms" have led to a growing disparity of wealth and with this the possibility of social unrest (Smith 1998; Smith and Huang 2003). Noland describes the measures as creating "a form of apparatchik capitalism similar to Romania's, in which officials channel resources to favoured groups" (Noland 1997, 13).

A related development has been the dramatic growth in the farmers markets and other black markets. According to several reports the government has wound down the rationing system under which citizens used state-issued coupons to procure food and other necessities. Since that time there has been an increase in trading at local markets. These farmers markets are relatively common and officially tolerated. In 1950, the present market system was established as an Agricultural Market under the management of the people's council in each province, city and county. In 1958, the new name of Farmers' Market was given and the approved tradable items were restricted to vegetables and limited amounts of grain. These items were mainly produced on individual small farming gardens (Good Friends 2004). In 2002, the government renamed the Farmers' Market as Market Place and allowed previously prohibited industrial products to be traded.

There has also been a significant increase in the volume of Sino-North Korean border trade with an inflow of products made in China and South Korea. According to a report, people 'can buy anything and everything in the market (Time, Feb, 13, 2005). Items include Japanese television, South Korean cosmetics and even sex videotapes from Western countries (Time Feb, 13, 2005; Hankyureh Feb, 27, 2005).

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78 It is unlikely that there will ever be a definitive statistic relating to the mortality rate during the famine and numbers vary widely in different research. Natsios (1999) weighs up a variety of different evidence to support the argument that the famine is likely to have costs at least 2.5 million lives. The WPF malnutrition rate has also been queried by Natsios who notes the dramatic change in malnutrition rates when follow up data was collected by WPF in subsequent years. He argues that limited access to the population gave an inaccurate basis for measurement.
Another by-product of the food and subsequent economic crisis has been an increase in the mobility of the North Korean people. Although officially denied freedom of movement, since the famine there have been widespread population movements as hungry people migrate in search of food (No land 2003). Some of those that travel have managed to cross the Chinese border. There is over 300,000 North Koreans now living permanently outside the country. Recent data suggests that more women than men are leaving North Korea. There were three times as many female North Korean refugees living in China and out of 4,952 North Korean refugees living in South Korea from 2000 to 2004, 59.5% of them were women - Korean Ministry of Unification 2005).

1.2 Discourses: women as equals in Juche
In 1955, the founding leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, proclaimed juche or self reliance, the national ideology. In 1967, at the first session of the Fourth Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Il Sung said that "our juche ideology refers to the most correct Marxist–Leninist-oriented guiding philosophy designed to carry out our revolution and construction" (cited in Kim 2003:63). Unlike other former communist regimes, the North Korean juche system defines the role of all aspects of social and political life in terms of their relationship to the leader (Ryang 2000). In this way, the juche system has generated a pervasive leadership cult and its discourse has affected the construction of a range of social phenomena including the notion of gender.

In general, in official North Korean documents, women are described as equals. This is evident even in early documents. For example, in the 1947 constitution the following text appears:

Women are accorded an equal social status and rights with men. The State shall afford special protection to mothers and children by providing maternity leave, reduced working hours for mothers with many children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, crèches and kindergartens, and other measures. The State shall provide all conditions for women to play a full role in society.

Article 77, Socialist Constitution of the DPRK (Kim 2003).

It appears that Kim Il Sung was also concerned with women's liberation, and in particular made special mention of his plans to relieve women from the heavy load of housework. In his speech to the 5th Congress of the Workers' Party in 1972, Kim declared that women would be liberated from heavy household chores and that this liberation was not so much based on any radical change in social or cultural structures but to be achieved through a technological revolution - one of the three revolutions (ideological, technological, and cultural) Kim outlined as the basis for his country's transformation. Kim promised that more refrigerators, cookers, and other household appliances would be supplied to reduce women's burden. The pre-packaged food industry was also to be developed for the same purpose (Kim D sung 1972b: 451 cited in Ryang 2000). In this way Kim claimed to guarantee equal female equal participation in all state-run operations including work in factories and agricultural cooperatives.

Despite such rhetoric, it is uncertain if Kim was genuinely committed to gender equality and was perhaps more preoccupied with mobilising women for nation-building in the context of a chronic labour shortage. His "progressive" interpretation was not consistent with other pronouncements such as his opinion of the primary role of mothers to instruct their children. In various works, for example, he made reference to the importance of women as the "revolutionised mother" and stressed that it is the mother that has to bear responsibility for home education (Kim Il Sung 1971a: 216 cited in Ryang 2000). He also argued that in situations where children were not adequately educated (that is inculcated with the tenants of juche and thus completely loyal to Kim Il Sung) then it was the fault of the mother – a view that has serious implications for a system that often punished family members of offenders.

In her study on the treatment of women in juche ideology, Ryang argued that, unlike China, in North Korea the question of women's rights has not been widely and publicly debated among the communist leadership.

As far as the North Korean media is concerned, there have been numerous accounts of Kim Il Sung's role as the major driving force behind for the advancement of the North Korean women's movement and women's status in society although many accounts stress that women's advanced status can be attributed to the 'mercy and love of their leader' (Lim 2003). For example, the women's magazine Chosun Yousung writes of how:

Wherever Dear Leader [Kim Il Sung] has visited, he is deeply concerned with how to relieve the heavy burden from women. He takes care of women with the great love and mercy (Lim 2003: 31).

It appears the treatment of women by the North Korean leadership is consistent with the construction of gender in many other socialist systems. In general, socialist systems seemed to support male and female equality, as all
socialist country constitutions stated that men and women were equal and that it was illegal to discriminate against someone based on their sex, age and so on. However, reality throughout the communist world has shown such equality to be a myth with the law masking the persistence of classical patriarchal social values that informed employment policies and attitudes to women’s role in the home (Heinen 1997, True 1999).

1.3 Historical Overview of Women’s Policy 1948-
Women’s policy in North Korea can be divided and examined in four historical periods. The first period is from 1945 to 1957 when various laws promoting sexual equality were introduced. The second period (1958-82) was characterised by the introduction of measures to increase female participation rates in the workforce. The third phase (1983-1995) was the period of ‘returning to the traditional role of women’. The fourth period takes us from 1995 to the present, a period dominated by the effects of the food crisis.

1948 - 1957 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established in 1948 when both the governments of north and south claimed to be the legitimate government over all of Korea. In the subsequent decade the North Korean government took steps toward institutionalising formal gender equality through legislation. Soon after the new government in North Korea began a major land reform, gender equality legislation was introduced and on July 30, 1946, the Gender Equality Law was passed. The law awarded women equal rights to men in all areas such as politics, economy, culture and suffrage. This law enabled women equal rights in marriage, divorce and child support claims, and banned polygamy, concubinage and licensed and unlicensed prostitution. Women’s inheritance and property rights were also legally secured and the protection of maternity rights to children was guaranteed (Shin 2001, Sohn 1991).

In 1945, the traditional household registration system, which recognised the oldest male as the head of the household was abolished. This system was further reformed in 1955 with the introduction of an individual ID system.

In 1946, the statute on the Labour of Manual and Clerical Workers was passed which set the basic foundation to secure women’s equal rights with regards to labour by guaranteeing equal pay for equal work (Shin 2001). In addition, women were entitled to free education. During this period, women’s policy was still concerned with educating women to be a ‘modern’ mother who could successfully combine traditional motherhood expectations with participating in the revolutionary campaigns and national building. For example, through the Women’s League women became extensively involved in one of the major campaigns during this period - the campaign against illiteracy.

1958-82 The second period was characterised by the mobilisation of women as workers. During this time the state became focussed on the worsening labour shortage and, in 1958, the Chollima movement was used to mobilise the work force and organise it to increase productivity in both agriculture and industry (Kim 2003). The state also developed policies designed to maximise women’s participation in nation building activities. In 1958, the Pyongyang government announced Cabinet Decision No. 84 which sought to increase women’s participation in all areas of the people’s economy, aiming to raise the ratio of women working in the sectors of education and healthcare to an average of 60% and in other sectors an average of 30% by 1961 (Ryang 2000).

To support this move - and also to encourage population growth - various social welfare reforms were introduced such as the establishment of child care centers and the granting of maternity leave. By 1976, paid maternity leave of 35 days before the birth and 42 days after birth was guaranteed by law. From 1986, paid maternity leave of 60 days before the birth and 90 days after delivery was introduced (Kim et al 2000). Mothers were also given time off for breastfeeding. Women with more children were extended other benefits. For example, since 1966, women who have three or more children under 13 are permitted to work only six hours a day and still receive a full, eight-hour-a-day salary (Kim et al 2000).

Child care was seen as a state responsibility, allowing women to be economically active. The North Korean state provides optional day care for children from the ages of 3 months to 4 years in nurseries. Children aged 5-7 years of age attend kindergartens for which registration is compulsory. As of 1960, 65% of children under 5-7 were sent to child care centers. In 1970, the number of children in child care was 4.5 times more than in 1960 (Ku & Oh 2004). Each provincial capital also has children’s centers that house orphans and other children who cannot be looked after by their families.

By 1965, 45.1% of the workforce was male and 54.9% was female (Kim Wan-sun 1976:89-90, cited in Ryang 2000:332). In 1970, women constituted 70% of the workforce in light industry and 60% of agricultural sectors (Ryang 2000).

79 South Korea did not abolish this system until 2005. The system granted priority to men over women in heading a family as recorded on the family registry. The new system in South Korea allows either parent’s surname to be used.
1983-1995 This third phase can be described as the period of 'returning to the traditional role of women'. Due to economic stagnation, more married women became full-time housewives and increasingly in official pronouncements the traditional role of women was emphasised. The influence and organisation of Minju Yeosung Dongmaing (Democratic Women’s League) was also weakened. The 1990 constitution stipulates that the state creates various conditions for the advancement of women in society. In 1991, records show that 1,660,000 children in some 60,000 day care centres or kindergartens were in operation, with the state offering childcare assistance to most working women (Yoon 1991). The degree of female participation in politics is not low in North Korea but most hold parliament posts that have no real power (Shin 2001). According to figures released in 1972, the provincial People’s Committees altogether had 729 women out of the total 3185 members (22.8%) (Ryang 2000: 337).

1995- The fourth period is the current period after the food crisis. There has been no systematic collection of data on women's policy in this current period. The information presented here focuses on daily life of women and is drawn largely from testimonies of North Korean refugees. It examines women in the context of work, family and marriage and the social construction of female sexuality.

PART TWO: WOMEN IN THE LARGER SOCIAL ARENA: WORK, FAMILY AND MARRIAGE AND SEXUALITY

2.1 Women and Work

Citizens have the right to work. All able-bodied citizens choose occupations in accordance with their wishes and skills and are provided with stable jobs and working conditions. Citizens work according to their abilities and are paid in accordance with the quantity and quality of their work (Article 70, Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic Of Korea, 1998, cited in Kim 2003: 159).

Until recently, all North Korean women have been expected to fully participate in the labour force. Apart from its ideological commitment to the equality of the sexes, the government has viewed women's employment as essential because of the country's labour shortage. It is said that women in North Korea are supposed to devote eight hours a day to work, eight hours to study (presumably, the study of juche and Kim Il Sungism), and eight hours to rest and sleep (although working conditions are different for women with three or more children). According to a defector, having no job 6 months after high school graduation is a punishable offence (Choi 2004).

Despite the rhetoric, recent reports suggest that equity in the workplace has not materialised. Several issues highlight various inequities particularly with regards to types of work, rates of pay, access to promotion and the status of working women.

One issue is that there remains significant occupational segregation between two genders. Women are concentrated in low-skilled labour and/or unpopular work. For instance, in the early 1970s in North Korea, 70% of women's employment was concentrated in light industries. According to Ku and Oh (2004)'s study about the lives of 27 female refugees, 8 refugees were low-skilled labourers. They were employed in the light industry, sales and services.

While there is legislation on equal employment and equal pay (since 1972) in general, women’s income accounts for 70% of men’s income (Shin 2003). One factor affecting income has been access and equity with regards to promotion. In general, the system of promotion is based on an examination system with the exams for promotion being administered at most workplaces every 3 years. Promotion and higher pay go to those that pass the exam (Choi 2004:10). Compared to women, a much higher proportion of men pass the exam. This demonstrates that 'glass ceiling' has existed for female workers in North Korea.

A key question relates to how the opportunities and limitations created by state-provisioned child-care and welfare services and the official promotion of female education and employment have affected women's perception of themselves? Have such state initiatives had a positive or negative impact on women's perception of work and career? Some scholars have argued that North Korean women’s motivations to work are related to both economic necessity and self-esteem issues as the status of homemaker is not highly valued in North Korean society (Ku & Oh 2004; Kim et al 2000). One refugee reported that "it is much better to do paid work otherwise I have to participate in organisational activities. In the 70s and 80s, women thought that having a job is necessary for women to be a ‘good mother and wife’ by actively contributing to the revolution." (Ku& Oh 2004:346).

However, by the end of the 1990s a new trend appears to have emerged where the number of married women that leave formal employment (Lim 2004) has been rising with many of these “housewives” branching out into other private economic activities.

*The married 'entrepreneurial' woman:* Recently there the gap between the participation rates of married and single women is becoming wider.
One of the distinct features of women’s labour participation in North Korea is the lower rate of married women’s participation in the workforce. Unlike other communist countries, from the mid 1980s, 60-70% of North Korean married women quit their jobs after marriage. It is argued that the 49% of that figure include married women working in neighbourhood work units. It seems that in North Korea, the male as breadwinner remains the dominant model and many women accept that they must rely on their husband’s income. A second distinctive feature is that the managers of enterprises continue to be reluctant to employ married women. Third, tradition still dictates that once married, a woman should stay at home to serve her husband and take care of her children (Shin 2001).

Ku and Oh (2004) suggest that this return to the home is because, by the 1980s, some women who married men holding senior positions that could manage economically to stay at home to look after children. According to one defector:

After the mid 1980s, there were increased numbers of women staying home after marriage. More and more women believed that there was no point graduating from university. Instead, many hoped to marry with a well-qualified husband. ….. Equality between women and men is applied only in the socialist revolutionary rhetoric – it bears no resemblance to practices in daily life (interview, cited in Ku and Oh 2004).

After the food crisis, women constituted the majority of those who withdrew from the workforce and pursued other ways of securing food and money for survival. Some women decided work from home or operate small businesses such as selling bread or home grown vegetables in the local farmers’ markets.

As discussed earlier, since the economic crisis and failure of the state-run food distribution system farmers markets have been growing in size and importance to become a major source of food and other necessities. This development has had significant consequences for the position of women. According to one female refugee:

Well, in 1997-98, men became useless. They went to their jobs, but there was nothing to be done there, so they came back. Meanwhile their wives went to distant places to trade and kept families going (cited in Lankov 2005).

As noted earlier, compared to other socialist countries, North Korea always had an unusually high percentage of housewives among its married women (for example, in the northern border city of Sinuiju, up to 70% of married women were estimated to be house wives) (Ku&Oh 2004). While in most other communist countries women were encouraged to continue work after marriage, in North Korea the government did not appear to take issue with women that decided to quit their jobs to become full-time house wives after marriage.

Despite the subservient role ascribed to woman in traditional Confucian society the emergence of the “entrepreneurial woman” also has some cultural basis.

2.2 Family and Marriage

While North Korean women experienced formal equality at work, in education and in political representation there was an implicit distinction between the public arena and the private sphere. It was in this private sphere that women remained subject to traditional gender role expectations.

In North Korea, the family is regarded by authorities as a "cell," or a basic unit of society, but not an economic entity. Both in urban areas and in socialist cooperatives, family size tends to be small—between four and five people and usually no more than two generations, as opposed to the three generations or more found in the traditional Korean "big house." (Lee 1991: 69) (There still remain, however, a number of extended families and in these larger households females tend to share the work. In some refugee testimonies, reference is still made to the traditionally oppressive relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law seems to remain, although, according to some testimonies, on some rare occasions an overly demanding mother-in-law might be

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80 This has always been the convention in South Korea. The numbers of married women that remain committed to their careers has grown in recent years.

81 Despite the restrictions evident in Confucianism, it should be noted that through some Korean folk traditions, sometimes referred to as the “second tradition”, women found freedom to express their artistic creativity outside the confines of this subservient role. Shamanism, in particular, gave women religious responsibilities including the role of mudang or chief spirit medium. Anthropologists describe various folk traditions including animistic spirit worship, shamanism, fortune telling and geomancy as Korea’s “second tradition” and argue that they are responsible for a certain egalitarian ethic in Korean popular village culture that was in conflict with the Confucian values of Choson elite society particularly as they related to the role of women (Brandt 1971).

82 There is a view that the extended families account for 20% of all North Korean households (Lee 1991). Park’s study of 165 defectors found that 77% of defectors were from nuclear families (1999:208).
criticized by a local branch of women's organizations such as the Korean Democratic Women's Union (Kim et al 2000).

Due to the persistence of traditional domestic division of labour North Korean women have remained the main performers of domestic tasks.

As traditional gender roles remained unchanged, women suffered from the 'double burden' of holding external employment and bearing the responsibility of the bulk of domestic chores. Sharing housework between husband and wife is very uncommon. A Chinese researcher who visited North Korea twice reported how shocked she was to see that only women cook and wash the dishes and serve the family during and after meals. She said that this was quite different from gender relations in China. According to interviews with refugees, women have tended to take this for granted:

After marriage, women are slaves. Women have to obey their husband and feed their family. While women are eating barley they provide their husbands with white rice. While women wear their husband's old clothes while they provide the husband with new clothes (Interview, cited in Ku & Oh 2004).

While the state authorities provided some assistance by providing a range of social measures (such as the child care measures noted above) Kim Il Sung promise of a technological revolution failed to materialize and modern conveniences such as washing machines remain the property of a privileged few (Kim 2000).

Son preference: This is a cultural trait common to both South Korea and North Korea. Sons used to be more desired than daughters for economic reasons and for continuing the family name. In this context, in the early 1980s a wife's inability to bear a son gave a husband grounds for divorce. According to one refugee: "Until the mid 1970s, married women without sons did not even have the right to speak their opinion" (Choi 2004).

From the mid 1980s, women's preference for a son changed. Facing difficulties, women tended to prefer only one child regardless of their gender. After the food crisis, some women preferred daughters because they believe that girls are more likely to survive in a difficult period, as one North Korean woman explained:

After our economic situation deteriorated, there were more families wanting to have only one child. There was even a saying "if you only have one son, you will end up an orphan in your later life" ...A son is more burdensome for parents because they need to prepare a house for their son. Facing a food crisis, sons need more food than daughters do (Choi 2004).

There has been no data on family planning in North Korea. It is found that 1974, Kim Il Sung has given a speech that women should not have more than three children. On the basis of the speech, it was assumed that family planning might have begun in the 1970s (Lee 1991).

Marriage and Divorce: The legal age for males to marry is eighteen and for females is seventeen. Marrying in one's late twenties or early thirties is common because of work and military service obligations. This relatively late marriage has affected fertility rates. In fact, the average number of children born to women decreased from 6.5 in 1966 to 2.5 in 1988 (Lee 1991). Most marriages seem to be between people in the same rural cooperative or urban enterprise. Traditional arranged marriages have by and large disappeared, in favour of "love matches"; nevertheless, children still seem to seek their parents' permission before getting married (Kim et al 2000, Minjok 2004).

In general, divorce by mutual consent has been prohibited since 1956. However, divorce from those branded "reactionaries," or "bad elements," is granted comparatively easily in the case of either gender and, in fact, is

83 Personal conversation with Kyungja Jung
84 According a comparative study on women's status in North Korea and China, the researcher concluded that the status of Chinese women in the household is higher than that of North Korean women (Shin 2001).
85 It is said that about 70 % of marriage is marriage by love (Minjok 2004).
often strongly encouraged by the authorities. In general, the authorities seem to discourage divorce with the exceptions noted above. In addition, since court fees are quite expensive and courts are reluctant to accept suits, it is extremely difficult to get a divorce (Choi 1999). According to statistics provided by the Central Statistics Bureau the number of divorces granted annually between 1949 and 1987 ranged between 3,000 and 5,000 (a low of 3,021 in 1965 and a high of 4,763 in 1949).

It appears that a social stigma is still attached to divorced women and unmarried women who have children as shown in one defector's testimony below:

> Once women are damaged [divorced], there would be no future in the life in North Korea (cited in Kim & No 2003:73).

After food crisis, incidences of family breakdown have increased. This has happened when one of the family members moved to another area of the country for getting some food or making money for business. In some cases, one of the spouses being away home resulted in separation or divorce (Park 1999). Park's study shows that among the defectors 6.9% experienced family breakdown prior to 1994 but after 1994 20% of defectors experienced family breakdown (1999). It was the state that provided all the food and social services for people before economic crisis but under current circumstances, where the state is no longer capable of feeding everyone, family has become a basic unit for survival. According to Park, it was more evident that families or networks of families cooperate for survival.

At the same time, traditional values such as marriage, divorce and son preference seems weakened at a time where many are engaging in a daily struggle for survival. In fact, the testimonies of female defectors show that a considerable number of women have married and divorced more than once in order to survive as shown below:

> Facing starvation, Choi crossed the muddy Tumen River to China. ...... She had little choice but to marry a Chinese man, as do thousands of North Korean women fleeing to China. ...... She left him [the second husband] but became involved with other men - again for survival. Her third husband was the most brutal of all, and when he started beating Choi's 3 year-old-son, she took the child and fled (interview cited in Hong, 2004).

2.3 Women and Sexuality

Literature and testimonies have offered differing interpretations of women and sexuality in North Korea. According to a report by KINU, women have been denied sexual autonomy and premarital relations and extramarital relations are discouraged while sexual abstinence is encouraged. In this context, unmarried pregnant women generally seek abortions secretly, while some seek the assistance of the fathers (KINU 2003: 174). One the other hand, Choi (2004) and Kim et al (2000) argue that North Korean women do not have a particularly conservative view of their sexuality (Choi 2004; Kim et al 2000). One defector argues that this is due in part to the sexual corruption in the political leadership particularly the use of so-called "pleasure troops" by Kim Jung-il. According to Choi, men in North Korea very often use the word 'Ho Saik Ho Geol'86 (2004, 11). This interview demonstrates a good example of the double sexual standards operating in North Korea.

In terms of sexual violence and harassment, no relevant legislation has been developed. There has been even no perception of sexual violence in North Korea (Lim 2004). Choi argued that the sexual violence and harassment has been widespread. Although there is little perception of sexual violence and sexual harassment among women (2004), sexual harassment is secretly committed in North Korea through the use of such incentives as Party membership and improved treatment (KINU 2003: 173). However, due to the emphasis on women's purity, most women are reluctant to reveal or report they have been the victims of sexual assault.

After the food crisis strict sexual norms for women have weakened. There seems to be more unmarried pregnant women, a higher rate of divorce and extramarital relations. From 2000, even abortions for unmarried women are carried out at city and university hospitals under tacit approval of the authorities (KINU 2003: 174).

After the food crisis and various economic reforms, it is evident that more women have become engaged in street prostitution and are the targets of sexual trafficking. During the famine and absolute poverty, women's bodies became an easily tradable commodity in exchange for food or money. Some testimonies of North Korean defectors confirm this:

86 Only those who loves sex are real men.
There are women who wear a lot of make-up and sell their bodies at market places or train stations. North Korean women do not wear make-up, or they do so very lightly. So the make-up is like the tags for sex traffic. The women lure people who pass by. (Good Friends 2000:132).

In addition, sex is sometimes offered as a bribe.

Lee was caught on a train without a ticket but could not pay the penalty. She was taken to the railroad inspector’s home and sexually assaulted (KINU2003: 173).

Sex is often the only way for women to survive:

It is easier for women to get out of North Korean than men because at least they have their own bodies to sell ... They figure it is better to find a man, any man, than starve to death in North Korea (one female defector interview cited in LA Times Aug 18, 2003).

The North Korean government claimed that in the last 50 years, the trafficking of women had not been tolerated in North Korea, however, since the food crisis this trafficking particular to China has significantly increased. This has been carried out by kidnapping, violence, luring women through intermediaries etc. The women are sold and re-sold as maids at farms, restaurants, servants of Chinese senior citizens, brides of lonely farmers, or workers in sex industry (KINU 2003: 173). One refugee shared the following experience:

I was helpless: I had no money, I didn’t speak Chinese, and I had my daughter to support ...... if you are a North Korean woman crossing the border, it’s almost impossible to survive without being abused or sold. It happens to almost all of us because they know we are vulnerable (Young, a female defector cited in Faiola 2004).

Conclusion: Women as victims and agents of change in economic transition

Feminist scholarship in general agrees that gender inequities existed under all communist regimes. They highlight the many inconsistencies of concerning women’s social status: with constitutions founded on egalitarian models coexisting with specific practices that reinforced a gendered model.

The situation in North Korea is consistent with these findings. Women achieved some formal equality but in practice gender inequality has been prevalent in both the workplace and family. Although the patrilineal clan system was abolished in 1955, North Korea’s distinct leadership cult gave it a significant boost as it recast the whole nation in line with the structures characteristic of the traditional family. Before the food crisis, women relied on the state for food and social services. This is just a different version of patriarchy. For example, it is frequently reported that prior to eating meals children are expected to give thanks to a portrait of “Father Kim Il Sung.” North Korean people treat their political leader as father and mother. Unlike the analysis of Hungary by Fodor, in North Korea, patriarchy has changed into patriarchal paternalism (Park 1999, Lim 2004).

Patriarchy was not altered or eliminated: it was merely forced underground (or into the private sphere of the family) by the communist rhetoric on women’s emancipation, much like, as some scholars argue, ethnic tension and discrimination, which erupted only after the fall of the state socialist regimes (Fodor 2004: 787).

After the economic crisis, people in North Korea encountered the situation in which the state no longer provided their necessities and services. In some degree, significance of the family unit has been strengthened while family breakdown has increased. Even in each family unit, men were not able to provide enough food and goods for family, thus, the authority and power of men was likely to be weak. Women have thus been left with the burden of feeding the family. In this context, women’s traditional perception of their role changed. Women began to perceive themselves as an individual human being. The shift in their perception led to the reluctance to marry or have children, high rates of divorce and separation and less tolerance for any abuse or violence metered out by their husbands (Lim 2004).

In North Korea, women are seen as both of the victims and the agents in the process of transition. Some researcher who studied the impact of transition of communist regime to market economy argued that women are marginalised (Heinen 1997) ‘the losers’ in the transition process (Adnanes 2000). It is argued that gender inequalities are being reproduced under the new regimes (Heinen 1997). In is true that more women in North Korea suffered from hunger and have become the targets of sex trafficking and street prostitution.

On the other hand, women are viewed as active players in the newly emerged market process in North Korea. Compared to men, women have been more actively seeking ways to survive in the new environment through creating self-employment as Lankov has observed, “men are left behind and capitalism is left to women” (Asia Times Online 2005). Some scholars(Lim 2004, Ku&Oh 2004) argue that the new entrepreneurialism of North
Korean women has translated into a notable improvement in the economic strength and status of women over the past 10-15 years:

The new North Korean capitalism of dirty marketplaces, charcoal trucks and badly dressed vendors with huge sacks of merchandise on their backs demonstrates one surprising feature: It has a distinctly female face. Women are over-represented among the leaders of the growing post-Stalinist economy- at least on the lower level, among the market traders and small-time entrepreneurs (Lankov 2005).

North Korea is still in the throws of transition. Such transition has resulted in the shift in the gender relations and the role and status of women to a degree. However, the long term impact of this shift in gender relations upon the broader society of North Korea warrants significant further research.

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The rise of the Internet in the last ten years has been accompanied by predictions of great changes in society and politics, ranging from very positive expectations of direct democracy to tales of increasing isolation and social doom. Howard Rheingold (1994) for example wrote in 1994 about the potential of virtual communities and the advantages of online communication in increasing social interactivity. Dick Morris (1999) described the Internet as the 'Fifth Estate' that would radically transform politics by reducing the role of political parties and traditional media and giving ‘the people’ more direct influence. On the other hand, writers such as Nie and Ebring (2000) feared that the use of computers at home would bring increasing isolation, leading to the decline of social capital and civil society activities. Questions of access and the so-called digital divide between those with access and those without were also discussed in detail (Norris 2001). As enthusiasm for the commercial potential of the Web – the "dot-com boom" - declined in the late 1990s, disillusion with the Web’s potential for political uses also spread. The web presence of political parties showed less effect than expected, as did election campaigns using new information and communication technologies (ICT). The expected increase in political activity and involvement of new internet users did not materialise as fast as expected or not at all. While the revolution of democracy and political processes did not take place, new ICT have brought profound changes to some political processes and to different degrees in different countries.\(^7\)

The purpose of my current research is to take stock of internet-related political activities after a more than a decade of technological progress and innovation. I look the potential of the Internet for the enhancement of democratic processes and as a new forum of deliberation in an emerging democracy, the Republic of Korea (hereafter South Korea). The conference presentation presents some of my findings in the first stages of the project, namely an in-depth content analysis of a variety of relevant websites, including political parties, news sites, individual politicians, and civil society groups at national and local level. The findings clearly demonstrate that established agents such as political parties and large news organisation were slower in embracing the new technologies, reflecting a generational gap while younger people created new sites and eagerly used ICT. However, the analysis also demonstrates that many sites are geared towards immediate action rather than creating long-term support, rising questions about the sustainability of the momentum of greater engagement by younger people. There is a possibility that the political discourse becomes dominated by another elite, albeit younger and more savvy in using new technologies that dominate public discussion and politics in South Korea.

New Information and Communication Technologies and Politics

New technologies are frequently greeted as harbingers of change and improvement of democracy and humanity. Inventions like the telephone, radio and cable television were all promoted as saviours of democracy at some point over the last 150 years (Meikle 2003). As with these technologies, the new ICT, and in particular the Internet, could not live up to the high expectations. Representative democracy has not (yet?) been replaced by participatory democracy with high degrees of individual involvement in the decision-making process through electronic consultation and voting. Many studies and commentators concentrated on western democracies, in particular the United States where a large number of Internet users were located, and focussed on election campaigns and the Internet as source of information. Initially, election campaigns and campaign reporting continued to be dominated by traditional means while online activities such as mass emails and life web casts had little success. Following the end of the dot.com-boom, the US presidential elections in 2000 were often seen as a failure for online political activity, in particular for parties and the news media (Margolis and Resnick 2000, Davis et al 2002). Similar outcomes in other countries pointed to a very limited influence of online activity on elections and the number of political activists (e.g. Gibson et al 2004). However, it was not so much established democracies but emerging democracies where new technologies came to their own and showed their potential in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

Examples for the use of new information technologies for political purposes from around the world are abundant. In 2000, a million Filipino citizens used SMS messages to organize demonstrations against then-President Estrada, who was being impeached for corruption. The current President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo offers the opportunity to send a text message to her office to allow easy access for many citizens.

\(^7\) It is important to remember that the Internet - part of which is the World Wide Web - is only one of the new technologies, email, instant messaging, mobile phones and text messaging are some other important new developments that have to be included in any analysis.
With the obvious caveat that they have to be willing to do so and have mastered the basic technology, ordinary citizens and civil groups embraced them much faster. Online civil engagement in all varieties and forms of media large investments, or a broadcast license were necessary, it is far easier to set up a website and the process differs from traditional forms of print and other media in their much lower entry costs. Whereas in the traditional media, anyone with a computer. Anyone with a mobile phone can send a SMS message (text message). The new online media platforms are used to spread false and/or slanderous information (the 2004 US elections produced plenty of examples by both the candidates). Information seeking in the Internet is an active pursuit, where users tend to drift towards sites that confirmed their views rather than looking for the wider picture. Internet users therefore were perceived to lack the exposure to information on a wider number of topics and different points of view, creating fragmented and polarised groups, or, as some call it, “Cyberbalkans” (Alstyne and Bryndfisson 1997).

While political parties and traditional media were slow in using the possibilities of the new ICT, ordinary citizens and civil groups embraced them much faster. Online civil engagement in all varieties and forms increased rapidly and became user-driven. Anyone with internet access can send an e-mail, even if they do not own a computer. Anyone with a mobile phone can send a SMS message (text message). The new online media differ from traditional forms of print and other media in their much lower entry costs. Whereas in the traditional media large investments, or a broadcast license were necessary, it is far easier to set up a website and the process incurs usually only a relatively small fee, as the increasing number of personal weblogs (or blogs) demonstrates.

88 With the obvious caveat that they have to be willing to do so and have mastered the basic technology necessary, such as typing in a text message.
The Situation in South Korea

South Korea is often mentioned as a positive example in the discussion of the potential of ICT in politics. The Korean government has actively promoted broadband technology in the late 1990s and the country is now a global leader with regard to broadband connections (25 out of 100 inhabitants subscribe, Table 1). A large share of Koreans thus has access to fast and cheap Internet connections that are used frequently. By the end of 2004, 78% of households had a computer at home and 72% had internet access at home (Table 2). Koreans have embraced new technologies enthusiastically, using the World Wide Web but also mobile phones with advanced technology frequently (Tables 3 and 4). Over 70% of Koreans use the Internet at least once a month and on average they spent over 75 hours a month online (Table 3). Koreans use the Internet to search for information, play games, emails and for other entertainment (including accessing pornography, Table 5). The government has been a driving force in introducing e-government and was one of the leaders worldwide in these developments. Many transactions with the government such as planning applications can now be launched online and often the progress can also be followed online, reducing delays and the temptation of corruption.

Koreans have also been inventive in the use of ICT and opened new avenues of participating in political and civil society with many interactive features. Online new services, discussion sites and websites and blogs of individuals and civic groups have all become very popular in Korea. Web sites were not only used to inform and communicate but also to collaborate and organise, both online and offline. The case of Korea thus shows the emergence of new political uses of the web rather than the extension of existing activities to a new medium. This extended to a number of fields, including changes in the media market, election campaigns and online engagement and discussion.

The Korean newspaper market is dominated by three conservative papers (Chosun, JoongAng and Dong-A Ilbo) that used their market dominance to set the political agenda, in recent years opposing, attacking and often even discrediting Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and other progressive political forces. The failure of these traditional media sources to provide the kind of news and information citizens desired has caused them to seek alternatives. More liberal papers sprung up online with different contents than offline papers, the most famous being Ohmynews.com. The site features contributions by regular journalists, as well as contribution by "citizen reporters", opening their pages to any Korean wanting to contribute (with over 38,000 registered reporters by now). Other sites using a similar format were created covering the whole spectrum of political opinion.

A feature common on many web sites of all types, whether they are run by commercial interests, the government or non-profit organisations, is the provision of a comment facility where readers are encouraged to write comments and join the discussion. This practice is building on earlier versions of guest books. Many site visitors like to leave their comments and opinions on bulletin boards and in chat rooms, but even more like to read other contributions. Anecdotally, the latter seems to be more important than the actual information on the page (i.e. People prefer to read what other people think of an incident rather than information on the incident). Other features include facilities to rate comments as good or bad, sometimes offering a complicated system of icons.92 The online community is very active and often nationalistic, and quickly establish movements and 'anti-sites' against all sorts of "opponents", real and perceived. Opposition against Chosun Ilbo for example is voiced on sites such as antichosun.com and urimodu.com. On controversial topics many sites rapidly emerge: on the Dokdo dispute for example, one Yahoo directory (http://kr.dir.yahoo.com/Society_and_Culture/Issues_and_Causes/World/International_Conflict/Dokdo_Trouble ) alone had 27 entries in late May 2005, giving some indication on the proliferation of sites on this issue. Many sites on the web tend to be more outspoken and drifting towards the edges of opinion, reflecting that people with an issue are far more likely to express their voice then those happy or content with a situation.

Civil society groups use the web to organise virtual and real-life actions from candle-light vigils to gatherings in support for the Korean soccer team during the Soccer World Cup Tournament that was co-hosted by Korean and Japan in 2002. The idea for the candle light vigils in late 2002 originated in a message to a board that then was discussed (by the same person) on a news portal site. Thousands of Koreans followed the call for these vigils. In the case of football supporters, SMS messages were important in organising spontaneous

89 In the UN Global E-government Readiness Report 2004, measuring the state of e-government readiness and the extent of e-participation, Korea held rank 5 (http://www.unpan.org/egovgovernment4.asp, accessed May 2005).90 For information on the system introduced in Seoul called 'Online Procedures ENhancement for civil applications' (OPEN) see http://english.seoul.go.kr/gover/initiatives/ini 12cor 02.htm.91 Although initially an internet-only publication, Ohmynews for example for legal reasons had to register a weekly paper with Korean authorities to qualify as a "news publication".

92 Sometimes, these icons seem to leave some room for interpretation, as this example from naver.com shows:
gatherings or those on short notice filling public spaces in Seoul rapidly with supporters in the red shirt of their team. These examples show the rise of civil society activities online that has also been extended to political society. Discussion about politics increased noticeably online and through web initiatives, more people joined demonstrations and other political activities. This was a positive sign of change in a country where political participation was low and apathy and cynicism with regard to politics and politicians prevailed.

It is widely acknowledged that during the presidential election campaign in late 2002, internet support groups played an important role in organising and mobilising supporters (Lee 2004). President Roh Moo-hyun owed his election victory in 2002 largely to his non-party support group Nosamo.com (literally “Roh-lovers”), which mostly organised via the Internet. This site in conjunction with other pro-Roh sites based online were a major component of Roh’s campaign that appealed to younger voters who make up the larger share of internet users. Support for Roh came from a movement rather than a political party, reflecting the will of people rather than an organisation, a substantial change in Korean political practice. The internet activities in Korea surrounding the presidential elections also caught the attention of observers and the international press; the British Guardian for example run the headline ‘World’s First Internet President Logs on’ (24 February 2003).

Online and telephone polls became another frequently used feature in Korea and politicians became sensible to their popularity ratings. Politicians and journalists watched online commentaries and polls with interest and reacted to the issues aired online, often describing it as the ‘vox populi’ (as do commentators such as Morris). However, as described before, the Internet community is not representative for the whole population. The more typical user is younger, urban, male, higher educated, a white collar worker with a higher income. Despite these caveats, Korean politicians, led by President Roh Moo-hyun, place great importance on online opinion and the discourses occurring there. The importance of online presence has also been acknowledged by other actors, the US embassy in Seoul for example opened a ‘chat room’ called Café US at Daum.net to encourage discussion (http://cafe.daum.net/usembassy) and US Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice during a recent visit to Seoul allowed for an hour-long interview by online journalists that was broadcast life (http://event.media.daum.net/rice/index.html).

The uneven distribution and voice given to public opinion makers is not the only reservation with regard to the reasons for the enthusiasm about the positive effects of new ICT on South Korean politics. Another problem remains in the measurement of the direct correlation between online activities and actual political participation. While there certainly was a lot of internet activity during the election campaign, how much of it influenced the outcome of the elections remains unclear. Voter turn-out among the younger voters, who were most likely to use the Internet, was the lowest ever (Table 6). This corresponds with data found in studies in other countries where little evidence is found that increased information results in increased participation (Davies 1999, Weber et al 2003). Norris (2000) refers to this as a ‘virtuous circle’ where an already active person has been activated more by online activities while few others have become active. In order to shed light on this problem, online activities by a number of actors and agencies are analysed, looking at three particular problems, the existing digital divide, the role of online information and lastly, the efforts made by agencies to increase online and offline engagement.

Despite the technological advances, a digital divide remains visible in South Korea. While a majority of households own a computer, the older generation (over 50), and poor and rural segments of the population are far less likely to count a computer among their possession (Table 1), although this could in part be offset by the prevalence of public computer rooms across the country, the so-called PC-bangs. Internet users are far more frequent among the under 40 year-olds, urban residents, richer Koreans (with a monthly income over 2 million won) and the higher educated segments of the population (Table 2). In turn, blue collar workers, housewives and the unemployed are far less likely to use the internet on a regular basis. These categories correspond with those found among the politically active and non-active: those more likely to be active are also more likely to be internet users. This shows the limitations of the reliance on and reaction to online opinion alone as a basis for decision-making in politics. In addition, there is also a group of people unwilling to participate, often in the older generation, who do not see any particular advantage in computer use and prefer to rely on traditional methods. How various websites and their designers address this problem of lack of interest and aim to widen the scope of their potential visitors is one aspect included in the content analysis.

The impact of online information and news reports on political activity is also under dispute. Although many Koreans rely on online newspaper for information this is not the only source of information used, as surveys around the 2002 election campaign demonstrated (Table 7). Many visitors of online sites seemed to be more interested in reading what other people had to say than the actual information provided, indicated in the following comment “I go to these sites to read what others have to say. It helps me to understand younger people.” Traditional news sources remained the most important source of information on elections for a large share of the population, followed by news reports and family members (the latter in particular for women). A clear distinction between the users and non-users emerged in December 2002: young, highly educated, urban residents, and non-manual workers were most likely to look for information on the elections online while older, less educated, rural residents and manual workers relied on traditional media (Min 2004: 307). The election result seemed to reflect this: younger voters voted for Roh, the older generation for Lee. However, campaign promises and programmatic differences between the two candidates were decisive in this outcome rather than the
campaign method as voters identifying the Lee’s party were far less likely to be online than leftwing identifiers (Min 2004: 309).

The Research Project

Political participation is, however, not restricted to voting in elections and engaging in campaigns but needs to be nurtured and sustained on a permanent basis. It includes the participation in and contribution to the improvement of one’s community, region, nation and ultimately the world. The existence of the Internet and other ICT by themselves does not lead to any changes. They are embedded in political and social circumstances determining the use of ICT. This is analysed in this study of online civic engagement and its translation into political participation (or lack thereof) by looking at both the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ for online services by a number of interested actors. Figure 1 shows a model of ICT use for political activity (the dotted line representing supply). On the supply side, the provision and design of web sites by a number of actors interested in increasing and sustaining political participation are analysed. These include political parties, politicians and parliaments (summarised as political society), as well as civil society groups and interested citizens. To some degree, media, in particular the online news portals, are also promoting political activity and interest through their reporting and discussion facilities. The contribution of these actors in turn creates demand by users, which again are divided into the same sets for analytical reasons. Citizens should be the main target but civil society groups and members of political society also create demand as do some degree media organisations. This second aspect will be analysed later with the help of a web survey.

The content analysis of a selection of sites provides an overview over the use and usage of internet sites of various agencies and players in Korean society and politics, all in the widest sense aiming at engaging Koreans in the political process. These are mostly randomly selected and include political parties (6), elected representative bodies at various level of government (5), sites of individual members of an elective representative body at all levels from the National Assembly to county councils (13), all representatives of established politics and representative democracy. Non-governmental organisations at national level (6) and lower level and those geared towards one issue only (3), representing a highly active segment in Korean politics, both online and offline, comprise another group of analysis. Also included in the comparison are four commercial portals, several news portals and news sites, and also one women’s portal. These commercial sites are included because they present a good comparison for successful design and approach in increasing and retaining visitors. On commercial sites, revenue is created by advertisement, not by subscription, so they are by default interested in engaging visitors to stay on the site and revisit later. Finally, several established media outlets are included, ranging from conservative papers to a television site. The analysis looks at the similarities and differences in presence on web and use of ICT by these varied actors as well as the degree to which
technology is used to communicate and coordinate activities. Also observed is the acceptance and commitment to the use of ICT and the inclusion of new user groups, breaking barriers between owners and users. The content analysis concentrates on the opening page, since many visitors decide about staying on a site within a very short time span. A well-designed and prepared opening page should turn hits to visits and result in the generation of return visits, the conservation of visitors and audience building, in addition to providing useful information and contact efficiency.

The analysis thus looks in detail at design, features and content of the opening pages of the selected sites, coding for the presence or absence of various types of facilities (for a more detailed methodological discussion see Weare and Lin 2000). The points of analysis were informed on a number of similar studies in a variety of fields (Dholakia et al 2000, Gustavsen and Tilley 2003, Hill and Hughes 1997) and can be summarised under four headings: ‘detectability’, ‘usability’, ‘content’ and ‘interactivity’. Each will be explored in detail in the following.

Findings

The findings of this study provide insight in the willingness and ability of various agencies in engaging online with Koreans and also in active measures to create informed and engaged citizens, both online and in the real world. This assists in addressing questions whether online engagement is a new form of democratic practice or a new vehicle for existing democratic rights and whether ICT inspired new activists (in larger numbers) or simply created a new outlet for old activists (Norris’ “virtuous circle”).

The analysis found some distinct differences between the groups. Political parties made relatively little use of the potential of the internet. This reflected their role in the political process in Korea. Despite their low membership rate little effort of online recruitment is made. The personalised climate of Korean politics is reflected in the growing number of personal web sites. Politicians make little use of party sites but maintain their own presence and supporters often create additional sites. Opposition leader Park Geun-hye for example has her own site that includes links to 23 supporting pages and weblogs. This trend of personalised sites is visible at the national level, but does not extend to lower level politicians across the nation. The presence of politicians at provincial and municipal level depends much on the location. While it seems to be taken as a given in Seoul, only a few members of Kangwon Provincial Council for example have their own site. At city and county level, numbers are even lower as is the quality of the analysed sites. Some administrations provided each councillor with a template to set up their personal site but not all picked up the offer and entered any content. This tendency illustrates the digital divide within the country and presumably also within politicians. The parliaments and assemblies at all levels have a web presence but the focus of many sites is on information, rather than offering opportunities to engage and participate. Since local autonomy is relatively new to South Korea, this would be an opportunity to educate citizens and strengthen the presence and profile of local councillors in the local political area. But visitor numbers are low and few efforts to create entertaining sites are made. The sites of parliaments are, however, good sources for information on their activities. Transcripts of sessions are available for downloading as are texts of relevant legislation. These sites seem to see the main use of the web in a library that is far easier to access and maintain.

Civil society groups (and NGOs) vary in their approach to online facilities. Local groups are less developed, reflecting their more limited resources, both financially and technologically. Established groups like the YMCA were also limiting their use to offering the same services that a printed brochure would, thus treating visitors as customers rather than partners. Most sites still talk ‘at’ their audience rather than talking ‘with’ them but the provision of background materials is a good practice on many NGO-sites. Other groups like the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) have a more pro-active approach, allowing for interaction. This particular site comes complete with radio set-up so upon entering the site, a visitor gets to listen to the group’s radio broadcasts. Most parties and national NGOs had set up an intranet, allowing for direct communication with members. This can potentially dissolve some of the hierarchy within the group and lead to much more inner-group discussion on all levels, if encouraged. Both political parties and civil societies rarely used their web presence to build up long-term support or collect donations.

The media and portals have two different approaches, reflecting their different background. As mentioned above, some news portals were found as online undertaking, hence making the best of new ICT while the traditional media were slower in catching up. Commercial portals used the interactive features for a variety of purposes, as some examples of the big players show: Amazon lets customers rate products and write reviews, eBay customers rate the service of sellers, and Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia compiled and edited by user contributions. The facility to add comments and thus lead to discussion was added by new portals. The blog and café facilities offered by the big portal sites in Korea are an important forum of social and political activities. Here, citizens can engage in political activity, often without direct intention of doing so upon logging in. Reading comments on political affairs or calls for demonstrations could lead to more engagement. Contrary to the notion that blogs and chat rooms lead to isolation and parochialism, the Korean example shows that they can also have the opposite effect and induce more activity, both online and offline. The following will look at the findings in more detail.
Detectability
Web sites can have a number of purposes, including the attraction of new visitors and participants, presentation of material for members, media and non-members, and also as information system for members only (intranet). The opening sites often tell where the owners put their priority. Many sites in the study use their web presence to portray their group, as they do in other media, in particular in print. Websites often are little more than online brochures, visitors were thus talked ‘at’ with little opportunity for dialogue, as is explored later. First, the visibility of a site is tested by looking at the presence in web directories and the number of links to a site. The number of hits a site attracts is difficult to measure and compare but in the (not representative) sample of alexa.com. The traditional news sites attract most clicks. The number of links to a site is a better indicator of how well known and connected the group is within its community and beyond. Here, the news sites obviously do best, but some smaller NGOs have no links that the search engines picked up on. Only the major players, i.e. main parties and best-known NGOs, produce more than 100 links. The lack of foreign language facilities probably has influenced the number but a similar picture emerged when entries in directories provided by yahoo Korea and naver. Most web sites are passively waiting for visitors to find them rather than making a conscious effort to attract more clicks. In terms of international links, most sites are geared towards the Korean market with little provision of non-Korean content. This reduces the chance of international discussion and engagement. The main opposition party, GNP, previously had an English-language site but in 2005, this feature is missing. As a result, fewer observers and journalists are able to find information of the party’s platform and report about it abroad. In contrast, the ruling Uridang offers sites in English, Japanese and Chinese. Many government and parliamentary sites provide an English site but post little content and rarely update it. NGOs are most likely to have a meaningful foreign language presence if they are involved in international movements such as the union movement.

Usability
When designing a web site, technical aspects need to be considered as a site should be accessible by a wide variety of visitors. This includes not only individuals with disabilities such as visual impairment or motor problems but also users with old or unusual equipment. Some countries have Web Content Accessibility Guidelines to ensure Discrimination Acts are not breached and successful challenges to ‘discriminatory’ sites have led to compensation payments (not just in the US but also for example in Australia, the Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games has lost a case [Sloane 2001]). If such guidelines do exist in Korea, most designers seem to ignore them. Only one site in the sample has a facility for visually impaired visitors while the general rule seemed to be to use the most modern and advanced software, usually based on MS Internet Explorer. Older machines often have trouble coping with the sites (including the author’s which is just over one year old). On more than one site, special software is needed for access, including the National Assembly site. This reflects a trend among Koreans to favour the newest technology and to buy the newest technology and gadgets. Multimedia is used extensively, but the fancy design comes at the expense of downloading time, as it slows the process. Times range from 7 seconds to over 30 with a mean of 16 seconds, a long time for a casual, impatient visitor. The frequent pop ups are also taking up time and capacity. Here, not only commercial sites are using popups but also the political party sites. All these features are exclusionary and deepen the digital divide. Poorer users thus encounter problems with many sites, limiting their ability (and willingness) to access them. The use of many different media sources also influences the design and layout of many sites. Apart from text, most sites contain some photos and often a link to video and audio clips. In an effort to provide information, some designs include too much information, influencing the length of a site. Ohmynews for example prints out over 3 pages (landscape) and scrolling down to access all the information is quite time consuming and can induce information overload. Most sites are however within a 1-2 page range.

Some other basics that many western sites have by default were also missing on many sites. These include the date of the last update, contact details, the person(s) responsible for the site, and site policies, including technical and privacy considerations. Some of the leftwing sites analysed take their own approach to copyright considerations, stating ‘no copyright, just copyleft’. The majority of sites includes contact details in some form, ranging from a simple email address to full postal details, many fail to name a person or persons handling enquiries and responsible for design and content. One interesting finding is the use of language. Very few pages use any Hanja (Chinese characters) at all, continuing a trend that could be observed for several years in some newspapers (such as Hangorye). More and more younger people grow up without using Hanja and will thus be unable to read documents that are suing them, including many (older) books and official papers and documents.

93 Given the sheer size of the Internet it is impossible to collect reliable data about the number of sites and links. The data presented here is obviously not definitive but only an indicator for comparison. Google.com does a simple search for the number of links by entering “link:www.domain”. Alexa.com provides some web traffic statistics based on data collected from sites that installed its toolbar, having obvious restrictions in its representativeness, in particular in the context of this study.
Content
The analysis of all layers of each site was beyond the scope and intention of this study, so this refers to the entry page only. Just 3 out of the over 40 sites have a separate opening page which required a further click to the actual home page. These entry pages seem to be a leftover from the slower days of the internet when these sites came up with some short information while the main site was still loading. With the faster connections, however, they have little use apart from some entertainment if the visitor is willing to invest the time. On the main entry page, a visitor would expect some information on the owner's platform but on the sites analysed a visitor is lucky to find a link. Many sites also lack organisation transparency with no contact details for the site co-ordinator and no site policies explaining technical and privacy consideration. Most sites, however, contain some type of bulletin board or calendar of events on the opening page, drawing the visitor's attention to up-coming events and news, an important element to catch attention and draw a visitor further in to find out more about these events, and maybe even attend.

Another factor in deciding on the length of stay on one site is its entertainment value and playfulness. Creative design and the use of various fonts and sizes for example can keep attention high, although that is very individual (and can easily backfire). Little polls or quizzes can lead to further engagement with the site and its content. Downloads of various formats can create more visitors. This could include wallpapers and screensavers (which also serve as advertisement) as well as pictures and music. The analysed sites do not offer wallpapers or screensavers but photos, video and audio clips are available or linked. One leftwing party for example offers a facility to download music for free while one party site allows visitors to add captions to a topical cartoon. Another party site links to a site where visitors could upload their own pictures (mostly using cameras on their mobile phones) which has led to a strange assortment of pictures with little connection to the overall topic of the site, showing the need for some sort of moderation.

As an initial introduction the entry page should contain some information on the purpose, platform and background of a particular group, but many sites fail to do that. The information is presented under a different link to the 'introduction' of the group, expecting the visitor to show initiative in looking for this material. In presenting their platform and activities, most sites limit their content to their point of view and showed little engagement with other opinions. In their parochialism, many sites thus confirm the fear of 'Cyberbalkans' and limited engagement with other views. This is of concern as it does not support the development of a democratic culture of discourse and compromise but exuberates existing positions and differences. But few sites would consider this engagement in the advancement of democratic habits to be one of their tasks. In contrast, discussion is flourishing on other sites, in particular the news portals.

Interactivity
Interactivity is the real improvement and innovation pioneered by the Internet. Rather than offering a monologue ICT offer the possibility of dialogue, not just between site owner and user but also between many users. But first a few observations about the 'user control' by just one visitor that sites offer, so that a visitor can easily personalise the site to their needs. This includes the provision of a search function and sitemap as well as navigation bars to allow a visitor to find information easily rather than spending time accessing many sub-sites. Only about half of the sites analysed have a link to their sitemap and about a quarter provide a search function on the opening page, making it difficult to find specific information quickly. Links to specific groups such as women's or children sites, regional branches or on particular topics are present in about half of the sites. Political parties are most likely to link to other sections, thus allowing to 'narrowcast' to a specific audience (in contrast to 'broadcasting'). The possibility to 'personalise' site to the visitor's preference, so common on commercial sites, is rarely picked up by the analysed sites. Intranets for members only were present on moist sites by political parties and NGOs but the usage of this system was beyond this study.

Few sites allow for some sort of dialogue by offering contact details, comment forms or a FAQ section on their opening site or a visible link to them. Bulletin boards, however, are frequent. Mostly they contain either relevant news or a calendar of events. This in turn then allows visitors to follow activities and see where and when they would be able to join activities or meet up with other members of the group. About half of the groups make some sort of effort to recruit participants, although rarely on the opening page. It seems to be of lesser importance as membership forms and in some cases donation forms are hidden at lower levels of the domain. Facts on local chapters and local representatives are by no means omnipresent and often also difficult to find. In some cases, rather than finding direct information on a local group, a link to their café site is offered. Direct offline involvement thus is not encouraged enough on many sites.

The notion of a chat room or discussion forum is present on most sites. Indeed, it seems to have become an integral feature of web sites in Korea. Citizens have accepted this feature quickly and mostly without the leadership or intervention by site owners (apart from some moderation). Few sites analysed make an effort to
steer the discussion and use it for example in a consultation process. Furthermore, many sites have few contributions while the big players attract most of the action (portals like ohmynews.com, the leading political parties). Open freeboards are rare, on most pages a login is needed to contribute to the discussion, even to just lodge a judgement on a comment. This requirement was introduced to stop the amount of spam coming out of Korea, and the amount of spam and non-related postings on open boards confirms the necessity of some sort of control. As part of the registration procedure, however, a Korean citizen registration number is necessary that has to be confirmed by the Korea Information Service, a government agency. Foreign residents in Korea and abroad as well as overseas Koreans are virtually excluded (although some sites offer the possibility of accepting other documents that have to be submitted separately). There are mixed policies on the privacy of contributions. Some sites allow the use of pseudonyms while others not only publish the name but also the email address of a contributor (a spammers dream). These rules as well as moderation rules are often inadequately explained during the registration procedure, possibly pointing to some lack of awareness of the potential problems.

Conclusion

Koreans have embraced the Internet and other ICT eagerly but with regard to political activity and participation, their influence is limited. About one third of Koreans does not use the Internet and many more do not use it to engage in political activity in the widest sense. Despite this, many politicians consider the discourse on the web as general public opinion, so that the political discourse is dominated by younger, more progressive Koreans. To President Roh Moo-hyun internet polls and his popularity ranking seem to be more important than election results. This affects not only domestic policy decisions but for example also the relations with the United States and North Korea, showing the limitations of direct democracy (as envisaged by for example Morris [1999]). Exemplifying the gap between the president and more conservative political society, the latter has been slow to adapt to new ICT and utilise it to their purposes, in particular political parties. Among the established groups there was little enthusiasm to embrace new initiatives that have been made popular by other sites, including online discussion and consultation.

Many sites were not actively attracting visitors but addressed the concerns of those who purposefully visited. Opening pages rarely held information on a group’s platform or even contact details but expected the visitor to spend more time to enter the site to find out more. This in turn was not encouraging casual visitors to look for more than basic information on the web, inducing apathy. The digital divide was exacerbated by the use of advanced technology on most sites. In contrast to many other advanced countries where inclusiveness is expected, Koreans prefer the use the most advanced technology, even at the cost of some users without the newest computer and software. Participation in discussion and the use of special features was largely limited to Korean residents by login procedures, excluding non-Korean residents in Korea and abroad as well as overseas Koreans. Long-term engagement and active membership were features that were not highlighted on opening pages, and often were hidden deep in the content of sub-directories, demonstrating the low level of importance given by many organisations. Discussion, a feature so praised by many observers, was limited to a certain number of sites, most had only a few contributions, often by the same people, confirming the existence of a ‘virtuous cycle’ in Korea. This cycle is in the process of extending by the wider use of chat rooms and blogs but most activity is still restricted to the virtual world. Many discussion strands are driven by visitors rather than the owners of the site. To include a wider range of citizens, far more efforts by both suppliers, i.e. the web site owners and designers as well as users, citizens, are needed.

Bibliography:


Table 1: Broadband subscribers per 100 inhabitants in selected OECD countries, December 2004:

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
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<td>15.0</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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Table 2: Possession of Computer and Internet access at home, December 2004, in %:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>One or more computers at home</th>
<th>No computer at home</th>
<th>Internet access at home</th>
<th>No internet access at home</th>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>30s</td>
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<td>44.8</td>
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<td>Region</td>
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<td>83.8</td>
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<td>Medium cities</td>
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<td>23.3</td>
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<td>Rural areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>35.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-3 million</td>
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<td>90.2</td>
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<td>4 million or more</td>
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Source: National Internet Development Agency of Korea http://isis.nic.or.kr/english/sub02/sub02_index.html, accessed May 2005

Table 3: Internet usage at least once a month (in %) and time spent on Internet, December 2004:

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<th>Do not use the internet</th>
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<td>61.2</td>
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<td>50s</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
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<td>60s and more</td>
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<td>28.6</td>
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<td>Male - female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>6-19</td>
<td>96.0 - 96.4</td>
<td>4.0 - 3.6</td>
<td>61.3 - 61.0</td>
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<td>4.2 - 5.2</td>
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<td>9.1 - 14.8</td>
<td>86.1 - 76.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>28.9 - 46.5</td>
<td>79.5 - 69.8</td>
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<td>41.3 - 20.9</td>
<td>58.7 - 79.1</td>
<td>73.2 - 64.2</td>
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60s and more | 15.3 - 6.4 | 84.7 - 93.6 | 33.9 - 19.5 |
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<td></td>
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<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15.5</td>
<td>81.5</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>92.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>white-collar</td>
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<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>service/sales</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>75.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>production</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>62.3</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not employed/others</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(student)</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>68.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>(housewife)</td>
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<td>45.3</td>
<td>71.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>(unemployed/retired)</td>
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<td>72.7</td>
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<td>89.4</td>
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<td>(graduate student)</td>
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<td>(college graduate)</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>89.3</td>
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</table>

Source: National Internet Development Agency of Korea
http://isis.nic.or.kr/english/sub02/sub02_index.html, accessed May 2005

Table 4: Spread of wireless internet usage in %, September 2004:

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>12-19</td>
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<td>86.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20s</td>
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<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30s</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40s</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50s and over</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Internet Development Agency of Korea
http://isis.nic.or.kr/english/sub02/sub02_index.html, accessed May 2005

Table 5: Reasons for Internet Usage (multiple responses) in December 2004:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
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<th>Gender</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>men</td>
<td>women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Search</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail</td>
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<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shopping or Reservation</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chat or Messenger</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Source: National Internet Development Agency of Korea  
http://isis.nic.or.kr/english/sub02/sub02_index.html, accessed May 2005 |
|---|---|---|
Table 6: Voter turn-out in last three presidential elections by age, in %:

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<th>Age</th>
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<th>1997</th>
<th>2002</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>55.2</td>
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<td>30-34</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>64.3</td>
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<td>35-39</td>
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<td>70.8</td>
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<td>50-59</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
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<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>80.7</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
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Table 7: Most important sources for information on candidates in 2002, in %:

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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TV (speeches, debates, interviews)</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News reports on TV, radio, paper</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet or phone</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family members or other people</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign poster, letter</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public speeches, canvas</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction
The year 2005 which was scheduled to be the official Japan-Korea year of friendship quickly stalled due to diplomatic disputes between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) only indicating its ill-preparedness. While the recent cultural and economic interactions between Korea and Japan are a milestone achievement, simultaneously both nations have failed to sufficiently cohere this with diplomatic issues that exist.

The dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima along with Korean protests against the so called "justification of Japanese colonialist rule" by Japan has been endemic since the end of the Second World War (WWII), and the failure by both governments to properly commit to the issue have only unnecessarily widened the wound that plagues the prospects of strong relations between the ROK and Japan.

This paper will discuss the factors that surround the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute but will do so without attempting to determine whom the islets belong to. Rather, it will aim at understanding the issues that surround the dispute and its effects on the ROK-Japan relations. After discussing these issues, it will also look at the nature of the ROK-Japan relations and how it was influenced by the dispute as well as looking at the possible prospects for the relations.

2. Dokdo/Takeshima, where and what is it?
The Dokdo/Takeshima Islands is consists of two main islands totaling to 34 islets. It is located roughly 190km from the ROK mainland and 250km from Honshu, Japan. Its geographical location is 131°52'0 to the East and 37°14'00" to the North. ROK's claims over the islets date back as far as 6th century while the Japanese claims are around the mid 17th century. What must be acknowledged is that history does not necessarily reflect the present state of affairs. Overtime, political events could change a particular situation of certain areas. For example, in 1951 the ROK demanded Tsushima to be returned to Korean sovereignty under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, however it was turned down by the U.S. as “it is already ruled by Japan for long time” however for the Koreans the islands not only have sentimental values because of their long history but also because it is known as the first land that was invaded by the Imperial Japanese forces.

3. ROK vs Japan, the disparities in views of Dokdo/Takeshima
3.1 Commercial and economic interests
The economic and commercial interests of the ROK and Japan are fairly common. This is mainly to expand its fishing rights, access to potential liquid-gas and to broaden the state’s marine territory. In addition, there are the prospects for untapped oil fields, which have bolstered Seoul and Tokyo’s economic interests over the islands. The Koreans have already fished in the area since their seizure of 1952 despite the occasional protests by the Japanese government.

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95 For historical background read: Korea http://www.dokdo.go.kr Japan http://pref.shimane.jp/section/takeshima/top.html
Other than fishing and mining interests, the ROK seem to have other interests on the islets. Following the 57th anniversary of the liberalization from Japanese rule, the ROK Ministry of Environment announced in mid-April 2002 that it is looking into designating the islets as a national park.\footnote{Andrew Ward, “South Korea reignites islet dispute; [London Edition]”, Financial Times, London: 16\textsuperscript{th} Aug 2002. pg. 8.} Commercial interests on the islets have also been pursued. For example, SK Telecom and KTF have revealed their investigative plans into constructing mobile phone facilities on the islands following Seoul’s move to easing public access to the islets.\footnote{SK Telecom and KTF to build facilities on Dokdo Islets”, Telecomworldwire, Coventry: 17th March 2005. pg.1} There is also potential for the tourism industry. Additionally, in light of recent public attention on the dispute, there also has been emergence of special tours to the islands. For instance, in middle of March in 2005, the ROK Cultural Heritage Administration increased the quota on the number of per-day-visits and relaxed its restricted access to the islets.\footnote{Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan-South Korea ties on the rocks”, Asia Times, 23\textsuperscript{rd} March 2005. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GC23Dh03.html Accessed: 16\textsuperscript{th} Apr 2005.}

For Japan, fishing interests in the area surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima are pressed forward by Shimane Prefecture, which for them is a cocktail of strong economic and fisheries issue with territorial and national sentiments.\footnote{Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan-South Korea ties on the rocks”, Asia Times, 23\textsuperscript{rd} March 2005. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GC23Dh03.html Accessed: 16\textsuperscript{th} Apr 2005.} This push by the fishing lobby has become stronger following the rapid decline in catches in Shimane Prefecture’s waters in recent years.\footnote{Statistics by Mainichi Shinbun in: Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan-South Korea ties on the rocks”, Asia Times, 23\textsuperscript{rd} March 2005. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/GC23Dh03.html Accessed: 16\textsuperscript{th} Apr 2005.} In addition, Tokyo’s economic interests are not in the islets itself but waters that surround it. Along with the Okinotori Island, Senkaku Island and the southern Kurile islands, Dokdo/Takeshima works as a baseline for Japan’s territorial boundaries. Hence it would allow expansion of its fishing and energy industry which is essential to Japan’s self-sufficiency of raw material which remains relatively low.

3.2 Geo-strategic and geo-political factors

In security and strategic aspects, Japan’s direct objective is to strengthen its maritime strategy objectives. Moves for expansion of its maritime geo-political map were decided under the 1996 plans by the Japanese government to expand its sea territory in accordance with the 1982 convention by the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, which sets sea boundaries at 200 nautical miles.

However, perhaps the most important factor lies in the effect the islets have on the security of Japan’s other disputed islands. Tokyo fears that softening its claims of Dokdo/Takeshima would make it more vulnerable to diplomatic pressure, and hence lose its grip on these islands. Japan is currently involved in four main territorial disputes: Dokdo/Takeshima and also Tsushima with the ROK; Okinawa and Senkaku islands with the PRC; the southern Kurile islands with the Russian Federation; and also Okinotori Island near the Mariana islands. Thus, the main political and strategic importance for the Dokdo/Takeshima islands is its importance to work as a strategic padlock, to bolster its claims and to send a message that it will not be despoited (I like that word, it means the same thing, and it means you don’t have to end a sentence in a preposition).

The ROK’s geo-political interests are somewhat similar, however territorial sovereignty based on historic rule over the islets tend to be the gravitational factor. Furthermore, protected by the Rhee Syngman Line, its assumption of the islets indicates that, regardless of Japanese protests, it already exercises ROK authority, and has done so since 1952. This has been clearly demonstrated by the ROK, with its stationing of coast guards and construction of a light house on one of the islands.

The other geo-political aim of the ROK could also be to bolster its demand to rename the Sea of Japan to the East Sea. Broadening its sea territory could be utilized to claim that they have a fair share of the sea, and thus may argue that it is inappropriate for the sea to be named after Japan.
3.3 Disparities in legal justification

Often there is the talk of solving the dispute through international law, for example through the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Solution to territorial disputes requires "international mediation."\(^{103}\) The problem with this however, is that it lacks understanding of the dynamics of the international legal system. Although there is the existence of treaties and agreements that are set between nations, one must remember that there are no authorities that can enforce solutions to territorial disputes. One may argue for the presence of the United Nations (UN), but even the ICJ only gives counsel advice on the matter, not a judicial ruling. Hence it may give a recommendation to the dispute, but it does not indicate that it will give a clear cut solution on the matter.

Another method of international mediation is by tallying the number of countries that officially recognise the islands as either Korean or Japanese. However, given the importance of both the ROK and Japan in the international community, the majority of the major powers are likely to take a neutral stance to the matter as they value the respective relations.

According to Takahashi, the discrepancies in the historical and legal justifications are based on three points: who discovered it first; validation of Japan's terra nullius claim; and ambiguity in the interpretation of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers Douglas McArthur's Instruction Note No 677(SCAPIN677).\(^{104}\) Although both Seoul and Tokyo rely the SCAPIN-677 to justify their legal cases, the document is problematic in itself. It seldom clarifies the fate of Dokdo/Takeshima and leaves the issue with a question mark.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that in 1954 it appealed for submission of the case to the ICJ however was rejected by Seoul.\(^{105}\) There has been much talk within Japan that Tokyo should push for settlement of the dispute in the ICJ. However at the same time it may be reserved to actually do so as it fears the influence of China or Russia who are not only major actors in the international community but are also contenders for Japanese territories themselves.

The ROK on the other hand has given a mixed signal. For much of the period since 1954, the Korean government has refused international legal settlement. In March 2003, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has argued that the Korean government is not obliged or required to respond to responding to Japan's demand to take the matter to the ICJ. However, recently a Korean government insider was quoted as saying that Seoul has the "intentions on spreading to the international community [that Dokdo/Takeshima] as an area of dispute, and to take it to the ICJ."\(^{106}\)

One may ask why the dispute wasn't addressed in the normalisation treaty between Seoul and Tokyo in 1965. However, for one reason or another it was sidestepped. Ambiguous agreements were again reached in 1999 with agreements on exclusive economic zones, although Japanese fishing vessels have not been allowed access.\(^{107}\) Thus, it can be argued that the responsibility for the failure to clarify authority over the islands lies in the failure of both governments to try and deal with the issue.

4. Effects of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute on the North-East Asian region

4.1 Democratic People's Republic of Korea

\(^{103}\) Cited in: Unknown author, "Asia: Rocky relations; South Korea and Japan", The Economist, London 26th March 2005. pg.74.


Interestingly, but expectedly, the DPRK have supported the ROK's claims over Dokdo/Takeshima not only through diplomatic messages and joint appeals but also by attempting to export postage stamps that illustrated a picture of the islets. Based on "Korean" interest, it is logical for the DPRK to bid the islands under Korean rule. However it is also interesting that they have not attempted to claim the islands themselves.

One aspect that can be drawn from this is that it is in Pyongyang's interests for friction to exist between Japan and Republic of Korea as it would evade synchronized pressure against the DPRK. Especially in a time when Japan is taking perhaps the most aggressive stance towards Pyongyang, it is beneficial for the DPRK to ensure divergence in the policies of Seoul, Tokyo and Washington to break the coherence that may prove unbenevolent to them in the six-party talks as well as distracts attention away from its nuclear ambitions and its human rights violations.

4.2 People's Republic of China
The government of People's Republic of China has also supported Seoul's claims over the islands. With the exception of historical disputes, the PRC for the moment have no territorial conflict with the ROK, whereas it has major territorial disputes with Japan over Senkaku Islands and also Okinawa. Thus, along with debates over "justification of the imperial past", the PRC views that it has common interests with Seoul and could therefore make combined efforts to push against Tokyo. China perhaps also views this as a window of opportunity for their territorial disputes against Japan. Firstly, should Japan weaken its policy towards Seoul in regards to Dokdo/Takeshima, such vulnerabilities in Japanese foreign diplomacy may give Beijing the green light to take further aggressive policies against Tokyo to push for the Senkaku Islands and parts of Okinawa.

Secondly, the PRC who faced several diplomatic frictions both with Japan and the ROK in 2004 would find the rift in relations between Seoul and Tokyo timely as it would distract attention away from its problems.

Finally, for the Chinese, strong relations between the ROK and Japan would pose as a challenge to their push for unilateral power in Asia. Therefore a rift in the relations between Seoul and Tokyo would prove to be advantageous as it would isolate Japan, thereby evading any significant threats to China.

4.3 Triangle relationship - importance of the U.S.
The U.S. played a central role in the establishment of the peace treaty with post-imperial Japan, and the formulation of the SCAPIN, which determined the territories that Japan was to return to Korea. However, Washington has avoided any involvement or intervention in the disputes surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima as the ROK and Japan are two of the U.S.'s closest allies in the region. There has however been a tug-of-war between the ROK and Japan in an attempt to win the support of the U.S. for their bid over Dokdo/Takeshima. ROK's foreign minister Ban Ki-Moon recently visited Washington to try and convince Condoleezza Rice, however the issue was sidestepped. However, there are also arguments that the ROK is using the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute to send a signal to Washington that its Korea-centered policies will not be manipulated.

4.4 Impact on Russia
Despite the declining influence of Russia in North-East Asian affairs in the post-Cold War era, it is naive to claim that the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is irrelevant to Moscow. Russia is likely to be keeping a close eye in the way in which the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute as Moscow too has territorial disputes with Tokyo. The southern Kurile Islands which are rich in Japanese national sovereignty is

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109 Chinese claimed Goguryeo as part of their historical legacy, campaigning to be recognised in United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.
aggressively sought after by Tokyo.\textsuperscript{112} Thus Seoul’s strong defense of the islets may hint to Russia the steps that it could emulate these moves to further bolster its grip of the islands. Additionally, Moscow may also be concerned for the dispute between Seoul and Tokyo to have a spill over effect on regional security and diplomatic dialogues such as the six-party talks.

5. Domestic politics and impact on the social level
The impact the dispute had on the social level is quite significant, and there have been distinctive disparities in the reactions by the Koreans and the Japanese. As Shigemura argues, Korea’s volume of nationalism over Dokdo/Takeshima easily outweighs that of Japan.\textsuperscript{113} The burst of widespread anger in Korea fuelled by Japan’s claims comes as it is seen as an intrusion of Korean sovereignty on the islands. This is understandable given the Korean historical background on the islets, to dates back almost a millennium earlier than the Japanese claims. The problem with the near-eccentric reactions however, is that it has given the Japanese with the image of unreliability in the claims by the ROK.

On the other hand, in Japan, nationalistic anger for the islets in Japan is generally within the Shimane Prefecture, fishing lobby and the political right.\textsuperscript{114} Rather, on a wide scale, Japan’s public attention is turned to North Korea’s abduction of Japanese nationals and China’s anti-Japanese riots involving sabotage.

Aggressive government action as a means of distracting domestic instability is frequently used by most states. Likewise the Korean government’s “Dae-II-Shin Doctrine”\textsuperscript{115} that centers on anti-Japanese policies was widely accepted. As Kim Byung-Ki, Professor of international relations argued, “Dokdo is like manna from heaven... past couple of years have been difficult because the economy is not doing so well, the US-South Korean alliance is not on level footing and by-elections are approaching.”\textsuperscript{116} There was also a similar scenario in 2002, when there were presidential elections that were to be held in December of that year. This time, when the by-elections for national legislators closed at end of April, utilising the nationalist credentials were important.\textsuperscript{117}

However, there are concerns about the rise of protests through eccentric behavior in both the ROK and Japan. Although the souring of relations has provoked harsh voices of discontent in both the ROK and Japan, its nature has been quite distinctive. In the case of the ROK, it seems to be more widespread across society, whilst in Japan it has allowed factions of the extreme right to be more vocal in the public arena. One of the major problems with public resentment based on political disputes that is extremely difficult to overcome and is a long term commitment. Thus it consequently has great influence on the political level which is likely to delay timely engagement on negotiations.

The way in which the dispute has been portrayed in the media has also been different. Yoon Young-Chul and E Gwang-Ho argued, “International conflict between the two nations is managed by the news media which aligns with the foreign policy objectives of the respective home governments.”\textsuperscript{118} Although such arguments are true to a certain extent, it is more applicable in the case of Korea, as the alignment of the media’s attention on Dokdo/Takeshima has been nationwide and flowed to each level. Actions by the Korean media have been almost overwhelming as it spanned to all levels of the media, especially on the internet. For example, everyday websites like emails, blogs, and search engines often

\textsuperscript{112} For further reading see: “Warera no Hoppou Ryodo”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001. and “Japan’s northern territories”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996.

\textsuperscript{113} Toshimitsu Shigemura, “Kankoku hodo taisetsu na kuni wa nai”, Tohyoh Keizai, 1998. Pg.188.

\textsuperscript{114} Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan-South Korea ties on the rocks”, Asia Times, 23\textsuperscript{rd} March 2005.


\textsuperscript{116} Anna Fifield and David Pilling, “Islands dispute with Japan infuriates Seoul: Years of rapprochement efforts threaten to be undone by a Japanese prefecture’s territorial claim”, Financial Times, London (UK), 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2005, pg.8.


displayed pictures of Dokdo/Takeshima and campaigned for its Korean sovereignty; a method which was of no avail in Japanese websites. Furthermore, the Korean government ordered the closure of five pro-Japanese websites, saying they are harmful to youngsters' health.\textsuperscript{119} While in Japan, media attention tended to focus on Korea's reaction rather than arguing for Japan's right of sovereignty over the islands.

At the government level, both the ROK and Japan are suffering from internal domestic tensions. The breaking of cohesion in domestic politics would only add to the complexities and may further retard progress in regaining mutual trust in the ROK-Japan relations.

In the ROK, the government faced criticism that the National Security Council (NSC) had almost hijacked Seoul's foreign policy making, especially when President Roh declared the "diplomatic war" on Japan.\textsuperscript{120} Thus there exists a certain level of friction between the Korea-centered NSC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade which focuses on maintaining the ROK-U.S.-Japan relations.\textsuperscript{121}

In Japan, there are frictions between Tokyo and Shimane Prefecture. Takahashi argues that this is the result of the Shimane Prefectural assembly's discontent at Tokyo's failure to take strong action against Seoul in the past, thus resulting in their independent move to establish their day commemorating the islets.\textsuperscript{122} Concerned by their move, Tokyo claims that it has not endorsed and cannot intervene in the act by the prefecture.\textsuperscript{123} However, for the prefecture it was aimed to back Japan's claims over the islets.\textsuperscript{124}  

Friction in the domestic arena is also seen between moderates and the conservatives who often clash in their opinions over their perspectives of the past. Although there are claims by China and both Koreas that the Japanese society is moving to the political right, such argument is simplistic as it overlooks this divide.

6. Security implications and possibility of armed conflict

In light of the sentimental uproar amongst the public many have talked about the prospect of war between the ROK and Japan. Although the likelihood of war is hypothetical, the threat of armed conflict should not be overlooked. Armed conflicts instigated from territorial disputes are not rare, such examples can be seen on the Falkland Islands dispute between England and Argentina which resulted in war in 1982. Minor armed exchanges could occur if the stand-off between Japan and ROK escalates. However, full scale conflict based on the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is unlikely as cost-benefit rationality between the two nations is likely to be extremely unfavorable on both sides. Additionally, given the presence of the DPRK to the north, the ROK would find itself gridlocked; needing to focus two fronts simultaneously.

Although it was generated merely from anti-Japanese excitement, the ROK government had labeled the Japanese claims on Dokdo/Takeshima as an act "Tantamount to invasion."\textsuperscript{125} This was followed by various Korean newspapers that labeled Japan's claims a hostile act bordering on a declaration of

\textsuperscript{119} Anna Fifield and David Pilling, "Islands dispute with Japan infuriates Seoul: Years of rapprochement efforts threaten to be undone by a Japanese prefecture's territorial claim", \textit{Financial Times}, London (UK), 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2005, pg.8.


\textsuperscript{123} Anna Fifield and David Pilling, "Islands dispute with Japan infuriates Seoul: Years of rapprochement efforts threaten to be undone by a Japanese prefecture's territorial claim", \textit{Financial Times}, London (UK), 19\textsuperscript{th} March 2005, pg.8.


\textsuperscript{125} Cited in: Unknown author, "Asia: Rocky relations; South Korea and Japan", \textit{The Economist}, London 26\textsuperscript{th} March 2005. pg.74.
war. Although the comments are seemingly eccentric in nature, Japan as a military threat to Korean security does seem to be fairly accountable. Talks for escalation of the dispute to armed conflict were seen in the ROK. In early April 2005, Lee Tae-Shik, vice-minister of the Korean foreign ministry stated that, "If the situation escalates, and there are frictions and undesired affairs, it could trigger an armed conflict." However at the same time he argued that "There are possibilities for Korea to be obligated to abide by the resolutions of international organizations or the ICJ if disputes escalate." 

There have also been movements within the defense department, where in late March of 2005, the Korean deputy-minister for defense Yu Hyeong-II argued that the ROK would dispatch the new F-15K to the region to reinforce its defense of the island. However on the same day, the Defense Department has also stated that "At this stage dispatching armed forces to the island will not only escalate military tensions but will also internationally recognize regional armed conflict, thus it is concluded that it is not an appropriate course of action." Furthermore, Yu Hyeong-II stated that "[Korea] has not looked into establishing missile bases on Dokdo, but depending on the situation, it may investigate it if required and will also look into building Naval facilities." Given the location of the islands and their uninhabited nature, the islets may serve as a suitable site for installation of such infrastructure. However it would only further undermine the relations between Japan and the ROK and is likely to escalate tension between Seoul and Tokyo. Additionally, some extreme comments like the one by Yi Mul-Yol of Chosun Ilbo suggesting that Seoul should give Dokdo to Pyongyang for its use as a missile base have also emerged.

Despite Japan’s protest over (what they perceive as) the ROK’s illegal authority over the islands, neither Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) nor Coast Guard (JCG) have taken any aggressive military action in response. However this does not suggest that Japan is not looking into any pre-cautionary steps into the matter. Both the Air and Maritime Self Defense Force have flown regular reconnaissance flights near the islands but armed units such as fighter-jets or destroyers have not been dispatched. Furthermore, it could even be argued that aggressive reactions by the Japanese have not occurred due to its constitutional constraints. Nevertheless, although Japan’s defense capabilities are restricted due to constitutional constraints, it is about to enter its transition of change. Despite being ranked the third strongest military force in the world, recent threats from the DPRK, China and terrorism, has proved that there are still major problems within Japan’s self defense policies as well the process and protocols in its command and

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control. In December of 2004, the Japanese Defense Agency released a 10 year defense program that clearly designates China as a potential threat.\textsuperscript{134} Such changes in nature of Japan's security policies have certainly worried the ROK. The pro-government Uri Party has expressed its concerns about "[Japan's] arming of his country with new militarism."\textsuperscript{135} However it is dismissive to claim that should Japan constitutionally remilitarise, this would symbolise a shift to the political right or that this would lead to Japan regaining the militaristic stature of the first half of the 20th century. As Menon argues, "It is crass and simplistic to imply that a Japan that chooses to boost its military strength will soon act like an alcoholic who comes upon a bottle of whiskey."\textsuperscript{136} These frequent claims within the ROK that label a more security self-reliant Japan will be the same as the former imperial army is sheer wilful self-deception\textsuperscript{137} However, despite the JSDF and JCG's reservations in taking stern action, fearing the diplomatic consequences, on the assumption that Dokdo/Takeshima is regarded as sovereign Japanese territory, it can be argued that it is constitutionally just to take defensive measures against the ROK. Glimpse of this was seen recently when the JCG fired tear gas shells against a ROK fishing vessel that came in close proximity of Japanese sea territory.\textsuperscript{138}

7. Undermining the potential Japan-ROK relations

The relations between Japan and the ROK in recent years seemed pretty optimistic within the last half of the decade with the exchange of pop-culture in the ROK and Japan. However this has not been reflected in diplomatic dialogues, which are vital to formulating any 'real' solutions. However, one cannot also doubt that such potential for closer relations have been greatly undermined by disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima and historical issues, and it only indicated that the relations are still fragile and premature. Cultural exchanges only stimulate limited understanding of each other's culture; however it does have limited contribution in establishing stable relations between two nations. What is essential is for simultaneous progress in cultural, economic and diplomatic exchanges. There have been accountable economic relations between Japan and the ROK which sit at an estimate of $70billion, however the diplomatic relations have been far from satisfactory although it has taken some significant first steps. Although both governments have expressed strong claims over the islets, simultaneously both governments only argued for the ends but not the means. This is a double edged sword. On one side it is a potential for dialogues, however on the other it only anticipates further breakdown in relations. Thus far, sufficient diplomatic dialogues that properly address this issue have been of no avail, which has resulted in the escalation of disputes.\textsuperscript{139}

When declaring the ROK's "diplomatic war", President Roh claimed that "Now the South Korean government has no choice but to sternly deal with Japan's attempts to justify its history of aggression and colonialism and revive regional hegemony...[and is] willing to take the hardship on our shoulders if we really have to."\textsuperscript{140} In Tokyo, Prime Minister Koizumi took a more moderate stance stating, "We should take measures that are forward looking...rather than only be concerned about the past, it is important for both sides to promote friendship through a future-oriented way of thinking."\textsuperscript{141} Thus although both leaders exchanged their stance on the dispute, simultaneously they both have failed to elaborate on the exact measures it will take to deal with the diplomatic crisis.

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\textsuperscript{135} Kim So-Yeong, "Koizumi's Dokdo remarks rile Koreans", Korea Now, 24th January 2004. pg. 7.
\textsuperscript{136} Rajan Mennon, "The end of alliances", World Policy Journal, Summer 2003; 20,2; Pg.11
\textsuperscript{139} Toshimitsu Shigemura, "Kankoku hodo taisetsu na kuni wa nai", Tohyoh Keizai, 1998. Pg.188.
Japan's failure to make candid reflections on its colonial history has also complicated the situation, which makes past apologies by the Japanese government void. This was seen in President Roh's claims that Japan's actions, "damages the truth of the apologies by past Japanese leaders." Although the ROK government has claimed that this aspect will be dealt with separately, it has nonetheless naturally coupled with the dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima. Stern voices in the ROK assaulting Japan's supposed failure to appropriately address colonial historical issues in textbooks and failure to make a sincere apology for its colonial past and actions has painted Japan as a nation that glorifies its past colonialist rule. Repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Koizumi and his predecessors have certainly added to the anger felt by the ROK. Such to the extent that recently Nakagawa Hidenao, Senior Liberal Democratic Party official suggested moving war criminals remains out of Yasukuni to ease relations with China and Korea and for Koizumi to elaborate that he is private citizen when going to the shrine. As Chairman of the ROK NSC, Chung Dong-Young argued, "Series of Japanese actions make us fundamentally doubt whether Japan intends to co-exist with its neighbor." Thus, a complete breakdown in relations between Seoul and Tokyo would only further isolate Japan in the region. What is essential now is for Japan to engage more in Asia independently, as only that would allow stable relations between the two neighboring nations.

8. Potentials

The history of instinctive bitterness and the dispute over the islets, has forced the prospects of relations between the ROK and Japan to be bogged down in the pessimistic paradigm, and the optimistic prospects for the relations are seldom addressed. Of course, in order for any stable positive relations to be in place, both camps must deal with the domestic problems that plague any bilateral prospects. The ROK needs to overcome the utilisation of anti-Japanese sentiments as a diplomatic and political tool, and in Japan independent but candid assessments of its history should be indoctrinated both at government and social level.

Firstly, both governments' evasion of elaborating on the actions it will undertake is an opportunity in itself as it keeps the options open-ended. Both governments still recognise and elaborate on the importance of the ROK-Japan relations. This was clearly stated in the March 17th doctrine by the ROK NSC, and by Prime Minister Koizumi. Similar actions were taken in March 1996 between Kim Yeong-Sam and Ryutaro Hashimoto. Here both exchanged views that for Japan, the islets are "indigenous territory of Japan" and for Korea it is "territory ruled by Korea". Thus there does seem to be some kind of ad hoc recognition between the ROK and Japan, however it is insufficient to make any groundwork for any stable relations.

Secondly, it can also be argued that continuation of disputes, if controlled, is a solution itself and it is the most realistic solution in the short-term. Hence, if an ad hoc agreement can be established and a deadlock is maintained, it enables the creation of some level of status quo. Nevertheless it is crucial for some kind of workable agreement to be achieved in order to pave way for strong relations in the future. ROK-Japan relations are essential to regional security, and given the interests of both nations there is potential for great benefits on economic, social, political and security levels. Additionally domestic policies that assist in these diplomatic dialogues are also essential.

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145 Anna Fifield and David Pilling, "Islands dispute with Japan infuriates Seoul: Years of rapprochement efforts threaten to be undone by a Japanese prefecture's territorial claim", Financial Times, London (UK), 19th March 2005, pg.8.

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The economic prospects are highly valued, not to mention the trade ties that are already worth $70 billion, the significance of the ROK and Japan economic ties are mainly three-fold. Firstly, there is the Free Trade Agreements (FTA) between Seoul and Tokyo. Although there are still domestic challenges that need to be tackled before signing, nevertheless the value of the ROK-Japan FTA will secure and enrich the economic ties between the two neighboring nations. Secondly, one must also acknowledge the significance of the two nations in the world economy. Both the ROK and Japan are the first of Asian states to enter the OECD, and they have taken joint steps in strengthening their contribution to the IMF despite the souring of political ties. 148 Thirdly, exchanges of each others’ culture especially in pop-media as well as increase in tourist visits have significantly stimulated each other’s relationships not only socially but also economically.

Finally, as Foster-Carter argued there are no two powers that are so alike. 149 He takes the optimistic argument that the ROK and Japan could walk the path that France and Germany took since WWII which later played key roles in the development of the EU. 150

Thus on the strategic level, although it remains as a utopian idea at this stage, there is potential for an alliance or ad hoc alliance between ROK and Japan. Although the U.S.-Japan security alliance seems fairly concrete, glimpse of possible decay in Japan’s confidence in the U.S. and the voices rallying for greater engagement with Asia than U.S. may anticipate an emergence of a more independent Japan. Should Japan take more independent steps away from Washington, it is likely turn to its relations with the ROK and it could take the initiative to deepen its ties with Seoul on security and strategic levels in fear of China and the DPRK. If achieved, such ties between Seoul and Tokyo would be a powerful driving force that could significantly contribute to regional stability.

9. Concluding remarks

This far the study has broadly outlined the recent Dokdo/Takeshima dispute examining its diplomatic and security implications. Firstly, the study has revealed that there are mismatches not only in the interpretations of international law that concern the sovereignty of the islets but also in the diplomatic dialogues that appropriately address the issue. Failures by both governments to cooperatively attempt to negotiate the dispute have been plagued by strong anti-Japanese sentiments in the Korean camp and also by the Japanese who attempt to sidestep the issue. Secondly, there are significant contrasts in the way in which the dispute of sovereignty over the islets is portrayed in public in the respective nations. While in ROK there is the near-absolute nationalistic support for Korean sovereignty, the Japanese public seems to be more bewildered by the active Korean demonstrations. The talk of armed conflict at this stage is limited and both governments have seldom talked of its possibilities as they fear a complete stall in relations. However, given the nature of the region’s security and strategic dynamics coupled with the military structure of both states, irrational escalation in disputes could result in military conflict.

In regards to the state of relations between the ROK and Japan, despite the disputes over the sovereignty over the islets and Japanese textbooks it seems that both governments still have not forfeited their willingness to adhere to the relations. Fortunately, while this adherence remains, the optimistic potential for further strengthening of ties and prospects for strong relations of reliance and perhaps even alliance stay alive. However this is only achievable if the two governments appropriately commit to addressing the disputed issues both through diplomatic channels and also within its domestic system. Only then can they benefit from a real time of friendship in economical, social and political levels which would significantly contribute to regional security and stability.

Imagined Antiquities and Forecast Futures: Taoist and Confucian Prognostication in Korean New Religious Movements

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The majority of nativist Korean new religious movements have adopted elements from Confucianism and Taoism into their doctrines and practices. The Confucian themes were incorporated because Neo-Confucianism was the dominant ideology in Chosŏn, and retained influence even into the period of the Japanese occupation, while Taoism circulated as an alternative or oppositional knowledge system. Yet the boundaries of Taoism in Korea especially were unclear, and overlapped with 'shamanism,' itself a rather contested concept, and esoteric Buddhism, so much so that from the late nineteenth century Korean scholars wrote of the existence of Sin'gyo (teaching of the gods) rather than of Taoism. This they asserted had predated Chinese Taoism, and to 'prove' it, they forged scriptures and histories for Sin'gyo and the primeval 'nation,' which were supposedly of great antiquity. These forgeries often drew upon Confucian and Taoist cosmologies, theories of the origins of civilisation, and analyses of cycles in nature that date as early as the Han Dynasty. In order to link them to the present, and more presciently (though usually this disguises a post-facto forgery), to the future of the nation or world, these texts made obscure prognostications. Some of these prognostication techniques dated back to early China, possibly to the usurpation of power by Wang Mang (r. 9-23 A.D.) and were transmitted to Korea and used through the ages.

Because Sin'gyo is allegedly ancient and of Korean origin, this paper will concentrate on the theme of Sin'gyo, and to illustrate the antiquity and Chinese origin of one of the prognostication techniques, which is dependent on the existence of Chinese characters, it will examine p'aja or glyphomancy and the related field of seals and talismans.

Sin'gyo, shamanism and Taoism

The earliest mention of Sin'gyo in the sense of an ancient Korean religion probably appears first in the Mudang naeryŏk (History of the Shaman), usually dated 1885. This claims that Sin'gyo began with Tan'gun, but that current mudang have distorted the original teaching. Elements of this text suggest that the author was a member of the elite who subscribed to a precursor of Taejonggyo (founded 1909) or Tan'gun'gyo, which was allegedly founded by Ch'ong Hurnmo (1888-1939) after the tragic death of Kim Yŏnbaek in 1896 during the aftermath of the Tonghak Rebellion. Kim entered Mt Myohjang and practised a thousand days of continuous prayer in order to be possessed by Tan'gun. Other intellectuals, such as Sin Ch'aeho in 1910, called this 'religion' Son'gyo, the teaching of the immortals, probably based on the testimony of Ch'ŏe Ch'iwŏn (858-ca. 910). Although Son'gyo initially conjures up Immortals Taoism, it was not meant in that sense. Yi Nŭngwha (1868-1945), arguably the greatest twentieth-century scholar of Korean religion, adopted this theory of a primeval, substrate native Korean religion, but thought that Sin'gyo had been influenced by

152 Yi Kang'o, Han'guk Sinhŭng Chonggyo Ch'ŏngnam (Seoul: Tachŏng Kihoek, 1992), 315; Murayama Chijun, Chŏsen no Ruji Shūkyō (Keijō: Chōsen Sotokufu, 1935), 446. Sŏ Yongdae, ‘‘Kim Sŏnseang Yŏmbaek ki’ e taehayŏ,” Tan'gunhak Yŏn'gu 9 (2003): 225-227, based on a book dated 1924, says Kim began this practice in 1852 and prayed for three years, but it was only in 1864 that he received the direct revelation. He died in fighting in P'yŏngyang in 1896.
Sino-Taoism. However, in 1912, he did distinguish an ancient religion he called the teaching of demons, spirits and the techniques of numerical phases (kwisín sulsu) that existed in ancient China from Taoism. The former uses the five elements (ohaeng) and the techniques of the mu ('shaman'), astronomers (sa) and diviners. It was this complex of beliefs that had been formalised into a system during the Han Dynasty, and much of this underlies what has been called Sin'gyo. Later, however, possibly under Taejonggyo influence, in his history of Korean Taoism, Yi begins with Tan’gun, but cautions that this was a myth, just like those of Shennong and the Yellow Emperor in China. Yi states that in ancient times, ‘Taoists’ have tried to demonstrate that the Yellow Emperor and other mythical immortals came to, or from, Korea, and observes, “when we look at the ancient histories, in high antiquity, gods (sin) and immortals (sõn) were not greatly differentiated.”

The danger in such an identification is that it assumes that shamanism or Korean folk beliefs have ancient roots traceable back to the earliest times, and that they have not undergone profound transformation or changes in significance. It further assumes that the belief system is native to Korea. Even Tan’gun, from analysis of the earliest record, the Samguk yusa by the monk Iryǒn, was likely an invention by the esoteric Buddhist monk, Myoč’ǒng before his rebellion (1135-1136), out of esoteric Buddhist elements in the Sin’jing (Sect of the Divine Seal). These in turn were influenced by Buddha-Taoist astral worship, seals or mudras, protector deities and altar rituals, most of which were imported from China and indirectly from India.

Shamanism is problematic in that in its ritual and other aspects, such as the names of gods, costumes and the like, it has been overlain or even displaced by elements of esoteric Buddhism, popular Taoism and folk Chinese religion. This was because divinatory practices, healing techniques and even methods of spirit-possession were “readily transportable arts and artifacts” that could spread “from one culture to another without the mediation of a major religion.” As Michel Strickmann concluded, “the notion of ‘shamanism’ (in any case a much overworked term) no longer seems to be of much relevance in East Asian studies.” Some claim that Chinese religion was ‘shamanism’ in ancient times or that even the supposedly original shamanism of Siberia was “profoundly influenced by Tibeto-Mongol Tantric Buddhism; in its present form, shamanism is the result of Buddhist penetration into northern Asia.” Finally, Strickmann asserts “that it would be hard to find any corner of East or Southeast Asia that has not been transformed by the power of either Indian or Chinese ritual.” Strickmann even opines that the “practice of voluntary possession began with tantric Buddhism,” and that archaic practices were not

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157 Yi Nŏnghwa, *Chosŏn To’gyosa*, original text plus translations by Yi Chong’ün (Seoul: Posŏn munhwasa, 1996), 355. I have cited only the original text, which was first published posthumously in 1959.

158 Ibid., 358.


160 John Jorgensen, “Who was the Author of the Tan’gun Myth?” in *Perspectives in Korea*, ed. Sang-Oak Lee and Duk-Soo Park (Sydney: Wild Peony, 1998), 222-255. Note that Sin Ch’ae’ho, writing in 1918, wrote that Myoč’ǒng was a ‘Taoist’ patriot who countered pro-Chinese elements, and that this was the greatest incident of all such patriotic sentiment in one thousand years. Cited by Chŏng Yŏng-hun, op. cit., 14 note 31. This work was published in 1925, for which see Han Yong’u, op. cit., 81 note 87.

left unchanged through the centuries, and that what exists now is merely a secondary, if not pseudo, shamanism. This assertion may reflect the ideas of Clifford Geertz and R. F. Spencer, who regarded shamanism now as "desiccated," something to be dumped in the "ethnographic dustbin." Waravren even thinks that the shaman does not know ecstasy, contrary to Eliade. While Strickmann’s methodology and terminology leaves much to be desired, his challenge needs to be addressed in relation to Korean shamanism and new religious movements.

Compounding the problem for any search for a primeval or native Korean religion such as Sin’gyo is the issue of the relationships of Taoism, shamanism and Buddhism at the popular level in particular. Taoism's main rival in China at least was 'shamanism.' Taoism tried "to supplant the local cults with which China teemed: to replace 'shamanism,' 'spirit possession' and 'ecstatic religion'." Buddhism also attempted to eliminate or co-opt local cults and 'shamanism.'

In Korea, on the other hand, institutional Taoism was extremely weak, and its rituals were maintained only as a supplemental insurance by the courts. Taoism was strongest in late Koguryo and had some influence in the Koryo court, but by the Choson its existence at court was barely tolerated. The hostility of the Neo-Confucians pushed much of Taoist belief into the underground and alternative histories (chaeya sahwa), so much so that much of the current analysis of early Taoism in Korea has been hopelessly compromised by Taejonggyo interpretations.

The successive Korean courts conducted the Taoist rituals of ch’o and chae or offerings and fasts, primarily for the protection of the state and the rulers who erected Taoist kwan or temples in the capital, but only there. This state-Taoism was ended by the destruction of Seoul in Hideyoshi’s invasions (1592-1598). Hence, Taoism in its ritual, philosophical, meditative and alchemical aspects appears to have not infiltrated popular belief, except via esoteric Buddhism and in literature via the image of the immortals. Nor should it be confused with 'shamanism' and folk belief.

However, many Korean scholars of Taoism persist in equating or identifying Tan’gun and ‘native’ folk beliefs with Korean Taoism, which they insist is different from Chinese Taoism. Although Yi Nonghwa was the earliest student of the topic, he surprisingly adopted the most cautious and ambiguous position. He stated,

Tan’gun was the very first ruler/lord (kun) of the East, and those who instituted altars to make offerings to Heaven, were therefore called Tan’gun (lords of the altar). And that character kun resembles those of Tonggun (Lord of the East), Che’gun (Imperial Lord)...etcetera, all titles of immortals (sön’ga). It is also similar to Unjunggun (Lord in the Clouds), Xiangjun (Lord of the Xiang) etcetera, all names of divine lords (sin’gun). Therefore Tan’gun was called...

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164 See review by Henrik Sørensen, “Michel Strickmann on Magical Medicine in Medieval China and Elsewhere,” History of Religions (Chicago) 2004: 319-332, esp. 323, 327.
165 Strickmann, Magical Medicine, 2-3; Robinet, op. cit., 4-5, on the difficulty of defining the contours of Taoism, but on the clear distinction Taoists made between their religion and popular religion or local cults.
167 These are described in the Chinese context in Robinet, 168ff.
168 For materials, see Yi Nonghwa, To’gyosa, 389-397 for Koryo; Ch’a Chuhwan, Han’guk To’gyo sasang Yon’gu (Seoul: Han’guk Munhwa Yon’gu, 1978), 4 passim; To Kwangsun, “Kankoku no Dokyo,” in Dokyo, ed. Fukui Kijun, Yamazaki Hiroshi, Kimura Eichi and Sakai Tadao (Tokyo: Hirakawa, 1983), 3 vols, 3: 80-86.
an immortal or a god (*sin*). These apply to ancient events. But when one wishes to search deeply, there is no way to do so, and so one can only allow for their longevity.\(^\text{169}\)

However, he later observes that, "if one examines the state-foundation myths of all the world's ancient countries, they all resemble each other, in that none do not begin with Heaven," and he asserts in a note that Sinsi of the Tan’gun myth was a *mudang.\(^\text{170}\)" rather betraying his critical position. Ch’a Chuhwan claims that the first distinctive feature of Taoism in Korea is that the Tan’gun myth “from its origins developed into a theory of immortals,” assuming that the Tan’gun myth was ancient and pre-Taoist, citing the *Ch’önghakkip* in support for a lineage of Korean-style Taoists back to Tan’gun or Hwan’in. Ch’a even quotes the *Kyuwôn sahwa* for a connection of Tan’gun et al with Mt Taebaek or Mt Samsin.\(^\text{171}\)

To Kwangsun takes this even further, while frankly admitting that there are two schools of thought about Taoism in Korea: one that all Taoism came from China or that in Korea it was not a complete form; the other that it originated in an originally Korean belief in gods and immortals. To Kwangsun candidly states that he has adopted the latter subjective position.\(^\text{172}\) This view considers that Taoism was exported from Korea to China, and that the beliefs were connected with Heaven or Han'ilim, mountain-god belief and shamanism, centred originally on Mt Paekdu. Ch’a asserts that the Hwan’in of the Tan’gun myth was later made into the Jade Emperor (Okhwang Sangje) of Taoism. Yet most of the sources quoted are works like the *Ch’önghakkip* and *Kyuwôn sahwa*, or Taejönggyo scriptures,\(^\text{173}\) all of which were written or forged after 1910, the *Kyuwôn sahwa* and *Ch’önghakkip* probably in the 1920s,\(^\text{174}\) although there is a remote possibility they were based on earlier materials.\(^\text{175}\)

Similarly, many writers on Korean ‘shamanism’ source it in Tan’gun, or at least place the Tan’gun myth at the commencement of their studies, implying thereby that there was a connection and that *Sin’gyo* was primeval and native and was initiated by Tan’gun.\(^\text{176}\) Yet the linkage of Tan’gun and shamanism can only be dated back to the 1885 *Mudang naeryŏk*, something that was repeated incessantly thereafter.\(^\text{177}\) This was despite Confucians having earlier questioned even that Tan’gun was a god.\(^\text{178}\)

\(^{169}\) Yi Nûnghwa. *To’gyosa*, 355.

\(^{170}\) Ibid., 358, 360.

\(^{171}\) Ch’a Chuhwan, 3, 32-35, 90-93.

\(^{172}\) To Kwangsun, op. cit., 51-52.

\(^{173}\) To Kwangsun, 54-60. For example, To repeatedly cites An Hosang, a modern Taejönggyo leader, at notes 5, 7, ideas in 8, 12 and 15 from Sin Ch’ae’ho’s *Chosôn Sanggosa*, which was still under Taejönggyo influence, for which see Han Yong’u, 164-176.


\(^{175}\) Ch’ŏng Yonghun, *op. cit.* 43, maintains that despite the doubts about, and accusations of forgery by Taejönggyo lineage members of these texts, that it is unreasonable to state that they all were written suddenly by Tan’gun activists in the modern period, for there was a tradition of Hwan’in, Hwan’ung and Tan’gun being considered part of a distinctive cultural tradition of the Tong’i (Eastern Yi), that opposed dependency on Chinese culture. These people were called “Taoists” (*son’ga* or *to’ga*). These texts only became popular in this early Japanese imperialist period. On the contrary, I think these texts were produced rapidly over a short period in response to the stimuli of the threat to ‘national’ identity and via Japanese forgeries. This is a topic for a later paper.

\(^{176}\) For example, even the sober scholar, Yu Tong sik, *Chosôn no shamanizumu* (Tokyo: Gakuseisha, 1976), 21-27, esp. 23, wrote: “The ancestral form that this myth took originated structurally in ancient Chosôn,” relying uncritically on Eliade’s notion that “the memory of the people retains the ur-structure.” See also James Huntley Grayson, *Korea: A Religious History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 283: “This would appear to be a shamanistic element,” and 23, “The primal religion of Korea...reflects...its descent from ancient Siberian shamanism.”

\(^{177}\) Walraven, “Interpretations,” 61.

Furthermore, these writers regularly identify Tan'gun or Heaven with Hananim or Han'ullim, via Altaic tengri and the Lord of Heaven (Ch. tianzhu), or via Hwan'ing or Hwan'ung to Hwanoul or Hanullim. But much of this speculation or folk etymology may be instead derived from a Christian theory that rewrote God as Hananim, and projected that belief and name back onto earlier beliefs in Heaven. Even among the Choson elite, intellectuals like Ch'ong Yag'yong (1762-1836) maintained that Sangje, the 'God' of the Confucian classics, was sometimes called 'Heaven.' Ch'ong unusually thought Sangje to be anthropomorphic, unlike the Zhu Xi or Yi T'oegye line, which made Sangje hypothetical, another name for ri or principle. But even here Ch'ong was probably under the influence of the Jesuit missionary to China, Matteo Ricci. Yet for Ch'ong, Sangje was not a creator, just a moral force. While the word hantul for Heaven is attested in 1103-1104 in the Kyereum yusa and the Yongbi Och'On'ga of 1447, the honorific nim was not yet attached. This linkage is first found in a poem by Yi Inno (1561-1642): "The circulation of the Heavenly fortunes. Oh! Hantulnim." But such tantalizing hints do not prove a belief in a native god called Han'il or Heaven in ancient or pre-modern times, despite some occasional resemblances of pronunciation. After all, the written records have all been contaminated with Confucian, Buddhist and possibly Taoist ideas; and so 'Heaven' could be the Confucian Heaven, or an arbiter of justice and Nature, or the Buddhist deva (ch'on or sin), or the Taoist 'Nature' (ziran).

However, the hold of Sin'gyo as an explanation of the 'native' Korean religious beliefs has not lost its grip. Thus the latest edition of the TojOn, the scripture of Ch'ong'sando, claims that Sin'gyo is at the root of all human culture, East and West, and dates from before Old Choson. It cites the Zhou Yi (Book of Changes) and the Kyuwon sahwa to show what Sin'gyo meant, and the Taegonggyo T'aebak IlSa to illustrate the theology of the Trinity. In the earlier English edition, the text says that the wife and successor of Kang Ilsun (the human incarnation of Okhwang Sangje), Lady Ko, was the "world's best female shaman." The notes state, "She revived the spirit of the Divine Spiritual Faith (Shingyo)*1."

Confucianism, Glyphomancy and Korean Religion

If there was no independent Sin'gyo or ancient belief in a single god or a lineage back to Tan'gun, this does not mean that certain practices did not date back to antiquity. The analysis of the fundamental themes and practices of nativist Korean new religious movements requires a stricter discrimination of the contributing elements, and a critical historical examination that does not rely on ab initio arguments like those of Eliade or assumptions of continuity and denial of the 'invention of tradition.' It needs also to be divorced from nationalistic anxieties. Unlike Eliade then, I do not accept that there are archetypal, universal symbols or structures of religious experience that remain constant throughout history, experiences that are given. Therefore, while a practice or technique used in religions may be ancient,
it can often be traced and shown to function differently in changed contexts. Glyphomancy and the related use of seals and talismans are such techniques.

The history of glyphomancy in Korean new religions starts with the experience of Ch’oe Che’u (Su’un) on the fifth day of the fourth month of 1860, when he collapsed in a form of epilepsy (Chinese dian, “falling sickness”), and received from Sangje or Hanullim a yŏngbu or “numinous tally” or talisman, also called a pudo ("talisman diagram"), which he wrote out on paper, and in Taoist fashion burned and drank the ashes in cold water. The term yŏngbu dates back to the Han Dynasty. It appears in the biography of Ban Piao (3-54 A.D.), where it writes of his “Essay on the Mandate of Kings” that he wrote it in order to show that “the Han had received the tally (ju) of the numinous mandate of Yao.” Other writers equated it with “an auspicious (or jade) tally of the divine numina.” The tally is always associated here with the mandate from Heaven to rule, and it was clearly a tally, for Ban Piao wrote, “If then the divine, auspicious tally corresponds...” This text was probably created to counter the theory of the “tally mandate” (fuming 符命) forged by the usurper Wang Mang (r. 9-23 A.D.), with the meaning of an auspicious omen that tallied with the Mandate of Heaven. These tallies were probably inscribed with the text of a prophecy, and took the form of an order.

However, at first blush it would seem that Sangje was not ordering Ch’oe to be the new king. Yet, in the Towŏn kisŏ, Sangje appoints Ch’oe as a “white-clothed minister,” which Ch’oe declined. This could imply that Sangje, the Supreme Emperor, offered Ch’oe the position of deputy or prime minister in Korea, the country of the white-clothed (paeg’ŭi minjŏk, a modern term), for early in the Kaihuang era (586-601), a children’s song contained the words, “The laws and regulations exist, the Way and virtues are present. The white-banered Son of Heaven appeared in the Eastern Sea.” Therefore the Sui rulers always wore white clothes. As Ch’oe was the ‘son’ of Sangje or Heaven, and born to the East of the Sea (Haedong), perhaps this was an omen he was to become the Korean king. However, this political post was declined for religious power.

In any case, the yŏngbu was not a simple talisman or amulet (pujŏk 符籍) as used in modern Korean. The word pujŏk is a Korean coinage out of two Chinese characters, but the character fu (pu) in Chinese was used widely in the religious Taoism of the fourth century, and in esoteric Buddhist texts of a slightly later period. These were often made into seals. Indeed, in the Samguk yusa account of the

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188 Earliest descriptions are in the Ch’oe Sŏnsaeng munjip Towŏn kisŏ, written on the orders of Ch’oe Sihyŏng while the Tonghak leadership were hiding in the T’aebaek Mountains in 1879. See Yun Sŏksan, trans., *Ch’oe Sŏnsaeng munjip Towŏn kisŏ* (Seoul: Sŏsŏwŏn, 2000), 7-8, 32-34.


192 Yun, *Towŏn kisŏ*, 34.

193 Morohashi, no. 22678.27.

194 Josef Kyburz, “Prolegomenes a l’étude des amulettes et talismans Coreens,” *Cahiers d’Extrême-Asie* 6 (1991-1992), 88-89, distinguishes between amulets or protect objects, and talismans, objects that emit a beneficentral force. However, most pujŏk have both functions, so Kyburz writes of written charms. Kyburz, 89-90. Some allege that ju were invented by Zbang Daoling, the first Heavenly Master (Tianshi) of religious Taoism who was born between 147 and 167 A.D., as a contract tally or healing charm. This contract was with the gods. Max Kaltenmark, *Lao Tzu and Taoism*, translated Roger Greaves (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 126-127.

195 Kyburz, 89-90. Some allege that ju were invented by Zbang Daoling, the first Heavenly Master (Tianshi) of religious Taoism who was born between 147 and 167 A.D., as a contract tally or healing charm. This contract was with the gods. Max Kaltenmark, *Lao Tzu and Taoism*, translated Roger Greaves (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 126-127.

196 See Strickmann, *Magical Medicine*, chapter 4, “Ensiggillation: A Buddho-Taoist Technique of Exorcism,” esp. 130-131, 145. Seals and talismans do not seem to have been clearly distinguished, with seals simply the printings of the paper talismans, 147, 151.
Tan'gun myth, Tan'gun is presented with Three Heavenly Tally Seals (samch'önbu'in 符印), probably the three asterisms of Sam, Wi and T'aebaek, and many of the talismans and seals have the patterns of stars on them, especially those of the Northern Dipper. This was part of an esoteric Buddhism of the Koryo. 197

Consequently, it is likely that the use of such seal-talismans date back to the Koryo or even earlier, mostly in an esoteric Buddhist or 'shamanist' environment. 198 Later there is evidence of Taoist influence through the use of Taoist ritual texts. 199 Murayama thinks that the talismans were originally associated with incantations (chu ɭ) and prayer (kido), but were later separated from these practices. The talismans can be divided into two types: those using written text made up of characters, often highly stylized, such as heaven, sun, demon, bow, fortune, mouth, king and shrine etcetera, sometimes combined with names of gods, persons and objects; and those diagrammatic forms that use the shape of the sun, faces, whirlpools, squares, heaven, lightning bolts etcetera, sometimes surrounded by characters. They were mostly written on paper made out of sophora japonica or zelkova, which produced a yellow paper, and cinnabar 'ink' for red script. Sometimes a piece of peach wood struck by lightning was used. The red script equated with good luck, and the zelkova was associated with the cooling and cleansing of the blood as a medicine. The red also indicated the heart etcetera. The paper talismans were often burned and drunk with cold water. 200

These objects were not only made by 'shamans,' but also by fortune-tellers and specialists in the occult arts, monks and exorcists. 201 Often the chanting of an incantation (chumun) was made while manufacturing or using the pujok. Many of the incantations and texts were Buddhist dharmas such as the Ch'ónjip'aryangju or those of Ucch'ima, who removes impurities, 202 or Taoist works of the Yushuijing, especially those associated with the Northern Dipper, such as the T'aeUlgyong. 203 However, in Ch'oe Che'u's case, the paper was white (or blank) and he probably wrote with ordinary black ink. The shape of the pudo diagram is described as follows by Sangje:

I have a numinous tally, called a medicine of the immortal. Its shape is the t'aeguk and also shaped like kung-kung . Receive this tally of mine and save people from illness. Receive my incantation and teach people for me, then you will also live long and spread virtue to the world. 204

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197 Jorgensen, "Tan'gun Myth?" 240 passim.
198 Murayama Chijun, Chósen no kishin (Keijó: Chósen Sotokufu, 1929), 377; Han Chóngsóp, Sinbi ǔi Pujok: Han'gukpujoksin'ang yon'gu (Seoul: Pômnyunsa, 1975), 19-26, although some of the evidence is of dubious quality.
199 Han Chóngsóp, 26-27, citing the Yushu (baojing), which is a Taoist ritual text, for which see Yi Núngwha, To'gyosa, 464-465.
200 Murayama, Chósen no kishin, 377-379; Han Chóngsóp, 85-87, 121-122, 31.
201 Kyburz, 93-94; Han Chóngsóp, 16-17.
202 Kor. Yejok kunggang, Ch. Huiji jin'gang, see Strickmann, Magical Medicine, 156-163.
203 Han Chóngsóp, 87-94, 116. There are several T'aeUlgyöng or T'aeUlju in Korean new religions of the Chóngsan lineage, but in Taoism Taiyi or T'aeUl is the name of a northern star that was deified and associated with fortune-telling. Taiyi appears at the start of a number of scripture titles, for which see Hu Fuchen, 784-785, and the meditation text, the Taiyi yuanzh.\, booming changshengjing, 344. See also a Taiyi lingfu 太乙靈符, which was burned and taken with wine and prayers. It is found in a compendium on acupuncture and moxibustion, see Yoshimoto Shôji, "Dokyó to Chôgoku igaku," in Dokyó, 3 vols, Fukui et al (Tokyo: Hirakawa, 1983), 2: 283-284, and is rather like the yóngbu burned and drunk by Ch'oe Che'u. Note Kang Ilsun, founder of the Chóngsan religion, and identified with Okhwang Sangje, was an apothecary, who wrote a t'aeUlju. Note also that in the Han Dynasty, Taiyi was equated with Sangje and was the essence of yang. See Ch'oe Samyong, "Kososöl e nat'an an sŏngak ǔi sŏnggyŏk koch'al," in To'gyo sasang ǔi Han'gukjok chön'gae (Seoul: Asea munhwasa, 1989), 214-215.
204 Yun Sóksan, annotator and trans, Tonggyöng Taejón (Seoul: Tonghaksa, 1996), 25-27. Note the Chóngdogyo interpretation is that pu is experience, verification, and that the t'aegük is a Confucian expression for the basis of the universe. It is thus the mind of Hanullim, and kung-kung is the function of Hanullim's mind. These are the internal and external forms of the mind of Hanullim.
Elsewhere the yŏngbu is described as, “stored in my breast, the medicine of immortality, kung-ŭl its shape; in my voice I chanted the incantation of long life; its characters thirty-seven in number.”

Ch’oe Sihyŏng, the successor of Ch’oe Che’u, preached that,

The shape of kung-ŭl is the character mind (sin). Kung-ŭl is the tally-diagram (pudo) of our Way, is the physical form of Heaven and earth.

These themes also have a long history, dating back to the Han Dynasty, as is clear from the line in the Yongdam yusa by Ch’oe Che’u on “the medicine of immortality of the three divine mountains,”

references that date back to the Shiji about three imaginary islands in the Gulf of Bohai where the First Emperor of the Qin sent people to search for the potions of immortality and long life. Moreover, there was a tendency, especially in Taoist works, to identify these mountains with a number in Korea, especially Mt Paekdu, and sometimes even with Tan’gun and Sin’gyo.

Such charms or talismans in China often were “imperial decrees” made up of conventional symbols, including the bow (kung) that supposedly scared demons. Indeed, there seems to have been set ways to write or design such talismans, at least in Taoism. Thus there were six styles of calligraphy, such as that derived from the divisions of yin and yang, called the Flying Heaven script or Heavenly script (also called dragon script), ancient script and various seal scripts. There were also grouping styles, such as the scattered and collected shapes (sanxing and juxing). Scripts could be composed of altered or dissected standard characters, sometimes re-assembled, or repeated characters joined together. Also, selected characters were taken from the scriptures and incantations to make talismans.

Hence the combination kung-kung forms the character kung, meaning strong. Furthermore, the pairs kung-kung ŭl-ŭl can be combined to form yak or weak. One interpretation of this derives from the prognostication text of the latter Chosŏn, the Ch'ŏng Kamnok, which suggests that the weak will survive by hiding during a period of chaos, and that the strong will be killed in an apocalypse. But the Tonghak text, the Kung'ilhae (Interpretation of Kung’ŏl) explains it as the Method, Law, Way or Virtue of Heaven, by the use of the words ilde (one great, ), in other words, Heaven . “None is not Heaven.” The Tonghak also interpreted Heaven as kung and ŭl, having two meanings: kyuj, literally a volume, which is the “text of the To’gyŏng and the volumes of the sages and wise men,” and as paek Ch’ŏn (white Heaven ); “To see it clearly is the meaning of paek, is mu, which is not the mu of non-existent things, but is the mu of the muguk. On the right there is kung, on the left ŭl, and on the right ŭl and left kung.” That formed an outline of the character ch’ŏn on white paper, and this is duplicated many times. The mu is the non-existent or white of the page. This in turn is related to the Ch'ŏng Kamnok, which suggested kung-kung ŭl-ŭl meant Heaven. More pertinently, however, is the use of the characters kung-kong or ŭl-ŭl to symbolise the t’aeigungdo, with each of the characters forming each half of the diagram within a circle.
These forms are closely intertwined with the practice of p'aja or glyphomancy, also known in Chinese as zhezi, which is the dissection and recombination of the written characters of names to make prophecies. Two chapters are devoted to the topic in the Tushu jicheng encyclopedia of 1726. Although de Groot thought it does not predate the Tang Dynasty, such techniques date much earlier. In the contest for imperial supremacy after the fall of the usurper, Wang Mang, Emperor Guangwu fought Gongsun Shu in Szechwan. The latter had proclaimed himself emperor in 25 A.D. These rivals engaged in military and propaganda wars. Prognostication texts were used for propaganda, and incorporated forms of glyphomancy. A prophecy recorded in the Hou Han shu reads, "The governor of the West [Gongsun] crushes the mo metal (sword)," which indicates Liu, the surname of Emperor Guangwu. Of course, this was a product of Gongsun's camp. Gongsun is said to have loved to use "mandate talismans and the responses of demons and spirits (guishen), and he falsely quoted prophecies."

In the propaganda for the Tang house, surnamed Li, songs and prophecies were circulated. One of these was a prediction in prophetic form attributed to Baozhi, the thaumaturge monk, who supposedly wrote of the eighteenth son (shibazi ) becoming king, which was later used in a rebellion by Li Hongye in 552. Again in 615, a magician (fangshi) predicted that a Li would become the Son of Heaven, and as a result, the Sui emperor had a number of people surnamed Li executed. Then in 617, Li Yuan, the founder of the Tang Dynasty, used such predictions to his advantage.

In the Koryo, Yi Cha'gyom adopted these prophecies for his rebellion in 1126 by having such ideas circulated in children's songs, and Yi Úimin in the late 1100s to early 1200s, used the eighteen sons' theory again, plus the twelve dragons theory to advocate a revival of the Silla in Kyŏngju. Even Yi Songgye used it. In the late Koryo, prophecies were allegedly discovered by a monk on Mt Chiri, which was associated with Tan'gun and Sinsi. According to Kwŏn Kôn (1352-1409), a stele wrote regarding the location of the capital:

The Chart of the Situation of the Nine Changes and the theory of eighteen sons comes from the age of Tan'gun, passing through several thousand years, and due to the correct (ruler) is now verified. Also, there was a strange monk who obtained a strange book from among the crags of Mt Chiri, which he presented to the court. Its theories, and the above words that came from the age of Tan'gun, coincided.

Kwŏn acknowledges the similarity of the above with the ch'amuiti (prognostication) theories of Emperor Guangwu of the Han Dynasty. Elsewhere, the story differs slightly, with the book-finder just a strange person and the words instead, "there is a wood son who will again correct the Sam Han." The strange record, The Diagram of the Nine Changes of Chindan, has "erect a tree and obtain a son. Chindan is Chosŏn." According to a note to the Yongbi Ōch'ŏn'ga, the diagram is a toch'am (prediction) written by Sinsi, the minister of Tan'gun, who was an immortal. Interestingly this theory of eighteen sons, in China was attributed to the poetic ch'am prediction by Baozhi, who had lived in the Liang Dynasty.

During the Chosŏn, anti-Yi-Dynasty forces had to use an alternative glyphomancy. Thus in 1589, Chŏng Yŏrip spread the prediction, "the wood son has died, the Chŏn town (ûp) has risen." Wood son is the Yi house; Chŏn ûp is Chŏng himself. This prediction also appears in the Chŏng Kamnok. Most scholars now think that the Chŏng Kamnok dates from around the time of the Hideyoshi invasion (1592-1596), and perhaps it was used by Chŏng Yŏrip. Evidence suggests that the Chŏng Kamnok dates from even later, probably after the Manchu invasions of 1636-1637.

216 Bielenstein, 254-256.
217 Yasui and Nakamura, 118-120.
219 Hwang, 263.
220 Hwang, 257; Yang Ónyong, "Chŏng Kamnok sin'ang ìl chae chomyŏng," in Chŏn'ong sasang ìl hyŏndaegŏk sími, Yŏn'gu nonch'ong 90-8, Kim Chongdan et al (Sŏngnam: Han'guk Chŏngsin Munhwa Yŏn'guwŏn, 1990), 50.
Place names, lack of references to the Chong Kamnok among the books proscribed by the court earlier, and the appearance for the first time in 1631 of a theory about a new capital on Mt Kyeryong, suggest these dates. The name of the book first appears in records for 1785. However, the evidence is uncertain because these manuscripts, circulating in secret, were subject to name changes, interpolations, copyists' errors, deletions and fabrications. It is likely that later forgers used the names and titles of older works no longer extant as covers and legitimacy for their own inventions.

Such forgeries can be viewed in two ways: firstly, as 'genuine' predictions meant to incite opposition to the status quo, and so became self-fulfilling; or secondly, as records after events, utilising earlier themes to express frustration and create new predictions. The latter may reflect widespread public opinion that was muffled by state censorship and threats, and thus had to be expressed through indirect means such as ditties with hidden meanings, metaphors, double entendres and secret calculations. For example, predictions were allegedly created to foment rebellions, and could be used to eliminate enemies. In 1519, the reformist Neo-Confucian, Cho Kwangjo (1482-1519), who attempted to overcome the legacy of the 'regent,' Yongsan'gun (r. 1494-1506), by selecting able administrators, was supported by those who wished Cho would become king. However, the opposing faction arrested Cho's supporters and forced Cho to commit suicide. To bring Cho down, they alleged Cho had created predictions and rumours that he, Cho, would become king. The plotters had one of the palace women trace the characters su 'ch' o wi wang on tree leaves in the forbidden palace with honey. This then was eaten by the insects, leaving the characters incised into the leaves. These characters were combined to read, "Cho will be king." This combination of two characters appeared earlier in the notes to the Sambongjip of Chong Tojön (-1398) written by Song Songnim (1338-1423), in which Song quoted a secret book found in a stone wall. It read:

The sword of the General Wood Son, the brush of Running Likeness, the wisdom of Lord Not Clothed, will again correct the framework of the Sam Han, which is glossed as referring to Cho Chun, a scholar, and then to Pae Kūngnyŏm, both of whom supported Yi Sŏnggye, the general. Again it said, "The three determinations/settlements and the three towns will destroy the Sam Han," which is taken to indicate the lord (here referring to the author of the collection) Chong Tojön, Chŏng Ch'ŏng (1358-1397) and Chŏng Hŭigye (-1396), three ministers and literati of the early Chosŏn. This combination then appears in the Muhak pi' gyŏl in the Chong Kamnok:

And the surname Mok (wood) in principle is completely shaded by trees, and so it starts from the watered mountain and concludes with the fiery mountain. As water is six and fire is seven, in accordance with the numerical progress, six times seven is forty-two....The sword of General Wood Son, the brush of Running Likeness, and the sword of Plotter Mountain Sparrow (means) blood will run eventually for three Springs.

Some have thought that the number forty-two in the sexagenary cycle probably indicated ḳilsa, which possibly coincided with 1905, the year the Japanese forced the Protectorate Treaty on Korea. Therefore, the existence of a prediction does not prove that it was sourced in the Chong Kamnok or any other specific "secret record," nor does the existence of the book title ensure that the prediction that exists now in the text was in the book when the title was mentioned. After all, some of these uses of glyphomancy date back to the time of Wang Mang and Emperor Guangwu of the Han in the first century A.D. Indeed, some of the authors of these prognostications were aware of Wang Mang and his sudden rise and fall. Furthermore, the glyphomancy could be used to support the Yi or a Chong in one instance, and against them in another.

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221 Hwang, 277-278; Yang, 49-50.
223 Murayama, senboku to yogen, 601-602, the kimyo conspiracy.
224 Yi Pyŏngdo, 358-359; Murayama, senboku to yogen, 622.
225 See Kim Susan and Yi Tongmin, 178-179: An Chun'gūn, text, 774, 576.
226 Chŏng Yi kan'yŏnŏn in An Chun'gūn, 619.
However, Ch'oe Che'u seems to have been influenced by the Ch'ong Kamnok and similar prognostication texts, for the Tonghak kyongjon and Yongdam yusa make a number of references to it. One of the references is to kung-kung or il-il, which according to Hosoi Hajime (1923) dates back to poems by the Confucian scholar Ch'ong Tojon. This places Ch'oe Che'u among that class of disaffected people who were using glyphomancy, the five elements or phases theory, geomancy and similar ideas to prophecy the overthrow of the Yi Dynasty and its replacement by a new dynasty, possibly at Mt Kyeryong. They, like Dong Zhongshu (ca. 179- ca. 104 B.C.), a syncretic Confucian scholar who influenced Wang Mang and subsequent Han thought, which in turn formed the basis of most of the systems of prophecy and regime change used in Korea, believed that there was a correspondence between natural events and calamities, and the fate of human beings and their rulers. Unusual happenings in the natural world thus became omens for the future from Heaven.

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, many believers in omens began to form rebellious groups. Among them were pall-bearers, bravos, monks and other disillusioned people. Some gathered under the banner of Mirl1k (Maitreya), others used the Ch'ong Kamnok, taking phrases from it such as “there is profit in kung-kung.” Millenarian hopes for a new world and saviour were linked to these items, but there were always political overtones, for even the earliest uses of glyphomancy were martialled in prophesies, with a view to becoming self-fulfilling predictions of the rise of a new dynasty. Although glyphomancy was used in general fortune-telling and the analysis of dreams, even in Korea the earliest examples involve political events, such as those surrounding the great Koguryo general, Yôn Kaesomun (-666) and Emperor Yang of the Sui. Even in the case of Ch'oe Che'u and Tonghak, which was supposedly religiously motivated, there are hints of a political message in the talismans and glyphomancy.

However, in the most recent new religion known to me, the p'aja glyphomancy and ensigillation have lost their political overtones, except for a generalised millenarian apocalypse, which demonstrates how the method has shifted from the outright political to the proof of the advent of a new saviour, but is still self-serving.

This latest example is from Myûlma Chǒngdo, the Correct Path to Eliminate the Demonic, which was founded in April 2004 by Yun Chôngch'il, the saviour or messiah. After searching for answers, on 3 October 2002, Yun claims to have experienced a revelation that his coming was predicted in all the sacred scriptures. This was evident from his birth-date, name, place of birth and life experiences. Although the religion has no scripture as yet, Mr Yun has been writing one for over three years, and it is now ready for publication. Thus this religion is known only to a handful of people.

After meeting Mr Sôk near Chogyê Sa on the Buddha's birthday while he was trying to hand out the leaflets, I accompanied him by train to Mr Yun's home. While travelling, he spoke about methods of interpretation of Chinese characters by sound, meaning and dissection (p'aja). While all three methods are necessary, p'aja is the superior technique. In a rather Gnostic analysis, he also stated that the soul is prevented from attaining eternal life by being encased in a material body.

Mr Yun, with a style of Hwalsan, had been a graphic designer of fonts and had published several books on the subject. As the entire religion is based on an analysis of characters and seals (in) to prove that Yun is the predicted saviour, this fascination with script and seeking for hidden messages in it appears to have become an idée fixe, and the source of the revelation.

Much of the glyphomantic analysis proceeds through the use of the character dictionary or okp'yôn, preference being given to the Myǒngmun Tae Okp'yôn of 1992. Mr Yun, aged seventy in 2004, had searched the Bible, Buddhist sutras (especially the Mahaparinirvana Sutra), Ch'ong Kamnok, and even

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227 Tabled in Yang, 58-59.
228 An Chun’gûn, 695, and “Tei Kenroku no shômei to chôsha,” 35 in An.
229 Loewe, 709-711; Kramers, 753-756.
230 Hwang, 275-281.
231 Murayama, senboku to yôgen, 234-235, 621-625 for this and other examples.
232 All the material on this religion comes from their promotional pamphlet and interviews with Yun at his home in Koean-dong, Puch’ón City, and his chief disciple, Sôk Sanghun, styled Ch’ônja, Son of Heaven, on 26th May 2004.
New Age works like *The Emerald Tablets of Thoth the Atlantean* (in Korean translation). What he was looking for were indications of his own name, as well as date and place of birth, in cryptograms that hid this information. These cryptograms are hidden in the Chinese characters, and demonstrate that the saviour will possess seals. This glyphomancy will identify Yun Ch'ongch'il and the seals of immortality in a revolutionary and scientific manner, for it follows set principles. By following these practices, one will eliminate the problem of death.

In Yun's analysis, his surname, Yun, as well as *silhae*, the cyclical year of his birth (1935), are symbols of the sun or *t'aejang*. According to the *Okp'yon*, *yun* means faith, sincerity or control, and *sil* means a bird, which does not support Yun's reading. Rather, Yun derives his reading in reverse from the seal character for sun (*il* 𓉉), but again the dictionary offers no support. Instead, Mr Yun has relied on an imaginative glyphomancy and a folk etymology via homophony. Thus *silhae* is meant to be the rising sun (*hae*), the sun to be.

The advent of Yun Ch'ongch'il is ascertained from passages in the *Ch'0nmun yuch'o* written by Yi Sunji (-1465). This book deals with the movements of the heaven, explains changes in weather, and the disasters that befall the state. Yi Sunji also wrote a book titled *Ch'iljongsan naewoe p'y6n* , a work of calendrical studies based on Chinese texts. *Ch'iljông* are the Seven Governors or Seven Regulators, which have been equated with the seven stars of the Northern Dipper, or with the sun, moon and five planets.233 *Ch'iljông* then is simply reversed to become Ch'ongch'il. It seems that there are passages here that suggest that "the axis of the Seven Regulators of the Northern Dipper...across are the stars and luminaries of the Seven Regulators","234 linking his name thereby to *T'aeul* and Sangje (my conclusion, see note 53).

The significance of seven is supposedly indicated in the *Mahaparinirvana Sutra*, which states that "seven, is never in the past a dead corpse. The dead corpse is called an icchantika, who..."

233 This was altered by Yun to read, "seven is never in the past (not) a corpse, who is the one, \[...\] and related to a secret numerology of seven, and that the corpse and one become Yun. This is the most important sutra for Yun, because it frequently mentions that "the meanings of all characters are stored in secret..."236 But of more importance is the passage in the sutra on the roots of characters: "The Thus Come spoke of the roots of letters...he first preached the half character as the root."237 In Sanskrit the half character (*cha* = syllable) means the vowels, which when combined with consonants or other vowels produce full syllables or meaning, but Yun has taken it to refer to *p'aja*. The Buddha is here saying that all the texts, mantras and words, are made up of these vowels and consonants. This Buddhist kabbala states that the vowels alone are not the full truth. Yet among the vowels are *i*, long and short, represented by the Chinese character . Written 𓉉 or 𓉉 in Siddham Sanskrit script, it is sometimes called *Ija samjôn*, which in the *Mahaparinirvana Sutra* symbolise the Dharmakâya, prajñâ and moksha (release), or are equated with *Iśvara*, Brahma and Heavenly King(s).238 Apparently this convinced Yun, that he, Yun, was being referred to via the human Yun (= ), and the *Ija samjôn* conjured up for him the number thirteen, the number of seals he had "discovered."

Such glyphomancy is used with many texts, and so the *Manbopjôn* (unknown to me) has *p'ap* described as three (equal to ), plus ten , plus earth , plus *mu* etcetera, yielding a number of the seals. Yun also takes the *Kyôp'âm yuruk*, a text attributed to Nam Sago (style Kyôg'am, dates possibly 1509-1571), but likely produced during the regime of Pak Ch'onghû by members of the Ch'ondo'gwan (Korean Jesus Teaching Ch'ondo'gwan or Olive Tree Church) founded by Pak T'aesôn.

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234 From notes of interviews; I have not seen the *Ch'iljongsan naewoe p'yôn*.

235 Dharmaksema translation, Taisho 12 (no. 374).558c26 or 559b9ff. This is from a list of inconceivable states of a bodhisattva, and is not a characterisation of the number seven.

236 For example, in the Southern translation, T12 (no. 375).651b.

237 T12.653e19-20, cf. 413a2-3.

238 T12.654a, 655a or T12 (374).413a-b.
The text includes predictions of Pak T’aesŏn arriving as the saviour and Chŏndo’gwŏn via glyphomancy. It even prophesies the coup d’etat by Pak Chŏnghuí and the thirty-eighth parallel ceasefire line between North and South Korea, as in the following:


Adding and and produces (pan). Yangdo gives (mun), and a grog shop without grog gives (chŏm), in all Panmunjŏm. Moreover, each of the three characters has eight strokes, and so this song is called “Samp’alsa,” and the place is the thirty-eighth parallel (samp’alsŏn). This text, influenced by a Chinese translation of the Bible, uses modern terms and relies almost entirely on glyphomancy, including a few of the old favourites, such as Wood Son for Yi, and Wood Man for Pak. One of the verses talks of a half field, meaning sun.

Yun analyses the character chŏn or field to mean thirteen and two Kings (equal), and that this indicates the Heavenly King and Fatherly King or Han’nim (God) or Yun himself revealed in the Manhŏpŏn. Thus, in the Myŏlma Chŏngdo leaflet, the seal of the Heavenly Father King is predicted via cryptograms in all the scriptures, and Yun invites people to come and see for themselves.

Yun also refers to stories about Kang Isun, founder of the Chungsan religion, and a seal related to the T’ae’ul incantation. A study method supposedly can be predicted through the kung-ŭl. Clearly Yun drew upon the Chŏng Kamnok and the Tonghak scriptures. The two kung are faced to the left and right to form the character : “Look at the kung-ŭl and enter the Way.” This instruction is based on various texts, notably the Kyŏg’am yurok:

The angel appears on earth, and with the sealing method of kung-kung that he left hidden, there will be a victory over the demons, and it will change into the medicine of immortality. The original text of the secret cryptogram (translated above) is (leaflet).

Thus, this religion, Myŏlma Chŏngdo, even in its very name, is what Strickmann would call demonofugic ensigillation.

Yun arranged the thirteen seals into a square, following an order from the double kung-kung at the base and moves anti-clockwise towards the centre. There are alleged to be thirteen seals in the Mahaparinirvana Sutra, which are related to the design of the lotus (yŏnhwasa), the udumbara or the mu’gunghwa. The ŭa samjŏn is calculated to total thirteen, and the Ch’ŏnmun yuch’o is reported to contain “thirteen like ŭl.” Yun supposedly can equal thirteen (or ), and thirteen can be found in the field of the Kyŏg’am yurok. Maitreya is also made a seal, containing kung.

Such seals, Yun claims, are the basis of faith, which is manifested in a trust, that is a tally of jade, the imperial seal (fuxi, pusae), one suitable to Sangie or the God of Heaven. This symbol or Imperial Seal is that of the character mu, which is dissected as (40), and . This is somehow related to , which looks like the central and final seal (and a number of others).

In turn these seals are related to practice. The fingers of both hands are crossed over, palms downward, and are brought towards the chest three times. They are then separated and brought down from the head in imitation of put in a sweeping motion from above the head to the floor while seated, and then brought up and folded on the chest. The other movement is of the hands in the form of a double ŭl


240 Morohashi no. 25935.36, using a quote of the Shiji on the First Emperor of Qin.
in front of the body in mirror images, and then crossed hands. These are su'in or mudra. Further, believers do not eat pork, as this corresponds to hae, the year in which Yun was born.

This is a millenarian teaching, which allows only four years from 2004 for practice, for 2007 will be a hae year. The explanation for this is that after 450 billion light years, a neutron star will arrive at earth, the energy of which will enter one’s body, which will be an apocalyptic end, as is indicated by the sentence, “in the sui-hae year many people will die.” The end time will be in the twenty-first century, as indicated by the glyphomancy on the character ydp or ‘age,’ which is twenty and one, plus generation, i.e. the twenty-first century.

While Myŏlma Chŏngdo has only a handful of followers, and is unlikely to become popular because of the obscure complexity, or obscurantism, of the explanations by the eccentric and enthusiastic founder, which will not attract many people, most of whom do not share his passion for Chinese characters, it has most of the features of Korean new religious movements, glyphomancy in particular.

Conclusion

The themes of Myŏlma Chŏngdo illustrate a commonality and continuity with the early Tonghak and even with ideas that originated in Han Dynasty China. They demonstrate that there has been a change in the use of seals and glyphomancy from purely political ends in the Han Dynasty, and through the Koryŏ and Chosŏn periods, to a purely religious and millenarian use in early twenty-first century Korea. Although many Koreans still believe in elements of this closely interrelated system of beliefs in Heaven, mandates of Heaven, the five phases, prophetic seals and glyphomancy that originated in the Han Dynasty as an integrated method of prognostication, this does not prove the existence of an ancient Sin’gyo native to Korea. Rather, it shows that the concepts of Taoism, shamanism, folk belief or Sin’gyo have to be closely scrutinised as to their origins, definitions and interrelations. Nor can one accept the categories of the religious groupings assumed to have functioned in Korea, or the notion that many of these elements are native to Korea. Moreover, the antiquities may have been primarily imagined from the late nineteenth century when Korea’s existence was threatened by its neighbours, and the futures were not forecast but were post-facto inventions used to bolster the claims of leaders of new religious movements, something they borrowed from the political realm.

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A Review and Evaluation of North Korea’s Neutrality Policy

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I. Introduction

After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union divided the Korean Peninsula into South and North Koreas against the will of the Korean people. Since the Civil War in 1950, the two Koreas have been in ideological conflict for over half a century as one of a few divided countries in the world.

This ideological conflict has had a negative effect on the effort to unify the Korean Peninsula. In fact, it is one of the major factors delaying Korea unification because it concerns not only the internal issues of the Korean Peninsula, but also the international problems that relate to the four great powers: the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan. Their national interests in the Korean Peninsula are keenly opposed to one another.

The unification policies of South and North Koreas are different from one another. The South favors a confederation system, while the North wants a neutral federation. In principle, there is not much difference between the two policies, but because they do not try to understand each other’s position, the two Koreas stand far apart from one another.

However, the unification policy of North Korea has some importance to South Korea in the direction of its neutral unification policy. In the past, Kim II Sung officially proposed his neutral unification idea three times to South Korea (Ro Jung-sōn, 1996, 218), and Kim Jong II has also shown an interest in the “Swiss-like armed neutrality” of the Korean Peninsula (Kim Myong-ch’ol, 2001, 111). In recent years, North Korean scholars have been working on the neutral unification of Korea (Yi Tae-jin, 2001).

There is little difference between Kim II Sung’s neutral unification policy and Kim Jong II’s armed neutrality. Kim II Sung’s proposal, which was based on an offensive unification policy, seems to have been designed to pull South Korea into the socialistic system, whereas Kim Jong II’s armed neutrality focuses on maintaining his regime. According to Kim Myong-ch’ol (2001), the basic scheme for Kim Jong II’s Swiss-like armed neutrality emerged from his father’s neutral unification policy. Nevertheless, Kim Jong II has not declared yet armed neutrality as an official unification policy, whereas Kim II Sung did announce his idea publicly.

The purpose of this paper is to review the neutrality policy of North Korea, to seek its possible application for the unification of the Korean Peninsula, and to evaluate its function in the unification of the two Koreas.

The scope of this paper covers the evolution of the neutrality policy put forward by North Korea, especially since 1980 when Kim II Sung officially proposed his neutral federation system to South Korea, including Kim Jong II’s armed neutrality and North Korean scholars’ works on permanent neutrality.

Conventional definitions of neutrality, neutralization, and permanent neutrality are as follow:

According to O Ki-p’young (1976, 277), neutrality has played a role in the history of war from the beginning of humankind. A third party in a war does not support any party, or supply any weapons to the other two sides. The effectiveness of the neutrality automatically ceases with the end of war.

Neutralization, in the same meaning as permanent neutrality, is an international system in which political independence and territorial integrity are permanently guaranteed by the great powers located around the neutral state. The neutralized state will not take up arms against another state except for defending itself; and it will not assume treaty obligations that may compromise its neutralized status. Neutralization can be applied not only to a state but also to international rivers, waterways, and regional areas. Finally, permanent neutrality is a special international agreement between a soon-to-be neutralized state and the great powers located around it (Black, 1968, xi-xii).

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This paper aims to review and evaluate Kim Il Sung’s neutral unification policy, its background, and Kim Jong Il’s perspective on Swiss-like armed neutrality. Moreover, the current works on the neutrality policy by North Korean scholars will be examined in the light of the applicability of the North Korean neutral policy to the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

II. Kim Il Sung’s Neutral Unification Policy of Korea

Kim Il Sung, the late president of North Korea, proposed his neutral unification policy for the Korean Peninsula in October 1980, October 1985, and April 1993. The basis for this policy is that neither of the two Korean governments should join political or military alliances with any foreign countries in any blocs of the world (Ro Jung-soon, 1996, 218).

1. The Founding Plan of Kim Il Sung’s Korean Democratic Federation Republic

In October 10, 1980, Kim Il Sung, the former president of North Korea, announced the founding plan for the Korean Democratic Federation Republic (KDFR) at the 6th Conference of the Labor Party. He proposed the neutral federation unification plan of the Korean Peninsula to South Korea based on the three principles of self-reliance, peaceful unification, and national grand solidarity (Ro, 1996, 216-9). It was the first time that Kim Il Sung officially suggested a neutral unification policy to South Korea.

Kim Il Sung argued that in order to bring about the unification of the Korean Peninsula in the near future, the same numbers of representatives from South and North Koreas along with South Koreans living abroad should build the KDFR peacefully without any foreign interference.

It is difficult to understand why Kim Il Sung proposed the neutral unification policy to South Korea; however, in consideration of the current political situation of South Korea and international relations in Northeast Asia, possible motives can be surmised.

First, Kim Il Sung stressed a self-reliant unification. This means that the two Koreas should achieve unification through inter-Korean cooperation, but devoid of any foreign assistance and intervention.

Second, in referring to the Korean unification, Kim Il Sung used the term, “neutral unification” for the first time. In order to fulfill the neutral unification of the two Koreas, he emphasized that neither Korea should ally itself with the United States or the Soviet Russia, which were the major actors during the cold war era.

Third, Kim Il Sung may have wanted to take advantage of the internal political situation of South Korea. In 1980, the political climate of South Korea was in the worst situation as the Kwangju May 18th democratization movement against the military government led by Ch’oun De Whan demonstrated to the world.

Fourth, despite social disorder in South Korea, the relationship between the two Koreas has, nevertheless, made progress. In this regard, Ro (1996, 214) has stated that North Korea was ready to seize the opportunity to unify the Korean Peninsula. The military government of South Korea continued in their effort to talk with North Korea even though there were fierce anti-government demonstrations by students. Some meetings and negotiations between the two Koreas were held in P’yon Yang and Seoul several times from February 6th to March 18th 1980. For example, working level preparation meetings for prime ministerial talks were held four times in Seoul and P’yon Yang respectively (Ibid.).

Lastly, the economic growth of South Korea exceeded that of North Korea. The level of economic development of both Koreas was much the same in the 1970s. In 1980, however, the economic growth of South Korea surpassed that of North Korea. Therefore, due to the increasing change in economic development between the two Koreas, Kim Il Sung seemed to modify his unification plan from communization to the neutral unification system (The Choson Year Book, 2001, 35).

2. Dialogues between Kim Il Sung and Chang Sae-dong

Kim Il Sung stressed the necessity of neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula to Chang Sae-dong, the South Korean CIA Director, who visited P’yon Yang on October 17, 1985. Kim Il Sung remarked to Chang (Ch’oe Bo-sik, 1998, 201-224):

In the cold war era, South and North Korea went to a war in June 1950 instead of the United States and Soviet Union, and we became a scapegoat of the West-East confrontation. We should not repeat again such a stupid
war representing the Western and Eastern blocs. Therefore, the Korean peoples should achieve the neutral unification in order to avoid war.

Kim II Sung further added that if South and North Koreas were to achieve neutral unification, it would reduce the level of armed forces to 100,000 men on each side, pointing out how the Japanese military forces stationed in Korea during World War II were able to control the Korean Peninsula with armed forces of less than 200,000.

The first conditions of becoming a neutral state is to increase the number of people going and coming freely between South and North Korea, to officially recognize the legal authority and government of the two Koreas, and to sign a mutual non-aggression treaty between the South and the North (Ibid.).

Though we do not know how much of Kim II Sung’s remarks have the ring of truth, one thing is certain that he had a number of interests in the neutral unification of Korea. Therefore, while taking every precaution in examining his proposal, it is important to evaluate his intentions.

First, his interest in the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula seems to have been intended to achieve the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, hence, to weaken Korea-U.S. relations.

Second, it is very sensitive for both Koreas that Kim II Sung suggested the neutral unification issue first. One particular thing he stressed is that both Koreas should be free from any alliance with foreign countries.

Lastly, since a neutral country must have sufficient armed forces for maintaining its neutrality, it is estimated that a total of 200,000 soldiers for Korea would be insufficient to defend the Korean Peninsula after unification.

3. Kim II Sung’s Ten Great Principles for Neutral Unification

Kim II Sung remarked on the ten great principles for the peaceful unification of Korea at the Fifth National Conference held in P’yongyang on April 7, 1993 (Ro, 1996, 518). He emphasized in the first principle to build the self-reliant, peaceful, and neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula with the great solidarity of the entire nation. His ten principles include some similar contents that he had already announced in the KDFR and dialogues with Chang Sae-dong (Ibid.).

He stressed that it is necessary to build the Pan-National Unification Conference (PNUC) with the participation of representatives from the various political parties of South and North Koreas, some NGOs, and all classes of people, while maintaining the current political systems of the two Koreas. The PNUC should consist of the same number of representatives from the South and North governments and maintain a neutral state that does not join global blocs (Ro, 1996, 518-9).

Kim II Sung’s proposal for the neutral unification of Korea is evaluated greatly because it was initiated by him for the unification of Korea. However, he did not mention the details for achieving neutral unification. For example, among the three approaches, simple neutrality, neutralization, and permanent neutrality, Kim II Sung did not specify which one was a preferred method. Therefore, it is also a problematic proposition which needs to be explored further since a neutral state, by definition, is not automatically assured of immunity from neighboring countries' attacks and foreign aggression.

If he had an intention to absorb South Korea into the communist system with his neutral unification policy, it would not have helped to unify the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, if his idea were specifically aimed at unifying Korea under communism, his neutrality policy would have been rejected and would have been considered a cause for vigilance in South Korea.

III. Kim Jong Il’s Swiss-like Armed Neutrality

1. Kim Jong Il’s Perspective on the Korean Question

Kim M’yong-ch’ol (2001, 104) has argued that Kim Jong Il likes to identify the root cause of Korea’s problem from the gunboat diplomacy of the United States. The so-called ‘Korean question’ has emerged from the U.S. military policy towards the Korean Peninsula. To remove the cause is a prerequisite for a successful Korean settlement that will enable the Korean people to reassert Korean questions and live in peace.

Kim Jong Il offers the following three aspects regarding the Korean question (Ibid.):

First, the current issues between the North and the South are not an ideological conflict. They do not have fundamental causes to hate or fight one another. The main trouble is that South Korea is a...
vassal state of the United States, which is treating North Korea as its fundamental enemy. The United States still holds the right of wartime operational control over the South Korean armed forces.

Second, the United States is the main actor who divided the Korean Peninsula into North and South Koreas. It was a great mistake for the Korean people not to resist when the U.S. armed forces landed in South Korea just after World War II. The Korean question is still in a troubled situation because the South Korean people do not fight for the removal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.

Lastly, the Korean people with a strong sense of cultural pride should put an effort to settle their moral cores with the foreigners such as the Americans and the Japanese. In order to settle the Korean question, it needs to be in a way that would liberate the Korean people from their long-held sense of inferiority towards foreign countries. Their resentment can only be mollified when Korea has reunified independently and has become a sovereign nation in foreign policy and national defense without foreign military bases in the Korean Peninsula.

Kim Jong Il's perspective on the Korean question is, however, far from the current situation of Korea. He stresses that in an effort to achieve Korean unification, South and North Korea should suspend their calumny against each other. However, North Korea has criticized South Korea for a long time as a vassal of the United States, and has insisted on the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.

Moreover, North Korea is likely to exclude South Korea from the U.S.-North Korea conference to settle the current nuclear issue even though it always emphasizes the necessity of close cooperation between the South and the North. It is analyzed that if North Korea had cooperated more closely with South Korea through inter-Korean collaboration in order to settle the current issues including the nuclear problem more smoothly, it would have gotten more economic assistance from South Korea than now and would have solved the nuclear issue far more efficiently in the negotiation with the U.S.

Kim Jong Il's argument in relation to the U.S. armed forces' immediate withdrawal from South Korea as a way of fulfilling the Korean unification is particularly aimed at the permanent retreat of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea. If he indeed wanted the Korean Peninsula to unify, he should have put his priority on dialogue with South Korea for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. The reason is that, once the Korean Peninsula is unified in neutrality, the U.S. armed forces would have to withdraw automatically from South Korea.

His argument on the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Korea is believed to be false. When U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited P'yongyang on October 23rd, 2000, Kim Jong Il said that the U.S. armed forces stationed in South Korea plays an important role for the security of Northeast Asia (The Dong-a Ilbo on September 18, 2003). It can be said, therefore, that his argument requesting the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces in South Korea hides his real purpose.

2. Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like Armed Neutrality

According to Kim M'yon-ch'il (1996, 111-2), Kim Jong Il's perspective on solving the Korean questions is based on Swiss-like armed neutrality. In this regard, it is necessary to review the definition of 'armed neutrality' in order to understand Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality. As has been mentioned in the introduction, a state heading for neutrality can follow one of three approaches: simple neutrality, permanent neutrality, and non-alignment. In this case, regardless of the choice made by the state, it must not make any weapons to attack other countries. But it can develop any military weapons to defend itself from another country's attack.

Therefore, armed neutrality is defined as a neutral state which is equipped with any type of weapons necessary to defend itself from the attack of other countries. For example, Switzerland maintains a strong civil service system at the same level as the active duty soldiers.

Kim Jong Il believes that while South and North Koreas, born as the result of the cold war by the great powers, may have some alliances with them, nevertheless a unified Korea should not make any alliance with foreign countries. For instance, North Korea was once a military ally of Russia, and now it has a military alliance with China against the United States and Japan. On the other hand, South Korea is still maintaining a military alliance with the United States. However, a reunified Korea should not adopt any kind of military alliances that inclines it toward only one country (Ibid.).

Kim Jong Il also considers that the unified Korean Peninsula should maintain friendly relations with all the countries in the world through either a foreign policy based on Swiss-like armed neutrality or a non-nuclear policy. Kim Jong Il cites five considerations why the reunified Korea must maintain its foreign policy as a Swiss-like armed neutrality (Ibid.):

First, the demise of the Cold War regime must be officially declared in the Korean Peninsula. In order to end the Cold War regime in the Korean Peninsula, the reunified Korea should not have any particular need to form a military and political alliance with one country against another.
Second, the Korean people have a peace-loving tradition. In Korean history, the Korean people have never attacked foreign countries for aggressive purposes. They built their military forces only for defending themselves. Aggression and revanche are strangers to Koreans.

Third, South and North Koreas need to be free from war weariness. The Korean people have become weary of war, and have suffered for more than one hundred years from the end of the 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century at the hands of the Japanese and Americans. Now, it is time to take a respite and relish the peace. There is no reason to subject them to another trauma again.

Fourth, the geopolitical location of the Korean Peninsula makes it necessary for neutrality. Since the Korean Peninsula is surrounded by the world's biggest four powers, Korea's decision to align with one particular country among the four would eventually bring forth greater risks in the interests of the other countries concerned. In this regard, the most effective action is to coordinate any possible conflict of interests.

Lastly, South and North Koreas have a sufficient defense potential. There is a sufficient defense capacity for the reunified Korea to be able to deter any would-be foreign military aggressors from attacking it. The North Korean Army (NKA) is equipped with defensive and offensive weapons that can strike any target in the remotest part of the world. Since the NKA and the South Korean Army will combine into a single deterrent, there will be no power vacuum created in the course of the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea.

The theory of Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality is more progressive than Kim II Sung's neutral unification policy. Since becoming a permanent neutral state in 1815, Switzerland has never been attacked by neighboring countries. In consequence, Switzerland has been one of the countries with the highest income due to the savings in military defense expenditure.

Permanent neutrality is more effective in its validity than the simple neutrality. It is because the effectiveness of permanent neutrality continues either in peace or in war. It is possible to say that, therefore, Kim Jong II's Swiss-like armed neutrality is closer to permanent neutrality than Kim II Sung's simple neutrality.

It is necessary to review what differences there are between Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality and the Military First Policy (Sŏn'gun ch'ŏngch'i) of North Korea. Kim Jong-II began to use the term "Military First Policy" (MFP) when he visited the 124th unit of the North Korean Army on January 1st, 1995. The Rodong Sinmun daily, however, first used the term MFP much later on May 26th, 1998 (Pak Hyŏn-ok, 2001, 175-6).

The general concept of the MFP is that the military has priority, which emphasizes the role of the military forces before that of the Workers' Party and helps to secure the military power over the external and domestic ones in North Korea (The Rodong Sinmun, May 26th, 1998).

Chŏng Sŏng-jang (2001, 88) believes that the special definition of the MFP is a political method, which has all the power of being able to unite the armed forces, the party, and the people for the national progressive movement towards the people's revolution and construction of North Korea.

In relation to the MFP, Kim Jong Il has increased his visits to the headquarters of military forces, specially treating them and maintaining his regime under the support of the armed forces. For example, among his fifty visits for on-the-spot guidance in 1996 he went to military camps a total of 37 times (74 percent), 67 percent in 1997, 70 percent in 1998, 59 percent in 1999, etc. (Ibid, 84).

It can be said that the MFP is one of the methods for internal rule in North Korea whereas Kim Jong Il's armed neutrality is a yardstick to measure the direction of North Korean foreign policy in the future. Though they seem to have little relation between them, they have some common factors. One is a means of currently maintaining Kim Jong Il's regime under the support of the North Korean armed forces, and the other is one of his concepts for the national survival of North Korean foreign policy based on the military power in the future.

IV. Studies on the Neutrality Policy of North Korean Scholars

1. Research on the Invalidation of Korea-Japan Annexation Treaty

There are a few North Korean Scholars who are currently working on the neutral unification policy of the Korean Peninsula. They are Yi Chong-h'yon, Chŏng Yong-nam, and Kim Kwan-gi, members of the North Korean Social Science Academy. They are largely researching the neutral problems including something to find out the invalid cause of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation agreement through the official diplomatic document of the permanent neutrality policy that was submitted by the Kojong (the 26th King of Yi Chosŏn Dynasty) to the Japanese government in September 1903 (The Chosŏn ilbo on February 8, 2001).
They attended the international conference on the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty which was sponsored by Harvard University and held at the University of Hawaii on January 25th through 28th, 2001. In the argument of the North Korean scholars, the invalid cause of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty is as follows:

Kojong did not want his country to be annexed by Japan; on the contrary, he wanted a self-reliant independence from the intervention of Japan. If Kojong had wanted Korea to become a part of Japan, he would not have submitted the official diplomatic document in which Kojong asked Japan to help Korea in achieving its independence through the policy of permanent neutrality. In this context, it is easy to understand that Kojong was not a man who wanted Korea to be annexed by Japan, but who wanted to attain a true independence. Therefore, the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty is entirely nullified (Yi Tae-jin, 2001).

It is remarkable for North Korean scholars to argue the invalidity of the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty in light of the permanent neutral foreign policy which Kojong pursued. Therefore, it is especially urged that the scholars of South and North Koreas should find more primary sources and data to invalidate the 1910 Korea-Japan annexation treaty. To achieve this purpose, it is necessary for the South and North Korean scholars concerned to study on the 1910 Korea-Japan treaty by thorough textual research based on their close cooperation which is needed more than ever.

2. North Korea's Interest in Neutral Unification of the Korean Peninsula

The Russian Broadcasting System reported that North Korea has been considering neutral unification similar to that of Switzerland (The Naeuwde tongsin, January 20th, 1998). In his interview with the Moscow Radio Broadcasting (MRB) on January 20th, 1998, Wain Dpacheko (spelling is not confirmed) said that in the past, the South Korean people argued strongly for permanent neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula like Switzerland, but now the North Korean people also believe that unified Korea should adopt a permanent neutrality for its foreign policy. Dpacheko further mentioned that South and North Korean scholars have not come to agreement on the political system of the unified Korea yet, but the North Korean scholars are seriously considering unified Korea as a permanent neutral state.

In 1961, the South Korean movement for permanent neutral unification was very popular because the South Korean people were able to take part freely in the social movement of Korean unification. For example, under the Chang M'yon government, a public opinion survey showed that a total of 32.1 percent of the South Korean people supported the neutralized unification of Korea (The Han'guk Ilbo, January 15th, 1961).

Dpacheko believes that a unified Korea could become either a friendly, neutral country with Russia or against it, but in considering the Russian position, it would be better for the Korean Peninsula to become a neutral state than a friendly state towards the United States. He argues that since Russia is located at the territorial boundary with the Korean Peninsula, Russia would like to see a unified Korea having no alliance with the United States.

After World War II, the Soviet Union provided the economic assistance to new, independent countries over the world in an effort to turn them into neutral states so as to prevent these states from becoming too friendly with the United States. Russia still prefers them to free themselves from the influence of the United States. In this context, Russia would like the Korean Peninsula to free itself from the United States influence. Therefore, Russia as well as China is anxious not to unify the Korean Peninsula into a country friendly towards the United States (Kim Gab-ch'ol, 1979, 295-9).

3. Kim Jong Il's Sons and Their Education in Switzerland

Kim Jong Il has three sons; the oldest is Kim Chong-nam, the second is Kim Chong-ch'ol, and the third is Kim Chong-wun. They each studied in Switzerland for more than 10 years. The oldest one attended an international school in Geneva from 1980 to 1989. The second and the third studied English and French at an international school in Beron from 1991 to 2001 (Wolgan Sindong-a, July 2001).

What is interesting is why Kim Jong Il let his sons study in Switzerland. Is there any possibility that there is some political connection between Kim Jong Il's Swiss-like armed neutrality and his sons' education there? Though it is hard to assume the real motives, a number of hypotheses can be made in this case.

First, it is well known that Swiss educational organizations' curriculum for foreign languages is very compatible for foreign students, especially in mastering French and German, which are used as the
Swiss official languages, and English. In Switzerland, moreover, there are many international organizations where foreign languages are rigorously used.

Second, the security organizations of Switzerland are well known for providing bona-fide protection to foreigners. The banks of Switzerland are likely to keep secret individual deposits. These merits that are offered by Switzerland for foreigners are said to help the safe education of Kim Jong Il’s sons.

Third, Switzerland is located at the center of Europe. Whenever Kim Jong Il’s family had the opportunity to travel to Europe, Switzerland seemed to have been a center for his family’s activities. Based on the above factors, it may not be improbable to think that Kim Jong Il particularly selected Switzerland not only for his sons’ field study and leadership in preparation for their future, but also in relation to his perspective on Swiss-like armed neutrality. This is not to say that their study in Switzerland will help them to understand the Swiss political system of permanent neutrality for their future leadership. If North Korea continues to pursue a foreign policy of Swiss-like armed neutrality in the future, North Korea might benefit from the Swiss model in becoming a neutral state.

V. Conclusion

The Korean Peninsula has been divided for more than a half century. Even though the question of Korean Peninsula’s unification is one of the foremost issues for the Korean people, the past political leaders of South and North Koreas have shown that their attention to Korean unification has mainly been related to the maintenance of their regimes.

The unification policies of South and North Koreas are now at opposite poles to one another. The South favors a confederation system, while the North wants a federation. Though there is not so much difference between the two systems, the two Koreas are still standing far from one another because they do not try to understand the other’s position.

In this political situation of the two Koreas, Kim Il Sung’s proposal for the neutral unification of the Korean Peninsula and Kim Jong Il’s view on the Swiss-like armed neutrality assume a critical meaning in the political process of Korea unification.

Kim Il Sung’s proposal for the neutral unification policy and Kim Jong Il’s perspectives on the Swiss-like armed neutrality are the first unification method that pushed the Korean Peninsula in the direction of neutral unification. Kim Il Sung’s proposal for neutral unification was based on an offensive unification policy in order to absorb South Korea into the socialist system, while Kim Jong Il’s armed neutrality seems closely related to the maintenance of his regime.

In order to apply Kim Il Sung’s neutral unification and Kim Jong Il’s Swiss-like armed neutrality on the Korean Peninsula, it is recommended that South Korea and the four powers should make an effort to achieve a neutral unification policy in Korea. So far, the positions of South Korea and the four powers concerning the neutrality of the Korean Peninsula are as follows:

Kim Dae-Jung, the former president of South Korea, said in June 1989 that after unification Korea would go to a permanent neutrality system along the model of Austria (Kim Dae-jung, 1994, 362).

In his letter to President Roh Moo Hyun, the Chief Justice, and the Speaker of the Assembly, Kang Y’ung-hun, the former Prime Minister and the Chairman of National Senior Association, recommended that the diplomatic and security policy of the Korean Peninsula in the future should follow permanent neutrality.

In the past, the United States was interested in Korea’s neutralization. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, signed a plan of South Korean neutrality in June 1953, in preparation for the military armistice of the Korean War. He submitted it to the joint conference of the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not accept Dulles’ idea. They believed that if South Korea had become a neutral state, it would become a satellite nation of the Soviet Union (Hwang In-Kwan, 1986, 798-801).

Other American individuals who shared a similar position to Dulles’ include General Albert Wedemeyer, Senator Mike Mansfield, Professor Robert A. Scalapino, Professor Zhigmiew Brezinski, Professor Gregory Henderson, Professor Edwin Reischauer, journalist Selig S. Harrison, etc (Ibid.; Yi Hong-dong et al trans, 2003, 526).

China wants the unified Korea to become neither a pro-American state nor a non-friendly state towards China, but prefers the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from Korea as soon as possible. In a public survey, some 62 percent of the Chinese scholars who are experts on the Korean issues support Korean neutralized unification and the withdrawal of the U.S. armed forces from South Korea. Therefore, China might want the Korean Peninsula to experience a neutralized unification (Mun Su-On et al, 1998, 98).
Russia is also known as a supporter for the Korean Peninsula to be unified in neutrality. It estimates that if the Korean Peninsula were to become a permanent neutral state, no kind of foreign troops could be stationed in united Korea since reunification would be premised on the withdrawal of foreign troops (Ibid.).

The above discussion indicates that the most related countries with immediate national interests in the unification of the Korean Peninsula are not unfamiliar with the neutrality of Korea. Therefore, the neutrality policy of North Korea will function positively for the unification of the two Koreas. If the North Korean government had strongly urged the neutral unification policy, its realization would have come sooner.

To realize its neutral unification policy initiated by North Korea, South Korea should play a major role for the neutral unification of Korea. This means that the willingness of the South Korean people is more important than that of other countries. Since the South Korean government has maintained its diplomatic relations with the four powers, it should assume a more active role in convincing the four powers to sign a treaty for permanent neutrality for Korea. Moreover, South Korea is in a military alliance with the United States, which has exercised the most influence over the Korean Peninsula.

In considering the current internal and external situation in the Korean Peninsula, it is believed that the will of the South Korean people and their government is essential in bringing the neutral unification of Korea. For South Korea to meet Kim Il Sung's neutral federation unification policy, the following actions are recommended:

First, South and North Koreas should select a hundred negotiators from each side, let them organize the confederation system of the Korean Peninsula and discuss unification methods such as the federation system of the North, the confederation system, or the neutral unification policy that Kim Il Sung had already proposed.

Second, South and North Koreas should operate a permanent organization such as 'South and North Korea Unification Promotion Committee' (SNKUPC) with a few working-level officials from the two Koreas and let them study everyday the political issues relating to the unification of Korea.

Third, in order to accelerate the unification process, the South Korean government, which is in a better position both politically and economically than North Korea, should take the initiative in creating a unification method that would benefit the South and the North as well as the four powers.

Lastly, the South Korean government should persuade the United States to make an effort for the unification of the Korean Peninsula since the U.S. was a main actor who divided it into the two Koreas.

There is a full possibility for the Korean Peninsula to realize its neutralized unification if the peoples of South and North Koreas strongly urge it on the four great powers.

Bibliography


The Origins of Low Trust in Korea and Italy

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- "Damned is he who trusts another."
- "Don't make loans, don't give gifts, don't do good, for it will turn out bad for you."
- "Everyone thinks of his own good and cheats his companion."
- "When you see the house of your neighbor on fire, carry water to your own."


I. The Problem of Trust in Korea and Italy

Trust is now considered an important basis for democratization, and social and economic development, the base of "social capital." In the political sphere, trust has been understood as a basis for civil participation and the development of democracy or as a basic condition for the synergy of state and civil society. In the economic sphere, trust has been known to facilitate market transactions, elevate the efficiency of government and business (Kramer and Tyler, 1996), and make possible the development of the overall national economy (Clague, 1997). In his book, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (Fukuyama, 1996), Francis Fukuyama considers trust as a factor that makes possible the formation of large business groups. In addition, trust plays an important role in reducing the uncertainty between persons and between institutions and in making society stable. When the members of organizations expect other members to behave honestly and that they are believable, we don't need to 'pay the cost of a suspicious mind.' Trust, the basis of social capital, is a lubricant that makes organization efficient (Fukuyama, 1999, p. 16).

In conclusion, trust is a necessary factor for economic growth and development, socio-political stabilization, and the formation of personal relationships. If transaction costs such as, contacts and judicial institutions, are decreased, the needs for contracts and prosecution will be reduced. If transaction costs are reduced, the possibility for economic growth is increased. Fukuyama emphasizes that trust is a precondition for highly industrialized societies in the 21st century and a necessary element not only for socio-political stability, but economic development.

The mass media in Korea proclaims that the recovery of trust in Korean society is one of the most important and immediate reform projects that Koreans have to accomplish. Social reforms in Korea have not been made successfully and public disappointment in Korean politics, economy, and society has increased. Korean people seem to believe that we need to overcome distrust or low trust in Korean society. For example, the win-win politics between government party and opposition parties is possible under conditions of trust. If the government party and opposition parties believe in the word of other parties, they can clear out the endless confrontations between them. Trust is also critically important to Korean economic growth. The financial crisis of Korea in 1997 resulted from international distrust of the Korean economy. When we don't trust a bank, we withdraw money from the bank. When international investors distrusted the future of the Korean economy, they withdrew their investment and portfolios, and South Korea reached the brink of bankruptcy. If we don't trust the market, the additional costs, that is, transaction costs, and inefficiency increase in the economy. If trust in government is low, citizens do not believe in the government and rely on Mafia protection for their lives and prosperity.

In this essay I will compare the historical origins and conditions that made South Korea and Italy (low) trust societies. According to Fukuyama, the characteristics of low trust societies are as follows: 1) weak intermediate associations; 2) a family-oriented society; 3) small businesses are the center of economy. The important characteristics of high trust societies are two: 1) spontaneous sociality and 2) strong solidarity for community. In other words a society of strong solidarity for community is a high-trust society, whereas a society of weak solidarity for community is a low-trust society. Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Italy, and France can be classified as low-trust societies. These societies cannot have large businesses. But the Korean government cultivated large business groups through its industrial policies of 1960-70. Small family businesses should prosper following the cases of China that depend on family. This is clear when we look at the cases of Korea's big business groups that have been managed by family members.
Fukuyama claims that in the case of southern Italy people show little trust in all others except family members (as is the case for the Chinese) and the power and number of intermediate associations between state and personnel are relatively weak and small. Also Italy lacks spontaneous sociability like China. Historically Italy was ruled by a "centralized and arbitrary state" and this state eliminated the intermediate associations and tried to control the life of associations. Fukuyama shows the examples of Montegrano in the southern part of Italy where Edward Banfield conducted research (Banfield, 1958, p.115-16; Fukuyama, 1996, p.141). Banfield pointed out that he was not able to find any kinds of social associations. The social activities only include the activities that were church and state made and centrally controlled. Putnam follows Banfield's arguments, explaining the differences between southern and northern Italy in the development of local autonomy. Putnam analyzes the number and role of "civic community" in the whole of Italy, which is not based on the blood ties and makes spontaneous sociability.

In this paper I do not start from the proposition that Korea is definitely a low-trust society from a Western point of view and the question of how to make Korea a Western high-trust country. I don't want to follow the mistakes of past modernization theorists who did not understand the characteristics of non-Western societies and argued that Westernization seems to be the best solution for all kinds of social problems in non-Western societies. For it is a matter of criteria whether society is low-trust or high-trust. Also the criteria can be chosen differently depending on the purposes. For example, Korean society shows high trust in inter-personal relations, but has a low-trust of public institutions and norms. It is argued that Korean society did not extend its high trust exhibited in the private sphere to the public sphere (Che-Hyok Yi, 1998).

Both Italy and Korea show high private trust and low public trust. This paper examines why two countries show the same phenomena and what are the historical origins of low public trust in a comparative historical perspective. How Italy has tried to overcome low public trust and what Korean society has to do to get over the problems of low public trust. If I can find out the similarities in the historical origins or causes of two countries' high private but low public trust, I can determine the differences between social conditions of low-trust and high-trust societies. With this kind of research, we can calculate the social cost which low-trust has resulted in. The huge amount of social cost will imply the necessity of trust buildup in low-trust societies and open up opportunities for raising the rate of trust in a society.

2. A History of Low-Trust Formation in Italy

Fukuyama classifies Italy as a low-trust society and explains the reasons why large companies are not well organized. The reasons come from Italy's familism. Is Italy really a low-trust country? Following [Table 1], Italy had shown the lowest rate of trust among European countries from 1976 to 1990. However, the gap in the trust rate between Italy and other European countries has decreased except in 1980, based on [Table 2].

[Table 1] The Change of Trust Rate among European Community

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Source: Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott, eds. Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance. Table 10.2 Kaase and Newton, 1995, p.120.
Table 2: The Difference in Trust Rate in European Community and Italy

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Source: Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. eds. Public Opinion and Internationalized Governance. Table 10.2 Kaase and Newton, 1995, p.120.

In *The Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba point out that Italy's political culture shows a low rate of trust. They explain that Italy has shown a political culture of suspicion, distrust, alienation, and low cooperation—a condition of low social trust. Ronald Inglehart points out that though there have been a lot of changes in Italy in the last few decades, the trust among people is still very low (Inglehart, 1991, p.183; Misztal, 1996, p.194). According to a survey of 1980, 24 percent of Italian people answered that they don't believe other Italians. Southern Italians showed a lower rate of trust than that of Northern Italians in the category of inter-personal trust. For example, 28 percent of Northern Italians answered that "they don't especially trust other Italians" or "they don't trust other Italians at all." However, Italians showed higher rates of trust for people of other countries than the rates of trust for other Italians. For example, 68 percent of Italians answered that they believe Americans. On the other hand, in the survey of 1990, only 3 percent of Italian people answered that they can believe other Italians (Misztal, 1996, p.194). When we look at the surveys of 1959-60, 1980, and 1990, Italians show relatively low rates of trust toward other Italians.

However, there is a controversial issue whether all areas of Italy should be classified as low-trust societies or not. Generally speaking, Italy can be divided into three parts, the Northwestern area, Central and Northeastern area, and Southern area. These three areas are different from each other in their economic development and socio-political structure. The first Italy includes the triangle area of northern Italy—Torino, Milano, and Genova (il triangolo industriale) an industrialized region where large companies are well established. The second Italy is the southern part of Italy covering the area below Rome and many islands, area where the economy relied on traditional agriculture. The third Italy covers two areas; the middle and northeast of Italy including Umbria, Toscana, Emilia, Romagna, and Veneto. The characteristics of the Second Italy are marginal economic activity, structure of society based on family, and politics of clientelism. The Third Italy has a very dynamic economy of small business production based on the cooperation between local government and small companies. The area of Emilia-Romagna ruled by the left coalition led by the Communist Party is the highest in the GNP per capita in Italy.

The local characteristics of the First, Second, and Third Italy come from the political, economic, and cultural differences. In northern Italy including Piedmont, Lombardy, and Friuli the portion of large companies is relatively high. But the portion of small companies is relatively high in the southern and Third Italy.

The regional differences and antagonism between northern and southern Italy originate from historical experiences. After the collapse of Rome, Italy was divided and conquered and ruled by foreign forces. In the 14th century Italy had two different patterns of governance. This became the origin of the socio-cultural differences of southern and northern Italy. While a communal republic was established in the northern part of Italy, a feudal autocracy took hold of the southern part. While, the northerners changed into "citizens," the southerners were made into "subjects." In the north the feudal bondage became weak and equal citizens appeared. In the south of Italy feudal bonds were strengthened and a hierarchical order of society was established. In the northern part of Italy public officials enjoyed legitimate authority, decided by the community, and they were responsible to the citizens. However, in the southern part kings monopolized authority and there was no need for the kings to be responsible to the people (Putnam, 1993, p.130). While a socio-political royalty and support based on a horizontal social order were built in the north of Italy, in the south there came to be a socio-political royalty and support based on a hierarchical order. As a result communal collaboration, mutual assistance, civic obligation, and trust were crucial virtues of citizens and extended the limits of family kinship in the northern Italy. But in the south hierarchy and order in society became important virtues (Putnam, 1993, p.130).

Though in the 17th century the republics of northern and middle Italy collapsed and were feudalized again, civic culture burgeoned with the implantation of northern Europe's culture. In the
south the legacies of a feudal autocracy continued. Frederick II’s rule was a feudalistic and centralized autocracy. King and nobles ruled people as predators and dictators. In other words the hierarchical social networks including extraction and subordination were fortified in southern Italy. While the tradition of association appeared under the horizontal social network in the north. The differences of hierarchical solidarity and horizontal network resulted in the differences of voluntary sociality.

The fact that foreigners, not Italians, for example, the Habsburg of Spain and the Bourbons, ruled all of Italy, the south of the territory of Pope between 1504 and 1860 is crucial for our understanding low trust in southern Italy. In the south Spanish rulers used distrust among people to aid Spanish domination. They taught subjects how to transfer their responsibilities to other subjects. This is the divide and rule (divide et impera) used by Bourbon Spaniards who replaced the Habsburgs in 1724. They tried to ignite disputes between the Neapolitans and Sicilians in order to make the divide and rule policy successful until 1861 when Italy was unified. For Sicilians the Bourbon domination and the Neapolitan domination were not much different (Gambetta, 1988, p.161) from each other.

In southern Italy the Italians’ poor living conditions were more serious and the Spanish kings’ heavy taxes were more severe than in other areas of Italy. The biggest rebellions rose in Naples and Sicily. The hunger and freedom from foreign rule ignited the rebellions. For example, in 1647 Naples raised the biggest revolt against Spanish rule. For a few months the “common people” (populo minuto) and populo civile who were composed of merchants and lawyers established an independent republic, but in 1648 the Spaniards conquered by force and ruled them again. But this resulted into the decline of the crown’s confidence in the barons and its policies were not in anybody’s long-term interests. For its policies had destroyed people’s trust and the cultural networks that sustained trust. In 1707, after the War of Spanish Succession, Naples was turned over to Austrian hands and in 1724 it became an independent kingdom under Bourbon rule (Pagden, 1988, p.128).

In south Italy, so-called “Mezzogiorno” under the Spanish rule, the distance between ruler and the ruled became wide and a patron-client system in politics was created (Putnam, 1993, p.138). Spanish rule destroyed the horizontal human networks and intentionally promoted mutual distrust and conflicts among people to maintain the hierarchical relationship of subordination and extraction. Anthony Pagden points out that distrust was facilitated on purpose and used to rule. The Spanish princes who lived far from the main territory they dominated adapted very malicious methods to maintain their rule. To use of force was not enough for them to maintain their rule. The methods were “divide and rule” (divide et impera) including creating distrust among people and turning neighbours against neighbor (depauperandum esse regionem). Paolo Mattia Doria explains that the Spanish crowns took away wealth and virtue and introduced ignorance, villainy, disunion and unhappiness. Because the main concern of the Castilian crown was secure revenues to fight foreign wars, they wanted to extract enough resources and strengthen political subordination. Therefore, the crown supported efforts by the nobles to squeeze people so long as the nobles met their requests (Pagden, 1988, p.132). Robert Putnam describes the conflicts among people as follows:

“The peasants were in constant competition with each other for the best strips of land on the latifondo, and for what meager resources were available. Vertical relationships between patron and client, and obsequiousness to the landlord, were more important than horizontal solidarities. As Bevilacqua has written for the period 1880-1920: ‘The peasant classes were more at war amongst themselves than with the other sectors of rural society; a war which fed off a terrain of recurring and real contrasts, both economic, psychological and cultural.’ That such attitudes triumphed can only be understood in the context of a society which was dominated by distrust...[T]he weight of the past, when combined with the failures of state authority after 1860 and the disastrous peasant-landlord relations...produced a society where fede publica (civic trust) had been reduced to a minimum: ‘chi ara diritto, muore disperato’ (he who behaves honestly comes to a miserable end) was a noted Calabrian proverb”(Ginsborg, 1990, p.33-34; Putnam, 1993, p.142).

The problem of differences between northern and southern Italy results in a dual structure in society such as “advanced vs. backward,” “modern vs. traditional,” “sound civil society vs. clientelismo society.” Putnam explains in his book Making Democracy Work (1993) why the introduction of local autonomy in 1970 in Italy was established successfully in the north, but not in the south. The reason why local autonomy was not successful in the South is the distrust among
people. The southerners do not believe each other. They are not successful in solving problems of public affairs by themselves and for themselves. The number of voluntary associations in the south is half that of those in the north. In the south hierarchical order types of organizations, such as the Sicilian Mafia, have succeeded instead of voluntary associations. The citizens of central and north Italy show the characteristics of "born participants" that Alexis de Tocqueville noted in Americans, but the southerners seem to have the features of the 'amoral familists' that Edward Banfield describes, people who seek material and short-term interest for their family and think others do same. In his book *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958), Banfield describes the features of a village in southern Italy with a culture oriented only towards the small family. Banfield finds the origins of amoral familism in Frederick II's domination of Sicily and Naples. He built an autocracy that suppressed independent movement and introduced a hierarchical societal order. There were no intermediate institutions between king and subjects. The church was able to play the role of an intermediary but it did so only to fortify autocracy.

But in northern Italy the church was apart of a burgeoning associative life that included guilds and other voluntary associations. Then Venice, Genova, and Florence enjoyed political autonomy as well as economic prosperity. These kinds of commercial activities and prosperity were possible under the conditions of a high trust culture.

According to Putnam the main feature of the South was the "uncivic," the lack of civic mindedness, called "incivisme" in French. Therefore the concept of equality as a "citizen" did not develop in the South. Public affairs belonged to someone else — i notabili, bosses, politicians, 'not for me.' People did not show interest in and did not participate in public affairs (Putnam, 1993, p.115). When comparing the number of voluntary associations in the South with the North, we conclude that in the south association was not important. Because civil solidarity and civic participation did not appear, people were not interested in what government was going to do. Putnam concludes that a civic culture results in trust, solidarity and tolerance, these exist in the North. The institutions in the North perform better than those in the South. [Figure 1] shows how civic involvement affects institutional performance. We can also conclude that the civic involvement influences socio-economic performance, not vice versa.
[Figure 1] Actual Effects among Civic Involvement, Socioeconomic Development, and Institutional Performance: Italy, 1900s-1980s

Note: Arrow a. civic continuity; Arrow b. the effect of economics on civics; Arrow c. the effect of civics on economics; Arrow d. socioeconomic continuity; Arrow e. contemporary civic engagement; Arrow f. socioeconomic development.

Source: Putnam, 1993, p.157. Figure 5.6.
In 1950, after World War II, the Italian government established *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* and tried to industrialize the South, which remain relatively backward in economic terms. The government poured in a huge amount of money and tried to eradicate poverty and other Southern problems in the name of "special intervention (l'Intervento straordinario)." Though there were some positive results in agricultural reform and industrialization, the result was that bureaucracies took care of their own interests using a self-serving investment policy and through collusion with the Mafia. Due to these kinds of negative effects, the 'special intervention' did not create the desired industrial bases for autonomous development and a democratic civic culture (Kang, 2000, p.75).

Putnam argues that the appearance of the gang association in the South is the result of a culture of horizontal distrust and vertical exploitation/dependence for over a thousand years (Putnam, 1993, p.148). The Mafia is well known as an institution based on paternalism and strong trust among only (family) members. The Mafia is famous for its strong internal trust and internal code of behavior called "*I'morto.*" The members of the Mafia (Mafiosi) are called "men of honor"(Fukuyama, 1999, p.16). However, the internal norms of the Mafia are not extended to the outside, to non-Mafia members. The most important norms outside Sicilian society are "use others except family members. Otherwise, they will deceive you." These kinds of norms do not lead to social cooperation or contribute to social and economic development. Organized criminality appears when there is a lack of intermediate associations between the government and the people; this makes the corruption of political and economic elites possible.

The Mafia organizes on and develops on a ground of distrust. Diego Gambetta considers the Mafia and the system of patronage as the price of distrust. He also identifies amoral familism or misguided individualism, where people ignore others' misfortune and seek only their own interests, as the source of a Mafia culture. Whether this kind of culture of distrust exists or not explains the reason why only the South and not other areas of the Mediterranean has the Mafia (Gambetta, 1993, p.77). The Habsburg's intentional policy of divide and rule resulted into the destruction of public trust (la fede pubblica) and the maintenance of personal trust (la fede privata). People seek shelter in the private arena of family and close friends, avoiding social injustice, aggression, and unpredictability. Schelling also sees that the Mafia arises in places where public interest destroys personal trust and cooperation, rather than creating them (Schelling, 1984; Gambetta, 1988, p.159).

From an economic point of view the Mafia fills the socio-economic vacuum that appears in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. From a political point because people distrust public protection, due to the inexistence of institutionalized public/government protection, they turn to hierarchical personal loyalty and the Mafia offers this kind of protection. The Mafia appears when public protection does not work and when conflicts arising from a lack of trust cannot be solved (Gambetta, 1993).

Quoting Leopoldo Frannchette's words, the landlord in Tuscany, who traveled to Sicily, Gambetta points why the Mafia appeared in Sicily. First, there are no credible or effective systems of justice and law enforcement. Sicilians did not believe in fairness or the protection of the law in the 17th century. Therefore, Sicilians sought other institutions to protect them. This is the main reason why the Mafia appeared. Second is the lack of a reliable central agency. After people in the South fail many times to find public institutions to protect them, they try to find any private institution. In the case of the Pisticci people, they developed a system of patronage rather than the Mafia. Here we find the economic cause for the Mafia’s emergence. If we cannot rely on the law, we cannot trust, trade will stall, and cooperation without personal connections will not be easy. In this situation society will turn to other forms of discipline. Gambetta explains one additional cause for the Mafia’s emergence—low social mobility in the southern Italy. When trust is lacking and there are severe restrictions on social mobility, the inducement for specialization as a means to achieving a superior position over one’s peers is weak and “a deeply fragmented social world” results (Gambetta, 1988, p.162-3).

Then why did the Mafia emerge in western Sicily? Gambetta explains that in eastern Sicily the upper class maintained their monopoly on power and defended successfully the challenges from the lower class wanting a share of power. The solidarity of the upper class was strong and made the transition form a late feudal system without the social tensions that happened in the west of Sicily.

The necessary conditions for the emergence of a Mafia were present in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this perspective some features of feudalism overlap those of
socialism. Few people have property rights or the right to resort to violence. Respect for property is maintained at the end of feudalism and socialism. People who have a lot of wealth increase their wealth and property rights move from the few to many. However, the right to violence is not transferred to the wealthy and thus they fear losing their property and the demands of trust on public institutions soars. If the government meets these demands, there will be no problems resulting from the lack of trust. But in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union there were no clear laws to protect private property rights not capable government institutions to secure property rights and stable financial institutions. Because it would take long time to set up these laws and institutions, people turned to private institutions to provide these kinds of services (Gambetta, 1993, p.252).

Trust in the former Soviet Bloc countries—with societies that experienced fear and suspicion under totalitarian regimes—was relatively lower than in Western countries. The ruling Communist party destroyed the institutions that strengthened traditional values and tried to disorganize the family system and downgrade the value of responsibility, respect, and autonomy. During the period of transition, the new system failed to restore the former traditional values. In this situation the Russian Mafia replaced the former Communist party and took over the rights to use violence. The Russian Mafia consisted of the former Red Army, former members of the Communist Party, and people who built their confidence, providing private justice in the Soviet market (Gambetta, 1993, p.253).

3. Low Trust in Korean Society

Where does the high rate of distrust, injustice, and corruption in Korea come from? The overall crisis of Korean society results from the overflow of traditional private trust and its misuse, and the lack of public trust that maintains social integration. Who bears responsibility for this crisis of low trust? Here I examine the origins of low public trust in Korean society.

The origin of low public trust in Korean society goes back to the distortion of modernization. What does "trust (信)" mean in traditional Korean society? "Trust" implies a "regime's legitimacy, in other words, trust from people" in the context of the Confucian tradition. The trust was the combination of "trust from people" and "confidence from the heaven." "Mangmin (閏民)" is when "politics do not acquire trust from people, when it deceives and exploits people. Examples of "mangmin" include "laws that change day and night, the ordinances that government officials change for themselves, and policies that are good only for officials and their friends." (Han, 1999, p.7)

The Confucian tradition of trust was marred by Japanese colonial policy that was based on the oppression and exploitation of Korean people. After Korea became a colony of Japan, the Korean tradition of community was intentionally destroyed by the Japanese colonial government. In sum, the unity, cooperation, and trust among Koreans were intentionally destroyed by Japanese colonial rule. The colonial government adopted a divide and rule policy by using Korean collaborators and promoted distrust and conflict among Koreans. The colonial policy of co-option resulted in the elimination of civic trust among Koreans and the building of hierarchical relationships between the Japanese colonial government and individual Koreans. In other words the Japanese colonial government focused on breaking down traditional relationship between Koreans and establishing relationships between pro-Japanese privileged Koreans and the Japanese colonial government. Because under Japanese colonial rule the "public" implied Japanese imperialism for Koreans, Koreans had to strengthen the structure of trust among Koreans and the building of hierarchical relationships between the Japanese colonial government and individual Koreans. In other words the Japanese colonial government focused on breaking down traditional relationship between Koreans and establishing relationships between pro-Japanese privileged Koreans and the Japanese colonial government. Because under Japanese colonial rule the "public" implied Japanese imperialism for Koreans, Koreans had to strengthen the structure of trust based on family members and relatives. The Japanese colonial rulers and their government and its policy were the targets of distrust. The laws, institutions and education which the Japanese provided did not attract the trust of Koreans, for they seemed to benefit only the Japanese. In conclusion, during the Japanese colonial period there was no space for Koreans to build public trust.

After liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, there were chances for Koreans to establish public trust based on their own constitution and economic system. However, due to the chaos that ensued in politics, economics and society, and the Korean War of 1950 and the establishment of a long military dictatorship, it was not easy to build social trust. We also must look at the effect that the military rule had, it destroyed civic relationships and strengthened a
hierarchical social order. The military government worked as an obstacle for building public trust among people.

South Korea's rapid economic growth has been called a "compressed, rapid modernization." During the economic growth its "growth first ideology" justified public institution measures that focused only on goals, rather than process. The concentration on national goals yielded Korea's economic miracle, but broke the trust in government, public institutions, and legal processes. Economic efficiency took precedence over "due process." People also began to distrust the process of wealth accumulation of the chaebol (business conglomerates), because they saw how the business groups used government privileges in collusion with politicians. Therefore, people consider government's confiscation of illegal capital accumulation as normal and government's redistribution of wealth as natural. The government's encroachment on property rights seems to be normal. In this situation big business groups and some capitalists depended on the regime's or politicians' protection in their pursuit of wealth. This is how collusion between Korea's capitalists and politicians emerged. There are no differences between the powerful politicians' protection of large capitalists in Korea and the Mafia's protection of businessmen in economic activities in Italy.

4. The Comparison of the Origins of Low Trust in Korea and Italy

In the case of Korea, it is difficult to deny the existence of the "amoral familism" or exclusive familism that Banfield describes. The cohesion of family and exclusion of strangers are very strongly rooted in Korean society: nepotism, regionalism, chaebol management by family members, sectionalism in party management, are all characteristic of Korean society. When people emphasize only their own family or relatives, it means they also exhibit 'exclusive familism' and a competitive spirit towards other families. Also the norms that are applied to their own family members are different from those that are applied to other families. If anybody becomes the members of their family, the members forgive almost of everything of him. The family norms do not transfer into the norms of community and the whole of society. The more serious implication is that people put family's interests and family's glory before public interest. For example, anyone who has power puts his family, relatives and followers at the center of the power and excludes and criticizes others despite their merits (Kuk, 1998, p.6). This is the origin of regionalism and nepotism in Korean society and the reason why social justice does not work in Korean society. This is also the origin of low trust in Korea.

Korea's regionalism in politics, for example, the voting behavior and decision-making process, is the extension of Korean familism. Why do people vote for candidates with whom they are familiar with because of name, school ties or birthplace? Because when voters and candidates are interwoven in the name of family ties or school ties or birthplace, voters can trust these candidates. In other words, voters calculate that after the candidates are elected, they cannot betray their voters' interests precisely because of the ties of family, school and birthplace.

Why do chaebol manage their companies with their family members? Why do Korean chaebols show the characteristics of "family capitalism"? The entrepreneurs who were successful in business and built the chaebols do not trust managers who are family members. They think they have established companies, and they and their family own the companies and their interests are companies' interests. The problems of amoral familism can be solved, only when Korean people extend their trust on family to the public sphere.

The "Chop'ok (Mafia in Korea) syndrome" in Korea can also be explained by amoral familism. Koreans have two contrasting points of view on the "Chop'ok" which means 'gangster violence." One is the view that gangster violence should be eliminated because they violate laws and destroy social order. But on the other hand gangster culture looks good, because that culture puts its priority on organization or group's interests before individuals' interest. This kind of attitude reflects the culture of Korean familism. Due to the loss of trust in laws people depend on violence and the fear from violence. People rely on the logic of power based on violence, not laws. Why are Koreans so accepting of the logic of power based on violence"? They experienced the rule of the Japanese military government and later the military coups of 1961 and 1980. Korean became accustomed to be governed by violent powers. It is very interesting that the Japanese colonial government and the Park military government had tried to eliminate all other domestic gangster
groups. However, there are not many differences between gangster culture that gangster members show loyalty only for group's own interests and their boss, and military culture that soldiers have to devote for their nation or their own group's interests and their generals.

In Korean society it is not easy to find large active voluntary associations that developed from small blood-tie groups or regional associations. Most large (voluntary) associations have been managed by a small amount of people who are connected by "school ties," "regional ties," and "blood ties" (Fukuyama, 1996, 150). The family centered (or blood centered) management of institutions appears in business organizations, the mass media, private universities, and even religious institutions. However, there are a lot of social criticisms of this.

Family organization is the basic institution to build trust among members and the starting point from which to spread trust to society. Cultural similarities between Italy and South Korea can be found in that the two countries rely heavily on family ties. Voluntary associations that connect family and state do not develop well in societies such as Italy and Korea. However, there are some differences between these two. For example, though Italy developed small businesses based on family, Korea developed large business groups. But clearly the similarities between Italy and Korea in their lack of spontaneous intermediate associations and the organization of gangsters have their origins in colonial domination.

However, when we explain the problem of distrust in the south of Italy with the tradition of the Norman dynasty's authoritarian state, we have to figure out how the medieval tradition of history influences the 19th and 20th century's reality. Theoretically it is easy to refer all kinds of social problems to the experiences of colonial period, but there is the cultural determinism. It is not proper to conclude that trust is the source of all kinds of virtues and distrust all kinds of social diseases. We need to draw cautious hypotheses and conclusions.

It should also be mentioned that another hypothesis is possible. It is argued that because the farmers of southern Italy sought short-term interests, and they were not able to develop communitarian social solidarity, this resulted into socio-economic backwardness. But the reverse is also possible: the backwardness is not the "result," but "cause" (Filippucci, 1997, p.54; Kang, 2000, p.86). Trust is involved in all kinds of commercial transactions. Therefore, the other side of economic growth and backwardness reflects whether trust exists or not. This implies that the hypothesis that amoral familism resulted in economic backwardness seems to be more reasonable than the hypothesis that economic backwardness concluded amoral familism. However, there is the possibility of a vicious circle of low trust-amoral familism-poverty-patronage political system. Now we need to draw cautious conclusion on the colonial experience as the origin of low-trust.

Geoffrey Hawthorn argues that Japanese colonial domination resulted in malicious distrust in Korean society. Because the Japanese colonial government collaborated selectively with Koreans, Koreans themselves were not sure who among them was collaborating with the Japanese (Hawthorn, 1988, p.122). After liberation from Japanese colonial rule, Korea experienced continuous social turmoil such as farmers' move into urban areas, the emergence of industrial workers, rapid urbanization. These kinds of social changes created tensions in Korean society between 1945-60s. The military coup of 1961 and military rule that ensued were not "escapable" matters. Gambetta says, when a Mafia disappears, another big and well-organized Mafia appears. When the violence of Japanese colonial rule disappeared, a new violence of military rule surged. Because the military had a monopoly over coercion means in Korea, it did not allow any regional Mafia who wanted to share the power of patronage. Also the state owned intelligence agency, the KCIA, used distrust in Korean society to maintain the military regime. The KCIA resorted to exaggerating the possibilities of a North Korean invasion and to arresting 'traitors' based only on rumors in order to fortify the military rule (Hawthorn, 1988, p.124).

5. Conclusion: The Ways to Build High-Trust in Korean Society

The distrust in politicians, distrust in government, distrust in education, distrust in law enforcement, etc. have taken hold in Korean society. Though distrust is a matter of degree, the overall distrust in politicians, government, education, and law enforcement imply that corruption is evident in every aspect of society and the law has not been enforced properly. Does all this mean
that trust does not exist in Korean society? It is well known that fede privata is high, though fede pubblica is low in Korean society. For example, private groups within public institutions through personal networks have prevailed. Groups based on people from the "same region" or from the "same high school" exist and people turn to these private networks in their attempts to solve public issues such as taxation and law enforcement.

How can public trust be increased? De Tocqueville argues that civic community or civic associations should be prosperous. Civil associations, religious associations, moral associations, choruses, and leisure clubs can be organized without considering age, occupation, and race. People learn how to cooperate and how to follow rules and laws and how to share responsibilities and how to trust each other in these associations. If these kinds of civic associations for public trust are successful, private groups, that is, private networks will weaken.

In the levels of personal as well as Korean society how can we restore the high degree of trust? Distrust can spread easily, but trust cannot be restored easily. First of all, we need to build a society run by "law." The rules of the game should be fair and law should be enforced correctly and fairly. Audit systems to evaluate a company’s managerial achievement should be fortified. Ownership and management should be divided in chaebol companies, the media, churches, and schools. A recall system or congressmen evaluation system to oversee politicians should be introduced. The judicial system, prosecutors, and police organizations should be independent from political influences. As Jae-Yul Lee argues, the "institutional basis to make possible the social cooperation and consensus to overcome the traditional bondage and trust should be build up" (Che-Yol Yi, 1998b, p.88).

The lessons of Korea are different from those of Western societies. Western democracies and capitalism were born from the institutionalization of distrust and the moral loophole has been filled by trust. But Korean society did not build fully legitimate public institutions that went beyond private trust. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate cultural traditions and customs critically. As Southern Italy lacked trust as a source of social capital because of "amoral familism," Korea had an authoritarian tradition, which emphasized hierarchical relationships rather than horizontal relationships, and regionalism which depends on familism, school ties, and regional ties. The most important mission for Korean society is to strengthen a social system in which a promise is a promise rather than a problem, and a law is a law, rather than a lie.

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A comparative experience of a Korean psychotherapist working in New Zealand: The origins of we-ism and its pathology

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The Impetus for the Study

A Korean woman in her mid 30's called me one day to ask about psychotherapy. I explained the process, the therapist's role, and the fees etc., and she said "I'll think about it" and hung up. A few days later she called again and with questions concerning confidentiality issues. The therapist assured her with an explanation of the New Zealand therapist's code of ethics as set up by the New Zealand Association of Psychotherapists, then she said "I see" and hung up. A week later, she called and asked again about the length, outcome and efficacy of therapy. Finally, she and I made an appointment, but she did not turn up; she called the following day, saying that "I was not sure whether I to come or not. Give me one more week to decide." A couple of days later, she called again for an appointment and promised that she was definitely coming and she actually came on the day.

The initial issues she brought were that she had been suffering from insomnia and depression. From the second session she was eager to talk about her difficulties and in the third session, she disclosed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Having worked for three months, the outcome of the therapy was visible but the client was rapidly becoming emotionally dependant on the therapist. Therapy was concluded because of the danger of a breach of ethics and she was referred to another professional therapist upon mutual consent.

A Pakeha woman in her early 30's called me and asked about therapy in general and made an appointment on the phone. She turned up on time for the therapy and the issues she brought were difficulties in socialising and conflicts with her family. The therapeutic relationship was built gradually but slowly. Having worked for a year or so, one day she disclosed that she had been sexually abused by her father. Even though she disclosed the issue very tardily, therapy kept going for another year without any risk of professional breach. The positive outcomes were seen and both agreed to finish the work at the time she was going to move to another city.

I have worked as a Korean psychotherapist in New Zealand for almost eight years and have had a number of therapy sessions with both Korean and Pakeha clients. (This study focuses on these two groups and so other ethnic groups will be excluded.) These experiences have given me some very interesting insights into certain particular tendencies in the Korean clients which are rarely seen in the Pakeha clients.

As illustrated earlier in the two cases cited in which both people are of similar ages, same sex and comparable core therapy issues, differing only in cultural origin. Here we see definite cultural trends in people suffering from problems such as depression, anxiety or eating disorders in their methodology of the process of contacting and entering the actual therapy place, building rapport and developing the therapeutic relationship. Korean clients tended to be very cautious in entering the therapeutic environment. Usually they call several times with many questions before setting a time for actual therapy. Even after setting-up an appointment, some turned up but some did not; the latter tended to call and say something like, "I need some more time to think about it".

This may be due to a lack of understanding of psychotherapy and the imagined stigma surrounding it, resulting in this aspect being more obviously found in Asian populations (Sue & Sue, 1990; Baruth & Manning, 1991; Tzeng & Straltzer, 1997) regardless where the research has been conducted. According to my clinical diary, the average number of phone calls made before actual face-to-face consultation is 2.5 times per person for Koreans compared to 1.2 times for Pakeha. However, contradictorily, once Korean clients entered into the therapeutic environment the building of rapport and the establishment of a trusting relationship -- which are vital components in the therapeutic process (Jeong, 2000) -- progressed significantly faster than with Pakeha clients. The Korean clients usually brought out the skeletons in the cupboard with little hesitation, thus almost immediately disclosing issues which had
long been hidden. It seems to be a definite trend that once the initial difficulty of Korean clients to come into the place of therapy was overcome and they engaged in the relationship, the degree of therapeutic intimacy was established almost immediately in most cases. Another tendency found was that I, as the therapist, had to be constantly concerned with keeping the professional boundaries very clear. Many clients, for instance, invited me to dinner or to lunch, or for a cup of tea at a café, or they would often call at times out of therapy. Further, some cases presented a definite danger because of covert, psychological invitations into a symbiotic relationship(1) which could bitterly threaten the therapeutic relationship; this was seldom seen in cases involving Pakeha clients unless they suffered Borderline Personality traits. From these two remarkably different characteristics of the Korean client group with that of the Pakeha group, much attention was put into peeling off the layers of the collective cultural unconsciousness. Some of these attitudes can be understood by looking at Korean culture whilst some dimensions are not able to be fully understood with existing Korean psychological theories. With these small seeds of evidence from my own clinical practice, this study aims to stretch these questions to analysing core psychological elements piled up by the culture and the social environment in the historical experience of clients.

Objectives of the study
This study explores Korean culture and the way Koreans formulate relationships from the psychoanalytic and psychopathological perspective. Driven by the researcher’s professional background, the collective tendencies shown by the Korean clients will be examined in its application to everyday life in Korean culture. The study is particularly aimed at investigating the social pathology of we-ism in Korean society - which partly originates from individual pathology - and which implies the offering of suggestions on how to make Korean society mentally more healthy.

Limitations of the study
First of all, the most significant limitation in this study is the methodology used. No form of qualitative or quantitative approach, commonly used in academic research, was used and so it could be said that the study is "unscientific". However, it is based on a number of actual cases producing considerable serious material from both cultures, and so the nature of the study is an explorative attempt to suggest different perspectives in helping us to understand Korean culture and psychology. The variables of the social environment in which the Korean clients find themselves can also be counted for as a second limitation. As immigrants whose English is limited and who are getting less social and family support than that which they were used to in their host population (Hurh & Kim. 1984; Noh & Avison, 1996), making them more dependent in attitude on mental health professionals from the same ethnic and cultural background is a variable to be almost expected (Lee, 2000; Shin, 2000). Thus this therapist finds himself in a unique situation in New Zealand. It is supposed that a Western psychotherapist and/or a Korean psychotherapist in Korea working for both Korean and Western clients might experience similar dimensions. If this were to be found then this study could become more valid and more congruent. However, no such study has been made according to my extensive research through available literature.

Lastly, the therapist’s own cultural understanding of Koreans and the consequential therapeutic approach taken based on that understanding could be considered another variable. A therapist’s broad and deep understanding of a client’s culture definitely makes the relationship progress faster and become established on more solid ground. The fact of my being Korean could make the work easier with Korean clients but this cannot be an advantage for the Pakeha clients, even though the experience of having lived in New Zealand for many years would surely help. This issue is also closely related to the second limitation.

Illustrations of Korean culture in accordance with the cases and the tendencies
The analysis of the layers and formation of the system for building and maintaining relationships for Koreans in their cultural background is the basis of various major studies. Quite a few scholars have surmised that Korean culture can be defined as collectivistic, the society as hierarchical, and family as patriarchal based on Confucianism. Choi, Sang Jin, who is one of the leading scholars in Korean psychology and has devoted much time and effort to finding the elements of the culture from a psychologist’s point of view, has explained that Koreans have a strong social attitude illustrated by their tendency to split we (friends, seniors and juniors, and/or families) from others (naam), according to bonds set up in school, through blood relationships, hometown, or work place ties.

Even the rapid modernization of Korean society has not changed this, the most powerful agent for one to make an immediate relationship with a stranger. The most common questions heard when a Korean
meets a new person are: "Which town (or province) are you from?" or "Which school did you graduate from?" or "What's your ancestral home (bon-kwan)?" (if they have the same surname) or "Do you know Mr. A who graduated from the same school with you?" (if they cannot find any ties) (Lee, 1999; Lee 2000) and finally "how old are you?" Through these questions, if any connections are found, after becoming we, they then try to sort out who is the senior or the junior (social hierarchy). Then they call each other brother (hyung or dongsang), treating each other like family members (patriarchal family system. In a more authoritarian relationship, they take on a teacher-student or parent-children (uncle-nephew) relationship. The older is supposed to take care of the younger, who in turn is expected to respect the senior in the social hierarchy. If nothing is found, then they may remain as naam until they build a relationship in another way. This is the ritual for Korean 'men' in a normal social networking situation.

Environmental psychology emphasises that the structure of one’s place and environment can influence one’s emotional and psychological state. The opposite is also true. The structure of a place also represents the psychological and environmental outcomes especially in a cultural context (De Young, 1999; Stokols & Altman, 1987). By looking at Korean traditional architecture when entering a house (especially the house of a nobleman) telltale signs can be seen. It is fairly difficult to enter such a house with the high gate in conjunction with thick and solid walls, called sot-ul-dae-moon. These features always prohibited any stranger from coming in easily. In the old days, a guest must have permission to come through the gate and this involved a certain ritual. Interestingly enough, when the guest was permitted to come in, he was directly led to the master's room. There was no lounge or living area in the traditional Korean house structure, and secrecy was not guaranteed as all the doors were made of paper, in contradiction to the solid, high gate and the strict entering ritual.

In a Western house, as seen in almost every house in New Zealand, there is a living area for guests and to get each room, the guest should go through the door between the living area and the corridor and in this way another door is reached leading into each room. Guests are not usually led to the master’s bedroom for a chat.

This demonstrates a good parallel to the process usually pursued by Koreans in building relationships, including the therapeutic relationship. For the client, when overcoming the difficulties in establishing any ties with the therapist, they proceed to call several times before having the face-to-face therapy. This is akin to the ritual they felt that they had to get through in order to enter the house. However, once they actually get into the relationship, it seems that no secrets are kept. On the other hand, Western clients take the process step by step when inviting me into their inner world. The therapeutic relationship with Western clients has to be kept in 'the living area' for a while, in contradiction to the Korean cases which had no need to stay in that area (or even there may be no such area) but went straight to the 'master’s bedroom'.

The problem of the symbiotic relationship which threatened the therapeutic relationship mentioned before was not a rare phenomenon and it can be understood in the types of cultural context which we have cited. Once the clients and the therapist became ‘we’, secrecy is overcome and there is an immediate trusting relationship. It can be said that keeping any secrets usually means that one does not trust the other and that their relationship remains distant. Park & Kim (2005) indicate that trusting, which is usually testified by how much they share secrets, is the most important factor for Koreans in forming we-relationship. In such a close relationship, there is a degree of emotional dependency as well. Inevitably, as the relationship deepens, the clients tend to demand more personal and emotional closeness from the therapist (which is not necessarily erotic), thus treating the therapist as a brother or uncle as well as a teacher.

A therapeutic relationship is the extremely condensed form of a relationship with one’s own cultural, historical, social context and one’s life history (Fromm-Reichmann, 1975; Ogden, 1986). All these aspects can occur immediately, automatically and also unconsciously (Ganzarian, R. 1989) when one is in a mentally critical situation.

The Problems of the analysing Korean culture and relationship formation
A few Korean psychologists (Park & Kim, 2005; Choi, 2003; Choi & Kim 2001, Jo, 2003) and sociologists (Jo, 1988; Jo, 1999; Lee, 19) have tried to analyse the formulation and the origin of we-ness or we-ism which contains the core feature of Korean culture. This study was inspired by the feminist psychoanalysts Gilligan and Chodorow, feminist sociologist Wolf (1972, 1985) influencing

By reviewing these theories, the main challenge in this study has been to question those attempts which are mostly based on the fact that Korean society has been a male dominant culture. Inevitably, the maternal culture or matriarchal aspects have been significantly forgotten whenever Korean culture has been analysed. Therefore I have chosen to stress the importance of maternity and the psychological and emotional influence of women in Korean families; this has been done in order to try to figure out the origins of we and its pathology.

The Korean family system is unique in that it is defined in a very narrow and strict sense. The system demands a more blood-oriented family than in other societies. Having a son is the most important responsibility for women because it is only through the son that the family name and heritage are handed down. In Joseon and in modern Korea, unlike Western countries, the reason a married woman does not change her surname to that of her husband is not because her own family heritage is respected but because she is still treated as 'the odd one out' within her husband's family (Lee, 2001). In spite of this, women are still expected to obey their husbands as well as their parents-in-law.

It is pointless to discuss here the fact that the status of women in the Joseon Dynasty. At that time, their situation was so miserable that they did not even have basic human rights nor were they treated with human dignity. However, it could be argued that women were not only victims but they tended to support this unfair condition autonomously (Jo, 1989; Joo, 1986; Jo, 2000). From one point of view, the Confucian patriarchal conditions strictly removed women's right, but it has to be recognized that the society successfully assimilated women within its rule. It was because of the emphasis on filial piety and the power of the uterine family (Wolf, 1972 recited in Jo 2000). Sons should be devoted not only to their fathers but also to their mothers, besides, in uterine families, where motherhood plays the principal role, emotional intimacy centred on the mother had equal power to official rule. In this way, women held their sons and daughters-in-law completely under their control. It was in this way that women in Confucian society survived and even managed to enlarge and firmly establish their domestic power.

In other words, there was no doubt that bringing up children was not considered men's work but that of the mothers. The society strongly encouraged children to achieve a high standard of education in order to pass the government exam. Once the children succeeded, the mother was extremely respected even being called a 'great mother'; this is so even in modern Korean society. The mothers of outstanding scholars, like Shin Sa im dang, the mother of the great scholar, Lee Hwang, were honoured all round and even received compensation from her husband's family (The Academy of Korean Confucianism, 2001). Therefore, it has been common practice in Korean families for mothers to greatly prefer sons to daughters and, in addition, they hold on to the son psychologically and emotionally very tightly throughout his life.

Domestically, when a daughter-in-law became a mother-in-law, the family dynamics changed, taking on a different dimension within the matriarchic hierarchy. The sons as well as the daughters-in-law were under the mother's control, a relationship maintained by the expected strong adherence to the Confucian ideal of filial piety.

Having discussed the role of women in the traditional Korean society and the fact that they had a certain space in which to create and maintain their own power which significantly influenced the next generation, it is interesting to find that these aspects of Korean society have mostly been overlooked in analysing Korean culture and relationships. Choi, S. J. (2000, 2001, 2002) has extensively developed different theories about Korean culture from a psychologist's point of view. Jo, G. H (2001, 2003) who also has developed his theories to explain the mechanism of Korean culture, based on extensive research seems to have missed this important part of Korean culture. None of these scholars pay attention to the importance of women in the Korean human world. It is my rough but psychoanalytic guess that the Korean psychologists may not be conscious that they are still living in the Confucian, male-centric world personally as well as academically. By missing the point of the role of women, it seems that they fail to explain the we-ism and a lot of the social corruption, illegal transactions, and collective selfishness, the prominent social phenomena within the relationship of, and under the excuse of we.

Discussion
It must be noted that the points made above do not indicate that women in the Joseon Period and in modern Korean society have equal power with men and that women are responsible for the social problem of their status. Rather, women have had to create a way of survival under the enormously suppressing weight of a totally male-dominated society. This argument is actually the starting point of the study.

The two leading feminist psychoanalysts, Chodorow (1989) and Gilligan (1988, 1995) have offered a conspicuous paradigm for viewing the psychology of the human world especially in terms of the mother-child relationship. According to Chodorow, authoritarian-aggressiveness is a typical feature of masculine, male-dominant cultures, and sociable-intimate relationships are derived from femininity (1989, p24). In psychoanalytic terms, women are less individualistic than men and have more flexible ego boundaries.

These views may offer solid evidences to prove that we-ism originates not only from masculinity but that it is derived in conjunction with femininity, especially in a society where the uterine family is strongly formulated (Wolf, 1972, 1985). Further, this is what we can see in societies where motherhood and womanhood have been crushed by several layers of hierarchical authoritarianism. In the Joseon Period, the royal family and the yangban (privileged) class were at the top of the hierarchy. However, the truth is that Joseon (even from Goryeo) paid homage to the Chinese dynasty as their master country and that Joseon was considered an independent but a subject state to China. Above the royal family and the yangban class, people had a higher layer in their society. It is presumed that the royal family and yangban class of people felt an unconscious inferiority because of their second-class ethnic identity. One with inner inferiority shows tendencies in discriminating socially less-powered people according to class, race, status, and/or gender.

Therefore, women had three social layers crushing them: the Chinese dynasty, the Royal family, and the yangban, three more domestic pressures from the husband, his extended family and also from the mother-in-law. In this context, women have been consciously and/or unconsciously subjected to an extremely thick and heavy pressure from the masculine and hierarchical powers above them resulting in a possible sense of inferiority. When considering such an environment, the image of a massive grave engulfing healthy femininity comes to mind.

What should be considered from this point of view is that Korean women's and men's femininity may have developed in a totally distorted way. By and large, the anima (for men) and the animus (for women) may both be adversely affected by this abnormal society. Unhealthy femininity caused by an unhealthy society has cyclically generated unhealthy behaviour and attitudes in relationships through their children. Women's animus was only encouraged for women's own compensation through their children's succession. To achieve their goal, women would do anything possible to achieve their end. The famous story about Mencius' mother has strong implications in the devaluing of people who are involved in businesses such as funerals and this becomes the environment which is thought of as 'never for my son'. However, that story has been a kind of sign post for Korean mothers to educate their sons (not daughters) for centuries. The caring nature of femininity may have been covertly and unconsciously distorted by the need to survive in such a competitive society. Now, Korean mothers of today are defined as "predatory mothers" (Hwang, 2004). Hwang describes Korean mothers as having two contradictory characteristics: ascetic women who sacrifice themselves for their family vs. extremely competitive mothers who are reckless for their children and husband to achieve their (own) social goal (p. 181).

Consequently, when the anima (pathos) of men is castrated because of the mother's competitiveness driven by her predatoriness, especially to a man with great power, like Park, Jeong Hee and Jeon, Du Hwan, the former Korean dictators, the society becomes a great grave like that within which women in Joseon lived.

Conclusion
Coming back to the starting point of the discussion, the pathological problems of we-ism and its origins should be investigated by analysing the distorted femininity of both men and women in Korea. Special attention should be paid to the fact that the problems having been suppressed in the unconscious level for centuries, men and women both can chose to stop the cyclic pathology. In modern Korean society, women are far more progressive whereas men are still very conservative. This fact has caused a rapid
increase in the divorce rate in Korea. According to my clinical diary, 60% of my clients (most them were wives) came to seek solutions to their marital conflicts, and 60% of them had a husband from Kyung-sang province where the Confucian tradition is most strongly alive and also all the Korean dictators were born.

Unhealthy femininity seems to affect most kinds of relationships including couple- hood as well as therapeutic relationships. It is obvious that adults in traditional Korea and even in modern Korea have had no chance to learn how to build affectionate, caring and adult-adult equal relationships. Restoring Korean’s unhealthy relationships with equal, affectionate, caring adult-adult relationships is most needed and effective treatment to cure not only women’s but also men’s unhealthy formed concepts of human relationships are both pressing goals that should be pursued. Again, knowing and understanding the origins of we-ism and its pathology would be the first step to achieve this goal.

I hope that by sharing my clinical experience of clients approaching therapy and extrapolating the information gathered to wider reflections on the dynamics of Korean society, I give impetus to those dedicated to help in our quest for a healthy, sane society. My aim is not to criticize but to understand so that we can all move in the right direction together.

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Study on South Korean government sponsored agricultural emigration to three South American countries during the government of Chun Doo-Hwan

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1. Introduction

It has been 43 years since the official start of South Korean emigration to South America. Official statistics account for approximately 56,500 South Koreans (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005) who travelled, temporarily or permanently, to the "Southern Cone" since the promulgation of Overseas Migration Law in 1962. This represents scarcely 6% of the total number of South Korean overseas emigrants during the same period of time. However, the development of this particular chapter of emigration and the story behind the project barely stopped appearing in the pages of newspapers and magazines in the first 15 years of its inception.

Contrary to common knowledge, during the government of Park Chung-Hee there had been only one official attempt to carry out agricultural emigration in South America. Argentina and Brazil were the countries chosen for the project, and the South Korean government acquired lands of considerable size in both countries by mid 1978. However, soon after the settlement of first Korean immigrants the unexpected death of then president Park put this project on hold. A few months later the government sought to continue the project; however this time, under the governance of another military man, the plan had different objectives and features than its precedent.

In January of 1980 the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs presented to president Chun Doo-Hwan the proposal of government sponsored agricultural emigration to South America. This program was approved in October of the same year and Argentina, Chile and Paraguay were chosen for this project. Through the successful settlement of farmers the government was looking to revive already existing South Korean farms in these countries and improve the deteriorated image of South Koreans in South America. The Korea Overseas Development Corporation (KODCO) was nominated to carry out the task in close cooperation with the ministries of Foreign Affairs, and Health and Social Affairs. After a nationwide call on 11 January of 1981, 34 families were selected to undertake this program. They were trained by diverse governmental organisations. Then, after an unpredicted incident with the Chilean government in late 1980, these families were finally sent to Argentina and Paraguay between 1981 and 1982.

Unfortunately the settlers began to abandon their farms soon after they started the project. There were a number of human and natural factors that could not be resolved in bona fide means. Seeing the future of the project becoming increasingly uncertain, the South Korean government decided to withdraw from the venture in late 1983, just three years after the plan had started.

In this study I will present the history of South Korean agricultural emigration to South America during the government of Chun Doo-Hwan. On this occasion I will narrate the development of this project up until when the selected families left South Korea between 1981-1982. In tracing this history I will utilise official documents from South Korean government and governmental organisations involved in this project as primary materials. This study will form part of my M.Phil thesis on South Korean government sponsored agricultural emigration to South America, focusing on the case of Paraguay.

2. Background

The first South Korean Overseas Migration Law was promulgated in 1962. Its objective described in Article 1 reflects the South Korean situation at the time. Political insecurity, military insurgency, student riots, economical instability and overwhelming population growth, among others factors forced many citizens to dream of a better life elsewhere in the globe. South America was one such location among the possible destinations.
The large distance between the Korean peninsula and the South American subcontinent was propitious in fostering the dreams of South Koreans longing for an endless horizon and fertile soil without entering into any consideration of the South American reality. Accordingly, it was simply called, 'the place to unfold a man's dream'. This illusion flowered in the harsh realities of the time, namely that 61% of the South Korean population was dedicated to agriculture when the fever for emigration began (Ministry Foreign Affairs, 1962, p.30). Considering the size of South Korean territory and its total population back in 19608, it is not difficult to picture the size of cultivable land corresponding meagrely to each farmer. Moreover, through numerous Japanese magazines people were aware of the success of Japanese agricultural immigration in Brazil. They were reported to own large lands.

It was a perfect South American dream: becoming the owner of a successful agricultural establishment. Nevertheless, this dream was strictly reserved for those who could afford to pay for it. Paradoxically, those who could pursue this dream were not farmers. The motives that prompted these people to leave their homeland behind were as diverse as their plans once they arrived in South America. A South Korean immigrant in Paraguay once reported:

"...we boarded the ship aimlessly with no more than a pioneer spirit, trying to accomplish something ..." (Korean Association in Paraguay, 1999, p.35)

The pioneer spirit was, nevertheless, insufficient to deal with the reality. These initial immigrants believed that they would arrive in South America under the agricultural emigration project between South Korea and the host countries. What they did not know was that this early agricultural emigration program was organised and carried out by government recognised private companies. For inexplicable reasons the lands were often located in inaccessible places and unfavourable for agriculture. Soon these immigrants abandoned their original purpose and questioned the South Korean government's emigration policy.

If the initial agricultural emigration was organised and carried out by private companies, one might wonder why the immigrants thought the project was organised by the government and question what was the actual role of the government. The problem lies in fact that the name of private companies and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare appeared together in numerous public notices for emigrants going to South America. The role of the Ministry though was merely administrative, yet influential nonetheless. Applications and other documents were to be submitted to the Immigration Examination Board in the Ministry, rather than companies organising the project, and this committee was responsible for selecting candidates. Due to the importance of selection process itself, and because the Ministry held the selection, it is plausible that many applicants thought the government coordinated this project.

From 1962 to 1979 officially 378,572 people emigrated from South Korea to elsewhere in the world, among which 350,000 immigrated to the American continent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). Despite the fervent promotion of emigration to Latin America at the time, only 29,000 South Koreans travelled, permanently or temporarily, to three main South American destinations: Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. A noteworthy detail is that most of these people arrived in the abovementioned destinations by kin invitation. Just 3,700 entered as agricultural immigrants and among them only 300 were dedicated to their original intention, namely agriculture (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1981).

It is important to note that when these farmers were reported to be in financial trouble the government assisted them with US$ 352,000. A number of farmers tried to work on the lands and achieve some sort of success. However, the lack of agricultural experience, unstable market prices, along with unsatisfactory opportunities for educating their children, forced them to abandon their farms and restart their lives in the large cities, most of the times running small businesses.

The involvement of the South Korean government in agricultural emigration started in the mid 1970s. In 1976, a commission entitled Inquiry into South America Agricultural Immigration composed of nine representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Research Centre for Agricultural Development and KCIA travelled to four South American countries to study the feasibility of Korean agricultural immigration to and the establishment of future agricultural colonies in those countries. Although South Korean immigration in South America was suspended in 1977, the government launched a US$ 2.5 million agricultural emigration project in the course of the year (Chosun Ilbo, 1977, p.2). A few months later, the Korean government
acquired two lands of considerable size in Brazil and Argentina. The budget to carry out this colossal project had been approved and a structured financial planning program established, however on 29 October 1979 then president Park Chung-Hee was assassinated and this unexpected turn of events brought this project to a standstill.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery was in charge of this first ill-fated attempt of the government agricultural emigration venture. With the accession of a new authority, nonetheless, this project was transferred to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. In January 1980 the Ministry presented a new agricultural emigration project to president Chun Doo-Hwan, which was finally approved in October 1980.

The socio-economical situation in South Korea in early 1980s was substantially different and comparably improved to the previous decades. In particular, the population explosion of earlier years that had caused so many difficulties was constantly decreasing. In spite of this the migration trend, on the other hand, remained unvarying. North American countries were still clear favourites over other countries and so was individual immigration by kinship over other types of immigration.

Considering previous experiences, one might ask why Chun Doo-Hwan’s government decided to organise a new agricultural emigration program to South America. One reason was that South Korean authorities were seeking to recover South American trust, which was seriously damaged in previous decade. Reports from different organisations (KODCO, 1980a; Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1980 and 1981) indicate that the government sought to run a successful small-scale, fully funded agricultural emigration project with the hope of improving the image of Korea and Korean immigrants. KODCO was called upon to organise and carry out the project, both within and outside of Korea. Three countries were chosen for this project: Argentina, Paraguay and Chile. KODCO was in charge of multiple responsibilities, which are described in the next section. Its overseas offices would work closely not only with headquarter in Seoul, but also with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and the Korean diplomatic representatives in host countries. This was the start of a new chapter in the history of Korean agricultural emigration to South America.

3. Objectives and Planning

As stated in the previous section, the foremost objective of this project was to recover South American trust through a successful South Korean government sponsored agricultural immigration program. Secondly, the government sought to revive, reactivate and expand agricultural emigration to South America (KODCO, 1980a).

An important aspect of this new scheme was to keep the agricultural immigration small scale, so the control and the execution of the plan would remain straightforward. It was planned that selected farmers would be dedicated to not only agriculture, but also livestock farming and apiculture, depending on the characteristics of each region. The government was looking forward to these farmers working on the basis of the Saemaul spirit, so that later they could collaborate with agro technical and economic developments of the host countries. If everything would progress as the government aspired, the benefits would be several folds. Firstly, it would affect positively in settling and stabilising South Korean communities; secondly, it would improve the image of South Koreans as hard working and therefore essential immigrants that host countries need; finally it would enhance international cooperation between South Korea and South American countries (KODCO, 1981a).

The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs was in charge of planning, funding and executing the venture. As for funding, KRW 1,620 million (approximately US$ 2.25 million) of government budget was to be invested as loans and as subsidies. Korean embassies and KODCO regional offices would report directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and KODCO headquarter about the utilisation of the fund (KODCO 1980a). The refund was then going to be saved in an ‘Account for Agricultural Immigration to South America’ for reinvestment, support and expansion of agricultural emigration.

KODCO regional offices in Argentina, Chile and Paraguay had a vast range of tasks and responsibilities. First of all, these representatives had to liaise with each the host country’s administration in charge of approbation of agricultural emigration project and also prepare for the smooth immigration of selected farmers into the country. In addition, they had to organise the clearing of land, housing for farmers, the farming calendar, design and execution of a cooperatives, coaching
and tutoring of farming techniques and the collection of data on domestic agricultural products. Furthermore, they were in charge of finding side jobs for families, purchase of any needs that members require, sale of harvest and finally, identifying and effectively solving any problem that might arise in the farm (KODCO, 1984).

Organisations involved in the project were expecting the farmers to be completely settled and working autonomously by 1983. Ideally these people would start to reimburse their loans with the harvest of 1984. With this basic planning KODCO called for applicants with an advertisement published in the Hankook Ilbo on 11 January 1981.

4. Selection Criteria and Training

The project initially planned to send 15 families to Argentina, eight to Paraguay and ten to Chile. In the single nationwide advertisement, it remarks that in Argentina farmers would focus on rice farming, while in Chile the focus would be grapes and farmers in Paraguay would cultivate diverse cash crops. The candidates for this programme were expected to be between 28 and 50 years-old, have completed their military service, with at least 5 years of farming experience and have sufficient financial capacity to bear the airfare and a deposit US$13,000 to cover expenses of cooperative farming. Prospective families should have at least five members, at least one member of the family should have graduated junior high school or above, and only non-school aged children were allowed to take part of this venture. Civil engineers, instructor in agriculture, and people with mechanic and special crop farming skills were also welcome to apply (Hankook Daily, 1981, p. 2 and KODCO, 1981d).

Before the immigrants were to arrive in South America KODCO was further responsible for organising the complete housing and other requirements of the immigrants. It was announced that each family would be allocated 10 to 20 ha of cleared land and the community would initially operate as a cooperative. Furthermore, it was known that at the start the government would cover the land cost and land cleaning expenses, while the cooperative would handle the cooperative farming expenses of each farmer. Once the land cost and the farming expenses were reimbursed to the government, the farmers would then become the legal owners of the land. It was advertised that successful candidate would receive proper training before they travelled to South America (KODCO, 1981d).

KODCO received 469 requests for application forms between 13 and 28 January 1981. By the deadline of 30th January just 58 applications were submitted, of which 53 were chosen for final assessment. Vetting the process was a selection committee composed of representatives from KODCO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Rural Development Administration and Rural Development Corporation. The selection process itself was a set of application screening, interviews, health check ups, field inquiries and police clearance (KODCO, 1981d). After months of evaluations, interviews and examinations, 34 families were selected to move to South America. The distribution was as follows: 12 families were designated to Argentina, 6 families to Paraguay and 16 families to Chile (KODCO, 1981b). These candidates were expected to leave Korea by mid June or no later than October 1981. I included a table-summary of characteristics of the initial 53 candidates and successful applicants later in this paper.

As advertised, successful candidates received 280 hours of training before leaving to their destinations, which consisted of:

1. Saemaul education: 52 hours, at Canaan Farmers School;
2. Theory and practice of agriculture: 133 hours, given by tutors from Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, Rural Development Administration and Rural Development Corporation;
3. Machinery handling: 40 hours, at Suwon Agricultural Equipment Training Centre;
4. Basic Spanish: 40 hours, KODCO;
5. Briefing of current South American situation and travel tips: 15 hours, KODCO.

5. Brief description of each farm for the project.

Initially, the organisers of this project had in mind three farms in Argentina and one in Paraguay. Two more lands were acquired later and finally, five farms were chosen to accomplish the project.
Argentina

**Llajta Mauca:** located in the Province of Santiago del Estero, this farm geographically belongs to the semi-arid Chaco plain (Quintero, 2000 and Riveros, 2002). The overall temperature of the region is 21.5°C, ranging from −5°C in winter to over 40°C in summer. The annual rainfall is 695 mm. The soil of Santiago del Estero region is rich in calcium carbonate (CaCO₃). Two saline mines, San Bernardo and Ambargasta are located in the NW of the region (Casa de la Provincia del Santiago del Estero, 1999).

The farm is located in the town of same name. It is the biggest Korean farm in South America with a total size of 20,989 ha. It was acquired in August 1978 by the Park Chung-Hee government who bought the land for US$ 2,086,000. There were several unsuccessful attempts to establish a Korean colony on this land. The main reason of the failure was reported to be the land’s poor quality soil. In this new endeavour KODCO (1989) was aiming to settle the farmers, revive the farm and somehow save the land from being wasted.

**Luján:** is located in the Province of Buenos Aires, 67 km west of capital Buenos Aires. The province belongs to the Pampa region and the farm is situated in Mesopotamian Pampa. The average temperature is 20°C and average annual rainfall is 1200 mm³.

The Luján farm has a remarkable background. In 1970 the South Korean government and an American flower company sought to send a group of 28 specialists in flower farming to Chile, aiming to export flowers to mainland US. Soon after the recruitment, the South Korean government learnt that Salvador Allende, co-founder of Chilean Socialist Party and who later established diplomatic relations with North Korea, won the presidential elections. Due to this political situation the florists were not allowed to immigrate to Chile. Instead, the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs bought a land of 11 ha in the district of Luján, Province of Buenos Aires in Argentina to reallocate these people. The land was acquired in March 1971 and the cost was US$ 18,887 (KODCO, 1989).

**San Javier:** is located in the Province of Santa Fé, in the Humid Pampa region. Humid Pampa is what we know as the Argentinean Pampa, “wide plains of everlasting deep, dark soils, able to produce high grain yields and meat of excellent quality (Moscatelli and Pazos, 2000).” The average temperature of 15°C to 21°C and annual rainfall between 800 to 1000mm³ makes this region specially suited for agriculture and livestock farming.

This farm was purchased as late as March 1981. KODCO paid US$ 1,912,235 for its 2,714 ha. It is located close to San Javier River and KODCO (1989) was expecting the farmers to focus on rice farming. The land was cleared and ready to work.

Chile

**Teno:** the town of Teno is located north of the VIIth region of Maule, in the Province of Curicó. Teno means ‘shrink of cold’ in Mapuche. The average temperature is 14°C and average annual rainfall is 700mm³. Soil in this region is typically classified as alfisol. The Mediterranean weather and its rich soil make this region home of the famous Chilean vineyards (Concha y Toro, 2001).

KODCO acquired this land in December 1980 and paid US$ 543,994 for 185 ha. The organisers planned to farm fruit and vegetable and just like San Javier, it was cleared and ready to work (KODCO; 1989).

Paraguay

**San Pedro:** this farm in Paraguay is located at the intersection of three departmental jurisdictions, Caaguazú, Canindey and San Pedro, the latter being where most of the land belongs. The average temperature of this region is 23°C, ranging from 10°C to 34°C and it has an annual rainfall around 1350mm³. Situated in the central plateau of Paraguayan geography, the soil is classified as Arenofersols, high in aluminium and low in phosphorus content. These characteristics make this type of soil limited and suboptimum for farming. This region was once known as the timber rich region of Paraguay for its dense rainforest. Originally this region had two swaps, Mbutuy and Tapiracuai before they were filled just few years ago (Salas 2005, pers. comm., 14 April).
This land was already acquired by KODCO in April 1968, as part of the prospect Immigration Agreement between South Korea and Paraguay. KODCO paid US$ 11,621 for 1,500 ha. There were few attempts to establish a Korean settlement. Initially 19 families arrived in 1969, however, the extremely hard conditions of life, lack of financial support and disagreements among families forced them to leave the farm within a few months. In addition, a shooting among the members resulted in three casualties, forcing the Korean government to almost shut the farm down. During 1975 and 1977 six families intended to work at the farm but they also soon gave up. From that time to 1980 the farm was practically abandoned (Korean Association in Paraguay, 1999, p. 60-63).

This farm is undulating in its extension and in late 1980, before the arrival of newly selected farmers KODCO completed a soil study to determine the quality of the land. The result showed that only 700 ha of total size were workable (KODCO, 1982). Around 300 ha were cleared by the time the farmers arrived.

6. Chile’s misfire

Initially 11 families were selected to settle in Chile, however not one of these families actually arrived at Teno Farm and the project to Chile was eventually abandoned. In the following paragraphs I will describe what happened behind Chile’s misfire.

The KODCO office in Santiago opened on 5 August 1980. An important task given to this office was to acquire land for this project in close cooperation with Korean diplomatic representation in Chile. In December 1980, the then Korean ambassador in Chile, Yun Kyung-Do, suggested to the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to purchase land located in the town of Teno, approximately at 173 Km from the capital Santiago. The ministry approved the purchase and KODCO bought the land on 29 December 1980 (KODCO, 1980b).

Just a week after purchasing the land, the KODCO office in Santiago sent a report to its headquarters in Seoul explaining Chilean migration policy. It explained that the Chilean agricultural immigration scheme was based on individual invitation, rather than collective immigration. It claimed that if Chileans learnt about this collective South Korean immigration project it might provoke discontent from the general public, as the unemployment rate was constantly rising. Also it made reference to a new immigration law, which was due to promulgated in upcoming April. This law, according to the report, was going to limit the number of overseas immigrants to Chile, settling them in less developed regions of the country and it was going to be very restrictive to Asian immigration to Chilean territory (KODCO, 1981c and 1981e). With all this information beforehand, KODCO headquarters nonetheless went ahead and selected 11 families to settle in Chile in 10 February 1981.

It is worthy to note that Chile never had a clear migration policy. In fact, contrary to many other South American countries Chile did not even have an immigration law. What was then available was a decree on immigration written in 1953. Not surprisingly, and like other South American countries, Chile also preferred to receive more Northern European immigrants than Asians or those from neighbouring countries (OIM, 2003).

Meanwhile in Santiago, KODCO and diplomatic representatives sought to make contact with numerous organisations to legalise the entry of already selected farmers. Eventually they decided to abide by the rules and sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chile the list of 11 families who were technically coming to Chile invited by former landowner of Teno farm. However, the processing and waiting was taking longer than expected. Although Chilean authorities assured Korean representatives several times that these immigrants will obtain their visa, there were rumours that authorities at a higher level were constantly objecting to Korean immigration to Chile, using as an example the cases of Korean immigration in Brazil and Paraguay. Effectively Chilean authorities asked the Korean representatives in Chile for a countermeasure to prevent settlers’ desertion to cities (KODCO, 1993).

Initially the selected families were arranged to leave South Korea on July 1981. Seeing as the visa issuance was postponed day after day and the delay was inevitable, the person in charge of the department of emigration in KODCO in Seoul posted an explanatory letter clarifying the reason of delay. Meanwhile, representatives in Chile were still sorting out the visa issuance. Having not heard anything from Chilean authorities, the Korean ambassador in Chile sent a plea letter to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Chile. The official reply from Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12 December 1981 was disappointing. Chile denied the entrance of Korean agricultural immigrants to the country citing domestic problems (KODCO, 1981f).

KODCO headquarters in Seoul ordered its office in Chile to continue with the negotiations. Also in January 1982 KODCO started to compensate 11 families for the unexpected delay in their departure. A month later, the KODCO office in Chile communicated the Chilean authorities' unchangeable position to their headquarters. Seeing the impossibility to continue with the project, KODCO invited the families to choose alternative destinations, either Argentina or Paraguay, or remain in Korea. Initially six families opted for Argentina and five for Paraguay, although one family later withdrew from the project. Finally, four families headed to San Pedro in Paraguay in October 1982, two to Luján and four to San Javier in Argentina in January 1984 (KODCO, 1993).

Statistics of the initial 53 applicants and 34 successful candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina (13 families)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Chile (10 families)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Paraguay (8 families)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initial 53</td>
<td>Successful 34</td>
<td>Initial 53</td>
<td>Successful 34</td>
<td>Initial 53</td>
<td>Successful 34</td>
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<td>First Choice</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Two candidates of the 53 initial applicants said they did not have a second choice.
** For four of the nine families that finally went to Paraguay did not originally choose this destination.

### Age Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Initial 53</th>
<th>Successful 34</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
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<td>35-39</td>
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### Marital Status

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### Education Level

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<td>(Junior High)</td>
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<td>(High)</td>
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### Accompanying Children

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300
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<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>7-12</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
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<td>13-15</td>
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<td>16-18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Size (in pyung; 1pyung=3.30578㎡)</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills (more than one)</th>
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<td>Flower Farming</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fruit Farming</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vegetable Farming</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice Farming</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Products</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructor in Agriculture</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Agricultural emigration to South America during the Chun Doo-Hwan government was significantly different to the one carried out by the Park Chung-Hee government. First of all, this new project sought to recover South American trust toward Korean immigration that was damaged in previous years. KODCO was designated to carry out this new venture under the supervision of KODCO headquarters in Seoul and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. After a nationwide call made in January 1981, 34 families were selected to move to three South American destinations: Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. The head of the families were people from all different age groups, with sufficient financial capacity and well educated. The Korean government had set aside US$ 2.25 million for this project. KODCO opened regional offices in Argentina, Chile and Paraguay to carry out the task effectively, however an unexpected turn of events forced the families who chosen to settle in Teno, Chile to change their direction. They joined families already settled in Argentina and Paraguay. In this way Korean government sponsored agricultural emigration started a new chapter of history.

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English


Spanish


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Current Attitudes in Korea regarding Comfort Women and Public Outcry against Lee Seung Yeon in 2004

Mohita Roman
Monash University

Introduction
The Korean ‘Comfort Women’ issue is a war time legacy which took 50 years to emerge. This dormant issue has developed into a highly volatile movement. What makes this issue unique is the fact that the victims chose to live in silence and to remain anonymous fearing ostracization from their own people for half a century. The Korean Comfort Women is one such topic that evokes memories of being colonized, humiliated and suffering at the hands of the Japanese. Though it is universally agreed that the Japanese committed unjustifiable crimes and have to take responsibility for them, some of the responsibility can also be said to rest with the comfort women themselves, with the Korean people and the government. In this paper I attempt to analyze the current Lee Seung Yeun incident involving controversial pictures that created a furor in Korea. I have examined the treatment of comfort women in various media, and found that the stigmas in Korean society that affected this incident relate not only to gender but also nationalism. The most useful data has been drawn from a number of internet sites in Korea which provided both statistical data and a spectrum of public opinion.

Since the early 1990’s, Korean former Comfort Women have received media attention in Korea and globally as well. To attract attention, the issue has encountered various barriers in society such as conventional attitudes towards gender roles in Korea, nationalism and pride and lack of freedom of the press. From then the comfort women movement has come a long way and has received global attention and sympathy and with the support of International organizations like the United Nations and has been able to create awareness nationally as well internationally. Various lawsuits have been filed, conferences have been held, tribunals have been conducted and rallies organized. In Korea every Wednesday a demonstration is held outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. However, the issue seems to have stagnated politically and legally. The Japanese government is adamant regarding compensation and refuses to give individual compensation. On the other hand, the Comfort Women are growing old and many have died, therefore it is imperative to get justice for these women before all of them pass away and the issue fades away with them. Moreover, with the Korean Government’s Comfort Women fund to be dissolved in 2007, the women are disheartened and have lost trust in the government seeing it as a course that the government has taken to try and put an end to the issue. In these circumstances both the people of Korea and the media play an extremely important role in keeping the issue alive across the whole spectrum of society and maintaining pressure on the government to take action. Recently, Korea was engulfed in a controversy regarding the Comfort Women and nude pictures taken by actress LeeSeung Yeon in collaboration with an entertainment company. This paper will look at the reasons for the negative reactions surrounding this incident in the light of the media and traditional Korean society.

Representation of the Comfort Women in the Media
The media acts as a perceptive expression of the constant changes and cataclysm-social, economic and political in South Korea. Media is a vital part of our lives and plays an important role in reflecting the views and sentiments of the people while shaping the social, political and cultural structure of a country. In Korea, freedom of the press and media is relatively new and still in its formative stages. From a dictatorial state to democracy Korea has shown impressive progress both economically and socially and the media has been a significant factor that has contributed to this. Moreover, it has mirrored the social and political upheavals and it has developed into a competitive commercial market. With the media diversification, the perceptions and attitudes of the people of Korea have also gone through significant changes.

However, it is a long way from addressing and overcoming sensitive issues which might bear a social stigma or contradicts and questions their inherent Confucianist values. Though the media enjoys greater freedom than in the past, it now faces scrutiny over ethical standards and responsibility. Moreover, it is also necessary to question whether this freedom is simply subjective and still riddled with taboos and controlled by political agendas, following a policy of selective representation and
ignoring other issues that might throw the government in a quandary or is it really as liberated as it is made out to be.

In the media, issues with a sexual connotation are still under addressed and it was only in the late 1980’s that discourses on sexuality were brought to the forefront in Korea and attention was given to women’s rights. The Comfort Women issue as a sexual nature but is always discussed in psychological or moral terms. Moreover, due to the nature of the crime related to the comfort women, this issue has been poorly represented in the media in the past. Though documentaries have been made and there has been representation of the various aspects of the topic, there has been no forum where the common people have been involved or objective discussions been held. The activities were limited to organizations and governments. The activists and organizations involved have worked hard to raise awareness nationally and internationally. They have been trying to reach a wide range of society as without the support and recognition of the general public the Comfort Women would be forgotten again. It is only recently that it has been felt that there has to be global representation to bring justice.

Nude Pictures by Actress Lee Seung Yeon
Recently the actress Lee Seung Yeon caused a furor in Korea when she agreed to have some nude pictures and video taken of herself as a Comfort Woman in an attempt to create awareness in the Korean people regarding the issue. This sparked off a controversy and she was shunned by the public, ridiculed by the press and snubbed by the comfort women themselves.

In February 2004, Netian Entertainment a production company in Korea, proposed to make a project regarding comfort women consisting of nude pictures and a video of actress Lee Seung Yeon posing as a Comfort Woman. The stated purpose for this project was to bring attention back to the Comfort Women issue, which had been upstaged by the 'Dokdo Islet dispute' between Korea and Japan. They were concerned to see the 'comfort women' issue being forgotten all the time. They also said that the 'comfort women' were the model upon which the sexuality of women was commercialized and were the starting point for a wrong history. Moreover, it was their intention to use the profit from the collection to help the comfort women. Lee Seung Yeon consented to her role in the video and pictures and agreed to raise awareness by posing nude. However, contrary to the expected response by the production company, the pictures sparked off a highly volatile controversy in Korea with negative and aggressive reactions towards both the production company and the actress. The immediate reactions of the people were of shock and incredulity. People claimed that they could not believe that the actress and production company involved could commercialize and make profit out of an issue that has suffering, shame, guilt attached to it and represents the extent of Japanese colonialism and control. This incident was covered extensively in the media and the Korean public lashed out at the actress through expressing their views on the internet and in various interviews and surveys. Not only were they angry at the pictures being taken they even expressed anger at the coverage and publicity it received. A whole section was reserved in 'Oh My News', a popular internet site, for people to express their opinion regarding the incident. Below are a few examples of the views expressed by Koreans on the Oh My News website.

In an article, an irate spoke man said that although the pictures themselves were disturbing, the fact that the netizens put more pictures on the internet and publicized them was even more problematic. That the netizens show so much interest in such pictures is a matter of even more concern than the pictures themselves. Naver.com, an internet site in Korea, reported this incident as well as putting the video on its site. This angered the Korea Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan, and Kang Joo Hei, a spokesperson from the Council threatened to take Naver.com to Court. Moreover, in another article, reporter Kim Kwang Soo denied Lee is innocent as she claims. He insisted that a big star like her has the choice to say yes or no to doing a project; she is not a mere pawn, she is also equally responsible as the entertainment company in carrying out this project. It cannot be believed that she did not look at the full terms and conditions of her contract especially since it consisted of taking nude pictures. Another person said that she cannot be forgiven, especially since she keeps denying that the pictures are nude. The whole country says it is, but she keeps contradicting this instead of accepting it and apologizing.
In a survey conducted by major internet sites in Korea, 9 out of 10 (90%) of respondents thought that the project was unjustified. In the Yonhap News survey it was revealed that women are even more agitated than men. Yonhap News posed the question to its readers about what they think of Lee Seung Yeon posing nude to help the comfort women and the response it received was that 1389 people out of 1533 people think it wrong (90.03%). Out of this 90.2% were men and 93.3% were women. In another survey according to age group, 100% of Koreans under 20 years of age, 90.6% in their 20’s, 91.3% in their 30’s, 91.6% in their 40’s and 83% in their 50’s consider it wrong. In a survey conducted by Daum.com, 4894 out of 5306 Koreans (92.2%) think it is not art but just a commercial project. Also, in a survey done by Chosun.com, 2142 people responded and 89.3% were against the whole episode. Oh My News asked its readers who is to blame, Lee Seung Yeon or the Company, 1227 people out of 1469 (83.5%) said both are to be blamed. 24.78% thought the actress was to be blamed and 55.75% believed that the entertainment company was responsible. In a survey conducted by Yahoo Korea after the actress apologized, when asked whether she should give her career up or not 70% replied that she should give it up and only 24% said that she can be forgiven. As noted in the surveys, regarding the Lee Seung Yeon Incident, diverse segments of society have reacted negatively to this incident. However, the reasons vary. Ironically, the comfort women have snubbed her due to various reasons. As one former comfort woman remarked, “I have been my life alone trying to soothe my heart …..how can they do this?” The Korea Council has denounced it by commenting, “The fact that they are trying to earn money through our painful history is unimaginable.” Do you know what kind of pain we go through? I can’t sleep at night. This is something that I can’t even talk about with my family, do you understand?” Kang Il-Chul, 76, former comfort woman, said in response to Lee’s apology.

It is important to understand why the Comfort Women are agitated and reluctant to discuss their past. Attitudes regarding women in Korea and their predetermined role and place in society are directly related to this. Korean society places a high degree of importance on chastity and female morality. Loss of either is shame not only for her but also defames her whole family. Even in national crisis, the Chosun Dynasty men upheld women’s fidelity as an utmost principle. Moreover, from the Confucian moralists’ point of view, the mere fact that a woman was even touched by an enemy soldier was equivalent to her having lost her chastity and thus her face in society. Therefore, discourses regarding chastity have been a driving force for these women to remain silent; they would prefer to lose their lives than to lose chastity. Confucianist values and fear of rejection has forced these women into silence and they themselves have been unable to overcome feelings of guilt and shame knowing that they are innocent.

Moreover, the Korean patriarchal society has double standards regarding sexual behavior of men and women and was one of the factors that forced these women into silence. Women who lost their chastity, whatever the reason, were regarded as tarnished, and made to feel guilty and were even ostracized by their family. In this perspective, one can understand why the comfort women concealed their past to avoid ostracism and instead many lived with a feeling of 'han.' Therefore, the actress who so blatantly exposed her body in pictures cannot be comprehended by these women who belong to an era where a strict code of dressing was the norm. Moreover, these women had spent their entire life protecting their past and suffering psychological trauma and physical disabilities, so it may have seemed that the actress was making a mockery of their suffering by exhibiting her body publicly. Besides this, many of these women lived in economic hardship and have not been able to even attain a decent standard of living. In these circumstances, the Korean Comfort Women view the producer as someone making money by commercializing their poverty stricken past.

As seen in the surveys above, the public reaction and opinion regarding the incident was remarkably aggressive and outspoken. The negative attitudes of the people was so powerful that the producer shaved his head as a sign of apology and burnt the prints of the photographs and the actress apologized on bended knees. What made the public react to this incident so strongly? Were they opposed to the nudity or are they too sensitive regarding the Comfort Women to deal with it objectively? Moreover, do gender roles in Korean society and nationalism also contribute to this collective feeling of antagonism? As observed in the survey, most Koreans held the opinion that the project had no artistic value. They claimed that it lacked creativity and seemed more of a money making project. In Korea, the media believes that public personalities like politicians, actors, actresses should live up to their
social responsibility and discipline themselves. It seems to expect high profile personalities to behave in a framework that they have outlined and this is more stringent for the public figures than ‘normal’ people. Moreover, the actress seems to have lacked in-depth knowledge of the issue and was insensitive to the feelings of the Comfort Women. This is a painful incident in Korean history and particularly for the Comfort Women themselves, as they haven’t received an apology. They live in hope of being compensated and each day is a reminder of their traumatic past. Therefore, the Comfort Women felt outraged to see a nude picture representing them. Moreover, it is questionable whether a nude picture can convey the suffering and pain the Korean women went through.

In the 1990’s there was a Korean television drama series made on the comfort women called *Yamyangye Nundongja* in which the suffering of the Korean Comfort Women, along with their mobilization were highlighted. Interestingly, compared to the recent Lee Seung Yeon incident, this drama received favorable reviews and appealed to Korean audiences. Why is it that the Korean public can accept certain forms of representation and commercialization and not others? The drama was a commercial venture by a television network to promote its ratings. In my opinion, the drama was melodramatic and appealed to the whole public - it appealed to their emotional, sentimental side and heightened dislike towards the Japanese. Moreover, it evoked strong nationalist sentiment as it also illustrated the colonial period and atrocities carried out by the Japanese, therefore, uniting them as the victims. Contrary to that, Lee Seung Yeon’s these pictures were perceived as purely pornographic and though depicting the comfort women they were restricted to the physical suffering and failed to emphasize the emotional suffering and trauma, as a result failing to strike a chord with the Korean people. Though the stated purpose of the production company was to reach out to the common man, the Korean public viewed it as trying to sensationalize a traumatic past. Moreover, it was incomprehensible that the producers could so blatantly commercialize the pictures by posting them over the internet for sale as well as to market the video for profit. Another comparison that can be made is to the incident in 1998, when a state financed Japanese organization, the Asian Women’s Fund, released advertisements in several Korean newspapers to publicize its activities to help Korean Comfort Women. The reaction they received was of anger and resentment from The Korea Council and the Korean Foreign Ministry. Here again the purpose of the publication was to create awareness and responsibility but instead it created controversy. Therefore, it can be said that publicity or commercialization of this sensitive issue receives negative reactions whereas anything that has entertainment or nationalist value like the Korean drama, is approved by the masses.

Role of Gender and Nationalism

It is also noteworthy that more women were critical of the actress than men. Moreover, in one article, Lee Seung Yeon seems to be condemned more than the Entertainment Company and her character is harshly regarded. This is because she is a woman and is also a victim of the rules that govern traditional Korean society where the woman is judged differently to a man. Although it is reasonable to condemn Lee Seung Yeon for her role in the project, it is not right to disapprove of her only because she is a woman and consider her fault greater to the producer’s. It is evident that gender disparity is still prevalent and women still must fight for their rights. The gender inequalities are still prevalent in the social system due to the acceptance of traditional gender roles. Moreover, the imbalances in women’s opportunities in a state are sustained through an intricate system of roles that are entrenched in and rationalized by Confucian customs. It also seems that women themselves subconsciously have accepted this subservient role and perceive other women’s actions with the same rules. In Korean Women Today, a publication by the Korean Women’s Development Institute, Kim Chong Ui wrote “because of the wrong socialization process in our society which has continued for too long, not only men but also women themselves tend to recognize the inferiority of women, at least unconsciously. This is what remains as the major obstacle to achieving equality between men and women.” Therefore, though women are advocating for greater freedom, equality and civic rights, it is possible that they themselves are an obstacle in enforcing this freedom. Moreover, as the women’s movement is till relatively new in Korea, it seems to work within the limitations of the existing society. In the early 1900’s and during colonial rule the women’s movements and participation in state activities was limited to upholding national sovereignty. Therefore, nationalist discourses still seem to bind women and the interest of the state is upheld over women’s’ interest. Moreover, it seems to demand self-censorship from women. In Lee Seung Yeon’s case the fact that she chose to represent an issue of national concern by using her body can be perceived as an immoral act and thus justified in being criticized and shunned by society.

In the post colonial period and Park Chung Hee’s time, Korean society was dominated by patriarchal views alongside the drive towards nationalistic modernization. Though Korea attained economic
development this was achieved by using force and authoritarian rule. Such nationalism was justified by anti colonial discourse that asserted 'spiritual superiority and masculine integrity' while inflicting chastity upon its women. The fact that these women were sexually assaulted by the colonizer makes it hard for the Korean public to accept the issue. The Korean society has to accept that it cannot dispose of the issue merely in terms of philosophy and morality. There is a definite physiological aspect which cannot be denied. They view it as an assault on the national pride and feel paramount humiliation; they would rather not have the sexual nature be brought into focus by the media as they do not want that aspect of it to be known to the outside world. These attitudes and perceptions are still inherent in Korean society today. In order, to break down the barriers hindering equality and to view the comfort women issue as a crime against humanity and not just specific to Korea, they have to discuss the issue openly so that it does not occur again. To do so, it is important to reflect nationally, to rethink one's individual position on issues of national concern and to bring about change where necessary.

With modernization and exposure to western thought, women's rights and education, Korean women's perception of chastity has changed tremendously and the strict nature of it as evolved to a more flexible one. Therefore, to increase consciousness and accountability in the public it is necessary for the comfort women to change their mindset as well. What was not acceptable in the past has become more tolerable now. Therefore, rather than condemn the nudity and commercialization they could have worked hand in hand with the producers to represent them in such a way that it not only raises money but also creates consciousness and responsibility in the younger generation while maintaining the dignity of the Korean Comfort Women.

With the advent of modern technology the form of expression has also changed. Earlier, the written form was the strongest-newspapers, tabloids, journals, articles etc. However, now the internet is the quickest and most inexpensive way to reach out to people all over the world. To get global attention it is the most effective tool. Moreover, the audience is undergoing a change as well. From being passive and noncommittal the Korean consumers are more vocal and diverse. Therefore, to reach out to all age groups and sections of society, the production company used the tools which are the standard today and one which would stir response. However, though internet usage and availability has increased it has also become a tool in shaping public values and to instill nationalism in the society. It works hand in hand with the government and the government in turn uses it to reinforce tradition and nationalism. Moreover, internet has become a powerful tool in mobilizing demonstration, this is also evident in the Lee Seung Yeon episode.

Nevertheless, despite of all the skepticism and uproar, it is imperative to note that though the Lee Seung Yeon episode might look like a failed attempt to raise awareness in favor of the Comfort Women, it was successful in bringing forth public views and opinions and more awareness among the people towards proper representation of a matter of national concern. However, it is crucial that the form of media used be beneficial for the Comfort Women movement rather than be misrepresented in the public view. Moreover, in a conservative society like Korea, to choose such an unorthodox way to express a sensitive episode in history was in itself a miscalculated move on the part of the producer and actress. They seem to lack foresight and appear unaware of their own history and norms. Though, with modernization and democratization, freedom of expression is a must, in the case of Korea it has to be within the constraints of 'Koreanized modernization'.

Conclusion

Korean women were forced to provide sexual service because of their subservient position as colonized people and in the post war period the women suffering did not become an issue. The women chose to live in anonymity fearing ostracization from their families and Korean society in general. The bitter memories of being colonized and humiliated are still shadows of a past that many comfort women wish to forget. Moreover, neither the Japanese nor the Korean government adequately recognized the women's suffering. It was only under international pressure and emergence of women's movements in Korea in the 1990's that attempts were made to recognize the wrongs done against the Comfort women and as a result the issue received media attention in Korea. One of the latest efforts to bring the issue into the public forum failed. There was failure on the behalf of the movie makers as they fail to consult with the Comfort Women in order to fully understand the issue. Moreover, the media failed to mediate between the Comfort Women and the movie makers in order to ensure that the image that the Comfort Women themselves would like to be portrayed in. If there was more co-operation between the movie
makers and the Comfort Women a successful movie would have been greatly benefiting the movement of the Comfort Women. However, the media focused and reinforced the well entrenched gender roles, nationalism and pride in condemning the movie makers rather than taking a progressive view to the well established social norms in order to seek justice for the Comfort Women. It is crucial for the Comfort Women issue to get represented in the media for the purpose of instigating public interest across the spectrum of Korean society as well as to achieve justice for the Comfort Women.

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Blood is thicker than water?: South Korean Perceptions on Chosonjok migrants

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1. INTRODUCTION

"Blood is thicker than water" was a popular saying in the late 1980s and early 1990s among ethnic Koreans in China when they thought of South Korea (Im 2003, 291). This reflects their expectation on South Korea, their ancestral homeland, with which they did not have any contacts for more than six decades due to the Cold War hostility between China and South Korea.

The two million strong ethnic Koreans in China today are descendants of those Koreans who migrated to the north-eastern parts of China (Manchuria) between the 1860s and 1940s. They are different in terms of their regional origins in Korea according to the time periods of their migration. Some of them migrated to Manchuria from the northernmost parts of the Korean peninsula in the late 19th century when there were crop failures and famines in Korea. More Koreans from the region and other parts of Korea migrated to Manchuria (and Siberia) in the early 20th century when Korea became a colony of Japan. After the establishment of Manchuko in 1932, peasants from southern parts of the Korean peninsula were systematically forced by the Japanese government to migrate to Manchuria to develop the huge land.

The political development after the World War II in northeast Asia brought changes to the ethnic Korean population in Manchuria. Soon after the collapse of the Japanese Empire in August 1945 about 700,000 Koreans returned to Korea. The division of Korea into North and South in 1948 and the political upheavals in China in the 1940s and 1950s added complexities to the life and political identities of the Chinese Koreans. Due to the Cold War, Chinese Koreans considered North Korea, China's close ally, as the legitimate Korean state while they had highly negative notions on South Korea. However, this had changed by the early 1980s as they learned about South Korea's prosperity in comparison with the North's economic failure and ideological rigidity. Until then, there had been no contact between Chinese Koreans and South Koreans.

Chinese Koreans began to migrate to South Korea in the late 1980s and there was a big increase after the 1992 normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China. Chinese Koreans come to South Korea with the 'Korean dream,' a dream of making a big money and returning to China to buy house, open a small business, and pay for their children's education.

However, as is the case of the Japanese (Tsuda 2000, Yoshino 1992), Koreans tend to have a very narrow concept of Koreanness and Chinese Koreans are not well accepted in South Korea because of the cultural differences between them. Chinese Koreans are socially alienated due to their cultural differences, including the use of northern dialects. Working mostly in '3D' sectors, especially in construction and domestic services, Chinese Korean workers are also economically marginalized and discriminated against just as other foreign workers in South Korea.

Alienated and discriminated against, Chinese Koreans quickly abandoned their rhetoric of 'blood and water.' Actually, they developed a negative attitude toward South Korea and its people after their experiences of living in South Korea. Through these experiences Chinese Koreans reflect both on their national/ethnic identity and their relationship with South Korean co-ethnics. Sometimes they struggled to prove their Koreanness, referring to their being colonial diaspora, and talking of their ancestors' contributions to anti-Japanese struggles in Manchuria. However, in the end, as with the case of

241 Migrations to Siberia and Manchuria were an important part of the global migration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but this has been relatively neglected by migration historians. See Adam McKeown (2004).

242 Among the 700,000 return migrants, 400,000 returned to South Korea (Kwon 1996, 54).
Brazilian Japanese in Japan (Tsuda 2000), Chinese Koreans only find they are not as ‘Korean’ as they thought they were, nor do South Koreans overly welcome them, which therefore reaffirms their being citizens of China.

Currently there are about 150,000 Chinese Koreans living in South Korea. While approximately half of them are working legally, half of them are illegally residing in South Korea as migrant workers. This paper looks at the process of Chinese Koreans coming to their ethnic homeland, and how this experience has changed their notion of ‘homeland’ and their identity. In so doing, it will also look at the South Korean perceptions of Chinese Koreans that contributed to the alienation of Chinese Koreans. Where necessary, the case of Chinese Koreans will be compared with that of the Nikkeijin Brazilian Japanese in Japan.

2. CHOSONJOKS’ COMING HOME

Before the late 1980s, Chinese Koreans did not know much about South Korea, and if they did, their knowledge was based on the Cold War propaganda of North Korea and China. It was after the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games that Chinese Koreans had a more realistic view of South Korea (Chong 2000; Im 2003). Chinese Koreans were positively impressed at the prosperity of South Korea and they were eager to visit the country. With the opening of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992 Chinese Koreans could visit South Korea and many of them stayed as migrant workers.

By 1996 more than 120,000 Korean Chinese had visited Korea, which is more than 5% of the total population of ethnic Koreans in China (Choi 2001, 132). Chinese Koreans quickly became the largest group among all foreign workers in South Korea. In October 2001 the total number of foreigners in South Korea reached 570,000 and among them 243,274 were illegal migrant workers. Among the 243,274 illegal migrant workers almost 30% (69,000) were Chinese Koreans (Chosun Daily December 11, 2001). In 2003, the South Korean government estimated that about 150,000 Chinese Koreans were residing in South Korea and roughly half of them were illegal migrant workers (Korea Herald November 11, 2003).

Such a scale of Chinese Korean migration to South Korea was possible because they speak Korean and feel that the two Koreas are their ethnic homeland. In any case, behind this large scale return migration is also the nostalgia for their ancestral homeland, which they were not able to visit for the last six decades. This nostalgia was also supported by the myth of ‘blood’ and the ‘Korean dream.’

It is generally accepted that China has had relatively a generous policy for its ethnic minorities. Among Chinese Korean elderly people, many truly accepted the New China with “gratitude and sincerity” as the Chinese Communist Party gave them land and citizenship (Choi 2001, 128). Nonetheless, it is also true that many Chinese Koreans felt that they were dominated and even oppressed by the majority, Han Chinese, so they have to be careful not to provoke this majority. This was particularly true during the 1950s and 1960s when China was in political turmoil. Ethnic minorities suffered greatly under ‘Grand Han Nationalism’ and ultra leftist policies. Among all the minority groups in China the Chinese Korean community was damaged mostly seriously (Chong 2000, 243 In 2005 the number foreigners in South Korea reached 734,000 and among them 27% are undocumented. 244 At the same time, due to this migration, the Korean community in China experienced a ‘hallowing out effect’ in which farmers, wives, and teachers left their jobs and families to go to Korea. In particular, the population of young women has dropped seriously in the countryside, causing a large imbalance between male and females (Choi 2001, 119; Chong 2000; Im 2003). 245 Choi (2001) argues that from the beginning of the establishment of the New China in 1949, Chinese Koreans developed a dual identity – Chinese national and Korean ethnic – yet their contacts with South Korea in the late 1980s did not lead them to identify strongly with South Korea (125). However, this argument seems to be too simplistic and one should consider the general patterns of behaviour of the ethnic minority groups that have their motherland right across the borders of their host countries. In such a condition, normally they develop opportunistic or flexible attitudes on political identities.

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My informants told me that (though the Chinese government has been generous to ethnic minorities) any political movements of ethnic Koreans are always closely checked by the government and Koreans are not given real power even when they take important government positions. True or imagined, this sense of discrimination in China, however subtle it might have been, has maintained and reinforced their nostalgia for the ancestral homeland.

The Chinese Korean nostalgia for their ethnic homeland was also reinforced by the liberalization of the Chinese economy and society in the 1980s. China was experiencing rapid industrialization and urbanization. Economic development was active along the coastal areas. Meanwhile, the northeastern Provinces of China, where most Chinese Koreans live, experienced relative backwardness during the 1980s and 1990s. Until then, Chinese Koreans were considered the most successful people in China with their high educational levels and (Lee 1986, Chong 2000) their high yield rice cultivation (Chong 2000). Therefore, they were slow in diversifying their businesses while Chinese farmers explored other areas. This made Chinese Koreans feel a sense of relative deprivation.

Chinese Koreans of rural areas, with this sense of relative deprivation, began to migrate to urban areas of coastal China, leaving farmland and adapting to commercial activities. In particular, they were attracted to South Korean companies in the Bohai region that moved from Korea in search of cheaper labour and bigger markets in the early 1990s. These companies also needed Chinese Koreans as translators and guides. Therefore, many Chinese Koreans worked for South Korean companies in the region, which again mobilized Chinese Koreans from rural northeast to coastal cities of China. Once urbanized and exposed to South Korean companies, many of these Chinese Koreans were eventually led to South Korea.

Nostalgia tends to get stronger especially when one is in hardship outside of one’s homeland yet knows of the existence of a well-to-do motherland. As Chinese Koreans have their homeland right across the border, it is rather easy for them to think about the homeland whenever they are in hardship. As a matter of fact, during the Great Purges and Cultural Revolution of the 1950s through 1970s in China many ethnic Korean families escaped the turmoil by migrating to North Korea. Next, in the 1990s, Chinese Koreans were motivated by the ‘Korean Dream’ and they migrated to South Korea.

Through the 1980s the South Korean economy continued to grow and labour shortage was becoming a serious problem. Due to rising labour costs, manufacturing and construction sectors were particularly in trouble. In addition, labour disputes frequently developed into violent demonstrations and strikes in the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, employers were interested in bringing in cheap and flexible foreign workers as a solution. Thus, the influx of foreign workers to Korea began in the late 1980s.

It was at that time when Chinese Koreans began to visit South Korea through the invitation of their South Korean relatives. Chinese Koreans who brought herbal medicines for their relatives found that herbal medicines could sell well in South Korea. Therefore, Chinese Korean visitors would bring herbal medicines from China and sell them on the streets of South Korea. Sympathetic and curious South Koreans would buy the medicines, which became a lucrative business for Chinese Korean visitors. They returned to China with the money and opened shops and bought new homes, which were envied by other Chinese Koreans. This was the beginning of the ‘Korean Dream’ and ‘Korean fever’ in the Chinese Korean community in China (Chin 2000). After the 1992 normalization of diplomatic relations between South Korea and China, an increasing number of Chinese Koreans migrated to South Korea for that ‘Korean dream.’ Though they had to experience status degeneration, Chinese Korean workers in South Korea would make relatively big money in a short time period as wages in South Korea were almost 15-20 times more than in China (Im 2003, 293). Success stories abounded and they spread quickly among Chinese Koreans in the early 1990s.

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246 The damage was both political and cultural. Korans lost much of their autonomy and Korean schools were destroyed and intellectual leaders were purged and killed (Chong 2000, 52-58).
247 My interview with three middle-aged males from Heilongjiang Province: two of them were government officials and the other was a farmer before they came to South Korea.
248 North Koreans helped ethnic Koreans in China during the 1960s when Chinese Koreans were suffering from famine due to economic policy failures in China. In addition, North Koreans also sought for help from Chinese Koreans when there were political or economic disasters in North Korea.

Today, hundred of thousands North Korean refugees are hiding out in the Chinese Korean community to escape starvation in North Korea.
A typical success story of the 'Korean Dream' in the early 1990s was as follows:

Kim (38 years old) is from Yanji City of Jilin Province, and he is currently applying for South Korean nationality. He believes Korea is a 'land of opportunity.' He came to South Korea first in January 1991. He sold his house in a suburban area of Yanji City for 20,000 Yuan (about $2,300). In addition, he borrowed 20,000 Yuan from his relatives. With this money he bought 30,000 Yuan worth of Chinese herbal medicine and came to Korea through Incheon Port, and started his Korean dream. He sold these herbal medicines at big subway stations in Seoul and Busan. In general, Koreans were very sympathetic to him and he could sell all of his medicines. People on the street treated him nicely and showed their sympathy, some even offering him board and food. In 10 months he made 100,000 Yuan and returned to Yanji. He bought an apartment at the city center and opened a blanket factory and two restaurants (Chosun Daily January 21, 2000).

Similar to the case of Brazilian Japanese, who tried their luck in Japan and returned with enough money to buy land, houses, and businesses in Brazil (Hosoe 2003, 256), many Chinese Koreans jumped at the chance to work in South Korea even though they experienced status degeneration. Ethnic Koreans in China are generally better-to-do than other ethnic groups, but in South Korea they had to engage in manual labour. Nonetheless, that did not seem to discourage them in their desire to work in South Korea.

As is the case of Brazilian Japanese workers in Japan, Chinese Koreans were better accepted in South Korea than other foreigners because they are Koreans. South Korean employers tend to prefer Chinese Koreans over other foreign workers because of their cultural similarities with Koreans, particularly in language. It was observed that, from the beginning, Chinese Koreans were better accepted as foreign workers in Korea than other foreigners. A researcher states:

The first foreign migrants allowed into Korea in significant numbers were largely limited to Chinese of Korean ancestry. The thinking was that, as ethnic Koreans, these workers would pose no threat to South Korea's tight-knit, homogenous society (a strategy that is also employed by the Japanese, who actively encourage South Americans of Japanese ancestry to work in Japan (Lim 1999, 329).

In any case, among all of the foreign workers working in South Korea, ethnic Koreans from China were preferred, especially in places where communicative skills are needed. Though Chinese Koreans speak dialects that are different from contemporary standard Korean, they are useful in the areas such as construction sites and domestic services. Today, Chinese Korean workers are concentrated in these two sectors: males in construction and females in restaurants and domestic services while non-Korean workers from China, Bangladesh, Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Russia are mainly in the manufacturing sector.

However, the Chinese Korean 'Korean dream' is not an easy dream. First of all, obtaining an entry visa to South Korea is difficult. In most cases they have to pay a lot of money to brokers. It is said that most people pay between $7,000-$12,000 to brokers to procure South Korean visas. Others pay even more for illegal entry.

Once arrived, South Korean prejudice against Chinese Koreans and other foreign workers makes their life difficult. In the case of the early herbal medicine sellers in the late 1980s, they came to Korea with money borrowed from their relatives and friends. In 1989, however, there was a report that the herbal medicines sold by Chinese Koreans were not of a good quality, and police stopped them from selling such medicines on the street, devastating their peddling business (Im 2003, 292). Soon, the herbal medicine business lost all its customers and those Chinese Koreans felt deeply betrayed by South Korean society. Many late-comers went bankrupt and, as they had borrowed money for the business, family tragedies followed.249

250 Many Chinese Koreans were cheated by South Korean visa brokers who ran away to South Korea after collecting huge visa processing fees. As most of the victims borrowed money from their relatives and friends, tragic events ensued and often families were destroyed.
Nevertheless, the most difficult challenges they encounter in South Korea are the prejudice and discrimination they experience from South Koreans on a daily basis. As we will see later, such prejudice and discrimination leads Chinese Koreans to suffer from an acute sense of alienation in their ancestral homeland, which develops resentment and hostility to South Korea. Then, how have South Koreans viewed their 'brothers' from China?

3. SOUTH KOREAN PERCEPTIONS ON CHINESE KOREANS

Before the 1980s South Koreans did not pay much attention to overseas Korean communities. If they did, it was mostly to the Korean communities in the US and Japan. In particular, regarding the ethnic Korean communities in the Soviet Union and China, not much was known to South Koreans until the late 1980s. However, as the Cold War receded from the late 1980s, South Korean business leaders and politicians gradually realized the potential value of these two and half million Chinese and Soviet Koreans. It was because the South Korean economy reached some degree of globalization by the end of the 1980s and it needed new sources of natural resources and markets for its products. Now, China and the Soviet Union emerged as new partners for the rapidly expanding South Korean economy. In addition, by the late 1980s China and the Soviet Union became very important for South Korea's international policy, especially in its policy toward North Korea.

Therefore, Chinese and Soviet Koreans gained more and more media coverage in South Korea through the late 1980s and 1990s. In this trend, however, overseas Koreans tended to be considered as economic, political, and cultural resources for South Korea's national and business interests. South Koreans are particularly interested in the possible role of Chinese Koreans in helping South Korean business to expand in China. For example, a South Korean researcher eloquently asserts the importance of overseas Koreans for Korea's business and global policy:

There live two million Koreans in China, eight hundred thousand in Japan, and one million two hundred thousand in the U.S. The size of the overseas Korean population is almost five million, including those who are not identified or registered. The fact that overseas Koreans are concentrated in the four super powers, which are our neighbouring countries, is a great advantage for our global policy. We, together with those overseas brothers, must form a "Pan-Korean Economic and Cultural Community," and let these overseas Koreans act as intermediaries between their host countries and us to develop bilateral relationships. Let them, principally, be loyal to their host countries and, secondarily, let them work to develop a [friendly] relationship between their host countries and South Korea (Ku 1995:177-178).

Some South Koreans even emphasized the future role of Chinese Koreans in the unification of the two Koreas. For example, South Korean nationalists viewed Chinese Koreans as the 'missionaries of unification' (Yi 1994). 251

South Koreans have paid less attention to Chinese Korean return migrants who are already in South Korea. Migrants from China are viewed as poor 'brothers' who are eager to take 3D jobs in South Korea. This negative view of Chinese Korean workers is also related to their anti-communist education and the Cold War mentality. In the early 1990s there were reports that Chinese Koreans were not able to meet the high demands of labour in capitalist society. This was particularly mentioned for Chinese Korean women who married South Korean farmers. 252 However, some activists and scholars have called that attention be given to Chinese Korean workers in South Korea, especially in regard to their illegal status in Korea. They raise the voice that Chinese Koreans should be treated better on the basis that they are the descendants of independence fighters who went to China during the colonial period. It is also emphasized that Chinese Koreans are people who could possibly represent Korea's national interests in China (Im 1998, 343). Reverend Seo, an activist for Chinese Korean workers in South Korea, states that Chinese Koreans are important for the following reasons: (1) failing

251 Chinese Korean intellectuals also use such logic frequently. A Chinese Korean writer says that "the meeting of Chinese Koreans and South Koreans was the first experiment for national unification and it totally failed" (Kim Hak-chol 2000)

252 However, those South Korean farmers who married Chinese Korean women normally belong to the poorest segment of society, and even South Korean women avoid marrying them as they do not want to perform intensive labour and have a low quality of life.
to embrace Chinese Koreans will not be good for the future unification of the Korean peninsula; (2) South Korean companies will not receive cooperation from Chinese Koreans when they enter into the Chinese market; and (3) South Koreans should not make Chinese Koreans feel betrayed or neglected as in the long-term future China will become a much wealthier country (Chosun Daily July 11, 2001).

In general, it is observed that South Koreans have imagined Chinese Koreans with a nationalistic and 'romantic' perspective but treated them from an essentialist ethnic perspective.

Romantic View of Chinese Koreans: Tradition-Bearers

If Chinese Korean workers came to South Korea with nostalgia for their ethnic homeland, South Koreans have viewed Chinese Koreans as tradition-bearers, which is a different kind, a 'nostalgia for the past.' For many South Koreans, Chinese Koreans are the people who have maintained 'pure' Korean traditions, which South Koreans have long lost in the process of modernization and economic development. They are fascinated about the fact that some old customs are still alive among Chinese Koreans. It is quite obvious in the travel writings of many South Koreans who visited ethnic Korean communities in Yanbian or elsewhere in northeast China.

The 2000 photo exhibition of Chinese Koreans in Seoul is a good example. The exhibition was held at a major art hall in downtown Seoul in 2000 and it attracted many viewers. Most of the photos exhibited there were Chinese Koreans from rural areas, who maintain the traditions of old Korea, using traditional farming tools that long disappeared in South Korea. In this respect, the photos of Chinese Koreans provoke another kind of 'nostalgia' for the old days that is alive only in the memories of South Koreans. Such a perspective urges South Koreans to be sympathetic toward Chinese Koreans and it fundamentally bestows a sense of superiority to South Korean viewers. In a word, through those photos South Koreans view Chinese Koreans as the 'Other' from whom they reaffirm their superior position in the global economic hierarchy. Roy Grinker's thesis of South Koreans' having a colonialis perspective over North Koreans (Grinker 2000) has relevance to this.

In a similar vein, South Koreans tend to view that Chinese Koreans are 'pure' and 'innocent' while they themselves have lost such innocence while living in the modern world. This dichotomy of tradition-bearing Chinese Koreans and tradition-breaking South Koreans implies different roles for each group in the national community. For example, it is implied that Chinese Koreans would keep the old Korean tradition while South Koreans would innovate technologies and develop the national economy. A few South Korean NGOs have projects to keep Chinese Koreans in the countryside in the belief that the rapid urbanization of Chinese Koreans would eventually result in the loss of their traditions.

In this aspect, such 'pure' Koreans are highly valued as spouses for South Korean men. Indeed, many South Korean males seek their spouses among Chinese Korean females. Each year the number of Chinese Korean females who marry South Korean males increases. According to statistics, almost 12% of all marriages in South Korea are 'international' marriages, and among them more than half are between Chinese Korean females and South Korean males. Love stories between South Korean males and Chinese Korean or Soviet Korean females are popular in South Korean novels and films. There are several films on such stories of romantic relationships. For example, the film "Innocent Steps" (2005) deals with a love story between a Chinese Korean girl and a South Korean man. Hwang Pyong-guk's film, "The Travel to Find a Wife" (2005), also deals with two South Korean farmers going to Uzbekistan to find ethnic Korean wives. Not surprisingly, in these films the ethnic Korean girls of China and the former Soviet Union are depicted as people of innocence and honesty, virtues that are considered lamentably rare among today's South Korean women.

In reality, however, the primary purpose of Chinese Koreans coming to South Korea is to make short term money: the Korean Dream. This is a big disappointment among South Koreans, and they are perceived as 'money-hungry.' For example, the 1998 film "Southern Man and Northern Woman" depicts Chosŏnjok as a street-smart and money-hungry person who tries making money from South

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253 A typical case is seen in Pak Kyongni's 1990 Malli changsongui nara Chunggsgul kada.
254 In the film, Kim Lara, a Soviet Korean lady helps two South Korean young men in their effort to marry. Kim Lara is depicted as a woman with strong will and resolution.
Korean tourists. South Korean employers frequently complain about the short-term-oriented behaviour of their Chinese Korean employees in China and in Korea. In any case, the earlier romantic ideas on Chinese Koreans did not help at all when South Koreans encountered Chinese Koreans in South Korea, especially because of their essentialist notions on race and culture.

Finally, in Korean academic discourses, often, overseas Koreans such as Chinese Koreans tend to be depicted as victims of foreign domination. For example, Japanese Koreans frequently mention being discriminated and oppressed in Japanese society. The similar is true about Chinese Koreans and Soviet Koreans who have been subject to forced migration and other forms of violence. By emphasizing the victim-hood of overseas Koreans, South Koreans tend to seek moral rights against their oppressive neighbours where these victimized ethnic Koreans are residing.

Essentialist ethnic attitude of Koreans

It is said that Japanese assume that they are a ‘homogeneous’ nation and that they have essentialist notions of ethnicity and culture. Tsuda mentions about it regarding the Brazilian Japanese in Japan:

Because of essentialized Japanese ethnic assumptions which correlate race with culture, the Nikkeijin who are “racially” Japanese but culturally Brazilian are seen as ethnic anomalies and peculiarities in Japan (Tsuda 2000, 16).

Koreans have same essentialist attitude toward race, nation, and culture. Koreans tend to believe that ‘Koreans’ should speak Korean language and keep clear identities as Koreans. Therefore, South Koreans expect Chinese Koreans to be similar to them. When they find out that Chinese Koreans differ, South Koreans tend to be greatly surprised and even shocked. In particular, South Koreans are deeply annoyed when they realize that Chinese Koreans consider themselves as “Chinese” and China as their “fatherland.” Ku Yang-gun, a professor of Chinese literature in South Korea, among many, expresses his bewilderment when he realized this during his visit to the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region:

An even more annoying matter is that ethnic Koreans of the Yonbyon Korean Autonomous Region also think in the same vein [with Chinese]. I was very surprised when I found this while working with ethnic Korean scholars at Yonbyon University. They frequently used the expression “our country...” and that “our country” surely was China. They were surely “ethnic Koreans of China” and their priority seemed to be always China’s national interest. I was furious about it and criticized them. I might have looked really strange to them. There was an enormous gap in our perspectives. Koreans in Japan at least feel internal conflict when they choose to naturalize to Japanese. However, there was no such thing for Chinese Koreans in China and they are deeply Sinicized; those ethnic Koreans did not seem to show any resistance against such assimilation” (Ku 1998, 147-8).

Koreans are almost obsessively interested in asking what ethnic/national identity overseas Koreans have. They tend to feel offended when they encounter overseas Koreans who identify themselves as non-Koreans, such as the case of Chinese Koreans who consider themselves primarily as Chinese, not Korean. Such an attitude can cause serious clashes with overseas Koreans who might have different identities or more flexible or multiple identities. One of my informants, a female Chinese Korean graduate student in Seoul told me that Chinese Koreans feel extremely uncomfortable when they are asked about their nationality in South Korea. She said that a few times she was scolded by South Koreans when she identified herself as a ‘Chinese.’ She says:

I am often asked by Koreans how I identify myself. I reply that I am a ‘Chinese.’ However, as soon as they realized that I am an ethnic Korean from China (Chosonjok), they showed their anger at me and admonished me saying that I should state that I am a Korean, not a Chinese.

By the mid-1990s it became general knowledge in South Korea that Chinese Koreans are very different from South Koreans in terms of their identity and national consciousness. Intellectuals emphasized such. A China specialist in South Korea states:

255 Ethnically they consider themselves as Koreans. Politically, nonetheless, they consider themselves as citizens of China, thus ‘Chinese’.
There are differences in the national consciousness among Chinese Koreans depending on which generation they belong to. The 2nd and 3rd generation who were born and raised in China do not feel any conflict in seeing themselves as Chinese.... Those who want to make money through close relationships with Koreans tend to emphasize our all being “Koreans”. Whenever I see such people, I am convinced that they would stress their nationality (as being Chinese) when China becomes a powerful country. It is because I clearly saw a sense of strong pride among Chinese Koreans in their being Chinese (Im, 1994: 357).

Once Chinese Koreans are not seen as Koreans, then they should be ‘Chinese’. Such a perspective became more prevalent in South Korean media after the late 1990s. More and more Chinese Koreans are viewed as people who are not free from all the negative tenets of China as a less developed and less civilized country. In May 2002, when foot and mouth disease occurred in South Korea, Korean media reported about the possibility that the disease originated in China and was carried by Chinese Korean workers. A report in 2002 goes:

The Ministry of Agriculture is investigating the possibility that the foot and mouth outbreaks were carried over by workers from China. It pointed out that the disease occurred mainly in regions where there are many Chinese Korean workers. According to a veterinarian who conducted a survey in the region, there were six Chinese Korean workers working at the farm where the disease broke out (Chosun Daily May 4, 2002).

Sure, the disease might have been carried by those Chinese Korean workers. Nonetheless, such a guess and report in popular newspaper reveals the general identification of Chinese Koreans with the backwardness of China. Such a prejudice against China led to even more negative attitudes toward Chinese Koreans. More often, Chinese Koreans tend to be depicted as wild and unlawful figures in South Korea. It is reported that a Chinese Korean threatened that he would explode urban gas pipes in Youido, a busy business district in Seoul, unless the South Korean government stopped expelling undocumented Chinese Korean workers (Chosun Daily January 28, 2004). One reader puts his/her opinion to the report, saying:

Chinese Koreans – their body is Korean, but their heart is Chinese. They support the Chinese soccer team when it plays against South Korea. They want their body in Korea, but their hearts are longing for China, their eternal homeland (Chosun Daily January 28, 2004).

Facing such negative attitudes of South Koreans toward themselves, Chinese Korean feelings of alienation get deeper.

Discrimination and exclusion: South Korean Policy on Chinese Koreans

In the 1990s, with the growing importance of overseas Koreans for Korea’s economic and political interest, the Korean government established a principle regarding overseas Koreans. This was the Kim Young Sam government’s “New Overseas Koreans Policy” in 1995. Its principle was to support overseas Koreans to grow as model residents where they resided. The same year the Presidential Committee for Globalization came up with the “Detailed Guidelines in Dealing with Chinese Koreans,” which became the foundation of South Korea’s policy toward Chinese Koreans for the next decade. In the Guidelines, the government made it clear that it treated Chinese Koreans as ‘Chinese citizens.’ It stated that South Korean government will support Chinese Korean community in China on the principle that they are Chinese citizens (Kim & Jang 2003, 172).

With the financial crisis of 1997, the South Korean government actively sought for overseas Korean investments in Korea. To promote such investment, the government enacted a new law in 1999 to encourage overseas Koreans to invest in South Korea. The new law allowed overseas Koreans to visit and stay in Korea, to conduct business and to own property. In the early stage of preparing the law it defined overseas Koreans as anyone who were ethnically Korean (descendants of Korean parents), residing overseas with or without foreign nationality. However, the Korean government was concerned about the possibly large scale migration of Chinese Koreans to South Korea. In addition, there were concerns over possible diplomatic problems with China, which has about its two million ethnic Koreans near the Korean border. As a governmental official states, the Korean labour market could be
seriously disturbed "if only a quarter of the two and half million ethnic Koreans in China and the CIS come to South Korea" (Chosun Daily, December 10, 2001).

Soon, the government excluded Chinese Koreans and Soviet Koreans by confining the definition of overseas Koreans only to those who left Korea after 1948 (when the South Korean government was established) and their direct descendants. It is true that China and Russia were concerned about the possibility of South Korea's liberalizing its visa system for ethnic Koreans, and they insisted that such an action would constitute an intervention into the domestic minorities of China and the CIS. 256 However, the major concerns behind this exclusion of Chinese and Soviet Koreans from the privilege of free entry visas and property ownership were more in terms of labour market disruption and security.

This new law clearly discriminated against Chinese Koreans and Soviet Koreans. With protests of Chinese Koreans and NGOs who appealed the Constitutional Court about the unconstitutionality of the law, the Law on the Status of Overseas Koreans was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2001. The Constitutional Court declared that the law discriminate against Chinese Koreans and Soviet Koreans against other overseas Koreans, such those from the US, Japan, or western countries. The Court demanded that the law be revised by the end of 2003.

Thus, in 2003 the law was revised and in February 2004 the revised law was approved by the General Assembly. According to the revised law, all overseas Koreans are given the rights to visit Korea freely, obtain real estate, and work. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Justice added new regulations in administering the law, making it harder for Chinese Koreans (and Soviet Koreans) to visit to and work in South Korea. 257

For Chinese Koreans, this was a clear indication that South Korea does not welcome them and would not treat them equally with other overseas Koreans from wealthier countries. This certainly deepened their sense of being neglected and alienated in South Korea.

7. CONCLUSION: BLOOD AND WATER?

By the mid-1990s, Chinese Koreans contemplated their relationship with South Korea and their ethnic/national identity and several books were published based on such reflections. Chinese Korean experiences in South Korea gave them an opportunity to reflect on their own identities and future. Among them are: Chae-guk Kim. No Such Thing As South Korea (1996); Yon-san Ryu. The Seoul Fever (1996); and P'an-ryong Chong. Our Nation in the World (1996).

Kim states that Chinese Koreans have affection toward Korea as though it were their biological mother (naajun chong) while to China they have the affection of parenting (kiwojun chong), and he concludes that the love of parenting is bigger than the love of giving birth (Kim 1996, 245). Similarly, a Chinese

256 Chinese and Russian governments were critical about any attempts by South Korea to give citizenship to ethnic Koreans residing in their countries. In particular the Chinese government reacted strongly against the movement to change the definition of Koreans. Chinese Ambassador Li warned the South Korean government: "It is against international law if Korea tries to regulate Joseonjok – who are Chinese citizens – with Korean law" (Kyunghyang Shinmun Feb. 18, 2001). He also said that Chinese Koreans might be Koreans in terms of their blood but they are undoubtedly Chinese citizens as one of the 56 ethnic minorities of China. “Therefore,” he added, “Chinese Koreans are a member of the bigger Chinese family, and South Korea should be considerate in treating the issue of the status of Chinese Koreans in Korea” (Chosun Daily December 16, 2001).

257 Now 'overseas Koreans' are confined only to the 1st and 2nd generations. Also restricted are visits by overseas Koreans from countries that have high rates of illegal residents in Korea. They are twenty countries where the illegal residency rate is more than 50% and ethnic Koreans from those countries can only be employed by companies with assets exceeding $500,000. This is to prevent illegal residency by unskilled workers in Korea. Both China and Russia are included in the twenty countries (Chosun Daily September 23, 2003).
Korean newspaper editorial also emphasizes that Chinese Koreans should not betray the ‘love of parenting’ they received from China (Hungnyonggang Daily September 12, 1995).

Chong P’an-ryong provides the thesis of a ‘married daughter’ in which Chinese Koreans are likened to a Korean daughter marrying a Chinese man. According to Chong, such a daughter should first serve her husband and his parents and learn the ways of her husband’s family. She should even keep a certain distance from her own family, he insists. Chong warns that the worst thing that a host society could consider would be for immigrants maintain strong ties with their homeland and try to harm the host society (Chong 1996, 271-2). This shows the fear of backfire from Chinese society should Chinese Koreans try to leave. Considering the Chinese Korean experience during the Cultural Revolution and other political turmoil in China, such worries seem to be legitimate.

In general, Chinese Korean intellectuals believe that Chinese Koreans should not be too close to South Korea or against the political interests of China. Considering the Chinese government’s position, they do not want South Korea to issue citizenship to Chinese Koreans. They rather want South Korea to make it easier for Chinese Koreans to visit the country so that Chinese Koreans will not need to become illegal residents of South Korea. So far, most Chinese Koreans just want to work in Korea and return to China with money. Chinese Korean intellectuals believe that the Chinese government would not oppose such measures.

The first ten years of the Chinese Korean experience in South Korea seem to have caused them to conclude that they cannot become ‘Koreans,’ at least in South Korea. In this regard, their South Korean homeland has been lost. Many of them reaffirmed themselves as Chinese citizens and seem to have found a new homeland in China.

As far as the experiences of Chinese Korean return migrants to South Korea are concerned, the once popular saying “Blood is thicker than water” seems to be just a myth. Earlier, South Koreans had a romantic view of Chinese Koreans, but quickly realized that Chinese Koreans were different from themselves. Chinese Korean migrants are alienated socially and marginalized economically in their own homeland that they had longed for. Today, most Chinese Koreans consider that South Korea is a good place to make money; they do not consider South Korea as their ‘homeland’ with which they would feel deep warmth.

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The mysterious death of the Pyongyang Declaration

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Introduction

The Pyongyang Declaration of 18 September 2005 (Anonymous, 2002b) following the historic meeting between Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro seemed to solve the abductions issue and set the two countries on the road to normalisation of relations. In fact, relations deteriorated very rapidly and today are at their lowest for many years. The usual explanation for this, in which all the blame is laid upon the Koreans, lacks plausibility. This paper offers another explanation in which Japanese domestic politics combined with US policy in East Asia offer a more satisfactory framework in which to view this sorry affair. This paper draws upon, and updates, an earlier version given at the Japanese Politics Colloquium held at Clare College, Cambridge in April 2005 (Beal, 2005a).

Background to the Summit

North Korea has been trying for some time to normalise relations with Japan in an attempt to achieve reparations and trade and investment opportunities as South Korea did forty years ago. The sticking point from the Japanese side, ostensibly at least, has been the issue of Japanese allegedly abducted by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s.

Why these abductions (and how many there in fact were) remains a mystery. If North Korea had kidnapped scientists, or political dissidents, that would have been one thing. But why Yokota Megumi? According to Niigata Prefectural Police,

On the evening of November 15, 1977, a 13-year-old secondary school girl, Ms. YOKOTA Megumi, disappeared somewhere hundreds meters away from the seashore, after parting from one of her friends on her way home from school in Niigata City. She has not yet been found since then (Anonymous).

According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs she, and the other abductees, were kidnapped for a number of possible reasons, none of which appear to make sense:

Possible motives for this unprecedented act of state sponsored crime by North Korea are thought to be as follows: identity theft for North Korean agents; coercing victims into teaching North Korean agents to act as Japanese; and recruitment by a Japanese Red Army faction who are still harbored in North Korea (Anonymous, nd 2003?).

"State sponsored" abductions are far from unprecedented in Northeast Asia as Koreans, North and South, point out. A DPRK Foreign Ministry statement of 29 January 2005 reiterated the charge:

Japan had savagely plundered Korea of its resources for over 40 years after occupying it by force of arms early in the past 20th century. It took away or abducted more than 8.4 million innocent Koreans and mercilessly killed at least one million of them and forced 200,000 women into sexual slavery for the imperial Japanese army (Anonymous, 2005c).

Although the figures vary, these accusations strike resonance in South Korea where they are frequently repeated, either at times of confrontation or on anniversaries, such as that of the 1 March 1919 Independence Movement (Chung, 2005). Nevertheless, linking them with the Japan abduction issue is relatively uncommon, in public at least. However, President Roh Moo-hyun did precisely this in his 1 March speech in 2005:

Moreover, he linked Japan's colonial-era atrocities to North Korea's kidnapping of ordinary Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s. "In the same light, Japan should put itself in Korea's shoes and understand the anger of our people, who suffered thousand and tens of thousands of times
as much pain over issues such as forced labor and comfort women." Roh himself added this section to a draft of his speech, according to the Japanese media (Takahashi, 2005).

Some Japanese have also attempted to put the adductions into this wider context:

It is clear that the abduction of innocent citizens is a grave human rights violation. But is the denunciation of the abduction an expression of anger toward the infringement of human rights of Japanese compatriots or protest against the infringement of universal human rights? If it is the former, then it is nothing more than self-centered nationalism. If it is the latter, then the Japanese must pay due attention to the violation of human rights of Koreans in the past by Imperial Japan and try to solve the abduction issue while showing readiness to tackle the issue of compensation for Koreans who were taken for forced labor and the former "comfort women" who served the Imperial Japanese military (Sakamoto, 2004).

All this may explain why North Korea security agents might feel no compunction about kidnapping Japanese in general, but it does not explain the practical problem of why they kidnapped these particular ones, who seem to have no relevant skills or attributes.

The Pyongyang Summit - the solution that wasn't

Like anywhere else there are contesting forces within the Japanese elite which argue, sometimes quite publicly, over foreign policy. In Japan's case, with the long-term dominance of the LDP, this has traditionally been coloured by the existence of factions within an essentially one party system. In respect of North Korea, and general foreign policy stance, there seems to have been a fight around a vacillating or opportunist Koizumi, paralleling that in Washington between Powell and the neocons for the ear of Bush.

According to the Asahi Shimbun, 'The LDP has been serving as bad cop to the government's good cop in dealings with North Korea.' (Anonymous, 2004e) The front-runner for the LDP on this issue has been Abe Shinzo, acting secretary general who back in 2002 was deputy chief cabinet secretary reportedly urged Koizumi to break off talks with Kim Jong Il after he admitted the abductions.

On the right, at least, there has been a continuity stretching back to militarism.

Moreover, the US released from Sugamo Prison many suspected war criminals, including political and business leaders, such as the right-wing godfathers, Sasagawa Ryoichi and Kodama Kiyoshi, as well as Kishi Nobusuke, who served as minister of commerce and industry during Tojo Hideki's militaristic administrations. Kishi, who became prime minister in 1957, was the grandfather of Abe Shinzou, acting LDP secretary general, who is known for his hardline stance against North Korea (Takahashi, 2005).

In the opposite corner from Abe has been Tanaka Hitoshi, director general of the Asian-Oceanian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was responsible on the Japanese side for setting up the Pyongyang summit following overtures from the DPRK (Pollack, 2003). The Japanese 'team' also included Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, Deputy Secretary Furukawa Tejiro, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko, Vice-Minister Takeuchi and Hiramatsu Kenji of the Northeast Asia Bureau. According to Wada Haruki, 'secret preparations began from the fall of 2001 when Tanaka and Hiramatsu met with North Korean defense committee members and people close to Kim Jong Il' (Wada, 2003). This was a senior team and if they were reasonably united then it is difficult to see how their plans could be overturned within the Japanese political system alone. The explanation would seem to be that outside pressure, from the United States, was the key factor. Koizumi went to Pyongyang wanting, and presumably expecting, a resolution of the abductedees issues. In return he was to promise serious movement towards normalisation of relations and de facto reparations. In other words, the Japan-DPRK relationship would move to quite another level from the past, similar to that between Japan and the ROK. Underneath there might be antipathy on both sides, but there would be a normal state-to-state relationship and increasing economic interaction. This was a bold step, bolder than perhaps he realised, and it seems unlikely that he, and his team, would have gone to Pyongyang without assurances that they would have their way on the abductedees issue. Indeed, Tanaka is reported to have said on his return from Pyongyang on 25 August 2002, where he had been making final preparations for Koizumi's visit, that, 'It had been agreed that the two leaders would strive to achieve normalization at the earliest possible date, settling once and for all the issues of the abducted Japanese, the nuclear program, and colonial period issues.' (Wada, 2003)
That was certainly the assumption in much of the press. For instance, Doug Struck in the Washington Post on 31 August, just after the surprise announcement of the forthcoming summit, wrote:

"We are aware of the risk of coming back empty-handed," said a chief Japanese government negotiator.

Japan and North Korea have never had formal relations, and Japan's diplomatic moves are usually slow and painstaking. The surprise of today's announcement was heightened by the fact that Koizumi has little background in foreign affairs and is typically more involved in domestic issues.

Korea watchers said that is an even stronger indication that a deal has been set, and that Koizumi's visit is to sign the agreement. (Struck, 2002)

In the event, Koizumi did not come back empty handed; he came back with what he went for, a resolution of the abductee issue.

The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration was circumspect and bland, as one might expect of something written by a joint committee of officials (Anonymous, 2002b).

Item one committed both sides to moving ahead with normalisation — 'Both sides decided to exert all efforts to establish the diplomatic ties at an early date on the basis of the spirit and main principle laid down in the declaration and resume the negotiations on opening them within October 2002.' And in item two Japan apologised for the colonial period — 'The Japanese side honestly admitted the historical facts that it had inflicted huge damage and sufferings upon the Korean people during its past colonial rule over Korea and keenly reflected on and sincerely apologized for them'.

In respect of the abductions it said, in item three:

Both sides confirmed their will to observe international law and refrain from threatening mutual security. As regards the pending issue concerning the life and security of Japanese nationals the DPRK side declared that it would take a proper measure to prevent the recurrence of such regrettable things, a product of the abnormal relations between the DPRK and Japan (Anonymous, 2002b).

There is no mention even of the word 'abduction' so whatever we know of Kim Jong Il's admission and apology, and the information provided by North Korean officials, comes from Japanese officials. Information from North Korean sources has been very limited. In other words, there were no public surprises at the summit outside the control of the Japanese government.

Koizumi went to Pyongyang knowing in essence what to expect, and as far as can be ascertained got what he wanted. If anything, he got more than he expected. For one thing, the Japanese expected 11 abductees and the Koreans came up with information on 14 -- four living, either dead, one missing and one unaccounted for (Takashima, 2002). More important, Kim's apology was widely seen as an unprecedented concession (which indicates, as we shall see in a moment) how important the prospect of normalisation was for the DPRK:

But for Kim Jong Il to admit to such acts is utterly unprecedented in North Korean behavior. For more than 50 years, North Korean propaganda has maintained they are absolutely right and the entire rest of the world is wrong—not to mention being imperialists, war-mongers and criminals.
Whatever one thinks of this regime, it has always placed complete primacy on its own conceptions of national dignity as it pursues an extreme doctrine of national sovereignty. For the top leader to admit to these crimes is for his entire nation to lose face.

Kim, chairman of the North Korea National Defense Commission, was the only person in the country who could have made these admissions, but the fact that he accompanied them with a direct apology was truly amazing (Cumings, 2002).

Koizumi is known for his mastery of internal politics, and it is commonly and reasonably assumed that Koizumi agreed to the summit primarily to bolster his domestic popularity. Did he miscalculate? This is a possibility.

The summit itself left the details of identifying the fate of the abductees and returning survivors and those of the families who so desired to Japan to be worked out in the normalisation negotiations. These were details to be tidied up, rather than unresolved issues.

The Japanese press secretary, Takashima Hatsuhisa, at a media conference on 20 September 2002, briefed journalists on this process:

Mr. Takashima: ..[the abductees] will be either visiting or coming back to Japan, or the members of the families will be seeing them in Pyongyang. I do not know when it will take place at this moment. But Mr. Kim Jong-II promised to Prime Minister Koizumi that their reunion will be materialized, and the North Korean side will certainly assist with that. /.../

Mr. Ken Hijino, Financial Times: /... Secondly, it was said that resolving the abduction issue was one of the biggest hurdles to normalizing relations. Has that issue been cleared, first of all, and what are the other hurdles to be cleared before Japan normalizes its ties? What are the coming conditions?

Mr. Takashima: First of all, the issue is not cleared, or resolved, simply because we need more information, and we have to clarify so many things. Therefore, this issue will be resolved during the course of negotiations for normalization. The hurdles: The things we have to clarify are how, when, and where, those abductions took place, and what happened with the victims. We and the members of the families wish to know all that information. We have to try very hard (Takashima, 2002).

They might have to try very hard, and clearly finding out exactly what security agencies had been up to a decade and more ago would be difficult in any country. It might be especially difficult in this case with the abductions seeming to be so hare-brained and turning out to be a source of embarrassment to the leadership. Nevertheless, there was no indication at this press conference that problems so serious as to derail the normalisation process completely would surface.

Was Koizumi surprised by the vehemence of pro-abductee groups, and the media, to fan public sentiment so that what had seemed to be his solving of the abductee issue turned out to be an albatross? Again this is possible; even adroit politicians such as Koizumi may misjudge popular feeling. However, it is usually argued that he had not anticipated North Korean 'stonewalling and deception' (Anonymous, 2004f).

Stonewalling and deception

The official Japanese line, and the one disseminated in the Japanese and most international media, is that the failure to resolve the abductee issue in the two and a half years since the 17 September summit, and despite a second trip to Pyongyang by Prime Minister Koizumi in May 2004, was due to Pyongyang's obstruction and cheating (Anonymous, 2004g). This is a complex story involving a web of living (and dead) abductees and their families and increasing bad feeling on both sides. As agreed, the survivors were allowed to return to Japan in late 2002 by Pyongyang on the understanding that they would return to consult their families in North Korea on where they wanted to live but then were barred by the Japanese government from returning (Clark, 2005a). Of particular interest to the US media, and military, was Charles Robert Jenkins (Anonymous, 2004h). He was an American soldier who had defected to North Korea in the 1960s and who had married one of the Japanese abductees, Soga Hitomi; they were both working as language teachers (Zaun, 2004). Jenkins was released to
Indonesia, which has no extradition treaty with the US, but then went on to Japan with his wife. There he surrendered to the US military, was court martialed, given a token 30 day sentence, and ‘debriefed’ (Kirk, 2004).

However, the issue which captured most attention and which seemed best to encapsulate the convoluted course of the post-summit relationship was that of Yokata Megumi. It was reported that she had committed suicide, after suffering a nervous breakdown. This was initially reported as having happened in 1993, but subsequently amended to 1994 (Yoshida and Takahara, 2004). She left a daughter whose identity was confirmed by DNA tests (Anonymous, 2002a). She was buried but her husband, Kim Chol Jun, subsequently had her remains cremated, and it was these ashes which ostensibly were brought back to Japan by a Japanese delegation on 15 November 2004. It was symptomatic of the prevailing state of distrust that the authorities immediately embarked on attempts to verify the remains, although, as an article in the Japan Times warned, DNA tests might be difficult because they were in poor condition, there was only a small amount, and cremation, if at a sufficiently high temperature, would have destroyed the DNA. However, the paper added, ‘The police plan to use other technologies in their attempt to establish the identity of the remains, but the efforts are expected to take some time.’ (Anonymous, 2004c)

On 8 December the Japanese government announced that the remains were not those of Yokota Megumi but of two other, unidentified, people. There was an immediate public outcry at this fresh evidence of Pyongyang’s perfidy. Yokota’s father, Shigeru, took this as an indication that his daughter was still alive, and called on the government to impose sanctions (Yoshida and Takahara, 2004). These would include banning remittances from Koreans in Japan, and stopping North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports (Takahara, 2004). Foreign Minister Machimura said that Japan would suspend food aid to North Korea. It was reported that surveys showed that 70% of the Japanese people supported sanctions (Rusling, 2005).

Pyongyang’s response was angry, but nuanced. It denounced ‘ultra-right forces’ in Japan, mentioning Abe Shinzou by name, but refrained from criticizing either Koizumi or the Japanese government as such. The DPRK Foreign Ministry, in a lengthy statement on 14 December, laid stress on the role of Yokota’s Korean husband, Kim Chol Jun,

As far as the remains of Megumi Yokota are concerned, her husband directly handed them to the head of the delegation of the Japanese government, which came to Pyongyang for the DPRK-Japan inter-governmental working contact held in November last, free from the interference from the third party at the repeated earnest request of the Japanese side. It is unimaginable that her husband handed the remains of other person to the Japanese side, as claimed by it, then what did he expect from doing so? The “results of the examination” announced by Japan, in the final analysis, make us suspect that they were cooked up according to the political script carefully prearranged to serve a particular purpose [emphasis added] (Anonymous, 2004d).

Motive is a vital aspect of this business and if it was a purely personal affair, it was a good argument, but then the Japanese had their doubts that Kim was, in fact, Yokota’s husband (Anonymous, 2004c). There seems to have been little disagreement in Japan that the tests proved that the Koreans were deliberately withholding information and there were no suspicions that the results were ‘cooked up’ by the ultra right. Even Gregory Clark who frequently castigated the Japanese right took the tests as indication that Yokota was still alive and that ‘she cannot be released now for fear of jeopardizing spy operations.’ (Clark, 2005b) The DPRK Foreign Ministry statement reiterated the accusations against Japanese colonialism, that ‘Japan abducted at least 8.4 million Koreans, massacred more than one million others and violated the chastity of 200,000 Korean women in the past but it has not yet made and moral and material compensation for these crimes.’ It also repeated the charge, to which we will return, that the Japanese ultra right was being manipulated by the Bush administration in order to ‘maintain its permanent supremacy in the region on the basis of the US-Japan alliance.’ (Anonymous, 2004d)

The DPRK returned to the offensive in January, armed with the Japanese results, attacking their scientific validity. On 24 January the official Korean Central News Agency (KNCA) issued a detailed criticism of the testing process. It pointed out that tests were done by two institutions, the Police Science Institute and by Teikyo College. The Police Science Institute, despite having a long history
and rich experience' in forensic examination, and having ‘the world’s latest equipment’ failed to achieve any DNA results. It was the Teikyo tests which formed the basis of Tokyo’s claim that the remains were not those of Yokota, and the KCNA itemised a number of reasons why the Teikyo results were suspect and concluded that,

Japan has refused to recognize that the issue of abduction has already been settled, faking up even the results of the examination of the remains and totally negated the sincere efforts made by the DPRK, driving the bilateral relations to the worse phase of confrontation. (Anonymous, 2005d)

These were familiar accusations and cut little ice in Japan. However, Pyongyang then received some endorsement from an unlikely quarter. The British science journal Nature ran a story on the tests and concluded ‘Cremated remains fail to prove fate of Japanese girl abducted in 1977’ (Cyranoski, 2005). It reported that ‘Teikyo University’ Tomio Yoshii, one of Japan’s leading forensic scientists’ claimed that he had managed to extract DNA from all five of his samples, while the National Research Institute of Police Science had been unable to do so. It continued, ‘Nevertheless Yoshio, who had no previous experience with cremated specimens, admits that his tests are not conclusive and that it is possible the samples were contaminated.’ (Cyranoski, 2005)

If the tests were, in fact, inconclusive why was the Japanese government so adamant that they had proved North Korea was deceptive, thus fanning the crisis to a new intensity?

The Nature article was picked up by KCNA, which exulted, rather over optimistically that;

The British science magazine Nature recently disclosed on its Internet site that the results of the DNA test of the remains of Japanese woman Megumi Yokota released by Japan were a sheer fabrication and lie. … It [Japan] should face up to the reality, frankly open to the international community the truth behind their mean fabrication of the results of the DNA test and apologize to the Koreans for it. (Anonymous, 2005b)

Actually, the Nature article itself said nothing about fabrication; it did not venture into politics but confined itself to science. Moreover, no one seems to have taken much notice; it would take more than one article, no matter how authoritative, to dislodge the official line unless there were political forces, such as an opposition party not committed to confrontation with North Korea, to force the issue.

However, deference to the Japanese government was lacking in South Korea, where anti-Japanese sentiment was much inflamed by the Tokto/Takeshima crisis. It is here, in Seoul, that we find an article by Ryu Jin in the mainstream English language daily, Korea Times, that tied the Japanese government stance over the Yokota Megumi affair, and the post-Pyongyang Declaration abductee issue with American construction of the nuclear crisis.

Referring to disclosures that the US had misled its allies over alleged North Korean nuclear exports to Libya (of which more below), Ryu Jin linked this to the Yokota affair:

The alleged cover-up, a reminder of the earlier dispute over its intelligence fiasco in the run-up to the Iraqi invasion, has raised suspicion here that the U.S. has joined hands with Japan to spread falsified information in order to topple the Kim Jong-Il regime in North Korea. In the Japanese version of the alleged information cook-up, the Tokyo government condemned Pyongyang last December saying it concluded that the bone ashes sent from North Korea were not those of Megumi Yokota, who was abducted by the North’s agents decades ago.

Much similar to the American case, which neo-conservatives apparently attempted to utilize for a harder line policy against the Communist North, Tokyo also tried to use its own conclusion to suggest punitive measures such as economic sanctions. …

"North Korea might have a nuclear arms program based on highly enriched uranium (HEU) as the U.S. alleges and might have sent false bone ashes – either mistakenly or intentionally – as Japan claims,” says Cheong Wook-sik, who heads the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, "But no scientific evidence has so far been provided to prove the allegations. This is another face of the international politics in Northeast Asia taking place between fallacy and truth.” (Ryu, 2005)
And this brings us to consider the wider Six Party framework, and the geopolitical policies and motivations of the states involved. Whilst the minutiae of Japan-North relations since the Pyongyang Summit may be inaccessible or unexplored (the second 'unknown'), the framework in which the relationship is played out is known in broad outline. Looking at this framework allows us to surmise what is happening even if we are not in a position to pin down the details.

The Six Party states – policies and motivations

For reasons of space and time I will touch on this very complex and broad subject lightly, keeping references to the minimum. A fuller explication can be found in my essay ‘Positions, Policies and Prospects: A View from outside the Six’ (Beal, 2004) and in my forthcoming book, ‘North Korea: The Struggle against American Power’. (Beal, 2005b)

DPRK

Whilst North Korea is widely portrayed as secretive and enigmatic, its broad strategic position is, in many ways, quite easy to describe. Supported by a favourable aid/trade relationship with the Soviet Union, able to exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and led by the charismatic and energetic Kim Il Sung (the major figure in the struggle against Japanese colonialism), the DPRK had been one of the stars of the developing world. For decades its economic growth outstripped that of the ROK and it became the most industrialised state in Asia, second only to Japan. However, the internal rigidities of over-centralisation, and the continuing military threat and economic sanctions of the United States meant that its economy was not able to withstand the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 1990s saw it plummet into a deep and compounded economic crisis, which caused the deaths of some quarter of a million people. Although the economy has recovered somewhat the situation is still dire and North Korea remains heavily dependent on international aid to feed many of its people. Economic reforms, especially the marketisation measure of July 2002 have spurred growth but also increased inequality.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that the main foreign policy objectives of North Korea are removal of the US military threat and economic warfare (of which Japanese sanctions is a major component), and normalisation of relations with the US, and with Japan. These are the only two major countries, aside from France, with which the DPRK does not have diplomatic relations. Internal Korean North-South relations fall within a different category; though both are sovereign states, with seats in the UN, neither regard the other as a foreign state. The Pyongyang-Seoul relationship has its own dynamic, especially the shared commitment to re-unification, but is inseparable from US policy.

Since at least the 1960s Pyongyang has been making overtures to Washington and at times – the early years of Carter’s presidency and the final period of Clinton’s – an ending of ‘hostility’ seemed on the cards. The summit between Kim Jong Il and Koizumi Junichiro took place, as we know from Japanese sources, at Pyongyang’s initiative. However, asymmetry is at the heart of North Korea’s dilemma. Whilst good political and economic relations with Japan, and with the US, are absolutely vital and the key to economic recovery for North Korea the relationship has no such importance for Japan, or for the US.

At the Pyongyang Summit of September 2002 Kim Jong Il was willing to sacrifice domestic face in return for the promise of normalisation of Tokyo-Pyongyang relations and all the benefits that might flow from that. Japanese de-facto reparations, if they matched those to South Korea in the 1960s, have been estimated to be worth $8-10 billion, a very large sum for the North Korean economy. Japan had been North Korea’s major trading partner in the early 1990s, but Japanese sanctions and other measure had stifled trade. Just in the year after the Pyongyang Summit instead of trade with Japan greatly increasing again, as North Korea had no doubt anticipated, it actually fell to $174m from $234m the previous year. Exports to China, on the other hand, continued to grow strongly and as a result the shares changed significantly. In 2002 China and Japan had each roughly one third of North Korea’s exports; by 2003 China had over a half and Japan’s share had fallen to less than a quarter. (Fig 1)

Fig 1: Japan and China in North Korea’s foreign trade, 2002-3
Source: see Table 1; Note that this excludes intra-Korean trade

Japan was also a major source of aid and remittances, both of which were stifled by the post-summit crisis.

It is very difficult to suggest any reason why North Korea should violate the Pyongyang Declaration, as Japanese spokesmen have alleged (Yoshida and Takahara, 2004). It would have everything to lose and nothing to gain. That does not exclude miscalculations at the top and obstruction below, but it does make the suggestion that it is Pyongyang that has brought about the crisis very suspect. Japan, as we shall see, is another matter.

Russia

After a decade of neglect under Yeltsin, Korean affairs regained attention under Putin. Russia shares with China and South Korea a common desire for peace and defusing of tension in the region, the survival of the DPRK and its economic rehabilitation. The long-awaited linking of the Korean railway systems, which may take place this year, offers prospects of the Trans-Siberian Railway becoming a major conduit for the trade of Japan and South Korea to Europe. Although the most peripheral of the six party states, Russia has played a reasonably strong role in the talks. At the same time, Russia is becoming increasingly worried by US policy, and the threats of the US-Japan alliance and this has led to a warming of the Beijing-Moscow relationship. Significantly, for the first time in history, there are to be joint Russian-Chinese military exercises, and in the Yellow Sea region, facing US bases in Japan and South Korea (Yoo and Lee, 2005). The conservative Seoul daily noted that ‘The military drill is a response to the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance’ and drew the rather strange conclusion that Seoul should draw closer to Washington, ignoring the inconvenient fact that in the event of a military conflict what with America and Japan being on the one side and China and Russia on the other, the Korean peninsula would be caught in the crossfire (Editorial, 2005).

China

China has been both the initiator and the host of the Six Party talks. One of the (presumably unforeseen) results of US refusal to negotiate with North Korea, has been to yield to China the role of the centrepiece of Asia/Pacific diplomacy.

China’s position on Korea affairs parallels that of Russia. It fears that an escalation of tension would derail its surging economic growth. A nuclear-armed North Korea would give encouragement or excuse for the nuclearization of an already remilitarising Japan. It needs to prevent the collapse of the DPRK because that could send a flood of refugees into China; it currently has about 50,000 - far more than the 6-8,000 in South Korea and the handful in the United States. On the other hand, a
rehabilitation of the DPRK economic would facilitate its burgeoning economic ties with South Korea and whilst the economic (and political) reunification of the peninsula under South Korean hegemony would have its drawbacks, they are minor compared with the status quo, collapse or, worst all of, war.

South Korea
The current administration of Roh Moo-hyun follows that of its predecessor (Kim Dae-Jung's) in North Korea policy, and this inevitably brings it into conflict with Washington. Kim Dae-jung recognised that a collapse of the DPRK, even a 'soft collapse' on the lines of German reunification, would impose huge, perhaps disastrous, economic and social costs on the ROK. His 'Sunshine Policy' was an attempt at defusing tension and economic cooperation as a way of leading to eventual measured and consensual reunification. Despite the Bush administration this policy has continued and this was symbolised in December 2004 by the first sales in Seoul of products made by a South Korea company in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. This economic zone in Kaesong, a North Korea city close to the border with the South, and quite close to Seoul, has been specifically designed for small South Korean Companies. The products, kitchenware labelled 'made in Kaesong' went on sale in the Lotte Department Store and were sold out in two days (Seo, 2004). The venue has added symbolism since the Lotte group was founded by a Japanese-Korean. However, North Korean policy (and hence relations with the United States) is very much contested territory. To some extent this follows party lines, with the ruling Uri Party leaning more to engagement with the North and attempting to assert independence from the United States. However, the leader of the opposition Grand National Party, Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the military dictator Park Chung-hee has also advocated engagement, has called on the US to negotiate with North Korea and has put herself forward as an emissary to the North (Jung, 2005). At the same time there are strong conservative political forces opposed to engagement and there is the military, with a vested interest in confrontation and with strong ties to the United States. The commander of the US forces in Korea, currently General Leon LaPorte, is also commander of the South Korean military through the Combined Services Command (CSC). The CSC periodically has high-profile joint US-ROK military exercises to reinforce the perception of a 'threat from North Korea' (Yoon, 2005). The centrality of the role of the ROK military, and US dominance of it, was emphasised when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited South Korea on her Asian tour in March 2005. She went straight to the underground command bunker where US commanders 'would direct any war against North Korea.' (Brinkley, 2005) Only the following day did she make a call on President Roh Moo-hyun. Marginalisation of political parties, and ROK political sovereignty, is a very real possibility.

At the Pyongyang Summit of 2002 Kim Jong Il was after what Park Chung-hee had achieved in the 1966—an apology for Japanese colonialism, normalisation of relations and reparations. Although Japan-ROK relations have improved over the years, especially under Kim Dae-jung, there has always been a large reservoir of anti-Japanese feeling, and discontent with Park's treaty (Park, 2005a). Despite the easing of barriers to Japanese culture in South Korea since 1998 and the success of the Korean soap star 'Yonsama' (Bae Yong-joon), and the 'Korean wave' in Japan, the scars of the past run deep (Anonymous, 2005e). A recent example of this, on the intellectual level, was the furious reaction in South Korea to an article by former Korea University professor Hanh Sung-joe in the Japanese monthly Sieron which was seen as 'praising Japanese colonialism' (Lee, 2005). Visits to the Yasukuni shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi and the textbooks issue are a constant source of friction (as they are in the North, and in China) (Beal et al., 2001) (Editorial, 2004). Against this background, it is easy to see how incidents such as the present crisis of Tokto/Takeshima islands, precipitated by Shimane Prefecture's designation of 22 February as 'Takeshima Day can quickly plummet Seoul-Tokyo relations to new depths (Lee and Serf, 2005). This crisis has echoes in the North, which shares the South's territorial claims (just as Beijing and Taiwan have identical positions on maritime boundaries in the Pacific) (Anonymous, 2005f).

Just as Seoul is trapped between Washington and Pyongyang, so also is it caught between Tokyo and Pyongyang. In recent months the ROK government has frequently called for Japan to desist from sanctions against North Korea, and if relations between Japan and South Korea continue to deteriorate, as seems likely, then this position may harden (Park, 2005b).

The United States
The US continues to tower over East Asian affairs, and the Japan-North Korean relationship cannot be understood in isolation from US policy. Moreover, US policy cannot be understood without recognising the centrality of its fear of the rise of China. US policy towards Japan, towards South
Korea and crucially towards North Korea, revolves around China. North Korea is often used as a surrogate for China; for instance it provides the justification for missile defense which is really aimed at China. This concern with China, and obfuscation with the myth of the ‘threat from North Korea’ is echoed in Japan. As Chalmers Johnson notes in a recent and important paper, ‘Japan may talk a lot about the dangers of North Korea, but the real object of its rearment is China’ (Johnson, 2005).

A second aspect of contemporary US policy that should be noted is the drive by the Bush administration to unravel the foreign policy agreements of the Clinton administration, not least in Korea. That specifically meant the destruction of the Agreed Framework signed between Washington and Pyongyang in 1994. That had basically traded North Korea’s suspension, and eventual decommissioning, of its nuclear programme – which was suspected of having produced some weapons-grade plutonium – for the construction of two light-water reactors (which would be less suitable for weapons), interim provision of heavy fuel, the lifting of sanctions and the move towards normalisation of relations. Richard Armitage, Deputy-Secretary of State for East Asia in the first Bush administration thought he could have done better than the Agreed Framework, and it seems he set out to prove that (Armitage, 1999).

There is naturally no consensus about the process by which the rapidly-improving relationship between Washington and Pyongyang in the final months of the Clinton administration turned to crisis, and the reactivation of the North Korean reactor within two years under his successor. It will be recalled that Secretary Albright visited Pyongyang in October 2000 and brought an invitation for Clinton to visit and bury the enmity of the past (Beal, 2005b). Gore lost the election and Clinton did not go but he did leave George W. Bush a relationship with both Korea’s that was on the cusp of a historic transformation. Peace was around the corner. And that may have been the problem.

According to a seminal paper by Jonathan Pollack in the (US) Naval War College Review no less, it was the Koizumi-Kim meeting in September 2002 that triggered the crisis (Pollack, 2003). Pollack sees two new factors that propelled the Bush Administration to send James Kelly to Pyongyang in October 2002. Firstly he thinks that US intelligence had new information about an heavily enriched uranium weapons programme in North Korea. Secondly,

> Four weeks later, the stunning disclosure of Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi’s impending visit to Pyongyang triggered movement in U.S. policy. In the aftermath of the Japan-North Korea summit, the Bush administration confronted the prospect of abrupt and unanticipated changes in the Northeast Asian political and security environment. The United States believed that Pyongyang had defaulted on fundamental policy commitments to Washington, at the precise moment when the DPRK had opened the door to a new relationship with America’s most important Asian ally and, prospectively, a major aid donor to the North. There was a real possibility that U.S. options on the peninsula would be driven increasingly by the policy agendas of others, perhaps enabling Pyongyang to achieve substantial breakthroughs at the expense of U.S. interests and without paying any price for its covert enrichment activities (Pollack, 2003).

Kelly came back from Pyongyang claiming that he had presented the North Koreans with evidence that they had a HEU programme, and that they had admitted it. Pyongyang soon denied both allegations, and has reiterated that frequently ever since, but this has seldom been reported in the Western press. Using the HEU admission as a justification, the US forced the suspension of heavy fuel oil deliveries, thus abrogating the Agreed Framework. With the Agreed Framework dead, Pyongyang announced that it was reactivation is reactors and in 2003, when the US still refused to negotiate, it said it would develop a nuclear deterrent. It made various statements about this deterrent programme over the following months and on 10 February 2005, following the ‘exports to Libya’ allegation and the Yokota Megumi remains affair, it announced that it had a nuclear deterrent and was suspending its participation in the Six Part talks until the US dropped its policy of hostility and agreed to peaceful coexistence (Anonymous, 2005a).

Pollack was right about the danger a Japan-DPRK rapprochement would pose to US hegemony in East Asia but he seems to have given too much credence to intelligence claims about an HEU programme (defaulting ‘on fundamental policy commitments to Washington’). He was writing at a time before US claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq were revealed as bogus.
Selig Harrison, a former Washington Post correspondent and one of America's foremost commentators on Korea, and the man responsible for Carter's historic visit in 1993, published an important essay on the issue in *Foreign Affairs* in January/February 2005 entitled 'Did North Korea cheat?' Firstly, Harrison brings South Korea into the picture, pointing out that the US was concerned about the warming of North-South relations as well as the Kim-Koizumi meeting. Secondly, he suggests that it was likely that the Koreans had an uranium enrichment programme for producing feedstock from their abundant supplies of natural uranium for the light water reactors promised under the Agreed Framework. Thirdly, he notes that the US has not produced any evidence to the other countries in the Six Party Talks that North Korea 'cheated' by having an HEU programme (Harrison, 2005).

This last point has been corroborated by various sources. In particular China has made it clear that it does not accept the American allegations (Anonymous, 2004b) (Anonymous, 2005g) (Kahn, 2005).

This pattern of disinformation was repeated in early 2005 when the US, in an effort to put pressure on the other members of the Six Party Talks, alleged that it had evidence that the DPRK had exported nuclear material to Libya. This, if true, could have been construed as a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Anonymous, 2005h). (Incidentally, the American supplies for the British Trident programme are in fact a violation of the NPT). The American commentator John Feffer noted that 'Precipitating the latest crisis were headlines that North Korea had crossed the ultimate red line by supplying nuclear material to Libya" (Feffer, 2005). Although Feffer, and others, pointed out that whatever evidence there was pointed to Pakistan, which was not a signatory of the NPT, rather than Libya, which was, it was not until the *Washington Post* published an article by Dafna Linzer on 20 March 2005 that things turned sour for Washington. Linzer's article, which was headed, "US Misled allies about nuclear export", took the issue to another level (Linzer, 2005). It was one thing to have faulty intelligence, it was (pace John Profumo's denials in the House of Commons) another thing to lie to your allies.

This was the article to which Ryu Jin in the *Korea Times* was referring when he wrote, as quoted above, "U.S. has joined hands with Japan to spread falsified information in order to topple the Kim Jong-Il regime in North Korea." (Ryu, 2005)

What is the explanation for US policy? Since coming into office the Bush administration has precipitated a crisis in East Asia, with North Korea, and has kept it on the boil ever since, injecting new allegations whenever necessary, and steadfastly refusing to negotiate a resolution. There have been a number of earnest proposals for ending the crisis from individuals and groups, both American and international, but Washington has spurned them, as it has rejected calls from the South Korea government, and opposition GNP party, and from the Chinese for it to negotiate. Many commentators argue that negotiations with North Korea are necessary, but would be difficult. On the contrary, negotiations would be relatively easy, but from the point of view of the Administration, and especially the neo-cons, would not be desirable. Leon Sigal, amongst others, has pointed out that Pyongyang's demands are really very modest - "North Korea isn't asking for much" (Sigal, 2005).

Chalmers Johnson has noted:

Japanese officials also claim that the country feels threatened by North Korea’s developing nuclear and missile programs, although they know that the North Korean stand-off could be resolved virtually overnight – if the Bush administration would cease trying to overthrow the Pyongyang regime and instead deliver on American trade promises (in return for North Korea's giving up its nuclear weapons program)(Johnson, 2005).

Actually, 'regime change' in Pyongyang is only part of Washington policy, and a minor part at that. It needs a North Korea that can be portrayed as threatening in order to advance more fundamental policy objectives, such as Missile Defense and the preservation of American hegemony in East Asia. 'Regime change', whilst satisfying imperial instincts would really be as damaging to imperial policy as a peaceful resolution, because it would remove that perceived threat. And there would be the danger 'regime change' in North Korea might be followed by an 'Iraqi-style quagmire'.

Chalmers Johnson raises the real issue – China. American policy towards North Korea is really aimed at China, and the 'renewed US-Japan alliance' based on hostility to China is becoming the key component of that (Blumenthal, 2005). Ezra Vogel has recently urged the Bush administration to ameliorate tensions between Japan and China which he claims 'are more dangerous than Washington.
realizes” (Hara and Vogel, 2004). However, Vogel misses the point; Sino-Japanese tensions are rising not because of Washington’s inattention, but because that is consistent with, and an inevitable outcome of, US policy.

The North Korea issue is a bit of a red herring. US policy, especially under Condoleezza Rice, is becoming increasingly confrontational towards China. Washington is encouraging domestic political forces that want Japan to become a ‘normal country, free of the constraints of the Peace Constitution, especially clause nine, support for Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council being part of the bait (Anonymous, 2004a). The ‘North Korean threat’ aids the process of remilitarisation but it is increasingly being elided with the China threat’ (Brooke, 2004). An important part of the new alliance is Taiwan, which is being brought under the ‘security umbrella’, thus introducing a fresh bone of contention with China, which has memories of the last time Japan took a strong interest in that island (Faiola, 2005). Perhaps in reaction to this move, opposition politicians Lien Chan (Nationalist Party, KMT) and James Soong (People First Party) hurriedly made historic visits to Beijing and Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian has muted his position on independence (Goodman, 2005).

This US-Japan-Taiwan alliance is also leading to moves in Asia to build up an loose alliance around China (Seo, 2005). Crucially, South Korea is moving towards this China-centred alliance, propelled by disagreements with the US and Japan over the North Korea issue, fears of Japanese remilitarisation, and the Tokto/Takeshima dispute (Shim, 2005).

That second unknown, the process by which the hopes and promises of the Pyongyang Declaration were dashed, remains unsolved. However, when we look at the broader geopolitical framework, we can see that the hapless surviving abductees and their families have become pawns in a larger game.

We are seeing a situation evolving in East Asia which has disturbing parallels with that in Europe on the eve of the First World War. If the alliances solidify into antagonistic tectonic plates then we may well face a cataclysm as they inevitably clash. Japan wrought catastrophe on itself in the 20th century by getting itself into a war with the United States that it could not win. It may repeat this in the 21st century with China. The Pyongyang Summit of September 2002 may have marked a crucial turning point in that process. By yielding to American and domestic pressure to walk away from the Pyongyang Declaration, Koizumi is leading Japan not merely into confrontation with North Korea but also with China, and perhaps South Korea. It is a path that ultimately may lead to disaster.

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APPENDIX

Table 1
North Korean exports 2002-3, major partners and total

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
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<th>2003</th>
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<td>$m</td>
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<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>270.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>395.3</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>234.4</td>
<td>31.8</td>
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<td>22.4</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>736.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>777.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

Source: Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
The past, present and future of Korea-Japan relations

In the long history of interaction between Korea and Japan from pre-historic times, one might ask which has given and which has gained more. Korea has always been a major source of cultural and human resources for Japan, and has suffered from Japanese incursions, notably in the Imjin Wars in the 1590s and the imperialist acts of "protectorship" (1905) and annexation (1910-1945), which were legitimized by the international community at the time (Dudden 2005). At the same time, Korea experienced modernity and development during this time, and has continued to look to Japan as a model and a source of technological and financial support in the post-liberation era.

In the post-colonial (post-liberation) era, the relations between Korea and Japan have been fraught with all sorts of complications and difficulties. Liberation did not deliver what Korea had hoped, due to the dividing up of the Peninsula by the USSR and the US, and the ensuing Korean War (1950-1953), when the country was devastated and laid low. It was Japan in fact which benefited economically from the Korean War, since it was used as a base and as a supplier of materials by the US.

Always dubbed the "distant but close neighbours", normalization of relations between Japan and South Korea did not occur until 1965. Relations since that time have fluctuated between openness and suspicion. The reality is that Korea's economy is inextricably entwined with that of Japan, and Japan has been a model for Korea's development. There has been a high degree of complicitness between political and business/industrial leaders of each country, which at present is provoking a head-hunting exercise against "Japanese collaborators".

How can the legacy of the past be overcome? As close neighbours, to live in such a high state of tension, suspicion and enmity can not be in the interests of either. Both share also the desire to bring North Korea into a more trusting relationship, so that it ceases to be a security threat to the region.

As for the future, it is impossible to imagine that Japan could ever again exercise direct political control over Korea, nor that Japan and South Korea would go to war with each other. In the case of the DPRK one should not perhaps be so sanguine, but it is to be hoped that diplomatic approaches will prevail.

What role can popular culture play in Korea-Japan relations? What power does popular culture have in influencing mutual images and enhancing mutual knowledge and understanding?

A recently quoted Korean youth said: "We hate Japan, but we love Japan's popular culture". Before the official opening up of Korea to Japanese cultural products in 1998, the official position was to condemn Japan, but in practice there was avid consumption of Japanese manga, music and TV dramas clandestinely. There is still an ambivalence towards Japan. Even now, South Korea does not permit the broadcasting of Japanese television dramas (Kim Yung-duk 2005: 46). Opinion polls are regularly taken in Korea and Japan, and continue to show the gaps and imbalances in mutual perceptions and knowledge.

Among causes for pessimism about the future of the relationship are the ongoing unresolved issues of Japanese history textbooks, compensation for Korean comfort women and forced labourers, the Japanese Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni shrine, ownership of Dokdo Islands, and the name of the Sea between the two countries.

On the other hand, there are causes for optimism visible on the Japanese side: the collaboration in sport (e.g. FIFA in 2002), the Kyoul Yonga boom, the designation of 2005 as the Korea-Japan Year of Friendship, the regular summits between the Japanese Prime Minister and the ROK President, the summits between Koizumi and the DPRK, and also the less visible stream of citizen level exchanges, school excursions, and tourism.
On the other hand again, as Sheila Miyoshi Jager pointed out (*Japan Focus*, June 9, 2005):

“The year 2005 has particular significance for Koreans concerning Japan: it is the 100th anniversary of the 1905 protectorate treaty (or Unea Treaty) which led to Korea's formal colonization by Japan in 1910. It is also the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from colonial rule and it is the 40th anniversary of the normalization treaty of 1965.

The year 2005 has also seen a distinct rise in anti-Japanese sentiments in South Korea. In March, angry swells of South Koreans protested at the Japanese Embassy, burning the flag of the Rising Sun, and expressing emotions so deep that some demonstrators cut off parts of their fingers. Riot police blocked a group of anti-Japanese demonstrators from blowing up a propane gas tank at the embassy gates. Citizens groups called for a boycott of Japanese goods, and at several golf courses, Japanese players were no longer welcome.

Tensions between the two countries have been building ever since January 2005, with the release of documents from the South Korean Foreign Ministry archives pertaining to Korea's 1965 normalization treaty with Japan. The issue of compensation for colonial victims was raised by South Korean lawmakers. President Roh also called on the Japanese government to again atone for its historical misdeeds.”

In this paper, I focus on the Korean television drama *Kyoul Yonga*, because of its “boom” status in Japan, and because its sheer scale forms a significant part of the hallyu (Korean wave, tidal wave, tsunami) sweeping East Asia. I wish to consider whether it is likely to have any impact on Korea-Japan relations, and if so to what extent. This relates to a broader issue of the potential for an East Asian popular culture, and the effect this might have on intra-regional relations. The present generation of leaders, while recognizing the importance of popular culture, actually just “don’t get it” as far as appreciating the consumer culture. It is likely however that the next generation of leaders will have experienced the same shared consumer culture as youth, and this will create a sense of community with generational change.

Appadurai (1996)’s popularizing of the concept of global cultural flows, and of the concept of mediascapes, a formation of a “landscape” or a discursive space, characterized by the sharing of a particular pattern of media consumption. Iwabuchi (2002) theorized a transnational Japan, which is creating a new kind of globalism, and a decentraling of US globalism closer to Asia. His nuanced argument is a pioneering study of media and popular cultural flows in the East Asian region, focussing on Japan. Now, increasingly, Korea, rather than Japan, is coming to be seen as the epicentre (to use an earthquake metaphor) of popular cultural commodities in Asia, especially television dramas and cinema.

The power of a shared popular culture

Chua Beng Huat argues from a Singaporean perspective that since the 1980s there has been emerging a discursive construction of an East Asian popular culture, in terms of production, distribution and consumption patterns of popular culture products such as music and television dramas (Chua 2004). The direction and volume of the dense flow of cultural products between the major cosmopolitan centres is however uneven. Early on, the penetration of Japanese popular cultural products in East and Southeast Asia was prominent, with Hong Kong origin products reaching a Chinese language market, and more recently the Korean origin flow has become prominent.

Discourse of Japan’s Gross National Cool

Joseph Nye developed the concept of soft power as the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. It differs from the hard power of economic and military might to force others follow your will. Soft power derives from having a culture, a way of life and values which others admire and want to emulate. Nye states that Japan “has more potential soft power resources than any other Asian country” (2004: 85), in which he includes not only economic prosperity and technological leadership, but also culture and lifestyle. Japan is however deficient both in military power and in global ideological appeal. A major detractor from its potential soft power, according to Nye, is the residual suspicion harboured by China and Korea, both of whom are opposing Japan having a permanent seat in UN Security Council, although in fact Japan makes an extraordinarily large contribution to UN peace-keeping activities, and is the world’s second-largest donor of ODA.

Because of its “Peace Constitution” (Article 9 forbids Japan having armed forces and engaging in military operations), Japan cannot be a superpower in the normal sense. However, by the 1980s, it was
an economic superpower, and a discourse of national culturalism and confidence was rife, until the bubble of the over-heated economy burst in the early 1990s. The “lost decade” has barely ended. By the mid 1990s, there was however a new awareness of the growing popularity of popular cultural products overseas and the discourse of soft power started to gain currency. An early example of an academic application was Shiraishi (1997)’s study of the reception of Doraemon in Indonesia and other Asian countries (“Japan’s Soft Power: Doraemon goes Overseas”).

In 2002, American journalist Douglas McGray published an article in the influential journal *Foreign Policy* (May-June 2002), proclaiming that Japan was exhibiting soft power in the form of Gross National Cool, because of the combination of culture and technology. He noted not only the development of popular culture and its consumption outside Japan, but also the high end of fashion, architecture and so on. This label of GNC was taken up avidly by the Japanese media and officialdom, who were grateful for the “outside” perspective: since it was a foreigner who gave a label to Japan’s greatness, it was no longer a hunch or wishful thinking. The term *kuuru* (cool) is now in the Japanese language (alongside the equivalent term *kakkoii*; although cute has not entered the Japanese language, *kawaii* has entered the English language – we must remember that Japanese “cute” is “cool” too).

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other official agencies were not slow to pick this up and apply it to diplomacy. The Japan Foundation advertises its cultural exchange program grants as both “arts and cultural exchange” and “Cool Japan”. The director of the JF, Kazuo Ogoura, talks in many forums about “Japan’s new cultural diplomacy” in these terms. The June 2004 issue of the magazine of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Forum*, was devoted to the topic *kuuru Japan* (pages 12-73). The two lead articles were by Joseph Nye himself, and cultural anthropologist Aoki Tamotsu, advisor to the PM. The issue was followed by a selective English version of the magazine in Summer 2004. There is a certain smugness in the new identity of “Cool Japan”, a new sense of being a leader in a certain context, and clearly it affects actual policy: for example, it was announced this year that Japanese ODA to some African and South American countries would take the form of helping them to purchase the broadcast rights of Japanese animated films (anime). This it is believed will enhance the image of Japan, and will lead to a desire to know more about Japan, and to study Japanese.

The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) also crows about the economic benefits flowing from “Gross National Cool” (JETRO Focus online newsletter, February 2004).

There is an easy eliding of Cool Japan and Soft Power in this discourse, but Joseph Nye’s analysis is more stringent: soft power requires the ability to present images which engender trust, and to provide values which people wish to emulate. While Japan’s urban youth lifestyles, techno-pop culture and cute culture are attractive to youth in East Asia, it is doubtful whether Japan’s popular culture if taken as a whole has this effect among its Asian neighbours. Values such as democracy, civil society and peace, while part of the fabric of contemporary Japanese society, are not necessary the stuff of popular cultural texts. Japanese discourse itself shows some uneasiness about the “value” of popular culture, but suppresses this in face of evidence of its popularity and its economic benefits. There is also some ambivalence as to whether culture can or should be commodified and manipulated for diplomatic or commercial gain, but for strategic reasons this must be done.

**Discourse of hallyu**

In Korea too there is a discourse of popular culture as diplomatic and economic tool. The competitive nature of Japan’s gross national cool and Korea’s hallyu, as respective governments try to capitalize on the economic and diplomatic potential of these flows / waves, indicates that there could be a “soft power battle” underway, although the rivalry has yet to be openly stated. The hallyu discourse is located in the broader discourse about South Korea becoming the hub of Asia, in economic, political and cultural terms.

There is a sense of urgency in official discourse that strategies for capitalizing on the Korean wave must be found quickly, because of the ephemeral nature of fads and fashions, and because of the potential destabilizing factors such as the North Korean nuclear issue, according to a researcher at the Samsung Economic Research Institute which has issued a report entitled “How to commercialize the Korean wave” (The Korea Herald, June 6, 2005).

These two national discourses are in competition with each other, an interesting variation on the conventional type of Cultural Exchange, of which there is plenty, even (or especially) in this year of
Korea-Japan Friendship. Cultural Exchange is usually bland and non-threatening. It is possible for this activity to continue against the background of almost explosive tensions which have emerged this year. On the other hand, Japan’s GNC versus Korea’s Hallyu brings a new element to Korea-Japan relations, a new battleground for soft power, a new type of cultural diplomacy.

Unlike the Japan Foundation, the Korea Foundation does not fund popular culture but only traditional culture, except under the auspices of the Asian Cultural Exchange Program, but perhaps this will change.

Lee Wook-Yon, a scholar of Chinese literature, gives an analysis of the potential of hallyu in fostering better relations between South Korea and China, and “eventually to the whole of East Asia”, by forging a “new sense of affinity” (Lee Wook-Yon 2005). He identifies two aspects to hallyu, the first being the market-oriented and nationalistic perspective, which eagerly seeks to maximize economic gains, and to enhance national image and essentially acquire soft power in order to dominate the recipient country. The other aspect is more idealistic, seeing hallyu as having the potential to create a shared “cultural community” between Korea and China, to extend to other countries in the region, to become the “cultural heat that melts away the unfortunate experiences of the past and foster new relations in East Asia”, and to promote the creation of a supranational East Asian cultural network and community. He explains the difficulties between China and Korea in terms of heterogeneity and conflict over Goguryeo, whereas conventional cultural exchanges between them in recent years emphasized the affinity of traditional culture (which fed into China’s nationalistic sentiment). The promotion of hallyu, on the other hand, is premised on Korean cultural superiority as being more modernized and developed than China, and remains ethnocentric. A new type of cultural community based on hallyu therefore has severe limitations. Drawing on Wada Haruki’s concept of a “communal house” in Northeast Asia, a highly heterogeneous region with serious antagonisms and ideological conflicts, Lee argues for communality which de-emphasizes hallyu, and instead recognizes strong heterogeneity and differences rather than uniformity. He advocates “critical regionalism” which requires criticism of and resistance to U.S.-centred hegemony.

If this kind of analysis is applied to Korea-Japan relations, certainly, conventional cultural exchanges (bunka kōryū) goes on unabated amid an the turmoil of anti-Japanese sentiment, suggesting that it does little to get to the heart of real “community” across borders. Lee’s analysis sees hallyu as derived from American popular culture, and offering to China an alternative modern consumer culture. He does not articulate Japan as a model of Korean popular culture, although most Japanese commentators would take this for granted. (See Mori 2004; his attribution of Japan as the source of hallyu was criticized as presumptuous by Hyangjin Lee, in her paper at the AAS in Chicago, March 2005. Here we see another kind of culture war between Korea and Japan.) His vision of a shared culture, but not an imposition of Korean hallyu on Chinese contemporary culture, tries to transcend the nationalist aspect of the discourse surrounding both hallyu and Japan’s GNC, which is very constructive.

The Kyoul Yonga effect
The Fuyusona boom in Japan is a prominent part of the Hallyu wave. Although the vogue for Korean cinema and music started around 2000, the popularity of KBS’s 20-part miniseries, Kyoul Yonga (Fuyu no sonata, Winter ballad) in 2004 was startling in its intensity and suddenness.

In recent years, there have been some notable milestones in improving relations and mutual images between Japan and Korea, such as the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the 1998 liberalization of Japanese popular cultural imports by President Kim Dae Jung, the 2002 co-sponsorship of the World Soccer Cup (FIFA), but the huge popularity and the momentum of Fuyu no sonata in Japan in 2004 was far greater than any of the preceding events. The commercialized and media-heightened nature of the Fuyusona boom follows the pattern of other kinds of booms in Japanese consumer culture, and it remains to be seen whether it will just die a natural death and replaced by another fad.

First broadcast on NHK’s BS2 satellite channel in 2003, by popular demand it went to air from April to August 2004 on NHK’s general channel. Both times it was a somewhat cut version dubbed in Japanese. It was re-broadcast at the end of 2004 in intensive format (two hours a day for 10 days), uncut, with subtitles and original sound track. By May 2004 signs of a massive fad started to appear, reaching the proportions of a "boom". While it was clear that the biggest group of fans was middle-aged women, the drama acquired fans from all groups of society, including netizens who established numerous Blogs, as elsewhere in Asia. The fever for Fuyusona soon led to a rush of Japanese tourism to Korea.
locations from the drama, as well as record crowds of fans going to the airport to meet “Yon-sama” (the lead male actor, Bae Yong-jun). The sales of related products, such as books and magazines, DVDs, Polaris necklaces, and novelty goods soared. Korean language courses experienced a rush. NHK TV’s regular Korean language course featured a selection of Fuyusona each week, a short section of dialogue used for language study, always selected from a dramatic or romantic highlight of that week’s episode.

The mass media gave constant attention to the drama and its fans. There is no-one in Japan who has not heard of the drama, and nearly 70 per cent of Japanese have watched at least one episode. “Yon-sama” became the 2004 word of the year, and Prime Minister Koizumi joked in an election speech in November that he wanted to be as popular as Yon-sama.

On the Korean side too, there was the diplomatic response of appointing lead actress Choi Jiwoo cultural ambassador to Japan. The on-line Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo Japanese version created a special feature archive running to about 500, commencing in April 2004 for its Japanese readers, although there was no corresponding feature in its Korean or its English version.

On both sides of the sea with no name, there was an energetic response on the economic level: airlines and the tourism industry, creation of ancillary products, souvenirs e.g. Yon-sama socks and calendars in Korea, special issue of postage stamps in Japan, necklaces, etc.

Content analysis and popularity

The cause of popularity of the series is to be found in the story and its themes, in the characters, in the locales, the music and the fashions. The story is one of so-called “pure” love, unrequited, always proper, whose fulfillment is indefinitely postponed, indeed prevented by myriad plot twists, over 20 one-hour episodes. Most commentators argue that Japanese viewers are attracted by a nostalgia for such a pure type of love, which is no longer possible in Japan. This is the kind of view described by Iwabuchi as feeling “cultural proximity”, but “based on a refusal to accept that it [Japan] shares the same temporality as other Asian nations” (Iwabuchi 2002: 159). In reality, such a “pure” love has never been possible in Japan, but the desire for such stems from the world of girls’ comics, which in turn derives from Western popular romance genres.

The major broad themes of the drama are the enduring and haunting nature of first love, memory and forgetting, and a Secrets and Lies type scenario, involving Karmic consequences from the previous (parents’) generation.

It is possible to read the story as an allegory of modernity and the break with the past. In this reading, the loss of memory is the suppression of memory of the dark past, and the desire to replace it with a new bright present, in which there are no shadows.

The theme of shadows is introduced early on in the playful dialogue about a “land of shadows”, where Jungsan is unhappy, sad and resentful. In contrast to this is the powerful symbolism of snow. Snow is a separate world of brightness removed from the everyday: pure, bright, cold, clean and cleansing, effacing, energizing, soft, playful, malleable (to make snow men), it is a medium for physical engagement, where inhibitions are lost, and there are no shadows. The snow scenes are the visual and emotional heart of the drama. First Snow echoes First Love.

Snow is able to efface dark memories of the past, and create a new bright world. The shadow-boy’s memory is effaced through the accident, and is replaced by a new identity, and a new memory, with no past to weigh him down. As he gradually regains his memory, largely through a bodily recognition, at visceral level (what shampoo do you use, he asks Yujin), he loses his bright confidence, and regains some of the insecurity of the old shadowy Junsang.

The theme of the absence of the father (aboji) is an adjunct to the erasure and recovery of memory. The new Minyong begins to seek to know who his father is, as Junsang had done. The father has been deliberately erased from his life and his identity by his mother, who has an international career as a concert pianist. There are no memorial services in their lives, unlike the case of the female lead Yujin towards her father. For Minyong and his mother, there is no connectivity with the past, until the love triangle of their parents’ generation starts to emerge as prefiguring the love triangle of the present, and casting its shadow on the narrative present.
The gradual and painful restoration of memory involves guilt and recrimination, and points to an ethical dimension in the story and its themes. This is seen at the most general level in the constant expression of regret and apology, of self-blame and betrayal: “I will be punished for this”, “I will never forgive you”, “God, forgive me”, “Let’s not hurt those we love”. “I’m sorry (myan hada)” is like a refrain.

In the frequent incidents of accident and injury (which form a major plot device), getting hurt or injured instead of the loved Other, the theme of self-sacrifice is evident. Religion features as part of the popular culture, including Christianity and fortunetelling, tarot cards and piles of stones on a mountain, fate and karma. The religious dimension is a significant part of the texture of the drama.

Among the many other striking themes and motifs in this long drama, I will mention the importance of scenes in cafés, at shared meal tables, the ritual of birthday cakes. Eating takes on a symbolism of wholeness and reassurance: characters regularly exhort each other to “eat well, sleep well, work/study well”, as a kind of incantation, or blessing. (Yonguk to Sanhyok in pub, Yujin to mother, Sanhyok to Yujin in hospital, Junsang to Yujin as they part.) Food features in the acts of buying, preparing, serving and eating as a social restorative act. Even the greeting “Chal denni? (Have you been well)” links with this social concern with well-ness and health.

The narrative structure is built skillfully with motifs, leitmotifs and images through repetition with variation. Powerful images which are leitmotifs include: being lost, finding one’s way, looking forward not backward; the constant Polaris star and the necklace which figures it; scenes of being lost and being found – in the mountain cabin, in the Taehanno urban quarter, at the airport, in the village market; having a hand to hold, someone to lean on when lost; recognition and non-recognition: after losing memory, after gaining consciousness after accident (Yujina, Junsangi ni?), after the three-year separation and blindness (Yujini ni? Junsangi ni?); the shoe motif, which is part of memory, and its regaining.

It is worth noting the images of other countries in the drama. The modern West serves as a deus ex machina providing a way of escape from Korea for various characters at crucial points.

Japan is marginal, but as the destination of Meehee’s concert tours, of Chelin’s fashion shows, and of Junsang and Kim’s architectural business venture, it is cast as a place of success, providing recognition of professional ability. The United States is the ultimate source of legitimacy: Minyong is created as having “grown up” there; Meehee’s career was established and developed there; Minyong retreats there when the going gets tough in Korea – it is the ultimate getaway, escape route. Interestingly, there is no hint of US presence in Korea, even though there is a base in Chuncheon, the site of the “past” in the drama, whereas Seoul represents the modern present.

France is a site less of work than of play. It is also a place to study, arguably also a kind of play, and a form of escape. The drama suggests that France provides the ultimate form of cultural capital. Chelin met Minyong there, when both were probably studying. It is an escape route for Yujin, as her mother comments.

In contrast to Japan, United States and France, Korea is often seen as dangerous, dark and threatening, full of conflict and of unpleasant memories of the past. The image of “walking on the ledge” shows that life is precarious and scary (says Sanyok), leading to the need to hold someone’s hand. Climbing a wall is also possible (over the school wall) if there is someone to step on (the iconic scene of the shoe takes place on the school wall just climbed.) Minyong’s dark (Korean) past was lost, effaced, replaced with a bright American past, present and future. But the love triangle of the parents’ generation is part of that dark past from which Meehee wanted to escape, and created lies and fictions in order to do so. The world of snow provides another way of escape from the dreary past/present, because it effaces the normal world, and replaces it with a magic wonderland of play.

Consumer experience
Is the Korea in Fuyu no sonata really Korea, or is it some fantasy land, a snow fantasy which is another form of escape from harsh reality? Undeniably, the drama is not a realistic representation of life in contemporary Korea. And yet, geographically it is locatable, as tourist agencies have been quick to point out. Tourism to the sites in the drama shows that the fans want to find this fantasy land in their lives, in the real world, like a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, where heaven and earth meet.
It looks as if Korean commercial interests are making fun of Japanese consumers. Degradation of the beautiful romantic experience in consumer culture: manga, plastic life-size images of Yon-sama, a Jun-bear doll, gloves, Fuyu no Sonata World theme park at Chamshil. Fans choose to reject much of the over-commercialization however, and are sensitive to the way the Japanese media has almost ridiculed them. The Fuyusona boom has had an impact in Korea as well. All Koreans it would seem know of Bae Yong-jun’s Japanese name, Yon-sama, and Korea has exploited the commercial opportunities fully.

Conclusion

I believe that the fans who fell in love with Fuyu no sonata and its lead actors also fell in love with Korea. The virtual, fantasy nature of this infatuation means it is fragile and volatile. However, the fans are reversing a directionality of Japan as the provider of a model for culture and development; they are resisting the official discourse of Japan’s GNC, to find that Korea is more desirable than Japan. These women are being subversive by claiming a place in popular culture as middle-aged fans, by studying Korean and going to Korea, by learning how to use new technologies (Internet and DVD players) to find out more and experience more directly the object of their desire. They have found new meaning in their lives through this experience of Korea in the drama. To quote Lee Wook Yon again: “whether the exchange of popular culture at the private level can result in the formation of a regional network that is capable of transcending the conflicting interests of the multinational cultural industries” is a key question (Lee Wook Yon 2005: 132). Once people go to such lengths to understand the Other of their desire, they are on a trajectory which can be totally compelling in their lives, whether this can influence policy makers or not. Fuyu no sonata plays out an allegory of modernity and a dark past which has been buried, but which must be acknowledged and come to terms with. This is also the story of Japan’s own modernization, and of its colonization of Korea. Japanese fans have responded to the deeper themes of the drama, not just to an attractive male actor, and the themes have touched their lives deeply. If it can contribute towards a reckoning with the past and awareness of the harm done to the neighbour, and form a step towards reconciliation, it will be a great day for Japan and for Korea.

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“How to commercialize the Korean wave” (The Korea Herald, June 6, 2005).
Assessing cross-cultural adaptability and expatriate performance between Australian and Korean expatriate managers

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Curtin University of Technology

INTRODUCTION

During the past few decades, the world has been rapidly integrating towards economic globalisation accompanied by a significant increase in cross-cultural business interactions around the globe. Such increasing cross-cultural interactions and the globalisation of business require a large pool of expatriate representatives or managers to work in different cultures and countries, where people operate with different set of values, behaviours and business practices. Unfortunately, however, many expatriate managers do not perform their overseas assignments satisfactorily due to various reasons, causing a significant loss not only to their organizations, but also to expatriates themselves including their family members.

Apparently, the main challenge for expatriate community is not very much to do with work specific technical expertise but more to do with human factor. It is this human factor that makes international expatriate management a difficult challenge. Drucker’s (1954) classic definition of the function of management combines human power, capital, and technology in attaining organizational performance. Of these, human power or the so-called human factor has been least manipulated area of scientific management and it is, in fact, this human factor that has pushed management discipline to look beyond its perspectives toward the methodologies and experiences of psychology. Tung (1988) highlights such human factor, from a north-American perspective, which tends to dominate management research in recent years, saying, ‘a common denominator underlying the best-run companies in the United States is the emphasis those firms place on human resource management (p.1).’

By focusing on such human factor, this research attempted to understand the relationship between cross-cultural adjustment and resultant expatriates’ performances in the context of international human resources management. This research regards cross-cultural adaptability as a major determinant leading to the success or failure of expatriate managers. For research investigation, two sample groups were employed Australian expatriate representatives working in Korea and their Korean counterparts in Australia, each of which represent the West and the East. Overall, this research attempted to increase the efficiency of expatriate’s performances on international assignments, hence reducing human and capital costs/failures, increasing personal/family wellbeing and promoting cross-cultural understanding.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Current Issues in Expatriates Management

In the last three decades, there has been a rapid increase in cross-cultural management research in international human resources management, including landmark research done by Hofstede (1984) and Trompenaars (1988) on culture, and Adler (1991) and Tung (1982) on international human resources management. These researchers recognized and highlighted cross-cultural differences as a key to enhancing efficiency in international operations. Hodgetts and Luthans (2000) also support such a cross-cultural emphasis by arguing that the universality of management or the parochial attitude does not lead to efficiency in international assignments and cannot be transferable to other countries.

In fact, the vast majority of existing literature or research findings on cross-cultural research was written from the perspectives of the Western business community. Many of the cross-cultural adjustment attributes for expatriates have been tested with relatively less comprehensive model and at best on American managers from the West and Japan or Hong Kong managers from the East.
the research record on the Eastern business communities is relatively insubstantial, with an exception on the Japanese expatriate managers. However, in recent years, the scope and diversity of cross-cultural management research are expanding in the East, where the focus of international management research shifted from Japan to China, for example, as led by Selmer (1999) who published 4 articles on expatriates in China in 1999 alone and Adler (2002) with a new book titled “From Boston to Beijing: Managing with a world view.”

A similar trend is happening also in the West, where the scope of expatriate researches is expanding to other areas, for example, such as Australia. Expatriate researches have been conducted for Australian managers by some researchers including Sheehan and Johnson (1992), and Forster (2000). Recently, there is a growing recognition on the need to look at family issues, especially spouse adjustment or dual career concerns and children’s education and adjustment, and also at repatriation as major determinants, which has been relatively neglected, for successful cross-cultural adjustment and expatriate success. Recent cross-cultural and cross-national comparative studies on expatriate management tend to convey family and repatriation issues and more researches look at psychological and personal attributes for expatriate and family adjustment.

Cross-Cultural Adjustment and Expatriate Success

Success on international assignment depends on many attributes and adaptational skills are regarded as a major determinant for expatriate success. Expatriates’ effectiveness depends on how much expatriates understand the target environment and how well they adjust their behaviour in accordance with the host culture. Mendenhall and Oddou (1988), who published significantly on cross-cultural adaptation of expatriates, emphasized one’s cognitive capacity such as personal, people and perception skills to be important factors for understanding foreign behaviours and cultural cues, which in turn lead to more conscious response for effective adaptation and to expatriate success in the end.

Cross-Cultural Adjustment

It is the cultural differences or distance between the home country and the target country, which makes expatriates exposed to such psychological experience like culture shock. Typically, expatriates and their family members may go through the typical U pattern of culture shock. However, in consideration for the relative short period of stay of expatriates and their family members in the target environment, Selmer (1999:515-534) contends that achieving a good and speedy adjustment, the third stage of culture shock, namely adjustment stage or cross-cultural adjustment, could be all what they need to achieve in order to achieve organizational goals and personal satisfaction during their assignment. Therefore, she highlights the importance of emphasizing the third stage of culture shock, adjustment stage or cross-cultural adjustment. Cross-cultural adjustment is regarded also by Stone (1991) to be the most important criteria in expatriate selection, since expatriates’ performance will not be effective and sustainable unless they are able to adjust in the target culture and business environment.

However, understanding the culture and the mindsets that underlie one’s values and behaviours is complex in nature and cause an enormous challenge for international assignees to overcome during the adjustment period. Waxin (2004) reports that culture of origin has a direct effect on cross-cultural adjustment, which is then positively related to the level of their satisfaction, but negatively related to expatriates’ intention to return to their homeland early (Takeuchi et al, 2002). The closer the cultural backgrounds, the easier and faster the adjustment occurs and the less likely the expatriates would want to return home early. Parker and McEvoy (1993) also emphasized such perspectives especially the importance of considering culture novelty, the degree of cultural differences, as vital factors in explaining about cross-cultural adjustment.

Culture novelty is well reflected when western expatriates are assigned to Asian countries, where they tend to face different adaptational patterns. Table 1 indicates that the newly industrialising economies (NIES: South Korea, Taiwan, HK and Singapore) and Japan show difficult degree of adaptation and therefore require high costs of operation in contrast to such ASEAN (Association for South-East Asian Nations) countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (Lasserre and Schuttee, 1995).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Groups</th>
<th>Degree of Adaptation</th>
<th>Cost of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan</td>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Easy</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from: Lasserre and Schuttee, 1995:257-258)

It is not just culture of origin or culture novelty that is important but also there are many influencing factors, for example, selection practices, personal, organisational and environmental variables. In a field study on cross-cultural adjustment through 196 American business executives on assignment in Japan, Netherlands, and South Korea, Palthe (2004) reports that it is host company socialisation that is the strongest predictor of cross-cultural adjustment. Unlike the origin of culture, socialization can be effectively managed by the efforts of expatriates themselves with the support from organisation and other stakeholders involved. Such a socialization process for expatriates can be fully functional by adopting two way processes of learn and unlearn as the new and more interactive forms of cross-cultural social engagement for both expatriates (Camiah and Hollinshead, 2003). Two-way process of learning and unlearning can best be achieved through socialization process when expatriates recognise the importance of fully cooperating with local counterparts.

Many researchers regard interaction with host nationals as important success factor for expatriate adjustment. Brislin (1981) suggested interaction effectiveness, task effectiveness, and psychological adjustment as the three aspects for international assignment success, while Black (1991) listed three dimensions: interaction, work and general adjustment. Consistent with these authors, Bell and Harrison (1996) regarded the interaction factor as the most fundamental dimension of the three on the assumption that both work and general adjustment are based on interactions. Black et al. (1992) also emphasized the importance of interaction in interacting with host country nationals as generally being the most difficult of the three adjustment dimensions.

Early researches on expatriate adjustment mainly focused on the need for selecting technically proficient person, but, as commonly accepted in international human resources management, technical proficiency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for successful adjustment (Bell and Harrison 1996). Recently, the focus has expanded more broadly to include new attributes like realistic job previews and cross-cultural training emphasizing pre-assignment process. Black et al. (1991) suggested that the more accurate expectations individuals can form as anticipatory adjustment in re-assignment process, the more uncertainty and culture shock can be reduced and therefore more successful adjustment will be. In general, socio-biological backgrounds can also influence expatriates’ adjustment. Mamman and Richards (1996) revealed that expatriates perceive their ethnic and racial background, nationality, education and prior cross-cultural experience as having the greatest impact on interacting with their hosts, while Bell and Harrison (1996) listed bi-cultural life experience as a positive influence in improving expatriate adjustment. Overall, biographical information and the bicultural competence of the spouse and family need to be considered since they very strongly influence the performance and degree of expatriate adjustment (Tung, 1982).

On negative side, researchers warned ethnocentrism as one of the major concerns in expatriate adjustment. Hall and Gudykunst (1989) indicated that the multinational companies with low levels of perceived ethnocentrism tend to use third-country or host country managers in their international positions and are more likely to offer training that provides cultural awareness and personal flexibility, than the multinational companies with high levels of perceived ethnocentrism. Thomas (1996) also warned about ethnocentric views since it may impede one’s adjustment and therefore training programs should rely less on models that reinforce ethnocentricty and attend more toward developing bicultural and multicultural identities in potential expatriate assignees.

Expatriate Qualities and Performances

Many researches on expatriate performance report, an alarming proportion of expatriate managers who are assigned overseas do not succeed in their tasks. For example, Tung (1982) reported that between 16
to 40 percent of all American employees on international assignment return prematurely. A more alarming finding was made by Copeland and Griggs (1985) who reported that between approximately 30 to 50 percent of American expatriates with an annual compensation package of US$250,000 on average are considered ineffective or only marginally effective. Therefore, it is crucial that expatriates are carefully selected and effectively maintained since the success of expatriates is critical to many organizations operating internationally and understanding the concerns is important part of expatriate management.

Achieving effective cross-cultural adjustment or adaptation involves many stakeholders and therefore measuring success can be complex and problematic since it involves interpersonal, intra-personal, family and organization as a whole. At the selection stage, it is generally accepted that expatriates' adaptability, inter-personal skills, technical competence, and understanding culture are the most important selection criteria. In the case of China, Feng and Pearson (1999) pointed out that adjustment and adaptation skills, inter-personal relations skills, cultural stress management, knowledge of Chinese culture, and survival language are the most important skills for successful expatriate assignments. In terms of cross-cultural adaptability, Magnini and Honeycutt, Jr. (2003) suggest that it can be measured at the expatriate selection stage through the level of candidate's learning orientation, and it can also be further developed through cross-cultural training program. Table 2 introduces the reasons why expatriates fail for Japanese and U.S. multinationals (Dessler, 1997).

Table 2: Reasons for Expatriate Failure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons of Failure</th>
<th>U.S. Multinationals</th>
<th>Japanese Multinationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (Most Important Reason)</td>
<td>Inability of spouse to adjust</td>
<td>Inability to cope with larger overseas responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Manager’s inability to adjust</td>
<td>Difficulties with new assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Other family problems</td>
<td>Personal and emotional problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Manager’s personal and emotional immaturity</td>
<td>Lack of technical competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (Least Important Reason)</td>
<td>Inability to cope with larger overseas responsibility</td>
<td>Inability of spouse to adjust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Adapted from Dessler, Gary, 1997:678)

Cross-cultural training and the resultant effective cross-cultural adaptation are important elements for successful expatriate assignments. Black et al (1991) addressed the importance of providing cross-cultural training to form accurate expectations about living and working in the target environment to provide expatriates with adequate pre-departure knowledge for reducing uncertainty, culture shock and cross-cultural inefficiency. Similarly, as one of the important training programs for cross-cultural assignments, Tung (1988: 23-37) introduced a ‘culture assimilator program,’ which deals with the critical incidents method where repatriated managers and experts present incidents happened during their assignments for would-be expatriates. Fiedler and Mitchell (1971) also agreed that such cross-cultural assimilator programs provide an effective method for helping expatriates interact and adjust successfully with the target culture.

Increasingly, dual-career families on international assignment are on the rise, and spouse and family factors are regarded as important determinants to expatriate adjustment, being supported by many other researchers. Harvey (1995) reported that one of the contributing factors to the high expatriate failure rate with the U.S. multinationals has been identified as family and spouse-related. Adjustment of such spouse and family can be successfully achieved, according to Ali et al (2003), by such attributes as open-mindedness and emotional stability, family cohesion and family adaptability, organizational support and work satisfaction.

Therefore, people involved in expatriation process should understand cross-cultural differences, culture shock, cross-cultural training and adjustment, spouse and family issues, partnership with local counterparts, all of which play integral parts in achieving success in international assignments. Also, the concerns related to spouse and family are becoming more recognized as major reasons for rejecting international assignments. Punnett (1997) reports that about 15 percent of expatriate candidates were reported to have rejected a foreign assignment because of their spouse's career, and this is expected to be a growing reason for rejection, especially in North America and Western Europe. According to
Adler (1997), in her study of 1129 graduating MBAs for rejecting international assignments, the most frequently mentioned reason for rejection was bad location, followed by job and career, and spouse and family, out of 2308 reasons.

In identifying the key factors for expatriate selection and training, Sheehan and Johnson (1992:2-11) provided an extensive check list for important expatriate qualities that include ability to adapt to new environment, technical competence, interest in overseas posting, cultural appreciation/understanding and cultural awareness/receptiveness, basic understanding of the country/people/customs, language skills, ability to cope with broader responsibilities, ethical considerations and relationships, personality aspects of expatriate manager, career paths/personnel planning aspects, costs of expatriate employment/conditions of service, and training for expatriate appointment. A famous study of selection categories in 80 US multinationals, Tung (1987 in Kramar et al, 1997) identified four important variables that determine expatriate success, technical competence on the job, personality traits or relational abilities, environmental variables, and family situation.

Different to the traditional approach to examine expatriate success in the context of selection criteria, Black and Mendenhall (1990 in Anderson and Herriot ed., 1997) introduced multidimensionality of expatriate success, which includes adaptability, maturity, sensitivity and stability. Tung (1998) went further by emphasizing the need to adopt holistic and systematic approach encompassing all aspects of international human resources management, including selection, training, compensation, appraisal and repatriation. According to Harris and Moran (2000:149), important qualities are empathy, openness, persistence, sensitivity to intercultural factors, respect for others, role flexibility, tolerance for ambiguity, and two-way communication skill, which are said to be positively related to adaptation and effectiveness for international assignment. After all, such important qualities should be sought for in the process of selection and recruitment of expatriates, but also providing an adequate support for expatriates before the departure and after the departure is equally important to ensure a successful cross-cultural adjustment in the target environment, which would correspond positively to successful overseas assignment and expatriates’ wellbeing.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESULTS

Research Samples and Instruments

The target populations of this research included Australian expatriates as representing the West working in an Eastern country, Korea and Korean expatriates as representing the East working in a Western country, Australia. The target population for investigation was the total number of expatriates from such two communities, and the list of expatriates was obtained with the help of AUSTRADE (Australian Trade Mission, as part of Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) for Australian expatriates working in Korea and KOTRA (Korean Trade Promotion Corporation) for Korean expatriates working in Australia. The research questionnaires were sent to the entire target population of 138 expatriates from the two lists obtained. In total, 28 Australian expatriates and 52 Korean expatriates responded, achieving a high response rate at 64.5 percent. In the case of Korean group, all 52 responses were used in the analysis, but in the case of Australian group, three cases were found to be inadequate for inclusions. Therefore 52 Korean cases and 25 cases, being 77 responses in total, were processed for analysis.

Instruments used for analysis were all sourced from English language publications, which were then translated into Korean for Korean expatriates. A variety of different instruments and scales were used in the survey such as yes or no, true or false, ordinal, criteria, weight, combination of Likert and Thurston scales, numeric 100 percentiles, multiple choice with one or more answers, and open-ended part for specifying others. In terms of Likert-type scale, interval descriptions are varied depending on the type of question, but the survey maintained a consistency, for respondents to avoid misunderstanding, where 1 is given to a description of lowest or negative frequency, such as never, not at all, very low, not used, not at all important, a little only, extremely unhappy, strongly disagree; definitely false or very dissatisfied.

In this analysis, three questions are used and analysed: cross-cultural adaptability, expatriate qualities and expatriate performance.
Question 1 (Cross-Cultural Adaptability): This question asks expatriates how well they could normally adapt to another culture by circling on 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral (neither disagree nor agree), 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree) for 20 statements as shown in Table 3.

Question 2 (Successful Expatriate Qualities): This question asks how important they value the qualities for achieving successful expatriation by using a combination of Likert and Thurston scales, to rate the degree to which they think important on the interval scales of 10, from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high), in the first column (Importance Rating) and also rating the degree to which they seem to possess each quality on a scale from 1 = very low to 10 = very high, in the second column (Self Rating). Twenty qualities for successful expatriates are listed in Table 5.

Question 3 (Expatriate Performance): In this question, expatriates are asked to rate the performance level out of 100 percentile on themselves and also on the overall communities of expatriates for their performance or adaptation.

RESEARCH RESULTS

Question 1: Cross-Cultural Adaptability

The overall average for cross-cultural adaptability on 20 statements was at nearly 75 percent, achieving the mean score of 3.75 that is close to 4 (agree). Table 3 compares two groups' mean scores on cross-cultural adaptability. Overall, the Korean group showed slightly higher score just by 0.75 percent than the Australian group.

Table 3: Cross-Cultural Adaptability Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adaptability Statements</th>
<th>Korean N=51</th>
<th>Australian N=26</th>
<th>Total N=76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am constantly trying to understand myself better.</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I respect the opinions of others, though I may not...</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I interact well with people who are very different from ...</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I were at a party with foreigners, I would normally...</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not need to understand everything going on around ...</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am able to change course quickly. I readily change...</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I often find humour in difficult situations, and...</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I have to wait, I am patient. I can be flexible...</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am always asking questions, reading, exploring. I am...</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am resourceful and able to entertain myself.</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I tackle problems confidently without always...</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When things go badly, I am able to keep my mind clear ...</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have made mistakes and learned from them.</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In unfamiliar situations, I watch and listen before acting.</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a good listener.</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I am lost, I ask for directions.</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sincerely do not want to offend others.</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>4.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like people and accept them as they are.</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am sensitive to the feelings of others and observe ...</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like new ideas, new ways of doing things, and am...</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>3.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A close examination reveals that there are four statements where both groups show the scores below the mean of 3.75. Interestingly, the Australian expatriates scored relatively higher than Korean expatriates in all those statements as shown below.

Statement 4: If I were at a party with foreigners, I would normally go out of my way to meet them. (Korean 3.35 < Australian 3.64)

Statement 5: I do not need to understand everything going on around me. I tolerate ambiguity. (Korean 2.67 < Australian 3.16)

Statement 6: I am able to change course quickly. I readily change my plans or expectations to adapt to new situations. (Korean 3.43 < Australian 3.72)

Statement 7: I often find humour in difficult situations, and afterwards I can laugh at myself. (Korean 3.31 < Australian 3.64)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4: Adaptability with Orientations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am constantly trying to understand myself better. I feel I know my strengths and weaknesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I respect the opinions of others, though I may not always agree with them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I interact well with people who are very different from myself in age, race, economic status, and education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If I were at a party with foreigners, I would normally go out of my way to meet them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I do not need to understand everything going on around me. I tolerate ambiguity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am able to change course quickly. I readily change my plans or expectations to adapt to new situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I often find humour in difficult situations, and afterwards I can laugh at myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I have to wait, I am patient. I can be flexible with my agenda, schedule, or plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am always asking questions, reading, exploring. I am curious about new things, people, and places.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am resourceful and able to entertain myself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I tackle problems confidently without always needing the help of staff or spouse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When things go badly, I am able to keep my mind clear and my attitude positive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have made mistakes and learned from them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In unfamiliar situations, I watch and listen before acting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am a good listener.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When I am lost, I ask for directions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I sincerely do not want to offend others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like people and accept them as they are.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am sensitive to the feelings of others and observe their reactions when I am talking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like new ideas, new ways of doing things, and am willing to experiment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, there are eight statements where either group scored 4 (agree) or more. Korean expatriates led in 5 statements (A) and Australian expatriates led in 3 statements (B) in group means as follows:
(A). I am constantly trying to understand myself better.
(A). In unfamiliar situations, I watch and listen before acting.
(A). I am a good listener.
(A). When I am lost, I ask for directions.
(A). I sincerely do not want to offend others.
(B). I have made mistakes and learned from them.
(B). I am sensitive to the feelings of others and observe their reactions when I am talking.
(B). I like new ideas, new ways of doing things, and am willing to experiment.

For a further analysis, two themes are employed in order to highlight major differences between the two groups, looking at the nature of the statements. The statements are divided into two orientations: self-orientation and situation-orientation. When the statement involves other people or situation in making the decision, then it is categorized under situation-orientation, and if the statement is independent of external influences, then it is categorized under self-orientation.

In Table 4, group mean scores are compared in each statement and it shows clearly that the two groups are fairly well polarized into two orientations, where the Korean group is more oriented towards the situation with 6 out of 9 situation-orientation statements, and the Australian group strongly towards self-orientation with 10 out of 11 self-orientation statements. The only self-orientation statement where Koreans are stronger was 'I am constantly trying to understand myself better. I feel I know my strengths and weaknesses (Statement 1).’ In Korean society, it is virtuous to humble oneself and try to make improvements constantly. Such Confucian virtue tend to make Koreans self-conscious but within a broad context of social obligation and confirmative situation. On the other hand, three statements related to situation orientation are stronger for Australian expatriates than Korean expatriates. Australia’s multicultural diversity and multi-ethnic society would have made Australian expatriates more interactive with diverse background and with differences in opinions in the society than monocultural Korean society.

Question 2: Successful Expatriate Qualities

Table 5 reveals the differences between the Korean and the Australian expatriates, showing how the objective importance changes when it is viewed from their own strengths, measured by group means out of 10 points. Such two dimensional analysis would provide insights how much gap exists between objective importance and subjective assessment on themselves having such qualities. Such analysis is useful for finding out how much gap exists and how much effort to be made in order to achieve what seems to be required objectively. Table 6 also shows the rankings of those 20 qualities in the order of importance, again in two dimensions.

Overall, both groups regard such 20 qualities fairly high at 7.32 for objective rating and at 7.11 for subjective assessment. However, Australian expatriates regarded those qualities higher on average in both dimensions, leading Korean expatriates approximately by 0.85 for objective importance and by 0.84 for subjective importance. In terms of objective importance, the group average over 20 qualities for being successful expatriate show that Australian expatriates regard those qualities more seriously by 11 percent, with Australian average of 7.896 compared with Korean average of 7.0495. Also in terms of subjective assessment of possessing such qualities, Australian expatriates lead Korean counterparts by approximately 11 percent with the Australian average of 7.6805 over the Korean average of 6.844. Lastly, the total average indicate that both group trend to feel that there are rooms for improvements showing marginally lower average in ‘self’ (average at 7.1155) than in ‘importance’ (average at 7.3265).

Table 5: Successful Expatriate Qualities - Group Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Successful Expatriate Qualities (Group Mean/Ordinal ranking)</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Importance</td>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical skill/competence for assignment</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>7.81</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcefulness/resilience</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability/flexibility</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>7.39</td>
<td>8.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional stability</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>8.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty/differences</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of spouse to live abroad</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>8.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of marriage and family life</td>
<td>7.72</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>7.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management skills applicable to another culture</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>7.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative skills suitable for another culture</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>7.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication skills in another culture</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>9.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful domestic career performance</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language ability for host culture</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>5.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural empathy/sensitivity</td>
<td>6.45</td>
<td>6.24</td>
<td>8.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural specific knowledge</td>
<td>5.61</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>6.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in host culture</td>
<td>5.86</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>6.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to get along with host nationals</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>6.59</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance of others’ views, especially when they differ from your own</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity to attitudes and feelings of others</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>8.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good health and well-being</td>
<td>8.37</td>
<td>8.22</td>
<td>8.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Mean Average</td>
<td>7.0495</td>
<td>6.844</td>
<td>7.896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, in terms of ordinal ranks of qualities, the findings show a shift between objective importance and self-assessment, where 9 qualities increased in ranking, 5 decreased and the other 6 stayed the same overall. These qualities that seem to be lacking, with decreased ranking, are listed as follows in the order of wider gaps.

5 decreased qualities in ranking: from ‘importance’ to ‘self’
Communication skills in another culture (1 → 7)
Ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty/differences (5 → 8)
Ability to get along with host national (7 → 9)
Management skills in another culture (14 → 16)
Cultural empathy/sensitivity (13 → 14)

9 increased qualities in ranking: from ‘importance’ to ‘self’
Good health and well-being (2 → 1)
Technical skill/competence for assignment (3 → 2)
Stability of marriage and family life (8 → 3)
Emotional stability (9 → 5)
Language ability for host culture (10 → 20)
Successful domestic career performance (15 → 10)
Tolerance of others’ views, especially when they differ from your own (16 → 15)
Sensitivity to attitudes and feelings of others (17 → 13)
Cultural specific knowledge (20 → 17)
4 qualities with no change in ranking: from 'importance' to 'self'
Adaptability/flexibility (4)
Resourcefulness/resilience (6)
Adaptability of spouse and family (11)
Willingness of spouse to live abroad (12)
Administrative skills suitable for another culture (18)
Interest in host culture (19)

Especially, 4 qualities showed significant changes of more than 5 rankings, either upward or downward, between objective importance and self-assessment, which indicate that they feel far short of reaching the objective importance level or feel over-confident than the required level. These are arranged in the order of changed scales.

Downward Shift (2): from 'importance' to 'self'
Language ability for host culture (importance: 10 - self: 20)
Communication skills in another culture (importance: 1 - self: 7)

Upward Shift (2): from 'importance' to 'self'
Stability of marriage and family life (importance: 8 - self: 3)
Successful domestic career performance (importance: 15 - self: 10)

The Korean group shows 'technical skill/competence for assignment' and 'communication skills in another culture' as the two most highly rated qualities, although they regard themselves as having 'good health and well-being' and 'stability of marriage and family life' at the top. The Australian group lists 'communication skills in another culture' and 'adaptability/flexibility' as the top two important qualities for successful expatriation, and 'ability to get along with host nationals' and 'good health and well-being' for themselves. There is only one commonality each, that is 'communication skills in another culture' for 'importance' and 'good health and well-being' for 'self' at the top two qualities, between the two groups. In order to identify and highlight the differences between the two groups, the 20 qualities are now functionally grouped in Table 6 into 5 categories: individuality (4 qualities), family and health (4 qualities), organisational skills (4 qualities), culture and communication (5 qualities) and attitudes (3 qualities).

Table 6: Report for Successful Expatriate Qualities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Clusters</th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>Australians</td>
<td>Koreans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resourcefulness/resilience</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability/flexibility</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional stability</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty/differences</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family and Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability of spouse and family</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness of spouse to live abroad</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of marriage and family life</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good health and well-being</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Skills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical skill/competence for assignment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management skills applicable to another culture</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative skills suitable for another culture</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful domestic career performance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

354
Communication skills in another culture 2 1 5 12 1 7
Language ability for host culture 4 20 10 20 10 20
Cultural empathy/sensitivity 15 8 17 5 13 14
Cultural specific knowledge 20 19 20 19 20 17
Interest in host culture 19 18 19 16 19 19

Attitudes
Ability to get along with host nationals 9 7 13 1 7 9
Tolerance of others’ views, especially when they differ from your own 16 6 14 11 16 15
Sensitivity to attitudes and feelings of others 18 3 16 7 17 13

Overall, ‘individuality’ and ‘family and health’ categories are ranked as more important categories than ‘organizational skills,’ ‘culture and communication,’ or ‘attitude’ categories. Those two leading categories show much lesser variation between the two dimensions of ‘importance’ and ‘self,’ indicating their subjective assessment of having such qualities are fairly close to the level of their objective importance. There is at least one of the 5 most important qualities in each category in both dimensions. However, in terms of objective importance, ‘culture and communication,’ ‘family and health,’ and ‘individuality’ categories tend to be more highly ranked than ‘organizational skills’ and ‘attitude’ categories. Contrary, in the case of subjective assessment, ‘culture and communication’ are shown much weaker compared with objective importance.

Question 3: Expatriate Performance

Table 7 shows expatriates’ own ratings, out of 100, on their performance and also on the overall performance of expatriate community in the target country, Korea or Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Rating</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Your overall performance</td>
<td>95.21% N=52</td>
<td>78.72% N=25</td>
<td>89.86% N=77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates on average in Korea/Australia</td>
<td>93.07% N=46</td>
<td>77.60% N=25</td>
<td>87.62 N=71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, they regard their own performance fairly high at almost 90% of 100 and also on the expatriate communities at 87% of 100, which seem to suggest that both expatriate groups regard their performances fairly successful. Both groups tend to rate their own performances higher than those of others, Koreans at 2.14% higher and Australians at 1.12% higher than their community counterparts. But the overall indication is that Korean expatriates regard their own performance by 16.49% higher than Australians at 78.72% and Korean expatriates in Australia in general seem to perform very high at 93.07%, by 15.47% higher than Australian expatriates in Korea overall at 77.60%. The differences between their own performance and the overall performance of expatriate community at 16.49% and 15.47% accordingly seem to indicate that Korean expatriates feel more confident on their performances than Australian expatriates.

RESEARCH DISCUSSIONS

In this paper, two explanatory attributes, cross-cultural adaptability and expatriate qualities, were analysed towards expatriate performances, using Australian and Korean expatriates. Overall, the findings strongly support that cross-cultural adaptability positively influence expatriates’ performances, and certain qualities of expatriates proved to be highly rated by both expatriate groups with some differences. However, this research implies some limitations in terms of external validity since it covered only two expatriate communities, Koreans in Australia and Australians in Korea, and therefore replication would be necessary with other expatriate communities.
Findings in adaptability (Table 3 & 4) suggest that Korean expatriates are almost entirely situation-oriented, except one out of seven statements, and Australian expatriates are mostly self-orientated, except 3 out of 13 statements. Therefore, the results clearly indicate the tendency towards individualism for Australian expatriates and towards collectivism for Korean expatriates (Hofstede, 1980, 1984), which are well reflected in their relevant statements in relation to their attitudinal and behavioural patterns in interacting with others.

Such tendencies in cross-cultural adaptability can be related to expatriate performances. Overall, both expatriate groups rate their own performances fairly high nearly at 90 percent of 100, but the overall indication is that Korean expatriates regard their own performances at 95.21 percent by 16.49 percent higher than Australian counterparts, and also regard other Korean expatriates' performance fairly high at 93.07 percent by 15.45% higher than Australians. Findings in the first two questions suggest that cross-cultural adaptability with strong situation orientation may provide higher level of expatriate performance than with self-orientated ways of interacting with others. Further, such findings are positively related to the findings in Question 3 for expatriate qualities, in where ‘adaptability/flexibility’ are rated as 2nd most important quality by Australian expatriates and 6th most important quality by Korean expatriates. As to which are more important qualities for expatriates’ success, there are differences between the two groups and also between objective importance and self-assessment dimensions. Findings on successful expatriate qualities suggest important differences between the two groups, which can be quite useful in selection and training of expatriate personnel, especially to Australia and Korea.

The Korean expatriates feel their skills or attitudes are short of the objective standard of importance in as many as 13 qualities and feel more confident in 7 qualities. The Korean expatriates feel they are short of those 13 qualities and the results indicate there is a strong need for making further improvements on such qualities. Clearly, they are concerned about the level of their ability in dealing with host culture and practices, such as language, people, uncertainty, technical skills, management and administrative skills in managing their duties. However, Korean expatriates feel very confident in terms of family stability and support, dealing with others, all of which are typical characteristics of community orientation. They also feel that they are emotionally stable in carrying out their duties and are supported with successful domestic career. These qualities are listed in the order of bigger discrepancies as follows.

Downward Shift (13 qualities): from ‘importance’ to ‘self’
Language ability for host culture (8.00 – 7.02 = 0.98 down)
Technical skill/competence for assignment (‘importance’ scale of 8.54 to ‘self scale of 7.81 = 0.73 down)
Ability to get along with host nationals (7.14 – 6.59 = 0.55 down)
Resourcefulness/resilience (7.63 – 7.10 = 0.53 down)
Ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty...(7.92 – 7.20 = 0.52 down)
Cultural specific knowledge (5.61 – 5.18 = 0.43 down)
Adaptability/flexibility (7.82 – 7.39 = 0.41 down)
Management skills applicable to another culture (6.61 – 6.37 = 0.24 down)
Cultural empathy/sensitivity (6.45 – 6.24 = 0.33)
Administrative skills suitable for another culture (6.08 – 5.92 = 0.16 down)
Good health and well-ness (8.37 – 8.22 = 0.15 down)
Interest in host culture (5.86 – 5.75 = 0.11 down)
Communication skills in another culture (8.41 – 7.33 = 0.08 down)

Upward Shift (7): from ‘importance’ to ‘self’
Stability of marriage and family life (7.27 to 7.88 = 0.61 up)
Adaptability of spouse and family (6.65 to 7.14 = 0.49)
Willingness of spouse to live abroad (6.49 to 6.94 = 0.45)
Sensitivity to attitudes and feelings of others (6.00 to 6.33 = 0.33)
Tolerance of others’ views, especially when they ...(6.20 to 6.37 = 0.17)
Successful domestic career performance (6.80 to 6.92 = 0.12)
Emotional stability (7.14 to 7.18 = 0.04)

Australian expatriates feel short of 12 qualities and feel more confident in 8 qualities, a pattern which is very close in terms of numbers to Koreans’ 15 and 7 accordingly. One obvious difference is, however,
that the Australian group has a significant shift downward in many qualities, three of which are over 1.00, although the total number of qualities downward is smaller, being 12 compared with 13 for the Korean group (with a biggest shift of 0.98). More three obvious qualities among them are 'language and communication skills,' and two spouse-and-family related qualities, which indicate there are significant rooms for improvement. In general, they also have concerns on qualities related to cross-cultural adaptability, tolerance and sensitivity.

Downward Shift (12): from ‘importance’ to ‘self’
Language ability for host culture (5.72 - 4.48 = 1.24)
Adaptability of spouse and family (8.12 - 7.09 = 1.03)
Willingness of spouse to live abroad (8.44 - 7.43 = 1.01)
Adaptability/flexibility (8.92 - 8.40 = 0.52)
Tolerance of others’ views, especially when they ...(8.40 - 7.88 = 0.52)
Sensitivity to attitudes and feelings of others (8.52 - 8.08 = 0.44)
Management skills applicable to another culture (7.84 - 7.52 = 0.32)
Stability of marriage and family life (7.96 - 7.70 = 0.26)
Administrative skills suitable for another culture (7.38 - 7.17 = 0.21)
Communication skills in another culture (9.04 - 8.73 = 0.32)
Cultural empathy/sensitivity (8.36 - 8.24 = 0.12)
Ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty/differences (8.00 - 7.88 = 0.12)

Upward Shift (8): from ‘importance’ to ‘self’
Technical skill/competence for assignment (7.80 to 8.08 = 0.72 up)
Successful domestic career performance (7.20 to 7.92 = 0.72 up)
Interest in host culture (6.88 to 7.40 = 0.52 up)
Ability to get along with host nationals (8.40 to 8.72 = 0.32 up)
Good health and well-ness (8.42 to 8.67 = 0.25 up)
Cultural specific knowledge (6.36 to 6.60 = 0.24 up)
Resourcefulness/resilience (8.12 to 8.32 = 0.20 up)
Emotional stability (8.04 to 8.20 = 0.16 up)

Overall, 5 most important qualities for successful expatriation are 'communication skills in another culture', 'good health and well-ness', 'technical skill/competence for assignment', 'adaptability/flexibility', and 'ability to deal with 'ambiguity/uncertainty/differences.' In terms of subjective assessment of having such qualities, two qualities related to stability, such qualities as 'stability of marriage and family life' and 'emotional stability' are added at the cost of 'communication skills in another culture' and 'ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty/differences.' Table 8 shows the comparisons of two groups on the five most important qualities for expatriate success, in the order of importance.

Table 8: Importance Ranking of Expatriate Qualities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Koreas</th>
<th>Australians</th>
<th>Two Groups Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Technical skill/competence for assignment</td>
<td>Communication skills in another culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communication skills in another culture</td>
<td>Adaptability/flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Good health and well-ness</td>
<td>Sensitivity to attitudes and feelings of others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Language ability for host culture</td>
<td>Willingness of spouse to live abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty/differences</td>
<td>Good health and well-ness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

'Communication skills in another culture' is the only one quality that is shared by both groups in the top 2 rankings, and 'technical skill/competence for assignment' as the most important for Koreans and 'adaptability/flexibility' as the second for Australians, and 'good health and well-ness' in the top 5 for both groups. Therefore, these four qualities require more thorough analysis as follows:

Communication skills in another culture
The Australian expatriates rate communication skills in another culture more important at 9.04 over Koreans at 8.41, but also possess the skills at a higher level, 7.83 over 7.33 than the Korean group. Both groups, however, requires a significant improvements, from 7.33 to 8.41 for Koreans and 7.83 to 9.04 for Australians, with the combined average from 7.49 (self) to 8.61 (importance) for further improvements.

Technical skill/competence for assignment

The Australian expatriates score (mean score of 7.80) less favourably than the Korean counterparts (mean score of 8.54) on objective importance, although they feel more confident themselves having this quality (8.08 over 7.81), with the overall importance rated fairly high. Interestingly, the Korean expatriates feel they are short of this quality (self-assessment at 7.81 less than objective importance at 8.54), whereas the Australian group feel that they are over-qualified (self at 8.08 over importance at 7.80).

Adaptability/flexibility

Both groups regard ‘adaptability and flexibility’ fairly important and, in both categories of and, the Australian expatriates lead the Korean group by a good margin, 8.92 over 7.82 for ‘importance’ and 8.4 over 7.39 for ‘self’ accordingly. However, the overall trend indicates that further improvements are necessary for ‘self (7.72)’ to match with ‘importance (8.18).’

Good health and well-being

Both groups indicate a very strong regard on good health and wellness at an approximate average of 8.37. In both cases of putting importance and assessing their capacity, Australian expatriates scores higher than Koreans, at 8.42 over 8.37 and 8.67 over 8.22 accordingly, while demonstrating a higher level of confidence at 8.67 (self) over 8.42 (importance). However, Korean expatriates are not as confident as Australian counterparts in terms of health and wellness level with a need for further improvements from 8.22 (self) to 8.37 (importance), and there exists a marginal improvements to be made on the combined average from 8.36 (self) to 8.39 (importance), mainly attributed by the Korean group.

When 20 expatriate qualities are grouped under five categories, as shown in Table 6, such as individuality (4 qualities), family and health (4 qualities), health (1 quality), organisational skills (4 qualities), culture and communication (5 qualities), and attitudes (3 qualities), some interesting trends appear as follows:

Trend One: Korean expatriates put more importance on individuality (with an exception of adaptability/flexibility), organizational skills (except administrative skills suitable for another culture) and health, whereas Australian expatriates put more importance on family (with an exception of stability of marriage and family life), culture and communication (with an exception of language ability for host cultures), and attitudes.

Trend Two: In terms of possessing the capacity for such qualities, Australian expatriates scored more highly on individuality (except ability to deal with ambiguity/uncertainty/differences), organizational skills (except technical skill/competence for assignment), culture and communication (except communication skills in another culture, language ability for host culture) and attitudes. Korean expatriates feel confident in family and health dimensions.

Trend Three: Australian expatriates regard attitudes dimension very highly in terms of importance, in all three qualities, ranking 7th over 9th (Korean) on ‘ability to get along’, 6th over 16th (Korean) on ‘tolerance’ and 3rd. over 18th (Korean) on ‘sensitivity.’ Also, Australian expatriates claim to have possessed such skills much more highly than the Korean counterparts by having the highest score, 1st, on ‘ability to get along with host nationals’ over 13th (Korean), 7th over 16th (Korean) on ‘sensitivity to attitudes and feelings of others’ and 11th over 14th on ‘tolerance of others’ views.’

Trend Four: Korean expatriates out-perform Australian counterparts in their capacity of possessing all three family-related qualities and health-related quality.

In conclusion, the findings strongly suggest that cross-cultural adaptability is an essential quality leading to successful expatriation, more strongly recognised by Australian expatriates. In general, those qualities related to cross-cultural adaptability, such as language and communication, sensitivity and the ability to deal with differences, are most highly regarded but the recognitions on the importance of spouse and health are also well addressed. Overall, expatriates recognise there are rooms for further improvements in many qualities related, directly or indirectly, to cross-cultural adaptability. It is crucial for human resources managers to understand the magnitude of gaps between the level of objective importance and the level of self confidence felt by expatriates, and to implement adequate strategies for such concerns in selecting and training overseas assignees in both pre-departure and after-arrival stages.
so that their appointments would bring satisfaction and efficiency to all stakeholders, organisation, personal, personal and family health and wellness.

REFERENCES


Entry Mode Choice of Foreign MNEs in South Korea and Its Impact on Their Korean Affiliate Performance*258

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INTRODUCTION

International entry mode selection has been one of the most extensively researched topics in international business. A plethora of research has been undertaken in the field to explain why firms select a particular mode of entry in their internationalisation process. While developed home and host countries were almost an exclusive domain of interest in earlier entry mode studies (e.g., Kogut and Singh 1988; Hennart 1991; Kim and Hwang 1992; Gatignon and Anderson 1988), more recently transition host economies, with their growing economic significance, have attracted increasing attention from researchers in the field (e.g., Brouthers and Brouthers 2001; Tse, Pan, and Au 1997; Chen and Hu 2002).

A variety of entry mode choices are available to firms expanding into foreign markets, ranging from exporting, contractual arrangements (e.g., licensing), through to FDI (either joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary). This variety of choices is well reflected in entry mode studies that are broadly classified into three main categories depending on their focus of interest, i.e., whether studies examine: i) the choice between equity and non-equity modes (e.g., Buckley and Casson 1976; Rugman 1981 cited in Rugman and Verbeke 2003); ii) the choice between shared and full control (e.g., Hennart 1982; Padmanabhan and Cho 1996; Brouthers and Brouthers 2001); or iii) the choice between greenfield operations and acquisitions (e.g., Kogut and Singh 1988; Chang and Rosenzweig 2001; Harzing 2002). The difference in the focus often makes a simple or outright comparison of the results not only difficult and complex but also problematic (Kogut and Singh 1988).

Entry mode studies have been naturally extended to explore the performance implications of entry mode choice (Root 1987; Woodcock et al. 1994; Li 1995). The underlying position of these studies is that entry mode choice for the international affiliate has critical impact on the its performance as the parent strategically selects a mode that generates better performance. However, contrary to extensive research found in the area of international entry mode selection, there has been a relative dearth of studies linking entry mode to performance (Brouthers et al. 1999; Woodcock et al. 1994). In addition, the majority of extant performance studies involving entry mode choice do not go beyond simple comparison of performance between alternative modes of entry, albeit with some recent exceptions (e.g., Chen and Hu 2002; Brouthers et al. 1999; Brouthers 2002; Shaver 1998).

It is suggested that researchers explore more frequently the characteristics of each investment decision to better understand the link between entry mode and performance (Shaver 1998 cited in Brouthers 2002). More importantly, more research efforts need to be directed at examining if conceptually or theoretically-driven entry mode choice leads to better performance of the affiliate than that of entry mode selected otherwise. Research in this direction not only enhances our understanding of MNEs' entry mode behaviour but also provides useful implications for both researchers and managers by attesting to the predictive (or prescriptive) power of existing theories or the need to incorporate new theories, and by showing how managers can better strategise their international entry mode to generate success in their overseas affiliates.

Our research objectives in this study are two-fold. First, we attempt to examine whether firms follow theoretical predictions in their entry mode decision, i.e., the choice between full and shared control modes of entry. We then explore whether theoretically-determined entry mode generates better performance than that of entry mode selected otherwise. Following the suggestions of recent studies

258 * This study is partly funded by the Korea Australasia Research Centre (KAREC).
(e.g., Brouthers 2002; Chen and Hu 2002; Delios and Beamish 1999), the present study applies a theoretical framework that extends traditional transaction costs theory to explain entry mode behaviour of foreign firms in South Korea and its influence on their Korean affiliate performance. Similar to Brouthers (2002), the proposed framework also includes cultural and institutional variables that are found to impact on entry mode choice and performance in the literature.

We tested our research questions by using primary data collected from a large sample of 228 (222 firms for performance analysis) foreign firms in South Korea. Subjective financial and non-financial measures were used to capture the complex and multidimensional phenomenon of performance. We conducted a two-stage statistical analysis; first, logistic regression analysis to categorise the sample into two groups, i.e., fit and non-fit groups and then multiple regression to examine the impact of theoretically determined entry mode choice on affiliate performance, while controlling for various firm, industry and country factors.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the literature on entry mode choice and performance. We then address research methodology, followed by a discussion of both regression results. Finally, the paper concludes with a note on the limitations of the study and the implications of the findings for future scholarly inquiry.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Transaction costs theory has been most frequently applied to explain a firm’s international entry mode choice in foreign markets. The position of earlier studies, Buckley and Casson (1976), in particular, is that firms would be better off by internalising their international operations rather than coordinating them through the price mechanism (Coase 1937; Williamson 1991 cited in Madhok 2002: 536) in the presence of market imperfections. This is because the “transaction costs associated with managing internal market across borders and the related requirement to decentralise many value-added activities” (cited in Rugman and Verbeke 2003) are lower than those of using external markets due to market imperfections, especially arising from the difficulty of pricing proprietary assets, such as knowledge and ideas. The fundamental tenet of the theory can, thus, be succinctly put as follows: firms choose an entry mode that minimises the transaction costs associated with their international operations (Hennart 1988: Kogut and Singh 1988; Brouthers and Brouthers 2001). In respect of the choice between equity and non-equity modes, managers make an entry mode decision by comparing the costs of internalising and integrating their operation to those associated with finding, negotiating with, and monitoring a partner or agent in an external market.

These transaction cost arguments have been successfully applied to investigate the MNE’s preference for particular ownership structure for its foreign affiliate among equity modes (Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Gatignon and Anderson 1988; Hennart 1988, 1991; Kogut and Singh 1988; Kim and Hwang 1992). In a similar vein, they posit that the choice between full and shared ownership depends on the relative costs and benefits of the two alternative ownership structures, i.e., joint venture vs. wholly owned subsidiary.

Transfer of tacit and proprietary knowledge can be costly in an imperfect market because of the difficulty of the external market to determine optimal pricing of these proprietary assets. Due to this difficulty, firms tend to choose internalised and hierarchical organisational structure over contractual arrangements for their foreign operation (Williamson 1985; Hennart 1988). There is a general consensus in the literature that firms equipped with high levels of proprietary assets prefer a wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) to a joint venture (JV) among available FDI entry strategies (Guillen 2003). Not only the level but also the complexity and tacitness of proprietary assets are positively associated with high control modes of entry. Hill et al. (1990) provided theoretical explanations for the relationship using a unifying conceptual framework, especially the dissemination risk construct underpinned by transaction costs theory. As firms do not want their proprietary assets, intangible and tacit assets in particular, to be disseminated to, or dissipated by, their local partner(s), they engage in a low dissemination risk and cost mode (i.e. WOS over JV). By completely internalizing their operation through WOS, they are able to transfer their firm-specific advantages to their subsidiaries while preventing them from being unduly exploited by local partners in the host country. Through internalised control, they can thus minimise transaction costs incurred to transfer their firm-specific proprietary assets to the foreign market. Although firms still face constraints of various forms, both internal and external, (e.g., administrative heritage in Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989) in transferring
knowledge to their overseas subsidiaries (Rugman and Verbeke 2003), they can easily transfer their firm-specific advantages including proprietary assets across the borders through internalisation (Buckley and Casson 1976). Similarly, firms can reduce their transaction costs associated with transfer of proprietary assets better through WOS than through JV. The following hypothesis is thus proposed:

**Hypothesis 1:** The greater the degree of proprietary assets of an investing MNE, the greater the probability of selecting a WOS over a JV for its affiliate.

Internal transaction costs increase with the increase in geographical distance and dissimilarity between the home country and the host country of the affiliate because distance or difference is most likely to create and/or exacerbate misunderstandings and thus increase expenditures because of a greater need for continuous checking (Rugman and Verbeke 2003).

Since Kogut and Singh’s (1988) seminal work of 228 foreign ventures in the U.S., national cultural distance has been frequently used to explain the behaviour of MNEs’ entry mode choice (Brouthers and Brouthers 2001). Some studies (e.g., Kogut and Singh 1988; Erramilli and Rao 1993; Agarwal 1994; Hennart and Larimo 1998) found a positive relationship between cultural distance and low control mode of entry. The preference for a JV over a WOS in culturally distant markets can be explained by the transaction cost arguments that firms can minimise transaction costs associated with “liability of foreignness” (Hennart 1991) through partnership with a local partner(s) equipped with knowledge about local market conditions and political situations (Anand and Delios 1997). The partnership with local partners allows a foreign MNE to better manage their local employees and relationship with local suppliers, distributors and governments. Furthermore, parent managers are usually reluctant to commit their resources to highly uncertain and unfamiliar situations and thus select a low resource commitment mode.

By contrast, Chen and Hu (2002) recently found that foreign MNEs actually select a high control mode (i.e. WOS) in China when cultural distance is large. This contradictory finding is also supported in prior studies, such as Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) and Anand and Delios (1997) who both found that large cultural distance between Japan and the host country of Japanese MNEs is significantly related to their choice of a full control mode (i.e. WOS). This contradictory relationship may be explained by the same transaction costs theory that firms engage in a high control mode in culturally distant countries because the cost of finding, negotiating with, and monitoring a local JV partner(s) is greater than the cost incurred in a WOS (Brouthers and Brouthers 2001). The costs of using an external partner becomes very high due to bounded rationality opportunism arising from information asymmetry that exacerbates in an international context, especially in highly distant and dissimilar host markets. The uncertainty and unfamiliarity arising from greater cultural distance makes it difficult not only to address all the “contingencies” and potentialities in their JV contracts due to greater bounded rationality, but also to enforce the contracts because of greater opportunistic behaviour by local partners resulting from information asymmetry (Hill 1990; Williamson 1985; Chang and Taylor 1999; Taylor et al. 1998).

Against the background of these conflicting empirical results the following hypothesis is proposed:

**Hypothesis 2:** The cultural distance between the home country of an investing MNE and South Korea, the host country, is associated with its entry mode choice.

Despite its usefulness as one of the most frequently cited variables, national cultural distance construct was often subjected to severe criticisms for its flawed conceptual and methodological properties (Shenkar 2001). While the construct provides a simple, quantitative, and tangible measure (e.g., Kogut and Singh’s composite index of national cultural distance), it largely fails to capture the intricate, complex and fuzzy nature of national culture (Shenkar 2001) and neglects the regulatory dimensions of institutions within the country (Harzing 2003). It is thus suggested that more research efforts be directed at incorporating equally important home and host country characteristics such as country risk, host country restrictions on foreign direct investment, and availability of local partners, which are believed to influence entry mode decisions. Transaction costs theory needs to be applied in conjunction with institutional theory because institutions endow the legitimacy of a firm and its activities or transactions in a particular institutional context (North 1990 cited in Brouthers 2002; Harzing 2003).
A firm's choice of entry mode can be thus constrained by the institutional context in which the firm operates (Brouthers 2002; Beamish and Delios 1997). A transaction costs-based entry mode may not be adopted by MNEs simply because a host country's institutions such as regulations on foreign ownership may restrict their access to local assets to protect domestic industries, thus affecting the choice of organisational forms in the local market (Harzing 2003). A firm's legitimacy in the restrictive host market becomes as important as transaction cost based goal of efficiency (Brouthers 2002).

There have been some recent attempts to incorporate the concept of institutional distance to explain entry mode choice. This approach is an encouraging shift away from the single-minded focus on the Kogut and Singh's cultural distance index and Hofstede's value dimensions (e.g., Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Kostova 1999; Davis et al. 2000; Xu and Shenkar 2002 cited in Harzing 2003). Xu and Shenkar (2002) in particular assert that institutional distance influences a firm's entry mode choice as well as the choice of host countries by enhancing or reducing its legitimacy within a particular host country.

The host country's attitude and policy towards foreign ownership were found to affect the investing firm's ownership structure (Padmanabhan and Cho 1996). Despite increasing global liberalization and deregulation, some host countries still restrict majority or full foreign ownership in fledgling and/or strategic industries to protect their indigenous firms. Types of restrictions include outright prohibition of foreign ownership, a ceiling on the extent of ownership, red tape, prior government approvals, and deprivation of financial and tax privileges awarded to domestic firms. For example, the Chinese government's restrictive policies and regulations did not allow full foreign ownership when the country first opened its market to foreign investors in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The government only allowed FDI in the form of joint ventures as they wanted select local firms to learn sophisticated technology and managerial know-how from their foreign partners. From the discussion are the following hypotheses derived:

Hypothesis 3: The institutional distance between the home country of an investing MNE and South Korea, the host country, is associated with its entry mode choice.

Hypothesis 4: An investing MNE will be less likely to choose a WOS for its operation in South Korea, the host country, when there exists restriction on full foreign ownership.

The underlying position of transaction costs theory is that modes selected following the predictions of transaction costs theory will provide firms with the most efficient and least costly organisational design and leads to better performance (Williamson 1985; Chen and Hu 2002). However, other scholars (e.g., Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Zajac and Olsen 1993 cited in Brouthers 2002) suggest an equally plausible argument that transaction costs-based mode does not necessarily lead to better performance at the affiliate. According to this stream of scholars, cost minimisation or efficiency maximisation may not lead to the best performing mode because organisational performance is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon comprising both efficiency and value enhancement of an operation. Brouthers (2002) warns against the single-minded focus on the efficiency maximisation and cost minimisation of transaction costs theory. He argues that an organisational design, entry mode in particular, will achieve best performance when other contextual variables are factored in to its decision, such as cultural and institutional variables. Distance between the home and host country, either cultural or institutional, may add to transaction costs due to increasing tensions arising from misunderstanding and miscommunication between parties across the borders. Institutional context variables are believed to affect a firm's performance as institutionally-sanctioned organisational form and activities enhance the firm's legitimacy through its external isomorphism and ultimately its survival and success within a particular institutional context. Following the general assertion expressed in the literature (e.g., Brouthers 2002 in particular), we propose the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: Firms selecting entry modes based on conceptual and theoretical predictions will perform better than firms not following the predictions.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Sample selection and data collection
As at 30 June 2002, there were 3542 foreign manufacturing ventures registered with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MOCIE) responsible for inward foreign direct investment in Korea (MOCIE 2002). Out of the total of 3542 firms, 1500 firms were randomly selected for the survey in the study. A copy of the survey questionnaire was emailed to the managing director or equivalent of these manufacturing affiliates in mid-2003. We were able to obtain responses from 262 firms, with an approximate response rate of 17%, out of which the responses of 34 firms were deleted because they do not satisfy the 10% ownership rule of OECD, albeit labelled as FDI under the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (FIPA) of Korea. This elimination process resulted in a final sample of 228 firms for the first-stage logistic regression analysis.

The sample used in the second-stage multiple regression analysis of performance was ultimately reduced to 222 firms that were all at least three years old when our survey was conducted in mid-2003, which is in line with prior studies (e.g., Pangarkar and Lim 2003; Chen and Hu 2002). According to Newbould et al. (1978 cited in Pangarkar and Lim 2003), a three-year requirement is necessary because it would be difficult to assess the affiliate performance, especially its financial performance, in the first few years of foreign entry. This criterion is slightly more stringent than that of Nitsch et al. (1996) that includes subsidiaries at least two years old. A non-response bias was found not to be significant. Furthermore, the sample distribution was found to be similar to that of the entire population in respect of industry classification, location, and parent nationality.

**Questionnaire Development**

We developed a draft questionnaire in English that was later translated into Korean by the bilingual author. The Korean version of the draft was then cross-checked by two other Korean researchers and academics in the field and adjusted accordingly. Designed for a larger project, the questionnaire contains a number of question items, including entry mode, source of material and sales, R&D activities, technology transfer, relationship with local suppliers/distributors, and performance, some of which will be used in further studies.

**Statistical tests**

As mentioned earlier, we ran two-stage analyses. First, we conducted a binomial logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship between independent variables (including control variables) and the dichotomous dependent variable, i.e., entry mode (JV vs. WOS). The binomial regression model is chosen for its robustness and the categorical nature of the dependent variable (Hair et al. 1998) where JV is treated as a baseline case with a value of zero. A positive regression coefficient means that the independent variable increases the probability of choosing an alternative mode (i.e., WOS) while reducing the probability of choosing the baseline mode (i.e., JV). In contrast, a negative coefficient decreases the predicted probability.

Second, after obtaining two groups (i.e., fit and non-fit groups) from the logistic regression, we compared the two groups in performance by using two-sample T-tests and then multiple regression analysis to isolate the contribution of mode fit to performance, while controlling for other variables that are conjectured to impact on performance. While using univariate analysis in their own study due to the nature of data, Li and Guisinger (1991) clearly suggests the use of multivariate analysis to examine the impact of entry mode choice on affiliate performance.

**Measurement of Variables**

*Dependent variables*

Two dependent variables are included in this study. First, our dependent variable for testing entry mode choice is a dummy variable that assumes one if the equity of the affiliate is wholly owned and zero if it is jointly owned. A shared-equity affiliate is one which is equal to or greater than 10% but less than 100% foreign-owned, while a wholly owned affiliate is 100% foreign-owned. While recognizing alternative types of entry mode, our focus is limited to FDI entry modes, that is, WOS and international JV.

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259 This number includes all ventures that satisfy the minimum equity requirement (i.e., 10% rule, consistent with the OECD definition of FDI) or other specific requirements set by MOCIE (see KISC 2003 for more details).
Our second dependent variable, performance, which is used in the second-stage multiple regression, is a multidimensional phenomenon (Barkema and Vermeulen 1997: 850) and consists of five items, i.e., sales growth, market share, operating profit, productivity, and employee retention. These multiple measures of performance (both financial and non-financial) are obtained from affiliate managers based on their perceptions of firm performance at the micro-firm level. While recognising the shortcomings of subjective measures, we believe the perceptions of managers do actually matter in determining the course of action that will be taken by the firm. The use of subjective measures can also be justified by the high correlation between objective and subjective measures of performance found in prior studies (e.g., Dess and Robinson 1984; Geringer and Hebert 1991). Multiple measures are used to avoid the problems associated with depending on narrowly defined criteria (e.g., profitability) because financial performance may not be the only determinant of the effectiveness of foreign entry (Anderson 1990; Geringer and Hebert 1991; Kim and Hwang 1992; Kitching 1974; Luo 1997; Pangarkar and Lim 2003), let alone the difficulty of assessing it. All performance variables were measured on a seven-point scale where 1 denotes “very low”, while 7 indicates “very high” compared to the domestic industry average.

Independent variables
Proprietary assets come in different forms and shapes ranging from intangible assets, learning capabilities, and privileged relationships with external actors (Rugman and Verbeke 2003). Transaction costs were captured by two variables in this study: degree of transfer of proprietary assets and proportion of R&D expenditure to sales at the affiliate. A significant body of literature uses the parent firm’s R&D or advertising intensity (e.g., Kogut and Singh 1988; Padmanabhan and Cho 1996) as a proxy for the risks of their proprietary assets being unduly exploited by the partner(s). However, the R&D or advertising intensity of parent firms at the time of entry is extremely difficult to obtain in studies like the present study which contains multiple home countries and targets affiliates only (Chen and Hu 2002). To get around this problem, we use two proxies mentioned above to capture the level of dissemination risks an MNE is subject to. While limited in capturing the level of proprietary assets, these measures may be, in a way, better proxies because the parent’s R&D or advertising intensity may not necessarily be translated into the actual degree of risks an MNE faces. The degree of transfer is measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (“very little”) to 7 (“very significant”), while R&D expenditure is measured by another similar scale (i.e., 1 (0%) to 7 (11% or more). Firms not engaging in R&D activities or technology transfer are given a corresponding scale, which is consistent with Johnston’s (1972) suggestion (cited in Kogut and Singh 1988) because the sample size would otherwise be significantly reduced.

National cultural distance was used to capture the cultural context in which a firm operates. The national cultural dimensions put forward by Hofstede (1980) and CCC (1987, also Hofstede and Bond 1988) are used to compute the aggregate cultural distance index. Following the suggestion of Shenkar (2001), we expand Kogut and Singh’s (1988) formula by including the short-term/long-term orientation in the calculation of the aggregate index.

Drawing on Kogut and Singh (1988), the aggregate index \( ACD_j \) is calculated based on the deviation along each dimension of each home country from the Korean index, as shown below in the equation. The deviations are corrected for differences in the variance of each dimension and then arithmetically averaged:

\[
ACD_j = \sum_{i=1}^{5} \left[ \frac{(I_{ij} - I_{iK})^2}{V_i} \right] + 5
\]

\( ACD = \) aggregate cultural distance
\( I_{ij} = \) index value for cultural dimension \( i \) of home country \( j \);
\( V_i = \) variance of the index for dimension \( i \);
A= host country (Korea in this case)

Our sample also contains countries for which the scores of Hofstede (1980) and CCC (1987) are unavailable. These missing cases are replaced with the score of a country closest to the country concerned. For example, we use the scores of Taiwan as a proxy for China for the original four dimensions, while cognizant of substantial differences between the two countries (Hofstede 2001). This method is in line with Pan (1996) and Chen and Hu (2002) who used Taiwan as a proxy for China. While Read’s (1993) proxy, i.e. ‘a country’s marginal propensity to save’ was suggested for the missing cases in the time-orientation dimension (see Barkema and Vermeulen 1997), the proxy is not used in our study simply due to the difficulty of obtaining the information. Instead, the same replacement method of using a closest country’s score is adopted. Our replacement method can be justified by the comparable variances obtained from the pre- and post-replacement scores in all the five performance areas.

Two institutional variables are included in the study: institutional distance and host country restrictions on foreign ownership. First, as our sample contains multiple home countries, we use readily available information as a proxy for institutional distance, i.e. corruption perception index (CPI) published by Transparency International (2003). The composite CPI, as an important determinant of a country’s political risk, provides a snapshot of the perceived levels of corruption of each country and thus partly captures country risk. We take the absolute difference between home country and South Korean indexes as a proxy for institutional distance. Second, the Korean government has undergone tremendous changes since the 1997 economic crisis in its mindset and policy toward foreign ownership in the country. In particular, the 1998 Foreign Investment Promotion Act introduced the concept of simple registration for foreign investors, away from the requirement of obtaining prior approval before registration. The pre-crisis policies were largely restrictive through indirect discrimination against full foreign ownership (e.g. red tape, prior approval, and restrictions on M&A and real estate purchase), as opposed to post-crisis virtual non-restrictions on the ceiling of foreign ownership, except in two very sensitive industries (e.g. radio and TV broadcasting) (KISC 2003). To capture the degree of restrictions, we use a dummy variable that assumes one if the affiliate was founded after the crisis (non-restrictive host country policy), and zero otherwise (restrictive host country policy). Lastly, entry mode fit used as the independent variable in multiple regression is separately explained in the results section.

Control variables:

We include four control variables: establishment mode, size, industry, and perceived level of competition. A dummy variable is used to capture the establishment mode, which is equal to one if the affiliate is established through acquisition and to zero if it is set up through greenfield. Following Padmanabhan and Cho (1996: 53), acquisitions are defined as "the purchase of ownership in an existing local firm in an amount sufficient to confer effective control", while greenfield is defined as an investment in new facilities. Due to the difficulty of obtaining relevant financial information, especially for unlisted firms in the sample, we use the number of affiliate employees as a measure of affiliate size. To capture the level of competition, we use a single item that asks the respondents to indicate the level of competition they perceive in their particular industry on a seven-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (‘very low’) to 7 (‘very high’). While industry is controlled for in our study because it is limited to manufacturing firms, we use a sub-sectoral dummy to control for any exogenous sub-industry effect by grouping the firms into two categories using the two-digit Korean SIC: low-technology vs. high-technology industry. The dichotomous variable is equal to one when the affiliate is in the high-technology industry and zero when it is in the low-technology industry. Similar to Chen and Hu (2002), high technology industries include: chemical products, industrial machinery; office equipment and computer; electrical and electronic products; medical/precision/optical equipment; automobile/trailer; and other transport equipment. Low-technology industries include: food/beverage; textile/clothes/leather/footwear; paper/printing/publishing; rubber/plastics products; non-metal
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Before running logistic regression, a correlation analysis (Table 1) was conducted to gain a preliminary understanding of the relationship between entry mode and the independent variables including control variables, and to detect any multicollinearity among the independent variables used in both logistic and multiple regressions.

Table 1

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<td>.126^</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.128^</td>
<td>.128^</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MotiveB</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.108</td>
<td>-.074</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>-.119^</td>
<td>.128^</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MotiveC</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>-.064</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.138*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MotiveD</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>-.125^</td>
<td>.130^</td>
<td>.120^</td>
<td>-.039</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Significant at p < .01; * significant at p < .05; ^ significant at p <= .10 (two-tailed); N= 222

Group= group classification (0= non-fit group; 1= fit group); Mode= entry mode (0= JV; 1= WOS)
CD= a composite index of cultural distance between home and host country using Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions
CPID= difference in corruption perception index; HP= host country policy on FDI (restrictive period= 0; vs. non-restrictive period= 1)
Location= affiliate location within Korea (0= non-special zone; 1= special zone including capital and its satellite city/province)
Industry= line of business (0= low-technology; 1= high technology)
Size= number of employees at the affiliate; Compete= perceived level of competition
MotiveA= strategic asset seeking (or advanced resource-seeking); MotiveB= incentive-seeking/regulation-avoiding; MotiveC= simple resource-seeking; MotiveD= market-seeking
As shown in Table 1, the correlation analysis shows some statistically significant relationships with entry mode at p <= .10; however, no particularly strong correlation has been detected among the independent variables, posing no multicollinearity problem in the regression models (Aczel 1996). Although the distance in perceived level of corruption (CPID) is significantly correlated with most cultural distance variables, the extent of correlation does not appear to cause concern.

The results of the logistic regression analysis are provided in Table 2. The total number of observations is 208 due to missing cases for one or more variables. The regression model in Table 2 shows a significant explanatory power with the chi-square of 73.225 and the p-score of .000. In addition, the Cox and Snell R square and Nagelkerke R-square measures also demonstrate a good fit of the models, with a very good explanatory power. The model explains 73.1% of the entry mode actually selected. This figure compares favourably with the classification ratios found in prior studies such as Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) and Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) and are relatively comparable to those of Barkema and Vermeulen (1997), Brouthers (2002) and Harzing (2002). More importantly, the classification accuracy of the model is much greater than the chance rate (51.25%), with an improvement rate of 42.63% far surpassing the generally accepted minimum rate of 25%. The model thus provides very meaningful information for identifying group membership.

Table 2  Results of Logistic Regression: Entry Mode Choice

| Independent variables |  |  |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| Proprietary assets    | -.134 (.066)*            |
| R&D                   | -.066 (.097)             |
| CD                    | .399 (.166)*             |
| CPID                  | -.018 (.277)             |
| HP (non-restrictive)  | -.200 (.364)             |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control variables:</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setup (acquisitions)</td>
<td>22.537** (7063.302)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>-.001 (.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compete</td>
<td>-.047 (.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (high-tech)</td>
<td>.378 (.465)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.992 (.997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>73.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correct ratio (%)</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline rate</td>
<td>51.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement</td>
<td>42.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R-square</td>
<td>.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R-square</td>
<td>.399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<= .01; * p<=.05; ^ p<=.10 (two-tailed); Joint venture= 0; Standard Error in Parentheses
CD= aggregate index of cultural distance using five dimensions
R&D= ratio of R&D expenditure to sales at the affiliate; Setup= establishment mode (greenfield= 0 vs. acquisition= 1)
Size= number of employees at the affiliate; Compete= perceived level of competition
Industry= line of business (low-technology= 0 vs. high-technology= 1); CPID= difference in corruption perception indexes between home and host countries
HP= host country policy on FDI (restrictive period= 0; vs. non-restrictive period= 1)
The significance for setup is determined by score statistics (not Wald score) due to extremely large coefficients
According to Table 2, what attracts particular attention is the significant influence of proprietary assets on entry mode choice, but with an opposite sign, thus failing to support Hypothesis 1. The level of proprietary assets is significantly associated with the choice of JVs over WOS, which is counter to the majority of prior findings and transaction cost arguments. However, this contradictory relationship was also evidenced in foreign firms’ entry mode choice in the U.S. (Kogut and Singh 1988). Given the existence of many internationally competitive Korean firms especially in heavy and chemical industries, e.g., chemical products, industrial machinery, and automobiles (Kim 1991; Lee 1992), foreign firms entering the Korean market may want to enter into partnership with local firms to take advantage of their partner’s proprietary assets, including local firms’ complementary sophisticated technologies, supplier and distribution networks, marketing expertise, and local knowledge.

In respect of the cultural context variable, cultural distance has a significant effect on entry mode decisions in Korea, as predicted, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. More specifically, foreign MNEs in Korea favour a high control entry mode i.e., WOS over JVs, the greater the cultural distance between the home and host countries. This finding is consistent with that of Padmanabhan and Cho (1996) and Anand and Delios (1997), and Chen and Hu (2002), while it is contrary to the findings of Kogut and Singh (1988) and Brouthers and Brouthers (2001). One possible explanation for the positive relationship between cultural distance and control is that foreign firms may have perceived the costs of finding a local partner(s), as well as negotiating and enforcing a JV agreement to be greater than the costs of direct control through a WOS in the culturally dissimilar Korean market (Erramilli and Rao 1993; Hennart 1989). In particular, given Korea’s relatively short history of massive inward foreign investment, it may have been very difficult for foreign MNEs to find suitable local partners, let alone drawing up a complicated and comprehensive JV contract with local firms that are relatively new to the system of inward FDI. This problem is often exacerbated by the degree of cultural distance between the MNE’s home market and Korea because the foreign MNE’s learning is further disturbed by the psychic distance felt by the MNE in making their entry into the host country (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). We found no support for the institutional distance or for the host country restriction variable.

Out of the four control variables used in the logistic regression model, the establishment mode was found to influence the entry mode choice significantly. Firms entering the market through acquisition tend to choose WOS over JV, which is contrary to the concept of staged acquisitions evolving from shared ownership to full ownership over time.

Following Shaver (1998) and Brouthers (2002), we used a two-stage technique to test whether firms selecting theoretically predicted entry mode perform any differently than firms whose entry mode choices were not predicted by the model. By conducting logistic regression, we developed a dummy variable (‘mode fit’) that assumes one if a firm’s entry mode choice fits the predicted mode (‘the fit group’) and zero if it does not fit the predicted mode (‘the non-fit group’). We then ran multiple regression to determine whether the ‘fit’ group performs better than the ‘non-fit’ group, while controlling for several factors that are considered to affect the performance of the affiliate.

Prior to running multiple regression, we prepared other preliminary and exploratory tests: descriptive statistics, correlation, and normality tests. Descriptive statistics show that none of the variables used in the regression have significant skewness or kurtosis, except for affiliate size with 4.604 and 28.942 each. Data transformation of the size variable using natural logs is thus made because the range of its values is dispersed widely. After the log-transformation, the variable shows much smaller skewness and kurtosis than that of the non-transformed variable. P-P normality plots of all the variables also approximate normal distribution. According to Table 1 presented earlier, no particularly strong correlation was found among independent variables used in the multiple regression, posing no multicollinearity problem.

Table 3 shows that firms in the fit group perform better in all the performance areas than firms in the non-fit group. In addition, foreign firms in general perform better in all areas than the domestic industry average in Korea, with the mean scores greater than four in all performance areas, where a scale of three corresponds to the industry average.
As exhibited in Table 3, however, two-sample T-tests display no significant differences between the fit (i.e., correctly classified) and non-fit groups (i.e., non-correctly classified) except in the non-financial performance measure, i.e., market share. Another non-financial measure, employee retention, was also found to show relatively significant differences at \( p = .108 \). However, these univariate results fail to show the unique impact of entry mode fit on performance, independent of other potentially powerful explanatory variables. To obtain its unique contribution to explaining affiliate performance, multiple regression is thus undertaken. Additional control variables used in the multiple regression include entry mode (JV=O; WOS=I), location (non-special zone=O; special zone=I), and investment motives. Results of the multiple regression are presented in Table 4 below.

### Table 4: Results of Multiple Regression: Performance Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sales growth</th>
<th>Market share</th>
<th>Operating Profit</th>
<th>Productivity</th>
<th>Employee retention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group (fit-group)</td>
<td>.158 (.187)</td>
<td>.350 (.523)</td>
<td>.022 (.193)</td>
<td>.052 (.177)</td>
<td>.390 (.222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode (wholly-owned)</td>
<td>-.197 (.172)</td>
<td>-.314 (.193)</td>
<td>-.348 (.177)</td>
<td>-.173 (.162)</td>
<td>.100 (.202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>-.017 (.077)</td>
<td>.133 (.086)</td>
<td>.067 (.079)</td>
<td>.014 (.072)</td>
<td>-.012 (.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPID</td>
<td>.231 (.113)*</td>
<td>-.090 (.127)</td>
<td>.090 (.116)</td>
<td>.142 (.106)</td>
<td>.004 (.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (high-tech)</td>
<td>.092 (.201)</td>
<td>.383 (.225)</td>
<td>.003 (.207)</td>
<td>-.032 (.189)</td>
<td>.443 (.236)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliate size HP</td>
<td>.046 (.055)</td>
<td>.142 (.062)</td>
<td>.113 (.057)</td>
<td>.072 (.052)</td>
<td>-.031 (.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(non-restrictive)</td>
<td>.222 (.165)</td>
<td>-.051 (.185)</td>
<td>-.192 (.170)</td>
<td>.084 (.155)</td>
<td>-.110 (.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>.177 (.161)</td>
<td>-.031 (.181)</td>
<td>.294 (.167)</td>
<td>-.072 (.152)</td>
<td>-.015 (.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic-asset</td>
<td>.263 (.078)**</td>
<td>.093 (.087)</td>
<td>.221 (.081)</td>
<td>.184 (.073)</td>
<td>.038 (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>seeking (special zone)</td>
<td>.157 (.078)**</td>
<td>.093 (.087)</td>
<td>.221 (.081)</td>
<td>.184 (.073)</td>
<td>.038 (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation/incentives-seeking</td>
<td>.007 (.076)</td>
<td>-.114 (.086)</td>
<td>-.043 (.079)</td>
<td>.015 (.072)</td>
<td>-.007 (.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple resource-seeking</td>
<td>-.059 (.077)</td>
<td>-.090 (.086)</td>
<td>-.026 (.080)</td>
<td>-.098 (.072)</td>
<td>-.115 (.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-seeking</td>
<td>-.030 (.076)</td>
<td>.152 (.085)</td>
<td>.091 (.078)</td>
<td>.079 (.072)</td>
<td>-.088 (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-statistic</td>
<td>2.103*</td>
<td>2.131*</td>
<td>1.700*</td>
<td>1.237</td>
<td>.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.120</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.050</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
As shown in Table 4, the overall results of the models have been found to be statistically significant at the level of $p \leq .10$ with F-ratios ranging from 0.818 to 2.131, except for the productivity and employee retention models. While causing some concern when compared to those (i.e., .16-.29) of Brouthers (2002) and Pangarkar and Lim (2003), the relatively low R-squared values are considered acceptable given the complex and multidimensional phenomenon of performance (Pangarkar and Lim 2003). These low values, however, warrant a need to examine how the affiliate is actually managed once a mode decision has been made, as entry mode decision is only one of many strategic decisions affecting affiliate performance.

The results for the entry mode fit variable shown in Table 4 are largely consistent with those of the exploratory two-sample T-tests mentioned earlier. The fit group performs better in all performance areas as predicted, at a statistically significant level in both non-financial performance areas, i.e., market share and employee retention, thus partially supporting Hypothesis 5. That is, firms following entry mode predicated by the theoretical model enjoy significantly greater market share and higher level of employee retention than firms choosing entry mode not predicted by the model. However, the non-significance found in all financial performance areas appears not to be consistent with the findings of prior transaction cost-based performance studies (e.g., Brouthers 2002; Chen and Hu 2002). The results may be attributable to varied roles of affiliates and their diverse investment objectives (Rugman and Verbeke 2003), which may not be properly captured by the limited number of performance measures used in the study. Furthermore, other variables may be more powerful than entry mode fit in influencing affiliate performance. The results of this study appear to fail to support the normative aspect of the extended entry mode theory used in the study. However, any hasty conclusion of this kind needs to be avoided because the results may arise from various reasons such as methodological problems, including use of inaccurate proxies to capture the constructs underpinned by theories or our neglect of other potentially important variables. For example, structural tools such as optimal communication and coordination mechanisms (Hennart 1991 cited in Rugman and Verbeke 2003) may affect performance more strongly because firms, through the use of these tools, can manage their international affiliates more efficiently and thus ultimately reduce internal communication costs. Superior firm performance is rather generated when a firm distinctively utilises its resources and capabilities and thus enjoys an “organisational advantage” that markets simply cannot (Madhok 2003: 536). It is suggested that researchers discard their heavy dependence on market failure or imperfection explanations that have been advocated by transaction costs theorists and adopt different approaches (e.g., resource- or capabilities-based view of the firm (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993)) towards explaining how and why firms can enjoy enduring source of competitive advantage.

Among the control variables, JVs consistently perform better than WOS in all performance areas, especially significantly better in operating profit, the same as with the affiliate size which shows positive relationship to all performance measures. What is particularly notable is the consistently positive relationship between strategic asset-seeking motive and performance at a significant level. That is, the greater the level of strategic-asset seeking motive (i.e., skilled labour, technology, or strategic production base for future entry into China and Japan), the better the performance of the Korean affiliate. In contrast, firms entering the market to seek government incentives and cheap labour or to avoid government restrictions (e.g., import restrictions) were found to perform poorly. Finally, market-seeking firms tend to perform significantly better in the market share dimension, which appears to provide some evidence to the achievement of their investment objectives.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

We have examined the performance implications of entry mode choice by a large sample of 222 foreign manufacturing firms in Korea, using an extended transaction costs model. This is an improvement on the majority of extant performance studies that simply compare performance between alternative modes of entry. As initially expected, firms following entry mode predicted by the extended model perform better in all performance areas than non-following firms, especially in both non-performance areas (i.e., market share and employee retention) at a statistically significant level, thus providing partial support. While providing some empirical evidence to the usefulness, the partial support appears to cast some doubt on the applicability of the extended model to the analysis of complex and multidimensional nature of performance. However, this may be attributable to the widely accepted preoccupation of transaction costs theory with initial entry mode decisions, not how to manage an established operation and network (Madhok 2002; Rugman and Verbeke 2003). For this reason, transaction cost analysis may be viewed as inappropriate to discuss management behaviour (Birkinshaw 2000 cited in Rugman and Verbeke 2003). As mentioned earlier, a firm's unique deployment and management of its internal resources and capabilities is able to generate organisational advantage, resulting in superior performance (Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993). According to Rugman and Verbeke (2003), however, transaction cost arguments can be easily applied to the analysis of established multinational networks beyond entry mode decisions. For example, integration of a focal affiliate with the network of the MNE as a whole and its relationships with local suppliers and distributors can be understood, using the same transaction costs arguments, as an organisational tool or governance structure of optimising its activities that involve multiple economic actors. Hence, increasing attention is being paid to the context in which organisational activities occur in an attempt to better understand the complex phenomenon of performance.

The present study has employed both financial and non-financial performance measures on the belief that roles expected of affiliates are diverse and varied, and that sole dependence on traditional financial measures, e.g., profitability, may not be able to capture affiliate performance properly. The measures used in the study, however, are all based on the perceptions of affiliate managers who are influential in determining the course of action that will be taken by the affiliate. The use of these subjective measures can be justified by high correlation between objective and subjective measures found in prior studies. However, inclusion of objective measures in future studies will provide valuable insight into whether objective measures are consistent with managers' perceptions about firm performance. The use of objective measures can also resolve the problem of common method variance (Luo 2003) as well as potentially different definitions (norms) of the same scale across firms (Brouthers 2002).

Finally, the study can be further improved upon by refining the theoretical model and employing more sophisticated measures of variables. Nonetheless, the findings of this study shed some useful light on our understanding of foreign MNEs' entry mode choice in a largely under-researched host country setting and the performance implications of their entry mode behaviour by adopting an extended model and a relatively rigorous research design.

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Korea’s new globalization strategy: political economy approach

You-il Lee
Edith Cowan University, Australia

Background

Until the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korea was one of few Asian countries that did not liberalize inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the '97 financial crisis to large extent changed the whole picture of the Korean FDI chapter (Park, 2003). The late 1990s saw the sudden emergence of Korea as a major recipient of foreign capital for both strategic and non-strategic industrial areas, ranging from consumer products (e.g., alcohol, tobacco, cosmetics, textiles, etc.) to telecommunications. By 2001, on a cumulative basis, there were more than 11,500 foreign firms invested in Korea. Further investment de-restrictions coupled with a lower value of the currency (won), declining status of the chaebol (mostly family-owned large industrial conglomerates in Korea), and the government capacity which resulted from the '97 financial crisis made investments more attractive. In particular, during the four year period after the crisis (1998 to 2001), Korea has attracted around US$52 billion in FDI, which is almost more than double the entire amount of the previous four decades. More strikingly, the Korea Times reported in late December 2004, foreign investors owned almost 42 percent of stocks listed on the Korean Stock Exchange by December 2004 (Cho, 2004). This implies that the Korean market is rapidly changing and open to outsiders offering opportunities to maximize market benefit in Korea. In particular, the Korean government has moved towards a new market-driven paradigm of economic growth based on FDI replacing the decades old state-driven and mercantilistic economic growth model. The IMF's proclamation made in 2000 well reflects the above, “over the past two years bold policies and a commitment to reform have made Korea a more open, competitive, and market driven economy” (Crotty and Lee, 2001a: 28). One of the attempts made by the government is its ambition to transform the nation into a business and economic hub of Northeast Asia. In April 2002, the Korean government, then the Kim Dae-jung administration, unveiled its grand ambition to turn the nation into an international business hub of Northeast Asia. This master plan included establishment of the so-called "special economic zones" that consist of 132 sq km (40 million pyeong) of land encompassing Youngjong Island, Songdo New Town of Incheon and Gimpo to promote international business. This new vision by radically liberizing market environment (covering foreign investment, finance, logistics, information technology, manufacturing and research and development) has emerged as one of the new government's (the Roh Moo-hyun administration, February 2003 – present) ten national agendas (Kim 2003: 17). In particular, Korea's new President Roh has established a special task force team to develop and implement the new vision, specializing in three main specific sectors including logistics, finance and industry. The logistics dimension is considered to be crucial given Korea's strategic and business location between Japan and China. The Roh administration has also promised to improve the business and operating environment for the multinational corporations (MNCs) through socioeconomic and institutional reforms such as labour market conditions, chaebol, liberalization of immigration policy and tax benefits at the national level. In other words, the attraction of MNCs has become one of the top priorities for the current Korean economy and the major component of the Korea's new globalization strategy (Sachwald 2003).

Hub vision: new paradigm?

It seems obvious that Korea needs to establish a regional business centre as its survival strategy in this rapidly changing and competitive age of globalization, especially with the geographical and technological advantages that Korea possesses. However, on the question of "hub" there seems to be a variety of opinions. Some refer to a logistical hub given Korea's geographical advantage (its close proximity to China and Japan) and its possession of a newly established airport and potential mega-hub ports (Lamers 2002; Kim 2002; Feller 2003). Others researchers (Seitz 2002; Raubach 2002; Rooney 2002) focus on Korea as a regional financial centre given that the nation is blessed with good infrastructure such as modern telecommunication facilities and high-speed internet network. Despite a sound and coherent strategic direction yet to emerge, Korea's new vision has seemingly been designed in an effort to create an image of Korea as a home for MNC's regional headquarters (RHQs), bringing
foreign capital and technology as a consequence of Korea's becoming the logistical and financial centre of Northeast Asia.

Despite the Korean government's and the media's effort in recent months, the majority of foreign companies in Korea do not seem to agree on what exactly is meant by "hub" (Lee and Hobday 2003). There seems to be two critical reasons that support this observation. First, to foreign companies and experts, Korea as a business hub, especially a regional financial centre by any standards is unrealistic. As Kwon argues in his study on Korea's financial liberalization, although financial globalization is an inevitable force, the idea of financial hub vision seemed to come out of no consideration of experts' strategic advices (Kwon 2004). Unlike Hong Kong and Singapore who have successfully built a "foreign-friendly business environment" such as English-speaking domestic workforce, effective urban-planning for foreign professionals, and the overall global mind-set among government bureaucrats, business leaders and employees, etc. Equally important, Korea still lags Hong Kong and Singapore in infrastructure and internationalization and has a smaller domestic market than Japan and China (Feller 2(03). Second, the market (48 million people) size and its potential of the Korean economy coupled with Korea's growing importance as a market in the global economy and their (MNCs) global strategies to expand to new markets turned out to be three most persuasive factors in MNCs' initial decision to invest in the Korean market.

Until very recently Korea has been among the least receptive to foreign direct investors in the Asian region, with the inflow of FDI accounting for just 1.1% of gross fixed capital formation in 1995. This contrasts with a regional average of 9%, and ratios of 25.7% in China, 24.6% in Singapore and 17.9% in Malaysia (Morgan 1997). Although FDI in Korea in 1996 increased sharply, a rise of 65% in amount (US$3.2 billion) over the previous year, Korea still compares poorly in terms of FDI (2.2% of GDP) with countries like China (18.2%), Malaysia (28.5%) and Taiwan (7.3%) (European Union Chamber of Commerce 1997: 60; Sakong 1998: 105-106). Korea was one of the few Asian countries that did not liberalize inflows of foreign capital until the mid-1990s. Until 1993, non-residents were given very limited access to the Korean stock market while the types of securities that local firms could issue abroad were expanded.

The main reason for not having a larger business presence in Korea is due to its long history of economic nationalism stimulated by negative experiences as a result of earlier interactions with foreign regimes. A strong belief in self-sufficiency has inevitably resulted in a tough business climate, seemingly especially hostile to foreign companies. Korea has always been for foreign companies a difficult market to set up and invest in. It has also been difficult to form joint ventures so it has not been an easy market.

According to analysis by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2002) on FDI environment, Korea was ranked as the least favourable destination among 60 countries in which to invest, although Korea was ranked ahead of Japan and Thailand.

One of the major indications from the above study is that although there is a general skepticism among foreign business community on the variable quality of the tax regime and rigidities in the Korean labour market, the sheer scale of the market opportunity coupled with the ongoing and progressive process of deregulation and economic stability combine to create a major upside. In March 2002, the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) conducted a market environment survey with CEOs (approximately 1,700 individuals) of the Fortune 500 companies in the Asia-Pacific region on eight categories including Korea's macroeconomic and global business environment and perception of the Korean market in comparison with Hong Kong, Singapore, Shanghai and Tokyo (AMCHAM 2002). The survey echoes the EIU analysis (2002) in that while the CEOs believe the market potential is perceived to be bright, Korea's brand image and global business environment are far less competitive than other major cities of Asia.

102 MNCs' perception on the feasibility of South Korea

It has been taken for granted that Korea's economic policy over the last three decades has been strongly nationalist. Prevailing perceptions are that there is chronic inefficiency and opaqueness in the Korean government and across society, difficulty in market access, unequal treatment in the domestic market, and relatively higher political and social instability than in other major Asian markets. Many (foreign companies in Korea) still believe that although Korea's economic development over the last few decades and deregulation since the financial crisis of 1997 have been impressive, elements in the environment such as corruption, labour-management conflict, taxation and red tape are no better, and
perhaps worse, than other Asian countries. A fundamental and obvious implication of this irony is that Korea is a tough market to invest in but the market and its potential overwhelm the obstacles and other issues that hinder their operation in Korea.

Hub feasibility

On the surface, there is no doubt among foreign business community that Korea has an enormous potential to be a business hub in the Northeast Asian region since the nation has already achieved internal and external requirements. Internally, Korea, according to Porter (1990) possesses a strong competitive advantage in factor conditions both in basic and advanced factors. Over the last four decades, Korea's lack of natural endowments has caused the nation to invest in the creation of advanced factors such as education, infrastructure and advanced communications systems to make its industries globally competitive. Korea's telecommunication infrastructure (utilization of internet) is already second in Northeast Asia. Korea is also investing very aggressively in the essential infrastructure for a business centre such as construction of a high-speed railway between Seoul (capital city) and Busan (second largest city in Korea), upgrading of deep-sea ports in Busan and Gwangyang and the establishment of the new international airport in Incheon. Further, China's entry to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the gradual shift of business activity from Southeast to Northeast Asia in accordance with the rapid but strong economic development of the region will accelerate Korea's role in the region. But Korea still considered among CEOs of MNCs, in general, to be an unattractive place for doing business. Thus, Korea's new vision and realization of becoming Northeast Asia's business hub seems to be skeptical.

Intangible issues

A crux of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) requests in 1997 was to uproot crony capitalism; non-transparent financial practices involving government, the chaebol and major banks; and the prolonged but rapid wage increase that outstripped the gains in labour productivity, which all contributed to the erosion of Korea's international competitiveness.

A critical point is that until the advent of President Kim Dae-jung administration (1998 – 2002), the government-chaebol alliance has been very active, using the control of finance (Bank of Korea) as a key policy tool. This enabled the government to have control over politics and led to the practice of favouring people and companies (chaebol) in regard to economic policies. A number of chaebol groups benefited from this tight alliance, especially when they needed financial help in expanding their industries overseas, including European countries. It is no wonder that most of the top 30 chaebol groups were found to have piled up debts averaging about 4.5 times more than their assets in 1997. The debt-to-equity ratio averaged 449.4% in 1997. The top 30 chaebol groups accumulated a total debt of 249.67 trillion won ($177 billion). This shows a sharp contrast with other countries like the US (160%), Japan (206%) and Taiwan (86%) (Gong 1999). Among the heaviest borrowers were the big five chaebol: Hyundai, LG, Daewoo, Sunkyung and Samsung. The Korean government is still regarded as a "god father", presiding over most aspects of economic affairs (Kim 1999). Korea's political and economic structures are still under government influence. Korean financial sectors, over the last four decades, have been under the government umbrella. Key figures in the major banks used to be appointed by the president himself and all financial matters were dealt with by the Ministry of Finance (now the Ministry of Finance and Economy). Although there has been some change in terms of the government and president's perception towards the role of banks since the IMF involvement in the Korean economy, the above tradition is still prevalent. This is why the role of the Korean government and bureaucrats still does not make sense to many foreign investors in Korea (Lee and Hobday 2003).

The Korean regulatory environment, difficult even for Korean firms, poses a particular challenge to the foreign investors (Office of the Investment Ombudsman (OIO) 2001). It is one of the most urgently needed areas to be corrected for Korea to become a regional business hub. Laws and regulations are often generally framed. In particular, government's current policy of frequent working-level post rotation (1 to 2 years) decreases the degree of expertise. The meaning of the law in practice thus depends on discretionary interpretations by working-level officials, thus increasing the opportunities for inconsistent application, discrimination and corruption. Working-level officials, particularly in divisions like Immigration and Taxation Departments, often rely on unpublished internal ministerial guidelines and unwritten administrative guidance in interpreting and administering the law. But one thing that differentiates Korea from the rest of the world is that the personal relationships are a little bit
more effective in Korea. These networks incorporate school friends (secondary and tertiary) going back 40 to 50 years, the region from which people originate particular universities and of course army friends. The following remarks made by a CEO of an MNC made at the interview with the author in Korea depicts the difficulty of doing business in Korea. “When we go the relevant government agency, you find most of the bureaucrats are from one of the top universities in Korea. Meanwhile, in filing for registration, it usually takes 2 or 3 years because it requires heaps of documents. But if an employee of a certain company and the bureaucrats are from the same university, they let the company know about the required materials before the review process is complete. So the company can prepare all required materials ahead of other companies and they can save a considerable amount of time. That is not possible for foreign companies. Now that we know this sort of practice, so we select a special person who does that kind of lobbying”.

One key aspect of Korean working environment that foreign countries must come to grips with is that of the confrontational relations between labour unions and management (Sakong 2003). In fact, apart from more general deterrents to FDI, the Korean labour market is the single most consistent worry by foreign MNCs. Many foreign chambers of commerce like AMCHAM believe that the Korean labour law gives significant benefits to the Korean union members with weak protection for management (AMCHAM 2002). For example, Korean labour laws still discourage firms from dismissing staff by requiring companies recruiting new staff in two years following dismissals to try to rehire laid-off workers and, in cases involving large numbers of workers, to notify the Ministry of Labour in advance, providing the reasons for the dismissal and proof that they have consulted sufficiently with staff (Economist Intelligence Unit 2002: 18). The Korean labour unions are militant and tend to pursue their aims in a merciless way. A failure to understand the nature and style of the process will be, at the very least, demoralizing for an expatriate manager. As Sakong claims that "Korea can become Northeast Asia's business hub - if only it can provide a business-friendly environment" (Sakong 2003).

Favourable FDI policies and laws (tax and labour) coupled with appropriate infrastructure for various hubs such as finance, logistics and other businesses may attract MNCs and eventually their RHQs. But issues concerned with socio-political and business cultures should not be underestimated. In other words, human issues are as important as business matters. Paradoxically, international businesses are all about humans and their families. Despite much publicized propaganda (establishing a residential complex for foreigners in the special economic zones) on ongoing improvements in relation to the quality of life in Seoul, the reality is that none of the above meets global standards. Importantly, many foreign companies put a high priority on their children's education, weekends, food, convenience, double-standard renting systems and cost of living in Seoul as much as business concerns (Lee and Hobday 2003). If Korea has less to offer to potential foreign residents, it is hard to attract foreign companies as well. Although there have been a few special economic zones designated (one in near Incheon international airport for business hub and two in the areas of ports of Pusan and Kwangyang for logistics hubs) where foreigners can find more favourable business and living environments (e.g. income-tax exemptions, simplified visa requirements, financial support, international schools, hospitals, accommodations, etc.) (Feller 2003), the government should also need to offer a credible reason that there will be no disadvantage in terms of convenience for existing foreign companies to shift their business operations to outskirts of Seoul. Further, in order for Korea remain as a Northeast Asian business hub candidate, more transparent measures should be taken to improve the regulatory framework and supervisory process in implementing plans and initiatives. In other words, even the "special economic zone” concept is not persuasive yet, rather it only serves as a symbolic gesture.

Other difficulties stem from:

- The government’s pragmatic but still nationalistic attitude towards foreign investment;
- A strong Confucian influence, especially linked to the relationships across government, business and financial institutions;
- A long history of homogenous culture;
- The complexity of Korean company structure involving seniority and the "ho bong system";
- Internal conflict rooted in language communication difficulties, unsuitable partner relationships and lack of understanding of the demands of joint venture business;
- Short-term orientation and frequent changes in policies and laws without prior notice;
- Lack of transparency in the financial market, its infrastructure and across society;
- Frequent rotation of posts within the government and its related branches;
• A wide gulf between the top and working-level people from English-language proficiency to expertise;
• Lack of expertise and professionalism among bureaucrats and government officials; and
• Lack of global perspective and pro-business mindset among bureaucrats and government officials.

The implication of the above is clear: Korea must admit that the nation’s challenges are not within tax/labour laws, FDI policies, or financial infrastructure, but within Korea’s deep rooted un-globalized culture in almost every part of Korean society. Thus, the country must be open to criticisms and establish a realistic and comprehensive strategy, which should aim at transforming the country into a more open, transparent, competitive, globalised and culturally dynamic society. This is a formidable challenge to a country like Korea but it is also true that achieving the ambition to be a regional business and financial hub is not an impossible task. Once Korean government and businesses and Koreans themselves, start moving towards the society, the realisation of the vision will occur naturally.

Conclusion

It is true that the 1997 financial crisis brought about a different market environment in Korea. For the first time in modern Korean capitalism, issues like transparency, accountability and lessened government intervention have been major themes in the local and foreign business community. In this way, better opportunities have been provided for today. Given that Korea still has rich market potential, a strong industrial base, an abundance of highly educated manpower, an excellent communication and logistical infrastructure, a high savings rate, and high market value as a strategic business location, it is now well observed by the foreign business community that the balance between risk and opportunity is in Korea’s favour, even compared to other neighbouring countries like Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and Japan. As such, the Korean government’s recently (2002) initiated vision to transform the country into a world-class business and financial centre in the Northeast Asian region sounds somewhat timely and achievable. However, this study shows that while the foreign business community in Korea unanimously is in favour of Korea’s great potential to be a business hub of Northeast Asia, they see the new vision as unrealistic unless there is a stark change in the current form of Korea’s internal and external business environment.

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Cartel Law in Korea: A Comparison with Australian Law on the Issue of Oligopoly Pricing

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Part I: Introduction

This paper considers cartel law in Korea and Australia. In particular, it focuses on the problem of distinguishing cartel behaviour from oligopoly pricing in a legal sense from both Korean and Australian perspectives. To be sure, cartel regulation has become a matter of international concern. The purpose of the study is to view the different approaches under a common theoretical framework, rather than to make concrete reform proposals. Both Korean and Australian approaches have their strong and weak points, although the strong role of the government in Korea has led to a greater sense of urgency in dealing with cartels through a legal “presumption” of agreement where competition-restrictive oligopoly pricing is proven.

Part II: Introductory Concepts

What is a Cartel?

First of all, it is important to define a “cartel.” A cartel, according to Hovenkamp (1999, p. 320), “[a]n association of two or more firms who would otherwise be competitors, for the purpose of fixing prices and reducing output.” Breaking this definition down into its elements: (1) the association is usually formed by some type of agreement, which is often hidden so as to avoid detection by the competition authorities; (2) the two or more firms who would otherwise be competitors are in a “horizontal” trading relationship because they trade a good or service at the same level of production, e.g., manufacturing, wholesale, retail; (3) fixing prices and reducing output are merely the most common uses or purposes of cartels, through which the cartel may stop competition on the basis of price or quantity.

From the Hovenkamp definition, in general, it is possible to attribute three elements to cartels:

An “agreement” element;
A “horizontal” element;
An “anti-competitive” element;

These elements are, as we shall see, sufficient to prove the existence of a cartel in South Korea and Australia. Strictly speaking, proof of the second element is not required in South Korea (Yoon, 2002, p. 231; Lee, 2004, p. 1).

One important difference that this paper explores between the approaches in these two countries is that South Korea allows a presumption to operate in relation to proof of the first element, agreement, where there is “externally conforming conduct” by the competitors that is anti-competitive. Thus, in Korea, proof of the first element is not strictly necessary; the corollary is that what is being established by the evidence is not really a cartel either.

The presumption of agreement in Korea finds its purpose in the fact that cartel members go to great lengths to hide these arrangements in order to avoid detection by the competition authorities. The problem is that without additional proof of the existence of an agreement it is very difficult, if not impossible, to say with certainty whether the observed conduct of the participants is due to a cartel or profit-maximising pricing activity in oligopoly markets. Thus, we need to examine what oligopolies are and how pricing occurs within oligopoly markets.

Oligopoly and oligopoly pricing
Oligopoly refers to a market where there are only a few participants. Pricing in oligopoly markets occurs somewhere between the prices experienced under the respective models of “perfect competition” and “monopoly.” While there is no generally accepted model for oligopoly, the Cournot model is the most widely used in relation to cartels. The Cournot model will be discussed in more detail later in the context of the economic analysis of oligopoly.

In addition to the supra-competitive level of pricing in oligopoly markets, another characteristic to note is the fact that firms often charge the same or similar price in an oligopoly market, a phenomenon known by economists as “oligopoly pricing” and by lawyers as “conscious parallelism.”

Main issue: Distinguishing Cartels from “Conscious Parallelism”

The problem is that conscious parallelism has usually been considered legally distinct from a cartel agreement. In terms of economic effect, however, conscious parallelism and cartel formation achieve the same misallocation of resources. That is, resource allocation is less optimal in oligopolies than in perfect competition, so competition scholars have tried to develop strategies to improve oligopoly markets. This is problematic due to the fact that the law has focused on proving the existence of an agreement, while allowing oligopoly pricing as legal conduct. Since the two appear the same externally, most cartel cases involve as a central issue the distinction between cartel agreements of some form and oligopoly pricing.

Given the fact that both cartel agreements and oligopoly pricing achieve the same economic outcome, yet only cartel agreements are illegal, it is natural that firms have tended to either disguise their agreements or tacitly agree that one participant set the price: “price leadership.” To understand how oligopoly pricing makes this possible we need to examine the Cournot solution in some detail. Once we can conclude that oligopoly pricing can work as a substitute for agreement we can then say that in the absence of additional proof of an agreement (so-called “parallelism plus”) there are no grounds to infer the existence of an agreement as a fact based purely on the uniform character of oligopoly pricing.

Conduct Approach v. Structural Approach to Cartel Regulation

There are two possible approaches to dealing with the problem of oligopoly pricing: conduct and structural. The conduct approach involves regulating existing cartels, usually through proving the existence of cartel agreements from the economic evidence. This approach is advocated by Posner of the Chicago School. The structure approach tends to argue that the conduct approach is insufficient and the only real way to deal with oligopoly pricing is through reform of the market structure itself, through prohibiting mergers that lead to concentrated markets where oligopoly pricing can occur. This view is associated with Turner of the Harvard school (Shin, 2005, p. 323).

Comparison between Korea and Australia highlights two possible approaches to conduct regulation. In Korea, it has been relatively easy to presume the existence of cartel agreements from oligopoly pricing, under Article 19(5) of the MRFTA. Unique to Korea, this presumption may be rebutted in certain circumstances such as price leadership. Yet the presumption of a cartel agreement in such circumstances, even if it may be rebutted, is controversial. One reason is that it requires the proof of a negative; the defendant must prove that it did not agree to engage in a cartel agreement. Another reason is the burden of proof. Under Korean Civil Procedure, for legal presumption such as Article 19(5), not only is the burden reversed, but it requires primary evidence such that a judge is certain that there is no agreement. This would not be the cases under a factual presumption requiring additional circumstantial evidence, such as “parallelism plus” (Lee, 2004).

Australia has taken the approach of Turner and the Harvard School. According to Corones (2004, p. 237), Australia’s conduct regulation is ineffective.

The application of s 45 of the Act to oligopoly pricing has failed because of problems of proving the existence of a contract, arrangement or understanding. Mere parallel behaviour alone would appear to be insufficient to establish an understanding, although it may be strong evidence of an understanding if it leads to conditions of competition that do not correspond to what may be regarded as ‘normal’ in a market with the structural characteristics of that in question.
On the other hand, Australia has been more concerned about structural regulation in terms of stopping mergers that form oligopoly markets before they arise.

Because of the problems associated with relying on s 45 to police oligopoly pricing, the merger provisions in s 50 are relied upon to prevent market structures arising that are likely to be conducive to tacit collusion. (Corones, 2004, p. 238)

Australia's reliance of structural regulation for parallel behaviour is shown in its merger provisions, which are intentionally designed to prevent strategic behaviour under a "substantially lessening of competition" test.

Unlike the dominance threshold which is only concerned with whether the merger lessened competition enabling the merged entity to exercise unilateral market power, the substantial lessening of competition test is concerned with both unilateral market power and whether competition is likely to be lessened through coordinated market conduct such as engaging in explicit or tacit collusion. For tacit collusion to succeed firms must agree on a continuing basis to stabilise their prices and other terms of trade and discourage maverick behaviour. A merger may make this type of collusion more likely by making agreement easier or raising the incentives to co-operate. Both the unilateral and the coordinated effects of the merger must be considered under the substantial lessening of competition test. (Corones, 2004, p. 304)

Korea also adopts similar structural regulation of mergers in addition to its conduct regulation under the cartel provisions. According to Seri (2002, p. 29) this is achieved through the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) Merger Review Guidelines.

According to the Review Guidelines, anticompetitive effects increase where the collusion among the competitors is made easy due to the decrease in the number of the competitors in the market. The Review Guidelines provide that in determining whether collusion among the competitors is easy, the following factors will be considered: (1) whether the price of the relevant product in the relevant market has been notably higher than the price of a similar product in another market for the past several years; (2) whether the competitors have maintained stable market shares of the relevant market for the past several years because the demand of the product in the market is inelastic; (3) whether there is a high degree of homogeneity among the products supplied by the competitors and whether the conditions for manufacturing and sale of the product are similar; (4) whether the information related to the business activities of the competitors can be obtained easily; and (5) whether there was any undue concerted act in the past.

Seri noted that of the three merger cases to consider strategic behaviour, the KFTC opposed the mergers in the OB case and the Haitai case. In the OB case and the Haitai case, the KFTC stated that collusion among competitors was likely because the business combinations at issue would decrease the number of competitors in the relevant markets and there was a history of undue concerted acts among the competitors. In the SK Telecom case, however, the merger was not opposed.

While the structural or Harvard School approach takes the view that oligopoly behaviour is inherent in oligopoly markets, neither Korea nor Australia take the structural approach to the extent that legislation is needed to break-up large firms. Thus, while Korea leans more towards the Chicago school approach than Australia, it retains the Harvard school approach in relation to the KFTC Merger Review Guidelines.

Administrative Guidance in Korea (and Japan)

Finally, there is a twist to cartel regulation in Korea (and also Japan) in that administrative guidance has been blamed for creating oligopoly pricing. (Heo, 2002; Shepherd, 2005). It is the legal position in both Korea and Japan that where price uniformity is created by the result of administrative guidance then this rebuts any claims of a cartel agreement (KFTA, 2003; Shepherd, 2005).

Part III. State of the Law in Korea and Australia
Cartel Law in Korea under the MRFTA

The law on cartels in Korea can be found in Article 19 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA). The terminology for cartels in the MRFTA is "undue collaborative acts." Article 19(1) prohibits "undue collaborative acts" where they have the effect of unfairly restricting competition:

No enterpriser shall agree with other enterprisers by contract, agreement, resolution, or any other means to jointly engage in an act, falling under any of the following subparagraphs, that unfairly restricts competition (hereinafter referred to as "unfair collaborative acts").

An act fixing, maintaining, or changing prices;
An act determining terms and conditions for transactions of goods and services, or payment of prices thereof;
An act restricting production, delivery, transportation, or the transaction of goods or services;
An act limiting the territory of trade or customers;
An act preventing or restricting the establishment or extension of facilities or the installation or equipment necessary for the production of goods or the rendering of services;
An act restricting the types or specifications of goods for the production or transaction of goods;
An act establishing a company, etc. to jointly carry out or manage the main parts of a business; or
Any practice that practically suppresses competition in a particular business area by means of interfering with or restricting the activities or contents of business by other persons.

It is worth spending a moment to break down Article 19(1). The reason is that Article 19(1) contains all the elements necessary to prove a cartel in the Korean context. The Korean jurisprudence, through court decisions and academic writings, is that proving a cartel requires establishing three elements: (1) an agreement; (2) a form of conduct; (3) anti-competitiveness.

Comparing these elements to our definitional framework, we find general agreement. First, the agreement element is clearly satisfied as an element. Second, the horizontal element referred to above can be subsumed within the form of conduct element, since these forms of conduct seem to implicitly involve the horizontal element. Third, the anti-competitive element is satisfied. Thus, the MRFTA definition of "undue collaborative act" in Article 19(1) concords generally with our theoretical understanding of cartels.

Article 19(2) provides for authorization of certain cartels, to which the above prohibition in article 19(1) does not apply.

(2) The prohibition of paragraph (1) shall not apply, where unfair collaborative practices are authorized as satisfying the requirements determined by Presidential Decree, where they are conducted for the purposes listed in any of the following subparagraphs:

Industry rationalization;
Research and technology development;
Overcoming economic depression;
Industrial restructuring;
Rationalization of trade terms and conditions; or
Enhancement of competitiveness of small and medium enterprises.

Thus, Article 19(2) does not involve the courts primarily, but instead the authorization by the KFTC in accordance with the policy of the administrative as expressed in the Presidential Decree. Article 19(2) recognised that while some cartels have negative impacts on competition, in certain cases these may be outweighed by other benefits as envisaged by government policy.

Article 19(3) simply provides for any relevant policies with respect to standards, methods, and procedures of authorization, as well as modification of authorized matters, to be determined by Presidential Decree.

Article 19(4) declares contracts that stipulate an unfair collaborative act listed in 19(1) to be null and void. This relates to their status at civil law.
Finally, Article 19(5) establishes a presumption of agreement in where certain elements are satisfied.

(5) Where two or more enterprisers are committing any acts listed in the subparagraphs of paragraph (1) that practically restrain competition in a particular business area, they shall be presumed to have committed an unfair collaborative act despite the absence of an express agreement to engage in such an act.

Subsequent court interpretation of the section in the Coffee case, examined in a later part of this paper, has clarified the meaning of this somewhat obscure provision. The elements required to be proved are: (1) external uniformity of conduct; and (2) practical restriction of competition in a particular business area. Once these two elements are satisfied, the effect of Article 19(5) is not to presume that Article 19(1) has been violated. It merely creates a presumption that there has been an agreement to engage in an unfair collaborative act. This means that the plaintiff does not have to do any more to prove the commission of the undue collaborative act unless the defendant can submit evidence to rebut the presumption of an agreement. This may be considered to be the unique Korean approach to cartel regulation, which makes it easier for competition authorities to overcome the difficulties in proving cartels while increasing the burden on defendants.

Cartel Law in Australia under the TPA

In Australia cartels are regulated under s 45 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) as a form of “horizontal agreement.” Section 45(2) of the TPA provides:

A corporation shall not —
the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding contains an exclusionary provision; or
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition; or
give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether the contract or arrangement was made, or the understanding was arrived at, before or after the commencement of this section, if that provision —
is an exclusionary provision; or
(ii) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition.

It is necessary to clarify the reason for the peculiar drafting of this provision. Paragraphs (a) and (b) respectively prohibit the making and the giving effect to certain contracts, arrangements or understandings. In each case, subparagraph (i) prohibits exclusionary provisions per se, while subparagraph (ii) subjects all other arrangements to a substantial lessening of competition test. We do not consider exclusionary provisions in any detail in this paper.

Thus, s 45(2) includes the prohibition of horizontal agreements that substantially lessen competition. Here too, the statutory definition corresponds with the three definitional elements given earlier: the agreement, horizontal and anti-competitive elements. Thus, the TPA definition of “horizontal agreements” in Section 45(2) concords generally with our theoretical understanding of cartels.

Comparison of Australian and Korean Price-fixing Provisions

In contrast to the Korean law under the MRFTA, price-fixing under Australian law in the TPA is illegal per se. Section 45A deems all agreements that fix prices per se illegal. This per se treatment has been extended to other “hard-core cartels” such as output restrictions. In ACCC v Tasmanian Salmonid Growers Association Ltd [2003] FCA 788, Heerey J held that an agreement or understanding to remove at least 10% of the salmon stock was in effect a price fixing provision prohibited per se by s 45A. In contrast, in Rural Press Ltd v ACCC (2002) 118 FCR 236, market sharing cartels were not been treated as prohibited per se, even though they involve the creation of “regional monopolies.”

While Korean law does not treat price-fixing cartels as illegal per se, there would probably be very few cases in which price-fixing did not restrict competition. Korean law also provides for a legislative presumption to make it easier to establish the cartel, although this presumption is rebuttable. Since Australian law does not have such a legal presumption in operation, one can conclude that the
Australian and Korean legal approaches to proving price-fixing cartels are different in terms of legal principle.

Nonetheless, in practice, both Australian and Korea regulatory authorities will be looking primarily for circumstantial evidence of agreement regardless of the different approaches to proof adopted under the MRPTA and TPA. This fact is apparent from the KFTC Collaborative Acts Regulation Guidelines (2002.5.8), which require the KFTC to consider additional circumstantial evidence not required by law before the KFTC takes enforcement action.

In the next section we consider what incentives face cartel participants in order to understand why cartels succeed or fail.

**Part IV. Economic Explication of Cartels and Oligopoly Pricing**

The law has generally regarded price fixing as an illegal cartel while treating oligopoly pricing as merely legal "conscious parallelism." What are the economic conditions that give rise to such "conscious parallelism"?

An oligopoly may be defined as an industry with only a small number of firms (Hovenkamp, 1999, p. 6). The criterion is "whether firms take into account their rival's actions in deciding upon their own actions" (Kip Viscusi et al, 2000, p. 101).

Economists use models to describe market interactions such as collusion and oligopoly pricing. There is no universal agreement on a model to explain oligopoly. The various models have been referred to as "styles of competition." For instance, in the Cournot model, it is assumed that suppliers compete by determining the amount they are willing to supply. This is also true in the case of the Stackelberg model, although that model assumes the existence of a price leader able to set the price that its competitors will follow. In the Bertrand model the assumption is not one of competition with respect to quantity but with respect to price. This part examines how these various models can be used to develop theories of oligopoly pricing and collusion.

**Cournot Model**

The most widely used model, however, is the Cournot model. (Kip Viscusi et al, 2000, p. 102) This game is described mathematically by Kip Viscusi as follows:

In the Cournot game, the set of players is comprised of firms 1 and 2. The strategy of a firm is its quantity. Finally, a firm's payoff is simply its profits. For our numerical example, the profits of firms 1 and 2 are, respectively,

\[ P = 100 - Q \]  \hspace{1cm} (5.1)

\[ MR = 100 - 2Q \] \hspace{1cm} (5.2)

\[ P = 100 - q1 - q2 \] \hspace{1cm} (5.3)

\[ \pi1 = (100 - q1 - q2) q1 - 40q1 \] \hspace{1cm} (5.4)

\[ \pi2 = (100 - q1 - q2) q2 - 40q2 \] \hspace{1cm} (5.5)

These profits clearly demonstrate the interdependence that characterizes oligopoly. The profit of firm 1 depends not only on its own output but also on the output of firm 2 (and similarly, \( \pi2 \) depends on \( q1 \) and \( q2 \)). In particular, the higher \( q2 \) is the lower is \( \pi1 \) (holding \( q1 \) fixed). That is, the more your competitor produces, the lower is the market price for the good, causing your revenue (and profit) to be lower.

From these equations it is possible show the outcome that leads to profit maximisation. In particular, Kip Viscusi (2000, p. 105) explains that "Nash equilibrium is defined by a pair of quantities such that
each firm's quantity maximises its profit given the other firm's quantity." In the above example, the Nash equilibrium is defined by each firm producing 20 units, such that where a rival produces 20 then the firm's profit is also maximised by producing 20. This turns out to be the unique Nash equilibrium, such that any other combination of units turns out to be "unstable" (non-profit maximising for at least one firm).

Another important point from the Cournot solution is that it lies below the competitive price of 40 (equalling unit cost).

This is a standard feature of the Cournot solution and is not particular to our numerical example. The Cournot price exceeds marginal cost because firms do not act as price takers. Firms are not small in the sense that their output decisions affect price and they realize this fact. They know that the more they produce, the lower is the market price. As a result, each firm supplies less than it would if it were a price taker, resulting in the Cournot price exceeding the competitive price. (Kip Viscusi et al, p. 106)

Thus, oligopoly pricing is generally going to exceed marginal cost, except in the case of the Bertrand model, which yields an oligopoly price equal to marginal cost. Kip Viscusi (2000, p. 109) notes that the Bertrand model is acknowledge to be a special case.

Further, the Cournot solution in this case of 60 is less than the monopoly price of 70. This is explained by the fact that each firm is concerned about its own profits and not industry profits.

When firm 1 considers increasing its output, it takes into account how this output affects π₁ but ignores how it affects π₂. As a result, in maximising one's own profit, each firm produces too much from the perspective of maximising industry profit. Hence the monopoly price (which is also the joint-profit-maximising price under constant marginal cost) exceeds the Cournot price. (Kip Viscusi et al, p. 106-107)

This leads to a non-Pareto outcome, which is similar to that of a prisoner's dilemma scenario. That is to say, each firm would maximise their profit by producing 15 and not 20. But if one party only produced 15, then the other would lose nothing by producing up to an optimal (for that firm) 22.5 units. These amounts may be tested by substitution into the above equations. If only there were some mechanism for holding each firm to an output of 15, then monopoly profits could be achieved. One way for this to occur would involve the formation of a cartel. Before developing a theory of collusion, however, it is worthwhile to spend a moment on another "style of competition," price leadership under the Stackelberg model.

Stackelberg Model

The Stackelberg model is "based on the observation that some industries are characterised by one firm being a leader in the sense that it commits to its output prior to its competitors doing so." (Kip Viscusi et al, 2000, p. 108) This game is characterised by the "leader" (firm 1) choosing its output, following the observation of which other "follower" firms (firm 2 etc.) choose their outputs:

Equilibrium behaviour in the Stackelberg model entails the follower, firm 2, acting the same way as in the Cournot model (thought not choosing the same quantity). In place of firm 2's conjecture as to what firm 1 will produce, firm 2 actually observes firm 1's output. Given the observed output of firm 1, firm 2 chooses its output to maximize its profit, which is just given by its best reply function. In contrast, firm 1, being the leader, acts quite differently. Rather than take firm's output as fixed (as it does in the Cournot model), firm 1 recognizes that firm 2 will respond to the output choice of firm 1. Taking into account the response of the follower, the leader chooses its output to maximise its profit. Using the example from the preceding section, the Stackelberg leader chooses its quantity to maximise:

\[
\text{Profit} = (100 - q_1 - (30 - 0.5q_1))q_1 - 40q_1.
\]

This expression is firm's profit where we have substituted firm 2's best reply function, 30 - 0.5q₁, for its quantity, q₂. This substitution reflects the fact that firm 1 influences firm 2's quantity choice. Solving for the value of q₁ that maximises (5.10), one finds that the leader produces 30 units and the follower responds with a quantity of 15 (15 = 30 - 0.5 \cdot 30). Compared to the Cournot solution, firm 1 produces more and firm 2 produces less and thus the leader ends up with a higher market share. Firm 1
produces above the Cournot quantity because it knows that firm 2 will respond by producing less (recall that firm 2's best reply function is downward sloping). In other words, firm 1 takes advantage of moving first by committing itself to a higher quantity knowing that it will induce its rival to produce less. (Kip Viscusi et al, p. 108-109)

This illustrates the phenomenon of "price leadership." Price leadership cannot be regulated easily using cartel law because, as we can see from the above, there is no need for any agreement for this form of oligopoly pricing to occur.

One possibility for regulation might seek to distinguish cases where there has been some threat made of a price war or some pre-existing custom, however, then it may be possible to bring these under some form of "coercive cartel", where a meeting of minds is established by a unilateral threat rather than the typical multilateral "meeting of minds". This sort of distinction regarding unilateral understandings is alluded to vaguely in both the Australian and Korean case law considered below.

Conclusion

The Cournot model results in a solution that does not maximize joint profits. The optimal outcome would require some form of collusion to maximize industry profits. In the above example of the Cournot model, the Nash equilibrium involved each firm producing 20 units for profits of 400, even though they each would have received the higher profit of 450 if they had colluded to produce a monopoly price. The problem that a theory of collusion has to solve is how to explain the fact that in some industries firms are able to collude. According to Kip Viscusi, "The lure of higher profits through coordination of their behaviour is what collusion is all about." (Kip Viscusi et al, p. 112)

In reality, collusion cannot be explained by a one-off game. Historical studies have shown that cartels involve a "trigger" strategy. A cartel might involve an agreement to maintain price at monopoly levels (15), whereas deviation could be punished by reversion back to the non-cooperative game under the Cournot model (20). The object of the collusion model is to show that these strategies would form a Nash equilibrium, so as to make collusion sustainable.

Continuing the same Cournot example from above, Friedman found that that collusion at monopoly prices would hold only where the firms sufficiently valued future profits (the discount rate \( r \) was sufficiently small). Following the Cournot example given by Kip Viscusi (2000, p. 115), this would occur only where \( r \leq 0.89 \). Nash equilibria occur at prices in between the monopoly level and Cournot price for \( r > 0.89 \). Again in the Kip Viscusi (2000, p. 116) example, if \( 0.89 < r \leq 1.33 \), it is possible to show that firms can use trigger strategies to support an output of 16 though not an output of 15.

Thus, cartel is stable in relation a "trigger strategy," so long as it is adopted at a quantity that results in a Nash equilibrium in light of the expectations that the firms have of future profits. This quantity will be typically in between the monopoly price and the Cournot price.

Finally, it should be noted that an increase in the number of firms lowers the discount rate in order for cheating to be unprofitable at the joint maximum (Kip Viscusi et al, p. 116). As Viscusi (2000, p. 117-121) points out, problems such as miscoordination, imperfect monitoring, changing demand curves and new market entry complicate the model, tending towards instability.

Part V. Korean "Presumption" Approach in Case Law

There has been no study done on the degree to which the above oligopoly pricing models are distorted by a presumption approach as applies in Korea. In comparison to Australian law, where oligopolies have little to fear from engaging in strategic behaviour, Korean firms engaging in oligopoly pricing can never be certain that they will not be penalized on the basis of a section 19(5) presumption. Thus, this section examines how this presumption operates in the Korean case to consider whether it distorts the operation of the oligopoly pricing models above. The purpose is not to provide a new economic model that takes into account the possibility of penalization for purely oligopoly pricing. The purpose is, rather, to consider the extent that the presumption has applied so as to penalize rational economic behaviour under the above models.
A. Coffee Case (Supreme Court 2002.3.15) - Interpretation of Presumption

Significance

The Coffee case is the foundational case in the interpretation of the presumption of an agreement under Article 19(5). The case stands for the principle that it is sufficient for the purposes of triggering the presumption to establish only two facts: (1) external conformity of conduct (2) competition-restrictiveness. It is not necessary to go further to prove additional “circumstantial evidence” of an agreement or tacit understanding between the enterprisers.

Facts

The facts in the Coffee case were as follows. The appellants were Dongsuh Foods and Nestle Korea. The respondent was the KFTC. At first instance, the court found that Dongsuh Foods and Nestle Korea had shared between them the coffee production and sales markets. Between July 1, 1997, and January 12, 1998, whenever Nestle Korea raised the sales price of coffee products Dongsuh Foods would follow by raising the prices for its competing products to the same level. The court accepted evidence that Nestle, over 2 or 3 times, and Dongsuh, over 3 or 4 times, had raised sales prices.

Meaning of presumption

As was noted above, the court held that in order to presume an agreement under Art. 19(5) two intermediate facts had to be established: (1) “external uniformity of conduct”; (2) “competition-restrictiveness.” The court explicitly rejected the view that there was a need to prove additional circumstantial evidence. That is, the court rejected the “parallelism plus” approach in relation to Article 19(5).

Economic Evidence of Competition-Restrictiveness

The court held that proof of “competition-restrictiveness” was judged assuming the situation where there is no agreement between firms. As our above consideration of economic models of oligopoly shows, this is the situation of oligopoly pricing. The price rises by the coffee manufacturers in this case, however, occurred in circumstances where the ordinary laws of supply and demand do not apply. Coffee was a market characterized by product differentiation, based on factors such as flavour, aroma, brand etc., rather than price. Hence it was hard to view the price rises as lessening competition.

The market data suggested that in 1990 Dongsuh Foods had a market share of 77.5% in the domestic coffee market. This market share fell suddenly in 1996 to 56%, due to its price being set somewhat lower than the price of competing products, which consumers took to mean that it was an inferior product. On April 7, 1996, when Dongsuh Foods raised the price of its representative product “Maxim” from 4350 won to 4750 won per 200g this exceeded its competitor Nestle Korea’s product “Taster’s Choice” priced at 4450 won per 175g. This lead to Dongsuh’s market share rising for the first time in seven years, up dramatically to 61.1%. Nestle Korea’s market share meanwhile fell from 44% to 38.3%. On June 2, 1997, Nestle Korea responded by raising the price of “Taster’s Choice” to 4950 won per 175g, 170 won higher than “Maxim”. On July 1, 1997, in order to prevent its market share falling once again, Dongsuh reduced its net weight to 180g, which amounted to a price rise from 23.9 won to 27.5 won per gram. From the beginning, it set its price the same as Nestle Korea. From that point, whenever Nestle Korea raised its price, Dongsuh Foods followed that price. The court concluded that this was competitive behaviour. That is, the price rises in this case were competitive as they were carried out in order to convey to consumers the awareness that their product was a luxury good.

Distortion of oligopoly model

If the facts of this case are to be accepted, this case is not a typical oligopoly pricing case that the above models can explain. The court accepted that it was a case of product differentiation. Yet the economic model of product differentiation accepts that the normal laws of supply and demand apply. The difference between a Cournot oligopoly and product differentiation is that the best reply functions of a competitor are downward sloping in the Cournot model, but the best reply functions of a competitor are upward sloping in product differentiation.
In contrast to the Cournot game, a firm’s best reply function is upward sloping... The reason is as follows. Firm 1’s demand rises in response to firm 2 charging a higher price as some of firm 2’s consumers decided to buy from firm 1. Generally, the stronger is a firm’s demand, the higher is its profit-maximising price. It follows that the higher firm 2’s price becomes, the higher is the price that maximises firm 1’s profit so that its best reply function is upward sloping. (Kip Viscusi et al., p. 110-111)

This was not the case in relation to the Coffee case since firm 2 charging a higher price led to firm 1’s demand falling. Thus, if we accept that that coffee in Korea is subject to an upward-sloping demand curve, maybe due to a Leblen or “snob” effect, then this is not explained by a price differentiation model.

B. Toilet Paper Case (2002.5.28)

Significance

The significance of the Toilet Paper case relates to the overturning of the presumption in the case where the court accepted a price leadership defence. As Lee (2004, pp. 162-163) notes, the Korean courts have recognised three situations where the presumption may be overturned:

Where there has been a coincidental conformity of price despite the setting of prices being carried out independently;
Where external factors affecting all businesses in a competitive relationship (eg. cost increases) affect to the same degree each business’s price setting behaviour leading to the businesses have no choice but to pursue the same or similar conduct at the same time. This does not apply, however, where the external factor affected each competitor in different ways.
Where there is market leadership, whereby in oligopoly markets the price leader sets the price independently and the followers simply imitate the price leader unilaterally. Even in this case, however, where the court concludes that the price leader foresaw that followers would conform to price leadership based on the market circumstances eg. hitherto customs, then this is excluded. Where competitors follow price leadership under an express agreement or tacit understanding the issue becomes one between only these firms and whether their acts lessened competition.

Facts

The four toilet paper manufacturers in this case shared 85.2% of sales in the toilet paper market. These were Ssangyong Paper (28.4%), Yuhan-Kimberly (27.5%), Mona Lisa (17.3%), and Daehan Pulp (12.0%). The plaintiff was Mona Lisa and KFTC was the defendant. The relevant market was the domestic “embossed roll” toilet paper supply market. It was accepted that for a certain period of time the toilet paper manufacturers had maintained the wholesale price at the same level.

There was one fall in price and three subsequent price rises. In 1995, in accordance with administrative guidance, the market leaders Yuhan-Kimberly and Ssangyong Paper had set their prices at 8,261 won and 8,448 won respectively. On June 1, 1996, Mona Lisa and Daehan Pulp both decreased their price to 8,448 won (1st price decrease). On March 1, 1997, as soon as Ssangyong Paper raised its price to 8,866 won, Mona Lisa and Daehan Pulp followed suit (1st price increase). On July 16, 1997, by the time Yuhan-Kimberly had raised its price to 9,306 won, the remaining three companies had already raised their price to 9,306 won uniformly and simultaneously on July 1. For the first time, all four companies were charging the same price (2nd price increase). Finally, after internal consultation on November 28, 1997, Yuhan-Kimberley raised its price again to 10,494 won on December 24. Once again, the other three companies had already raised their prices to 10,494 on the 15th and 16th of that month (3rd price increase).

Price Leadership

The issue was whether there had been price leadership such as would rebut the Article 19(5) presumption of agreement. The court noted that in oligopolies there might be price leadership in which the leading participant with a large market share sets the price that is imitated unilaterally by the other participants.
In relation to the first price decrease and first price increase, the Court found that there had in fact been price leadership, thus overturning the presumption of agreement. This decision was made based on a comprehensive consideration of the characteristics and situation of the toilet paper supply market, distribution system and price formation structure, position held in the market by the three firms (excluding Yuhan-Kimberley), previous history of price leadership, and the economic circumstances of the time.

The court, however, maintained the presumption in relation to the second and third price increases which included all four toilet paper manufacturers. The court found that these two subsequent price increases differed from the aforementioned price movements, especially regarding the fact that price harmonization was especially deep in these cases. That is, internal consultation for fixing the price increases of the three companies (apart from Yuhan-Kimberley) occurred during the same period, which was due to the characteristic of the distribution system facilitating indirect price information exchange by prior notification of price changes to the distributor. Thus, the court would not overturn the presumption in relation to these price increases.

Distortion of oligopoly model

It is hard to say whether this case conforms to the Stackelberg model due to the existence of two potential price leaders, Ssangyong Paper and Yuhan-Kimberley. The important focus of the decision, however, was to compare the first two changes in price (1st decrease, 1st increase) with the subsequent two changes in price (2nd increase, 3rd increase). In particular, the key difference related to evidence of contemporaneous internal consultation and subsequent price conformity, which the court attributed to communications through the distribution system. On this point also, it is interesting that Yuhan-Kimberley raised prices later than the other three. In practice, we can say that this decision could be explained by a "parallelism plus" approach, if we accept that the additional circumstantial facts related to the internal consultations combined with the distribution system. On the other hand, this does make substantial inroads into conscious parallelism because the decision did ultimately draw its inference from uniformity of the price formation process through internal consultations. Such precise analysis of competitor behaviour and close uniformity can be said to be a characteristic of oligopoly markets (KFTA, 2003, p. 156-157). Therefore, if we consider that this decision is taken as one directly regulating conscious parallelism, then it potentially distorts the economic models we considered above, creating an incentive for sub-optimal oligopoly conduct.

C. Beer Case - Administrative Guidance (Supreme Court 2003.2.28)

Significance

Given the wide use of administrative guidance in relation to price setting, it is worth noting the Beer Case briefly.

Administrative Guidance

The question in the Beer case related to whether the presumption of agreement could be overturned in cases where there had been administrative guidance by a supervisory body in relation to the price of the product. In this case the court accepted that the parallel conduct was caused by following administrative guidance by the government. In the case of a price increase, even where there is no explicit provision for consultation pursuant to regulations or even where there was no provision to receive prior approval, the court overturned the presumption based on evidence of administrative guidance by the former Financial Economy Institute, which had been involved in the beer price rise.

Evaluation

Undoubtedly, the widespread use of administrative guidance in price setting under industrial policy in South Korea can contribute to cartel activity. Much depends, however, on the type and extent of administrative guidance involved. In the subsequent Liability Insurance case, decided by the Supreme Court this year, attention was paid to details of the price setting arrangements in rebutting the presumption (Shepherd, 2005).
Part VI. Australian “Parallelism Plus” Approach in Case Law

A. David Jones Case (1986) 13 FCR 446

“Parallelism Plus” under Australian Law

While there is no legal presumption under the TPA in relation to the existence of an agreement, price fixing has been inferred from circumstantial evidence in a “parallelism plus” approach, which is similar to that of the United States. In the David Jones case, Fisher J inferred that an understanding to fix prices for Sheridan bed linen had been reached based on the following evidence:

- since margins were low, the parties had an incentive to agree to increase their prices;
- it was established that a meeting had occurred so that there was an opportunity to fix prices;
- prices were in fact increased so that there were subsequent concurrent acts which indicated an understanding to fix prices; and;
- no alternative explanation was given by the respondents for their parallel behaviour.

Evaluation

In particular, point (d) above is somewhat similar to a rebuttal of the presumption in Korea, although this would at most be equivalent to rebuttal of a factual presumption under Korean law. This is because there is no presumption created directly in the TPA in relation to presuming agreements.

B. Email Case (1980) 43 FLR 383

Price Leadership

The doctrine of price leadership is accepted under Australia antitrust law as inconsistent with cartel behaviour. In the Email case there was no direct evidence of a price fixing agreement. This case involved price signalling, in that Email would ensure that its only competitor, Warburton Franki, always knew its latest price list (Corones, 2004, p. 237). The court instead found that Warburton Franki was free to price however it wished. Dr Norman, an expert witness had given evidence of price leadership, which confirmed the views of Lockhard J.

Evaluation

Price leadership is also recognised in Australia, similar to the Toilet Paper case. It remains an open question, however, whether there are some “special circumstances” in which the price leader could be punished.

Part VII. Conclusions

This paper has examined the cartel law of Korea and Australia. While Korea and Australia have different approaches to proof of cartel agreements, in practice the sorts of evidence that the regulators using to discharge this proof are the same. Australian law has been more circumspect in relation to inferring the existence of agreement from circumstantial evidence, with the David Jones case perhaps representing the high-water mark. In contrast, based on its approach of presuming agreements where there has been parallel behaviour that has lessening competition substantially, Korea has gone much deeper into the territory of “conscious parallelism” in the Toilet Paper case.

The economic models presented in this paper have given an insight into the incentives facing cartel participants in oligopoly markets. These models are useful to competition lawyers. The general consensus in both Korea and Australia is that conscious parallelism is legal. Korea and Australia have both tackled this problem indirectly through structural regulation ie. merger regulation. Only Korea has taken a direct approach, however, through its presumption of agreements, which can be classified as conduct regulation. It has been evaluated that Australian law has been ineffective in controlling cartels. A presumption approach would present difficulties for criminal cartel actions in Australia, not to mention other criticism in relation to presuming the illegality of “conscious parallelism.”
For Korea, on the other hand, there is the suggestion that cartel regulation move from the current presumption approach to the "parallelism plus" approach through reform of the MRFTA. This would remove some of interpretative difficulties that have resulted from the vague drafting of the section. The Coffee Case interpretation of Article 19(5) has remained a controversial issue. A future paper will address additional concerns relating to the difficulties in applying the presumption to: (1) criminal cases; and (2) calculation of surcharge. The generous approach of courts seen in the cases in overturning the legal presumption ameliorates some of the concern regarding the onerousness of the burden. On the other hand, the overturning of the presumption in cases of administrative guidance shows that the problem of cartelisation in the Korean economy is to some extent government created. In such cases, structural regulation would seem to be the only realistic approach in relation to these markets, eg. beer and insurance markets. Overall, however, the presumption has created a more proactive approach to cartel regulation in Korea.

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English Texts


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