The Humanitarian’s Dilemma: The experience of international NGOs in North Korea.

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ABSTRACT

Until the drastic reduction in the flow of international aid precipitated by US sanctions in 2005, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) conducted significant operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK solicited assistance from the international community in 1995, after a major flood and subsequent chronic food shortage. Over subsequent years the country became increasingly dependent on international assistance. Given this dependence on foreign aid by one of the world’s most isolated, repressive and potentially dangerous regimes and the recent withdrawal of many aid agencies, it is timely to examine the impact of INGO operations, not only in humanitarian terms but with regards to economic, political and social development. After discussion of the various theories relating to the role of INGOs in economic, social and political development, including their potential to promote democratisation, the paper examines the impact of the activities of international aid organisations participating directly or indirectly in the provision of humanitarian aid, assistance or development in the DPRK. Based on the findings of 10 semi-structured telephone interviews with relevant INGO personnel, INGO documents and other economic and social data, the paper examines the impact of INGOs on three key areas: Humanitarian objectives, economic development and political/social development.

Until the drastic reduction in the flow of international aid precipitated by US sanctions in 2005, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) conducted significant operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK solicited assistance from the international community in 1995, after a major flood and subsequent chronic food shortage. Over subsequent years the country became increasingly dependent on international assistance. By 2001, North Korea received more food aid from the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and US government than any other country. Similarly, private relief aid to North Korea significantly increased, with approximately 130 organisations worldwide providing over US$1.66 billion in aid between 1995 and 2000. Given this dependence on foreign aid by one of the world’s most isolated, repressive and potentially dangerous regimes and the recent withdrawal of many aid agencies, it is timely to examine the impact of INGO operations, not only in humanitarian terms but with regards to economic, political and social development.

After discussion of the various theories relating to the role of INGOs in economic, social and political development, including their potential to promote democratisation, the paper examines the impact of the activities of international aid organisations participating directly or indirectly in the provision of humanitarian aid, assistance or development in the DPRK. Based on the findings of 10 semi-structured telephone interviews with relevant INGO personnel, INGO documents and other economic and social data, the paper

1 We would like to acknowledge Professor John Casey for his valuable input for the draft of this paper
examines the impact of INGOs on three key areas: Humanitarian objectives, economic development and political/social development.

In summary, INGO representatives reported that the impact of their work in the DPRK was mixed. Some INGO representatives said that they had some success in meeting their humanitarian objectives, in particular in alleviating food shortages in targeted areas. Some respondents said that they felt they had made progress in the delivery of programs to develop the North Korean economy. These same organisations also reported that the aid provided to the DPRK served another purpose – that is that it gave North Koreans a sense that the global community cares and that they are connected to this community. Other aid and development agencies, however, were not confident that their programs were successful. Some interviewees said that through contact with North Korean refugees in China they discovered that the most vulnerable in the population never saw any aid, while others said they believe that aid was diverted to the political elite or the army. All the INGOs interviewed described the extraordinary lengths the North Korean regime went to ensure that the populace was not “contaminated” through contact with aid staff, noting how the degree of government control placed real limits on where and when INGO representatives could travel, what type of activities they could pursue and with whom they could interact. There were mixed reports regarding the implementation of monitoring devices such as morbidity tracking, nutritional surveys, market surveys and price surveys. Finally, all respondents agreed that the presence of INGOs to date has not had any discernable impact on political or social structures.

These findings do not preclude INGOs assuming a greater role in “civil society” building in the future but given the ongoing humanitarian crisis and that many INGOs are questioning whether recent programs have done more harm than good, is it worth considering a change of approach? The outcome of current US sanctions notwithstanding, it appears that many agencies would seriously re-consider re-entering North Korea unless certain monitoring and access conditions are met. So, should INGOs make aid to the DPRK conditional? If so, should conditions go beyond access to those that allow implementation of more complex and longer term programs directed at economic and social development? What would be the political implications of such a change in the approach? Indeed would such a shift be possible? Even then, INGOs are more likely to become a force for liberalisation not democratisation, by giving momentum to economic change. How then, can INGOs fulfil this potential role?

**THE ROLE OF NGOs IN FOSTERING REGIME CHANGE**

**Theories about the role of NGOs in fostering regime change**

Much of the INGO-related literature in the 1980s and 1990s focuses on those INGOs active in the Third World, seeing them as ‘apolitical’ development organisations often engaged in micro-level programs such as the delivery of services. This literature has tended to evaluate the role of INGOs with regard to their potential to alleviate poverty or promote economic development and studies their approach to technical development practices such as health provision or rural development (Thomas 1987; Cernea 1988; Wellard and Copestake 1993).

Interpretations of the role of NGOs in regime transition can be broken down into three interrelated areas: economic, political and social.

The economic role centres on the links and the dynamic interactions between the processes of democratisation and economic transformation. It is generally believed that economic reform produces new interests which demand political voice and political
expression and demands for institutionalisation and democratisation. Voluntary associations, NGOs, religious organisations and other civic groups are key providers of services where states and markets are weak, and, in theory, nurture the social values, networks and institutions that underpin successful market economies (including trust and cooperation). The development of market relations creates conditions conducive to the activation of civil society and/or a withering away of an authoritarian regime because, as Huntington maintains, economic changes “extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, and broaden political participation.” (Huntington 1968). Thus, economic reforms are expected to make a society more pluralistic and stimulate the people to increase their awareness of civil rights and consciousness of their legitimate demands. As people become less tolerant of repressive regimes, the regime is pressured to foster liberalised changes and tolerate some demands of civil society. Furthermore, as observed by Eisinger, who adopted Alexis de Tocqueville’s paradox in his concept of political opportunity structure, people revolt, not when things are worst but when closed opportunities have begun to open up (Eisinger, 1973).

In the political role, voluntary associations are seen as a crucial counterweight to states and corporate power, and an essential pillar in promoting transparency, accountability and ‘good governance’. It provides channels for voice, debate and decision-making, and strengthens skills as future political leaders. (Lipset; Diamond et al 1990).

The social role views NGOs as a form for ‘humanizing capitalism’ by promoting accountability among corporations, respect for labour rights and new experiments in ‘social economics’ that combine market efficiency with cooperative values. The social role nurtures a caring, cultural life, positive social norms that foster stability and skills of citizenship (often under the heading of ‘social capital’) (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Woolcock 1998).

The role of international NGOs as potential builders of civil society.

Despite a focus on indigenous NGOs, much of the literature on regime transition also acknowledges that international organisations can be important, if not central players, in regime change. Laurence Whitehead argues that “Two-thirds of the democracies existing in 1990 owed their origins to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from without...It is not contiguity but the policy of a third power that explains the spread of democracy from one country to the next” (1996: 9). In addition to the economic impact of developmental programs (which possibly leads to economic liberalisation and eventually democratisation as discussed above), this literature argues that INGOs can support internal change in other ways.

In a recent article, Sreeram Chaulia argues that INGOs can act as vehicles through which superpower foreign policy interests can initiate and shape regime transitions. Citing the recent revolutions in the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, Chaulia argues that they are not authentic democratic uprisings supported by local NGOs but were largely brought into being by organisations substantially backed and led by the US. He refers to several international agencies such as Freedom House as having a history of being headed and staffed by ex-CIA high-level planners and personnel and argued that these personnel were instrumental in defining these agencies’ role in shaping the course of regime change (Chaulia 2005). Another area of scholarship focuses on the role the European Union has and can continue to play in contributing to democratisation in Europe (Pridham 1994). In terms of types of INGOs, some scholars regard western economic aid agencies and the Catholic Church as “catalysts of democratisation” in the post-communist world (Weigel 2003). Others focus on human rights INGOs and how they can establish and spread
international human rights norms which can then trigger fundamental political changes leading to the demise of communism (Hyde-Price 1994, 2000).

In this literature it is argued INGOs can provide information / access to the outside world thus challenging regime interpretations of the outside. In the case of the DPRK, this information could show that, contrary to DPRK propaganda, the international community cares about the plight of the North Korean people.

INGOs can also provide anti-regime forces moral support. Democratisation theorists have argued that through denouncing the repression of domestic groups, international groups may force the regime to consider some of the costs such repression may have for the country’s international reputation while giving these groups a sense that they are not isolated completely. In South Korea, organisations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch generated international sympathy for the pro-democracy movement through their documentation and publication of the authoritarian regime’s violation of human rights. Similarly, in South Africa, INGOs are credited as playing a prominent role in building widespread international intolerance of apartheid and eventually shaming the South African government into officially repealing apartheid laws and drafting a new constitution.

Once regime transition has gathered momentum, Anne Hudock (1999) describes more direct material and logistical support activities open to INGOs interested in regime change. These include INGO provision, directly or indirectly, of medicine, food, funds, currency and fuel and means of transportation or communication to anti-regime movements; and more radically, acting as a cover for arms shipments.

However, many question whether INGOs have succeeded in civil-society capacity building. Citing a range of evidence, Hudock points out that international support for Southern NGOs tends to empower donors and international agencies not the other way around. (Interestingly this theme can also be found in the 1980s literature on developmental NGOs cited earlier. See in particular Thomas 1987). They are various characteristics that set the NGOs of Southern and western/developed nations apart. For example: In developed countries NGOs are internally funded, while in developing countries they are externally funded and so open to foreign influence/interference (or at least to such criticisms). In developing countries NGOs are seen as supporting democratic process, in developing they are occasionally accused of undermining state institutions.

Hudock argues that while international resources being ploughed into capacity-building of Southern NGOs may increase their numbers and influence, the building up of the NGO sector does not necessarily give voice to the poor and marginalised in these societies. According to Hudock international funding for Southern NGOs creates two main problems:

Firstly, the funding of projects tends to involve these NGOs in a lot of bureaucratic and administrative tasks, in both applying for funding and in the monitoring and accounting for expenditures, drawing resources away from 'front-line' work. Secondly, in order to meet donor targets, Southern NGOs will seek to work with groups and individuals where positive results are easiest to achieve, for example, those with easy access, organisation skills and easily attainable goals (Hudock 1999: 120).

Related to this, it is worth noting the imbalance that exists in the numbers, capacity to influence and resources between NGOs from industrialised and developing countries. For example, countries from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be unrepresented in transnational NGO networks (Florini and Simmons 2000).
The North Korean famine and INGO operations

The cumulative and interrelated effects of the sudden demise of Soviet aid, the collapse of the socialist world market, structural problems of the command economy, and the droughts and floods of the 1990s resulted in the North Korean economy contracting by about 30% in the period 1991-1996.

Economic decline coincided with a widespread and devastating famine. Food shortages have been relatively common in recent times, but it was not until a major flood in 1995 that the DPRK acknowledged a widespread food crisis. Since that time, it is estimated that between one and two million people have died from famine-related causes. Evidence suggests that children have been the most deeply affected section of the population. According to a joint Food and Agriculture (FOA) and World Food Programme (WFP) 2002 report, North Korea has one of the highest rates of acute malnutrition in the world with 42% of children found to be chronically malnourished (stunted) (FAO and WFP 2002).

In response to the chronic food shortages and severe flooding, in 1995 the DPRK solicited assistance from the international community. Since that time the country has become increasingly dependent on this assistance. By 2001, the DPRK received more food aid from the UN WFP and US government than any other country. Reporting on US aid contributions (which totaled $1.1 billion by 2004) for the US Congress, Analyst in the Congressional Research Service, Mark Manyin notes that about 60% of US-sourced assistance took the form of food aid, and about 40% the form of energy assistance channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) (Manyin 2005). Similarly, private relief aid to the DPRK has steadily and significantly increased. Between 1995 and 2000, total international aid provided to the country amounted to US$1.66 billion (Flake & Snyder 2003).

The support that the international community extended to the DPRK in the period 1995-2000 concentrated mostly on alleviating the food shortage and on medical treatment and hygiene. Approximately 130 organisations worldwide, including nearly a dozen larger INGOs, participated in the humanitarian response to the DPRK food crisis at some point during the humanitarian response effort. Some of the larger INGOs involved include Oxfam, the Red Cross, Caritas International (the relief agency of the Roman Catholic Church), Medicines sans Frontiers, Action Contre la Faim, and World Vision US.

It is also important to note that there are many South Korean civic groups (and some Japanese groups) active in the DPRK and along the Sino-Korean border (Manwoo Lee 1994, 185). Many of these organisations are aligned to either Christian or Buddhist organisations and the majority tend to focus on providing assistance to North Korean refugees. Among these organisations are: the Citizen's Alliance for North Korean Human Rights; Citizens’ Alliance to Help Political Prisoners in North Korea; RENK (Rescue the North Korean People! Urgent Action Network); the Buddhist group Good Friends; the North Korea Freedom Coalition; Mintongryun (the United People’s Movement for Democracy and Unification) - a national coalition of workers, youth, farmers, students, religious groups, writers and journalists; the Eugenbell Foundation; Pommominyon, the Pan-National Alliance for the Reunification of Korea.

2 Figures for mortality rates during the famine vary widely in different research. Andrew Natsios, former vice-president of World Vision US and current head of US Aid, weighs up different evidence to support the argument that the famine is likely to have cost at least 2.5 million lives. Natsios (2001: 201-5).
3 Note that over 90% of U.S. food assistance to Pyongyang has been channeled through the UN World Food Program (WFP), which has sent over 3.6 million metric tons (MT) of food to the DPRK since 1996.
Changes in the Humanitarian Situation in 2004

Since the DPRK nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when the DPRK reportedly admitted that it has a secret uranium enrichment nuclear program, the dollar amount of US aid has fallen by an order of magnitude. No US funds have been provided to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization for energy costs since early 2003, and the Bush Administration’s position is that it would like to permanently end the KEDO program. US food aid also has fallen considerably in recent years. Now South Korea and China are the DPRK’s two most important providers of food. These countries send almost all of their aid directly to the DPRK with virtually no monitoring (Manyin 2005).

Relations with the North government and INGOs have also changed substantially in recent times. US sanctions makes it very difficult to source supplies from the US without a range approvals (otherwise it is trading with the enemy). On 15 September 2004, the North Korean agency liaising with INGOs since 1995, the DPRK’s Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) announced that from now on the presence of international NGO would be scaled down. By the end of August 2004, the international staff presence was 63 at UN agencies, 14 for International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a 46 at 10 other smaller INGOs: ADRA (Switzerland), Campus fuer Christus (Switzerland), CESVI (Italy), Concern Worldwide (Ireland), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (Germany), Handicap International (Belgium), PUM Interlife (Sweden), Premiere Urgence (France), Triangle GH (France), and Save the Children (UK).

Table 1: US Assistance to North Korea, 1995-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar or Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Food Aid (per FY)</th>
<th>Medical Supplies (per FY; $ million)</th>
<th>Total ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metric Tons</td>
<td>Commodity Value ($ million)</td>
<td>KEDO Assistance (per calendar yr; $ million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>$9.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>695,194</td>
<td>$222.1</td>
<td>$65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>265,000</td>
<td>$74.3</td>
<td>$64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>$3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,063,894</td>
<td>$695.8</td>
<td>$405.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Figures for food aid and medical supplies from USAID and US Department of Agriculture; KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) figures from KEDO. Cited in Manyin (2005)

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Although some INGOs noted that sourcing from US has always posed challenges. “The US Govt is not deliberately obstructive but heavily bureaucratic – it is a licensing problem I would imagine if we were purchasing and shipping from the US we would be spending an enormous amount of time waiting for approval for licences and that puts a time lag on anything.” Stephen Linton, Eugen Bell.
PART II: THE IMPACT OF INGOs:
REALISING HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES AND EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Realising humanitarian objectives

All INGOs interviewed for this study emphasised how the relief of human suffering remained the principle goal of their operations, although the focus of some programs, such as the Red Cross, moved from emergency relief to longer-term health programmes, disaster preparedness and response and capacity building programmes to bridge the gap between relief and development.

While it is not possible to establish a clear link between aid and any changes in the welfare of the North Korean people, particularly in the absence of rigorous monitoring, the latest nutrition figures suggest some improvement. A nutritional survey carried out in October 2004 by the Central Bureau of Statistics and North Korea's Institute of Child Nutrition (ICN), with the assistance of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) found that malnutrition among children in the DPRK declined between 2002 and 2004. This is evidenced by lower rates of stunting and wasting. However, proportions of stunted and underweight children, at 37% and 23% respectively, remain “high”, according to World Health Organisation criteria. Moreover, the assessment found that the nutritional status of mothers has not improved, with almost one in three women with young children remaining malnourished and anaemic (UNICEF 2005: 72).

In terms of realising humanitarian goals, interview responses and various INGO documents show that some agencies believed they were successful, some believed they weren’t, while most admitted they couldn’t tell for sure and others added that it didn’t matter.

Some INGO representatives said that they witnessed improvements in the health of those reached by feeding programs, particularly young children. In 2004, in an interview in the Washington Post, UN Humanitarian Coordinator in DPRK, Masood Hyder says that now is not the moment for the international community to give up on aid to North Korea, just when cautious changes are gradually emerging.

We did not fail. Lives were saved; we are helping turn the situation around. The malnutrition, stunting and maternal mortality rates, while still high, have fallen. Above all, we have established preventive capacity: Another famine cannot happen while we are here and properly supported. Washington Post, 4 January 2004.

In this interview Hyder also responded to allegations that WFP assistance is diverted to the North Korean military. He said “While we cannot guarantee that every sack of grain goes where it should, there are good reasons to believe -- foremost among them the impressive results of last year's nutritional survey -- that the great bulk of it does” (Hyder 2004).

The responses of our interviewees and evidence suggest that the humanitarian inspired efforts have not completely failed. In a CARITAS document prepared for an emergence appeal it said that: “So far Caritas feels confident that most of the aid is reaching the right people and no major aid diversion has been discovered. Although some

5There are many other possible factors influencing changes in nutritional status include ongoing support from China and South Korea. Also, according to the WFP has said that North Korea’s domestic food production particularly has stabilized.
CARTIAS workers mentioned that some donated food etc will end up in markets …but with a market economy developing, chances that food and non-food donations are sold or bartered increase.” (CARITAS 2006)

Other groups seriously doubted whether aid reached the right groups of people. According to Marine Buissonniere, Secretary General, Medecins Sans Frontieres:

Within North Korea you don’t reach the disadvantaged… I talked to refugees [in Seoul] and I explained to them that from this period to this period so much aid went into your country and they laughed their heads off. They said ‘do you think we saw any of that?’ …When they managed to hear the international news - by listening to a South Korean radio or whatever on the border – they thought that the West was lying. They thought that the international community probably never sent the amount they claimed. (Buissonniere 2005)

An Action Contre la Faim report titled “The inadequacies of Food Aid in North Korea” released in 2000 questioned the agency’s success in reaching the needy:

It is very unlikely that food aid in North Korea reaches the most vulnerable people. The total amount of food aid in ’99 covered a major part of the estimated food deficit. Unfortunately, reports from North-Korean refugees in China underline that some people are still starving to death in North Korea. As in other countries, a famine is not necessarily due to the fact that there is not enough food but that the food is not reaching some parts of the population. One of the main weaknesses of food aid in North Korea is that it is distributed through channels completely controlled by the regime and mainly targets institutions, especially children institutions. But the most vulnerable children are not in these institutions.

The Action Contre la Faim report also expressed concern over North Korean government reports on the agency’s recipients “The number of beneficiaries on the ’98 list was undoubtedly inflated. It may mean that Action Contre la Faim distributed aid to nearly 50,000 non-existent beneficiaries. Where did the aid go? What did the authorities do with the “surplus”? We do not have any answers to these questions.”

The report concludes that food aid was “distributed in a selective way, to an inflated number of beneficiaries and without any effective control” and that, in reality, “no agency working in North Korea can confirm that the food aid is actually reaching the final beneficiaries and is not diverted. It is virtually impossible to prove that part of the aid is diverted but it is also impossible to prove that all the aid is reaching the intended beneficiaries” (Action Contre la Faim 2000)

At virtually every point, the North Korean government has placed roadblocks in the way of the donor community, and more than 10 years into this process, the relief effort remains woefully below international standards in terms of transparency and effectiveness. Up to half of aid deliveries do not reach their intended recipients (Haggard and Noland 2005)

Progress in the delivery of programs to develop the North Korean economy

Many of the agencies interviewed attempted to incorporate some form of development or rehabilitation into their humanitarian programs. For example, since North Korean authorities have allowed some free market activities, some INGOS and UN agencies have financed a smallholder credit scheme. INGOs have also attempted to introduce new seed varieties and double cropping. Kathi Zellweger of Caritas-Hong Kong described a number of development oriented programs initiated by Caritas:

We provide new farming equipment and as this needs maintenance and repairs and we are in the process of establishing a workshop to train farm mechanics and tractor drivers. We provide new inputs for fish farms combined with expertise and training programs….Instead
of importing from China, CARITAS has supported the production of clothing locally, thus providing job opportunities and exposing the factory management to international practices as well as saving on international transport costs for our donations. We also collaborate with The Korean Association for Supporting the Disabled (KASD)—a semi-governmental organisation in North Korea. Important components of our collaboration are assistance for KASDs office set-ups, supporting the production of training materials and organizing exposure and study tours to China (Zellweger 2005).

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has also invested in industries such as sericulture (silk worm farming), weaving and textile mills and also in a range of small cooperatives producing clothing and soft toys and the like (UNIFEM 1994). An International Fund For Agriculture Development (IFAD) report notes how women have built on skills acquired in their traditional role as managers of household finances to increasingly take charge of a variety of credit-financed household income earning activities. In response, IFAD developed household-oriented credit services to support these “off-farm activities” with about 60% of loans going to female headed households. A recent IFAD report notes how loan recovery is near 100 percent and that the female recipients of loans have demonstrated considerable acumen in their development of relatively complex and financially successful sideline businesses. (International Fund For Agriculture Development 2001).

**Conditions on the ground: the degree of government control on INGO operations**

In some cases INGOs and the UN agencies with which they collaborated have enjoyed increased access to the groups they assisted. For example, the World Food Program was able to open four satellite offices throughout the country. For the most part, however, working conditions in North Korea remained difficult for INGOs.

Marine Buissonniere of MSF described the “continuous obstruction” by the authorities affecting “how we could work, where we could go, whenever we were asking something that they considered out of the scope of what would be allowed.”

According to a Caritas report planning field visits was a continual challenge. “Travel plans need to be submitted at least a week in advance, although from Caritas’ experience, some flexibility can usually be negotiated at county level” (Caritas 2006)

One significant hurdle was the inability to deploy Korean speaking aid workers. Marine Buissonniere said that “basically –we had no ability to choose our own translator and our North Korean guides were present all the time.” She added that this had a range of ramifications for MSF’s humanitarian work. In particular, it undermined the building of relationships with locals.

Contact with the population very strictly controlled…Being in direct contact with patients, in itself, was a challenge. Because of some very….you had to go through government-appointed translators, you couldn’t have your own. The number of translators was limited in the first place, as the number of questions which are related to health history of a family, etc which a normal doctor would ask, but you couldn’t ask in a NK context because you were not allowed to. It was very difficult to follow on (think she meant follow up) patients – see them twice in a row for doctors – things which may seem completely natural, but which in a NK context were not considered proper by the authorities (Buissonniere 2005).

**Monitoring and accountability**

Food aid to North Korea has come under criticism because the DPRK government restricts the ability of donor agencies to operate in the country, making it difficult to assess how much of each donation actually reaches its intended recipients and how much is diverted
for resale in private markets or to the military. According to a Caritas appeal document as of late 2004 the number of inaccessible counties had remained steady (around 44). Some INGOs said that, for a period, they gradually had increased access to the groups they assisted. For example, the World Food Programme was able to open four satellite offices throughout the country. There were also concerns about reliability of data. To address this issue UNICEF provided capacity building programs to the DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics.

In 2004 UN Humanitarian Coordinator in North Korea, Masood Hyder noted that cautious changes are gradually emerging. “Change, albeit gradual and cautious, is all around us. There is greater openness. We have recently been granted access to a local market in Pyongyang. Mobile phones have arrived. Adjustments in prices and pay levels are having a major -- though not always salutary -- impact. Food aid monitoring visits have risen by nearly 50 percent in the past two years. … Will the world stand aside or help the process along?” In North Korea: First, Save Lives Washington Post, 4 January 2004.

According to a Caritas report the number of monitoring visits has improved considerably over the period of their operations, but in Spring 2005 there was a reduction of approved field visits. In addition, needs and impact assessments as well as evaluations remained difficult to undertake, due to what the DPRK government described as “national security considerations”. The report describes how the “government only provides information on a ‘need to know’ basis and little is known about how information is collected and analyzed. (CARITAS 2006).

Marine Buissonniere of MSF said “there basically isn’t any data that could have been the basis for development of relevant intervention, relevant program, were basically treated as state secrets. It was almost impossible to get any reliable health data. Extremely difficult to measure accurately the extent and severity of malnutrition in such a context.”

The Action Contre la Faim report (from December 2000) stated that:

this notion of geographical access is partly an illusion. In fact, even within the accessible counties, the North Korean authorities usually conduct the expatriate staff to the county towns but not all over the county. …In September ‘99, the county of Musan, in North Hamgyong province, inaccessible since the beginning of humanitarian intervention in North Korea, eventually became accessible. However, it soon became evident that only the county town was accessible and that the rest of the county was off-limits.

Some argued that large INGOs did not make monitoring a priority at the outset. Stephen Bell of the Eugen Bell Foundation said:

A lot of these organisations did not put a lot of emphasis on accountability in the beginning and then as soon they begin to find that there is a problem then try to build it back into the system that already exists. That’s always very difficult.

Manyin (2005:2) argues that South Korea and China have compounded problems around access and monitoring. They are now North Korea’s two most important providers of food and send almost all of their aid directly to DPRK with virtually no monitoring.

Impact on political or social structures
As discussed much of the political science literature has given attention to the role of INGOs to act as agents for social and political change. We have also noted how some aid agencies have argued that an increased INGO presence in North Korea holds some promise for the development of North Korean civil society. Proponents of engagement
argue that in the long run, aid could fundamentally change the character of the North Korean regime by increasing the DPRK’s exposure to and dependence on the outside world. However, in the course of interviewing and researching for this paper, we did not discover any reports of INGOs having any discernable impact on North Korea’s political or social structures.

Ewa Eriksson, the East Asia Desk Officer for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, was perhaps the most cautiously optimistic. She said that the presence of aid agencies may have some impact:

Well, I feel people feel less isolated when they see expatriates moving around in the country and engaging with them at a community level - bringing new ideas, new technology, discussing their issues, their problems (Eriksson 2005)

Other interviewees said they felt their programs would have no significant long lasting impact. According to L. Gordon Flake, Executive Director of The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation), INGOs have had no discernable impact on the society or polity:

At this point the NGO impact is extremely limited. There is very little ongoing impact and the scope of it is tiny…I wouldn’t want to for a second try to overstate it. …They are having impacts, but at an individual, local, institutionalised level. It is not going to change the North Korean nuclear program. What you really want to do is move from are these grandiose claims that they are affecting the political or economic context (Flake 2005).

Instead Flake believes smaller organisations such as the South Korean based agency the Eugene Bell Foundation are likely to have a longer term impact:

It was those who were able to kind of carve out a niche, where they were able to avoid the politicization of either side and kind of target those forgotten populations that didn’t have any strong political ramifications….And so the ones that really come to my mind are things like the Eugene Bell Foundation – with Stephen Linton. They were able to set up this network of TB hospitals, serviced with food, equipment, X-ray machines and medicine etc. They are hitting the very bottom of the population. So, in a broad sense it is not significant right – it doesn’t impact on the stability of regime, it doesn’t impact on NK period. It is just kinda good, very humanitarian work. But you can question the overall relevance on a broader scale (Flake 2005).

Interesting, however, Stephen Linton, Director of the Eugen Bell Foundation, said that he was not interested in fostering internal change and argued that such attempts could be counterproductive:

North Korea is a post colonial state and that means it has a visceral, almost violent reaction against outsiders telling them what to do – in fact, it’s more likely they will deliberately do the opposite. If you want them to do what you want to do, you have got to figure out a way to make them think that it’s their idea – that they want to do it, otherwise they’re not going to do it just for spite’s sake because the legitimacy of the regime is based on just saying no to big powers or you tell them the less likely they are to respond and you just basically write your ticket out of there. So if an NGO tried to get actively involved in social change in North Korea – you know before the ink was dry on the first sentence, they would be on an aeroplane. And there have been organisations that have done that and are now gone.

Propping up a dictator?

Some agencies have gone further and believe that aid arguably has helped keep the current North Korean regime in power. Oxfam and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) are among several INGOs which have pulled out of the DPRK. For MSF, this goes beyond complaints at restrictions on their work to a conviction that the DPRK state is itself the
problem - a view argued by Fiona Terry in 2005 when she was Director of MSF in Australia. In an article in the *London Guardian* she says that “Food aid to North Korea only props up Kim Jong-Il’s grotesque regime. It should be stopped.” (The feeling was, of course, mutual. It is no coincidence that the NGOs most critical of the DPRK were those that have pulled out and ceased their operations. (Organisations that were publicly critical of the regime were no longer granted entry)

According to L. Gordon Flake, the presence of aid regimes may have in some ways reinforced the regime:

Perversely, the relative control maintained by the DPRK government meant that in times of shortage and deprivation, North Koreans had few viable alternatives and thus had incentive to be more rather than less loyal to the regime. The only way to survive was to find ways to move closer to the centres of power... Ironically, the international aid community’s reliance upon official government distribution mechanisms likely encouraged and enforced loyalty to the regime.

Kathi Zellweger, CEO of Caritas Hong, also considered the potential to prolong the status quo but said she felt that in the end the benefits of aid probably outweighed the disadvantages.

I have to admit that from time to time I ask myself if -- once the North Koreans are free to talk -- the mothers, the children, the doctors, the farmers, the staff at orphanages, the old folks, will praise or blame me for having collaborated with the DPRK government in order to provide humanitarian aid. During my recent visit to Seoul, I had the opportunity to speak to a few defectors. One had been in South Korea for almost ten years; the others were more recent arrivals. I asked each one of them about aid as well and all -- some after thinking awhile -- replied that providing aid should continue and that even if not all aid was reaching the right people, it still helped and had a trickle-down effect. We know full well by giving to this certain group of people, you are essentially allowing the regime to put its resources elsewhere.We believed in (engagement). It is much easier to close the door than to open it further. Walking out of North Korea is the easy option. What have you gained at the end of the day?

An Update Report on the Humanitarian Situation by Caritas released in 2004 noted:

What is interesting is the fact that the DPRK officials have expressed an interest in more technical assistance and development-oriented support. But that would mean that the quality of interaction has to improve, that there is a need for better transparency, for more data and information, more policy dialogue and a change in the working relationship to a partnership approach. The people dealing with UN agencies and NGOs are aware of these requirements; but those that have made the decision to request development assistance probably are not.

**PART III: THE ROLE OF INGOs IN THE FUTURE**

**Can aid be conditional on reform?**

Questions as to the consequences of INGO intervention aside, the other question is whether such a democratising role for INGOs is even possible in the DPRK. In this regard it is important to acknowledge the overriding significance of local societal context. Before a democratic transition can begin there must be a political community receptive to democratic aspirations. After the regime change has taken place, the same community must respond to the new possibilities for political participation. The stability and overall direction of the process will depend on this larger social context.

Three aspects of the DPRK context make plans to promote change appear somewhat ambitious. First, North Korean civil society, if it exists at all, is significantly
underdeveloped. The 2001 report of the Freedom House pointed out that, in the DPRK, “even fundamental elements of civil society do not exist, not to mention the rule of law” and that there is no room for anti-establishment powers (Chosun Ilbo, April 5, 2001). Second, while INGOs provided substantial aid in the years 1995-2000, few remain on the ground (primarily thanks to US sanctions) while others such as Amnesty has never operated in the DPRK. Third, there is ample evidence, such as the ongoing nuclear standoff, that the North Korean government is not particularly responsive to international pressure.

There is also an issue of whether INGOs are willing to play such a role. This question may depend on the degree to which you assign these organisations agency and independence. It should be emphasised that the mandate of all INGO organisations discussed in this paper, at least as it is expressed in relevant mission documents, is *purely humanitarian* – that is they professed an “apolitical” approach to assisting the disadvantaged and not to play a role in promoting regime change. But is separation really possible?

“It is misguided to separate the humanitarian and human rights discourses. North Korea would have faced difficulties in the 1990s regardless of its regime type. But it is difficult to imagine a famine of this magnitude, or chronic food shortages of this duration, occurring in a regime that protected basic political and civil liberties.” Haggard & Noland (2005)

A more fundamental issue is the applicability of these theories themselves. Underpinning the theories described above are interpretations of civil society rooted in the specific historical experiences of a few selected countries. This may mean that the concept (and therefore the theories) may share significant limitations in understanding how and when the DPRK will experience political, social and economic change. Historical circumstances, intellectual contexts and institutional arrangements have influenced how the term civil society has been interpreted. The term first emerged in the context of the emergence of capitalism in Britain and Europe - a time when those who controlled capitalist production sought access to political power. Thus, the notion of a confrontation between social forces from below and state power from above began to dominate European civil society discourse. Since then, civil society tends to refer to a realm separate from - often contrasting with or indeed counterbalancing - yet interdependent with state power. However, in reality, no civil society is completely free from the state. In particular, in East Asian countries with Confucian culture, the state has dominated civil society, and thus civil society has not been as much separated from the state as in the Western democracies (Cotton 1992). It may be that the existence, role and/or type of society in North Korea will offer new insights but also challenge some assumptions which have been drawn from the study of civil society in western societies. One indicator of this divergence between theory and reality has been the effects of recent experiments with the market in China and Vietnam. In these two contexts the introduction of market relations has not produced widespread civil society activation or regime change. Instead scholars argue that the introduction of capitalist relations in these countries has had a major impact on the state and status of society particularly in terms of making society more complex and difficult to control from a centralised authority (Halpern 1989; Pierre 2000).

Nevertheless, the DPRK’s economic disarray and its recent pragmatic foreign policy have heightened the expectation that the country might tolerate a degree of economic liberalisation, if not political, liberalisation, which might contribute to activation of its civil society. Recently, the DPRK has stepped up its contacts with the outside world,
seeking rapprochement with other countries. It normalized diplomatic relations with many capitalist countries, and Kim Jong Il has made rare foreign visits to China and Russia. The DPRK’s dire economic situation necessitated an aggressive approach to other countries for economic gains, including cooperation with capitalist markets for hard currency. North Korea has also indicated several other changes in the economic realm, including an emphasis on the study of market-oriented economy in its efforts to adapt to the international society.

Moreover, the choices for those seeking to change the DPRK are pretty limited. In a society where the regime has successfully monopolised all sources of news and information, where there is no access to independent newspapers, radio stations, the Internet or even an international telephone service, where there are no independent unions or indeed, organisations, and no freedom of travel, INGO programs may be the only “liberalising” tool available. Even if INGOs are agents of US policy to expand geopolitical influence, in Chaulia’s (2005) words “vehicles of strategic penetration” (incidentally, a view shared by the North Korean leadership) if the outcome is democracy then perhaps it doesn’t matter. The value of democracy is not necessarily diminished if the US supports it and has strategic interests in the state under question. At the end of the day North Koreans still need a break. As Cotton (2000) argues, the on-going deprivation of the citizenry, the regime’s nuclear capacity and their history of exporting comparably deadly weaponry is sufficient grounds to justify INGO (and foreign government) intervention. He writes:

Policy toward North Korea should be framed in order to encourage internal change. Here the focus should not be the present regime – which is incorrigible – but the social and economic dynamics of the country. As the result of famine and the decay of the former socialist economy, sizeable tracts of the country are being left to their own devices. The proto-market relations that are developing there should be encouraged by aid programs provided in the name of multi-lateral agencies. North Korea will depend for some time to come on international relief and food supplies. At the very least, these should be delivered in such a way as to foster local civil society and individual enterprise. An international quarantine, apart from imposing extraordinary suffering on the ordinary people, would obstruct the exercise of such leverage.

But ultimately the question may boil down to a choice between saving lives and fostering internal change. Pridham defines conditionality as ‘deliberate efforts to determine from outside the course and outcome of the regime change’ (2001: 57). Is such a policy possible? Current indications are that waiting for the DPRK regime to change its ways is pointless and will only prolong the suffering of the North Korea people.

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