Global Korea: Old and New

Proceedings of
The Sixth Biennial Conference
Korean Studies Association of Australasia

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9 - 10 July 2009

Edited by
Duk-Soo Park
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Editor’s Notes

This book contains the proceedings of the 6th Biennial Korean Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA) Conference: Global Korea: Old and New, held at the University of Sydney 9-10 July 2009. After its establishment in 1994, the KSSA launched its first conference in 1999 at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. As a result, this event marks a decade since the founding of the KSAA Conference, commemorated by the return of the conference to its city of origin.

The theme of the conference, Global Korea: Old and New, was chosen to reflect not only various issues related to globalisation and the current development of ‘new’ Korea but also to meet the demand for academic investigation of how ‘old’ Korea related to the rest of the world.

As you know, recently the Republic of Korea has been dramatically transformed by modernity and faced many challenges associated with such change. The majority of papers presented at the Conference, which appear in this volume, concern issues associated with globalism, as well as topics that delve into both old and contemporary Korea. Some papers examine global Korea from past perspectives, while others advance a vision and philosophy for the future based on Korea’s current situation.

Thanks to the initiative of our first KSAA Conference organiser, Dr Chung-Sok Suh of the UNSW, this Conference has a valued tradition of not only requiring presenters to submit full papers to the conference organiser but also of offering them the opportunity to submit their papers for publication in the proceedings prior to the Conference. The five previously published proceedings have advanced Korean studies and provided a strong academic foundation for future research. All the proceedings represent the time, effort and intellectual rigor of experts who cherish Korea and Korean studies, and establish a strong benchmark for additional academic scholarship. Since the 5th Biennial KSAA Conference, held at the Curtin University of Technology in Perth under the guidance of Dr Kyu Suk Shin, conference organizers have produced refereed conference papers that have been published in the form of Conference proceedings. This makes the Conference more valuable to academics and researchers worldwide since refereed conference papers have the same standing as papers published in professional journals.

This time, 32 papers underwent the review process at the request of authors. The double-blind peer review process began in late April. Each paper was sent to two referees in the field without information on the author’s identity. Referee comments were relayed to the authors. The authors of the 20 papers selected for publication then made appropriate revisions or corrections to reflect issues raised by the referees. Final versions appear in Section 1: Refereed Papers. Section 2 contains 26 non-refereed papers and other material presented at the Conference. In each section, papers are listed in alphabetical order based on the field of study and the author’s name.

Topics addressed by the papers in this volume include:

Anthropology: There is an intriguing paper on an aspect of old Korea: an anthropological and archaeological study of the relationship between early Mongols and ancient Koreans.

Art history: Two papers discuss modernity in Korean art since the late Chosón dynasty.
Bibliography: One paper is on the traditional bibliographical taxonomy on history and religion.

Business: A number of papers examine changes in Korean business structures as firms expand internationally.

Film industry and the “Korean Wave”: Six papers research either the spread of Korean popular culture in Asia (the Korean Wave or hallyu) and/or Korea’s film industry.

Gender studies: Two papers cover gender issues, which are particularly relevant as Korea evolves into a more egalitarian society.

Information services: Four librarians joined us to educate us in the state-of-the art technology available in library services.

Intellectual history: One paper is about Yangchon Kwŏn Kŭn and the Confucian canon.

International relations: Two papers deal with Korea’s international relations—one with Japan and the other with China. There is also a paper which deals with the relations between EU and North Korea.

Language and language education: One paper is a comparative survey of country names in Korean with those in Japanese and Chinese. Two papers on language education, examining a project-based learning method and a motivation study for students of Korean as a Foreign Language (KFL), are a welcome inclusion since the demand for KFL increases as the country’s international importance grows.

Linguistics: Three formal linguistics papers involve a semantic analysis of a morpheme na, a pitch analysis of wh-clauses, and a discourse analysis of adnominalisers.

Literature in the East Asian context: Three papers are on literature—one a comparative study of a Korean writer and a Japanese writer, one on the old Korean novel Kuunmong in the Sinosphere, and the third on Korean kagok songs in relation to Confucianism.

North Korea: Three papers investigate North Korea. One deals with the experience of international NGOs in North Korea, one with the relationship between North and South Korea, and the third with the relationship between the military and the economy in North Korea.

Politics and economy/society: Three papers cover Korea’s political economy, the recent development of local government structures and policies, and the cultural citizenship/identity issues of Korean Chinese.

Religion in history: Three papers address religion—two on Buddhism (one covering a period in Koguryŏ and the other covering the Japanese colonial period) and one on Christianity.

Social issues in multicultural Korea: Five papers deal with emerging social issues in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Korea amid the increase in migrant workers and imported brides. One paper addresses issues on Korean New Zealanders’ return migration to Korea.

Additionally, the two keynote addresses are highly relevant to the theme. The first address by Professor Robert Buswell, entitled “Korean Buddhist Journeys to Lands Worldly and Otherworldly,” shows how old Korea faced global and spiritual challenges. The second address by Professor Do Hyun Han, entitled “Visibility and Academic Impact of Korean
Studies in the Global Academic Community,” will be of great interest to scholars of contemporary Korea and Koreanists dealing with the globalisation of Korean studies.

The success of the Conference owes much to the financial support and assistance of a number of individuals and institutions. Of primary importance were the generous financial grants and cooperation provided by the Korea Foundation, the Academy of Korean Studies, the Australia-Korea Foundation, the Consulate-General of the ROK in Sydney and the School of Languages and Cultures of the University of Sydney. The University as a whole provided all venues for the Conference.

Section 1 of this volume represents an enormous achievement by the Conference team, our tireless Secretary Ms Deborah Kim and our School Administration Coordinator, Mr Michael McCabe, many authors and referees. For more than six months, Deborah managed communications with over a hundred people involved in planning and other aspects of the Conference. Michael lent his expertise by managing the Web site and formatting the content for this volume.

While it is not possible to list everyone who assisted the Conference team, mention must be made of the members of Conference Organising Committee—Associate Professor Hong-Key Yoon (The University of Auckland), Associate Professor Chung-Sok Suh (UNSW), Dr Young-A Cho (Monash University), Dr John Jorgensen (Griffith University), and 21 anonymous referees who shared their valuable time and expertise during the paper review process, despite tight end-of-semester schedules. Special gratitude goes to 11 external referees, who are not associated with our Association, for their kind contribution to the review.

Finally, I would like to thank all those who travelled far to join us. Out of 59 presenters, 27 scholars represent such countries as China, Germany, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Russia, UK and USA. In particular, we are delighted to welcome 11 postgraduate students to the conference and are pleased to be able to give them the opportunity to share their research and ideas in this vibrant academic gathering and interact with so many experts in such a wide range of discipline areas.

Personally, I feel honoured to convene this important Conference at the University of Sydney, and have been looking forward to this event for a long time. I thank everyone for their active and enthusiastic participation, which is making this the KSAA Conference so valuable and influential around the globe.

I hope you all have an enjoyable, fruitful and productive conference.

Editor
Duk-Soo Park
July 2009
Sponsors

The 6th Biennial KSAA (Korean Studies Association of Australasia) Conference is supported by grants from the Korea Foundation, the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2009-C01), the Commonwealth through the Australia-Korea Foundation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea, Sydney, the KSAA, and the School of Languages and Cultures at the University of Sydney.
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Keynote Addresses
Korean Buddhist Journeys to Lands
Worldly and Otherworldly

ROBERT E. BUSWELL, JR.
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

ABSTRACT
This address explores Korean Buddhist travel for religious training, missionary propagation, and devotional pilgrimage. Simultaneous with continued travel overseas to the Chinese mainland and the Buddhist homeland of India, Koreans were also bringing those sites home through a wholesale remapping of the domestic landscape. As local geography became universalized, there would have then been less need for the long, dangerous journeys overseas to Buddhist sacred sites: instead, the geography of Buddhism became implicit within the indigenous landscape, turning Korea into the Buddha-land itself. Once this “relocalization” of Buddhism had occurred, Korean Buddhists were able to travel through the sacred geography of Buddhism from the (relative) comfort of their own locale.

Travel for religious training, missionary propagation, and devotional pilgrimage has been an integral part of the Buddhist tradition since its inception—and Korean Buddhism has been no exception. Soon after the start of the Buddha’s dispensation in the sixth or fifth century B.C.E., the Buddha formally enjoined his monks to “wander forth for the welfare and weal of the many, out of compassion for the world, for the benefit, welfare, and weal of gods and men.” This command initiated one of the greatest missionary movements in world religious history, and the travel impulse became an integral part of Buddhism’s self-identity. Buddhist propagators, accompanying trading caravans that carried goods across Asia, arrived in China by at least the beginning of the first millennium C.E. and the Korean peninsula within another three centuries.

Travel on pilgrimage soon became an integral part of Buddhist practice in India and beyond. In the mainstream recension of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, for example, the Buddha tells his attendant Ānanda that the laity should be encouraged to make pilgrimages to the four sites (mahāsthāna) most closely associated with the Buddha’s career,

1) his birth at the Lumbini grove near the city of Kapilavastu;
2) his enlightenment at Bodhgayā near Magadha,
3) his first teaching, or “turning of the wheel of the Law” (dharmakārapravartana), at Rśivadana near Benares; and
4) his final parinirvāṇa at Kuśinagara.

Still today, Korean Buddhist monks recite a litany of these four places at the beginning of every midday meal, keeping alive in the present the memory of these traditional, and long-neglected, pilgrimage sites. Pilgrimage became deeply engrained in Buddhist practice by at least the third century B.C.E., after King Asoka was said to have established 84,000 reliquary shrines for the Buddha’s relics (śarīra; sari) throughout his realm. These shrines became focal points of pilgrimage and cultic practice. This sponsorship led to massive
movements of Buddhist pilgrims across the Indian subcontinent, following what became well-developed pilgrimage routes. Wide-ranging and well-supported pilgrimage networks leading to important stūpas existed throughout the subcontinent, networks in which East Asian monks, including Koreans, eventually participated.

1. TRAVEL OVERSEAS

Korean monks also went forth to propagate their religion, including monks from the early Three Kingdoms. In the fifth century C.E., Paekche monks were among the first to introduce Buddhism to the Japanese isles and monks from the Koguryō kingdom were probably the initial propagators of Buddhism in the Silla region of the southeastern Korean peninsula. Korean monks sojourning in China played active roles in the development of the indigenous schools of Chinese Buddhism as well.

The stories surrounding the travels of the eminent Silla scholiasts Wŏnhyo (1158-1210) and Úisang are emblematic of how deeply engrained travel for study and propagation comes to be in Korean Buddhist monasticism. After several years of training in Korea, both monks tried to leave for China in order to study with their counterparts in the mecca of the mainland. Arrested for espionage by guards at the Koguryō border and arrested as spies—a role that itinerant monks not infrequently played, in fact—they were imprisoned for several weeks before being repatriated to Silla. On a supposed second trip, they intended to travel via sea from Paekche, but ultimately Úisang made the trip alone (as on the slide) and eventually arrived in China. Úisang studied there for ten years with the early Huayan exegete Zhiyan (602-668) and became his successor, before returning to his Silla homeland to help forestall an impending Tang invasion of the peninsula. Wŏnhyo’s own enlightenment experience is said to have occurred while he was on the road with Úisang. Taking refuge at night from a severe storm, at first light they discovered that the sanctuary they thought had sheltered them was actually a tomb littered with skulls. Wŏnhyo is said to have realized from this experience that the mind could turn something offensive into something agreeable and that all things were therefore merely projections of mind. He knew then that he did not need to continue on to China in order to continue his Buddhist training but could live a salutary and productive Buddhist life on the peninsula. (This story becomes increasingly embellished over time. According to the most elaborate retelling of the legend, in Juefan Huihong’s (1071-1128) Linjian lu, when Wŏnhyo took sanctuary that evening, he drank what he thought was sweet water in a gourd, only to discover at daylight that what he had actually quaffed was offal rotting in a skull. There was a predictably gruesome rendition of this story in a TV mini-series about Wŏnhyo.)

A little over a generation after Wŏnhyo, we have the first record of Korean monks who undertook the even more arduous pilgrimage to the Buddhist homeland of India. The Unified Silla monk Hyech’o (d.u.; ca. 704-780) left a travelogue of his journey, Wang o Ch’ŏnch’uakkuk chon (Memoir of a Pilgrimage to the Five Regions of India), which is one of the few pieces of Korean Buddhist travel literature that has been the object of extensive scholarly study in the West. After traveling from Korea to China, Hyech’o spent about three years on the mainland before departing in 724 via the southern sea route for India (the Ch’ŏnch’uakkuk of his title). After landing along India’s eastern seacoast, he subsequently traveled for another three years or so, visiting many of the Buddhist pilgrimage sites in north-central India, including Bodhgayā and Kuśinagara, before making his way to the south and west of the subcontinent. Departing from India via the northwest Buddhist strongholds of Kashmir and Gandhāra, he made his way overland back to China via the Silk Roads of the Takla Makan Desert in Inner Asia. After his return, Hyech’o wrote an account of his journey, where he describes in rather prosaic
fashion geography and climate, along with comments on the economies and agriculture, the dress, customs, and religious practices, of the regions he visited. Since his account was written at the Tang government’s behest, his memoir at times sounds more like a reconnaissance report than a travelogue. (He shows inordinate curiosity, for example, in the size of the local cavalries and the height of ramparts around cities).

Although his account is closely beholden to the similar travelogues of Faxian (ca. 399/337-422), Xuanzang (ca. 600-664), and Yijing (635-713) written many decades before, Hyech’o’s memoir is valuable for offering a detailed contemporary record of the geographical extent of different schools of Buddhism in the regions he visited, as well as the decrepit condition in which he found some of the important Buddhist reliquaries and monasteries. Especially notable in his memoirs is the evidence he provides of the inroads Arabs and Turks were beginning to make into traditionally Buddhist regions and his testimony that, by the early eighth century, Buddhism had still not yet been transplanted into the Tibetan plateau. Hyech’o spent the rest of his life in China, collaborating with the Indian Tantric master Amoghavajra (705-774) and perhaps Vajrabodhi (671-741) in translating Esoteric Buddhist materials into Chinese, before passing away at the Chinese pilgrimage site of Wutaishan (about which more later). We have contemporary records of seven other Korean monks (and forty-nine Chinese) who traveled to India prior to the middle of the seventh century, so as gueling as the journey was, many successfully completed it.

Although travel to India stopped with the demise of Buddhism on the subcontinent, Korean monks continued through the Koryô period to live in China for extended periods. During the Koryô dynasty, Úich’ôn (1055-1101), the fourth son of the Koryô king Munjong (r. 1047-1083), sojourned in Song-dynasty China for fourteen months between 1085 and 1087. As a learned scholar-mönk, Úich’ôn sought to test his knowledge against the best minds in contemporary Chinese Buddhism. During his travels, Úich’ôn visited with some fifty monks, including leading specialists in the Tiantai, Vinaya, Chan and Huayan schools. A well-known bibliophile, Úich’ôn also collected hundreds of volumes of books during his travels, which he took back to Korea with him. He later dispatched agents all throughout China, Japan, and the Khitan Liao regions of Northeast Asia seeking out other indigenous East Asian writings. All these he eventually compiled into his renowned Sŏkch’anggyŏng, or Supplement to the [Buddhist] Canon. The flow of Korean monks into China continued unabated until the Ming-dynasty proscription against foreigners traveling to the mainland, a prohibition that started in the seventeenth century.

2. Travel to Worlds Beyond

Buddhist travel need not, however, be limited to the confines of this physical world. Deeply engrained in Buddhist cosmology is the notion that profound meditative absorption and spiritual insight could offer advanced adepts access to realms of existence that would otherwise be beyond the ken, from the deepest depths of the hells (where East Asian Buddhism claims Mahāmāyūrapālita, one of the Buddha’s two chief disciples, traveled in order save his mother), to the highest reaches of the heavens (where the Buddha himself traveled to teach his deceased mother Māyā, to all lands in between. In addition, massive scriptural anthologies offer virtually a Buddhist Pilgrim’s Progress of the spiritual journeys of Buddhist adepts, as for example in the Gandavyūha, which relates the seeker Sudhana’s travels throughout the world to seek out fifty-three teachers in his quest for enlightenment.

The undersea palace of the Dragon King protector of Buddhism had long been an recurrent object of mythic travel in many Buddhist traditions, but especially in Korea’s.
The scriptures of the Mahāyāna school in India were said to have been a product of the Indian exegete Nāgārjuna’s (fl. ca. 150 C.E.) journey to the Dragon King’s palace. These texts were said to have been stored away there for safekeeping until human beings’ understanding had matured enough to appreciate them. From that point on, most Buddhists would seek to establish an explicit connection between the Dragon King’s palace and themselves as a way of introducing their traditions into broader Buddhist macroculture. Korea was no exception. Paekche and Silla’s nautical prowess, and the role these kingdoms played as the virtual Phoenicia of northeast Asian maritime travel, ensured that Korea’s connection to the undersea Dragon King would be especially deep.

One of the best known of these stories is that of a Silla envoy described in the biography of Wŏnhyo, who is waylaid while on his way to Tang to find medicine for the Silla queen-consort and escorted under the sea for an audience with the Dragon King. Upon arriving at the palace, the envoy is told that the queen’s illness had simply been a pretext to allow the Dragon King to transmit a previously unknown scripture, the Vajrasamādiśāra (Kimgang sammaegvông), to Korea, where it was to be edited by the theurgist Taean (d.u.) and commented upon by the leading Korean scholiast, Wŏnhyo.

By demonstrating Korea’s many and varied contacts with this palace, peninsular Buddhist civilization was seeking to define itself, at least partially, in terms of mainstream continental beliefs. Indeed, myths are often created as a way of “escaping” from geographical or cultural isolation and this seems an obvious reason for these exuberantly told tales of Korea’s connection to this undersea bastion of Buddhist culture.

Travel to the Buddhist meccas of India and China, as well as to the mythic undersea bastion of the faith, played a crucial role in connecting Korea to the broader Buddhist cultural sphere. By sojourning in such regions, Koreans were demonstrating their associations with the wider world of Buddhist culture, whether that world be terrestrial, subterranean, or celestial. The Korean pilgrims who left the peninsula for China or India were part of the cultural elite of Korea and pilgrimage would serve as a sort of cultural insignia, indicating that Korea too was now an integral part of pan-Asian Buddhist macroculture. The ability to engage in pilgrimage would have required, first, extensive networks of patronage in order to fund such a journey; and, second, a sophisticated knowledge of, and cultural familiarity with, Buddhist cosmology and myth in the case of travel to cosmological realms. Hence, the capability of mounting such journeys would also help to validate the achievements and understanding of indigenous Korean Buddhist culture.

In a very real sense, since pilgrimage was something Buddhists in established Buddhist cultures like India and China did, engaging in pilgrimage would therefore help to make Korea an established Buddhist culture. In making these efforts to connect their tradition to the wider Asian tradition of Buddhism, Korean Buddhists were also exhibiting a sense of homogenous time and space, which allowed them to be active participants in a religious tradition whose origins were distant both geographically and temporally from their own. Travel to Buddhist imaginaries then also helped to break down the spatial and temporal barriers separating Korea from mainstream Buddhism in much the same way as did overseas travel.

3. REMAPPING THE KOREAN LANDSCAPE

Simultaneous with their continued travel overseas to major Buddhist sites, Koreans were also bringing those sites homes through a wholesale remapping of the domestic landscape. Often, the very same pilgrims who made the arduous journey overseas were most
influential in domesticating the dharma and harnessing the numinous power of its cosmology for their compatriots.

With the development of centralized political institutions and the advent of organized religion—which for Korea first means Buddhism—the telluric landscape of the peninsula had to be decoupled from earlier religious cults so that it could be remapped with the sacred geography of the newly-imported religion. This remapping process imposed new significance on the indigenous landscape, endowing it now with the sacred power of Buddhism.

It is important to note, though, that this relocalizing process was not necessarily static. In Korea, mountains and other sacred sites were successively remapped as the sites were dominated by different religions, or even different schools within the same religion. But because these remappings were not necessarily totalizing, these sites could also become loci of religious contestation, as vestiges of the different overlays survived the latest remapping.

At least by the ninth century, Korea had been thoroughly remapped in terms of Buddhism, with a replication on the peninsula of both the imaginary geography of Buddhist cosmology as well as Indian and Chinese historical landscapes. Because of this Buddhization of the Korean landscape, relatively few traces of the indigenous pre-Buddhistic names remain. The Buddhist sites now ranged from Yongch’uksan (Mt. Grdrakūṭa, or Vulture Peak, the site in India where many Mahāyāna sūtras were preached), to Kūmgangsan (the Diamond Mountains, from the Avataṃsakasūtra), to Odaesan (the Korean analogue of the Chinese Wutaishan, the abode of the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī in China).

As local geography became universalized, there would also have been less need for the long, dangerous journeys overseas to Buddhist sacred sites. Instead, the universal geography of Buddhism was now implicit within the indigenous landscape, turning Korea into the Buddha-land itself. This remapping even extended back in time to previous buddhas, whose dispensations were located on Silla territory and commemorated through the establishment of new monasteries. For example, Buddhists discovered near the Silla capital the “meditation stone” of Kāśyapa—a buddha of antiquity who gave Śākyamuni the prediction of his future buddhahood—and established the major doctrinal center of Hwangnyongsan on the site. Once the decoupling of the local geography from indigenous cults and their preliteracy interpretations had occurred, the “relocalization” of Buddhism on that environment enabled Korean Buddhists to travel through the sacred geography of Buddhism from the (relative) comfort of their own locale. The Buddhization of the landscape thus allowed domestic travel to stand in for pilgrimage to either foreign lands or otherworldly realms. This process was certainly speeded by geopolitical changes in Asia, such as the demise of Buddhism and its pilgrimage networks in India and the Ming dynasty’s prohibition against foreigners traveling to Chinese mainland. Eventually, then, rather than writing only about dangerous journeys to the distant lands of India or China, Koreans were freed to write travel documents concerning trips within their own Korean sacred Buddhist geography.

4. MOUNTAINS AS PILGRIMAGE SITES

One of the major loci of pilgrimage activity in Korea, as elsewhere across Asia, was mountains. Mountains were often viewed as the abodes of important sacred beings, such as bodhisattvas, but also as the sites where those beings’ most spiritually efficacious activities occurred. The Tibetan pilgrimage cult surrounding Mt. Kailash is probably best
known in the West, but China and Korea both have sacred mountains that traditionally were conceived of as being similarly powerful. Standing as close to heaven as one could come on earth and located in some of the most isolated of terrestrial regions, mountains were ideal locations for the “liminoid phenomenon” that is pilgrimage.

The translation of Indian Buddhist sacred literature into Chinese provided the initial impetus for localizing the Indian subcontinent’s sacred geography in East Asia. With the accompanying Buddhicization of the East Asian landscape, most of the major mountain sites where pilgrimage was performed were given Buddhist names and often came to be associated with various of the bodhisattvas of Mahāyāna Buddhism. One of the most interesting tales of the relocalization of a Buddhist cult to Korea involves Cha’jang (d.u., ca. mid-seventh century), an important early figure in the Korean Vinaya and Huayan traditions. During a five- to seven-year sojourn in China between 636/638 and 643, Cha’jang’s first stop was at the major Chinese pilgrimage site of Wutaishan (Five-Terraces Mountain). There, after seven days of supplication before an image of Mañjuśrī that was supposedly cast in heaven at the behest of the King of the Gods Indra himself, he had a vision in a dream of the great bodhisattva. Among various instructions the bodhisattva gave Cha’jang, Mañjuśrī ordered the monk to go to a mountain in the northeastern part of the Korean peninsula, where he would find a Five-Terraces Mountain with ten-thousand Mañjuśrīs in residence.

The Chinese Wutaishan became a major pilgrimage center of East Asian and, eventually Tibetan, Buddhism starting at least by the Northern Wei dynasty (424-532); it soon came to be recognized as the abode of Mañjuśrī, the bodhisattva of wisdom, an identification that prompted Cha’jang’s journey to the mountain. Upon his return to the Korean peninsula, Cha’jang traveled to the mountain Mañjuśrī had identified as also being a Five-Terraces Mountain, where he fashioned a small hut and awaited a vision of these myriad Mañjuśrīs. Cha’jang’s faith inspired subsequent aspirants to travel to this Korean Odaesan, where their visionary experiences revealed the presence of massive populations of Buddhist sacred beings on its five separate peaks. This Korean remapping of Odaesan served to relocate the universal pantheon of the Avatāmsakasūtra (Hwaomgyŏng) to the specific local site and helped build up Odaesan as a major pilgrimage center dedicated to the cult of Mañjuśrī.

The Korean Buddhist pilgrimage site par excellence has long been the Diamond Mountains (Kūmgangsan), which until recently drew annually thousands of well-heeled tourists (and probably at least a few pilgrims) to the Hyundai-run tourist center in North Korea. The Kūmgangsan site in Kangwŏndo in present-day North Korea became sacralized in connection with the establishment of the Hwaom school on the peninsula, where the mountain was said to be the abode of Pŏpki posal (Dharmogata Bodhisattva). The later translation of the Avatāmsakasūtra (often called the Xin, or “New,” Huayanjing), made by Śikṣānanda’s translation team (which included the Korean scholar Wŏnhŏk), includes an early reference in Buddhist literature to a Kūmgangsan (supposedly located in the middle of the sea) and notes that Dharmogata Bodhisattva is in residence there. Üisang’s contemporary in the Huayan school, Fazang (643-712), makes one of the first explicit connections known in East Asian literature between the Diamond Mountains mentioned in the Avatāmsakasūtra and the Kūmgangsan of Korea. According to Minji’s (1248-1326) fourteenth-century account in the Kūmgangsan Yajōmsa sajokki, Üisang himself made a visit to this Diamond Mountains, where Dharmogata Bodhisattva appeared and told him that even people who do not practice can become enlightened at Kūmgangsan, whereas only religious cultivators can achieve liberation on Odaesan. For all these reasons, Pŏpki posal is considered to be the patron bodhisattva of Kūmgangsan.
A Hwaöm monastery was established on Kûmgangsan at least by the time of P’yohun (d.u.; ca. early eighth century), a disciple of Úisang, forever cementing its connections to the sacred geography of the Avatamsakasūtra (Hwaömgyông). The Diamond Mountains continued to draw monks to its sacred peaks and isolated monasteries at least through the mid-twentieth century, when the Cold-War division of the peninsula and its location near to the De-Militarized Zone effectively cut the mountain off from Buddhist pilgrimage networks in Korea.

5. The Institutionalization of Travel

Travel has been institutionalized in Korean Buddhist monasticism since at least the seventeenth century and probably long before. The annual schedule followed by monasteries belonging to the Chogye Order, which constitute the overwhelming majority of Korean temples, still today is divided between alternating three-month periods of “binding rule” (kyŏlche) during the summer and winter retreats and “slackened rule” (haeje) during the fall and spring free seasons. During the retreat periods of “binding rule,” monks are required to remain in residence at the monastery where they have given their formal introduction or “room request” ( pangbu), which constitutes their official acceptance into the monastic community. Residence requires that they commit as well to a specific monastic position for the duration of the retreat period, such as training in the meditation hall. During the free seasons of relaxed rule in spring and fall, however, monks are permitted to travel at will among the monasteries, and travel they do, with sometimes gleeful abandon. Monks call their travels haenggak (“itinerancy,” lit. “walking on foot”) or manhaeng (lit. “traveling everywhere”), both terms emphasizing the journey of spiritual discovery, not the destination of “pilgrimage” (sulhye). Indeed, “traveling everywhere” is exactly how many monks will spend much of their three months’ break from rigidly structured practice and meditation. At the major training monasteries, on the first day of the free season, the number of monks in formal residence may drop as much as eighty percent, as monks depart in droves on the first bus out of the local village to follow their itinerant impulses. All major monasteries have a separate guest quarters (kaeksil) near the kitchen area, where these itinerant monks are allowed to stay for up to three days, before either moving on to their next destination or giving their lodging request and joining that monastic community. Thus, as has been the case throughout history, travel remains still today an integral part of what it means to be a Buddhist monk in Korea.
**Visibility and Academic Impact of Korean Studies in the Global Academic Community**

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Korean Studies has grown substantially during the last several decades. For example, about two weeks ago I was at the biennial conference of the Association for Korean Studies in Europe (AKSE), which was held in Leiden, the Netherlands, from 18 to 21 June. At this AKSE Conference, about 150 papers were presented. At the annual meetings of the Association of Asian Studies (AAS) in the USA, the number of papers presented on Korea also has substantially increased. There has also been an increasing number of participants at these events.

Despite this promising growth, Korean Studies has a long way to go to enhance its visibility and impact among the global academic community. Up to now, the Korea Foundation has done an excellent job establishing Korean Studies professors and chairs at distinguished international universities. Such efforts are the most important driver in developing and growing Korean Studies worldwide. Other programs supporting scholars, graduate students, conferences, and small research have been supported by the Korea Foundation and Center for Information on Korean Culture in the Academy of Korean Studies.

These efforts are invaluable for the continuing development of Korean Studies. They, however, must be supplemented. In 2006, the Academy of Korean Studies introduced state-sponsored scholarship programs and the program of Korean Studies Institution Grants (KSIG) to improve Korean Studies abroad. Currently, 14 universities worldwide have received KSIG grants, and this number will increase over the next few years. For state-sponsored scholarships, recipients receive monthly stipends and tuition when they are admitted to the Graduate School of Korean Studies in the Academy of Korean Studies. In 2007, the Academy of Korean Studies launched a new initiative, the Strategic Initiative for Korean Studies (SIKS).

SIKS aims to improve the visibility and impact of Korean Studies among the global academic community. As a result, SIKS has committed to long-term and stable support of recipients for periods ranging from three years to a maximum of ten years. SIKS will welcome comparative studies and participation from European Studies, Asian Studies including Chinese, Japanese, Indian Studies, etc. if their participation enhances the visibility and academic impact of Korean Studies among the global academic community.

SIKS is open to both scholars in Korea and abroad. In the past, scholars in Korea and abroad did not compete for the same grants. SIKS changed this practice by introducing global competition. Selected scholars in Korea and abroad by global competition have participated in such projects as the Modern Korea Project, the Korean Classic Library Project, the Asia and the Korean Wave Project, the Curriculum and Teaching Materials Development for Global Korean Studies, and the Oral History on Modern Korea Project.  

As we see from Professor Buswell’s academic scope and efforts, Korean studies may be linked to East Asian Studies and India Studies. Professor Buswell is the President
of AAS as well as a distinguished professor of Korean Buddhism at UCLA. Recently Professor Buswell became the Director of the Academy of Buddhist Studies at Dongguk University in Seoul. SIKS greatly values his contribution to the international growth of Korean Studies. In May 2007, when the SIKS was established, its annual budget was about 3.4 million USD. In 2009, its annual budget is more than ten million USD. We are negotiating with the Korean Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology to set the annual budget for 2010, which will be finally decided by the National Assembly in December 2009. We are hopeful that the 2010 annual budget of the SIKS will be increased substantially.

SIKS wants to be different from traditional funding agencies such as the Korea Foundation and the Center for Information on Korean Culture in the Academy of Korean Studies. Since November 2008, with the support of scholars in Korea and abroad, SIKS has worked to get new funding for a Program for Global Korean Studies Labs, which aims to substantially improve the global academic impact and visibility of Korean Studies. Labs will be small research units under the strong academic leadership of a director who has an excellent publication record in major journals or distinguished academic presses. These labs will support the publication of academically distinguished papers in top journals or distinguished academic presses. SIKS will support a lab for maximum of ten years, depending on annual reviews. Financial support for one lab will range from 150,000 to 400,000 USD annually, depending on the research type and budget requirements. This new innovative program is open both to scholars in Korea and abroad. Recipients will be selected through a global competition. SIKS will hopefully launch either on a small or large scale in 2010.

To sum up, SIKS is looking for additional programs or initiatives to improve the visibility and impact of Korean Studies among the global academic community, and is especially interested in programs that can be integrated or linked to other advanced area studies through comparative research in various disciplinary areas.

I would appreciate your ideas in developing Korean Studies overseas. Thank you for your support and we will keep you informed.
When Was Modernism in Korean Art?

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ABSTRACT
The issue of how to define ‘modern’ Korean art has been a subject of on-going debates within the Korean art community. There have been a number of chronologies of ‘modern’ Korean art history, which begin with different dates ranging from the 18th century; 19th century; 1876; the 1880s; the 1890s; 1894; 1909; the 1910s; 1915; the 1920s, and the 1930s to 1945. As yet, there is no consensus on the beginning date of modern Korean art. One of the reasons for the instability in Korean historical periodisations of modern Korean art is that these periodisations have changed over time, according to the shifting approaches of Korean art critics and historians to the opposing historical views of whether modern Korean art was of ‘native origin’ or the passive consequence of impacts of external or foreign influences on Korean art. I will discuss further complex problems in the controversial chronologies and definitions of ‘modern’ art in Korean - in fact, South Korean – art history.

INTRODUCTION: HOW TO DEFINE MODERN KOREAN ART
There have been a number of chronologies of ‘modern’ (kǔndaе) Korean art history, all of which begin with different dates ranging from: the 18th century; 19th century, 1876; the 1880s; 1894; 1909; the 1910s; 1915; the 1920s, and the 1930s to 1945. The terminal date of the modern period of Korean art has also varied from 1919; 1945; 1955; and 1956 to 1957, depending on their respectively corresponding definitions of ‘contemporary’ (hyŏndaе) Korean art. As yet, there is no consensus on the beginning date of modern Korean art. Sometimes, the same critics have used several dating systems. To further complicate matters, there has also been a different argument (for example, Kim Yun-su 1975) that contemporary Korean art evolved without passing through the historical phenomena of the ‘modern’.1 It should be pointed out here that the period after liberation and before the formation of the Republic of Korea in 1948 was the last time when Koreans could speak of ‘Korean’ (Han’guk) art as a whole. Ignoring this, South Koreans have freely used the category of ‘Korean’ art when, in fact, they are talking only about postcolonial South Korean art.

PROBLEMS: COMPETING CHRONOLOGIES AND DEFINITIONS OF ‘MODERN’ KOREAN ART
One of the reasons for the instability in Korean historical periodisations of modern Korean art is that these periodisations (often employed by the same person) have changed over time, according to the shifting approaches of Korean art critics and historians to the opposing historical views of whether modern Korean art was of ‘native origin’ (chasaeng) or the passive consequence of impacts of external or foreign influences on Korean art. The former view has been largely informed by the ‘internal’ (naejaejŏk) development theory,’ while the latter by ‘the external impact theory’ (oebu ch’unggvyŏngnon). These theories

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1 Korean names are generally written with the family name first and then the given names. If the name of a person has been widely known outside of Korea in a different form, for example Yi Gyeong-seong [aka, Yi Kyŏng-sŏng], I have used the name by which he/she is internationally known.
were in fact generated by the South Korean national history circle as part of their competing responses to the postwar Japanese and Western claims that South Korea’s remarkable economic developments since the 1960s were a consequence of the Western-style modernisation of the colonial period as transplanted by the Japanese (Jung 2001, 193-219).

The Korean external impact theory is influenced and shaped by the colonialist Japanese theory of ‘stagnation’ (chōngch’esong in Korean and teitairon in Japanese), developed by the German historical school-trained economist Fukuda Tokuzō (1874-1930), and the Western theories of modernity, modernisation and developmentalism. The Japanese theory of Korea’s ‘Asiatic stagnation’ (which echoed much of the Eurocentric Hegelian notion of Oriental stagnation) claimed that as a culture, Korea had always been dependent on intervention from the outside and as a society, especially in the Chosŏn period, had become stagnant with no growth. In short, the Japanese theory of Korean stagnation basically argued that Korea should be assimilated into Japan in order to escape its stagnation. This theory provided colonialist, and also postwar, Japan with the justification of its colonisation of Korea, by highlighting its role, not as a colonialist plunderer, but as a late-colonial developer who industrialised and modernised the underdeveloped Korea. From the 1960s, the Korean theory of ‘internal’ (naejaejŏk) development—which is largely associated with the scholarship of the historians Kim Yong-sŏp (1931 - ) and Kang Man-kil (1933 - )—gained popularity among South Korean intellectuals who saw it as an alternative to the Western modernisation theory which, to their mind, provided imperialist Western countries and Japan with a justification for their colonial exploitations. According to the internal development theory, Korea had some ‘sprouts’ (maeng-a) of modernity in the late Chosŏn period, especially in the Korean intellectual movement of the early 17th to early 19th centuries, called Silhak (or Sirhak, translated as the School of Practical Learning), but such sprouts were destroyed by Japan’s brutal colonisation of Korea. The internal development theory has been contested by both domestic and international scholars, particularly for its weak empirical basis and its nationalist bias.

Silhak was in fact not a 17th or 19th century term. It was established under the Japanese occupation around the 1930s by nationalist colonial Korean historians and scholars who wanted to interpret the loosely associated Chosŏn Korean intellectual movement of these centuries as a progressive nationalist modernising force working against the presumably Sinicised and unpractical mainstream Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism (Im 2000, 42). From the 1960s, these earlier nationalist interpretations of Silhak gained increasing acceptance from the postcolonial Korean historians who eagerly sought to undo the influences of the ‘colonialist Japanese historical perspectives’ (simgin sagwan) on Koreans’ understanding of their own past. It is arguably the internal development theory-influenced Korean desire of the 1960 to 1980s to counter the colonialist Japanese claims about the ‘stagnated’ and ‘declining’ feudal Chosŏn society that led many postcolonial Koreans to claim the Silhak as the beginning of an indigenous modernity. However, there has been an ongoing dispute within South Korean scholarly circles over the actual nature and significances of the Silhak.

In the field of Korean art history, the leftist nationalist art critic and painter Yun Hŭi-sun (1946) was probably the first to interpret the supposedly Silhak influenced Chingyŏng-sansu (has been translated as the ‘True-View landscape’) paintings of Chŏng Sŏn (1676-1759) as a ‘nationalist’ (minjok) style, developed ‘independently’ (chajujŏk) from Chinese influences (Plate 1, Chŏng Sŏn, Kŭmgangsan or ‘the Diamond Mountains,’ 1734, Ink and light colour on paper, 130.7 cm x 94 cm, Collection of the Leeum Samsung
Museum of Art, Seoul). Inspired by Korean history circles’ nationalist interpretations of the *Silhak*, in the late 1970s and 1980s, *Minjung* art critics (for example, Yi 1991, 208-18) argued that in Korea, long before the early 1900s, certain ‘inherent’ (*naejaejok*) aspects of modernity had already appeared in the *Silhak* influenced *Chingyong sansu* and the Korean genre paintings of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The *Minjung* circle also tried to identify a kind of home-grown modernity in these art developments which they thought were an expression of anti-Confucianism, anti-feudalism and middle class consciousness, therefore a nationalist, populist and progressive art, compared to the Sinicised high art of the mainstream elite class (for example, Choi 1991, 230-2).

Genre painting (*Pungsokwhwa*) has long existed in Korea from its ancient times, but in the 18th century it achieved a new high and unprecedented popularity (Ahn 1993, 310-367). Arguably, the influences of the *Silhak* movement supposedly prompted Choson Korean artists like Kim Hong-do (1745-c.1818) to depict the lives of common people engaging in their daily activities in the cities, marketplaces, or villages with a new awareness. The *Silhak* philosophy also supposedly inspired Choson Korean artists like Chong Son (1676-1759) to become keenly aware of their own country’s natural beauty. Chong Son visited famous scenic sites in Korea and made outdoor sketches. By incorporating these sketches and his own personal brush techniques, he created a new distinctive painting style which became known as *Chingyong sansu*. From this aspect of Chong Son’s work, *Chingyong sansu* has been interpreted by the advocates of the *Silhak* theory as a radical departure from the prevailing conservative, tradition-bound Choson art practice which repeatedly produced conceptual and idealised landscape paintings based on the styles established by earlier Korean and Chinese masters and virtuosos, or Chinese painting manuals.

However, the art historian Ahn Hwi-joon (1993, footnote 58 on page 148) had already pointed out as early as 1984 that the development of Chong Son’s True-View landscape paintings was, in fact, influenced by the Chinese Southern School painting style which arrived in Korea in the mid-Choson period and gained a huge popularity in the late-Choson period (1700-1850). In addition, a recent study (Pak 2002, 137) argues that imported Chinese prints of the Ming period also provided a stimulus to this development. Further, according to one (Chong 2000, 114-163) of new Korean examinations of the unprecedented development of Korean genre painting in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, part of the real impetus for this development came from China, especially its Ming and Qing woodblock prints. Another study (Yi 2004, 66) argues that the flourishing of Korean genre paintings in the late 18th and early 19th centuries should not be treated as an isolated or uniquely Korean historical phenomenon, but one of the common developments occurring in other part of Asia such as China, Japan and Vietnam from 17th to 19th century. These examinations suggested that the prevailing nationalist misconceptions about the purely Korean elements of the 18th century True-View landscape painting were, in part, a result of the lack of cross-cultural and comparative studies of Korean art history.

Meanwhile, it is worth pointing out that much of these on-going competing explanations about the earliest indigenous modern art development in the 18th century

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2 In fact, in the 18th century, *Sunsuyu* or an excursion to famous scenic places was a poplar recreational activity among Choson scholar gentlemen. The Kunggangsan or Diamond Mountains with twelve thousand needle-pointed peaks, stretching from the north central part of the Korean peninsula down to the East coast of Korea, was one of the most visited places by Choson Korean literary figures and painters. Chong Son and his patron, for example, went there. The *Kunggangsan* painted in 1734 by Chong Son is one of the most famous pictures of this subject.
Korea were premised on the allegedly universal but Eurocentric notion of modernity, which Koreans had been taught to revere as the ultimate goal of Korean history. Rather than trying to apply the concept of modernity, which was unknown to the Chosŏn Koreans of 18th century, in order to enrich our understanding of the Korean art development of this century, we need to reorient our contemporary understandings within the 18th century Korean contexts. To begin with, contemporary Korean interpretations of the ‘realism’ (sasiljwái) of the True-View landscape painting are somewhat misguided. Looking at the frequently quoted works in Korean discussions of the True-View landscapes, for example, the famous Diamond Mountains (Pl. 1) by Chŏng Sŏn, the putative founder of this painting style, one can easily see that this 18th century Korean artist’s pursuit of reality is clearly different from that of any representative European artist of the 19th century Realism. The meanings of the ‘true view’ (chingyŏng) need to be understood in the context of the Neo-Confucian aesthetic philosophy of 18th century Chosŏn Koreans. The 18th Korean century concept of true view had little to do with an attempt to create objective representations of the external world. It was rather a unique 18th century Korean interpretation of the Neo-Confucian and Taoist notions of truth (chin) which informed what late Chosŏn painters considered to be the true nature (sóng) or the truthfulness (saŭl) of their painting subject (Kim 2002, 200, 204-5).

The external impact theory basically explains how Korea (in fact South Korea) achieved its current impressive (mainly economic) growth through adopting and transplanting Western-style modernisation. According to the logic of the external impact theory, Korean history was little more than the sum of shifting dominant foreign influences on a more or less passive society and culture, flowing from China, then Japan and from America or what Koreans vaguely called the ‘West.’ From the 1970s, the external impact theory has been increasingly criticised in Korea (and elsewhere in the so-called ‘Third World’) as being too Eurocentric. Despite the repeated Korean criticisms of the theories of stagnation, modernisation and external impact, all of these ideas continued to influence postliberation Korean understandings of and writings on various modern developments in Korea. Examples of this in the field of Korean art history are the periodisations of modern Korean art that use the Kaehang (literally, ‘opening ports’) event of 1876, the year 1909, 1910, 1915 and other dates associated with the first Korean encounter with Western art influences as the beginning point of the modern period.

The use of the Kaehang as the demarcation of the modern period of Korean history has had a critical effect. It gave many Koreans a profound impression that the alleged first arrival of Western influences in Korea utterly restructured the course of Korean history by splitting it chiefly into its pre-modern and modern era. Consequently, it has generated an imagined ‘discontinuity’ (tanjŏl) of native traditions in the mind of contemporary Koreans. The application of the Kaehang demarcation to the field of Korean art history is now increasingly contested for its weak causal connection with the actual developments in the field of visual art. Importantly, the Kaehang theory blinded Koreans to the facts about pre-1876 Korean exposure to Western cultural influences. The transmission of Western influences to Korea had in fact occurred, long before Western ships reached Korean shores, through the country’s cultural exchanges with China and other Eastern countries. For example, although rather faint, one can see an evidence of Greek (via Gandharan) influences on a realistic representation of the main Buddha sculpture of the mid-8th century at the Sŏkkuram Grotto in Kyŏngju, the ancient capital of Silla.

Many Korean art critics and historians have taken the year 1910 to mark the advent of the ‘modern’ and, in a sense, modernism in Korean art. The Korean archaeologist and art historian Ko Yu-sŏp (1905-1944) was the first to suggest the year 1910 as the start of
modern Korean art history. Ko (1941) argued that before 1910 in Korea, there was no ‘art’ (misul) in a modern sense, so modern art emerged in Korea only after 1910. However, it was the ‘first’ Korean modern art critic Yi Gyeong-seong (1919 - ) who popularised the 1910 as the advent of modern Korean art. In 1968, he drew the following chronology which has been most frequently quoted by Koreans:

a. The Period before 1910
b. Modern Period
   The Period of Beginning (1910-1919)
   The Period of Search (1920-1936)
   The Period of Darkness (1937-1945)
c. Contemporary Period;
   The Period of Confusion (1945-1951)
   The Period of Transition (1952-1956)
   The Period of Settlement (1957-1970)

[Taken from an English adaption of Yi’s 1968 essay, “Han’guk kûndae misul 60-nyôn-ûi munjedûl” (The Problems of Korean Modern Art in 1960), Sindonga (October), in Yi 1972, 126]

Yi constructed this bold chronology, by recapitulating his earlier arguments of 1959. In 1959 (62-85), he had argued that as a result of Korea’s ‘Oriental backwardness’ (echoing the Japanese notion of Korean stagnation), its modern art began late in 1910. Later, he (1968, 111) traced the beginning of Korean modern art back to 1909 when the first Korean Western-style painter Ko Hei-tong (1889-1965) began to study oil painting at the Tokyo School of Fine Arts in Japan. In other words, Yi equated the genesis of modern Korean art with the advent of Sôyanghwa or ‘Western-style painting’ in Korea. However, the starting date of Ko’s study in Japan has been disputed. For example, according to the historian Kim Young-na (1992, footnote 4 on page 277), Ko commenced his study between 1909 and 1910. Other writers (for example, Yi Ku-yeo 1992, 88) on modern Korean art history dated the beginning of Sôyanghwa in 1915 when Ko returned to Korea after his study in Japan. Importantly, the chronologies of the modern period of Korean art by using the dates of 1909, 1910 and 1915 all suggest that the path of Sôyanghwa had laid the foundation for the genesis and development of modern Korean art.

The conceptual foundations of Yi Gyeong-seong’s chronologies of modern and contemporary Korean art display the influences of both the internal development theory and the external impact theory. For example, in 1959 (83-4) he argued that Korea had shown its own attempted ‘anti-feudal’ modernisation through the Kabo reform in the 1890s but that attempt was sadly ‘discontinued’ (tanjôl) by the nation’s loss of sovereignty, thus the ‘distorted modern’ (oegokdoen kûndae) Korean art was tragically born under the Japanese colonial regime. His arguments were premised on the acceptance of the colonial Japanese notion of Asiatic stagnation, and he repeatedly used this premise in his writings on modern Korean art. Inspired by the Korean historical circle’s interpretation of Silhak, in 1973 (40) Yi had considered the late 18 century as the beginning of modern Korean art. But, a year later, he resorted to his earlier dating of 1910. Yi’s formulations and conceptions of modern Korean art have been reproduced by younger Korean critics in their own writings (for example, Oh 1990, 174-5, 187-8).

The Korean art historical periodisations of the modern period of Korean art that used the year 1876, 1910 and other dates associated with the earliest Korean reception of Western arts, unintentionally, have generated the following popular Korean perceptions. It has been often believed that only through external stimulus, or the earliest Korean assimilation of Western influences, that modern Korean art was born. In other words, the history of modern Korean art has been merely a history of ‘yiip’ or ‘importations’ (Oh
1992, 8, 19) of the modern arts of Western origins which happened initially via the Japanese filter and then has been occurring more directly from America and other Western countries. Another significant outcome of the unreflective art historical periodisations using the dates related to the presumed first Korean contacts with Western art influences is that, despite the apparent continuation of various traditional Korean art forms, many contemporary Korean studies and writings of post-Chosôn Korean art tend to concentrate on Western-influenced Korean art developments (Yun 2000, 15). In other words, the alleged first arrival of Western art influences in Korea has been the point d’appui of any discussion of modern and contemporary Korean art history.

Some Korean art critics, for example the influential critic Oh Kwang-su, used the term ‘contemporary’ (hyûndae) in place of the ‘modern’ (kûndae). In his influential book of 1979 (the 7th ed. 1992, 8), A History of Korean Contemporary Art (Han’guk hyûndae misulsa), Oh categorised all diverse Korean arts from the 1900s to ‘the present’ (the 1970s when the book was written) as ‘contemporary.’ According to him (idem), the application of the concept of the modern to the Korean art of the 1900s to pre-1945 was ‘too problematic,’ particularly in a chronological sense. This was, in his view (idem), because from the beginning of the 20th century, Koreans had received the various 19th and 20th century Western art trends haphazardly and selectively and thus this period contained indiscriminately ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ elements together. However, this statement, according to Oh himself (ibid. 13), should not be misinterpreted as a simplistic equation of ‘modernisation’ (kûndaeohwa) with ‘Westernisation’ (Sŏguhwâ). Yet, Oh himself did not seem to be entirely free from the prevailing Korean view that regarded modernisation as synonymous with Westernisation. For example, according to the ways in which he described the historical progress of Korean art since the post-1900s in his 1979 book, Oh appeared to have evaluated the more directly Western influenced developments of postcolonial Korean art rather more positively than those developments resulting from colonial Koreans’ indirect exposure to Western arts via colonialist Japan.

The conflicting Korean chronologies of modern Korean art history are a result of the varying Korean definitions of modern Korean art. There are several unexplored reasons for this problem. Some of these reasons lie in the conceptual foundations of the current ambiguous Korean definitions of modern Korean art. An obvious one is the unexamined validity of the applications of the historiographic frameworks, borrowed from the field of national history, to art historical analyses of Korean art. Writers of modern Korean art history, using these categories, have often blurred distinctions between the art historical usages of the terms, ‘modernity,’ ‘modern’ and ‘modernism’ and the general meanings of ‘modernity’, ‘modern’ and ‘modernisation’.

Another problem arises from the limitations of the Korean applications of Western terminologies and theoretical frameworks in historicising the various art developments of 20th century Korean art. Some Korean art critics and historians (for example, Yi 1973, 64-65) have occasionally acknowledged the fact that the developments of modern Korean arts took different paths from those of modern Western arts. Further, since the late 1960s, Korean art critics and historians have repeatedly commented about the problems of the Korean uses of Western references in explaining the historical developments of modern and contemporary Korean art. But they themselves have continued to use Western-style terms, concepts and theories in their writings on Korean art. This is because there is as yet no satisfactory alternative Korean conceptual framework which would allow Koreans to reexamine the modern period of Korean art on its own terms. As a result of this, many Koreans continue to evaluate and judge various modern and contemporary Korean art.
developments from the standpoint, and through the paradigms, of Eurocentric world art history.

Having accepted the authority of the supposedly most advanced Western arts as the key source of the legitimacy of the modern identity of Korean art, for example, the prominent art critic Lee Yil (1932-1997) argued:

[W]e have to make a precise definition of what modernist art means in the context of modern Korean art. Unless we do, modern Korean art becomes an orphan [my italics] in international art history. … While contemporary Korean art has been distancing itself from Western trends, it has been trying to establish a solid position in the world. This is one of its ambitions, and to achieve this urgent task, Koreans must establish their own identity. [Taken from Lee Yil, “On Working with Nature,” in Biggs et al. 1992, 14, 16. I have revised this English translation in the light of the original Korean.]

Lee’s anxiety about the insecure identity of contemporary Korean art is resonant in the following argument of Oh Kwang-su (1992, 202):

Having been born with the fate of a recipient, not an originator, how to reduce the initial time gap with the developments at the origin became the foremost concern of Korean art from the contemporary period. There, the developments of an original method of expression and ‘spirit of plastic arts’ (chogyo chōngsin) emerged as the immediate tasks.

The arguments of Lee and Oh reveal how these art critics and other Koreans felt it was necessary to ‘place’ Korean art, even as a self-described ‘late’ peripheral member, within the Western-centred global artistic ecumene. Further, in order to ‘objectify’ Korean art history, in their minds, the cultural specificity or particularity of modern Korean art had to be delocalised from its own historical context and integrated into the ‘universal’ narratives of world art history, which they paradoxically acknowledged as predominately Western. In this way, they could emphasise Korean artists’ desire and will to catch up with the advances of modern Western art as a key motivating force in Korean art’s self-transformations that resulted inexorably in the births of ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ Korean art. Further, they (for example, Yi 1974, 65-66; Oh 1990, 181) claimed that what they identified as the belatedness, ‘involuntariness’ and ‘discontinuity’ in the process of the drastic transformation of Korean art, from its ancient traditional past to its modern era, constituted the historical ‘specificities’ (t’ūksusŏng) of modern Korean art. Yet, no one has elaborated this claim further. There remains an unexplored critical question about the real significances of these Korean specificities and their actual effects on the continued developments of modern Korean art.

Another reason for the lack of widely agreed Korean definition of modern Korean art lies in the unresolved question of how to restore a meaningful historical continuity of contemporary Korean art with its allegedly broken, ancient traditional past. Oh Kwang-su (1990, 173) once argued that the Korean understanding of modern Korean art history should begin with an examination of the responsive developments of Tongvanghwâ or post-Chosŏn traditional Korean ink painting to the relentlessly changing modern world. And (as if responding to Oh’s argument), the eminent art critic Yi Ku-yel, in his 1992 book of A Study of Modern Korean Art History (Kûndae Han’guk misulsa-ûi yŏn’gu), began his analysis of the Korean art of the 1910s to 1960s with a detailed discussion of the various responses of late Chosŏn Korean traditional painters to new and unprecedented dramatic changes in Korea since the 1880s. Further, Yi’s book emphasised how late Chosŏn Korean artists continued their inherited pictorial traditions, whilst trying to modernise them. Yi (1992, 48) acknowledged that such an attempt at modernisation was certainly associated with these artists’ exposure to the Western arts brought into Korea
after 1910, as well as to the modernised forms of Japanese traditional paintings. Yet, this modernising move, in his view (idem), was clearly motivated by their conscious will to creatively maintain their inheritance.

However, until recently, Yi Ku-yeol’s approach to the writing of modern Korean art history did not resonate in later Korean art historical writings. The Korean art community also seldom remembered that Yi Gyeong-seong, in his influential 1974 book of A Dissertation on Modern Korean Artists (Kundae Han’guk misulga nongo, 1992 edition, 7), had in fact already argued that the genesis of modern Korean art should begin with the traditional ink painter An Chung-sik (born in Choson period of 1861 and died in 1919), a lone figure standing on the edge of the boundary between the modern and Choson period. The reasons that the arguments of Oh, Yi Ku-yeol and Yi Gyeong-seong failed to change the popular Eurocentric Korean assumptions about modern and contemporary Korean art lie in the ways in which these critics themselves and other writers have normally narrated the history of modern and contemporary Korean art. The typical account of modern Korean art history began with the earliest Korean exposure to Western art influences. Sometimes, this account was accompanied by a brief mention of the Silhak-influenced, indigenous proto-modern art movement in the 18th century. Then, the rest or a large proportion of the account was allocated to a lengthy discussion of the formations and developments of Söyanghwahwa or ‘Western-style painting’ and sculpture. In his 1972 book of A History of Korean Contemporary Art, Oh Kwang-su appears to have tried to keep a balance in terms of the proportions that he allocated to the discussion of Tongyanghwa (traditional Korean ink painting of the post-Choson period) and to that of Söyanghwahwa. Yet, his overall representation of the history post-1910 Korean art gives an impression that the author has paid a more attention to the developments of modern Western-style Korean arts than that of traditional painting. This imbalanced focus overshadowed the important fact that not only the emergence and developments of new Western-styles of Korean art, but also the major changes within the continuing traditional Korean painting also constituted the major historical developments which gave rise to the modern and contemporary periods of Korean art.

Koreans’ Eurocentric view of their own country’s modern and contemporary art has been reinforced by the customary concentration of Korean accounts of modern and contemporary Korean art history on tracing and identifying the Korean parallels with the evolutionary patterns in the history of modern and contemporary Western arts. This discussion is usually accompanied by an emphasis on Korean artists’ positive efforts to embrace Western art influences, their selective choices of certain Western art trends and their modifications of these imports, all of which somehow led to the ‘original’ or ‘Koreanised’ (Han’gukjok) developments of modern Korean art. These explanations are rather unsatisfactory, as they are simply asserted, without any demonstration of how the artists achieved a distinctive ‘Korean’ originality in their art work. More often than not, the unified emphasis by Korean art historical writers of modern and contemporary Korean art on the originality and Koreanness of modern and contemporary Korean art were generated as a reaction to the continuously haunting Japanese claims about the allegedly Sinicised inauthentic traditional Korea art.

The concentration of Korean art historical writers on the task of identifying Korean parallels with Western developments was primarily guided by the assumption that modern art was essentially derived from the Western origin, and that non-Western cultures including Korea simply adopted it. Therefore, modern Korean art is one of many localised versions of that singular Modernism found throughout the non-Western countries. Through this understanding of the general art historical process, the postcolonial Korean
art community contextualised its collective desire to gain a wider global recognition of the excellence and originality of Korean art within a global cultural war. Long before Huntington’s (1993) warning of the clash of civilisations, the post-war Korean art community envisioned this imaginary war. In that battle, the Korean art community projected itself as a belated peripheral participant, being pitted against the Japanese with a significant advantage of several decades of prior experiences, or against the entire Western art world. This fictional global struggle for national prestige led Korean writers of modern and contemporary art history to dwell on the binary framework for formulating the national identity of Korean art vis-à-vis the exaggerated, essentialised and generalised differences of modern Western art.

There is no doubt that in the history of modern and contemporary Korean art, Korean artists have achieved remarkably original artistic achievements. To delineate the true nature of these achievements, one must first critically examine the prevailing assumption about the involuntary transition of Korean art from its traditional past to its unfortunate modern beginning. In fact, there is no proven evidence that the Korean assimilations of foreign influences in the 20th and early 21st centuries were forcibly imposed by the external forces like the Japanese colonial occupation. It is more likely that Korean artists (either individually or in a group) during these periods freely embraced and transformed these external influences, according to their own complex needs and varied conditions. What we can refer to as originality, a truly Korean quality or an indigenous modernity in Korean art, would emerge when we shed light on such a complex internal dynamic. In order to gain a new insight into that complexity, first, we need to free our thinking from the confines of identity politics. This would allow us to enrich our understanding of cross-cultural influences, beyond the simplistic one, premised on the assumption about the one-way transaction between Korea/peripheral passive recipient and the West/the origin/the donor/fixed point of reference.

Importantly, our understanding needs to be accompanied by comprehensive research on the significant effects of modern Japanese, Western, and other foreign art influences on the major art developments in modern and contemporary Korean art history. We also need to reconsider the assimilation of Western art influences from the perspective of the active participation of Korean artists in those assimilations, rather than hastily assuming their work simply constituted a Korean submission to Western cultural domination. In other words, we should scrutinise the prevailing conception that it was through adopting and assimilating the advanced modern artistic modes of the West that Korean art history could integrate itself (otherwise orphaned) into the predominately Western oriented world art history. This does not mean a denial of the fact that from the early 20th century, Korean art has been intertwined with, and an inseparable part of, an increasingly globalising international art world. The point of departure here is that one should pay more attention to abundant demonstrative instances of the creative outcomes of various Korean artists’ transformations of their absorbed foreign (whether modern Western or modern Japanese) art influences, which had been already integrated into a new Korean tradition, and thus into a part of the history of Korean art. It should be pointed out here that all assumed cultural origins are mythological in nature, and these ‘origins’ always are subjected to continual refashioning. Korean art has continuously assimilated various external influences, by translating or transforming them into its own form of life. This kind of self-transformation involving a creative synthesis of indigenous traditions and new imports did not start in 1876 with the Kaehang event as conventionally claimed, but from its mythical and imagined beginning in the third millennium B.C.
The assumption of contemporary Koreans about their own discontinued native tradition is partly derived from a Korean essentialist notion of tradition, which tends to regard ‘tradition’ (chönt’ong) as something unchanging and immutable. That assumed discontinuity is also, up to a point, an effect of the industrious Korean endeavour to assess and validate modern Korean developments objectively in an international context, by using the Western-style terms, categories, classifications, paradigms and criteria. Many Koreans thought that their demonstration of the parallels and similarities between Korean and the benchmark Western developments guaranteed objectivity. This is perhaps why the Korean practice of adopting Western-style terminologies, rather than inventing Korean ones, did not pose a problem for these writers. For the same reason, they have felt no need to re-evaluate the meaningfulness of the granted importance of those parallels and similarities in a locally specific context and also a comparative Asian context. In fact, many of the Western style terms that are used in Korean art historical writings are actually derived from their prior Japanese translations. This was because most of the early Korean pioneers in the modern-style disciplines of visual arts, art criticism and art history studied under the Japanese either in imperial Japan or in colonial Korea. In colonial and postcolonial Korea, these Koreans became influential figures in their respective fields and many of them taught in universities, thereby transmitting the Japanese translated Western terminologies to younger generations of Koreans. These historical facts prompt a re-examination of the translatability of the borrowed Western terminologies in a comparative East Asian context.

**CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR A FUNDAMENTAL RETHINKING**

A critical outcome of the Korean adoption of the modern Western-style definition of art is that some of the continuing traditional arts like calligraphy, which do not fit into that definition, have been excluded from the Korean discussions of modern and contemporary Korean art history until recently. Another outcome led influential Korean scholars like Ko Yu-sŏp (1941) to claim absurdly that before 1910, Korean art was nothing but folk art-ish (minyeffok), as it was not an art in a modern sense which existed for purely aesthetic appreciation, free from its religious and utilitarian functions. Ko’s definition of art here echoes the ideologically constructed 19th century European modernist notion of the autonomous value of art. In his all encompassing generalisations about the pre-1910 Korean art as folk arts, we can trace certain influences of the colonial Japanese connoisseur Yanagi Muneyoshi (also known as Sōetsu; 1889-1961) and his scholarship on Korean art. It is now well known that Yanagi’s (1976, 122-3, 125, 144) conceptualisation of the essential aesthetic characters of Korean art was largely grounded on his personal liking for a certain type of Chosŏn ceramics, especially those made by nameless craftsmen (as distinct from singular artists). The cosmopolitan imperial urban intellectual Yanagi praised and advocated the positive aesthetic values of traditional Korean folk arts and crafts, which he thought could be an antidote to ‘inauthentic’ modernity (Bernard Leach, “Introduction,” in ibid). In contrast, the colonial scholar Ko seemed to have perceived folk arts pejoratively as a typical product of an unsophisticated, backward pre-modern society. An important argument here is that when Ko argued about the non-existence of ‘art’ (misul) in pre-1910 Korea, he was simply looking through the wrong categorical lens. Such an inadequacy in the application of the modern Western definition of art to all of diverse Korean visual arts prompts a rethinking of modern and contemporary Korean art history.

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De-influencing Late Chosŏn (1700-1850):
Open and Closed Discourses on Early Modern Korean Art

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ABSTRACT

With its true-view landscape and genre paintings, the popularization of art collecting, and the pursuit of artistic originality among literati scholars, the eighteenth century is often characterized as the pivot between the old and the modern in Chosŏn dynasty art and literature. Historians of Korean art have considered the cultural programs from late Ming China (1550-1644) as a driving force behind the shift from convention to innovation, thus making Chinese “influence” a keyword in the study of early modern Korean society and art. This assumption and methodology, while providing a rationale for comparison-based analysis of cultural links between two countries’ art making, has driven the study of Korean art into a dead-end discourse that allows no alternative interpretations.

This paper will re-evaluate the historical records and evidence frequently used by recent scholarship and illuminate how they could lead to a different conclusion if approached from different perspectives. A careful reading of the societies and cultures of early modern China and Korea, surprisingly, reveals the ambiguous artistic link between both countries and further demonstrates the limitation of art historical research solely dependent upon similarities of visual expressions found in two different countries.

TRENDS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHOSŎN

After a series of invasions by Japan and China between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Chosŏn Korea began to reorganize its economy and society, and it finally regained a level of stability and prosperity by century’s end. The population was growing fast, the economy had expanded to an unprecedented degree, and the rigid system of social hierarchy was also beginning to be challenged. As these changes swept society, there emerged simultaneously a number of artistic innovations. For students of Korean art history, the eighteenth-century carries special significance. It represents a point of divergence between old and new, between pre- and early modern, when original and unprecedented artistic expression suddenly burst on the scene and quickly became established as a major trend in the Korean art world.

This may be traced to a group of artists, including Chŏng Sŏn (1676-1759), Kang Hŭiŏn (1710-1764), and Ch’oe Puk (1721-1769), who established a genre of landscape painting that took real scenery as its primary motifs. (Figs. 1, 2) Prior to this so-called “true-view landscape (Chin’gyŏng sansu),” landscape painting had principally derived from either Chinese monumental landscape or Zhe School, where mountains and rivers from imagination or established models were transmitted onto the picture screen. The new form instead delivered actual landscapes of Chosŏn, places where the artists themselves had visited in person. Next came a number of artists of the late Chosŏn period, who devoted their talents to recording images from the daily lives of various social classes. These included Yun Tusŏ (1668-1715), Cho Yŏngsŏk (1686-1761), Kim Hongdo (b. 1745), Kim Tûksin (1754-1822), and Sin Yunbok (b. 1758), all of whom created idiosyncratic paintings of agrarian labor, the cultured leisure of the literati class,
scholar/courtesan romances, and humorous incidents of daily life.\(^1\) (Figs. 3, 4) In addition, the serene and simple landscapes of Chinese literati taste were also popularized among late Chosŏn elites. Altogether these three genres of paintings have often been marked as characteristic of late Chosŏn art, and accordingly many scholars have endeavored to interpret their historical functions and meanings.

Previous scholarship has leaned heavily upon the political situation of the time, wherein Chosŏn elites began to recognize their own cultural superiority, a development brought on by the collapse of Ming China in 1644. In the absence of an heir to real Chinese tradition, Chosŏn took upon itself a new identity as “the last bastion of civilization.” As a result, Chosŏn artists turned their attention inward and sought programs for their art from among their own landscapes and people.\(^2\) More recent scholarship, pointing out that both true-view landscape and genre paintings were also found in China and Japan of that era, have tried to understand this phenomena in light of a broader cultural matrix. However, in the process of seeking historical proofs to build their arguments, they have often over-emphasized and misinterpreted the role of late Ming culture (1550-1644) in eighteenth-century Chosŏn. While problematizing certain interpretations made in the recent scholarship, this paper will offer alternative explanations of how and why late Ming Chinese cultural programs were adopted and reproduced in the early modern Korean art world.

**LATE MING PAINTING ALBUMS AND MANUALS**

Recently, grappling with the impact of Chinese painting manuals and albums on late Chosŏn art has become a primary scholarly pursuit and a key interest in the field of Korean art history. For example, in a painting by Chŏng Sŏn, we find an undeniable reference to a motif from one Chinese painting manual, *Jieziyuan huazhuan* (The Mustard Seed Garden Manual of Painting), which was initially published in 1679. (Figs. 5, 6) The general pose and size of the standing figure as well as the shape and angle of the pine tree he holds onto, strongly suggest that Chŏng Sŏn, the eighteenth-century Korean master artist, consulted this Chinese model. In addition, it was not Chŏng Sŏn alone who consulted Chinese publications. His student, Sim Sajŏng (1707-1769) copied illustrations from a Chinese album, *Gushi huapu* (Master Gu’s Painting Album).\(^3\) (Figs. 7, 8) Here, Sim has condensed the horizontal span to a square format; yet, tall trees fronting hills, an expanse of water, distant mountains, and the truncated mountain top on the left side of the screen makes it difficult to deny the link between these images. What is interesting is that Sim did not try to hide his source material; instead, he announced that he had copied from such books in his paintings’ colophons.\(^4\) This suggests the unique status of Chinese art books in the early modern Korean art world. The example of literati master artist, Yŏn Tusŏ (1668-1715) provides a fair understanding of their function and meanings. As the eighteenth-century art critic, Nam T’a’eung (1687-1740) related,

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3. Regarding *Gushi huapu*’s impact on Chosŏn, see Song Hye-kyŏng, “*Gushi huapu* wa Chosŏn hugi hwadan,” (MA Thesis: Hongik University, 2002).
4. In a painting titled “Samyang kaet’aeo,” Sim left a colophon reading “In emulation of *Gushi huapu.*” In another painting of his, “Sansŏng ponapto,” now housed at Pusan Municipal Museum has a colophon written by Kang Sehwang (1713-1791). It says, “The painting of a Mountain Monk Amending his Robe” is [originally found at] Jiang Yin’s work in *Gushi huapu.* Here, Sim Sajŏng’s rough sketch delivers its meaning and shape. This is quite amazing.”

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Yun Tusô did not know about painting, nor had he received any lessons. [However] when he was still a boy, he accidentally saw Gushi huapu and Tangshi huapu. Thenceforth, he was devoted to mastering the programs of these books by copying every detail until his paintings would exactly match those in them.  

It is hard to believe that Yun Tusô practiced only with these books and had no other help. Still, the bottom line is he used the Chinese books as legitimate guidebooks for the practice of art.

Furthermore, manuals and albums were consulted as a reliable source of information about artists and their work. After appreciating the Wen Zhengming (1470–1559) album owned by his colleague Ch’oe Han’gyông, Hô Mok (1595-1682) left following colophon:

During the Tianqi year (1621-1627), I once saw the Gushi huapu and learned that Wen Zhengming’s brushwork is exquisite and his poetry, calligraphy, and paintings are all superb enough to be cherished. It has been a few decades since Gu’s album was lost during the wars. I wished I could see Wen’s works in Chosôn [again]. Finally, I found one in Ch’oe’s collection.  

The manual’s small size, simplified brushwork, and lack of any color, since it was produced in woodblock print format, all seem to suggest a critical limitation for displaying the true quality of the paintings by this sixteenth-century Chinese artist.  

(Fig. 9) But Hô Mok recognized Gu’s album as a legitimate resource for learning the paintings of this specific Chinese master. This record also testifies to the fact that leading critics in late Chosôn recognized the merit of Chinese painting manuals and albums as authentic and normative media for artistic evaluation.

In addition, the print media consulted by Korean artists were not limited to painting albums and manuals. Illustrations in tour guides, local gazetteers, and daily-use encyclopedia (Riyong leishu) were also appropriated by late Chosôn artists. For example, Yun Tusô’s son, Yun Tôkhû (1685-1715), consulted a Chinese encyclopedia, Sancai tuhui (Collected Illustrations of the Three Realms), for a painting of the Daoist figure “Zhongli Quan.” (Figs. 10, 11) Works that carried images of actual landscapes in China, in particular, Sancai tuhui (1607), Hainei qiguan (1609), Mingshantui (1633), and Taiping shanshuitu (1648), have been recognized in recent research as sources of inspiration and reference that led to the emergence of Korean true-view landscape painting. Accordingly, a number of late Chosôn artists were noted for having consulted Chinese painting manuals and albums. Those names include Yun Tusô, Chông Sôn, Cho Yôngsôk, Sim Sajông,

5 “Yun Tu-sô” in Nam T’ae-ông, Ch’ôngjuk hwasa. The copy of Gushi huapu Yun used is housed at his family collection in Haemn, South Korea.  

6 Hô Mok, Ōnjip, Pyōljip 10.  

7 Another example of this kind is found in a note left by Cho Yong-sôk. It reads, “The lovingly lustrous painting of Suokchông [by Chông Sôn] carries the brushwork of Jing Hao’s (c. 855-915) painting in Gushi huapu. The work of “Wôltan” has the sense of inward distance as in Li Cheng’s (919-967) painting. “Hwasông ṭó-ri” is simple and elegant as the Wen Zhengming painting in my nephew’s collection.” Original text is quoted in Ch’oe Wen-su, “Kyômje Chin’gyông sansuwa ko,” Kansong Munhwa 35 (1988): 44.  


Kang Sehwang (1712-1791), and Kim Hongdo, most of whom became innovators in Chosŏn art in terms of new styles and subject matter. It appears that every genre of late Chosŏn painting, whether landscape, figure, or bird-and-flowers, refers to forms of expression adapted from Chinese sources.

Art historians seem to be competing to find more and more examples of just such cultural transmission. To a degree, this line of inquiry has been productive for recognizing and promoting Chinese print media as a legitimate part of Korean art historical research. However, in the process, they have tended to over-simplify and so misinterpret the mechanisms of cultural exchange. I would argue that, perhaps counter-intuitively, the Chosŏn artists’ active use of Chinese manuals actually suggests a complicated relationship between the two cultures. Things were not as simple as they may appear.

RETHINKING THE EVIDENCE

Critical in the study of painting manuals is the discrepancy in their readerships between early modern China and Korea. In this regard, one of the most discussed publications, Gushi huapu, also known as Lidai minggong huapu, provides useful clues. Compiled by a minor court painter, Gu Bing (fl. 1594-1603), and printed by the commercial publisher Shuangguitang of Hangzhou in 1603, it was a collection of biographies and paintings of 106 artists up to the late Ming period. This publication was to provide its readers with a summary history of Chinese master artists and their works. As Robert Hegel has noted, such books were guides for the relatively uninitiated viewer of paintings, from which he could absorb a modicum of art historical knowledge. In this regard, Gushi huapu was a commercial venture designed to be marketed to the rapidly growing reading public.

The shoddy program of Gu Bing’s album has already been discussed by many modern scholars. Editorial errors are found throughout the text and also in its pictorial attributions. Its textual contents are not at all authentic or original; instead, they are mostly copied from Xia Wenyan’s (act. 14th c.) Tuhui baojian of 1365. Many of the illustrations in the volume do not match the styles and subject matter attributed to the painters it presents. For example, Shen Zhou (1427-1509), a literati master painter celebrated for his composed and idyllic landscape style, is associated with a painting of flowers and insects (Figs. 12, 13) while a painter from the Wei/Jin period, Gu Kaizhi (ca. 344-406), is introduced with a poetic and delicate landscape of the Southern Song dynasty (1127-1270), a style that appeared and became popular almost a thousand years after his death. (Figs. 14, 15) These inaccuracies suggest that the book was created for middling or aspiring urban art hobbyists of late Ming China. It was highly unlikely that any leading scholars of the time, such as Dong Qichang (1555-1636) or Chen Jiru (1558-1639), would have accepted this book as a legitimate reference for developing art historical discernment. On the contrary, some of these books were criticized for their pandering to low and philistine taste.

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12 Furthermore, the book could have functioned, as Craig Clunas has explained, as a “buyer’s guide” to help readers tell genuine paintings from false attributions. See Craig Clunas, Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 139-146 and Robert Hegel, “Painting Manuals and the Illustration of Ming and Qing Popular Literature,” The East Asian Library Journal 10, no.1 (Spring 2001): 57-58.
14 J.P. Park, “Ensnaring the Public Eye: Painting Manuals of Late Ming China (1550-1644) and the
Korean scholarship seems to agree that this album was introduced to Chosŏn in the early seventeenth-century, thus soon after its publication. I do not dispute the dating of its introduction, however, one of the primary grounds for this dating needs further discussion. The album has two prefaces, one composed by a rather shadowy figure, the other written by Zhu Zhifan (1548-1626), a member of the highest degree-holding elite, who was also famed for his painting skill. He visited Chosŏn in 1605. Although it was primarily for a diplomatic mission, he also earned a fortune on that trip by trading his own paintings and calligraphy for lucrative furs and ginseng. Historians of Korean art understand this visit to have been the earliest occasion of the *Gushi hua*pu’s introduction to Chosŏn. As author of one preface to the manual, they claim, he must have brought this manual with him. However, this is an absurd claim, for the following reasons.

Late Ming publications typically list the names of famous scholars as their editors or collators; but it often seems that such attributions are false. The names of two acclaimed writers of the time, Chen Jiru and Li Zhi (1527-1602), are listed as contributors in the prefaces of dozens of late Ming books, but these men can actually be associated with only a very small number of these publications. Both Gu Bing and Zhu Zhifan lived in Beijing around 1600. Thus, it is not impossible that Zhu did actually write the preface. As only a minor court painter, Gu Bing would have lacked the social and cultural prestige needed to promote the work so he may have needed to include a preface by an established cultural luminary. Again, considering the book’s low quality, it is hard to imagine that Zhu Zhifan would have wished to have his name associated with the production of Gu’s album; thus, I am skeptical that he brought this manual to Chosŏn during his visit.

Then, how are we to understand the eagerness of Chosŏn’s leading artists and critics to seek out this album? None of Chosŏn master artists and literati members who commented on this book appears to have been aware that *Gushi hua*pu and other illustrated art books were popular publications aimed at the urban middle class or social upstarts in China. And this is not an isolated example of a cultural gap. The primary concern of late Ming artists and critics, the debate on Dong Qichang’s Southern/Northern School theory, did not figure in the writings of Chosŏn literati until almost a century.

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15 Song Hye-kyŏng, 61-73.
17 This was first suggested by Hŏ Yŏnghwăn, “Gushi hua*pu yŏn’gu,” *Sŏngsinyŏn’gu nonmunji* 31 (1991): 281-302
21 Furthermore, Yi Ho-min (1553-1634), the minister of Rites, visited Beijing in 1608 and found a copy of *Gushi hua*pu at a bookstore. His note does not indicate any previous occasions when he saw the album. During Zhu’s visit to the Chosŏn court, Yi was the official who oversaw diplomatic protocols for Zhu. Thus, if Zhu had actually brought this album to Chosŏn, he must have been the first one who had access to it. For Yi’s note on *Gushi hua*pu, see Yi Ho-min, “Hwabo kyŏbal,” in *Obonggi p* 8.
(Fig. 1) Kim Hongdo, Mountain Katang, 1734.

(Fig. 2) Kang Huiôn, Inwang Mountain, 18th c.

(Fig. 3) Kang Huiôn, A Literati Gathering, 18th c.

(Fig. 4) Kim Hongdo, A Wash place, late 18th c.

(Fig. 5) Chong Son, A scene from “Tao Yuanming Returning Home,” 18th c.

(Fig. 6) “Luseng by a solitary pine, reluctant to leave,” Jieziyuan huazhun, 1679.
(Fig. 7) Sim Saijong, Landscape in style of Ni Zan (1301-1374), 18th c.

(Fig. 8) Ni Zan (1301-1374), Gushi huapu, 1603.

(Fig. 9) Wen Zhengming (1470-1599), Gushi huapu, 1603.

(Fig. 10) Yun Toyohito (1685-1715), Zhongli Quan, 1732

(Fig. 11) "Zhongli Quan," Sancai tuhui 三才图会, 1607.

(Fig. 12) Shen Zhou, Gushi huapu, 1603.
later. As the modern scholar Yi Sŏng-mi has suggested, Chosŏn elites’ understanding of Chinese art and theory was mostly limited and fragmentary until the late eighteenth century. In short, the active interest of elite Chosŏn artists in late Ming Chinese manuals suggests Chosŏn Korea’s lack of understanding of China.

22 Cho Yŏng-sŏk, Kwanjae-go 3.
The so-called Chinese “influence” in early modern Korean art is thus not as straightforward or unidirectional as it has described in recent studies.

CULT OF THE LATE MING

The critical problem with this “influence” based analysis is its disregard for the historical peculiarities of a given time and place; thus it tends to interpret any changes in a society as a consequence of outside forces. This over-extension of “influence” is definitely a fixture in recent scholarship of later Korean art.

During the eighteenth century Chosŏn Korea was able to fully recover from the devastations caused by consecutive wars of the first half of the seventeenth century. The state successfully reinvigorated agriculture, which sustained the fast-growing population and fostered commercialized agriculture and trade in foodstuffs. Prosperity brought stability, economic development, and further urbanization in the major cities. In the meanwhile, an emerging urban elite began to turn their attention to cultural activities.

As recent scholarship has pointed out, late Chosŏn was the time when literati cultural activities, such as poetry, painting, music, and tourism, were taken up by people outside the traditional elite class; they extended to the larger urban populations and even the female quarters. Many of the middle-class technocrats who worked as official translators, medical doctors, and government clerks, whose positions were often hereditary, used their upgraded economic and social status to enjoy artistic leisure activities. Among them, highly talented writers and painters were almost equally recognized as members of the literati class. Other members of the middle class, such as Hong Setae (1653-1725), Yi Önjin (1740-1776), and Kim Kwangguk (b.1725), built large collections of art while associating with leading literati of the time. The fashion of art collecting became so popular that soon it even reached commoners and young boys in rural areas. The democratization of artistic leisure, however, was not looked on favorably by everyone. Some prominent cultural critics noted that most people pursued the fame and fashion of art without genuine interest or understanding.

Historians of Korean art also interpret these new cultural developments as an outcome of the impact/transmission of late Ming culture. Most of the trends popularized in eighteenth-century Chosŏn, such as holding literati gatherings, the construction boom in private gardens, art collecting, and the popularization of art beyond the traditional elite class, have also been recognized as the types of cultural progress made during the late Ming period. This scholarly observation, although it recognizes the historical parallel between Chinese and Korean societies, does not push the analysis far enough. Their claim

24 Yi Se-yŏng, “Chin’gyŏng sidae ēui kyŏngje,” Kansong Munhwa 50 (1996): 92-101. Starting from 1650s, the population began to re-increase with an unprecedented speed. By 1680, Chosŏn had recovered the population of the pre-war period of 14 million and by the end of eighteenth-century, it reached its apex of over 18.5 million.


28 Song Hūgyŏng, “Chosŏn hugi ēui yaoe ahoedo,” Misulsa hakpo 24 (2005): 63; Chang Chin-Sung, “Chosŏn hugi Sain P’ungsok’wa wa Yŏga munhwa,” Misulsusa nondon 24 (2007): 267-272. However, a group of modern literary scholars in Korea have produced outstanding observation. For example, An Dae-hwi has aptly argued that there was no direct link between late Ming xiaopin and late Joseon po-pum literature.
suggests the cultural changes of late Chosŏn were mostly brought on by the culture of late Ming. But the similarity between early modern China and Korea was not the consequence of cultural transmission; instead, it must be understood as overlap in the historical development of these two countries as they moved toward a recognizably modern form of society.

The social situations of late Ming and late Chosŏn society were undeniably similar. In late Ming, the increased population, rapid urbanization, and economic growth also provided the foundation for a fluid and flexible status system, free of legal barriers to status mobility. Traditional status system was longer in play and this is why and how “alternative” qualifications to sustain one’s claim to elite status were so avidly pursued in late Ming society. Cultural activity, then, was thought of as a repertoire that provided its practitioners with the means to create the sense of superiority and maintain social networks which set them apart from the majority of population.\(^{29}\) For the emerging urban elites in early modern China, art collecting provided a channel by which they could transform their monetary power and status into cultural and thus social prestige.\(^{30}\)

The social structure of late Chosŏn was very much like this. The rigor of the traditional hierarchical system in particular was seriously challenged. The top echelon of society, the yangban class, was losing its prestige as an elite status. Statistics show that in the late seventeenth century yangban represented only 8.3% of the population in Taegu, but that number soared to 34.7% in the late eighteenth century, and even to 65.5% by the mid-nineteenth century.\(^{31}\) Then, could it be mere coincidence that in this era of Korean history art collecting became established as a popular leisure activity among urban elites? Just as happened in late Ming China, art became a special and alternative device by which a prosperous late Chosŏn urban public could display thus claim their cultural superiority.

In sum, the structural parallels between these two societies definitely allow us to approach cultural phenomenon of late Chosŏn art from a new angle. When we recognize a pattern of development like that of Chinese society in Korean history, we need not interpret it to be the result of socio-cultural exchange.\(^{32}\) The scholarly model of Chinese “influence” has dominated the field of Korean art history for too long. We have reached a point where we should reassess it, before it becomes an unquestioned assumption in the study of the entirety of the development of Korean art.

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\(^{30}\) Craig Clunas, Superfluous Things, 108.


\(^{32}\) Late Chosŏn literature also shows very close affinities to that of the late Ming: pursuit of originality, popularization of informal essays, and challenges to traditional styles. Regarding these similarities, however, An Tae-hoe warns against interpreting them as the result of the cultural impact of late Ming onto Chosŏn literary field. See An Tae-hoe, “Yi Yong-hyu sop’um-mun ūi mihak,” 18-segi Chosŏn chisigin ūi munhwa ūisik (Seoul: Hanyang University, 2001), 229.
Internationalisation Processes of MBC, Korea

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ABSTRACT

Scholars of the 20th century vigorously attempted to theorise internationalisation of multinational enterprises (MNEs) based on MNEs’ internationalisation processes. As the vast majority of such theories were developed based on descendants of internationalisation processes of manufacturing industry, the validity of theories for the outer manufacturing industry became ambiguous. Despite the fact that one of the fastest growing sectors of global trade since the late 20th century is the trade in cultural/creative industries, scholars haven’t attempted to validate such a phenomenon by reference to existing theories of internationalisation processes.

This paper attempts to dismantle the internationalisation processes of a cultural firm and to explore the validity of existing internationalisation theories. Although this paper shows strong support for the dynamic capabilities theory, the theory itself is deficient in explaining the underlying sources and drivers of those environmental factors/forces. In order to overcome such a shortfall, this paper suggests an integrative approach of integrating multidisciplinary theories as a theoretical framework thereby contributing to the under-researched field in the discipline of international business.

1. INTRODUCTION

The importance of the culture industry to the world economy has been mentioned by a number of scholars raising their voices to assert that this field of paper deserves more attention (Carman and Langeard 1980; Adorno and Bernstein 1991; Patterson and Cicic 1995; Lovelock and Yip 1996; Samiee 1999). According to the annual report prepared by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Global Entertainment and Media Outlook in 2004, the entertainment and media industry in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and Canada was worth $US 1.22 trillion in 2003, and was expected to grow to $1.67 trillion in 2008 with an annual average growth rate of 6.3 per cent (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2004). Considering the average annual GDP growth rate of the same sample countries’ data was shown to be 5.4 per cent, the outlook for the culture industry would appear to deserve some attention. UNESCO’s (2005) report on the international flow of cultural goods and services reveals a total global export figure of $US 36.2 billion in 1994, growing to $US 54.6 billion in 2002, representing growth of more than 66 per cent over seven years.

Despite the fact that the culture industry seems to display a vital role in the world’s economy as far as the above-mentioned figures are concerned, many of the academic studies into the culture industry have been much more apparent within the field of social sciences, communication studies, and cultural studies that focus on ‘globalisation of culture’ as key words. Although global media giants’ recent amalgamations and diversifications have been receiving much attention from economic studies (Chan-Olmsted and Chang 2003; Chon, Choi et al. 2003; Peltier 2004), none of the studies has yet tackled the internationalisation processes of cultural firms within the scope of international business discipline. This is despite the fact that most global media giants are amongst the biggest MNEs in terms of scale and geographic presence.
In the context of international business, scholars of international business discipline acknowledge the lack, or rather difficulty, of conceptualising theoretical frameworks that are apparent to the school of international business due to its nature of the multidisciplinary characteristics of topics and studies it deals with. However, one of the reasons for the formation of the international business studies arena was to explain the phenomenon—whether from country-to-country, corporation-to-country, inter-corporation, or intra-corporation—of activities across borders. Scholars studied the internationalisation of corporations in respect of processes, motives, modes and effects (Caves 1998).

Concerns and questions emanated from scholars regarding whether the concepts of internationalisation theories are sustained across different industries; the arguments being voiced suggested that those theories were built upon stages of industrialisation and were focused mainly on manufacturing industries (Vandermerwe and Chadwick 1989; Samiei 1999; Stare 2002). Questions arise from a factor as simple as the uniqueness or difference of the characteristics of goods and services.

Having identified an apparent lack in academic studies of internationalisation processes of cultural firms within the conceptual scope of international business discipline, despite the fact that there are sufficient grounds for such phenomena to deserve more attention, this paper aims to provide a foundation for further studies. Melin (1992) stresses the importance of integrating interdisciplinary concepts and theories in order to fully grasp the outer context of the internationalisation processes of firms with holistic and longitudinal approaches, rather than of restricting the research scope to a single discipline. Hence, by integrating interdisciplinary conceptual frameworks as a basis for the present paper, this paper follows up by way of contribution to and support of the proposition articulated by Melin (1992).

Although not very apparent in Western countries, since the mid-1990s Korean cultural products have poured into neighbouring countries like China, Taiwan, Japan and Hong Kong to the extent that a name was created for the phenomenon: ‘Hallyu’—Korean Wave (Wikipedia 2006). Such a phenomenon has attracted much attention from Korean scholars in order to identify the motives/sources (Ha and Yang 2002; KOFICE 2005), trends (Lee 2005; Lee 2006; Shim 2006; Gil 2007), and ways to develop/sustain (KOFICE 2005; Lee and Won 2005; Park 2005) the Hallyu. However, those studies have all based their theoretical frameworks either from social sciences, communication studies, cultural studies or political economy, and in fact none of the studies closely examined it by applying the perspectives of business and management studies not international business alone. This study has selected one of the leading cultural firms - Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation, or MBC - contributing to the Hallyu phenomenon in Korea in order to capture vast aspects of the internationalisation processes of cultural firms comprehensively and chronologically. Hallyu doesn’t appear to be just a momentary boom in Korea’s neighbouring country—mainly East Asia—but current trends reveal that the phenomenon has dispersed into South East Asia and even to the Middle East and Eastern Europe (Suh, Kwon et al. 2005). Some scholars even claim that the success of Korean cultural products so rapidly dispersing into foreign markets resembles the success of Hollywood and makes Korea the Hollywood of Asia (Ha and Yang 2002; Lee 2006; Shim 2006). As this study analysed the internationalisation processes of MBC since its inception in 1961 up until the current period, including the periods of birth of Hallyu, applying however international business theories as the primary conceptual framework for the study contributes to its becoming the first of a kind.
2. CASE STUDY SUBJECT: MOONHWA BROADCASTING CORPORATION (MBC)

Although the Hallyu phenomenon received much scholastic attention as ‘the next big thing’ and the evidence shows that such a phenomenon has certainly contributed to the success of internationalising Korean cultural products, the primary focus of this study isn’t the study of Hallyu. Hallyu is just an interpretation of internationalisation performance and does not explain the internationalisation processes of cultural firms, though it has certainly contributed to the overall processes as one of the forces. This study has selected MBC Korea as the case study subject to empirically test their internationalisation processes, applying an integrative and interdisciplinary theoretical framework which will be explained in a later section.

MBC is one of the largest terrestrial broadcasters in Korea, with seventy per cent of their equities owned by a non-profit public institution called ‘The Foundation for Broadcast and Culture (FBC)’, and the remainder owned by a public institution called ‘The Foundation for Chung-Soo Scholarship’. Although the equity structure would suggest it is a public broadcaster, MBC has been operating more as a quasi-private broadcaster with commercial characteristics unlike Korea’s state-owned national broadcaster Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). This is understandable, considering KBS is a state-owned though independently-operated entity with most of its revenue coming from government subsidies generated by television registration fees collected from Korean citizens, whereas MBC has no access to government funding. Historically, MBC entered the Korean broadcasting industry in 1961 by dismantling the monopoly market structure that was sustained by KBS since 1927. For MBC to become a serious competitor to KBS, in spite of its origin as a mere regional broadcaster that had gone through waves of changes in its equity structure to become what it is today, generated instant scholastic motives.

Figure 1 Changes in total advertising revenue collected from the terrestrial broadcasters of Korea, 2001-2005 (thousand US dollars)

Source: (KBC 2003; KBC 2005; KBC 2006)

Note: Based on an exchange rate of 1 US Dollar = 1,000 Korean Won

MBC has been selected as a case study subject for this study not only for the astonishing growth phases it has displayed but also because it has been at the forefront of the Hallyu phenomenon (Park 2001). Apart from KBS receiving most of its operational revenue from
government subsidies, MBC had constantly attracted the largest amount of advertising revenue in the Korean broadcasting market as shown in Figure 1. One of the contributing factors to MBC attracting the highest advertising fees from television commercials is, contentiously, the highest viewing rates that MBC programmes have received. Of the various genres produced and broadcast by MBC, drama has constantly received the highest viewing rates as shown in Table 1 from audiences compared to other Korean terrestrial channels, and its reputation in the market for being the best channel for drama has been demonstrated in various statistical surveys (FBC 2003). However, these findings alone do not sufficiently justify the reasons for selecting MBC for this study. Since the mid-1990s, Korean cultural products have been flowing into foreign countries at a speed that has shown astonishing growth. The total exports revenue of Korean cultural products in 1995 was US$5.4 million, becoming US$115.9 million in 2005—more than a twenty-one-fold increase over ten years. More detailed analysis from the same sources as above shows that, at a minimum, over 93 per cent of the export revenue of Korean broadcasting programmes is generated from the export of Korean dramas over the same periods (KBC 2002; KBC 2003; KBC 2004; KBC 2005; KBC 2006). The compelling reason for MBC being selected for this study is that, throughout the same years, MBC had been the largest exporter by far of broadcasting programmes to foreign countries as shown in Table 2. Although export revenue figures show KBS to be the highest revenue generator as shown in Table 3, KBS also owned and operated a satellite television service to Korean nationals overseas, and its status as a national broadcaster explains how it has the highest amounts of revenue in spite of being an exporter of far fewer programmes to foreign markets. MBC’s position as an exporter of the largest number of programmes overseas, with the majority of them being drama, and its reputation as the channel for drama programmes makes its selection for this case study self-explanatory. Inevitably, one may wonder how MBC could have become so competitive in the Korean broadcasting market given it had no financial support from the government like KBS and with certainty it would have been disadvantaged. Perhaps, this is a more stimulating factor for the selection of MBC for this case study given that their successful internationalisation performance only reveals their results, but the grounds which have allowed such results to be achieved become a curiosity. Effectively, in order to identify those grounds, a study of MBC’s internationalisation processes is a sensible route to take considering exhaustive analyses would be required.

*Table 1* Changes in viewing rates of the Korean broadcasting industry, 1993-2004 (%)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TVR</th>
<th>VR Prop</th>
<th>KBS1</th>
<th>KBS2</th>
<th>MBC</th>
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<td>VR Prop</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10.9</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>45.9</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.1</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
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<td>9.4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Other in 1993 and 1999 include viewing rate of AFKN and from 1995 to 1999 indicates EBS only. Since 2000, Other includes Cable, Satellite, and Internet TV facilities as well as EBS. Highlighted in grey colour indicates the highest viewing rate for the corresponding year.
Table 2 Changes in number of programme exported by Korean broadcasting industry, 2001-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oversea Korean Support</td>
<td>5,884</td>
<td>2,191</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>1,193</td>
<td>6,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video Sales</td>
<td>7,460</td>
<td>11,333</td>
<td>13,549</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>56,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial TV</td>
<td>12,079</td>
<td>17,828</td>
<td>13,983</td>
<td>15,317</td>
<td>21,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>3,935</td>
<td>6,228</td>
<td>4,510</td>
<td>4,858</td>
<td>6,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>5,669</td>
<td>6,321</td>
<td>5,240</td>
<td>6,135</td>
<td>9,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBS</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS &amp; OP</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>5,138</td>
<td>4,143</td>
<td>4,302</td>
<td>6,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable TV &amp; Cos</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>7,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,848</td>
<td>33,273</td>
<td>29,458</td>
<td>18,142</td>
<td>92,264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (KBC 2003; KBC 2005; KBC 2006)

Table 3 Changes in export revenue generated by the Korean broadcasting industry, 2001-2005 (thousand US dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oversea Korean Support</td>
<td>6,510</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>7,297</td>
<td>5,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Video Sales</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>6,281</td>
<td>5,411</td>
<td>6,706</td>
<td>10,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial TV</td>
<td>10,906</td>
<td>18,024</td>
<td>27,267</td>
<td>55,516</td>
<td>102,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBS</td>
<td>3,671</td>
<td>5,897</td>
<td>10,123</td>
<td>25,216</td>
<td>42,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>5,019</td>
<td>7,982</td>
<td>8,932</td>
<td>14,985</td>
<td>29,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBS</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS &amp; OP</td>
<td>2,155</td>
<td>4,082</td>
<td>8,134</td>
<td>15,244</td>
<td>30,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable TV &amp; Cos</td>
<td>2,964</td>
<td>4,080</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>3,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24,047</td>
<td>30,321</td>
<td>35,560</td>
<td>70,306</td>
<td>121,763</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (KBC 2003; KBC 2005; KBC 2006)

Note: Overseas Korean Support: Programmes exported to countries where large population of overseas Koreans are residing.

Abbreviations: OP – Other Private Broadcasters affiliated with SBS, Cos – Channel Operators

MBC and also other broadcasters in the Korean broadcasting industry are situated with many different environmental factors/forces working to shape the practices and structures of each and every component of the industry and its players. Broadcasting products, and in turn the firms that create them, are by nature subject to constant scrutiny from government and have regulations and policies imposed upon them. This is primarily because, as many media studies suggest, broadcasting products are considered to be public goods with civil responsibilities (Schiller 1969; Chan 1996; Alvarado 2004; Hutchison 2004). As well, the broadcasting industry tends to be constantly challenged with rapid changes in broadcasting technologies (Waterman 1988; Leung 2002; FCC 2005; NHK 2005). Inevitably, part of the reason why broadcasting technologies are forever developing is the demand from an increasingly sophisticated audience (Miller 2001; Ellis 2004). This reason leads this study to note that the broadcasting industry is also confronted with changes in market (audience) dynamics. Researchers suggest that broadcasting products are under public scrutiny and have a social responsibility on account of their power to influence values, be they cultural or ideological. These effects become more prominent
issues when broadcasting products are sold to foreign markets since the cultural values embedded in them also have the power to influence and change other cultural values (Schement, Gonzalez et al. 1984; Waterman 1988; Larsen and UNESCO 1990; Straubhaar 1991; Hong 1998; Chang 2000; Wei 2000; Otmarzgin 2008). As will be discussed further, the forces/factors from the broadcasting industry, markets, technology and the international trade in broadcasting products all seem to shape MBC’s internationalisation processes. In addition, the factors/forces of MBC’s internal resources and capabilities become the motive force for such processes to evolve. By dismantling years of MBC’s progression in their internationalisation processes and also by analysing the above-listed factors/forces driving the processes against the theoretical framework of this study, sufficient findings will be ascertained to achieve the aims set for this study.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As discussed earlier, the aim of this study is to dismantle the internationalisation process of cultural firms and to seek their applicability to theories of internationalisation. As the process can be broken down into three main components—starting point, way stations and ending point—the theoretical framework will be drawn to serve as an analytical tool for each component of the process. Firstly, a trigger at the starting point causes firms to engage in the internationalisation process. Triggers in the field of international business discipline are mostly defined as ‘motives’ (Bilkey 1978; Erramilli 1990; Tatoglu and Glaister 1998; Patterson 2004). Motives involve activities performed prior to starting a process and are termed ‘pre-internationalisation activities’ or ‘pre-export activities’ by international business scholars (Bilkey 1978; Wiedersheim-Paul, Olson et al. 1978; Cavusgil 1980). The significance of studying the motives of internationalisation is that as motives are triggered by both internal and external forces/factors for decision-makers of firms to consider whether to initiate the internationalisation process, it becomes the foundation of the internationalisation process once it gets initiated. Although there are many conceptualisations of triggering factors for firms to commence the internationalisation process, there are broadly two main triggering factors/forces of internationalisation motives. One is the internal organisational factors focused on the firm’s capacity, capability, resources, competitive advantages and competencies; the other is external environmental factors such as government activities, market dynamics (economic and socio-cultural), and international trade barriers (Bilkey 1978; Zou and Stan 1998; Fletcher 2001). Having discussed that MBC, as the case subject for this study, has shown evidence of successful internationalisation performance, the research question into the concept of the starting point for MBC’s internationalisation process becomes the following:

Q1. What are the motives and pre-internationalisation activities of MBC prior to its engaging in internationalisation processes?

Theories attempting to explain way stations of internationalisation processes of firms take the largest parts of conceptualisation. Naturally, this is because the way stations involve actual delivery of international processes based on their motives. Some of the key questions that the decision makers of firms would raise are: where should the firm go? (choice of location); how should it enter? (mode of entry); and, what needs to be done? (processes). Without doubt, previous studies around the above-listed questions form the bulk of research into internationalisation processes. However, as this study is focused on analysing the overall pattern and firms’ activities in internationalisation processes, more emphasis will be placed on the analysis of sub-processes which make up the overall processes. As the aim of this study is to dismantle internalisation processes of cultural
firms by looking at patterns, way stations and performance of internationalisation processes of cultural firms, the popular theories of internationalisation processes discussed above will be put to the test in order to answer the following question.

**Q2. How did MBC’s internationalisation processes progress over their historical development? What activities have MBC performed?**

Motives are closely linked with performance because motives become the foundation for firms’ initiation of internationalisation processes; as such, performance is a reflection of whether motives have been fulfilled or not (Zou and Stan 1998; Wolff and Pett 2000; Hsu and Boggs 2003). Yip et al. (2000) hypothesise that the internationalisation performance from one stage of the process becomes the firms’ possession of competitive advantages prior to commencing subsequent internationalisation processes. Performances of internationalisation are much studied by researchers with different perspectives of measurements and how those performances are interpreted. Zou and Stan (1998) provide three broad groups of performance measurements: financial measures consisting of sales, profit and growth measures; non-financial measures consisting of perceived success, satisfaction and goal achievement; and a composite measure which is an overall score of a variety of performance measures. Apart from more obvious performance indicators such as financial measures, as discussed by Yip et al. (2000), performance enhances firms’ competitive advantage by providing knowledge supposedly obtained from the prior experience of completing one process. Teece et al. (1997) in their dynamic capabilities theory explain one of the fundamental sources of capabilities is the firm’s possession of experiential learning and tacit knowledge which can’t easily be imitated by competitors, thus becoming a sustainable competitive advantage that the firm exploits. Although there are difficulties in measuring those factors explicitly to prove a direct linkage between firms’ internationalisation activities and their relationship to performance, an empirical study of Cavusgil and Zou’s (1994) argues that the possession of firm-specific tacit knowledge is one of the significant success factors of internationalisation performance and also of the overall process of internationalisation. We arrive at the following question from taking these conceptual frameworks into consideration:

**Q3. What are the internationalisation performance indicators of MBC? How has that performance influenced the subsequent internationalisation processes of MBC?**

As briefly identified above, internationalisation processes are subject to internal and external factors of environmental change. Although changes in internal resources and capabilities of firms and the conduct that the firm consequently chooses to implement can be sufficiently explained by the conceptual frameworks discussed above, the vast majority of external environmental sources that are beyond the control of the firms leave a fundamental question. What are the underlying sources of those external environments that firms are exposed to and how do they affect firms’ resources and capabilities? Although the various international business theories discussed above offer compelling explanations to four of the key aspects of internationalisation processes of cultural firms defined for this study, they nevertheless offer only perspectives based on firms’ behaviours/activities. Effectively, it seems there is an insufficiency of international business discipline’s explanatory power to offer comprehensive reasons for internationalisation processes of cultural firms due to their inability to capture conceptual theories around the outer contexts of firms. Attempting to answer the above questions regarding the external environment will certainly offer more comprehensive answers about
why firms behave in certain ways, having a more comprehensive understanding of outer contexts which affect firms’ behaviour.

Cultural firms have unique features that set them apart from traditional manufacturing firms upon which most internationalisation business studies have been conducted (Stare 2002). As MBC experienced paramount success in its recent internationalisation processes, it would obviously aim to develop more opportunities. As MBC is a cultural firm that exports cultural products to foreign countries, certain aspects of internationalisation activities are restricted from foreign markets which are dictated by the governments of the foreign recipients. The only way to capture underlying sources for such restrictions exist can be explained by borrowing theories from other disciplines. One of the compelling theories to explain reasons for the existence of institutional restrictions on the trade of the cultural goods of cultural firms by foreign countries will have to be the theory of cultural imperialism (Schiller 1969; Crane 2002; Krishnaswamy 2002). It hypostudyes that global culture is disseminated from rich and powerful countries located at the centre of the world cultural system to poorer and less developed countries on the periphery of the system (Schiller 1969; Crane 2002; Husted 2003). One of the most studied examples of such a proposition is the globalisation efforts of the US media industry. Schlesinger (1987) articulated media imperialism of the US media industry dispersing into global markets, thereby threatening the heterogeneity of national identities which many countries are at pains to protect. Therefore, the underlying reasons for many countries still implementing measures (institutional restrictions) to prevent foreign access to their cultural firms can be explained by taking theories from the above-mentioned studies, for example. Throughout various sections of this study, conceptual frameworks from social sciences, media studies, cultural studies, services marketing and political economy will be adopted to form an integrated theoretical framework by comprehensively integrating interdisciplinary theories. Hence the last research question has been formed to encapsulate the interdisciplinary approach.

Q4. What are the underlying sources of both internal and external environmental factors/forces which affect the internationalisation processes of MBC? How are they interrelated and interlinked?

4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Several times throughout the earlier sections of this paper, the methodological approach taken for this study is revealed as a case study. Although the case study approach has apparently adapted well to the fields of law and medicine, evidence suggests that it has been developed and well applied to the social sciences (Jocher 1928; Maxfield 1930). As the case study approach is mostly adapted by researchers conducting and providing qualitative sets of research evidence, often regarded as an implicit companion of qualitative research analysis (Yin 1981).

For this study, a contemporary phenomenon of the focus is the evolutionary development of MBC’s internationalisation processes, and the context is the factors/forces of both inner and outer environmental changes. Yin has also said that case studies are the preferred approach when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are to be answered. As indicated above, the majority of research questions for this study involve asking ‘how’, ‘what’ and ‘why’. Although this study has no capacity to theorise on new internationalisation processes as such, it attempts empirically to test and validate existing theories and in so doing aims to contribute further theoretical development by offering complementary findings. Such motives can also be supported by Eisenhardt’s (1989) argument that case
studies are particularly well suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate. The foundation for this study is both an identified lack of research in the subject area, and the seeming inadequacy of current theories to explain the phenomenon selected for this study.

As sufficient grounds for selecting the case study strategy for this study have been explained above, a discussion of the types of case study adopted by this study is inevitable. There are two main types of case study depending on the number of case subjects selected for the case study. One is a single case study while the other is obviously multiple or comparative case studies (Yin 2003; Ghauri 2004). As the names are self-explanatory and suggest how the two are different, it is wiser to discuss features of the case study type chosen for this study. This study has chosen a single case study subject of MBC by using historical and longitudinal research data. Ghauri (2004) argues that single cases are appropriate when a particular case is critical and so to use it to explain or question an established theory.

The overarching question in this study is about the validity of existing internationalisation theories with respect to the internationalisation processes of MBC, hence the tasks described by Ghauri (2004) of confirming, challenging or extending the theory have all been set as objectives for this study. Another condition suggested by Ghauri (2004) is when a single case is an extreme or unique one; for example, particular organisations may be of interest because they represent ‘outstanding successes’ or ‘notable failures’ (Patton 1990). MBC has achieved notable success in internationalising its programmes into foreign markets, and such a case is very unique to the perspectives of international business discipline offering further valid grounds for selection of single case study for this study. Apart from selecting one subject which is specific to a particular industry, in this study, culture industry as MBC is a cultural firm producing cultural goods. Bell and Young (1998) advocates that as internationalisation of firms involves complexity in identifying factors from theoretical grounds, the use of industry-specific research offers a more intuitive understanding, as industry factors can have a strong influence on internationalisation. In fact, as this study has suggested and taken an integrative approach to integrating multidisciplinary concepts due to the nature of industry-specific factors that can affect the internationalisation processes of cultural firms show apparent support for Bell and Young’s claim.

5. CASE FINDINGS

5.1 Motives of Internationalisation Processes of MBC

Although Bilkey (1978) and other followers of his work focused on and attempted to explain the motives of pre-internationalisation, this study has applied and found that such factors/forces not only triggered motives at the stage of pre-internalisation processes but also throughout the various routines of the processes as they evolved.

Within the context of MBC, the motives for initiation of MBC’s internationalisation process came from two factors. Firstly, there were internal factors: in order to compete against its only competitor KBS, MBC deployed differentiation strategies since its inception. In addition to the development of various programmes with different approaches to production—for example those involving audience interaction—quality improvement of programme content was also an essential part of MBC’s differentiation tactics. As a consequence, MBC internationalised the content of its news programme as a means of making its programme quality stand out from the competition. MBC adopted internationalisation activities (more specifically inward internationalisation)
as one of the fundamental activities as part of their capability building strategies which later became their competitive advantages (MBC 1992). The other factors were external ones interrelated to the previously mentioned internal factors in a cause-and-effect relationship. As MBC entered the Korean broadcasting industry, thereby dismantling the monopolistic structure of the industry, it had only one competitor: KBS—a state-owned enterprise. Because KBS was financially subsidised from government sources, MBC was not operating on a level playing field. In addition, under an authoritarian government, the institutional environment was such that it unfairly restricted the ventures MBC could take on. MBC then explored various other avenues in order to sustain its presence in the market, leading it to initiate the process of internationalisation discussed above. There is also clear evidence that at various other stages of MBC’s internationalisation process, the continuation of its motives in applying differentiation strategies adapted existing internationalisation activities and also initiated new modes. Especially at the dynamic stages of MBC’s internationalisation post 1990s, where export activities were paramount, the motives of MBC at the time were to look for an opportunity outside an intense domestic market. Obviously, changes in domestic market structures which had called upon MBC’s motives to further develop its internationalisation processes, such as exporting, would necessarily become one of the external factors to MBC’s motives. In fact, the cause of changes in domestic market structures was identified to be the consequence of government regulations. However, without MBC’s prior knowledge earned from many years of internationalisation, which has evolved to become one of the internal capabilities possessed by MBC, this possession itself becomes one of the internal factors of motives. However, in this case it is not interlinked with external factors as other previously discussed internal factors are. As discussed here, applying the theories and concepts enumerated above, the motives for a firm’s internationalisation process come from internal as well as external factors which may be closely interlinked, as demonstrated, or independent as the sole factor (MBC 1992).

5.2 Performance of the Internationalisation Processes of MBC

It is found that one of MBC’s motives at the dynamic stage of its internationalisation process was the possession of prior knowledge of international markets gained from earlier experience. This was explained as one of the internal capabilities possessed by MBC. Referring back to Cavusgil and Zou’s (1994) argument that tacit knowledge is one of the significant success factors of internationalisation performance, which this study also supports. It also proves there are clear interlinks between performance of one instance of the process becoming a motive for subsequent processes. Although MBC’s export activities became very active from the mid-1990s, considering MBC initiated other means of internationalisation activities from as early as the 1960s shows that MBC had built up over thirty years of experience in international markets. Knudsen and Madsen (2002) emphasised that firms should not neglect the knowledge acquisition trait of internationalisation activity even if such activity fails to generate accounting returns, because knowledge can affect a firm’s capability over the longer term. Application of this proposition is supported by MBC’s case, since at the earlier stages of its internationalisation process MBC was not seeking an accounting return as both motives and performance measures of its internationalisation activities they had routinely performed. Hence, there is sufficient evidence to prove that MBC’s success in the rapid growth of its export activities since 1995 can be explained by the corporation’s possession of tacit knowledge and the experience that it had gained. This factor also contributes to the dynamic capabilities theory, as MBC’s knowledge and long years of experience would
have contributed to its expertise, in turn becoming one of the key assets that MBC could was able to exploit at the later stages of its internationalisation process and beyond.

5.3 Patterns of MBC’s Internationalisation Process

The patterns of internationalisation processes are two-fold. One, it explains certain model of overall processes—for example, incremental internationalisation processes as stipulated by the stage model. Two, it explains the routines of certain processes which may show a systematic patterns. The fundamental feature of the stage model suggest firms tend to show incremental internationalisation activities as they gain more experience and knowledge (Johanson and Vahlne 1977).

The stage model reveals its shortcomings when applied to cultural firms as MBC had entered into foreign markets with multiple modes of entry simultaneously. However, some attributes of the stage model seem to fit, such as the proposition that an incremental commitment to a firm’s internationalisation activities is triggered by the increase in knowledge the firm has gained from previous stages. In fact, such a proposition within the stage model has been supported by Knudsen and Madsen’s (2002) study of applying dynamic theory to the internationalisation processes of firms. Nevertheless, the key feature of the stage model is not focused on the aspects of explaining the way stations of processes within but the overall pattern of various stages of processes which make up pre-determined paths. Interestingly, however, there is evidence that the internationalisation process of MBC shows incremental commitment in the firm’s internationalisation activities performed through periodic stages. But such a pattern should not be represented as complying with the stage theory’s proposition of incremental commitment, as MBC’s pattern of incremental internationalisation processes reveal a horizontal extension rather than a vertical increment as stipulated in the stage model. In fact, MBC’s incremental pattern of routinely performed internationalisation activities throughout the different stages of its internationalisation process conforms more closely with the proposition articulated by the dynamic theory. As discussed earlier, routinely performed internationalisation activities of MBC became one of the key capabilities of MBC in the form of tacit knowledge which in turn contributed to the incremental pattern of internationalisation processes of MBC. Table 4 shows a summary of MBC’s internationalisation processes including activities, mode of entry and geographic span.

Table 4 Changes in patterns of MBC’s internationalisation processes (1961 – current)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inward internationalisation</td>
<td>Import</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Internationalisation of programs</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Foreign production</td>
<td>- Foreign production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Foreign production</td>
<td></td>
<td>- International fairs</td>
<td>- International fairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- International networking/partnership</td>
<td>- International networking/partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Program Exchanges</td>
<td>- Foreign direct sales</td>
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<td>Mode of Entry</td>
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<td>Licensing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Licensing</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Co-production</td>
<td>- Co-production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Export</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Export</td>
<td>- Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Span</td>
<td>US &amp; Japan</td>
<td>Programs exchanges with</td>
<td>Major Export – Whole Asia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.4 Environmental Forces on Internationalisation Processes of MBC

MBC’s internationalisation has been clearly shown to have developed in evolutionary patterns with sets of different activities routinely performed throughout its development stages of MBC itself. MBC’s success expanding into foreign markets should not be perceived as an unexpected phenomenon of windfall proportions to the extent this paper has identified. As shown in Table 4, MBC demonstrated the progressive development of MBC’s internationalisation process and performance, MBC’s progress in intensifying its internationalisation processes is the result of MBC’s continuous efforts and routines. Performance results from processes, and the processes make up a group of activities that a firm performs throughout the various stages of its development. The activities that MBC performs as part of its overall processes as it evolved aren’t driven purely by the will and direction of MBC itself; there are also environmental forces that have led MBC to perform such activities. These forces are the source and are fundamentals to influencing MBC’s internationalisation processes and performances.

External forces to the internationalisation processes of MBC

Interestingly, but also understandably, one of the forces exerting the most influence on corporate affairs within MBC has come about from changes in the political regimes in Korea. Since its inception in 1961 until the late 1970s, a continuation of authoritative regulations over the Korean broadcasting industry was a hindrance to the autonomy of Korean broadcasters. This was more apparent in the case of MBC because it deployed different broadcasting practices to those at KBS, which was a state-owned enterprise, and any potential competitive threat to the business of KBS was restricted through government regulation of such practices. In early years of MBC’s inception, MBC’s programming content was under stringent control, and the hours allocated for broadcasting certain genres were restricted by the regulations. Unfortunately, most of regulations imposed on MBC contradicted the broadcasting practices and corporate culture of MBC. Changes in political regimes not only affected MBC’s practices but also changed its ownership structures. Compared to the 1970s, much of the stringent controls placed on the broadcasting industry had softened due to the democratic movement in the political regimes of the 1980s. Much of internationalisation activities of MBC had been conducted during this time, especially before and after the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games. In the early 1990s, liberalisation of broadcasting regulations had continued and the entry was granted to new private terrestrial broadcasters and new media channels such as cable and satellite broadcasting, making significant changes to the structure of the Korean broadcasting industry. Evidently, changes in the structure of the Korean broadcasting industry had no doubt been shaped mostly by changes in government ruling parties and its political agenda regarding the practice of broadcasting.

Changes in government policies imposed on MBC and the Korean broadcasting industry overall had two different agendas. One is policy development relating to industry regulations, practice monitoring and protection of viewers’ interests, conducted by Korean Broadcasting Commission (KBC) – a government body regulating Korean broadcasting industry. The other concerns policies that promote development of the broadcasting industry by offering financial and regulative support for various parties to the Korean
broadcasting industry, which are conducted also by KBC and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT). MCT’s promotional policies became more apparent from the mid-1990s when *Hallyu* came to the notice of government and there was a push to develop and sustain the phenomenon. Whereas KBC’s policies were geared more towards the infrastructural development of Korean broadcasting industry, MCT was focused largely on the development of cultural content and the internationalisation of such content to foreign countries.

The changes in the international institutional environment, especially the conduct of WTO has played a major role in MBC’s internationalisation processes. As WTO is a facilitator of global trading activities in goods and services, including cultural goods, changes which bind member countries in its conduct relating to trading activities must be adhered to. Apart from the terms of trade of WTO, more bilateral agreements between specific parties of trading partners were more apparent in terms of the restrictive terms of trade for audio-visual goods. Such trends stimulated the formation between neighbouring countries of regional trading blocs such as APEC, NAFTA and ASEAN. The upshot of discussion on changes in the global trading environment and institutional changes is that the internationalisation processes of MBC are faced with certain limitations beyond its will-power and capabilities. This also means that institutional changes in the global trading environment and an individual country’s market conditions are vital factors affecting the international processes of cultural firms owing to the nature of cultural products.

As emphasised earlier, an understanding of the dynamics of consumption of cultural goods is more crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of production, as cultural goods are interpreted (consumed) differently from one consumer to the next. Changes in television viewers’ behaviour, together with the emergence of new media for watching television, forced terrestrial broadcasters to alter its business practices in an effort to sustain its position in the market. One of the motives of MBC’s internationalisation, besides building competitiveness in the domestic market as explained previously, is the ever-increasing intensity of competition that was forcing MBC to look beyond a saturated domestic market.

In addition to the importance of understanding changing dynamics in the domestic market, MBC also had the task of understanding the patterns of international consumption as the market expanded to include foreign markets. It was identified that four of the primary international markets for MBC—China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan—has each displayed different industry structures and institutional environments. Although China is where *Hallyu* originated, that country is applying the most stringent measures to control the inflow of Korean cultural products. Taiwan displays unique market structures with less stringent government barriers, with the result that there is a high success rate for Korean cultural products. In Japan, industry and market structures are very similar to those of the Korean broadcasting industry, though in terms of both market size and expenditure the volume of trade in cultural products is significantly higher than that in Korea. Japan is considered a gold mine for the Korean broadcasting industry due to the size of its market economy. Although the size of the market in terms of export revenue is nowhere comparable to the abovementioned primary export markets of MBC, newly emerging South East Asian markets have been receiving more attention from MBC recently.

In addition to changes in market dynamics, one of the focal forces of the broadcasting industry will have to be the changes in broadcasting technology over recent years. This is especially so with the convergence of the broadcasting and
telecommunication industries blurring the distinctions between the two industries, and new business models emerge progressively as digital technologies get more sophisticated. MBC’s early adaptations of advances in broadcasting technologies demonstrated its proactive approach towards changes in technology. In the early stages of its development, MBC focused strongly on extending its coverage by establishing regional transmission networks where MBC had the capacity to build such infrastructure from the composition of locally-sourced abandoned equipment, as well as self-developed equipment.

5.4.2 Internal factors to the internationalisation processes of MBC

One of the biggest forces of change to MBC’s internal structures has been the waves of changes to MBC’s equity structures since its inception in the 1960s and even until the early 1990s. As the equity holders are the driving force behind organisational direction in a firm, changes in equity holders may also lead to changes in the characteristics of the firm. Soon after MBC entered the Korean broadcasting industry in 1961 as the first privately owned and operated terrestrial broadcaster, MBC’s private owner Ji-Tae Kim voluntarily donated his equity holdings to a government-linked private institution in 1962. As MBC wasn’t subsidised by government as was KBS, building capability and achieving operational efficiencies was the main focal point of MBC’s attention throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The second wave of major changes in equity structures happened in 1974 as a result of the merger between MBC and Kyung-Hyang Newspaper Corporation (KNC). In effect, one of the positive outcomes of the merger was that MBC become the first ever comprehensive media giant in Korea. The challenge, however, was that MBC had difficulties in integrating two distinctively cultured organisations after the merger took place. As from previous management directions of MBC, achieving operational efficiencies again became the principal focus of MBC, however this time it was aimed towards efforts to eliminate the wasteful resources that became obsolete after the merger.

In 1981, another major government intervention in media industry restructure led to a de-merger of MBC and KNC, and also portions of equity holdings was donated to the government which was then passed on to KBS, thus making MBC under control of KBS. In addition, the compulsory acquisition of regional MBC network broadcasters was forced by the government. In effect, MBC took equity control of regional MBC networks which used to be privately owned and in so doing increased its capacity. However, even under the direction of KBS, MBC retained its corporate culture from its beginnings and maintained its position in the market. During the 1980s, three of the key directions of MBC portrayed by MBC directors were listed as increasing the scale and process of drama productions, enhancing the quality and variety of programme productions, and promoting local programme production of MBC regional networks. However, it was clear that even though changes in the equity structure of MBC had impacted on its operations and practices, the organisation’s core strategies, culture, spirit and motto, which had been set in the early stages of its foundation, had been maintained throughout.

The changes in the organisational structure of MBC, which are geared towards achieving the strategic directions of MBC have direct implications. It was found that the shape of changes in the organisational structure of MBC clearly reflected MBC’s strategy implementation at different stages of its development. On several occasions MBC made changes to its divisional and hierarchical structure to gain maximum efficiencies, as required in its strategic direction discussed above. Also, several changes of organisational structure relevant to the internationalisation processes of MBC are evidence that its commitment to internationalisation activities has increased significantly. The creations and shift in certain umbrella of corporate structures of organisation units dealing with
internationalisation processes have evolved from mere co-ordination units to an establishment of wholly-owned separate entity.

5.4.3 Interactions of External and Internal Forces of Internationalisation Processes of MBC

As far as findings from the case study of MBC and their relevance to the internationalisation processes theories are concerned, the study identified sufficient evidences to demonstrate in its structures that both MBC’s external and internal factors show the evolutionary development of MBC’s internationalisation process. In addition, discussions from the previous sections discussed clear evidence of how motives and performance are interlinked and affected by the internal and external factors/forces of MBC throughout the different stages of its internationalisation process. It is clear that MBC was confronted with dynamically changing external environments such as institutional, technological, market dynamics, industry structures and inter-country relationships. Some of them challenged, some dictated, and some enriched the various stages of the internationalisation process of MBC. Most importantly, however, those forces led MBC to integrate, build and reconfigure internal resources and capabilities to act upon and draw out the best possible strategies. For example, one of the most competitive products of MBC in the local market was found to be its drama programmes, as identified from various performance measures.

As MBC possessed competitive advantages in its drama productions, it supported reasons for its success in the market. In addition, such factors also explain how MBC became very successful at exporting drama genres even in international markets. External factors for MBC to be so competitive in drama production lead back to its motives of foundation. Since its inception, MBC has deployed differentiation strategies with market-oriented programme development, and MBC’s strength in drama production was evident from the very early stages of its operation. As broadcasting technologies underwent rapid development, MBC proactively adopted and utilised its production capabilities which in turn effectively increased the production quality. MBC’s drama export activities were also supported by the Korean government’s initiatives to promote the internationalisation of Korean cultural products, working to stimulate international market demand through inter-country relationships and offering various financial support as well as hosting cultural fairs. As demonstrated here, various aspects of certain internationalisation processes (in this case, exporting) are interlinked via various activities of MBC. However, it is clear that throughout the history of MBC’s internationalisation process, there has been constant adjustment to MBC’s resources and capabilities according to both internal and external forces/factors of change, as stipulated by Teece et al.’s (1997) central proposition of dynamic capabilities theory.

6 CONCLUSION

International flows of cultural goods, particularly audio-visual goods including motion pictures, television programmes, music and other pop culture, have increased dramatically since the 1970s. Not only has this phenomenon impacted upon the economic attributes of some nations, as exemplified by the United States taking centre stage among media giants, but it has also raised global concerns about the threat of ‘cultural imperialism’ to the heterogeneity of national identities and cultural values. Still, trade barriers to audio-visual goods do exist in many countries, and ongoing battles between the US and its counterparts and the EU and their counterparts seem to continue unabated.
As discussed above, with the discipline of international business being unable to explain comprehensively the reasons for the internationalisation processes of culture firms, this paper has attempted to show how this insufficiency can possibly be remedied. Although the various international business theories discussed above offer compelling explanations for four of the key aspects of the internationalisation processes of cultural firms defined for this paper, they nonetheless offer only macro perspectives of the internationalisation processes in general. By no means are theories obliged to encapsulate even the micro-details of firms’ internationalisation processes to explain the underlying sources of environmental forces affecting firms’ capabilities. However, this paper demonstrated that some of the environmental factors/forces naturally dictate the scope of firms’ behaviour. For example, government regulations dictate the scope for local practices by broadcasting firms in local markets. Similar applications are also evident from foreign markets when broadcasting programmes are traded internationally. These forces in fact become applicable industry-wide, not specifically to individual firms.

As international business theories are centred mostly on explaining the behaviour of firms as the central object, inevitably even the effects of various outer contexts are viewed from the eyes of the firm rather than the nature of contexts themselves. For instance, the dynamic capabilities theory’s proposition puts an emphasis on the forces of environmental change because they affect firms’ behaviour, thereby the theory itself takes a reactive stance in the eyes of the firm as recipients. The question of why those particular forces in fact do exist cannot be explained or captured by any of the theoretical frameworks applied in international business disciplines. Addressing such a question will surely offer more comprehensive answers as to why firms behave in certain ways, often a fundamental question for scholars attempting to theorise about the behaviour of firms. Although this paper isn’t exhaustive enough to theorise about the internationalisation processes of cultural/creative firms, it does clearly emphasise that an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to explicate the subject much more comprehensively.

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Made in Australia/New Zealand/South Korea ... The New Landscape of International Film Production

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Abstract
Since the early 1990s, collaborations between Australian, New Zealand and Asian filmmakers have grown in number and visibility. A rising number of Korean, Chinese and Indian films have been shot in Australia or New Zealand, while Korean and Chinese filmmakers in particular have made use of Australian and New Zealand post-production, digital and visual effects firms in recent years. New Zealand and Australian film agencies have sent delegations to recent industry events in Asia including BIFCOM (Busan, South Korea) and Asia-Pacific Producers Network (Tokyo) with the intention of raising awareness in Asia both of Australia and New Zealand as production locations and of the skills and expertise of Australian and New Zealand filmmakers. Collaborations between Australian, New Zealand and Asian filmmakers can be expected to increase in number following the recent signing of official coproduction treaties between New Zealand and South Korea, and Australia and China. In this paper I will explore some of these collaborations and assess their implications for international partnerships and industrial development in the respective countries.

1. Introduction
Since the earliest days of cinema, film production has been an international business. While the emphasis in policy and scholarship on the idea of ‘national cinemas’ has focused attention on the films that are produced in particular countries, by residents of those countries, telling stories about those countries, there has always been a body of films that have drawn on international finance, used cast and crew from more than one country, or travelled to foreign locations to shoot particular scenes or sometimes whole films.

Over the last twenty years or so, international production has become much more commonplace. A great many films are now preproduced, shot and postproduced in more than one location, and often in more than one country. The trend for filmmakers to work with international finance, locations, partners and service companies has long been a feature of Hollywood films and television programs, with a growing volume of production migrating for aesthetic and economic reasons to places around the United States and to other parts of the world since the Second World War. Since the establishment of a film studio on the Gold Coast in 1988, Australia has benefitted from the willingness of American filmmakers and projects to travel, and New Zealand has become a major centre of large scale international television and feature film production since the Hercules films and television series and the Xena: Warrior Princess series were produced there from the mid-1990s. And since the global success of the Lord of the Rings trilogy, New Zealand has hosted many Hollywood blockbuster feature film productions.

There is now a competitive market for film locations, with film commissions and agencies around the world pitching the unique and generic attributes of their particular region, their infrastructure and their labour pools to international filmmakers. Production ebbs and flows around the world, impelled by a number of forces. Story demands, the
availability of particular locations, and the desire or need to work with ‘situated expertise’ – particular people or companies that for one reason or another are only available in one place – are sometimes the main motivation. But the impulse is often economic, as changing international currency exchange rates, tax incentives and increasingly sophisticated and extensive packages of assistance provided by film commissions and governments draw filmmakers to particular places.

In other work with Tom O’Regan, I’ve drawn a distinction between the ‘design interest’, which is the collective focus of those involved in making decisions about the story and production of a film or television production, and the ‘location interest’, which is the focus of those individuals, firms or organisations working to facilitate production in particular places.

Sometimes political interests invigorate the location interest, as governments at various levels intervene in the process of production in order to stimulate or situate production in particular places. Sometimes production decisions are influenced or regulated by international agreements between governments in the form of coproduction treaties or memoranda of understanding. Here, as in the case of the recent coproduction agreement between New Zealand and South Korea, the political motivation may be a form of cultural diplomacy as well as an effort to increase trade and business links between countries.

2. Korean International Cinema

There are a number of commonly observed and written-about international aspects of Korean cinema in English-language scholarship. First, the prospects and success of Korean films and filmmakers abroad in the wake of the Korean wave and particularly the production of Korean blockbusters for domestic and international consumption have all been well documented (Berry 2003, Howard 2008, H.Lee 2008, K.Lee 2008, Shin 2005, Shim 2008). Second, considerable scholarly attention has focused on the competition for screen space between Korean, Hollywood and to a lesser extent Japanese films, the issue of the screen quota, and the role of the Korean government in transforming the film industry (Jin 2006, Paquet 2005, Park 2007, Ryoo 2005 and 2008, Yecies 2008). Third, the use and adaptation by Korean filmmakers of genres familiar from international cinema has been the subject of a number of articles and book chapters (Klein 2008, Stringer 2005.

And fourth, critical and scholarly attention has turned to the phenomenon of the re-making of Korean films in English (Xu, 2008). By contrast, the international production of Korean films – that is Korean films produced or postproduced outside Korea, and Korean films made under coproduction agreements – has not garnered as much attention or consideration by film scholars, or those working within Korean studies.

International film and television production has been the focus of my research for a number of years, with particular emphasis on the infrastructure, services and policy architectures that enable filmmakers to cross borders and make possible production in locations around the world (Goldsmith and O’Regan 2003, 2005, and 2008, Goldsmith 2003, 2004, 2007, forthcoming, O’Regan and Goldsmith 2002). During the time I taught screen studies at the Australian Film, Television and Radio School, I was able to work with my friend and colleague Brian Yecies developing a course on South Korean cinema. As part of the course we taught together in 2006, we screened Musa (Kim Sung-soo, 2001) followed by a discussion with John Dennison, the Australian sound editor of the film. From this discussion and from Brian’s research, it became clear that there have been a number of Korean films that have been postproduced in Australia over the last decade or so. There have also been a number of Korean films shot and postproduced in New

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Zealand. And yet apart from some commentary in industry papers and in hard-copy and online publications by film agencies, the existence and importance of these international productions has not been the subject of critical attention. In our work, Brian and I have begun the process of rectifying this (Yecies and Goldsmith 2009, Goldsmith 2008). This paper is another part of this effort to bring to light the collaborations between Korean, Australian and New Zealand filmmakers with the intention of expanding our understandings of the production, circulation and resonances of international films, and showcasing the long-term transnational flows and cultural exchange between Australian, New Zealand and Korean filmmakers and film industries. As I will argue here, these films help to expand and challenge existing frameworks for thinking about film and the international, and about the idea of ‘national cinema’. Onscreen, these films are undeniably Korean, but offscreen they are international projects with cultural and industrial resonances that go beyond the Korean peninsula. These films are, at some level, shared cultural expressions and sites of cultural interaction and dialogue.

I would like in the remainder of this paper to discuss a number of specific projects that exemplify some of the reasons why films travel. These films also suggest ways of thinking about the transnational connections of Korean, Australian and New Zealand cinema.

*The Host* (Bong Joon-ho, 2006) is an example of a ‘localised international’ film. The film uses and transforms the codes and conventions of American and Japanese genres including the monster movie and the thriller. As Christina Klein argues, *The Host* “uses generic conventions to grapple with contemporary Korean social and political realities” (Klein 2008, 885). But as well as being a Korean film, *The Host* is also an international film not only because of its play with film genres recognizable to audiences around the world, but because director Bong made use of international expertise to produce the film. Bong originally approached New Zealand digital effects company Weta to produce the many scenes in the film in which the monster is digitally animated into a live action shot. Due to pressure of work, Weta was unable to take on this job and recommended the San Francisco based firm The Orphanage. Weta also recommended the Australian firm John Cox’s Creature Workshops to the filmmakers, as the digital animators needed a model of the physical monster to work from. John Cox’s Creature Workshop, which is based on the Gold Coast in Queensland, specializes in ‘animatronics’, or the design and manufacture of life-sized and scale models of animals and creatures whose movements can be electronically controlled. The company won an Oscar for its visual effects work on the 1995 feature film *Babe*. The monster in *The Host* was designed by Bong Joon-ho and designer Jang Hee-cheol, and models were built to their specifications by John Cox’s Creature Workshop. Bong’s decision to employ expertise located outside South Korea was not guided by the requirements of a formal international agreement like the increasingly common co-production treaties that require certain amounts of production to take place in each of the countries that are parties to the agreement. Instead, Bong’s decision was based on commercial and creative criteria, and was made after extensive research into genre cinema and the ability of particular companies to perform work to the desired standard (‘Dream Comes True’ 2006). The press commentary in English about the film makes it clear that Bong was seeking a particular look for *The Host* that had not been seen before in a Korean film. Bong was also concerned to ensure that the digital and visual effects employed in the film were convincing, and for this reason he went first to Weta, the company responsible for many of the visual effects in *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy and, on their advice, subsequently to The Orphanage and John Cox’s Creature Workshop. *The
*Host* travelled in order to make use of the situated expertise of digital and visual effects artists and model-makers, expertise that was not available in Korea.

The provision of services to international filmmakers by Australian is not a new phenomenon with American producers making use of companies based on the Gold Coast since the revival of the television series *Mission: Impossible* in 1988. And since the early 1990s there have been many collaborations between Australian post-production companies and Asian filmmakers. In 1995, the Australian sound postproduction house Audioloc worked with editor Kim Yang-il, on the sound mix of *Eunhaengnamoo Chimdae* (Gingko Tree Bed, Kang Je-gyu, 1996). Kim Yang-il was a key player in other Korean projects posted in Australia around that time, such as *A Man Holding Flower* (1997), *A Petal* (1996) and *Chun Tae II* (1995) – all of which were edited at another Australian sound postproduction house, Soundfirm. As a result of the relationship developed during postproduction of *Eunhaengnamoo Chimdae*, when Kim Yang-il was appointed Postproduction Supervisor on the historical epic *Musa* (Kim Sung-su 2001), he approached Audioloc to work on the sound mix. Director Kim also expressly wanted to avoid the exaggerated sound design of action scenes in conventional Hollywood films. The Australian company’s resourcefulness and record of managing complex soundtracks secured what was a challenging assignment involving large scale battle sequences, dialogue recorded in three languages, and wildlife unfamiliar to the Australians. Entomologists, ornithologists and botanists were consulted to assist the sound designers in constructing a layered mix that was full of dramatic life and natural sound.

The experience of working with Korean filmmakers on a number of projects has enabled Australian sound designers like Steve Burgess of Soundfirm to develop a heightened sensitivity for designing Asian sounds in Australian soundscapes. Working on *Shadowless Sword* (2005), Burgess was challenged by the director Kim Young-jun’s desire to create within the action sequences a different sense of internal combustion or muffled implosion (sounds of air being sucked into a vacuum) as opposed to the more common, outwardly explosive and conventional frenetic sounds heard in Hollywood films. Films such as *Shadowless Sword* and *Musa* require different sights, sounds and most of all a willingness on the part of the sound designer to remain open to cross-cultural forms of expression. They also invite us to re-evaluate what is often dismissively or disparagingly considered service work. Sound editors and mixers, screen composers and orchestrators, digital effects artists and animators are not directors, and do not have total control over the big picture, but they make often substantial creative contributions to the projects on which they work. These collaborations between Korean filmmakers and Australian postproduction companies enrich the films and industries of both countries.

Another set of motivations for international production were at play in the filming of *Antarctic Journal* (2005, Im Pil-sung) which was shot around Queenstown in New Zealand’s south island. The film is an example of the complex interplay of what Tom O’Regan and I have termed the design and location interests in film production. The decision by the director and producers to shoot the film in New Zealand was influenced by both creative and economic factors. The subject and setting of the film demanded a snowy, forbidding location. Greenland and Canada were considered but rejected principally on the grounds of the costs involved in flying the cast and many of the crew to these northern hemisphere locations. The south island of New Zealand was chosen because it offered the required climate and environment, and because filming would be considerably cheaper than in Canada or Greenland. As a result of working on large scale Hollywood films like the *Lord of the Rings* trilogy, New Zealand has extensive and sophisticated programs to support film projects coming in to the country from overseas. New Zealand film agency
Film New Zealand has developed a ‘Film Friendliness’ protocol for local governments to ensure that inbound projects and filmmakers experience the same high levels of service and assistance across the country. New Zealand is a global leader in the provision of ‘film friendly’ services, and recently hosted the annual meeting of the Association of Film Commissioners International, the professional body representing film commissioners and agencies around the world. While some of these developments occurred after the filming of *Antarctic Journal*, the Korean crew benefitted from the highly developed and coordinated efforts of those working to bring film production to New Zealand, that is, those working in the New Zealand location interest. New Zealand companies and individuals provided around half of the crew, much of the postproduction work and all of the location services for the film.

In addition to this interplay of design and location interests that facilitated the production of *Antarctic Journal* in New Zealand, the film was also to some extent the consequence of high-level cultural diplomacy. *Antarctic Journal* was one of the first Korean films made in New Zealand following the signing of a film cooperation agreement between the two countries in 2003. For New Zealand the film cooperation agreement was an important component of the effort to become ‘more Asia literate’, in the words of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Asia White Paper. This name of this white paper, ‘Our Future With Asia’ indicates the political, economic and cultural focus of New Zealand policymaking in the early twentieth century. With film production and production services representing one of the country’s most important export industries, collaboration with a large regional powerhouse like Korea makes considerable sense as New Zealand seeks to capitalise on the advantages bestowed by the series of high profile, large scale, big budget feature films that have been shot there over the last decade to build new alliances and opportunities.

*Antarctic Journal* was part financed by the Korean firm Daesung BiNEXT, the company which subsequently entered a business alliance with New Zealand postproduction firm Park Road Post to produce the comedy-horror film *Black Sheep*. In September 2008, the film cooperation agreement was upgraded to an official coproduction treaty. Under the terms of this treaty, Korean films shot in New Zealand may be eligible for a slew of tax rebates and incentives and other preferential treatment.

The various films discussed in this paper represent some of the many ways in which international collaboration in film production now works, from service provision, to location services, to co-production agreements. While the number of Korean films made in whole or in part outside Korea, or with non-Korean partners is still a relatively small proportion of the total number of Korean films made each year, it is reasonable to expect that this proportion will increase. International partnership is a growing trend around the world as filmmakers seek ways to tell stories, and governments and other agents of the location interest seek to facilitate production in particular places. For the Australian and New Zealand film industries, the provision of postproduction and other services to films made by or with filmmakers from other countries is now increasingly important. For many individuals and firms, work on international productions not only helps to upgrade technological capabilities, build skills and expertise, grow professional networks and develop careers, this work also subsides or finances their work on domestic productions; the size of each industry and of the New Zealand and Australian markets has long required government assistance to make film production viable and possible. International production also assists the production of local films and helps grow local screen culture. For Korea, such benefits may be less important, but international production can have positive cultural and economic impacts and can help to forge strong bonds with Asia-
Pacific neighbours that in turn may open up new possibilities in storytelling and film production.

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What the Boomerang Misses: Pursuing International Film Co-production Treaties and Strategies

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ABSTRACT

This paper illustrates some of the dynamic ways that members of the Korean, Australian, New Zealand and Chinese creative and cultural industries have engaged with international instruments such as co-production treaties. Strategies, benefits returned and lost costs, that is, sacrifices that are made in the process of producing a film or digital media program in more than one country, and/or with an international team are investigated to reveal how creators are engaging with the demands of different governments’ policies. It is hoped that this paper and the larger research project to which it is attached will assist scholars, creative and cultural industry practitioners and policymakers to understand the dynamics of international linkages and transnational cultural production flows – with a view toward enhancing the field of Korean Studies and Korea's future role in the power dynamics of cultural industries across the globe.

Key words: Korean film industry, film policy, international co-production treaties, audio-visual cultural industries

Boomerangs, which include throwing-sticks and clubs, come in diverse shapes and sizes. Ancient Egyptian, Australian Aboriginal and North American indigenous cultures, among others, used them primarily as hunting tools, but they were also used for starting fires, making music and playing sports. When launched correctly, a boomerang either follows an arc in the air and then returns close to the thrower or stops when it hits an intended target. Whether working alone or in a small group, throwers can maximise the boomerang’s potential when the design, accuracy/technique, objective/target and surrounding elements, including competition, are taken into consideration and fully understood. Knowing what the boomerang can catch as well as miss in its path, that is, knowing its limitations, is a significant aspect of this process. Practitioners learn distinctive strategies to compensate for these limitations.

Official International Film Co-production Treaties (hereafter ICPTs), which are endorsed by national governments, are similar to boomerangs. They come in diverse shapes and sizes depending on their geographical specificity, intended function, management strategy and design. They are extremely important in the context of global trade, as discussed in detail by Goldsmith and O’Regan (2003, 2005, 2008), Goldsmith (2003, 2007), O’Regan and Goldsmith (2002), and Yecies (Forthcoming, 2008a, 2008b, 2007), Yecies and Goldsmith (2009) and Yecies and Shim (2007). As a translatival instrument they harmonise economic and cultural relations between nations and bridge the gap between their diverging film regulations. ICPTs, which used to be primarily bilateral in nature, but are now witnessing more multilateral projects, are valued as a mechanism for developing local media industries. Along with informal personal networking and

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1 The author gratefully acknowledges valuable assistance of the Korea Foundation Advanced Research Grant, which enabled multi-country fieldwork for this project in progress.
company-to-company deals, they are one of the primary pathways for collaboration between filmmakers and content producers from one or more nations. Like the boomerang, ICPTs have intentional targets and require a particular execution technique. However, both participating and potential producing parties often encounter unexpected hurdles in the returning pathways of such collaborative instruments. Although ICPTs are not obligatory, and certain countries embrace them more than others, there is a dark side to pursuing such agreements. Overcoming the central tensions that are addressed in this paper is more important now than ever before as the burgeoning creative and cultural industries of Korea and China look to each other and to Australia and New Zealand for new international co-production (hereafter ICP) strategies. They all share the desire to compete against the almighty US industry – which does not have any ICPTs nor does it feel the need to pursue such collaborative international instruments – and its culturally-specific films, which have long ensured the effectiveness of the Hollywood majors’ overseas campaigns illustrated by Vasey (1997), Jarvie (1992) and Thompson (1985). They are all looking for ways to promote and/or preserve national identity as well as diversity from inside and from outside their audio-visual and cultural industries.

This paper introduces the benefits of engaging with official ICPs as well as the lost costs for producing partners. It will also present various ICP projects that have experienced pitfalls with a view toward improving future opportunities between the aforementioned nations. Ultimately, the aim is to illustrate some of the dynamic strategies that creative and cultural industries are engaging to meet the demands of different governments’ policies and to overcome the limitations of representative cross-cultural linkages made while producing a film, TV show or digital media program in more than one country, and/or with an international team. There are only a small number of cases addressed in this paper as well as in the papers offered by Ae-Gyung Shim and Ben Goldsmith. This is a fascinating topic that needs more attention elsewhere, but for today it is hoped that scholars, creative and cultural industry practitioners and policymakers will gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of transnational cultural production flows – with a view toward enhancing Korea’s future role in the power dynamics of cultural industries across the globe.

**PERCEIVED BENEFITS vs. THE DARK SIDE**

Official ICPs are facilitated through memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and treaties between pairs of countries. Under the rules of these instruments, each country agrees to specific guidelines under which a co-production can occur. These types of agreements have two ideal (underlying but distinctive) purposes: one aims for an economic benefit and the other results in a collaborative cultural experience. ICP agreements have a significant positive spin. They are ‘offensive’ because they compound funding sources, enabling producers to make a bigger and better end-product – i.e. feature film, documentary, mini TV series or telemovie – that can potentially compete with a better-funded US production.

All formal agreements generally share the same fundamental aims and outcomes – namely they are designed to facilitate ongoing international cultural exchange via audio-visual production collaborations, collective financing for projects, and new distribution and thus consumption markets for completed projects. Within this process co-production partners acquire privileged insights and inroads into each other’s market while enabling them to combine their creative and technical expertise. The ultimate outcome is a film, television program or other digital media content that from the inside of each country has cleared local content regulations and thus can be considered a ‘domestic’ production in
each of the respective partner countries. This national status achieved by an international co-production provides unprecedented access to markets and foreign audiences that might otherwise be governed and protected by local censorship and import regulations in those markets. Historically, co-productions have generated larger revenues in smaller markets than the domestically-produced films from those markets because of the ability to cast large stars form the partnering countries, resulting in higher fees that broadcasters (of telemovies and miniseries) or film distributors are willing to pay for the end product. Generally speaking, for instance, a successful China-Korea co-produced film (usually the first named country denotes a majority partner in terms of content and financing) potentially would have access to the estimated 36,000 and 2,058 cinema screens in China and Korea respectively and hundreds of millions of China’s media consumers – whether via public cinema screens, private television screens at home or mobile screens on portable devices. Simply stated, after a period of courtship between the governments and creative industries of two countries and the signing of an ICPT, possibilities are cast outward with the hopes of returning something economically-viable and culturally-enriching.

However, as is the case when throwing a boomerang, there is a real possibility of missing the target – particularly if the target is moving as in the case of the industry’s current economic conditions or any nation’s ratings and censorship guidelines, for that matter. Over time, the combined pools of cash in each country that producers gain access to have proven more popular than having a collaborative cultural experience because of the brunt of criticism aimed at the exploitation of the game played to acquire this cash. In this sense, ICPT agreements are ‘defensive’ or ‘protective’ because they set minimum requirements for cultural content and other ‘local’ employment obligations. Here, something that can be considered local is often sought-after to fulfil policy requirements, that is, to tick a box on a form, rather than to grow from an organic desire to tell a local story. I will return to this forced nature and negative context of local content requirements shortly.

Among the countries mentioned thus far, Australia leads the pack with one of the oldest agreements in the form of an MOU with France signed in 1986. Australia’s other agreements established, in chronological order, include: United Kingdom (1990), Canada (1990), Italy (1993), New Zealand (MOU, 1994), Vietnam (MOU, 1996), Israel (1997), Ireland (1998), Germany (2001), China (2006) and Singapore (2008), while proposed treaties with Denmark, Malaysia, India and South Africa are currently pending (and another treaty with Fiji died in 2004). New Zealand is the runner-up with ten agreements, including Spain, South Korea, Ireland, Germany, the UK, Singapore, Italy, France, Canada and Australia. Presently, China has signed co-production treaties with Canada, Italy and Australia and is under negotiation with the UK, India and Bulgaria. South Korea is a relative latecomer to signing ICPTs, having signed treaties with France (2006) and New Zealand (2008). By way of comparison, as of 2005 the Canadian government has displayed the most conscientious enthusiasm about pursuing ICPTs. Canada has had more ICPTs than all of these combined, with a total of 52 agreements across Europe, Asia, North and South America and parts of Africa – namely, as an effective mechanism for stimulating the development of its national audio-visual and creative industries. Canada is

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3 Here, ‘successful’ means that the film in question passes China’s rigorous two-stage censorship approval process, which involves pre-production/script and final cut/content approval.
unique in this regard, nonetheless, their track record of ICPTs makes South Korea and China appear more ambivalent about reaching out to potential international collaborations in this way – and for good reasons. However, it should be remembered that there are many unofficial co-production activities amongst these countries. As is going to be shown in the case of Korea, whilst Korea’s official ICPTs number only two, its international co-production activities have noticeably increased in the early 2000s with the globalization efforts initiated by Korean production companies – particularly in conjunction with other Asian countries such as China and Japan.

Korea, which has not signed an ICPT with China yet, has pursued the Chinese market through multiple private levels. Since 2006, production companies such as MK Pictures, Beijing Nabi Pictures and Boram Pictures have actively sought-after co-production opportunities with the PRC. According to China’s film law, any film that has been completed with a mixture of Chinese funding, staff and actors, as well as foreign investment, can be treated as a ‘local’ Chinese film. Thus this ‘local’ film is not restricted by import quota regulations in China (Moon Cine21 no. 550). While the government (via the Korean Film Council’s) aim of signing an ICPT with China is lagging behind its ICPT with New Zealand, the aforementioned private companies have found their own pathways for entering the Chinese market. Here, the Korean Film Council (KOFIC) and, partly, the Korean Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) – through several targeted industry networking events and project developments between the Korean and Chinese industries – have been invaluable catalysts for bi-lateral collaborations. One recent outcome of these efforts is a film called Sophie’s Revenge. This film stars Korean actor So Ji-seup alongside the beautiful and talented Chinese actresses (and now pop singers) Zhang Ziyi and Fan Bingbing. It is directed by Yimeng Jin and produced by the Beijing Perfect World Co and CJ Entertainment. At the time of writing, Sophie’s Revenge is waiting to be released simultaneously in China, Hong Kong and Korea on 14 August 2009.

In terms of ICPTs impacting on how film industries conduct business, it is no secret that US producers will go anywhere that offers the best bottom-line, which is also a moving target; they favor the national industries in New Zealand, Australia and parts of Europe because of the attractive tax and rebate incentives that their governments offer them to produce films there.4 One thing to be remembered here is that ICPTs exist next to other instruments such as production incentives, location and producer offset incentive schemes, which include cash rebates (often presented at the airport upon departure), tax credits (deductions, exemptions and waivers) and advance or post-production rebates. Governments use these types of incentives to develop economic growth, to modernise industry infrastructure and to increase domestic employment and training opportunities – all while promoting tourism. Members of the US film industry have been taking advantage of these incentives while ignoring a more direct pathway toward official ICPTs. However, today the US film industry is facing unique challenges with the national industry in China, in which collaborative partnerships seem indirectly possible through an ICPT mechanism. Once signed, the China-Bulgaria ICPT will provide new opportunities for a large part of Hollywood because of the relationship between Bulgaria’s previously state-owned Boyana Film studio and the US film industry. Boyana Film studio is now known as the US-owned NU Boyana Film Studios, and is one of the largest film production complexes in Europe (owned by California-based Nu Image/Millennium Films).5 To me this deal really seems


5 Before it purchased the Bulgarian studio from the government, Nu Image had made at least 60 feature films
to be a backdoor US-China agreement, which will provide at least certain members of the US film industry increased access to the Chinese market. This is one masked but direct way ‘in’ to China.

One might ask why Korea and the US among other countries are so keen to gain access to the Chinese market? The answer is this: the total number of films that have been made since the government initiated market liberalisation in 2001, has made this world power a hot market. China is in the middle of a boom. Apart from the dominating state-controlled film studios, more than 350 private domestic companies across all aspects of pre- and post-production have entered the market. Next to India and the US, China is one of the largest film producers across the planet. According to The Hollywood Reporter’s Special Issue on Chinese Film Industry (undated, p. 2-3), in 2007 the industry produced an all-time high of 402 feature films (up from 330 in 2006) as well as another 122 HD digital films for television – all part of the 1100 feature film applications for that year of which 82% were given the green light for production. Among the 402 films made in China in 2007 were about 50 ICPs with 20 different countries and regions. Producing with a Chinese partner is a luring proposition for some of the previously-mentioned reasons, such as access to a massive number of eyeballs and wallets.

However, the coming together of two countries with different cultural backgrounds, such as in a Chinese-Canadian co-production, is proving to be more difficult than expected. The benefits of reduced costs – estimated to be a fraction of producing in the US or in Hong Kong – can quickly evaporate because of divergences between local and foreign production methods. On the ground and in their own way, Chinese filmmakers are a talented and experienced mob. But they do things differently from, say, a Canadian production crew. This fact has caused numerous ICP projects, such as the Canadian-Chinese four-part television miniseries Iron Road (2008), starring Peter O’Toole, Sun Li (China), Sam Neill (New Zealand), Tony Leung (Hong Kong) and Luke MacFarlane (Canada) to go vastly over budget. To be fair, production crews on both sides of an agreement still have a lot to learn about each other’s local customs and traditional operating methods. Appropriate expectations, in other words, reasonable targets achievable through experience, are needed for such dynamic international collaborations.

At the same time, the Chinese government’s approach to media regulations is vastly different from other nations, which makes China a challenging partner. In essence, the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) is focused on ‘purifying’ screen content with the goal of developing a child-friendly screen culture. Films portraying hardcore sex, rape, prostitution or nudity, among other things, are forbidden. The use of obscene or sexually-implicit dialogue and soundtrack music in domestic films is forbidden too, even though this style of content is often allowed in foreign screenings. The violent attempted rape scene in the James Bond film Quantum of Solace (2008), which opened un-edited across China on 1250 screens, is a case in point. However, censorship targets often move without warning, making it more difficult for local filmmakers, let alone foreign co-producing partners, to hit the bullseye – particularly given China’s two-layered censorship approach: once in the script development stage and again in the final-cut stage. The Australian producers of Bruce Beresford’s film Mao’s Last Dancer (expected to be released in 2009), which is based on the popular autobiographical book by Li Cunxin, desired the film to be a formal co-production film, but the Chinese government (represented by the China Film Co-Production Corporation, in Bulgaria over a 10-year period.
CCFC) has decided not to sanction it. Hence, ‘China’ will be but one of many locations where *Mao’s Last Dancer* was shot.

Nonetheless, even for countries with similar cultural backgrounds it is still challenging to pursue an ICP. Take the example of *BeastMaster* (1999-2002), a 66-episode official Australian-Canadian co-produced television series that was shot on location in Queensland, Australia. This is a case that reveals further insights into some of the trade-offs and controversies associated with ICPs. The original material was based on a sword-fantasy science fiction novel written by Andre Norton and published initially in the US in 1959. Undoubtedly, the project brought valuable work to the Australian production industry. Australian broadcasters acquired the US-looking *BeastMaster* series for approximately one-tenth of the cost of other Australian television programs that had been pre-sold to them. Hence, this seemingly foreign production simultaneously met quota conditions surrounding Australian content while maintaining a significant competitive advantage over truly local content. However, given that the series evidently did not contain Australian or Canadian content one can say that the program’s producers exploited the ICP system to leverage funding from the Australian Film Finance Corporation (hereafter FCC), the then-Government’s core agency for financing film and television productions that met the objectives of the Australian Content Standard under the *Broadcasting Services Act 1992*. These were standards that attempted to galvanise the broadcasting of domestic content, which reflected multiculturalism and promoted (Australia’s) cultural identity – all while enabling the local industry to flourish under its own creative control.

Another interesting formal ICP is Peter Weir’s Australian-French film *Green Card* (1990), which was shot entirely in New York and distributed by Australia’s Village Roadshow. It showcased the poorly English-spoken French star Gérard Depardieu and the all-American actress Andie MacDowell. Although there is a noticeable absence of Australian cultural identity, *Green Card* qualified as a ‘locally-funded’ production under the FCC at the time. Although discussed only tersely, the *BeastMaster* and *Green Card* productions highlight some of the dear costs and sacrifices that follow ICPs and their impact on local industries. More research is needed on these and other films in order to better understand how to overcome the challenges of international film policy instruments.

**CONCLUSION: OVERCOMING THE ‘DARK SIDE’**

For some producers who are familiar with working alone, ICPTs are unproductive and impractical for five primary reasons: 1) they are too complex; 2) they remain out of sync with other incentives available within the majority partner’s own country; 3) producers are forced to balance loyalties between two sets of rules, two sets of government funding, two sets of bureaucracies and two sets of crews – often speaking languages other than their native tongue; 4) they can cost more because of the need to negotiate complex legal agreements; and 5) on a smaller note, different time zones can make communication difficult, particularly if the project is a European, Australian and North American co-production. Despite these challenges, treaty co-productions seem to work well for children’s drama and animation because of the ability to dub the end product into multiple languages, that is, increasing the production’s flavour of local identity without sacrificing

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6 On 1 July 2008 the FCC and the Australian Film Commission (AFC) merged under the umbrella brand name of Screen Australia, which is now the centralised government agency responsible for encouraging local and international investment in and promotion of Australia’s screen production industries. In 2005, the Australian Communications and Media Authority’s *Broadcasting Services (Australian Content) Standard 2005* superseded the Australian Content Standard under the *Broadcasting Services Act 1992*.  

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the cost. As Betz (2001, 35) observes, “The tensions between national identity and international policy are borne out in the ultimate untranslatability of its specific confluences of sound and image, voice and body, language and performer.”

In defence of employment situations, trade guilds, associations and unions comprise the largest and the most vocal opposition to ICPTs because they are perceived to be taking jobs away from locals by taking the pre-production, shooting and post-production to another country. For this reason, Screen Australia has taken great care to consult with unions wherever and whenever possible during the selection and construction of international agreements. For the whole of a national industry, ICPs can ultimately damage or impede local industry development, which is an explicit objective of supporting regulations. As evidenced by the films discussed today, ICPs can also circumvent cultural imperatives, because they weaken the cultural relevance of the content to any one international partner by trying to appeal to and represent the cultural identities of all partnering countries all at once. Rather than directly impacting adversely on other art forms such as theatre, music, visual arts, these five problems potentially plague everyone who works in the industries that inform or entertain audiences (including but not limited to journalists, actors, dancers, sportspeople, cartoonists, photographers, orchestral & opera performers and others working in public relations, advertising, book publishing and website production.

Those who avoid ICPS tend to consider their terms as virtually unworkable. That is, the creative and production control process is difficult for the partnering producers from each territory, adding, among other things, greater costs (e.g. duplication of fees and extra admin, legal and accounting costs). Furthermore, while ICPTs tend to cater for film and television production, other areas of the audio-visual and cultural industry, such as in theatre or music tend to pursue informal or unofficial agreements and collaborative events/festivals rather than a predetermined set of government rules and regulations. In addition, the gaming industry, unlike the film and television industry, tends to conduct more unique one-on-one international commercial agreements as opposed to following general co-production treaties due to the availability of different types of direct markets and distribution channels.

For scholars in Korean Studies and in Film and Cultural Studies as well as for audio-visual and cultural industry practitioners, the issues presented here are of critical concern for the Korean film industry but they largely remain under-examined. Further research into these matters is necessary because it promises to provide new perspectives on the dynamics of such international linkages and transnational cultural production flows in the Asia-Pacific region, while assisting cultural practitioners and policymakers to understand Korea’s future role in the power dynamics of cultural industries across the globe. Ultimately, it is hoped that this and other similar projects will encourage stronger bonds between Korea and its Asia-Pacific neighbours, specifically regarding the resistance to the “Americanization” (i.e. globalisation) of digital media, by fostering dialogue, promoting networking opportunities and informing future policy development. The preliminary findings in the present paper may be significant because they promise to expand existing knowledge about traditional media and to offer insights into the development of cultural content for new digital media in Korea, China, Australia and New Zealand – nations that are eagerly searching for effective pathways toward international collaboration.

However, like the boomerang, the design/general properties, functionality and execution of ICPTs is paramount for success, let alone, sustainability. Clear targets need to
be identified and controls for influencing variables need to be in place. Understanding the best ways forward requires an appreciation of each other’s history and culture, as well as the characteristics of each other’s modern audiences and media consumers. On paper, it is precisely the ICPT that promises to provide deep and privileged insights into these issues. Yet, in reality, as suggested today, the hunt for the so-called perfect project and the communication required to complete this project is marred by a fear of what is lost or what it will cost to do so.

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Remaking the Korean RomCom:
A Case Study of Yeopgijeogin geunyeo and My Sassy Girl

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ABSTRACT

Since 2001 the Korean film industry has become one of the strongest in the world outside the U.S. and India, with local movies accounting for almost 50 percent of overall ticket sales and often outperforming the biggest Hollywood blockbusters. In recent years Hollywood has turned its attention to Korea as reflected in the increasing number of articles in trade journals such as Variety and The Hollywood Reporter that focus on Korean movies and particularly studios’ acquisitions of remake rights to films such as My Wife is a Gangster (Jopog manura, 2001), Oldboy (2003), The Host, (Gwoemul 2006), The Chaser (Chugyeogja, 2008), and many others.

This paper focuses on a case study of My Sassy Girl (Yeopgijeogin geunyeo), a romantic comedy directed by Jae-young Kwak based on a series of autobiographical stories posted on the Internet by Ho-sik Kim, and its Hollywood remake directed by Yann Samuell, which was recently released direct to DVD in the U.S. I perform a close comparative reading of both versions of the film, discussing similarities and differences with regard to their narrative and formal strategies, their approach to the romantic comedy genre, and their ideological perspectives on gender, sexuality, class, and nationality. By putting in conversation a textual analysis of My Sassy Girl with the creative and cultural choices that were made in translating it for American audiences, I aim to provide a kind of cultural barometer for assessing both the global circulation of Korean popular culture and the continued power of hegemonic U.S. values within an increasingly hybrid mediascape.

INTRODUCTION

In the past few years, the South Korean film industry has become one of the strongest in the world outside the United States and India, with local movies accounting for almost 50 percent of overall ticket sales and often outperforming the biggest Hollywood blockbusters. Its meteoric success has caught the attention of the U.S. film industry as evidenced by the growing number of articles in trade journals, which have spotlighted Korean films and particularly studios’ acquisition of remake rights to domestic blockbusters such as My Wife is a Gangster (Jopog manura, 2001), Oldboy (2003), The Host, (Gwoemul, 2006), The Chaser (Chugyeogja, 2008), and many others.

This paper looks at a recent attempt to remake one of the most commercially successful and culturally influential of these contemporary movies: the romantic comedy Yeopgijeogin geunyeo (hereafter YG, distributed in the U.S. under the title, My Sassy Girl), which was directed by Kwak Jae-young and released in Korea in 2001. The remake, also titled My Sassy Girl (hereafter MSG), went direct to DVD in the U.S. in August 2008 and did poorly upon its theatrical release in Korea a few months later. I use MSG as a case study to think about moments in global flows of media culture when certain narratives do

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not resonate cross-culturally and what we might learn about globalization and its limits from such moments.

More specifically, I examine how MSG was unable to convey the ideological codes of love and courtship recognized and enjoyed by East Asian audiences to Hollywood ones. I suggest that this (mis)translation may have been due to two related factors: first, the conditional consumption of East Asian cultures in the U.S. through the filter of certain orientalist stereotypes; and second, the continued existence of cultural differences between Korea and the U.S. with regard to notions of gender, sexuality, and love despite the rapid modernization of the former since the 1960s. I discuss these factors through the lens of gender and genre, centering on the social dimensions of romance, melodrama, and comedy that constitute the romantic comedy genre, or “romcom.”

The paper is divided into two sections. The first section notes the ways in which Korean commercial films have attracted the attention of U.S. producers and distributors. It then goes on to consider why combinations of historically masculinized genres such as the action, thriller, and horror have thus far been remade more often and more successfully than those utilizing historically feminized genres such as the romance, melodrama, and comedy. The second section highlights the cultural literacies that the romcom assumes of its audiences in Korea and the U.S. through readings of YG and MSG, focusing on the following elements: narrative style and structure, development of the male and female protagonists, and depiction of the protagonists’ relationships with their families and friends. Along with pointing out formal and ideological connections between Korean and U.S. films, my readings consider those moments when narrative aspects fail to translate in comprehensible or otherwise pleasurable ways. In so doing I hope to provide a kind of cultural barometer for assessing both the continued power of hegemonic U.S. values and the potential challenge to that power posed by the global circulation of Korean popular culture.

“COPYWOOD,” HOLLYWOOD, AND THE ROLE OF GENRE IN THE “REMAKE CRAZE”

As a number of film scholars have shown, the ways in which filmmakers in Asian countries such as Hong Kong, India, and Korea have drawn on and reworked the Hollywood blockbuster to appeal to local and regional histories and cultures, tastes and trends reveal that globalization is no longer (if it ever was) a purely western-centered or driven phenomenon. I would like to take that observation a step further by considering how U.S. remakes of Korean blockbusters further complicate the notion of global cultural flows as unilateral, or even for that matter, bilateral.

The first Korean movie to self-consciously model itself after the Hollywood blockbuster and market itself as such was the spy drama action thriller, Shiri, directed by Je-gyu Kang, which helped bring the film industry out of its longtime slump when it was released in 1999. The film grossed an estimated $27.5 million at theaters, broke the Korean box office record set by Titanic in 1997, and helped Korean films to take 35.8% of the domestic market that year. While the film displayed traits associated with Hollywood

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3Chi-Yun Shin and Julian Stringer, “Storming the Big Screen: The Shiri Syndrome” in Frances Gateward,
movies such as an emphasis on spectacle and special effects, a memorable theme song, a tight, character-driven storyline, and of course, a big production budget, its theme centered on the uniquely Korean legacy of national division and desire for unification, a tension played out in the tragic ending when the espionage and romance plots converge. It was this combination of Hollywood style and Korean content that led Shiri to usher in a new era and style of commercial filmmaking, which Chi-yun Shin and Julian Stringer have dubbed the “new Korean cinema.”

Since the debut of Shiri, filmmakers have followed Kang’s lead, using the narrative and economic models of Hollywood to tell stories about Korean characters that resonate in Korea but ostensibly are flexible enough to make sense as potential U.S. remakes without the Korean settings, themes, and ideologies. Also, like Hong Kong and Hollywood films, they blend many different genres to appeal to as many audiences as possible. Yet different than their U.S. and Hong Kong counterparts, generic diversity in the new Korean cinema often produces surprising, sometimes startling narrative twists and outcomes, as David Diffrient and Darcy Paquet have discussed. All of these formal aspects, along with a well-organized system of film production, marketing and distribution, contribute to the appeal of Korean movies for U.S. producers and distributors looking for fresh new story ideas. Both in and outside Korea, these so-called “Copywood” movies have been critiqued as being derivative of Hollywood and thus less “authentically” representative of so-called Korean culture than the art films of auteurs such as Im Kwon-taek and Hong Sang-soo. Yet this strategy makes practical sense given that the biggest market remains the local one, followed by Japan and France, and that the U.S. is less interested in distributing Korean films — art house or commercial — as it is in remaking them for notoriously ethnocentric American viewers, most of whom can’t be bothered to read subtitles.

In the wake of the highly successful Hollywood remakes, The Ring (2002, based on the Japanese horror film, Ringu, 1998) and The Departed (2006, based on the Hong Kong thriller, Mou gaan dou, 2002), U.S. producers and distributors have gone “remake crazy,” shopping for story ideas from other parts of the world, especially Asia and Latin America, to inject new life into the increasingly dull and predictable American film industry. As mentioned earlier, in the past decade, studios have bought the story rights for several Korean films and remade a few, including The Lake House (2006, based on Siworae, 2000), The Uninvited (2009, based on A Tale of Two Sisters, 2003), and Possession (2009, based on Jungdok, 2002). It is telling that thus far, more movies emphasizing action and horror have been produced and are in development than those emphasizing romance and melodrama. For instance, the action thriller Old Boy, directed by Steven Spielberg and starring Will Smith, will be released in 2010. Other high profile remakes in the works are the horror monster movie, The Host, directed by Fredrik Bond, also slated for release in 2010, and the psychological crime thriller, The Chaser, currently in development at Warner Bros. with Leonardo DiCaprio rumored to play the lead.

Why is Hollywood so interested in remaking these violent, traditionally masculinized genres from Korea? According to Korean-American producer Roy Lee at

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Vertigo Entertainment who has brokered most of the Asian remake deals in Hollywood, these genres are simply more universal – and therefore, more easily adaptable – than others. Indeed, our visceral reactions to the highly visually, adrenaline-charged scenes that characterize these genres make up most of our viewing pleasure, and such embodied responses are shared, for the most part, across cultures. Due to their ability to appeal to a wide range of audiences, “high concept” genres such as action, horror, fantasy, and science fiction unsurprisingly prove to be the highest grossing at the U.S. box office. Advanced special effects studios in Korea also contribute to the high production values so crucial to the enjoyment of these genre films.

Another possible reason for Hollywood’s privileging of Asian action and horror films over others is that these are the primary genres associated with Asia in the U.S. thanks to the high exposure of American audiences to popular media such as martial arts films, Hong Kong action movies, video games, and mecha manga and anime. As Julian Stringer notes, generic categories are used by film producers, critics, and fans not only to sell movies but also to give audiences certain aesthetic and cultural cues for “reading” them. According to Stringer, in the case of contemporary Korean films, essentialist debates in Korea over genre as representative of national values or character (e.g. melodrama as more culturally authentic than comedy) become “quest[s] to secure subcultural capital” when these films enter the global market. In their drive to make sense of this generically diverse body of Korean movies, western critics constantly compare them to Hollywood and other well-known Asian films in the U.S. It would seem to follow from this that American producers would be more enthusiastic to remake genres from Korea that are recognizable to U.S. audiences, whether associated with Hollywood or other East Asian countries such as Japan, China, and Hong Kong.

This might help explain why few melodramas, for instance, have been remade or are scheduled to be remade in Hollywood. While extremely popular in Asia, sentimental East Asian melodrama, romance, and comedy films have not been distributed in the U.S. to the extent that slick Asian action, science fiction, and horror movies have, and thus are less recognizable to most American audiences. While it is too soon to tell how the former genres will ultimately perform as Hollywood remakes, the reception of Korean romantic films that have been remade thus far seems to indicate they will not fare so well. The melodramatic fantasy romance, The Lake House, enjoyed modest success at the box office thanks to the combined star power of Keanu Reeves and Sandra Bullock but was critically panned for the most part. MSG, as noted earlier, did not make it to theatres, and My Wife is a Gangster, the other massively hyped remake of a Korean action romcom, seems to be languishing in permanent development at Miramax after years of rumors that Queen Latifah would play the lead role.

The same reasons for Hollywood interest in Korean action, horror and thriller films might give some insight into its disinterest in Korean romcoms. First, inasmuch as the former genres are consistent high performers at the box office, romantic comedies have not had the spotlight in Hollywood since the reign of the screwball subgenre in the 1930s. Exceptions include surprise hits such as Pretty Woman (1990) and My Big Fat Greek Wedding (2002) and “event” films derived from other properties such as the Bridget Jones movies (2001, 2004) and Sex and the City (2008). According to Tamar Jeffers McDonald,

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7 Jane Park, Interview with Roy Lee, Los Angeles, California, December 5, 2008.
8 Putting Korean Cinema in Its Place: Genre Classifications and the Contexts of Reception” in Shin and Stringer (2005), 96.
9 Ibid., 101.
the contemporary romcom is “aware of its own impoverishment and exhaustion” after its last coherent cycle in the 1990s. Characterized by films directed by Nora Ephron such as *When Harry Met Sally* (1989), *Sleepless in Seattle* (1993), and *You’ve Got Mail* (1998), these “neo-traditional” romcoms reiterate the narrative and ideological formats of classic Hollywood romance movies for nostalgic contemporary female audiences. Following this cycle, the American romcom seems to be experiencing an identity crisis, one mirrored in more general popular representations of the predominantly white, middle-class, and “post-feminist” girls and women that this genre depicts and targets.

Second, as mentioned earlier, the Asian genres that have been privileged so far in the U.S. – martial arts, horror, action, and fantasy – necessarily decontextualize and dehistoricize Asian characters, cultures, and places – a phenomenon I have elsewhere called “oriental style.” In other words, if Hollywood audiences are not used to seeing well-developed Asian characters who have deep and complex relationships with their families, friends, and co-workers, then romantic comedies and melodramas, which foreground such relationships, no matter how well done, may simply not be interesting to American viewers who will not understand or have limited understanding of the histories, cultural codes, and social trends on which these social interactions draw.

Related to this last point, one final and perhaps obvious reason for the lack of interest in the Korean romcom might be that the current state of this genre and the popular attitudes it reflects about gender and sexuality vary quite a bit in Korea and the U.S. By looking at how ideas about love and romance in Korean romcoms fail to cross over to the U.S. and vice versa, I do not mean to suggest that these two cultures are reducible or irreconcilable. Instead, what I want to underscore is that our conceptions and expectations of romantic love are always socially and historically constructed and thus understood, experienced, and performed differently in different cultures. More to the point of this paper, I want to suggest that looking at how romcoms from western and nonwestern countries narrate the evolution of love relationships can help shed interesting light on these differences. I attempt to do this in the following readings of *YG* and *MSG*.

**YG and MSG**

*YG* was the second top grossing film in Korea in 2001, earning $26 million at the box office and drawing 1.76 million admissions. The film was based on stories posted on the Internet in 1999 by recent engineering graduate Ho-sik Kim, describing his experiences with his ex-girlfriend. It traces an offbeat romance between college student Gyeon-woo (Tae-hyun Cha) and the attractive but violent object of his affections: the unnamed The Girl (Ji-hyun Jun) who has a strong penchant for drinking and bullying. One of the primary representatives of the *hallyu* trend that began to sweep East and Southeast Asia in the late 1990s, *YG* also did well regionally, grossing $1.67 million in Hong Kong in 2002 and $4.2 million in Japan during a limited release in 2003. The film subsequently spawned a huge fan base, leading to the so-called “yeobgi” craze in Korea as well as other

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11 Ibid., 85-86.
14 Kyoung-Lae Kang, “Novel Genres or Generic Novels: Considering Korean Movies Adapted from Amateur Internet Novels,” MA Thesis, Department of Communication, University of Massachusetts Amherst, February 2008, 43.
East Asian countries such as China where the aggressive flirting style of the female protagonist became a popular trend amongst young female viewers.16 Yeobgi literally means “weird,” “novelty-seeking,” and even “delinquent,” but in recent usage has come to mean a kind of cool transgressiveness.17

Along with drawing on Hollywood romcom and teen films, the film is part of cycle of so-called “femme antiharines,” or “female stereotype-breaking characters,” appearing in a number of coeval Korean films such as My Wife is a Gangster, Take Care of My Cat (Goyangileul butaghae), Kiss Me Much (Besaeme mucho), and One Fine Spring Day (Bonnaeun ganda), which were all released to commercial and/or critical acclaim in 2001.18 These films showcase strong, complex, and often quite contradictory female protagonists who reverse and/or critique traditional representations of Korean women as socially and sexually transgressive figures that must be punished, passive victims in need of rescue, or marginal narrative devices used to cement central male homosocial relationships. According to So-young Kim and Kyung-Hyun Kim, these kinds of female representations continue to populate the majority of contemporary Korean blockbusters.19

In sharp contrast, men in the abovementioned movies play peripheral roles in stories that focus on women and female relationships, either as backdrop or as emasculated partners who are younger and/or occupy lower social positions than their more powerful female lovers. Examples of the former include Take Care of My Cat, which follows the interwoven stories of five female friends after university graduation, and Kiss Me Much, which centers on the sexual sacrifice a mother makes for her family. Examples of the latter include My Wife is a Gangster, in which a female gang boss uses a submissive junior member to impregnate her, and One Fine Spring Day in which a divorcee has an affair with a younger, less experienced man.

MSG obviously falls into the second camp. Describing the film as “an offbeat romantic comedy of manners between a mother-dominated twentysomething and a weird, self-centered girl he falls for in the subway,” Variety columnist Derek Elley predicted the movie seemed “unlikely to make much impression beyond East Asia but [would] be appreciated by anyone with a broad interest in current Korean cinema.”20 Remaking a film with so much Asian “cultural odor” (to use Koichi Iwabuchi’s term), would require not only some understanding of contemporary Korean youth culture, but even more importantly, a good idea of which aspects of this culture would appeal and not appeal to audiences in the U.S.

Dreamworks seemed to have hit the perfect formula when, after buying the story rights from Shin Cine for $750,000 in 2002, it signed British Indian filmmaker Gurinder Chadha to direct, and executives from Madonna’s production company, Maverick and Vertigo Entertainment (well-known for brokering Asian remakes) to produce.21 At the time Chadha was receiving much critical acclaim for her crossover hit, Bend it Like

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17Kang (75-76).
Beckham (2002) and appeared to be the perfect candidate to direct the remake with her focus on strong female characters and sensitivity to cultural difference. Three years later, however, Gold Circle bought the remake rights from Dreamworks; Chadha dropped out of the project; and rookie French filmmaker Yann Samuell was signed to direct the remake. Samuell had just directed Jeux d’Enfants (2003), also a screwball romcom involving violent displays of affection. Vic Levin began adapting the screenplay, and young rising stars, Jesse Bradford (from Flags of Our Fathers (2006)) and Elisha Cuthbert (from The Girl Next Door (2004)) signed on to play the lead roles. MSG eventually was released direct to DVD in the United States in August 2008, with very little mention in the trades and major newspapers. It opened in theatres in Seoul in late October, far outside the top ten movies.

NARRATIVE AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

As Kyoung-Lae Kang points out, production company Shin Cine’s clever marketing of YG toward the teen to mid-twenties target audience, which made up the large existing fan base for Kim’s Internet novel, played a key role in its runaway success in Korea and the rest of East Asia. The movie makes self-reflexive allusions to intertextual links between the extradiegetic and diegetic narratives – i.e. between the novel and the film and between author Ho-sik Kim and character-turned-author Gyeon-woo – which are clearly aimed not only at members of Kim’s fan base, but also the early twenties demographic depicted in the film. These allusions are dropped in MSG since the target U.S. audience is not assumed to be familiar with the Korean novel or for that matter, the Korean movie on which it is based. The remake also features university students in their early twenties falling in love through almost exactly the same plot devices. However, because cultural norms, expectations, and attitudes for this age group differ significantly in the two countries, what works to elicit laughs and identification in YG often appears odd, puzzling, or simply implausible in MSG. In the remainder of the paper, I will discuss these variations, especially regarding gender, sexual, and family dynamics, as they appear in a few key scenes.

CONSTRUCTIONS OF MASCULINITY: MOTHERS, FATHERS, CAREER GOALS

Both movies open with a flashback at the tree where a year ago, the lovers buried time capsules containing letters expressing their feelings for each other. Through voiceover, the male protagonist (Gyeon-woo in YG, Charlie in MSG) begins narrating the story of how he met the female protagonist (The Girl in YG, Jordan in MSG) after he introduces himself through a comic montage of his childhood. Differences in how the two films construct these characters and the particular sort of masculinity they represent become immediately apparent in these montages.

Gyeon-woo’s montage follows a short scene in which he is having his professional photo taken for employment purposes. While the photographer is taking the picture, his paternal aunt calls on his mobile phone. After politely telling her he will call her back, Gyeon-woo recounts his childhood through a series of baby pictures in which he is dressed in a female hambok and crying. We learn that his mother dressed him as a little girl until

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25‘Wife’ scores at Korean box office,” Sunhee Han, November 3, 2008.
27In Korea professional photos are almost always required as part of one’s resume.
he was seven because his parents wanted a daughter rather than a son. Shortly thereafter, we see Gyeon-woo as a twenty-something back from military service, drinking with his friends and checking out girls from the restaurant window. His mother calls, loudly reprimanding him for not returning his aunt’s call. From the phone conversation, we learn that Gyeon-woo strongly resembles his aunt’s dead son, and that the aunt is eager to set him up with a girl. The would-be family set up, facilitated by the aunt and encouraged by the mother, is repeated at the end of the film and ironically serves to reunite the lovers. This is when we learn that The Girl is precisely the girl he would have met through his aunt had he listened to his mother.

The photo montage is funny for two reasons. First, the photos of Gyeon-woo as a baby boy in drag literally feminize him, playing up the “mama’s boy” aspect of dominant Korean masculinity and foreshadowing his masochistic relationship with The Girl. Second, it reverses the traditional notion of Korean women wanting and favoring sons over daughters. Unlike American men whose masculinity depends on not being perceived as “mama’s boys,” Korean men generally have close relationships to their mothers. This is due to the continued cultural influence of the neo-Confucian family structure in Korea in which women are expected to sacrifice everything for their children, especially sons, who determine their social value, though this is rapidly changing as women gain more legal rights. Gyeon-woo is (re)masculated at the end of the film when he enters the workforce and contains The Girl in a proper relationship recognized by their families and headed for marriage.

Tellingly, however, Gyeon-woo is only able to achieve these goals through the aid of his mother and the mother-figures played by The Girl and his aunt. Throughout the film, Gyeon-woo’s mother, whom we never see in close-up, seems to run the household, loudly scolding and beating him when he sneaks home after his misadventures with The Girl. The father appears only once, to make sure that Gyeon-woo is doing his homework instead of looking at Internet porn, and rather than a disciplinarian, he seems more like a meek co-conspirator likewise living under the whip of the mother. Similarly, The Girl’s father, while playing the role of the patriarch, is drunk both times he appears in the film (when he meets Gyeon-woo and forbids him from seeing his daughter) and is always accompanied by his wife, who discreetly tells him what to say. As I will discuss in more detail shortly, Gyeon-woo’s career as Internet author and screenwriter (modeled after that of Ho-sik Kim), is directly indebted to and enabled by his experiences with The Girl. Also, like her mother with her father, The Girl continually tells Gyeon-woo what to do and like Gyeon-woo’s mother with her son and husband, she expresses her “tough love” through what seems on surface to be mental and physical abuse. Finally, the aunt serves as a substitute mother-figure for Gyeon-woo when she introduces him to The Girl as a substitute for his cousin, who coincidentally turns out to be The Girl’s ex-boyfriend.

Meanwhile, the mother and mother-figures play little to no role at all in MSG with respect to Charlie’s masculinity. His montage is a cartoonish film, which caricatures his growing up in the American Midwest, a region known for its politeness and good “family values.” We learn that Charlie’s father has worked as a manufacturer at the Tiller King, the largest employer in their small town, for all of his life, and his parents’ biggest dream is for their son to become a middle-manager at the company. Charlie moves to New York to realize that dream as the first person in his family to attend college. The humor of this montage derives from the familiar Hollywood trope (presented self-reflexively here) of the young and innocent working-class boy from a wholesome small town moving to the dangerous big city. Unlike Gyeon-woo’s mother, Charlie’s mother functions simply as an extension of the father, whose footsteps his son is expected to follow and surpass
(embodied in the embarrassingly parochial Tiller King representative he meets later in New York). Significantly, both parents only appear in the montage. Also, while MSG uses the same plot device of the aunt and dead cousin to reunite the lovers in the end, we never learn how the aunt is connected to Charlie’s parents, what brought her to New York, and why she seems to occupy a very different (upper) class position from them. Meanwhile, the film makes no mention at all of Jordan’s mother, and her father is painted as an absolute tyrant, continually forbidding Charlie from seeing his daughter, without ever asking him anything about himself or his plans for the future (as does The Girl’s father with Gyeon-woo).

Introduced through the montages and developed in the films, the characteristics of the male protagonists’ masculinity (or lack thereof) that are supposed to be funny are quite different. In MSG the comedy derives from Charlie putting up not just with Jordan’s abuse (which is much tamer than The Girl’s) but, perhaps more astonishingly for American audiences, her insistence on keeping the relationship chaste. Meanwhile, in YG the comedy derives from Gyeon-woo’s obvious emasculation by The Girl and sexually suggestive situations that are funny because of their innocence. The shift from comedy to melodrama, laughter to tears occurs when the lovers break up and enter their trial separation period. In both films this separation is brought on by the parents’ rejection of the male protagonist and the emotional confusion of the female protagonist (who feels guilty for falling in love with someone who so strongly resembles her dead ex-boyfriend). It is interesting to note, however, that when the lovers are reunited (presumably through fate), the Korean male protagonist has evolved from being an aimless university student to a professional screenwriter, unwittingly meeting his family’s expectations for him. In contrast, the American male protagonist has transformed from being a motivated student to a slacker who deliberately declines a management job at the Tiller King, thus renouncing the future his family had envisioned for him.

**CONSTRUCTIONS OF FEMININITY: SEX AND VIOLENCE, ALCOHOL AND MOVIES**

Meanwhile, the “sassy” female protagonists in both films follow the same development trajectory, from uncontrolled and uncontrollable girls who repeatedly, sadistically test their devoted, somewhat castrated suitors to grown-up, self-disciplined young women who happily settle into serious, long term relationships. As in most romcoms, their power decreases as that of their partners increases. Neither is shown with any female friends nor having close relationships with their mothers (though as I pointed out earlier, The Girl exhibits maternal tendencies toward Gyeon-woo). Jordan lacks a mother, and The Girl is doubled more with her father than her mother, mostly through their shared propensity to drink and suddenly pass out. The only woman with whom the female characters bond is the matchmaking aunt who functions both as a kind of mother-figure and as the potential mother-in-law who represents the patrilineal family.

This follows the ideological formula of the romcom in which female protagonists ultimately are defined by and through their relationships with men. Put simply, the female protagonists in YG and MSG are introduced as “unruly” young women in the first, comedic section of the film, which segues into the melodramatic break-up and separation period during which time the female characters are humanized (read: feminized through tears and revelation of their vulnerability) so that they can be transformed into and contained as good wives and future mothers at the end. As Kathleen Rowe notes, this shift from the playful preoedipal or semiotic stage (characterized by carnivalesque attitudes and behavior) to the mature oedipal or symbolic stage (characterized by the law of the father,
or patriarchy) also follows a generic shift from comedy as social and gender transgression (courtship) to melodrama (separation) back to comedy as restoration of social order and reproduction of family/community (reunion).28

Along with their aggressive, unfeminine behavior, chronic drinking also characterizes both female protagonists in the preedipal, “sassy” stage. Indeed it is their alcoholism that leads them to meet their future mates who rescue them from falling, drunkenly, into the subway tracks. However, The Girl’s drunkenness is played up much more, drawing on elements of the “gross-out film” – a comedic subgenre characterized by “toilet humor” that emphasizes bodily functions such as farting, burping, defecating, etc. Here, much of the humor derives from a long sequence in which The Girl eventually vomits on an older gentleman’s toupee on the train after which she passes out, calls Gyeon-woo “darling,” and inadvertently begins their relationship. Gyeon-woo reluctantly takes her to a motel because he is too conscientious to abandon her in the station and is repaid for his thoughtfulness by being thrown in prison, presumably for raping her. Meanwhile, Jordan exhibits none of the gross-out behavior of her Korean counterpart; Charlie takes her to his university dorm and is promptly thrown in campus jail. This entire sequence does not make sense as U.S. universities are not allowed to have jails on campus; furthermore, campus police do not have the right to arrest students for having sex.

Here we run into another point of cultural difference. Whereas in the U.S. most young people leave home to attend university, the majority of young people in Korea continue to live at home until they get married. Premarital sex, while not at all uncommon, remains more of a social taboo in Korea than in the U.S. where it is considered the norm. For this reason, Gyeon-woo’s first few dates with The Girl ending up at a motel is both funny and realistic since we know they are not having sex and since he literally cannot take her home. Also, YG does not have to justify its lack of eroticism between the main characters. Indeed, until quite recently, lovers in Korean movies and television never even kissed – partly due to censorship and partly due to general discouragement of public displays of affection. In contrast, MSG constantly pathologizes Jordan’s delay in having sex with Charlie even as it valorizes Charlie for waiting. Gyeon-woo suffers from physical abuse; Charlie suffers from not getting laid.

As well, alcoholism is seen as a social problem and personal addiction to be overcome in the U.S. while drinking is an important social lubricant in Korea, functioning as a culturally sanctioned outlet and bonding activity, particularly among men. Although Korean women have gained more legal and economic power with their entrance in the workplace, they are still expected to meet certain expectations of “soft” and “innocent” femininity. Such expectations run counter to those exerted by dominant culture on American women to be assertive and sexually empowered. Perhaps for this reason, Jordan’s drinking seems much more pathetic and pathological than The Girl’s, which is funnier in the Korean context. Whereas The Girl’s heavy drinking reverses the feminine gender role expected of her, Jordan’s paints her as that of a spoiled, alcoholic socialite. Later, of course, we learn that the girls drink from having broken hearts and are shown sober during and after the separation period.

Finally, both female characters are aspiring screenwriters and rewrite famous Hollywood and Korean movies as well as genres associated with both film traditions, humorously reversing the gender roles of male and female protagonists. The Girl rewrites Terminator, a famous Korean melodrama, Shower, and a martial arts film; Jordan rewrites

Titanic and a western. In all the films a woman from the future comes back to the present to rescue her male partner. This plot device works in YG, again, due to the film’s allusion to Kim’s Internet novel and its adaptation; it doesn’t work in MSG and so is never followed up or developed. During the separation period, Gyeon-woo and Charlie improve their athletic skills in swimming, kendo, and racketball. However, while Charlie dates other women to make the time go faster, Gyeon-woo, assuming the character of Ho-sik Kim, publicly sublimates his pain by writing about his experiences with The Girl on the Internet. In doing so, he inadvertently appropriates the role of author that she had aspired to be. In other words, The Girl (unnamed throughout the film and thus rendered simultaneously anonymous and universal) is doubly objectified, both in the Internet novel and its adaptation: her boyfriend not only contains her physical sassiness when she becomes a proper girlfriend but also her dreams of becoming a storyteller by telling her story for her.

Meanwhile, the female characters do exactly the same thing during this time: they cry and mope, though The Girl also goes abroad to England, presumably to study. Fate, with a little bit of help, brings both couples back together, and we are to assume they all live happily ever after. Yet the conclusion of YG is more satisfying because we can see how the characters have grown and developed through their relationship and because it reaffirms the presence and power of the characters’ families in their lives (for good or bad), which is a recurring trope throughout the film. The conclusion of MSG, on the other hand, leaves the viewer hanging. Jordan and Charlie remain fundamentally the same characters as when the film began, except Charlie is “free” from his parents’ influence, having decided to give up his original career goals. Whereas it is clear that The Girl and Gyeon-woo’s union is stable and sanctioned by their families, we have no idea how Charlie’s parents or how Jordan’s father will react to their relationship, and we are not really supposed to care. This distinct difference in the role of the extended family underscores the communal nature of romance in Korean in contrast to the less family-focused and more individualistic approach to romance in the United States.

CONCLUSION

As I have tried to show in this reading of YG and MSG, the limitations of reworking Korean movies for U.S. audiences are particularly apparent in genres such as the romcom, which foreground human relationships as expressed through the formal and ideological terms of a specific time, place, and culture. One could easily argue, of course, that the failure of MSG was related to the production process: perhaps under the direction of Chahdha or a Korean female director, with different actors, or aimed at a different audience such as the teen demographic, the remake would have been more successful.

As it stands, however, the inability of the almost perfectly faithful adaptation in MSG to capture the particular kinds of characters and their motivations and performances that made YG so popular speaks to the cultural distance between Korea and the U.S with respect to what romance is, and how it is represented in the movies. A close examination of how and why certain narratives fail to translate across different cultures highlights crucial gaps and disjunctions in the global mediascape and also points to the continued existence of cultural and national differences in a supposedly swiftly “globalizing” (read: homogenizing) world. As Asia becomes one of Hollywood’s biggest export regions (experts estimate that it will comprise 60% of the U.S. market in the next ten years) and as
stars, styles and stories increasingly “cross over” from Asia to Hollywood and back, understanding and appreciating these differences will grow ever more important.29

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Matrifocality in Korean Society:
Hindrance or help towards gender equality?

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ABSTRACT
Matrifocality, which literally means ‘mother-centeredness’, should not be confused with matriarchy or matriliney. Matrifocality usually occurs in societies where man folk are absent for various reasons and women have to fulfil the double role of mother and breadwinner of the family unit. However, I would argue that it existed in patriarchal Confucian-orientated Korean society even in the pre-modern age, and that it has gained strength in ever-changing but persistently male-dominant contemporary South Korean society.

The ideology of namjonyŏbi (honoured man, subservient woman), derived from the Confucian cosmology, still permeates in most sectors of Korean society. Despite the much improved women’s status in recent years in terms of legal rights, the traditional concept of male superiority is a long way from being eradicated, but analyses of the past records and contemporary case studies suggest that matrifocality in Korean society is not a paradoxical figment of feminist imagination.

Will matrifocality in the Korean family structure help or hinder in achieving gender equality in Korean society? It can be said to be a double-edged sword. While it is an ideology that restricts women from political participation and public activities, confining them to the domestic circle, it is underpinned by respect for women, which may help restore a higher social position once held by them.

INTRODUCTION
The mother figure has always been important in Korean society: the ideal womanhood is defined as hyŏnmo yangch’ŏ (wise mother and good wife) in Korea, which originated in Japan where ‘good wife’ precedes ‘wise mother’ (Pae 2007, 169). The reason for the reversal of the word order is that traditionally to the Korean woman being a mother is more important than being a wife, which testifies to the strong presence of matrifocality in Korean society (Pae Ibid.). Even during the Confucian orientated patriarchal Chosŏn dynasty, when women’s subordination to men was sanctioned by the prevailing cosmology, paradoxically matrifocality was clearly present in the family structure. It has been further strengthened by the recent economic development and social changes (Pae 2007, 167-171).

Matrifocality, which generally refers to the mother-centred form of family, should be distinguished from matriarchy or matriliney. Since matrifocality per se is not a kinship system in the usual structural sense as matriarchy, it can be found within a variety of kinship types. It occurs in families in which the role of the mother is structurally and culturally central and this centrality is legitimate.

With the introduction and subsequent establishment of Neo-Confucianism in Korean society from the 14th century, the Korean people’s everyday life has been strictly guided by Confucian ideology. Ancestor worship playing the pivotal role in society, filial piety has been considered a prime human virtue (Yi Nŭngwha 1926/1990, 484; Lee
Kwangkyu 1975; Choe Chaesŏk 1982; Pae 2007, 161 & 164). Since filial piety does not distinguish between male and female parents, a woman’s power was largely derived from her sons.

This paper discusses how Korean women maintained the central position in their family mainly through their sons’ filial piety under Confucianism. It examines the current situation of the position of the mother in the family through domestic economic structure and other important issues, such as the children’s education. It then attempts to analyze the effects of matrifocality in gender equality, in light of the changing women’s position in society, the shifting male and female roles, and the marriage pattern in contemporary Korean society.

**Definition of the Term**

The term ‘matrifocality’ was first coined by Smith (1956) to refer to the black family structure in British Guiana. Since then matrifocal families have been identified in diverse societies ranging from urban England (Bott 1957), Java (Geertz 1961), the poorer sections of Naples (Parsons 1969) to African American communities (Smith 1973). However, matrifocality *per se* is not a kinship system, since it can occur in a variety of kinship types. It is therefore important to distinguish matrifocality from matriarchy or matriliny.

According to the Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology (1986), it refers to ‘mother-centred family forms which are usually defined by the absence or weak roles of the father and the corresponding emphases on the female role in the domestic group.’ It is therefore sometimes taken to refer to the family in which the husband/father is absent, incapacitated and/or un/underemployed, such as the black families in the Caribbean countries, and the economically underprivileged African Americans (Stack 1974). The matrifocal family often carries negative connotations (Tanner 1974) owing to the implications that females become family heads through the necessities which are beyond their control.

This definition is problematic, however, since it does not take into account the division of the male and female spheres, and the roles that they play in a particular domain. In societies, where there is a clear demarcation between the spheres of male and female, the mother’s role in domestic sphere is usually much stronger than that of the husband/father. In these mainly patrilineal societies, men have jural and economic power in the public sphere, but wield little influence in the domestic sphere, which includes housekeeping and childrearing. I would argue that ‘matrifocality’ can exist in this type of situation through analysis of the Confucian family structure.

Matrifocality should not necessarily be defined in terms of a dysfunctional family or a temporary state. It can be found in a variety of socio-economic contexts, and can also be said to be an integral part of an overtly patriarchal society. However, some generalities can be drawn despite variations in socio-economic settings in which it occurs.

According to my definition, in the matrifocal family the mother has authority, influence, responsibilities and solidarity of the domestic group, as well as their affection and loyalty. There may or may not be the male head of a family, who has político-jural power in the society although he plays a peripheral role in the domestic domain.

An important feature of matrifocality is that its priority of emphasis is placed upon the mother-child relationship, while the conjugal relationship is expected to be less solidary and less affectively intense (Smith 1973). Tanner (1974) also points out the emphasis on the mother-child bond in a matrifocal society.
MATRIFOCALITY IN PRE-MODERN KOREAN SOCIETY

It is a truism to say that women have long held a low social status in Korean society. The concept of namjon yŏbi (honoured men and subservient women) has been so firmly embedded in Korean people’s psyche, both male and female, that it has provided a simple explanation for the severe gender inequality that has prevailed in all sectors of society. It was derived from the Confucian ethics and cosmology, which governed every aspect of daily life during the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910).

There is, however, documentary and historical evidence to suggest that women’s status in pre-Confucian Korean society was not always that low. During the Shilla period (57 BC – 935 AD), there were three queens (not queen consorts), namely Queen Sŏndŏk (632-647), Chindŏk (647-654) and Chinsŏng (887-897). Although the family system has long been patriarchal and patrilineal, there is strong evidence to suggest that uxorilocal marriage was prevalent in Korean society, at least for the first years of marriage (Yi Nŭnhwa 1926/1990, 120-124). According to Yi, this custom of namgwi yŏga (the man entering his wife’s natal home) existed from the ancient times in Korea, and carried on throughout the Koguryŏ period (37 BC – 668 AD), down to the Koryŏ period (910-1392). This age-old custom was severely criticized by prominent Confucian scholars during the Chosŏn dynasty. Yang Sŏngji deplored this custom in his book Nuljae-jip, and Chŏng Tojŏn lamented in Sambong-jip that this custom of the man living at his wife’s natal home made the wife think lightly of her husband, relying on her parents’ support, so it had the effect of yin dominating yang, which he insisted was totally against the absolute cosmological law. The father-in-law of Yi T’oege (1501-1570), one of the greatest Confucian scholars, moved into his wife’s family home after marriage, which according to Chŏng Sun-mok (1991, 42) was quite common in those days, and eventually inherited the old man’s estate after he died without a son. So it would appear that the custom never died out entirely despite the repeated kings’ orders prohibiting it, which were issued in the 7th year of King Sŏnjo’s rule (1567-1608) and the 25th year of Yŏngjo’s rule (1724-1776). The trace of that widespread practice still remains in today’s language; the Korean phrase for a man getting married is ‘change tŭl’a’ which literally means ‘entering into his in-law’s house’ (Yi Nŭnhwa 1926/1990, 120). Women joined their husbands’ kin as mothers later in life, often as matrons in charge of their own households. Women also inherited a share of their own parents’ property, as in the case of Yi T’oege’s mother-in-law, which accorded them an important social and economic role.

Confucianism was adopted by the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910) as the guiding ideology for social organization. The Korean version was based on the literal interpretation of and the rigid adherence to the Neo-Confucianism developed in Sung dynasty China in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It had an overwhelmingly negative impact on the status of Korean women, who had previously enjoyed a much higher status.

Engels’ (1884/1972) well-known theory about virtually universal male dominance links it to the development of private property from the original communal ownership, men’s exclusive ownership of it, and the subsequent relegation of women’s work from what he calls social production to personal domestic slavery. According to him therefore women’s lowly position is a phase in the developmental history of the family structure, which can and will change with the prevailing economic and social conditions.

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1 According to Deuchler (1977 & 1992), it was a gradual process; the total confucianization took more than a century.
To Neo-Confucianists, however, women’s subordination was an unquestionably natural and proper phenomenon, based on the unchangeable absolute cosmological law. They believed that the human world had to be in equilibrium with the cosmic order, otherwise disasters would befall it. To be in complete harmony with the universe, humans must observe the rules of the moral imperatives, which are commonly known as samgang (the three basic bonds) and oryun (the five moral rules in human relations). Samgang meant that subject should obey sovereign, son should obey father, and wife should obey husband. Oryun decreed that there be loyalty between sovereign and subject, intimacy between father and son, distinction between husband and wife, order of priority between junior and senior, and trust between friends. Thus all human relationships were vertically structured; there were no horizontal relationships, even between friends, since they were either one’s senior or junior. These rules governing human relationships stressed the hierarchical order of the world, and formed the basis of the social matrix.

Correlated with the hierarchical order of society was the notion that each human being had to recognize his/her proper position in society and stay there. In cosmological terms, heaven (yang) dominated earth (yin) and correspondingly, male had precedence over female. Female subordination was thus cosmologically sanctioned, and was considered essential for the proper functioning of human society. A woman had to follow her father before marriage, her husband after marriage, and her eldest son after her husband’s death. To prevent sexual passions from interfering with this order2, the Confucianist drew a sharp distinction between the man’s outer or public sphere and the woman’s inner or domestic sphere.

The wife in theory assumed authority in the domestic sphere. Housekeeping was analogized to the administration of the state. Domestic peace and prosperity depended on the way a wife exerted her authority. The domestic sphere, however, contained a female hierarchy, and existed within the framework of the lineage.

Neo-Confucianism emphasized the concept of lineage as the fundamental device for social organization. In Chosŏn dynasty Korea, a lineage was patrilineal descent group that traced its origin from a common ancestor, and was identified by a common surname and ancestral seat. Lineage membership was genealogically traced through the male line to the founder of the lineage. He and his direct agnatic descendents were regularly honoured by memorial services. Ritualized ancestor worship was an essential institution that emphasized the line of descent as well as the sense of community of living members.

Marriage was the most important contractual institution in Confucian society. According to the Confucian Book of Rites, marriage was intended to be a bond of love between two surnames, with a view to securing the continuation of the family line. Therefore, the purpose of marriage and the most important duty of a wife was to produce sons for the continuation of the lineage. Mencius said, ‘There are three ways of being a bad son. The most serious is to have no heir.’ As a result, the intergenerational relationship between father and son is given priority over the conjugal union, and chastity on the part of the woman was of paramount importance. Although monogamy was the legal practice, virtual polygyny in the form of concubinage was the reality (Ch’oe 1999, 42). Sexual inequality was so great that while a woman’s infidelity was punished by ‘honour killing’, i.e. cruel murder or forced suicide by her family to preserve the family honour, and widows were not allowed to remarry under any circumstances, men enjoyed total sexual

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2 In Confucian society, a public display of love between the opposite sexes, even between a married couple, was subject to gossip, ridicule, ostracism and occasionally more violent forms of punishment for this reason. See Hsu (1948, 228).
freedom. Women were firmly instructed not to be jealous of their husbands’ affairs or concubines, and the wife’s jealousy was one of ‘the seven deadly sins (ch’ilgöjiak)’3, which were legitimate reasons for her expulsion from her husband’s family. That was a fate worse than death to the woman, since it meant social death to her.

Marriage was everything for a woman, since without it she had no social identity. The wedding was, however, a important rite of passage fraught with danger (Van Gennep 1960), an occasion for sorrow rather than joy for her (Freedman 1967). From then on she severed all her ties with her natal family and joined the family of total strangers.4 Since the marriage was officially exogamous and virilocal in Chosôn society, the young bride began her married life as an outsider. She often received harsh treatment from her mother-in-law,5 as well as being subjected to the total subordination to her father-in-law and her husband. Here Korean, Japanese and Chinese societies differed from one another. China had a system of joint family and equal property division among all sons, indicating egalitarian relations among them, as a result of which quarrels often broke out among sisters-in-law in China.6 Korean and Japanese societies made a hierarchical distinction between the successor and the non-successor. Japan had a system of a stem family and one-male inheritance (Nakane 1967). Korea had a joint family system and one-male inheritance, but younger brothers also inherited half the share of their eldest brother, so in Korea inside the extended family, there also existed brotherly hierarchy.

The birth of a son changed a woman’s life. She fulfilled the most important duty as a wife, and acquired the privilege and authority of motherhood. She finally achieved full affiliation to her husband’s lineage through consanguineal ties of her son. As she got older and came to a senior position in the family so her influence grew. In the domestic sphere at least she was in control. Even when her husband died and she supposedly came under the authority of her eldest son, her age and her relationship with her sons often enabled her to wield power. If she was senior in generation and age in the family she would almost certainly be treated as the family head. He sons would defer to her on most matters. Since her sexuality no longer posed a potential threat to the continuation of the lineage, old age gave woman at least a measure of equality with man. Post-menopausal women are considered honorary males in other patriarchal societies such as the Mundurucu of Brazil and the Hua of New Guinea. In Confucian society, however, her power derived through her having sons. Without sons, she was doomed to powerlessness and eventually extinction, since nobody would make offerings to her soul after her death. With sons her importance to the family was established, her existence after death assured, and she became as immortal as did her husband.

3 Ch’ilgöjiak (‘the seven deadly sins’ or ‘the seven-outs’) are (1) pulsun kugo (not obeying parents-in-law), (2) mujū (producing no sons), (3) umhaeng (licentiousness), (4) ch’il’u (jealousy), (5) akčil (bad disease), (6) kassöl (talkativeness) and (7) tošöl (thieving). In return she was protected only by ‘three-not-outs’, which ruled that she could not be sent away if she kept three years’ mourning for either of her parents-in-law, if her husband’s family had become prosperous after she was married into it, and if she had no home to return to.

4 Freeman describes (1967) how Chinese brides were wept over at her wedding by her kinswomen. Borrowing Douglas’s symbolism (1966), tears are purifying, therefore the ceremonial weeping of the wedding can be interpreted as exorcising evil spirits and wishing the bride luck in her new life.

5 The often observed harsh treatment of a young daughter-in-law was explained by Freedman (1967) as something to be endured by her on her way to the solid matriarchy of old age and widowhood. It was a rite of passage (Van Gennep 1960), fraught with pain and hardship for the young bride.

6 Freedman explains (1966) the quarrelsomeness of Chinese women; ‘As a result of a marriage system in which women were bodily and jurally transferred to the families which acquire them as brides, when a married woman fought, she fought for herself, for her children and for her husband.'
Therefore, in Confucian society it is vital for a woman to produce at least one son to acquire authority and power, since it is mostly derived from her sons’ filial piety (Hsu 1948/1971; Freedman 1958 & 1966 & 1979). This situation is also found in many societies, such as the Tallensi (Fortes 1957 & 1959/1983 & 1960/1970 & 1976), who hold similar views on filial duty to those of the Confucianists. In typically patrilineal and patriarchal societies, such as those of Korea, China and Japan, and also the Tallensi, the relationship between father and son is overtly one of severe dominance and submission. The son owes obedience and deference, and a distance is called for between the two men (Freedman 1958 & 1966). On the other hand, the relationship between mother and children, particularly sons, is an extremely affectionate and close one. Wolf (1970) claims that a woman has a close relationship with her son in Confucian society, since she must establish her power in a more subtle fashion, a mother’s authority not being so clearly stated. In Korean society at least, I do not think a mother’s devotional love for her children has any such conscious motive. It is more instinctive, derived from the low-priority relationship with her husband. This close mother-child relationship gives Confucian society a matrifocal quality, since the father’s influence is marginalized at least in the domestic sphere.

**MATRIFOCALITY IN NEWLY-INDUSTRIALIZED CONTEMPORARY SOUTH KOREAN SOCIETY**

The Confucian family ethos still prevails in contemporary South Korean society despite the recent industrialization. Filial piety is still considered by many to be as the supreme human virtue (Lee Kwangkyu 1975; Choe Chaesŏk 1982; Pae 2007, 161 & 164). As stated earlier, filial piety has never discriminated against women, even under the most rigid Confucian system. The Korean mother-child relationship is as close as ever before, but has to be distinguished from Anglo-American ‘momism’. In the former society if a grownup man is extremely attached to his mother, he becomes an object of mild derision, since an adult is conceptualized as one who ‘has cut the apron string’. However, in Korean society, he is admired for his filial piety. The recent social changes have neither affected nor weakened this important element in Korean family life. Moreover, since these days married daughters are no longer considered ‘married outsiders’ in their natal families as previously, a woman receives filial piety from both her sons and daughters. This has strengthened the matrifocal nature of the Korean family.

Despite the great changes in the social and family structure, the division of male and female spheres is still largely intact. Intensified competition in the social sphere has increased the stress level of the men, who are left with even less time to give to their family, often alienating them from the children. The onus of the children’s education has fallen entirely on women. In fact, a woman and her children’s education have become so inseparable that a woman who has a child preparing for the university entrance exams is often excused from many onerous other tasks. Since education is all important in moulding one’s values, a woman can wield great influence on their children to the point of manipulation. This again is a contributory factor to the matrifocal element of the Korean family.

Another important aspect of the modern Korean family structure is the management of the family finances. An English acquaintance of mine with a Korean wife told me a few years ago, ‘I knew Korean women are no blushing violets despite the popular myth, but I was shocked when my wife expected me to hand over my entire pay packet to her. I had to put my foot down there.’ It is quite usual for women to take charge of household budgets in modern Korea. In most households, rural or urban, the husband
hands over his entire earnings intact to the wife, who then administers him an allowance for his personal expenditure. Its origin and developments have been explored by some anthropologists, and various causes, such as the rural precedents, financial demands of maintaining a middle-class lifestyle, etc. have been cited (Janeli & Janeli 1996). My interpretation would be that this system originally stems from male arrogance, i.e. a man thinks that it is beneath his dignity to concern himself with petty household matters. It was probably more relevant in the early days of modernization of Korea, when most men’s income fell far short of being sufficient for their families’ needs. Therefore, the distinctly unpleasant task of trying to make ends meet fell on the ‘lowly’ women. In reality, however, and particularly as a result of the country’s newly-found economic prosperity, women have acquired a tremendous power in the domestic sphere as well as in society itself. Of course it cannot be said that Korean women have the total economic power because of their management of household budgets, since important financial decisions are made by men and men can still command their wives to give them whatever they want. However, the control of money has given women opportunities to make a lump sum through forming a mutual finance association with friends, and taught them a business sense. More importantly, it has strengthened the pivotal position of the mother in the family.

Great changes have been taking place in the women’s status in South Korean society in recent years. In January 1990 the government promulgated the law, decreeing equal inheritance for both sons and daughters. Although son preference is still prevalent, educational opportunities are open equally to male and female children. There has been a gradual increase in women engaged in professions, which used to be entirely the domain of men, such as medicine, law and diplomacy (Ch’ón 2003). This trend will continue more markedly in the future.

The family pattern is already showing a sign of change. The marriage pattern has undergone great changes in recent years in Korean society. Long gone are the days when marriage was an alliance of convenience and propriety between two comparable families in terms of social standing. These days the wishes of the couple themselves are the most important factor in marriage, even in those arranged through professional matchmakers, who are still active and doing good business. Love marriages between two young people who meet at school, work and through social activities, etc. are becoming so common that parental objections do not have the same clout as they used to until quite recently.

The nuclear family with a small number of children living in a high-rise block of flats is the norm among city-dwellers in contemporary South Korea, who have hegemony over the rest of the country. Families with more than three children are unusual among the younger generation urbanites. However, ancestor worship being still embedded in many people’s lives, the traditional boy preference, verging on boy-mania, still persists, and no fewer than 30,000 female foetuses are said to be aborted each year after ultra-sonic scans (Pae 2007, 194). As a result, as of 1994, the number of boys born is 15.4% more than that of girls, compared with the world average of 10.5%, and this ratio is said to be the highest in the world (Pae Ibid., 194). But the attitudes have been changing in recent years, and it is not considered such a great tragedy not to have sons, as a woman can now be the legal head of a family and offer ancestral sacrifices. I have often heard young women promise their parents to perform ancestral rites after their death.

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7 In 2003, the first woman head of the Ministry of Justice, Kang Kûmshil and the first female career diplomat ambassador Kim Kyôngim (to Tunisia) were appointed, which attracted considerable media interest.
Against this background, matrifocality is strengthened, the mother being indispensable as she plays the pivotal role in the family in every way, even though the main breadwinner of the family is still mostly the husband/father. But as stated earlier, the management of the household budget is done entirely by the wife, who in many cases takes over the whole wage packet of the husband, these days often electronically straight into the couple’s joint account, leaving the husband no leeway for siphoning the money elsewhere without his wife’s knowledge. Although the original reason for this arrangement was to relieve the man of the tiresome and difficult task of making ends meet with insufficient income, with the dramatic increase in the national GNP, women have unwittingly acquired considerable power.

Although their opportunities in the public sector are still very limited, the women have succeeded in making their husbands depend on them. As a result, by the time a Korean man reaches the middle age or beyond, his wife has usually become the most important figure in life. There are several jokes told by both men and women, which bear witness to this interesting phenomenon. When a middle-aged or elderly man is asked what the five most important things in his life are, his answer is apparently (1) waip ‘ŭ (Korean pronunciation of the English word ‘wife’), (2) anae (a Korean equivalent of ‘her indoors’), (3) chip saram (literally ‘person at home’ i.e. wife), (4) manura (a familiar term for wife), and (5) aedil ëmma (Kids’ Mum). According to another joke, when a child is asked what the five most important beings are in his/her life in order of importance, the answer is (1) Mum, (2) Granny, (3) The family dog, (4) Dad, and (5) Granddad. Although those are only jokes, there is an element of truth in them, as the proverb goes, many a true word is spoken in jest. However, the fact that people laugh merrily at them suggests that they consider this phenomenon unnatural and puzzling, hence a joke, suggesting male superiority and dominance is still very much a reality in Korean society (Kim Ch’ŏl 2003).

Despite the pivotal role that women have succeeded in acquiring in the domestic circle, discontentment and disillusionment are often felt by middle or upper class women, even by those with higher education who enjoy a high material standard of living, and in many cases more acutely by them (Sŏk 1997, 159). Korean women have learned about the power of money in the modern times through experience, and have become obsessed with money, seeing it as a means to achieve their liberation (Ko 1991, 231). While the five most important things in a middle-aged man’s life are all his wife, hers are apparently: (1) ton (money), (2) kūmjŏn (coins), (3) hwap ‘ye (currency), (4) sup ‘yo (cheques), and (5) yegŭm t‘ongjang (savings accounts). Some try their hand in making money, often with disastrous results, although a few succeed. However, most contend themselves with engaging in creative activities such as calligraphy, painting, flower arranging, etc., but few achieve financial independence through them. Oddly enough, the women’s desire for public life expresses itself in their outings; so it is very difficult to contact them in the daytime, as they are out most days, engaging in some activities and always keeping busy. Incidentally, that contributes to the very bad traffic congestions in cities, especially the capital Seoul.

The high level of discontentment among married women causes a sharp increase in divorce; the divorce rate being the highest among the couple in their 20s. An interesting new phenomenon is a significant number of so-called ‘twilight divorces’, between couples in their 50s and 60s, eight out of ten such cases being instigated by women after years of suffering in silence living with chauvinistic husbands (Pae 2007, 197). ‘Pension divorce’, started by the wife immediately after the husband’s receiving a lump sum retirement fund, is also on the increase.
The increase in divorce means there will be more families with female heads, since the custody of the children is usually given to the mother. There is also a high mortality among men in their 40s and 50s, particularly among successful urban executives in Seoul, through stress, excessive smoking and drinking, etc. Apart from that, the normal life expectancy is longer for females than for males in Korea. Since there still persists the ethos that ‘a virtuous woman does not serve two husbands’, among older women, widows tend not to remarry. All these factors will contribute to longer periods of widowhood for more and more women resulting in more families with female heads.

Unlike the old days, when a widow handed over the financial affairs to her eldest son or outsiders if he was too young, these days she herself tends to take over her dead husband’s affairs. I have witnessed many cases of successful continuation of business ventures by widowed mothers. To give a few examples, Ms. H, who was an ordinary housewife and mother, took over her husband’s tourist business after his death. She not only successfully carried on the business, but also expanded it further to include overseas tours. Another woman had an advantage of having run a small furniture company of her own, when her husband, a man in his 40s, suddenly died of a heart attack. She sold off her shop, took over his motor parts business and within a year turned it into an even more thriving business than before. The third case concerns a woman, who suddenly got widowed in her 40s. Although she had had no previous commercial experience, she successfully ran her dead husband’s small hotel. I met her at a shamanistic ritual she sponsored to pray for good luck and the repose of his spirit. I would attribute their successes partly to their experience of daily management of household budget, which taught them discipline and control as well as a measure of business sense.

Equal rights for men and women may still appear to be a distant dream in Korean society. However, whenever opportunities present themselves, a mother will occupy the central position in her family, not only as a recipient of affection and loyalty of the domestic group, but in the cultural and structural sense as well. In future a female head will not be considered an anomaly, as she has tended to be up to now. In actual fact, there already exists a section of Korean society, albeit marginalized and still ostracized, in which female heads of families occur frequently, namely the shamanistic community. There, matrilocality exists blatantly, the mother of the family having full financial control and responsibility, authority, influence, and solidarity of the domestic group (Hogarth 1998, 1999). Ironically enough the female shaman/mother does not always have affection and loyalty of her family that most Korean mothers receive, because of the social stigma long attached to her profession. The matrilocality in the shamanistic household is largely due to the often-unstable marriage of the shaman. In light of the increased divorce rate, early widowhood due to the longer life expectancy of women in mainstream Korean society, matrilocality in the Korean family structure, which has so far been largely latent, may well emerge overtly in the future.

**CONCLUSION**

In discussing matrilocality, it is important to point out that it refers to the ‘mother-centeredness’, not ‘female dominance’. What is presupposed here is therefore that the central female is the mother of the children of a domestic group. I have discussed how matrilocality can be found in overtly male-dominant Confucian society such as pre-modern Korean society. In a Confucian society, there exists a strong emotional involvement in the mother-child relationship, while the conjugal relationship tends to be deemed of secondary importance (Hsu 1948/1971; Wolf 1970). Under Confucianism, therefore, the centrality of the mother in the Korean family was largely based on this close
mother-child relationship, the filial piety and affection of her sons. However, in modern Korea, the mother not only still receives filial piety from her children of both sexes, but also takes control of the household finance and the all-important education of the children. The father, under increasing pressure of the newly-industrialized society, plays even more diminished role in the domestic sphere.

Matrifocality even in traditional Korean society is clearly reflected in an old Korean saying, ‘If your mother is a stepmother, your real father becomes a stepfather’ (Tieszen 1977). This matrifocal element, which nevertheless has been a latent, albeit integral, element in the Korean family structure, has been strengthened in recent years in the face of changes in social norms, behavioural and marriage patterns in favour of women.

Will matrifocality in Korean society help or hinder in achieving gender equality in Korean society in future? It can be said to be a double-edged sword. The underpinning respect for women in theory should help them to regain the higher social position once held by them. Up to now, however, it has been an ideology that has restricted women from political participation and public activities (Yang 2003, 84), confining them to the domestic circle. In future, as more and more opportunities are available to women to be successful in their own right in mainstream society instead of through their husbands and sons, matrifocality, which essentially emphasizes the supreme importance of motherhood, an exclusive prerogative of women, may well help further improve women’s status in Korean society.

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South Korea, Japan, and China: In Search of a Shared Historical Awareness

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ABSTRACT
The paper introduces past and current attempts to forge a shared historical awareness among South Korea, Japan, and China - official committees examining the historical disagreements between the two countries, citizen groups attempting to create common pedagogical material, and local or individual initiatives. Contrary to the common view of being a historical battlefield, Korea and Japan have also been confronting courageously the largest issues concerning their shared past. Nevertheless, a comparison with the European experience, especially that of the French-German joint history textbook, prompts caution regarding these attempts’ real chance for success.

East Asia all too often appears to be an historical battlefield. Disputes over a colonial and wartime past, protests and indignation following commemorations or untimely statements emanating from Japan, and clashes over school textbooks; all of these go towards characterising relations between Japan, China and South Korea. The legacy of thirty-five years of the Japanese colonisation of Korea (1910-1945) and that of eight years of total warfare with China (1937-1945) seem to be a long way from disappearing.

However, in the midst of such turmoil, other voices are audible, other processes at work and attempts underway. For around twenty years, joint historical studies have been led by civil groups, joined for the last decade by official institutions. The overriding objective sought for is to appease the historical issues which tear the region apart. Yet, beyond this there is another ambition, on the limit of utopia, which propels these forces working from the shadows; that of creating an historical awareness shared by the entire region.

These initiatives take the form of two major axis: an official axis, with joint Korea-Japan and China-Japan committees; and a citizen’s axis, which offers a series of rather courageous Korea-Japan or China-Japan initiatives, and even a spectacular trilateral Japan-China-Korea venture.

The aim of this study is to present the attempts at shared historical reflection, in addition to the writing and publication of joint pedagogical material, particularly as undertaken between Japan and Korea. As a conclusion, I will question the prospects of success of such attempts, particularly in light of the Franco-German history book experience.

KOREA-JAPAN OFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS
Between Japan and South Korea, the persistence of the issue of history, since the school textbooks crisis in 1984, has led, for around twenty years, a number of civil and official organisations to undertake joint historical studies.

Official initiatives – which came much later than the civil activities – began in 1997, in the wake of a meeting between Korean President Kim Young-Sam and Japanese
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō. The two leaders decided upon the establishment of a “Korea-Japan Joint Committee for Promoting History Studies”, in an aim to “find ways of improving the study of history in the two countries” (Japan 2008). This “Joint Committee” met on five occasions between 1997 and 2000. In parallel, a much wider initiative was implemented – the “Japan-Korea History Forum” – which organised two conferences (in 1998 and 1999) in Korea and Japan (Nihon 1999).

The final report of the “Joint Committee” was presented to both governments in 2000. Outlined in this report was the necessity to cooperate with a view to developing joint educational material, but no concrete proposal was put forward. Critics stated that the Committee had failed to venture beyond that which had previously been agreed upon in 1982, and that its work had served the Japanese government as a way out of entering into a real dialogue with Korea on historical subjects (Yama 2002).

The second official initiative was established following the school history textbook crisis of 2001. Korean President Kim Dae-Jung and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō decided upon the creation of a “Japan-ROK Joint History Research Committee”. The decision was taken during a summit meeting between the two leaders, but the resultant negotiations – regarding the definition of the task to be assigned to the Committee – manifested the existing gap. The Koreans demanded that history books take into consideration the findings which would result from the Committee. The Japanese refused to commit as such. The controversy was only resolved by the approaching World Cup. Time was running short, and Korea and Japan were obliged to collaborate and defuse historical controversies.

Once serious discussions were underway, both sides demonstrated good will. Between May 2002 and March 2005 six meetings took place, following which, in June 2005, an impressive 1,400 page “Japan-ROK Joint History Research Report” was published simultaneously in Japanese and Korean, and made freely accessible on the Internet in both languages (Nikkan 2005).

The Committee chose not to focus upon school textbooks themselves, but rather to begin a large-scale joint research program into the history of Japanese-Korean relations, from the ancient period to the present. Mitani Taichirō, Japanese Committee chairman, said it was about creating an “academic community” of historians capable of transcending the borders of national history in each country (Nikkan 2005, 5). And for Cho Tong-Köl, Korean Committee chairman, the aim was to try and grasp, for each period, the areas of agreement and disagreement in the historical approaches of both countries (Nikkan 2005, 7).

In order to undertake this, the Committee was divided into three groups responsible for examining three different historical periods: the ancient period, the Middle Ages and pre-modern period, the modern and contemporary periods. The first two groups were each made up of three Japanese historians and three Korean historians, the third group made up of four historians from each of the countries.

The first of these texts – about the ancient period – is given over to Japan-Korea relations between the fourth and sixth centuries. Each century is the subject of two studies, one written by a Korean researcher and the other by a Japanese researcher. In a second part, these studies are then discussed by all participants. The aim is both to highlight the areas of agreement and disagreement, as well as the issues emerging from the studies and discussion. The discussions are highly specialised, dealing with specific issues, such as the Japanese empress Jingū or the Koguryō king Kwanghae’t’o, and additionally more general
issues such as the nature of Japan-Korea relations in the fourth century or that of the relations between the Yamato and Korean states in the sixth century. A general discussion dedicated to “a new history of Japan-Korea relations in the ancient period” concludes the second section of the report. Satō Makoto makes a fitting summary of the overall impression when he states that the findings reached by the participants only constitute a “starting point” for much wider joint research.

This feeling is strengthened in the third part of the report, which includes remarks and impressions from each of the six participants. Hamada Kōsaku expresses the desire to see research about the formation of ancient Korean and Japanese States additionally include Chinese and Western researchers. Kim Tae-Sik states a desire for a wider approach, beginning from the fifth century BCE up to the tenth century CE.

Organisation of the second report – about the Middle Ages and the pre-modern period – is slightly different. The first section is given over to Japanese articles, and the second to Korean studies. Furthermore, the six Committee members were aided by the collaboration of eight additional researchers, four from each country. Three subjects dominated the more than 600 page document: “pseudo-envoys” (gishi) 1, the Korean wars of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1592-98), and the Korean embassies to Japan. (1413-1811).

More than simply a revision of the areas of agreement and disagreement, the participants presented in a very detailed manner the history and the state of research of these issues in their respective countries.2 The result is a highly specialist report, which makes for passionate reading for people aware of the subjects, yet also difficult reading for lay people.

The third report, which relates to the modern and contemporary periods, deals with the most burning issues from the Meiji Restoration to present day: the Russo-Japanese war (1904-05) and the two Sino-Japanese conflicts (1894-95 and 1937-45), the annexation of Korea in 1910, the thirty five years of colonisation (1910-1945), the reestablishment of relations after the war (1965), economic ties and the issue of North Korea. Given the scale of the task, the eight Committee members called for assistance from twenty three additional experts (twelve Japanese and eleven Koreans). The result was on the same scale as the number of participants: thirteen thematic chapters made up of between two to four articles, almost all followed by remarks from a specialist originating from the other country, and these general remarks themselves being accompanied by reflections from the author.

This confrontation allowed for a clearer understanding of the areas in which divergences remained the strongest: the link between the evolution of international relations and the process of modernisation of the countries in the region, problems relating to the legality of the treaties signed between Korea and at from the beginning of the twentieth century, the effects of colonial power on social transformations and relations with North Korea.

The “Joint Research Committee” undertook a gargantuan task. For three years, its members confronted each other over some of the most difficult issues, covering a period ranging from the fourth century to present day, and managed to draw up a faithful

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1 Between the end of the fourteenth to the beginning of the seventeenth century, some Japanese people, in passing themselves off – using false documents – for official envoys, travelled to Korea for trade. These were named “pseudo-envoys” (gishi), in opposition to “authentic envoys” (shinshi).

2 With the exception of Son Sūn-ch’ŏl’s study which aims at shedding light on the differences in approach relating to the period studied in history books as often used by University students.
assessment. However, the issue of school textbooks was not approached, and no effort made to create joint pedagogical material. As a specialist work being aimed at specialists, the Committee’s work did not have a great deal of effect on the general public.

Following a break of two years, a second round of official conversations between Japan and South Korea began in 2007 (“Second Phase of the Japan-ROK Joint History Research Committee”). Would this second round of dialogue allow for the obstacles confronted in previous discussions to be overcome? It is very difficult to say, but the desire to move forward was clearly evident. In April 2007, the creation of a sub-commission responsible for studying the issue of school textbooks was announced, which came in addition to three other sub-commissions dealing with ancient history, the Middle Age and the pre-modern period and the modern and contemporary periods, in a similar vein to the first round of conversations. A first plenary session of the Committee took place in Tokyo on 23 June 2007. A second session took place in Seoul in November 2007, and a third one in June 2008 in Japan (Gaimushō 2008).

**JAPAN-KOREA CITIZENS’ GROUPS**

The difficulties encountered by official organisations were immense, and there was a great deal of scepticism. Effectively, the most tangible outcomes achieved to date have come from citizens’ groups, and not from official organisations.

On 1st March 2007, the very symbolic anniversary of the March First Independence Movement, a book entitled “Joint Japan-Korea Historical Educational Material: History of Japan-Korea Exchanges – From Prehistory to Today” was published simultaneously in both Japan and Korea (Rekishi 2007). This book constituted the first joint pedagogical material ever to be published covering the entire history of Japan-Korea relations – from prehistory up to the 2002 football World Cup. It was aimed at schoolchildren, secondary-school children, students and teachers from both countries, and beyond, all of those interested in the subject. Although based upon the most recent historical work, it is not a research study which is presented, but a sort of textbook, extremely well organised and very readable.

This book is the fruit of a decade of joint work accomplished by a group of around twenty teachers and researchers from Japan and Korea. The joint project was aimed at overcoming the obstacles confronted by official organisations. The project participants, believing that it would be difficult to arrive at a shared state-based historical awareness, chose to freely exchange ideas, without any constraint and from a “citizen’s” point of view, so as to establish a collection of shared historical pedagogical material, aimed at deepening mutual understanding between the two populations.

Kimijima Kazuhiko, working on the basis of the three elements constituting the title of the work (shared historical material, history of exchanges, from prehistory to present day), reflects on both the scale of the task and the difficulties encountered (Kimijima 2007). The principles which oversaw the work were as follows: the publication of educational material accessible to all, and surpassing the framework of interstate exchange by embodying human exchanges in a continuous and encompassed recital, written as one. The writing process, where the endless comings and goings of the text erase the very trace of the authors, constitutes a major concrete contribution to the elaboration of a truly joint Japanese-Korean vision of history.

The “History of Japan-Korea Exchanges” arguably constitutes the most ambitious attempt at publishing a joint Japan-Korea educational work, but this is not unique. Other joint works have indeed been published, examining more specific aspects of the history of
relations and bilateral exchanges or aiming to apprehend in their entirety the history of both countries.

The first joint Japan-Korea educational textbook indeed dates back to 2005. Entitled “Korean Embassies to Japan: from Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s Invasions of Korea to Friendly Relations”, published simultaneously in Japan and Korea, was written by a group of eleven secondary school teachers from Hiroshima and Taegu who were brought together in a “Joint Japan-Korea Educational Material Publication Team” (Nikkan 2005).

The initiative dated back to 2001. Members of the Taegu teachers union, in Korea, made a proposition to their Japanese counterparts in Hiroshima, to act together in response to the revisionist “New History Textbook” by publishing a joint educational material. At the outset, the group attempted to tackle modern and contemporary history, but owing to the depth of the cultural gap, quickly decided to focus on a much older period, albeit rather sensitive, in that of the Hideyoshi’s invasions at the end of the sixteenth century and the Korean embassies in the Edo period. This allowed for an optimistic tone to be adopted, which appeared in the very title of the book – from invasions to friendship.

The outcome, published following four years of work, is a beautiful, well written and vastly illustrated book, which focuses on the history of Japanese-Korean relations from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century. The main themes covered are those of Hideyoshi’s invasions, their violence and brutality, but also the profound influence of this war upon exchanges between the two countries, and the neighbourly relations of the Edo period, symbolised by the Korean embassies travelling to Japan. The most original chapters are those concentrating upon the welcome granted to the Korean embassies by the fiefs of Hiroshima and Fukuyama, which provides an excellent educational material usable at a local level.

Another joint work, with a vastly differing approach this time, was published in 2006. “Face to Face – History of Japan and Korea: From their Origins to the Modern Period” is a greatly ambitious book, in two volumes, which does not so much present a narrative of Japanese-Korean exchanges, but an overall history of Japan and Korea (Rekishi 2006). Five years of work were undertaken by two history teachers associations from both countries which resulted in a unique publication of a parallel, comparative and joint history of both countries from prehistory to the nineteenth century.

The book comprises two volumes divided into four sections: “Neighbours since the dawn of time”, which focuses upon prehistory and the ancient period; “East Asia through change”, where the emergence of warrior powers on the island and the peninsula in addition to the evolution of Buddhism in both countries are notably examined; “The yangban and bushi periods”, and “Preparing for a new period”, which deal, inter alia, with the Japanese and Korean reaction to Western penetration. A follow up, with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as its focus, is currently in progress. Once again, it will adopt an original approach, as the book’s material will be taken directly from actual lessons taught by Japanese and Korean teachers in education establishments in both countries.

Miyahara Takeo, one of the main authors, invokes concrete examples of differing viewpoints between the Japanese and Korean parties during the writing of the book, and the manner in which these were overcome (Miyahara 2007). He attributes the vast part of these differences to a fundamentally different approach towards nationalism in Japan and South Korea, differences which were encouraged by the Americans after the war. In the case of Japan, it was indeed the democratic and individualist values which were promoted, whilst in Korea a nationalist and ethnocentric vision prevailed.
Miyahara Takeo seems a great deal less optimistic than Kimijima Kazuhiko. While, for the latter, a joint Japanese-Korean vision of history may have been possible – as was proven by the joint publication in which he was involved – the former believes the obstacles to be much greater. Finally, in the view of Miyahara Takeo, it may be more worthwhile to envisage a publication on various different levels of history, respecting cultural and historical differences.

The approach desired by Miyahara Takeo is not entirely contradictory to the joint efforts of historical writing. In this vein, Kimijima Kazuhiko was amongst the translators of a Korean publication which appeared in Japan in 2004, aimed at teaching Japanese schoolchildren the Korean vision of history (Lee, Seo, and Chung 2004). The book is divided into two sections: a history of Korea, and an overview of Japan-Korea cultural exchanges. The particularity of the textbook resides in the fact that it was neither written by a Japanese historian, nor by a Korean specialist addressing his/her own people, but that it is written purposely by three Korean historians aimed at Japanese school children. The three translators were additionally closely involved in the formulation of the book and its adaptation for Japanese readers. The book is abundantly illustrated by pictures and is remarkably concise and readable. Admittedly it does not represent a joint historical writing effort, but rather constitutes without any doubt a precious tool for Japanese to gain knowledge of the Korean historical vision.

AN OFFICIAL SINO-JAPANESE INITIATIVE

In parallel to these Japanese-Korean activities, other attempts at compiling joint pedagogical material and implementing a shared vision of history are underway between Japan and China. Such initiatives came much later, and in lesser quantity. Once again, there was an official forum as well as citizen activities.

A “Japan-China Joint History Research Committee” was established in 2006, based upon the model of the Japan-Korean “Joint committee”. The committee is composed of twenty two members: eleven Chinese and eleven Japanese, and presided over by Kitaoka Shin’ichi, a Tokyo University professor, and Bu Ping, director of the Modern History Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Two sub-commissions have been implemented, one focussing on ancient, medieval and modern periods, the other on modern and contemporary periods. Two meetings have taken place in December 2006 in Beijing and March 2007 in Tokyo. A third session was held in January 2008 in Beijing where participants expressed the hope to publish their report in July 2008, prior to the opening of the Beijing Olympic Games. However, at the time of writing, May 2009, no report has yet been published.

Differences between the two parties seem quite considerable. The first meeting as such saw a “candid and wide exchange of opinions” between the parties, Bu Ping invoking the insults felt by the victim country when Japanese words and actions go to denying the “historical fact of the aggressive war” led by Tokyo; Kitaoka Shin’ichi declaring the difficulty in “sharing a joint historical awareness” and regretting the existence of an “excessive gap between Japan and China” (Gaimushō 2006).

The second session confirmed that the desired objective of the Committee was not the publication of a joint history of Sino-Japanese relations, but rather the constitution of separate reports accompanied by remarks from the other party. A series of historical events to be studied was also agreed upon including the Nanjing massacre in 1937 but not

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3 Kimijima Kazuhiko, Kokubu Mari and Tetsuka Takashi.
the issue of “comfort women” (Gaimushō 2007). Admittedly a surprise is still possible, but judging by the current state of affairs, it is unlikely that the Sino-Japanese Committee will finalise a work on the scale and of the same quality as that accomplished by their Japanese-Korean counterparts.

**Chinese and Japanese Researchers**

In reality, the task of the “Joint Committee” has already been partially accomplished by a group of Chinese and Japanese researchers in a book entitled “Historical Awareness Crossing Borders: Attempt at a Sino-Japanese Dialogue” (Liu, Mitani, and Yang 2006), published simultaneously in 2006 in both languages and countries by the Tokyo University Press and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press.

The book, accomplished under the management of Liu Jie, Mitani Hiroshi and Yang Daqing, is the fruit of five years of reflection. In addition to these three men, eight additional researchers contributed, thus involving a total of three Chinese and eight Japanese. Such a disproportion is further accentuated by the fact that two of the Chinese involved, Liu Jie and Yang Zhihui, reside in Japan and teach at Waseda University, and the third, Yang Daqing, is a lecturer at George Washington University. No researcher working in China at that time actually contributed to the book, even though a certain number of them were involved in various stages of the project. Finally, it is necessary to note that the “Sino-Japanese conference of young historians”, whose reflection was behind the publication of the book, was financed by the “Sasakawa Japan-China Friendship Fund”.

Be that as it may, the outcome is an excellent work. The book is divided into two parts and thirteen chapters. The first part entitled “Historical Facts and Historical Awareness” sets out rather remarkably the various narratives which have taken place in both countries relating to the period between the mid-nineteenth century up to 1945. One chapter is devoted to Manchukuo and another to the Nanjing massacre. The second part entitled “In search of an historical awareness leading to reconciliation” deals with more specific issues which are likely to favour rapprochement and reconciliation: joint visions such as they appear in Chinese and Japanese school textbooks, differing apprehension regarding the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan, the problem of Yasukuni as well as that of indemnities.

The most remarkable characteristic of these works is the desire to outline, in the most unheated manner possible, the varying approaches and issues. The outcome is that of a rare tool which allows for the substance and scale of current issues to be apprehended. It is difficult to imagine just how the official “Joint Commission” could accomplish a work of better quality.

**The Trilateral Japan-China-Korea Committee**

A certain number of civilian groups have undertaken a great deal of research activity in the move towards a shared historical awareness. The most spectacular initiative to date is arguably that led by the “Trilateral Japan-China-Korea committee for joint pedagogical material”, whose work led, in May 2005, to the publication of a shared modern history book, published simultaneously in the three languages and countries. In total, fifty-four people (fourteen Japanese, seventeen Chinese and twenty three Korean) took part in

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4 The Sasakawa Foundation (official title : The Nippon Foundation *Nippon zaidan*) is an institution established by the former war criminal and business man Sasakawa Ryōichi (1899-1995). In spite of the controversy surrounding it, the Foundation provides support to a large number of quality research projects.
writing this book and a second edition was published in July 2006 (Nitchūkan 2005; Nitchūkan 2006).

This group, composed primarily of researchers, teachers and civil group activists, constitutes a product of the “Asian Educational History Network”, whose activities form part of the tradition of the 1992 Yokohama Declaration when Chinese, Korean and Japanese Universities called for a joint review of history textbooks in East Asia (Bungei 2002). This network was established in 2001; and in 2002, it began collaboration with the “Korean Civilian Movement for Correction of Japanese Textbooks”, both organisations together forming the “Joint Japanese-Korean Organisation of Historical research”.

This group is much more politically involved that the “Japan-Korea Symposium” outlined earlier. The Organisation states its desire to assemble, in addition to academics and teachers, “representatives of the victims of the war of aggression and the colonial regime”, and the overriding objective is “the creation of a shared historical awareness, which will give rise to fresh relations and bolster peace and friendship between Korea and Japan, in addition to within Asia” (Kodomo 2002).

The reference to Asia is not accidental. Indeed, in 2002 the “Forum for historical awareness and peace in East Asia” was established, holding its first meeting in Nanjing in March of the same year. Six organisations – Chinese, Japanese and Korean – participated in this meeting, amongst them figuring the “Asian Network” and the “Joint Organisation”. The “Nanjing Forum” focussed upon the review of the revised textbook which was behind the 2001 crisis, in addition to the attitude of the Japanese authorities. The debate was politicised and predictable, with the primary signification of the event being the inclusion of China in the reflection upon school textbooks. The main outcome from the Nanjing Forum was the creation of the “East Asian Committee for the publication of joint historical pedagogical material”. Composed of Chinese, Korean and Japanese representatives, the Committee was the first trilateral structure ever to be established in the area of historical research.

Eleven working sessions were to be held (four in Japan, four in China and three in Korea) prior to accomplishing, in 2005, the publication of a book on the history of the three countries, from the nineteenth century to the dawn of the twenty first, bearing the title “A History which Opens up the Future: Modern and Contemporary History of Three East Asian Countries” (Nitchūkan 2005).

This book had a rather strong “progressive” political accent. Modern East Asian history was presented in a clear and univocal perspective, that of the Chinese and Korean “resistance” (teikō) to Japanese “aggression” (shinryaku). However, the Japanese did not simply join the Chinese and Korean subjects. “The difficulties were immense”, explains Obinata Sumio from Waseda University. “For example, the writing of the passage focussing upon the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki gave rise to major differences in opinion; the Japanese wanting to outline the evil nature of nuclear weapons, while the Chinese wanted to outline the liberation that the bombings had provoked”. Differences in opinion also manifested themselves between the Koreans and Chinese, particularly concerning the Chinese policy on Korea at the end of the nineteenth century (Saitō 2008).

The outcome was admittedly a politicised work, but one which is highly interesting due to the focus placed upon the history of the “people” in all three countries. Nevertheless, this book was rather a “progressive” educational work, written by
individuals with relatively close political sensitivities, who took note of their shared opinions, and additionally discovered their differences in opinion5.

**VARIOUS INITIATIVES**

This trilateral work did not constitute a unique phenomenon, but was rather part of a vast ranging activity spread across various different axis. Indeed, in addition to the official and civilian organisations invoked, there were a large number of initiatives coming from various sources.

As such, the daily paper *Asahi shinbun* published a collection entitled “Impact of History: one hundred and fifty years of East Asia”. These one hundred and fifty years included the period going from the opium war in 1840 to the end of the cold war in 1989. The aim of the paper was to examine the significance of ten central themes during this period in history, the manner in which they were presented within Japanese, South Korean and Chinese textbooks (People’s Republic of China and Taiwan), and the memories they evoke. The articles were published in Japanese and English in editions published by the newspaper as well as in Korean and Chinese (simplified and traditional characters) on the internet (Asahi).

The publication of this collection was motivated both by the ignorance displayed by young Japanese people about the war and events preceding the war, and by the small amount of understanding regarding democratic changes which had taken place in Japan since the end of the war amongst Chinese and Korean young people. In November 2008, simultaneously in Japan and South Korea, a book was published based upon this collection, which was also likely to be used as pedagogical material, and can be included on the list of the many works dealing with history and memory in a perspective of a rapprochement of consciences (Asahi 2008).

Another important book was published in 2007 in Japanese under the supervision of Mitani Hiroshi and Kim Tae-Chang. It is entitled “Historical Dialogues in East Asia: Beyond Borders and Generations”, and aspires towards a similar rapprochement of consciences (Mitani and Kim 2007). This book is based upon the work of a symposium organised in 2004 by the Kyoto Forum, a philosophical association devoted to the establishment of a “public philosophy” based upon dialogue (*taiwa*), cooperation (*kyōdō*) and innovation (*kaishin*).

Japanese, Chinese and Korean historians and philosophers undertake, throughout the book, a dialogue based around themes liked with the perception of twentieth century history: “From the historical experience of a Chinese”, “Asia in the thoughts and memory in post-war Japan”, “Historical awareness through the appreciation of the colonial cultural policy”, “History as I lived it: experience, sensation and conscience” are just some of the themes touched upon in this far-reaching, arduous and stimulating book.

The dialogue which is undertaken consists, first and foremost, of “recounting to one another” (*katari*) the history of East Asia, such as it was lived and witnessed by each individual. It is not about “talking” (*hanasu*), writes Kim Tae-Chang in a magnificent post face, but rather about “recounting” (*kataru*) just like one would recount a story such

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5 Although there are no overall statistics on the subject, the book is used as additional educational material in some classes, particularly in Korea, where it benefits from strong governmental support, in spite of its overtly “progressive” nature. It is interesting to note, in this context, that some corrections made in the second edition deal with the Korean war. Whilst in the first edition it was written that the North Korean People’s Army had “begun to descend south” (*nanka o hajimeta*) with a view to “liberating” (*kaishō*) the peninsula, in the second edition, the aim of this “descent” was “unification” (*tōitsu*) of Korea.
as the listeners can identify themselves with what they hear. As such, the participants alternated their own considerations in terms of philosophy and personal experience, reflecting upon the history they had each witnessed, the memory they retain and the recital they make. The “Historical Dialogues”, therefore, constituted a major contribution to the reflection of an historical awareness of East Asia, forcing each and everyone to listen and recognise themselves in each other.

Another dialogue underway which has recently given rise to a joint publication is that of the Japan-China-Korea Conference of Historians (Kibata and Cha 2008). Originating from an official Japanese-Korean report published in 2000, the Conference constitutes nevertheless an independent structure bringing together historians from both countries reflecting upon their own profession and the problems with which they are confronted. It is, thus, a bilateral dialogue both very specialised – historians in dialogue with other historians – but also very vast, as the discussion is not strictly limited to Japanese-Korean issues. The work is based upon the results of seven meetings held in Seoul and Tokyo between 2002 and 2007, on themes such as modernity and nationalism. The themes discussed are varied – the history of masses and the thinking of the post war period, or even the search for an inner world – and the objective seems to be to make known to readers in both countries the actual state of historical research (and its sophistication) in the neighbouring country.

A similar aspiration for rapprochement and an increased awareness of others is additionally often expressed at an individual level. Hence the recent publication of a work devoted to the Russo-Japanese war as written by Koyasu Nobukuni, specialist of Japanese thought, and Choi Moon-hyung, historian of Korea (Koyasu and Choi 2007).

The book was born subsequent to an accidental meeting in 2005 between the two researchers, and their mutual understanding, which was followed by a series of both formal and informal dialogues in Tokyo and Seoul. The two men are of similar age (one born in 1933 and the other in 1935), and have been witness to the same historical events in the same region of the world. As Koyasu Nobukuni wrote: “living our lives in Korea and Japan in the twentieth century led us to become friends. In the same vein, we hope that this book will represent an important step forward in the establishment of a shared history of East Asia”.

The opening section of the book is essentially constituted of a series of conferences held by Koyasu Nobukuni in Seoul in 2006 on the theme of “Imagining the issue of East Asia from the perspective of Japanese-Korean relations”, accompanied by Korean remarks; and the second part of a sequel of articles written by Choi Moon-hyung about the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05.

The differing approaches with regard to this war constitute the overriding theme of the book. The Japanese generally consider the Russo-Japanese war through the perspective of the Shiba Ryōtarō’s novel Clouds on the hill (Saka no ue no kumo), an ordeal imposed upon Meiji Japan so that it transformed itself into a real Nation State, a war of defending the homeland, a bilateral conflict from which Korea was almost totally absent. This conflict, a Japanese nationalist war, was also evaded from the Korean national memory, which did not grasp its overall significance for the country’s history. For Koyasu and Choi, jointly re-evaluating of the Russo-Japanese war was intended to be a first concrete step toward the elaboration of a joint Japanese-Korean history.
IN LIGHT OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN EXPERIENCE

In East Asia the historical issue is a long way from quietening down. The joint attempts at clearing a passage and the publications of shared pedagogical material only constitute for the time being an initial, rather hesitant step towards the establishment of a shared regional consciousness. This is where European experiences may have a role – albeit indirectly – to play. Indeed, in the same way that those in favour of a greater regional integration considered the European Union, in spite of many failings and difficulties, as a model for inspiration, those involved in the publication attempts of joint pedagogical material often feel encouraged by the recent success achieved in Europe. Since France and Germany achieved the publication of a joint history manual, and since Poland and Germany held historical dialogues regarding textbooks which led to concrete results, Japan, China and Korea have every reason to keep their hopes alive.

Nevertheless, a more careful examination of European activities requires caution. In East Asia, it is not so much about joint textbooks, as in the case of France and Germany, but about joint reflection and, in the best case, the creation of shared pedagogical material, which teachers may choose to use as additional material for history classes.

In East Asia, there is no counterpart to the Franco-German history textbook, and for good reason. The creation of a joint textbook has as a prerequisite the harmonisation of school curricula, which was achieved between the German Lander, and subsequently between France and Germany. Such a shake up requires political desire at the highest level, which is, for the time being, totally absent between China, Korea and Japan. Presuming, on the other hand, that such a desire exists would additionally require a definition of the subject which this textbook would teach. For France and Germany, the choice was based upon a history textbook for classes in the final year of secondary school and the 13. Klassen, entitled Europe and the World since 1945; and two other books for first year of sixth form education/12. Klassen and second year of sixth form education/11. Klassen, are currently being published. While particular issues surrounding Franco-German relations are discussed, in addition to subjects such as “memories of the Second World War”, this continues to be a textbook of European and world history, which extends far beyond the sole scope of France and Germany (Defrance and Pfeil 2006).

So, what might be the equivalent of such a subject in East Asia? In Japan and Korea, the two subjects taught in history at school are local history (“Japanese History” and “Korean History) and “World History”. Subjects such as “History of Japanese-Korean exchanges” or “History of Japan, China and Korea” – to lend the title of some of the recently published works – are not part of the curriculum. It is for this reason that these books carefully avoid being categorised as “textbooks” (kyōkasho), preferring the name “pedagogical material” (kyōzai).

Yet another difference presents itself. The Franco-German textbook is part of a long tradition of historical dialogue, going all the way back to the beginning of the 1930s. A joint history textbook programme which deals with Franco-German relations was even undertaken in 1932 by Jean de Pange and Fritz Kern (Defrance and Pfeil 2006, 6). Even after the arrival of Hitler to power, in 1935 historians from both countries put together “recommendations” for history teaching. These were used as a basis for discussions which were to take place following the war.

Truthfully speaking, the current situation of an historical dialogue in East Asia invokes more the pre-war Franco-German contact than the recent publication of a Franco-
German textbook. Just as before the war, there seems to be a preference for studying exchanges between the countries concerned rather than aiming to write an overall history. Just as before the war, commissions of historians are trying to take stock of controversies, so as to ease these. The Franco-German experience may not, therefore, lead to an optimistic vision of the situation in East Asia. In the same manner as the historical dialogue of the 1930s did not prevent a violent explosion of the world situation, the actual search for a shared historical awareness, as fascinating, enriching and passionate as it may be, would not be worth a great deal in the event of a degradation of the regional situation.

However, if tensions ease, if East Asia moves in the direction of increased economic and political cooperation, this pioneering search for a regional historical awareness could contribute to the crystallisation of new and stimulating perspectives into the past.

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South Korea Confronts the Rise of China

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ABSTRACT
The rise of China is one of the most discussed topics in the field of international relations. While few doubt that China is indeed “rising”, precisely how this process is unfolding and with what implications, is unclear. Should China’s growing prominence in regional and global affairs be treated as simply the latest in a natural process of states rising in influence, or is it somehow new, different or potentially destabilising? Given that the implications of China’s rise have been acutely felt in South Korea, this paper focuses seeks to typologise the responses of South Korea to the rise of China.

1. RESPONDING TO THE RISE OF CHINA

Scholars in the field of international relations generally deem the rise of China to be inevitable, and assume that at some point China will challenge America’s regional and global dominance. When and how this may occur is unclear and much disputed. Both Western and Chinese observers have raised the spectre of a destabilising “hegemonic transition”, causing some to warn that the region is destined for conflict (Dibb 2008; Lynch 2009). When considering what China’s rise means for the region and the world, it is worth distinguishing between two inter-related yet separate issues. First, how might the rise of China be measured? And second, does it necessarily imply the decline of the US?

The most tangible measure of China’s rise is its rapid economic growth over the past three decades. Even if Chinese authorities overstate the country’s growth rate and understate its rate of inflation, as some critics maintain, it is beyond doubt that China’s economic resources have expanded markedly in recent times. At least some of the fruits of China’s growth have been invested in its defence budget, allowing the country to present a more formidable face to the world. And the success of China’s growth and stability has translated into political capital, with some authors claiming that a “Beijing consensus” (Ramo 2004) is emerging that vindicates the Chinese path to social and economic organisation. In absolute terms, China has clearly “risen” economically, militarily and politically. However some scholars argue that this has not (yet) endowed China with the status of great power. In this view, China has yet to achieve “global reach and influence”; nor has it attained “a position of leadership and a moral purpose” (Ungerer 2009: 12; see also Ikenberry 1998; Nye 1991). In other words, scholars are consciously comparing China and the US, on the assumption that China will use its newfound power to challenge America.

Just as the degree to which China has risen is both a relative and absolute concept, so too is the issue of American decline. The two issues, although analytically discreet, are intimately linked in the eyes of scholars in the field of international relations. The continuation of China’s rapid economic growth (along with that of Russia, India and Brazil) must necessarily result in a world where the US is less dominant, but descriptions such as “post-American world” (Zakaria 2008) belie the concerns of some analysts about the relative decline of the US. This is not to imply absolute decline, or to predict “imperial overstretcher” (Kennedy 1988). Indeed, pessimism about the capacity of the US to retain its dominance has proven to be unfounded at least since the 1980s (Cox 2007; Huntington
1988, 1999; Leaver 2008). Nonetheless, any suggestion that China is “rising” tends to spark heated debate about its gaining prestige and power at the expense of the US, implying a zero-sum game between the world’s largest powers.

This paper seeks to move beyond the debate about whether the rise of China is actually occurring, or whether the US is in decline. Much of this “debate” will remain in the realms of speculation for the foreseeable future, but it serves to remind us of the multifaceted nature of power, and the need for putative leading states to provide a range of “public goods” to smaller, secondary states. This paper treats the behaviour of secondary states as a means of assessing the significance of China’s rise. What implications does a transition have for secondary states, which have less capacity to influence the nature of the transition? How might a hegemonic transition occur, and with what implications for secondary states such as South Korea?

The international relations literature suggests a range of options available to states in the face of a rising power. One response is engagement. Based on the logic of economic interdependence, this stance suggests that the optimal course for all states is to encourage a challenger such as China to open its economy to the outside world. If China becomes a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system, it is unlikely to overturn the system or engage in hegemonic rivalry with the US. By supporting institutions such as ASEAN and APEC, and by not devaluing the Yuan during the Asian financial crisis, China has sought to convince the region that it is a constructive and valuable partner (Fishman 2005; Gifford 2007; Gill 2007; Kyenge 2006).

A second response is accommodation. Accommodation includes “not only contact and engagement, but also recognition of and adjustment to the needs of others. In substantive terms, accommodation is more about mutual adaptation on equal terms” (He 2007, 2). A positive reading of accommodation is that secondary states are merely adjusting to the growing influence of China via its traditional hard power resources and its “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick 2007; Shambaugh 2004). In this view, China is gradually returning to its former role of regional superpower, from which it long exerted a benevolent influence on the region (Kang 2007). States such as South Korea, Australia and Singapore have preserved their ties to the US, which they deem to play a positive role in the Asia-Pacific region, while not overtly “balancing” against China (Goh 2007; Mochizuki 2007, 230; Ross 2006, 387–9). There is also a negative reading of accommodation, one that amounts to acquiescence or “Finlandisation” (Howe 2007). That is, a small state’s capacity to conduct an autonomous foreign policy will be necessarily limited by the emergence of a hostile great power in its immediate vicinity. This was the experience of Finland during World War II, when it only avoided occupation by the Soviet Union after declaring itself neutral. A defining feature of this form of accommodation is “a situation where [a secondary state] doesn’t decide important national issues by itself, and instead considers the great power China’s intentions first” (Bok 2009, 62).

A third response is hedging. This position combines elements of other approaches—the economic logic of engagement and a steeleier approach in the security realm (discussed below in terms of “containment”). Hedging is a policy better suited to large and powerful states, and it is the dominant stance that Japan and the US adopt towards China. Both are major trading partners of China, but they are also wary about its military build-up. Hedging is a less realistic option for a smaller state such as South Korea. Being in closer physical proximity to China, the South fears a backlash from China more so than Japan or the US. It would be less / than the larger states of withstanding the adverse effects of economic sanctions. The PRC imposed high taxes on some South

A final response is containment. Advocates of containment argue that it is incumbent upon the existing great powers to limit the ambitions of a rising power; accommodating or appeasing the new entrant will only increase its ambitions, and the traditional powers will have no option but war if the new power is to be checked (Mochizuki 2007, 230). In this view, the rise of China is by definition a destabilising force in international politics. The rapid development of China could lead to an unpredictable and dangerous phase of great power rivalry, during which China competes for the mantle of superpower with states such as India and Japan (Emmott 2008; Zakaria 2008). Conflict between China and the US is possible, especially given the unresolved historical grievances that China holds toward the West and Japan (Gries 2004).

For a country such as South Korea, the first and fourth options are not realistic. No country can afford to craft its response to China’s rise solely in economic terms. There is certainly no evidence that the South has done so since normalising ties with China in the 1990s. Likewise, containment is simply too costly and perilous an option for even the world’s most powerful states, let alone South Korea. So the range of choices available to the South is reduced to accommodation and hedging, but the precise approach that the country adopts is expected to vary according to the issue at stake.

The impact of China’s rise will be felt unevenly among states, and South Korea is a prism for investigating the differentiated effects of the rise of China. As a state in the immediate vicinity of China, and one that has a long and complex interaction with various Chinese regimes, the South offers potentially rich insights into the ways in which the region is confronting the re-emergence of China. And yet South Korea’s patterns of interaction with China distinguishes it from others within the subset of American-allied, trade-oriented liberal democracies. More so than Japan and Australia, for instance, it is conceivable that the South could be drawn into a conflict involving the US and China, especially over North Korea. Likewise, China’s emergence as a manufacturing base is of greater concern to Korea than it is to either Australia or Japan, because Chinese firms compete directly with some of South Korea’s main export industries. And as the state which has the longest-standing ties with China, the South might be the most vulnerable to a Chinese charm offensive. The remainder of this paper examines the security, political–ideational, and economic realms in order to typologise South Korean responses to China’s rise in each realm of interaction.

2. SECURITY RELATIONS

The triangular relationship between China, the US and South Korea has changed dramatically in the past two decades. China’s “lean-to-one-side” policy on inter-Korean affairs—whereby it sided with the North—changed in accordance with the emergence of a more independent and less ideological foreign policy during the 1980s (Jin and Fang 2005, 174–80). South Korea underwent its own diplomatic transformation, as Roh Tae-woo’s “Nordpolitik” policy sought to increase Seoul’s diplomatic clout. Furthermore, the ROK viewed China as the key to hastening Korean unification. In light of this transformation and 15 years of normalised relations, what impact has Sino–South Korean rapprochement had on inter-Korean relations, and on the ROK–US alliance? Has the Chinese “charm offensive” reduced the South’s fears about the rise of China?

South Korean views of China warmed in the first half of this decade, with one main reason being China’s support for the Sunshine Policy. Sunshine produced some highly
symbolic successes, such as the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, family reunions, and the founding of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Furthermore, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments sought to convince the North to abandon its nuclear facilities by offering humanitarian and development aid. This approach accorded neatly with the preferences of China, which has invested a substantial amount of political capital in the resolution of the nuclear crisis. China has stated its opposition to the North’s possession of nuclear weapons, and agreed to UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which called on the North to desist from developing such weapons. The PRC wanted the crisis to be resolved in a peaceful manner, and acted as host of the Six Party Talks (Jin and Fang 2005, 185–6).

The US was unenthusiastic about the Sunshine Policy, which it viewed as somewhat naïve and detrimental to its interests in the region. Whereas the Clinton administration offered qualified support for the policy, the Bush team viewed the South’s willingness to offer aid with few conditions as a reward for bad behaviour. In the eyes of the ROK government, the North’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was a symptom of its weakness and inability to defend itself. North Korea could not even feed its people, let alone launch an attack on its enemies. For the Bush administration, the North was a sponsor of terrorists, an enabler of fellow rogue states, and one of the world’s worst violators of human rights. By including North Korea in its “axis of evil”, the US indicated that the North ranked among the greatest threats to its security (Cumings 2007, 105–6; Pempel 2008).

So evolved a sharp divergence of opinion between the US and South Korea. Other incidents, including the accidental killing of two young Korean girls by an American military vehicle, further strained the alliance. This divergence reached its nadir in early 2005, when Roh stated that the South could mediate in the ongoing dispute over North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Roh suggested that the South could act as a “balancer” (Frank 2005), and implied that South Korea was a diplomatic player in its own right and with its own interests.

The Bush administration deemed Roh’s stance as entirely inappropriate. Roh’s questioning of US security strategy contrasted with the attitude of allies such as Japan and Australia. These states met US expectations of greater self-reliance within the context of the alliance system and also willingly contributed to causes that the US viewed as paramount, such as the War on Terror. Roh, in contrast, sought greater independence from the US. The Bush team responded by instigating its new strategy of deploying American military assets on a more flexible basis. The mission statement of ROK-based US troops expanded from merely the defence of South Korea to a wider “roving commission” across East Asia. The Roh government opposed this reconfiguration of US military assets, on the grounds that “strategic flexibility” could imply the use of American forces in the Taiwan Strait, or against North Korea (Ross 2006, 381–2). In the wake of the redeployment of American forces, the number of US troops in South Korea dwindled from 37,000 at the outset of the Roh government’s term to 25,000 by its end. If agreement can be reached on the relocation of troops from the Yongshan base, the American presence in the South will be even less visible (Hahm 2009b).

The US also agreed to expedite the transfer of wartime control of South Korean forces to the ROK. Initially 2012 was suggested as the point when the South would assume full control of its troops, but the US proposed 2009 for the transition (Hahm 2009b). Eventually the two sides agreed to the 2012 handover, but not before South Koreans were forced to ponder a future in which the US was less committed to
guaranteeing the South’s security. Since assuming office in 2008, the Lee Myung-bak administration has offered the tangible signs of support that the US has traditionally sought from allies such as South Korea. Lee has also been more sceptical about the Sunshine Policy (Hahm 2009a). The net result of the Bush–Roh years was an end to equivocation about the value of the alliance.

China has promoted a positive view of itself through its heavy involvement in regional forums—a stance at odds with the unilateralism of the Bush period (Beeson 2009, 104). As part of the “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo, 2004), some authors argue that China offers an alternative to the US-dominated international order. That is, China rejects the argument that political openness must accompany or follow socio-economic development. Governments ranging from post-totalitarian East Asian states to resource-rich autocracies in Africa and the Middle East have endorsed China’s alternative, and it could well be argued that China’s developmental and political experience is closer to the norm of most developing states than the ideal-type model of political and economic governance suggested by the “Washington Consensus” (Beeson 2009, 105). Even if China has devised a blueprint for retaining political control while overseeing rapid development (Cho and Jeong 2008), it would appear to have little if any appeal to South Korea. The model, to the extent that it exists in a coherent format, is much more appealing to those states which have yet to achieve a substantial level of economic and political development.

South Koreans do not appear willing to entrust their security to any state other than the US. Some scholars have detected a notion of “pan-Asianism” in Chinese foreign policy. Herein, China would present itself as the Asian representative in a broader confrontation with the West. This implies that China would displace Japan as the most powerful Asian state, and displace the US as the region’s dominant power (Ko 2006, 106–7). The South appear to recognise China’s growing influence in regional and global affairs, but does not trust it as much as the US.

3. POLITICAL AND IDEATIONAL INFLUENCE

In terms of the political aspect of China’s rise, to what degree does China offer an ideational alternative to the mode of liberal democracy that is commonly (though not exclusively) associated with the US? Of interest here is the ways in which the Chinese government, under the Communist Party, has re-appropriated Confucianism in its bid for greater influence in the region. Some observers (see Bell and Hahm 2003) have labeled Korea the most Confucian of countries. And Meredith Woo argues that South Korea is “culturally at ease with China” (2007, 127) due to its experience of being a tributary state for centuries prior to the Japanese colonial period. A degree of symbolic value could thus be attached to China’s choosing Seoul as the location for its first-ever Confucius Institute. The purpose of the Institute is to promote the study of the Chinese language and to raise interest in the broad study of China, in much the same way as the British Council, Alliance Française and Goethe Institute serve as conduits of cultural influence for other states. Since the founding of the Seoul institute in late 2004, another 12 institutes have been established in South Korean universities. By way of comparison, there are 43 institutes in the United States, 17 each in Great Britain and Japan, 10 in France, six in Australia, and two each in India and Singapore (CI 2009).

If concepts such as propriety, deference to authority, and the prioritisation of community over the individual are central to Confucianism, and if such concepts can be guiding principles for inter-state relations, we might expect relations between China and South Korea to revert to a hierarchical format whereby the latter is highly accommodating to the imperatives of the former.
As noted earlier, China has been a strong supporter of the Sunshine Policy. In particular China and the South enjoyed a significant degree of policy coordination in terms of minimising the impact of North Korea’s economic decline. Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans died due to severe famine during the 1990s, and thousands more crossed into China in search of food, employment and money. While illegal and tantamount to treason, China and the North turned a blind eye to such activity in order to alleviate food shortages. The main issue was that the cross-border flows be kept out of the limelight, and that “economic migrants” not undermine morale in the North by launching audacious escapes to third states. South Korea also tempered its criticism of the North’s human rights record, arguing that this would foster a spirit of reconciliation. However a series of attempts to gain asylum occurred in the early 2000s, as North Koreans sought refuge in diplomatic compounds in China. The PRC began a harsh crackdown, and forcibly repatriated some asylum seekers. It repatriated thousands of North Koreans during several waves of expulsions from 2000 to 2003 (Beck et al 2007, 251).

Opposition parties in the ROK criticised the government for its handling of the North Korean refugees, and claimed that the government was not doing enough to ensure that the refugees—who South Korea is constitutionally obliged to accept as citizens—reached the South safely. The opposition also accused the government of appeasing China on the refugee issue, and claimed that Chinese authorities always sided with the North rather than assist the refugees reach the South. The ROK’s new president, Lee Myung-bak, is sympathetic to efforts by NGOs to assist the flight of refugees from the North. Whereas the Kim and Roh governments were mindful of the reaction of Pyongyang and Beijing to the refugee issue, Lee is more willing to cater to the demands of his conservative base, which is desirous of “regime change” in the North. A sustained outflow of refugees, activists argue, would create a similar dynamic to East Germany, where the visible flight of citizens sapped the morale of the communist government and contributed to its downfall in 1989 (Caryl 2008). However the new government appears unwilling to risk its relations with China by requesting greater cooperation on refugees. At a time of heightened tensions with the North, it has also sought to rein in the efforts by some activists to liberate their compatriots in the North. For instance the state publicly dissuaded one NGO from sending money and other aid to the North via balloons.

While the ROK government may have calculated that any criticism of China for actions within Chinese territory would be potentially detrimental to bilateral ties, it has been stronger in criticising violations of South Korean sovereignty. For instance, the “yellow dust” phenomenon, whereby sand from the Gobi Desert in Northwest China blow across the Korean peninsula and Japan, receives ample news coverage. South Korean officials have attributed incidences of respiratory disease to the dust. Likewise, an incident involving a Chinese diplomat who refused to submit to a breath test received greater coverage in light of tensions with China (Snyder 2007a, 112; Snyder 2007b, 120).

Another series of incidents which illustrate the at-times tense relationship between China and the ROK are attempts by South Korean human rights activists to host a visit by the Dalai Lama. An invitation was withdrawn in 2000 after China voiced its opposition to such a visit, and subsequent attempts to have the Buddhist spiritual leader visit Seoul were quashed in 2004 and 2006 (HRW 2006). Human rights activists were particularly critical of Kim Dae-jung’s acquiescence to Chinese pressure, given that the Dalai Lama shares with Kim the status of having received a Nobel peace prize. China argues that overt support for the Dalai Lama amounts to interference in its affairs. For this reason China reacted with hostility to attempts by human rights activists to use the 2008 Olympic torch relay as an opportunity to raise allegations of human rights violations in Tibet. In the
South Korean case, activists raised both the status of Tibet and also China’s repatriation of North Korean refugees. The South Korean public also witnessed the spectacle of Chinese citizens fighting with Korean protestors and assaulting pro-Tibetan activists.

A related example of the potential for political discord between China and South Korea revolves around the interplay between sovereignty and history. China and the Koreas both claim to be the legitimate heirs to the Koguryo (Gäogōuli) kingdom (37BC?–668AD) that occupied parts of present-day Manchuria and the Korean peninsula. Koguryo is of great historical importance to Korea, being one of three kingdoms (with Silla and Paekche) that formed a unified state in the seventh century AD. The name of that state—Koryo—is linked explicitly to Koguryo, implying political and ethnic continuity (Song 2007). For China, Gäogōuli is one of many kingdoms that have existed within Chinese territories across the millennia. Numerous peoples have exercised various degrees of self-governance within China, and for Chinese historians Gäogōuli is a single component of a multiethnic super-state. More importantly, most of the territory which the kingdom ruled lies within China’s present borders, so an exclusive Korean claim to Koguryo’s history could imply a future claim to Chinese territories (He and Hundt 2008).

The way in which the dispute was resolved is noteworthy in the context of the re-emergence of China. According to the South Korean government’s account of the dispute, verbal agreement was reached in 2004 whereby China would avoid “additional distortion of interpretation” of the history of Koguryo, and “make efforts to correct existing distortions” (MOFAT 2007). The South Korean side monitored China’s compliance with the verbal agreement, noting efforts to remove information perceived as offensive to Koreans. Furthermore, China suggested that the dispute be resolved through academic exchanges, with one proposal being that the kingdom be considered a “shared history” (ilsa yangyong) that could be recollected separately (Ha 2006, 12).

China’s efforts to placate South Korean concerns suggest that it is anxious to avoid creating the impression that it will threaten its neighbours or create discord in the region. Some commentators argue that the Koguryo issue illustrates China’s view of itself as the region’s natural heavyweight (Ko 2006, 114; Snyder 2004, 109–11). A negative image of China could result in the formation of a balancing coalition that seeks to contain China rather than allowing it to resume what it believes is its rightful role in the region. It also suggests that former tributary states such as Korea will not automatically defer to Chinese prerogatives.

4. ECONOMIC ISSUES

For some scholars (Woo 2007, 121–5), the rise of China signifies its return to the economic centre of East Asia. By dint of its massive population and demand for resources, China naturally draws surrounding states into its orbit. No other state, not even the US, can offer the same degree of economic opportunity as China. Despite its people earning relatively low levels of income by world standards, China is viewed as an insatiable market for everything from raw materials to the most advanced consumer goods and financial services.

Since China’s rapid and sustained economic growth has been a windfall for many of its neighbours, their reliance on the China boom for their own prosperity may provide incentives for accommodation. China has become the largest trade and investment partner for South Korea, an advanced industrial economy with one of the world’s highest rates of trade dependency. Whereas international trade was valued at 18% of South Korean GNP in 1962, it climbed to 72% by 2003. In contrast, Japan and the US recorded 18% by the
same measure (Kim 2007, 51). Consequently, the South has a greater incentive than most states for China’s rapid growth to continue unabated.

Some authors focus on issues that could hinder the seemingly irresistible rise of the Chinese economy. A range of domestic problems, including a sharp rural–urban divide and an internal “floating population” (Beeson 2009, 106), environmental degradation (Economy 2004; Gallagher 2006), a heavy reliance on exports and foreign investment (Pan 2009), and smuggling, corruption and high inflation, threaten China’s current growth trajectory, and could cause its economy to collapse (Chang 2002; Shirk 2007). In this sense, instead of delivering prosperity to the rest of the world, China could drag down other economies. The current global financial and economic crisis has reminded other states that their prosperity has come to depend on China’s growth, and greater degrees of integration necessarily imply a commensurately greater exposure to any slowdown in China (The Economist 2009).

In their study of the impact of China’s economy on the rest of the world, Eichengreen and Tong (2006) found that states that specialise in the production of raw materials, such as Australia and Brazil, have benefited from the China boom. Producers of consumer goods, like South Korea, have come under pressure from China’s low-cost manufacturing sector. Woo, likewise, argues that China’s re-emergence as an economic powerhouse threatens the manufacturing bases of Southeast Asia and South Korea (2007, 124–5). And yet part of the generally favourable view of China that South Koreans have held since normalisation of ties in the 1990s has stemmed from the assumption that the China boom has benefited the South.

South Korea has recorded trade surpluses and double-digit growth in exports to China for most of the past decade. The two economies have proven to be complementary insofar as South Korean semiconductors, steel and LCDs served as crucial inputs to China’s manufacturing sector. A substantial number of small-and-medium South Korean firms have relocated their production facilities to China in order to capitalise on the low costs of labour. Many of these firms have used their China-based factories to supply the South Korean market, raising questions about whether these products should be considered Chinese imports or Korean domestic production. However from the mid-2000s, perceptions began to change, as the technological gap between the South and China closed. Instead of China being merely a consumer of South Korean goods, it has become a competitor in some of the South’s main export industries. China’s rapid growth is also ruining South Korean ambitions to become the economic and financial “hub” of Northeast Asia. Further, Chinese firms have increased their acquisitions of South Korean industrial assets (Hundt 2007, 227–30).

South Korea has also made concerted efforts, under both progressive and conservative governments, to mitigate the effects of its integration with China via free trade agreements (FTAs) with extra-regional states. An FTA, at least in theory, integrates two or more national economies into a coherent whole. When an agreement links economies of vastly different scale and complexity, there are implications for the sovereignty of the smaller state. For this reason, the signing of an FTA has great symbolic meaning in international politics, and the US pursues FTAs with those states that it deems to be its closest and most valued allies. For instance Australia finalised an FTA with the US in 2005 despite some observers (Weiss et al 2004) arguing that the agreement would be detrimental to Australian economic interests. Instead, the real value of the agreement appeared to lie in the symbolic linkage of Australia to the US.
By one estimate, South Korea has been the most active negotiator of FTAs in the world; more than 40 agreements are at various states of completion (Lie and Kim 2008, 122). However few agreements have been ratified by both legislatures, with the most notable case being the South Korea–US (KORUS) FTA. Ratification at the South Korean end stalled in early 2008, when US negotiators insisted that the South resume the importation of American beef. US imports were halted in 2003 after the detection of mad cow disease on one American ranch, but US officials argued that the problem had been addressed sufficiently, and that American beef was completely safe to consume. Demonstrations against beef imports expanded and became linked with the FTA as a whole (Hundt 2008, 508–9).

According to Woo (2007, 126–7), the KORUS FTA—whose future remains in doubt due to the American recession and demands from legislators for the agreement be restructured to assist the car industry (Hwang 2009)—was a bold attempt by South Korea to balance against the rise of China. In the face of competition from China, the signing of an FTA with the much-larger American economy offered the opportunity for manufacturers from the South to bolster the scale and scope of production. Woo likens this to a new version of industrial policy, whereby South Korean producers would re-launch themselves into competition with their Chinese counterparts by drawing on the strength of the American market. Similarly, the agreement that is nearing completion with the European Union appears quite bold at face value and represents an opportunity to secure market access to what is collectively South Korean Korea’s second biggest trading partner (Stangarone 2009). In this sense the FTA strategy reflects the logic of hedging or balancing rather than the other responses discussed in this paper.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This review of South Korean responses to the rise of China indicates that the spectrum of options has been relatively narrow, shifting between accommodation and hedging. The negative response in the security realm has offset the relatively positive response in the economic sphere, while the response in the political–ideational realm falls somewhere in between the other two spheres of interaction.

China’s efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia have been one of its most active diplomatic forays in the past two decades. Despite the political capital invested in these efforts, North Korea has, to date, tested two nuclear devices and missiles capable of delivering weapons across the Pacific Ocean (ICG 2009). Chinese diplomacy did not enhance South Korean security by preventing weapons testing in late 2006, and China’s legalistic interpretation of the recent missile tests suggests that its main priority was to preserve its influence over the North rather than to prevent nuclear proliferation. However China supported the UN Security Council resolution condemning the nuclear test in late May, and has thus in theory committed itself to inspecting ships suspected of carrying weapons-related materials. China’s stance on the North may become closer to that of South Korea, and how China uses its remaining leverage over North Korea will influence whether the South makes any further movement to reduce its dependence on the US for security.

In the political and ideational realm, Sino–South Korean relations founded on issues such as the status of North Korean refugees in China and competing claims to Koguryŏ. During these disputes, the South displayed little capacity to force China to change its behaviour. Even in the history dispute, China merely refrained from pressing its claims to the kingdom openly. It has not relinquished control over the territories in question, most of which lie within China’s present borders. Consequently, South Korea
has been forced to accept China’s views on a range of bilateral issues about which the US
and other allies have been unable or unwilling to intercede.

China and South Korea are becoming increasingly interdependent in terms of trade
and investment, but the consequences are far greater for the South given the massive
discrepancy in the scale and scope of the respective economies. South Korea has
experienced some adverse effects, as measured by a loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis
China, but the South Korean government has sought to mitigate the effects of integration
with China via FTAs with extra-regional states. The South is increasingly interdependent
with China in all three areas of interaction, but it is the economic sphere in which ties have
been most tangible. For the foreseeable future, a continuation of a quasi-hedging strategy
is likely to continue.

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Variation in Country Name Words in Early Modern Korea

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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to determine how the changes in international relations of Chosŏn affected the variation of names for foreign countries used in late 19th and early 20th century Chosŏn. For 19th century text, we analyzed four kinds of textbooks and how the unique characteristics of each textbook affected vocabulary variation. For 20th century text, we studied corpora consisting of newspapers in early modern Korea to explore the frequency patterns found in the appearance of names for foreign countries at that time. We found that the Japanese influence on Chosŏn and Chosŏn’s relationship with the Sino-sphere countries and World Powers had significant effects upon the variation of names for foreign countries. In addition, we also discovered a strong correlation between the unique characteristics of each textbook and newspaper and the distinctive patterns found in the variations in foreign country names.

1. INTRODUCTION
In this research we examine the variation in names for foreign countries in early modern Korea and explore how changes in Chosŏn international relations affected the use of vocabularies. We explore four kinds of textbooks and examine corpora consisting of early modern period newspapers.

Traditionally, Chosŏn had imported new culture and technologies from China for thousands of years; however, in the late 19th century when Chosŏn opened its port to the World Powers it expanded trade routes to several other countries. This shift happened to other Sino-sphere countries and ended with the collapse of the Sino-sphere and Sinocentrism. This social change also triggered language changes. As the role of China was supplanted by other countries, other languages took the place of Chinese and Chinese characters. This was especially noticeable in vocabulary shifts.

A massive influx of information on foreign countries yielded many new loan words1 including words for foreign country names2. Before the late 19th century, only a few neighboring countries such as China, India, Japan, Mongolia and Vietnam3 were mentioned in historical texts. Conventionally, country names were written in Chinese characters because of the strong influence of Chinese. However, new words for country names appeared in the late 19th century which were mostly transliterations from Japanese and English4. Therefore, there was more than one word referring to the same country in late 19th and early 20th century Chosŏn.

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3 The 21st Century Sejong Historical Corpus, which contains historical texts ranging from the 15th and 19th centuries, shows mentions of China (the names of several dynasties), Japan, Annam, Mongolia and India before the late 19th century.
4 According to Chung (1998, 131), Japan experienced similar change earlier than Chosŏn. Until the late 16th century, Japanese words for foreign country names were the same as their Chinese names; however, after
Example (1) is a list of types of words for Oceania/Australia used in late 19th and early 20th century Chosón. Type (1a) is the name of the continent Oceania, although it refers to a country in Sŏyugyǒmnun (1895). Type (1b) illustrates indirectly transliterated words, which were once transliterated into Japanese and then into Korean using the Korean pronunciation (tong’um) for each Chinese character. Type (1c) are abbreviated forms of (1b). Type (1d) shows the words directly transliterated from English to Korean.

(1) a. Taeyangju
   b. Hot’aeria, Hodaeria, Hodaria, Odaeria, Otaeri, Hot’aeri, Hot’ari,
   c. Hoju, Hoju
   d. Osū’t’urenlüya, Ósūch’ůeria, Osūch’ üryeria, Osdūrelrya, Osū’t’üryölya, Osū’t’ūrelri

Previous researchers such as Seong (1983), Lee (1987), and Chung (1998) were concerned about types (1a) ~ (1c), which were written in Chinese characters, and discussed the relationships these words had with Japanese and Chinese words while focusing on certain texts, mostly Sŏyugyǒmnun. Based on the results of such previous studies, here we examine the variations in foreign country names, including type (1d), and explore the distribution of words and the competitive aspects among their variations.

Our research is comprised of two steps. First, we examine foreign country names in late 19th century texts and describe the variations used. Specifically, we examine textbooks and travelogues. Second, we explore the distribution of each word in early 20th century texts, with a focus on the text of newspapers.

2. Variations of Foreign Country Names in Late 19th Century Textbooks

2.1 Data

Western-style education began in Chosón in the late 19th century. The government established modern schools and compiled textbooks. There were several world geography textbooks, and they contained numerous foreign country names. In this section we examine the four textbooks described in Table (1): Saminp’ilchi, Kungminsohaktokpon, Chiguyangnon, and Man’gukchiji.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table (1) Textbooks</th>
<th>Abbr.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saminp’ilchi</td>
<td>&lt;Samin&gt;</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>H. B. Hulbert</td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kungminsohaktokpon</td>
<td>&lt;Kungmin&gt;</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>The faculty</td>
<td>K+C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiguyangnon</td>
<td>&lt;Chigu&gt;</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>The faculty</td>
<td>K (C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man’gukchiji</td>
<td>&lt;Man’guk&gt;</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>The faculty</td>
<td>K+C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<Samin> was the first Korean textbook of world geography. It is exclusively written in Han’gül. H. B. Hulbert, a missionary dispatched from America to teach students

Japan opened its ports to Western countries, it began writing the names of foreign countries using its own system.

5 On the other hand, Osū’t’üryölya referred to a continent in Chiguyangnon (1895).

6 Sŏyugyǒmnun (1895) was written by Kiljun Yu, who studied in Japan and America. It is a travelogue containing a lot of foreign country names. Seong (1983), Lee (1987), and Chung (1998) focused on the words written in Chinese characters.

7 It was also the first Western-style textbook of Korea.
at Yuk’yŏng’gongwŏn, was the author. The book includes numerous foreign country names, most of which are transliterated words. Four years after its publication in Korean, it was translated into Chinese (Min 1999, 366).

<Kungmin>, <Chigu>, and <Man’guk> were all compiled by the government; however, all three had different characteristics. First, <Kungmin> was the first textbook published by the government. It was written in a combination of Korean and Chinese characters. Although it was published as a Korean language textbook, it contained content about various aspects of life. Most of the textbooks used by teaching faculty had to pass Japanese imperialist officials’ inspection before they could be used, but <Kungmin> did not go through this textbook censorship process. The publication of <Kungmin> was planned before Japanese councilors started to intervine in Chosŏn from December 1894, but because of the delay caused by the censorship policy, it was published in 1895 (Jeon 2005, 250-253). In addition, the main writers were pro-American and anti-Japanese scholars (Jeon 2005, 250-253). Next, <Chigu> consists of questions and answers on world geography and Chosŏn geography. <Chigu> was written in Korean, but Chinese characters were included only for words originating from Chinese. Finally, <Man’guk> was a textbook about world geography and written in a mixed script of Korean and Chinese characters.

We examined all the country names in the four textbooks and selected the 34 foreign country names used in more than two textbooks. Example (2) lists these names in alphabetical order. We discuss the variations of these 34 words in the textbooks and compare each variation with its Chinese and Japanese counterpart. Further, we referred to Yonghwaja jon (英華字典 (1866-1869)) to determine the names for foreign countries used in late 19th century China. Additionally, we confirmed the Japanese words for country names using the ‘Taiyo (太陽) Corpus,’ which consists the Taiyo magazines issued from 1895 to 1925.

(2) Afghanistan, Africa, America, Annam, Arabia, Asia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Egypt, Europe France, German, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Judea, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Persia, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Scotland, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.A.

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8 The first Korean government school, built in 1886.
9 <Kungmin> was a not a geography textbook, but we analyzed it because it covers various academic fields and contains several country names.
10 Chosŏn abolished yejo in 1894, which had been in charge of education, and established hakpu in 1895 (Kang 1973, 13).
11 As a result, several patriotic parts remained in the contents. For example, it contains stories about the capital Hanyang and King Sejong and uses the word Taechosŏnku, which means ‘The Great Chosŏn. After the Japanese annexation of Korea, <Kungmin> became listed as a forbidden book.
12 The names included continent names.
14 The National Institute for Japanese Language introduces this corpus as follows: “The Taiyô Corpus is a text database of the periodical Taiyô, read by a wide range of readers from the end of the 19th to the beginning of the 20th centuries. The individual articles exhibit a variety of writing styles and orthographic characteristics, providing an excellent resource for the study of the development of modern Japanese. The Taiyô Corpus provides texts of 3,409 articles in 60 issues published over the period of 1895-1925, amounting to approximately 15 million characters.”
2.2 The Textbooks Published by the Government

Country names in <Kungmin>, <Chigu>, and <Man’guk> are mostly comprised of Chinese characters. These government textbooks used country names written in either Chinese characters or the Korean characters that corresponded to the Korean pronunciation of the Chinese characters. What we consider most important here is whether most of the country names in these books were the same as their Japanese counterparts, despite the fact that Korean textbooks had been written in Chinese for hundreds of years. We also discuss a few exceptions.

Example (3) shows the country names that consist of the same Chinese characters as those of their Chinese and Japanese counterparts. In this case, all of the word forms were the same in each text. It is not clear whether these words directly came from Chinese, or from Chinese to Japanese and then to Korean. (‘x’ means the word did not appear in the respective text.)

(3) Word: <Kungmin> / <Chigu> / <Man’guk>
   a. Afghanistan: x / x / 阿富汗 (abuhan)
   b. Annam: x / x / 安南 (annam)
   c. Arabia: x / x / 亞剌伯 (aribaek)
   d. England: 英國 (yŏng’guk), 英吉□國 (yŏng’gilliguk) / yŏng’guk, 英國 / 英國
   e. Greece: 希臘 (hŭrap) / x / 希臘
   f. Hungary: 正牙利 (hyung’ari) / x / x
   g. India: 印度 (indo) / indoguk, 印度 / 印度
   h. Japan: 日本 (ilbon) / ilbonguk, 日本國 / 日本
   i. Mexico: x / x / 墨西哥 (mukoša)
   j. Portugal: 葡萄牙 (p’odoa) / x / 葡萄牙
   k. Romania: x / x / □馬尼亞 (lamania)
   l. Spain: 西班牙 (sŏbana) / x / 西班牙
   m. Switzerland: 瑞西 (sŏsŏ) / x / 瑞西
   n. Turkey: x / x / 土耳其 (t’oigi)

Japanese influence on the country names is more obvious in Example (4), which shows the country names that were different from the Chinese word but the same as the Japanese.

(4) Word: <Kungmin> / <Chigu> / <Man’guk>
   a. America: 亞米利加洲 (amirigaju) / amirikka, 亞米利加 / 亞米利加洲
   b. Australia: x / osūt’ ūryŏllyya / 澳太利亞 (hot’aeria)
   c. Austria: 英法獨俄奧伊 / x / 奧地利 (ojiri)
   d. Belgium: x / x / 白耳義 (paegiūi)
   e. Denmark: x / x / 丁抹 (chŏngmal)
   f. Italy: 伊太利國 (it’aeriguk), 英法獨俄奧伊 / x / 伊太利
   g. Scotland: 蘇格蘭 (sogyŏngnan) / x / x

The Chinese word for America was 亞美利加 (amiriga), but Japan changed the second character to 米 (mi). All three textbooks followed the Japanese version of the word. Austria was written as 奧地利亞 (ojiria) and 奧地哩亞 (ojiria) in Chinese, but as 奧地利
(ojiri) and 墾太利 (ot’aeri) in Japanese; thus Chinese used the character 奥 (o) for the transliteration of the English ‘Au’ while Japanese used ‘塬’. Both <Kungmin> and <Man’guk> used the same characters as the Japanese words. The transliteration of Italy in Japanese was 伊太利 (it’aeri) and 以太利 (it’aeri). <Kungmin> and <Man’guk> used 伊太利 and 伊 (i) in an abbreviated form, while the Chinese transliterations were 以太利 and 意大利 (üidaeri). Finally, the Chinese word for Australia was 新荷蘭 (sinharan) and 澳大利亞 (odaeria), for Belgium it was 比利時 (pirisi), and for Denmark, 丹拔 (tanmal). However, <Man’guk> used 濟太利亞 (hot aeria), 白耳義 (paegiüi), and 丁抹 (chŏngmal), which were written in the same characters as their Japanese counterparts. In addition, the Chinese word for Scotland was 蘇吉蘭 (sogillan), while the Japanese used 格 (kyŏk) for the second character; <Kungmin> adopted the Japanese version.

Meanwhile, (5) illustrates the words for country names which took different forms in different texts. “J” and “C” in parentheses denote whether the country name is the same as the Japanese or the Chinese, or both.

(5) Word: <Kungmin> / <Chigu> / <Man’guk>

a. Africa: 亞非利加洲 (abirigajou) (C, J) / apărîkka, 亞非利加 (C, J) / 亚非利加洲 (abullijaju) (J)
b. China: 清國 (ch’ŏng’guk) (C), 支那國 (chinaguk) (J) / ch’ŏng’guk, 清國 (C) / 支那 (J)
c. France: 英法獨俄伊 (C) / pŏpkuk, 法國 (C) / 佛國 (pulguks), 佛蘭西 (pullansŏ) (J)
d. Germany: 英法獨俄伊 (J) / 德國 (tŏkkuk) (C) / x
e. Russia: 英法獨俄伊, 俄國 (aguk) (C) / arasaguk, 俄羅斯國 (C) / 露西亞 (rosōa) (J)
f. U.S.A.: 合衆國 (hapchung’guk), 米國 (miguk) (J) / miguk, 美國 (C) / 北米合衆國 (pukmihapchung’guk) (J)

(5a) is the example of Africa, which illustrates that <Kungmin> and <Chigu> use both the Chinese and Japanese versions of the word, just like in example (3). <Man’guk>, however, used the word that was only used in Japanese. For China, <Kungmin> used both the Chinese and Japanese words, while <Chigu> used the Chinese word and <Man’guk> used the Japanese word. In addition, when referring to France and Russia, <Kungmin> and <Chigu> used the Chinese names, but <Man’guk> used the Japanese names. Germany, however, was written using the Japanese word in <Kungmin>, using the Chinese character 獨 (tok), while <Chigu> used the Chinese word. As in (5f), although <Kungmin> and <Man’guk> used the Japanese word, <Chigu> chose the Chinese word.

Example (5) illustrates the difficulty in finding any preference in a single text regarding the use of country name words originating from a particular language. Especially in <Kungmin>, some names were the same as their Japanese counterparts while

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15 China was described as 中國 (chung’guk) and 大清朝 (tæch’ŏngcho) in Yŏnghwajajon. The Taiyo Corpus shows 4,323 occurrences of 支那 (china), 131 occurrences of 中國, but no occurrences of 清國 (ch’ŏng’guk) or 清朝 (ch’ŏngcho).
16 While 4,043 occurrences of 獨逸 (togi) were found in the Taiyo Corpus, there were no occurrences of 德國 (tŏkkuk).
others were the same as their Chinese counterparts. On the contrary, <Chigu> tended to adopt the Chinese words, with a few exceptions such as America (4a), Africa (5a) and Australia (4b). On the other hand, there was not a single country name that was different from the Japanese version in <Man’guk>. <Man’guk> is considered to be either a translation of a Japanese textbook or a textbook created under the influence of the Japanese. In a word, we could say that the origin of the country names varies in accordance with the unique characteristics of each textbook.

2.3 Samin’p’ilchi

In contrast to the faculty written textbooks, most country names in <Samin> were directly transliterated words. <Samin> was written by an American missionary, and as such it used direct transliterations from English. Example (6) illustrates the words for the country names appearing in <Samin>. Most contain the suffix ‘-kuk (-guk)’, which was traditionally attached to country names in Korean.

(6) Word: <Samin>
   a. Afghanistan: apkan’isūdanguk
   b. Africa: apūriga, apūrikka
   c. America: amerikka
   d. Australia: osūdūrellya
   e. Austria: osūdūria, osūdūriaguk, osūdūrohōng’geriguk
   f. Belgium: belchiamguk
   g. Denmark: Tenmakkuk
   h. Egypt: ijūpkuk, ijūptūguk
   i. Greece: kūrisūguk, kkūrisūguk
   j. Hispania (Spain): isūbaniaguk
   k. Hungary: hōng’gōriguk, hōng’geria, osūdūrohōng’geriguk
   l. Mexico: meksūgoguk
   m. Netherlands: nederansūguk, rederansūguk
   n. Portugal: p’och’ugalguk, p’och’yugalguk
   o. Romania: Romaniaguk
   p. Scotland: sūkōtūlandā
   q. Switzerland: shwit’sūrandūguk, shwit’śūllandūguk
   r. Turkey: tōk’iguk

While these were transliterated, words for country names in (7) are not transliterations but Korean words originating from Chinese or Japanese.

(7) Word: <Samin> / relationship with Korea
   a. Annam: annamguk / Sino-sphere member
   b. India: indo / Sino-sphere member
   c. Japan: ilbon, ilbonguk / Sino-sphere member
   d. China: ch’ōng'guk / Sino-sphere member
   e. America: miguk, amerikka / Since May. 1882

On the contrary, country names written in Hangul in Sŏnyŏnmun seem to be simply transcriptions. Sŏnyŏnmun used Chinese characters for country names and added words in Hangul such as ‘p’ūransu’ for France, ‘taennakk’i’ for Denmark, ‘Ōsūt’ūrelnu_aff’ for Australia, to name just a few. These are thought to be transcriptions of their English pronunciations because country names were mentioned only as their names, that is, the ‘-kuk’ suffix was never attached to the words. In addition, even Chosŏn was referred to as K’or’ia, Japan as Cha’pan, and China as Ch’a’ina.
f. England: yŏng 'guk, yeng 'gillanďu, yeng 'gilliuk / Since Nov. 1883

g. Germany: tŏkkuk / Since Nov. 1883

h. Russia: arasaguk / Since July 1884

i. France: pûlnansiguk / Since June 1886

The words for the traditional Sino-sphere member countries such as Annam, India, Japan
and China all originated from Chinese. (7a) annam, (7b) indo, (7c) ilbon, (7d) ch’ŏng in
<Samin> were the Korean pronunciations of the corresponding Chinese characters. These
were the old neighbor countries of Chosŏn, and their names had already become settled
and fixed. A search of the <21st Century Sejong Historical Corpus> revealed that the first
usage of annam appeared in Waeŏyuhae (17XX), indo in Wŏlinsŏko (1459), ilbon in
Tusiŏnhae (1481) and ch’ŏng in Sansŏng’ilgi (1636). Each of these countries had already
experienced hundreds of years of history with Chosŏn, so they were written in the traditional
way even though <Samin> was compiled by an American missionary.

Besides the Sino-sphere countries, several Western countries mentioned in (7e) ~
(7j) were also written in this way. America, for example, was written in two ways: indirect
transliteration, miguk, and direct transliteration, amerikka. In addition, the words for
England were the indirect transliterations yŏng ‘guk, yeng ‘gilliuk and a mixture of both
indirect and direct transliteration, yeng ‘gillanďu (yeng ‘gil + landŭ). Actually, the indirect
transliteration of 英吉利 (yŏng gilli) was supposed to be yŏng ‘gili, however, yŏng
was unlauteed to yeng. For (7e) and (7f), we were unable to conclude whether they originated
from Chinese or Japanese18.

For the other words in (7g) ~ (7i), however, the origin of the words is quite
obvious. The Chinese words for Germany were 日耳曼 (iriman) and 德國 (tŏkkuk), and
the Japanese words were 日耳曼 and 獨逸 (togil). As illustrated in (7g), <Samin> used the
Chinese word 德國, which was pronounced in Korean as tŏkkuk. Furthermore, the Chinese
words for Russia were 俄羅斯 (arasa) and 島羅斯 (arasa), while the Japanese word was
露西亞 (rosŏa). For Russia, <Samin> also used the Chinese word arasa (俄羅斯 or
俄羅斯). For France, however, <Samin> used the Japanese word. The Chinese words for
France were 法蘭西 (pŏmnanso) and 法國 (pŏpkuk), while the Japanese words were
佛蘭西 (pullanso) and 佛國 (pulguk). Pûlnans in <Samin> was the Korean pronunciation
of 佛蘭西, but it was supposed to be pûlnansŏ. It is unclear whether this reflected a
phonological change of Korean ([s] to [i] before a sibilant) or the Chinese pronunciation
of ‘西’ ([si])

Example (7) also shows the month and year when each country signed a treaty with
Chosŏn. All of the countries illustrated in (7) had a comparatively long trade history with
Chosŏn. Four of them (7a ~ 7d) were traditional Sino-sphere countries, and the other five
(7e ~ 7i) were countries which began trade with Chosŏn relatively early among the
Western countries. <Samin> was written in 1891, and Chosŏn opened its ports to America,
England, Germany, Russia and France before then. To determine if the start of trade
affected word usage, we compared (7) to the words of the countries which started trading
with Chosŏn after the publication of <Samin>. Austria began trade with Chosŏn from
June 1892, Belgium from March 1902, and Denmark from July 1902. As can be seen in
(6), the names of these three countries were transliterated from English to Korean in
<Samin>.

18 As explained in 2.2, Japanese and Chinese used the same word for England. For America, they used
different words but the Korean pronunciation of the words was the same. <Samin> only used Han’gŭl, and
thus it is not possible to determine the origin of miguk.

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The Western countries included in (7) were the World Powers, and as such their influence on Asian countries was enormous, with lively discussion about them surely occurring often. This means that the country names of the World Powers must have been introduced to Chosŏn from Japan and China, both of which opened their ports earlier than Chosŏn. Accordingly, we posit that the words for America, England, Germany, Russia and France were adopted from Japanese and Chinese and had already entered and become settled in Korean before the time <Samin> was written.

To summarize the above discussion of variations in country name words in late 19th century textbooks, all three of the faculty written textbooks illustrate the extent of the influence of Japanese words in Korean. All the words in <Man'guk> were the same as their Japanese counterparts, and even <Kungmin>, which was written by people whose political attitudes were anti-Japanese, used many Japanese country name words. On the other hand, the textbook written by a foreign missionary, <Samin>, used directly transliterated words for the most of the country names, although adopted words introduced from Japanese and Chinese were used for the traditional Sino-sphere members and the World Powers. In chapter 3, we describe variations in country names appearing in newspapers and explain the development of those variations in the early 20th century.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF VARIATIONS IN NEWSPAPERS

While textbooks introduce words intended to be spread by education, the words appearing in newspapers tend to reflect what words are actually prevailing in the society. We therefore should be able to find out whether early textbooks really affected the usage of country name words subsequently.

3.1 Corpora

We approach the variation of country name words quantitatively so that we can determine which words were frequently used and which were not. The four corpora chosen for analysis are described in Table (2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Abbr.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Transcription</th>
<th>Corpus size (ŏjŏl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tongnipsinmun</td>
<td>&lt;Tongip&gt;</td>
<td>1896–1899</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>38,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheguksinmun</td>
<td>&lt;Cheguk&gt;</td>
<td>1898–1902</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>529,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taehannmaeilsinbo</td>
<td>&lt;Taehan&gt;</td>
<td>1907–1910</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>252,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kongnipsinbo</td>
<td>&lt;Kongnip&gt;</td>
<td>1907–1908</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>120,621</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<Tongnip> was the first newspaper written in Han’gul for the common people. It was published from 1896 to 1899. <Cheguk> was also published for the common people, and especially for women. It was published for around 5 years from 1898. We expected these two newspapers to show the words of country names prevailing in late 19th century Chosŏn society. In addition, <Taehan>, published from 1907 to 1910, had the largest circulation among the newspapers of early 20th century Chosŏn. The publisher of <Taehan> was an English man, Ernest Thomas Bethell. Finally, <Kongnip> was a newspaper made for Korean emigrants in L.A. The <Kongnip> corpus spans 1907 and 1908. It was a newspaper published outside of Chosŏn, and as such the source of its contents was different from that of the other three newspapers. Moreover, both <Taehan> and <Kongnip> were free from Japanese interference.

We aligned all of these corpora in the unit of ŏjŏl and then sorted the data in Korean alphabetical order. We examined the sorted lists and selected the words of country
names for analysis. When we were unsure whether a word was a country name, we searched for the word using the tool ‘SynKDP’, which creates KWIC concordances.

In the following sections we describe the results of the analysis in three parts according to the country classifications: the Sino-sphere countries, the World Powers, and others.

Sino-sphere Countries

The words of the Sino-sphere country names in newspapers were the same as those used in the textbooks. The words for Annam, India and Japan were the indirect transliterations, which were also used in Japan and China. Sino-sphere countries had a long history of trade with Chosŏn, and thus they shared the same country name words. The names of these countries were written the same in all four newspapers. Example (8) illustrates the variations in the name of each Sino-sphere country in the four newspapers, with the numbers in parentheses describing the frequency of each word in the corpus. Although we can compare the numbers, such comparisons should be limited to within the same line (within one newspaper) because the size of each newspaper corpus was different.

(8) a. Annam
   <Tongnip> x
   <Cheguk> annam (52), annamguk (3)
   <Taehan> annam (33), annamguk (1)
   <Kongnip> annam (8), annamguk (1)

b. India
   <Tongnip> indo (3)
   <Cheguk> indoguk (51), indo (38)
   <Taehan> indoguk (3), indo (2)
   <Kongnip> indo (73), indoguk (3)

c. Japan
   <Tongnip> ilbon (139), ilbonguk (1)
   <Cheguk> ilbon (1765), ilbonguk (18)
   <Taehan> ilbon (1103), ilbonguk (27)
   <Kongnip> ilbon (873), ilbonguk (7)

d. China
   <Tongnip> ch’yŏng’guk (62), chinaguk (1), ch’ŏng’guk (1)
   <Cheguk> ch’yŏng’guk (1088), ch’ŏng’guk (126)
   <Taehan> ch’yŏng’guk (306), china (17), ch’ŏng’guk (1)
   <Kongnip> ch’yŏng’guk (200), china (17)

As can be seen in (8), whether the suffix ‘-kuk’ was attached depended on the country. Annam and Japan were usually written without the suffix in all the newspapers, while most occurrences of India had the suffix in <Cheguk>, but the opposite tendency was seen in <Kongnip>. Meanwhile, the words for China appeared in two different forms. One was the Chinese word ch’ŏng’guk and the other was the Japanese word china. The word china appeared in most of the newspapers except <Cheguk>, but it was nonetheless low in frequency. The name of China was mostly written in Chinese even though the Japanese word filtered into the newspapers.

To conclude, the names of the Sino-sphere countries were still written in their traditional forms in early modern Korean newspapers, except for the Japanese word ‘china’, which means China.
3.2 World Powers

As discussed in chapter 2, the names of America, England, Germany, Russia and France appeared in various forms in textbooks. The words for England were the same as their Chinese and Japanese counterparts, which were indirect transliterations, and the word for America was the same as the Japanese word. Additionally, the words for Germany, Russia, and France showed different tendencies in the textbooks (See example (5)). However, the words in newspapers were even more complicated. Example (9) demonstrates the various words for each country and their frequencies in the corpus. Variation forms are described in order of frequency.

(9) a. America

\(<\text{Tongnip}>\) miguk (57), ameriga (3), amiriga (1)
\(<\text{Cheguk}>\) miguk (508), amiriga (13), ameriga (2), amerikka (1)
\(<\text{Taehan}>\) miguk (292), amiriga (9), amerik’a (5), amirik’a (2), amerikka (1)
\(<\text{Kongnip}>\) miguk (412), ameriga (8), amerikka (2), amerik’a (1)

b. England

\(<\text{Tongnip}>\) yong’guk (28), yong’gilli (4), yong’gilli (3), yong’gilliguk (1)
\(<\text{Cheguk}>\) yong’guk (748), yong’gilli (7)
\(<\text{Taehan}>\) yong’guk (193), yong’gilliguk (2)
\(<\text{Kongnip}>\) yong’guk (137), yong’gilli (1), ing’gillaendú (1)

c. Germany

\(<\text{Tongnip}>\) tökkuk (7)
\(<\text{Cheguk}>\) tökkuk (436), työkkuk (18), il’iman (4), chyömaen (2)
\(<\text{Taehan}>\) tökkuk (63), työkkuk (6)
\(<\text{Kongnip}>\) tökkuk (52), työkkuk (5), il’iman (2)

d. Russia

\(<\text{Tongnip}>\) arasya (56)
\(<\text{Cheguk}>\) arasa (604), aguk (156), arasya (87), arasaguk (18), arasyaguk (3), rössa (1), rosyöa (1), rogu (1)
\(<\text{Taehan}>\) rogu (103), arasa (45), aguk (28), arasya (25), arasaguk (6)
\(<\text{Kongnip}>\) arasa (44), rogu (42), rossia (25), aguk (12), russia (6), arasya (1), rosyöa (1), rosysa (1)

e. France

\(<\text{Tongnip}>\) pullansyö (32), pulnansyö (6), pöpkuk (1)
\(<\text{Cheguk}>\) pöpkuk (326), pullansyö (18), pulnansyö (6), p’uraensū (2)
\(<\text{Taehan}>\) pöpkuk (63), pullansyö (2), pullansyö (2)
\(<\text{Kongnip}>\) pöpkuk (67), pullansyö (2), pulplansyö (1)

(9a) ~ (9e) illustrate that the names of America, England and Germany were mostly written as the traditional Sino-Korean words. The gap between the most frequent and second most frequent word is clearly wide. What’s more, the most frequent forms of the names of these three countries were all abbreviated: first syllable + suffix ‘-kuk’. Their full names were also used, but these were quite low in frequency. Through these examples

\[\begin{table}[h]
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Country & Frequency \\
\hline
America & miguk (57), ameriga (3), amiriga (1) \\
England & yong’guk (28), yong’gilli (4), yong’gilliguk (1) \\
Germany & tökkuk (7) \\
Russia & arasya (56) \\
France & pullansyö (32), pulnansyö (6), pöpkuk (1) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}\]

\[\text{We counted the frequency of the word denoting the continent America and that denoting the country separately, and thus the frequency of America showed in the data includes only the occurrences of the country America.}\]
showing that the four newspapers unanimously used the same word for each country, we
can conclude that the words miguk, yŏng’guk, tŏkkuk had already entered and become
settled in early modern Korean.

Although the most common words for the names of America, England and
Germany were the same in the four newspapers, we found a new type of word among the
low frequency words: a mixture of the existing indirect and direct transliterations. For
instance, one of the words for America was ‘amerīga’, as illustrated in (9a). This word
form can be analyzed into the direct transliterated part ‘ame’, just like the words
‘amerikka’ and ‘amerik’a’ in (9a) and the indirect transliterated part ‘riga’ as in ‘amiriga
(Japanese: 亞米利加 (amiriga) ; Chinese: 亞美利加 (amiriga))’. Furthermore, ‘amirik’a’
in (9a) illustrates the reversal of the order of the indirect and direct transliteration. These
examples comprise a new type of loanword that haven’t been discussed in previous
research.20

A comparison of (9d) and (9e) reveals that the country name words for Russia and
France were more diverse. These names also varied in the textbooks. We therefore assume
that the country name words for these two countries were still often confused in early
modern Korea. They were mostly indirect transliterations from Chinese and Japanese,
although <Cheguk> used directly transliterated words such as rōsia and p’uraensu.21

<Tongnip> and <Cheguk> used the word ‘arasa’, the Chinese transliteration of the
name for Russia. These two newspapers were published for the common people, and
therefore we can assume that words that were familiar to the common people were chosen.
The Japanese transliteration ‘rosyōa’ and directly transliterated ‘rōsia’ also appeared in
<Cheguk>, but their frequency was only once each. In the meantime, <Taehan> mostly
adopted the abbreviation from the Japanese word ‘roguk’. Because <Taehan> resisted
Imperialist Japan and did not go through the Japanese censorship process, we expected the
words of country names in <Taehan>. However, our analysis revealed that such political
attitudes did not noticeably affect the use of vocabulary. In the meantime, the frequencies
of Chinese and Japanese words in <Kongnip> were similar. Similar to the case of
<Taehan>, <Kongnip> also adopted the Japanese abbreviated forms of some words.

(9e) describes the example of the words used for France in the newspapers.
Compared to the other country names in <Tongnip>, France was commonly written as the
Japanese word. On the other hand, the other three newspapers mostly used the abbreviated
form of the Chinese word.

In this way, the country names for the World Powers used in newspapers were
largely similar to those used in textbooks. In most cases, indirect transliterations from
Chinese were used when referring to the World Power countries, with Russia and France
being the only exceptions in certain newspapers. Even the newspapers published in
America adopted the traditional Korean words originating from Chinese. The slight
difference seen compared to the words used in textbooks is mostly the result of
newspapers tending to prefer the abbreviated forms of country names. Although we could
not clarify whether the characteristics of each newspaper influenced the use of country

20 The mixed forms of direct and indirect transliterations were also found in the words used for Africa. The
indirect transliteration of the Japanese word was abulīlīga and that of the Chinese word was abirīga; the
direct transliteration, meanwhile, had an aspirate ‘p’u’ and ‘kka’, corresponding to the English ‘t’ and ‘ca’,
respectively. <Cheguk>, which showed the greatest number of variations for words for Africa, included
several mixed forms, such as ap’irīga, ap’irīga, ap’irīga, ap’irīga.

21 <Cheguk> also included a direct transliteration for the word Germany (actually “German” in this case):
chyōmaen.
name words, we could, however, determine that some country name words had already become settled in Korean at that point in time through our comparison of the variations in the four newspapers.

### 3.4 Others

In this section we narrow down the country name words to those which appeared with sufficient frequency in the corpora for analysis. For most of the names of other countries outside of the Sino-sphere and World Power countries, a number of variations were used in the newspapers. As shown in (10), the total numbers of variations are larger than those of the countries discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3. The first group in example (10) comprises Japanese indirect transliterations (JI), the second group Chinese indirect transliterations (CI), and the third direct transliterations (DT). Finally, an additional group is added at the end of each list if any other additional word types were found (etc.).

(10) JI / CI / DT / etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>JI</th>
<th>CI</th>
<th>DT</th>
<th>Etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Italy</td>
<td>&lt;Tongnip&gt;</td>
<td>x / i’al’mi (1), i’t’al’i (1), i’t’ael’i (1)</td>
<td>&lt;Cheguk&gt;</td>
<td>i’t’aeri (4) / i’däeri (6), i’däaeriguk (5), i’däeri (1) / i’t’aeri (1) / i’t’oeri (1), i’ü’t’aeri (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Taehan&gt;</td>
<td>i’t’aeri (30), i’t’aeriguk (17), i’t’aeria (1) / i’däeri (3), i’däaeriguk (1) / x / i’t’ari (1), i’ü’t’aeriguk (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Kongnip&gt;</td>
<td>i’t’aeri (2), i’t’aeriguk (2) / i’däeri (6) / i’t’al’i (1) / i’t’aeriguk (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Netherlands</td>
<td>&lt;Tongnip&gt;</td>
<td>x / haran (4) / x</td>
<td>&lt;Cheguk&gt;</td>
<td>hwaranguk (14), hwaranguk (2) / haranguk (9), haran (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Taehan&gt;</td>
<td>hwaranguk (3), hwaranguk (1) / haran (4), haranguk (2) / rederansüguk (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Kongnip&gt;</td>
<td>hwaranguk (1) / haran (10), haranguk (6) / ollindü (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Austria</td>
<td>&lt;Tongnip&gt;</td>
<td>x / x / x</td>
<td>&lt;Cheguk&gt;</td>
<td>x / ojiriguk (11), ogir (7), oguk (7), odiriguk (2), ojiria (1) / x / osü’üría (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Taehan&gt;</td>
<td>x / oguk (9), odiriguk (7), ojiriguk (4), ojiria (1) / osüdüriaguk (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;Kongnip&gt;</td>
<td>x / oguk (6), ojir (4), odiri (2), ojiriguk (1), ojiria (1) / osü’üriaguk (12), osü’yuria (4), osüch’yuria (3), osüch’yullia (2), osü’üría (2), osüch’yulliaguk (1), osüch’yuriaguk (1), osü’üriya (1), osü’t’ül’a (1), osü’üliya (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in (10), in most cases it is difficult to choose one variation that was dominantly used in the newspapers because the distributions of each variation were quite evenly scattered. Italy and the Netherlands were written in various forms in the four newspapers. Contrary to our hypothesis that &lt;Kongnip&gt; would prefer direct transliterations, only one DT word for each country appeared in &lt;Kongnip&gt;. On the other hand, as can be seen in (10c), there were numerous transliterated words for Austria in &lt;Kongnip&gt;. This contrasts with the other newspapers, which used few DT words for Austria; thus, whether a country’s name was directly translated in &lt;Kongnip&gt; seemed to be country specific. This tendency can be seen even more clearly in example (11), which shows the names of the countries forming the two American continents. In the case of Canada, the DT word k’aenada occurred much more frequently than the other variations.

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22 The Chinese word for the Netherlands (Holland) was 荷蘭 (haran) and the Japanese word was 和蘭 (hwaran). There were occurrences of 荷蘭 in the Taiyo Corpus, but the frequency was quite low (23) compared to 和蘭 (454).
However, in the case of Mexico, rather than one particular variation having the highest frequency, the number of low-frequency variations was large.

(11) JI / CI / DT / etc.
a. Canada\(^{23}\)
   <Tongnip> k’anada (1) / x / x
   <Cheguk> x / kanada (4) / k’aenada (6),
   <Taehan> x / kanada (9) / k’anada (4)
   <Kongnip> k’anada (1) / x / k’aenada (33),

b. Mexico
   <Tongnip> x / x / x
   <Cheguk> same as CI / muksyōga (11), muksyōgaguk (4), muktsōga (1) / x
   <Taehan> same as CI / muksyōga (1), muksyōgaguk (1) / maeks ’ūgo (2),
             maeks ’ūk’o (2)
   <Kongnip> same as CI / muksyōga (5) / maeksūgo (8), maeks ’ūgo (4),
             maeks ’ūk’o (4), maeksūk’o (3), maeksiego (1), meas ’ūk’o (1)

4. CONCLUSION

In summary, from our analyses of the variations in country names used in late 19\(^{th}\) century textbooks in section 2, we found significant Japanese influences in all three faculty written textbooks. Directly transliterated words were used for most of the country names, but some Japanese and Chinese words were adopted for the names of traditional Sino-sphere members and the World Powers. From the patterns we discovered in our analysis of the variations of country names in early modern Korean newspapers in section 3, we found that most of the Sino-sphere country names were written using traditional forms, with the only exception being the word for China. On the other hand, the country names for the World Powers, such as was the case in the textbooks, were mostly indirect transliterations from Chinese. However, unlike the textbooks, we discovered many more abbreviated forms of country names in the newspapers. Lastly, for the names of other countries that were not closely related to Chosôn, we found evidence of less degree of settlement with respect to the use of one particular word form compared to the names of the World Power and Sino-sphere countries.

The significance of this study lies in two aspects. First, in contrast to previous research that focused only on a single source material, this study targeted various types of materials in a comparative analysis of the variations in country names. It is also important to note that we took the unique characteristics of each source material into consideration. Second, in this study we not only compared the forms of country names extracted from various materials, but also conducted a quantitative analysis to compare the actual patterns of distribution and frequencies of country names.

Nonetheless, because this study focused only on discovering the patterns found in the variations of foreign country names used in the late 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries, further research is required on how such variations eventually undergo the unification process to become established in the language.

REFERENCES


\(^{23}\) The Chinese word for Canada was 加拿大 (kanadae) while the Japanese word was カナダ (k’anada).
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A Pitch Analysis of Two Types of \textit{wh}-Clauses in Korean

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ABSTRACT

In Korean, \textit{wh}-words have dual functions: one as a \textit{wh}-pronoun in a \textit{wh}-question, and the other as an indefinite pronoun in a yes/no-question. In speech, however, such ambiguity does not occur as native speakers distinguish the two interpretations according to prosodic differences between the two types of questions. This phonetic experiment tries to uncover the salient prosodic features by which Koreans disambiguate the two types of questions.

The main finding of the experiment is that there are two loci of contrast for the two types of questions, i.e. the boundary tones (or sentence final intonation) and the pitch contour of the \textit{wh}-words themselves. Predominantly, the yes/no-question ends in a high rising intonation, while the \textit{wh}-question may end in either a medium rising or a falling intonation. Compared with indefinite pronouns used in yes/no-questions, \textit{wh}-pronouns in \textit{wh}-questions generally have a higher pitch contour.

INTRODUCTION

\textit{Wh}-words in Korean have two functions: one as a \textit{wh}-pronoun, as in a \textit{wh}-question, and the other as an indefinite pronoun, as in a yes/no-question. For example, the \textit{wh}-word [nugu] can function either as the \textit{wh}-pronoun ‘who’ or as the indefinite pronoun ‘someone /anyone’, so that the sentence [nuguwanni] can be ambiguous, at least at the segmental level or in writing, between the interpretations “Did anyone come?” or “Who came?”. In actual speech, however, such ambiguity does not occur because native speakers are able to distinguish the two interpretations according to prosodic differences between the two types of questions. In this paper, I will investigate the salient prosodic features by which native speakers of Korean disambiguate the two types of questions. The \textit{wh}-clauses, which include the following five \textit{wh}-words, were analysed using an open-source speech analysis software, Praat.

\begin{align*}
(1) \textit{wh}-word & \quad \textit{wh}-pronoun & \quad \text{indefinite pronoun} \\
[\text{and\textae}] & \quad \text{when} & \quad \text{sometime} \\
[\text{adi}] & \quad \text{where} & \quad \text{somewhere/anywhere} \\
[\text{nugu}] & \quad \text{who} & \quad \text{someone/anyone} \\
[\text{mwa}] & \quad \text{what} & \quad \text{something/anything} \\
[\text{at'\textae}k\text{\textae}] & \quad \text{how} & \quad \text{somehow}
\end{align*}

According to Oh and Lee (1993) and Jun and Oh (1996), \textit{wh}-phrases (\textit{wh}-clauses in my terms) in Korean can be ambiguous at the segmental level in three ways due to their dual lexical functions or to the syntactic properties of a \textit{wh}-phrase. They are (1) a \textit{wh}-question, (2) a yes/no-question, and (3) a so-called incredulity (or echo) question. The incredulity question is an echo question expressing surprise concerning the referent of the \textit{wh}-word, used by the listener when s/he cannot believe what the speaker says.

I exclude incredulity questions from my analysis because of their predictability. While prosodic features may disambiguate different types of questions with \textit{wh}-words,
there are other things which also help listeners distinguish between them. Potential disambiguating factors include an extra morpheme, word, or phrase, or even the conversational situation. Incredulity questions, for example, are the only type of question which can be produced in the context of an unbelievable or surprising story. In other words, incredulity questions are easily predictable because of the situation in which they occur.

Of course, in reality, the other two types of question may also be accompanied by clues other than prosodic features. Often, an additional word or phrase in a wh-clause can be a clue. For example, having an extra word like /jóm/ ‘a little/a bit’ (which may surface as [dʒóm] as a result of intersonorant voicing) makes the clause [mwaʃdʒómmeŋik’a] more likely to be a yes/no-question, “Shall we eat a little (of) something?”, than a wh-question, “What shall we eat a little (of)?”, as the latter is clearly an unusual expression.

**Previous Studies**

The issue of the disambiguation of wh-words or wh-phrases/clauses has been discussed in terms of different prosodic notions in Korean phonology, such as ‘pitch accent (Chang 1973, Choe 1985), ‘boundary tones’ (Martin 1951, Choe 1985, Lee 1990), or ‘high versus low pitch’ (Cho 1990).

Choe (1985, 114), for example, maintains that if a wh-word is *phonologically prominent* compared with other elements of the sentence, that word is interpreted as a wh-pronoun. He does not, however, spell out what this ‘phonological prominence’ means in terms of its phonetic realization. Cho (1990, 56) also claims that a wh-word is *intonationally focused* when it functions as a wh-pronoun, thus forming one phonological phrase together with the following word, given that the following word does not belong to a separate phonological phrase. In the phonetic experiment reported in this paper, I look into the source of the notions *phonological prominence* or the *intonational focus* from point of view of the phonetic manifestation.

A similar issue has been noted in Tokyo Japanese (Maekawa 1991) and Kumamoto Japanese (Maekawa 1994). Using a perception test involving synthetic intonation, Maekawa (1991, 1994) finds that a phrase boundary marked by a falling tone between a wh-word and the following word is perceived as a yes/no-question, while the lack of a falling tone in the same position is perceived as a wh-question (Jun and Oh 1996, 38). In this paper, using natural rather than synthetic data, I endeavour to find if there is any similar tone pattern in Korean.

While there have been a number of phonological descriptions of the issue, Jun and Oh (1996) (henceforth J&O) is one of the first phonetic analyses on this topic in Korean. The findings of J&O are that the [three] types of questions are distinguished by the combination of boundary tones, accentual phrasing, pitch ranges, duration, and peak amplitude. The following are a summary of J&O’s findings under each notion:

*Boundary tones.* “... There was no single boundary tone type specific to one type of question: Yes/no-questions [and incredulity questions] were most often realized with High boundary tones (H%), although they sometimes appear with LH boundary tones (LH%) for all [four] speakers. The most common boundary tone for wh-questions was LH%, although H% and HL% were also observed, and one speaker used all four boundary tones (including HLH%) with roughly comparable frequencies. In addition to the different types of boundary tones, there seems to be a difference in the phonetic realisation of the high boundary tone. Within a given category of boundary tone, a high tone was in general significantly higher that the high tone in yes/no-questions, which was itself higher than that of wh-questions. ...” (1996, 44) (See also Figures 3 and 4, and Table 2 on pp. 45-47).
**Accentual phrasing.** “Accentual phrasing was categorically different between the yes/no-questions and the other two types of questions. All speakers produced the wh-phrases as two separate Accentual Phrases—a wh-word and the following verb each forms one Accentual Phrase—in yes/no-questions, but as one Accentual Phrase in wh-questions [and incredulity questions].” (1996, 46-47) On the basis of Jun (1993)’s theory on six boundary tones in Seoul Korean (i.e. L%, H% LH%, HL%, LHL%, and HLH%) and another principle that an Accentual Phrase in Seoul Korean begins with a low tone (L) and ends in a high tone (H), accentual phrasing is achieved.1

**Pitch range.** J&O compares the pitch range and duration between incredulity- and wh-questions only, examining the pitch range of three points—i.e. the final H of the pre-wh-phrase, the initial L of the wh-phrase, and the peak of the wh-phrase. J&O states that “For all speakers, incredulity questions generally showed a larger pitch range than that of the other two types of questions, but this pitch range was more useful to distinguish incredulity questions from wh-questions rather than yes/no-questions from other two, because accentual phrasing is the same for both incredulity- and wh-questions, but not for yes/no-questions.” (1996, 50) So, the finding is not relevant to my experiment, which compares wh-questions with yes/no-questions.

**Duration.** “All speakers except Speaker O [i.e. three out of four] produced the peak F0 of the wh-phrase significantly later for incredulity questions than they did for wh-questions. This is due to the lengthening of the first syllable of the wh-word in incredulity questions relative to the same syllable in wh-questions. But incredulity questions are not longer overall than wh-questions, as Speakers Y an L [i.e. two out of four speakers] reduced the rest of the wh-phrase in incredulity questions.” (1996, 51)

**Peak amplitude.** J&O measures the peak amplitude (RMS, arbitrary scale) of the final syllable of interrogatives (“a question particle” in J&O) and wh-words for all three types of questions and compared them. Both the peak amplitude of wh-words and question particles were greatest in incredulity questions. “[For three out of four speakers], the peak amplitudes of wh-words were greater in wh-questions than those of yes/no-questions, while the amplitude of question particles [i.e. the last syllable of questions which relates to boundary tones] was variable across speakers.” (1996, 52)

For this fact, J&O assumes that the impression of greater *phonological prominence* for a wh-pronoun over an indefinite pronoun (Chang 1973, Choe 1985) seems to be based on the greater amplitude of wh-words in wh-questions than in yes/no-questions. (1996, 52)

In the experiment reported in this paper, I will examine whether some of these findings of J&O hold true. Note that this investigation is limited to the pitch, amplitude and duration of wh-words and the boundary tone in the two (rather than three) types of questions.

## EXPERIMENT

### Method

**Subjects.** Four native speakers of Seoul Korean in their twenties participated in the experiment: two female (Speakers A and B) and two male (Speakers C and D). All subjects are undergraduate students of the University of Sydney, Australia. Speaker A was born and raised in Seoul until she came to Australia at the age of 12. Since then she has been educated in Australia. Speaker B was born and raised in Seoul. She came to Australia at the age of 20. Speaker C was born and raised in Seoul, and left Korea at the age of 14, and since then he has been educated in Australia. Speaker D was also born and raised in Seoul until he left the country at the age of 16. All subjects reported that they speak

1 A schematic representation of tonal realizations of the basic tone patterns of an Accentual Phrase in Seoul Korean are L(1HL)H for up to three-syllables, LHLH for four syllables and LH...LH for five or more syllables. See Jun (1993 & 1996) for details.
Korean to other Korean friends and acquaintances. Only Speaker C reported that he speaks Korean at home as his family is in Sydney. The other three subjects are international students without family in Australia.

Material. Ten brief dialogues were designed with five wh-words (see (1)) in two types of questions—wh-questions and yes/no questions. Each wh-word is followed by a verb, making up what I call a wh-clause. Some wh-clauses are preceded by a phrase to make the dialogues more natural (See Dialogue Pairs 1, 2 and 4): Sentence Pairs 1 and 2 begin with the vocative use of ‘Mr Park’ [paksansænənim], and Dialogue Pair 4 begins with an adverbial phrase ‘while I was out’ [naegaŋagainindoŋane]. Every question is followed by a relevant response to make it more natural, and each question ends in either [yo] or [k'a], the final syllable of the so-called Polite or Deferrential style interrogative, respectively: Sentence Pairs 3 and 5 end in [k'a] and all others in [yo]. Notice in (2) that every second line is a phonemic transcription of each dialogue. For Dialogues 3a and 4a, there was an optional word or phrase in parentheses, which implies that the speaker may optionally choose to say it.

Dialogue Pairs

1a. /pak sansænənim əti kaseyo/  
   ‘Mr Park, are you going somewhere?’ /ŋ əti ʃom kanta/  
   ‘Yes, I am going somewhere.’

1b. /pak sansænənim əti kaseyo/  
   ‘Mr Park, where are you going?’ /ufekuke ka/  
   ‘I am going to a post office.’

2a. /pak sansænənim əntʃe hankuk kaseyo/  
   ‘Mr Park, are you going to Korea sometime?’ /ŋ kʰonə wæ/  
   ‘Yes, I am, but why?’

2b. /pak sansænənim əntʃe hankuk kaseyo/  
   ‘Mr Park, when are you going to Korea?’ /ta+mʃ ətuoil kanta/  
   ‘Next Wednesday, I’m going.’

3a. /mwɔl (ʃom) mæk¹l’ə/  
   ‘Shall we eat (a bit of) something?’ /kʰle pækʰtə mwɔl ʃom mækʃə/  
   ‘Yes, I am hungry. Let’s eat a bit of something.

3b. /mwɔl mæk¹l’ə/  
   ‘What shall we eat?’ /nən ʃ’alʃənə mæk¹lə nən/  
   ‘I will eat Tchajangmyôn, how about you?’

4a. /nuta naka is’n+iŋoŋane nuka was’as’ə/  
   ‘While I was out, did anyone come?’ /ŋ nuka was’as’ə/  
   ‘Yes, somebody came.’

4b. /nuka was’as’ə/  
   ‘Who came?’ /kimʃuŋiʃən ʃəlik was’as’ə/  
   ‘A person called Kim Sudong came.’

5a. /ɔt’ahke ʃəl twəes’+lk’ə/  
   ‘Do you think it went somehow?’ /ŋ ət’ahke ʃəl twəes’+lkəya/  
   ‘Yep, I think it went well somehow.’

5b. /ɔt’ahke twəes’+lk’ə/  
   ‘How do you think it went?’ /kim sansænənim təwəʃuʃəsə ʃəl/  
   ‘I believe it went well since Mr Kim helped.’

Procedure. The dialogues in (2), written on a piece of A4-size paper, were presented to each subject with a brief explanation of two functions of wh-words in Korean. After one practice session, the dialogues were recorded in a digital recorder, MicroTrack 24/96 Mobile Digital Recorder, with a Stereo Electret Microphone, although the recording was done in mono. Each subject read the question part, and the author read the responding part of each dialogue. The digitalised audio file was analysed by using Praat, a speech analysis software developed by Paul Boersma and David Weenink, Professors of Phonetic Sciences at the Institute of Phonetic Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. The
version used was Praat 5.0.07 for Windows. From each speaker’s long audio (MP3) file, ten wh-clauses were extracted and analysed by Praat. The length of long audio files for each speaker was between 45 to 101 seconds, and the length of wh-clauses was around 1 second.

The pitch contour of each wh-clause was drawn by the software, and then measurements of the mean pitch of the wh-word and the sentence-final syllable, as well as the pitch range were taken. The mean intensity in dB (µ) and the duration (in seconds) of wh-words were also measured to see if they could be disambiguating factors for the two types of questions.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

From each pitch contour, the mean pitch (in Hz) and the pitch range (of the minimum and maximum pitch points) were measured for wh-words and the sentence-final syllable. The former is to see if there is prominent pitch for one type of wh-words, and the latter for the boundary tone distinction. For both wh-words and boundary tones, then, the increase (or decrease) of pitch was measured to see how much pitch rise occurs in terms of intonation.

Table 1 is the mean pitch data for wh-words, and Table 2 is that of the sentence-final syllable, and a description and interpretation of these data follow each table. The full data from which Tables 1 and 2 are drawn is attached at the end of this paper as Appendix 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>gender</th>
<th>speaker</th>
<th>Indefinite pronoun</th>
<th>Wh-Question</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes/No-Question</td>
<td>Wh-Question</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>rise</td>
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<td>f</td>
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<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pitch in Wh-words

As shown in Table 1, the mean pitch of wh-prouns is significantly higher than that of indefinite pronouns: 43.4 Hz higher by Speaker A, 18.7 Hz higher by Speaker B, 13.2 Hz by Speaker C, and 13.4 Hz by Speaker D. While the two male speakers show a similar gap (of around 13 Hz) between the mean pitch of the two types of wh-words, the gaps shown by the two female speakers were quite different. This is related to the pitch ranges that the two female speakers have in their speech. The pitch range of Speaker A was around 450 Hz (from the high 100s Hz to the high 500s Hz), while that of Speaker B was slightly more than 200 Hz (from low 100s Hz to mid 300s Hz).
As we compare the pitch rise from the minimum to the maximum points in wh-words, again, we consistently see greater pitch values in wh-pronouns both in the peak points as well as the rise range. The difference between the peak points of the two types of wh-words was 61.2 Hz by Speaker A, 39.2 Hz by Speaker B, 42.8 Hz by Speaker C, and 24.3 Hz by Speaker D. Here, the minimum pitch value can be lower in wh-pronouns as this increases the rise range, as shown in the cases of Speakers G and I.

In addition to the difference in the mean pitch (in Hz) of wh-words, distinctively different pitch contour (or intonation) was found between the two types of questions. Figure 1 shows the pitch contour diagrams of the two tokens of [ədigateyə] by Speaker A: ‘Are you going somewhere?’ (above) and ‘Where are you going?’ (below). Figure 2 shows the extracted diagrams of the wh-word portions, which are marked by two vertical dotted lines in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Pitch contour of the two types of questions [ədigateyə] by Speaker A:
Figure 2: Extracted pitch contours of ‘somewhere’ (left) and ‘where’ (right) by Speaker A

Figure 1 shows the most typical pitch patterns of the two types of questions. A similar pattern was shown in the speech of all other speakers and in many other pairs of wh-words, except for those with a falling boundary tone for wh-questions. A falling intonation was observed in the wh-questions of Dialogue Pairs 3 and 5, i.e. ‘What shall we eat?’ and ‘How do you think it went?’ For Speakers B, C and D, the rising intonation is not as high as Speaker A, but the highest point of the boundary tone in yes/no-questions was always higher than that of wh-questions.

Boundary Tones

This experiment confirms J&O’s claim that the boundary tone of yes/no-questions is significantly higher than that of wh-questions. In English, a rising boundary tone (or intonation) is a distinctive feature for yes/no-questions, while a falling intonation is for wh-questions. One may assume, therefore, that the Korean language may have the same or similar intonation patterns for each of the two types of questions. This experiment shows that while the yes/no-questions occur with a high rising tone all the time, a falling tone does not always occur for the wh-questions. In fact, among other patterns, many wh-questions had a rising intonation, while the pitch range was much lower than that of yes/no-questions. I would call this a medium rising tone in wh-questions in comparison with a high rising tone in yes/no-questions.

At the end of yes/no-questions, all speakers used predominantly high rising tones. Out of twenty yes/no-questions, only two were with other than a high rising tone: one with a small dip before the rising tone (henceforth indicated by √-tone in Appendix 1) (i.e. 142-120-210 Hz; See C5 in Appendix 1) and the other with a more or less flat tone (indicated by – in Appendix 1) at around mid/high 90s Hz (i.e. 95-98 Hz; See D2 in Appendix 1). Nevertheless, even for these speakers the boundary tones’ pitch values in yes/no-questions are much higher than those wh-questions.

On the other hand, wh-questions ended with various boundary tones, 14 medium rising tones, 4 falling tones, 1 √-tone, and 1 up-and-down tone (indicated by Λ-tone). The rising tones of wh-questions were much lower than those of yes/no-questions in terms of their pitch range and the peak point. The mean peak of boundary tones in wh-questions was very similar to the mean in the wh-pronouns: i.e. Mid 200s Hz for both female speakers and low and mid 100s for male speakers.
Let us now consider the interpretation of individual speaker’s data. Female Speaker A’s speech exhibited the most distinctive boundary tones for the two question types: The average boundary tones for yes/no-questions ranged from 261 to 517 Hz (with a mean of 393.6 Hz and a mean rise of 256 Hz), while those of wh-questions ranged from 227.4 to 292.8 Hz (with a mean of 257.38 Hz and with a mean rise of 65.4 Hz). Speaker A, like the other three speakers, always used a high rising intonation for yes/no-questions, reaching up to the mid 500s Hz, but predominantly a medium rising intonation up to mid/high 300s Hz or a falling intonation for two wh-questions (i.e. from 287 to 186 Hz, and from 254 to 196 Hz in /mwal makik’a/ ‘What shall we eat?’ and /at’ahe twaes’i4ik’a/ ‘How do you think it went?’). (See the wh-question column of A3 and A5 in Appendix 1.)

Female Speaker B’s data also confirms a higher boundary tone in yes/no-questions than in wh-questions, with a much narrower range of somewhere in between that of female Speaker A and those of the male speakers: The mean pitch range of her yes/no-questions was from 260.6 to 341.4 Hz (with a rise of 80.8 Hz), and the mean pitch range of her wh-questions was from 223.8 to 250 Hz (with a a rise of 26.2 Hz). Notice that, for the wh-questions, the boundary tone’s pitch increase is 54 Hz for Speaker B, while that of the other female, Speaker A, is 190 Hz. This is, as a matter of course, due to the different pitch range of each individual. Notice that the valley points of boundary tones were similar to each other, around the low and middle 200s Hz, but their peak points were quite different: Speaker A’s peak points were much higher than those of Speaker B, i.e. up to the mid/high 500s Hz vs the mid 300s Hz.

While the speech of the male subjects also shows greater mean pitch values (such as the mean pitch and the pitch range) in the boundary tones of yes/no-questions than those of wh-questions in general, there were three individual cases where the pitch values are the other way around—i.e. the boundary tone values of yes/no-questions are lower than those of wh-questions (See C2, D2, and D5 in Appendix 1). My interpretation for this relates to the fact that there are two loci to achieve the contrast—i.e. the pitch of the wh-word and the pitch of the boundary tone—but that, in order to disambiguate the two types of questions, speakers can use only one locus of contrast. In these three cases, the distinction is in the pitch value of wh-words rather than that of boundary tone.

In fact, quite the opposite phenomenon was also found in the speech of Speaker D: In the Dialogue pair 1a and 1b by Speaker D, the wh-pronoun ‘where’ has a lower pitch value than that of the indefinite pronoun ‘somewhere’, except for the peak point (146 Hz vs 139 Hz). In this case, rather than the pitch of the wh-words, the boundary tones function as the distinguishing factor. These two cases reveal that native speakers do not always make use of the two loci of contrast. In spite of having two possible loci of contrast, the use of only one seems to be sufficient. In the cases of C2, D2 and D5, while the boundary tones are not sufficiently contrastive, the wh-words are. On the other hand, in the case of D1, when the pitch contours of wh-words are lower than those of indefinite pronoun counterparts (opposite to the general pattern found in the experiment), the boundary tones play a more decisive role.\(^2\)

---

\(^2\) In fact, I found the same phenomenon in my own speech (which is not included in this experiment), where the pitch of a wh-pronoun is often lower than that of its indefinite pronoun counterpart, meaning that the distinction depends on the boundary tones. For the cases like this, in a phonological description, we may need to say that the tonal distinction in boundary tone is a more decisive factor than the pitch contour of wh-words.
Table 2: Boundary tones in the two types of questions (in Hz)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Yes/No-Question</th>
<th>Wh-Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-final syllable</td>
<td>S-final syllable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>rise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>393.6</td>
<td>259.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>308.3</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>135.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intensity and Duration

As mentioned previously, J&O (1996, 52) assumes that the phonological notion described as phonological prominence by Chang (1973) and Choe (1985) might be due to the greater amplitude of wh-pronouns from the measurement of RMS (arbitrary scale). My experiment, however, shows that the mean amplitudes of the two types of wh-words are not different from each other, and the data was inconsistent among subjects too. The inconsistency is marked by > or < (greater or less than) in Table 3 below. Contrary to the claim by J&O, for Speaker B, both the mean amplitude as well as the mean duration of wh-pronouns was shorter than that of yes/no-questions. Even for the overall average figure with 0.37 dB (μ) difference, I strongly doubt that this much difference in amplitude could be a distinctive feature for the purpose of disambiguation of the two types of questions. I found in some cases both pitch and intensity were greater in wh-pronouns than in indefinite pronouns, but the difference in intensity was minor, while that in pitch was clearly noticeable. I also found that the duration of wh-words may not be a significant feature either, as the overall average difference was merely 0.0257 second. See the data in Table 3 and Appendix 2 for details.

Table 3: Intensity and Duration of Wh-words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Intensity in dB (μ)</th>
<th>Duration in second</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indefinite pronoun</td>
<td>Wh-pronoun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>66.27</td>
<td>&lt; 68.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>64.23</td>
<td>&gt; 59.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>66.68</td>
<td>&lt; 67.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>62.67</td>
<td>&gt; 65.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall average</td>
<td>64.96</td>
<td>65.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CONCLUSION

The predominant pattern that emerges from this experiment is that Korean speakers distinguish the two types of questions—the wh-question and the yes/no-question—by the tonal contrast in two loci: the boundary tone (or the sentence-final intonation) as well as the pitch contour of the wh-words. With regards to the boundary tone, the yes/no-question ends in a high rising intonation, while the wh-question may end in either a medium rising or a falling intonation. With regards to the wh-words, there is, however, a tendency for these generally to have greater pitch contours in wh-questions than in yes-no questions, in terms of their mean pitch, peak pitch point and rise range. It is, however, noteworthy that there are some speakers who sometimes rely on a contrast in only one of these two loci: either the boundary tone or the pitch contour of the wh-words. This experiment also confirms that phonological notions like *phonological prominence* or *pitch accent* correlate with the higher pitch in wh-pronouns than in indefinite pronouns. The experiment also shows that the notion of *phonological prominence* does not correlate with greater amplitude or duration in wh-pronouns than in indefinite pronouns.

REFERENCES


Appendix 1: Pitch Data of Yes/No-questions and Wh-Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker &amp; data</th>
<th>Yes/No-Question</th>
<th>Wh-Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indefinite pronoun</td>
<td>Yes/No-Q Boundary tone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean Hz</td>
<td>PP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1 where</td>
<td>200.7</td>
<td>370.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 when</td>
<td>200.8</td>
<td>298.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3 when</td>
<td>227.6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4 who</td>
<td>249.4</td>
<td>381.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>A5 how</td>
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<tr>
<td>B1</td>
<td>228.1</td>
<td>263.8</td>
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<td>Avg of B</td>
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Prominent than those of Wh-Q
Prominent than those of Yes/No-Q
Appendix 2: Intensity and Duration of wh-words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intensity in dB (μ)</th>
<th>Duration in second</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
<td>ind-pron</td>
<td>wh-pron</td>
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<tr>
<td>A1 where</td>
<td>68.82</td>
<td>67.78</td>
</tr>
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<td>A2 when</td>
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<td>A3 what</td>
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The conceptual structure of the verb nata

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ABSTRACT

Whether language influences its speakers’ thought has been a continuing quest since the proposition of Sapir-Whorf’s linguistic relativity hypothesis. Humans encounter infinite range of experiences but those experiences can only be expressed by linguistic categories of the language that are available to its speaker. The essence of linguistic relativism asserts that while speakers of a particular language use lexical and morpho-syntactic categories that are unique to the language in which they speak for describing their experiences, their perception of the world could inevitably be shaped by those obligatory classifications hence it becomes habitual thought.

This study examines lexical, conceptual and syntactic construction of the verb nata in comparison with English in terms of their codability and translatability. In particular, the study analyzes the lexicalization of the verb nata in order to identify the common semantic element encoded in the morpheme na-. The paper reveals that the path information conflated in the intransitive verb nata is the key in the conceptual construction of the verb. The study shows how Koreans regard spontaneous motion events whose path is ‘out’ as the same and use the concept for describing various natural phenomena and human experiences.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Human thoughts are expressed and communicated through language and whether language influences its speakers’ thought patterns has been a continuing topic for discussion. The proposition of the Sapir-Whorf’s Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis has generated ongoing interest as the implication of establishing such a relationship between language and thought would be paramount; after all, language and thought are what make human beings different from other species.

The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is based on three fundamental propositions for the argument that human thought is influenced by language. Firstly, the view is that languages differ in the way they categorize the phenomena of the world and human experiences as Boas observed - “each language has a peculiar tendency to select this or that aspect of the mental image which is conveyed by the expression of the thought (Boas 1966a[1911], 39). Secondly, people’s views of the world are dissected into grammatical patterns which their language prescribed because they have no other choice but use the categories set in their native language. Thirdly, as a consequence, their perception of the world would inevitably be shaped by those obligatory classifications and they become habitual thoughts. Whorf explains this phenomenon

“…users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers, but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world (Whorf 1956a, 221).”

* The Yale Romanisation system is used in this paper.
The implication of the principle is that each speech community is in agreement of this linguistic creed only by speaking the language and no individual can be free from the grammatical constraints of the language (Whorf 1956a, 213-214).

When Korean speakers observe the world and encounter various experiences, they describe experiences using lexical and morpho-syntactic categories that are accessible in the Korean language. For example, most Koreans are not aware of the grammatical distinction between the descriptive verb and processive verb but use them automatically for describing what they observe and experience, not realizing which is for what. When Koreans learn another language, it becomes apparent to them the way the Korean language operate is very different from other languages such as English.

There have been very few studies done on the relationship between the Korean language and thought. Shin (2006) analysed the verb issta closely to determine how the concept of ‘possession’ is constructed in Korean and compared it with English. The existential verb issta is categorized separately and known for denoting two meanings, ‘existence’ and ‘possession’. However, the analysis of the grammatical and semantic structures of issta reveals that the semantic function of issta is ‘existence’ only. The conceptual structure of possession is constructed when the theme, reference object and location make thematic relationships; the meaning of ‘alienable possession’ is inferred.

Using Jackendoff’s Thematic Relations Hypothesis (1983) for the semantic analysis of the verb issta, Shin shows how the [NP1-eykey NP2-i/ga iss-ta] structure is interpreted as possession with the following example:

(1)    Y-Location       X  
Youngsu-eykey     aphathu-ka  iss-ta  
name-LOC         apartment-NOM  exist-END  
‘Youngsu has an apartment.’  (Shin 2006, 79 (15))

The conceptual relation between the theme, reference object and location is that Y, Youngsu is PEOPLE which implies that PEOPLE can act on and apply physical force to an OBJECT (Schank 1975) and claim an ownership of that object. Consequently Y (NP1) has a possession of X (NP2) thus, the interpretation is that Youngsu has an apartment. Shin argues that the Korean possessive issta denotes that an entity is already exists in an observable objective state and is located with someone therefore the spatial relationship is alienated from the subject. It is a temporary and alienable ownership of the object by a mortal animate such as a human being. Koreans’ view regarding possessions is different from English speakers as the spatial relationship between people and the object references is constrained by the existential verb issta. In order to express any coactive ownership, the transitive verb kacita ‘to have’ is used and the spatial relationship between the subject and the object is much closer with a strong sense of ‘keep’ and ‘belong’.

Regarding the differences in children’s language acquisition between English and Korean, Bowerman and Choi (1996) conducted an empirical study on children’s use of spatial verbs. The study reveals that children learning English and Korean acquire spatial words very quickly before the age of two. The English speaking children used path words like up, down, in, out, on and off freely for both spontaneous and caused motions, while the Korean children made a clear distinction between spontaneous and caused motions e.g. kkenayta ‘take out of loose container’ and kkita ‘fit’ and never violated the distinction between spontaneous and caused motions. In answering the Whorfian question: does learning the spatial categories of their language influence the way children conceptualise space non-linguistically? Bowerman’s answer is that “spatial thought – undeniably one of
our most basic cognitive capacities – bears the language of imprint.” (Bowerman 1996, 170)

In order to examine the relationship between the Korean language and thought, this study examines the semantic, lexical and syntactic construction of the verb *nata* and its compound verbs in comparison with English in terms of their codability and translatability. Whorf suggested a comparative analysis between exotic languages and Standard Average European Languages would provide clues as to whether there is any dramatic cognitive difference (Whorf 1956a) and this study would be such a case. This paper is particularly focused on the semantic element that is expressed in the verb *nata* for describing various natural phenomena and human experiences. A few examples are listed below to highlight the range of expressions:

(2) na-nun Seoul-eyse na-se cala-ss-ta.
  I-NOM Seoul-LOC be born-CONN grow-PST-DEC
  ‘I was born and grew up in Seoul.’

(3) yeki sayssak-i na-ss-ta
  here new leaves-NOM come out-PST-DEC
  ‘Here new leaves have **sprouted/come out**.’

(4) tongsayng-i hwa-ka na-ss-ta.
  brother-NOM anger-NOM come out-PST-DEC
  ‘My brother is angry.’

(5) Victoria cwu-eyse khu-n sanpul-i na-ss-ta
  Victoria state-LOC big-ATTR bush fire-NOM breakout-PST-DEC
  ‘Big bush fires **broke out** in Victoria.’

(6) cakkwuman kichim-i na-n-ia.
  constantly cough-NOM come out-PRS-DEC
  ‘(I) **cough** constantly.’

(7) masiss-nun naymsay-ka na-n-ia
  delicious-REL smell-NOM come out-PRS-DEC
  ‘Delicious smell **comes out.**’ = ‘Something **smells** delicious.’

(8) Ah! cikum sayngkak-i na-ss-ta
  oh now thought-NOM come out-PST-DEC
  ‘Oh! I’ve **remembered** now.’

As we can see, these descriptions are translatable into English but English uses different grammatical categories and lexical items (in bold) for the same human experiences. Whorf (1956a, 258) points out that it would be wrong to assume that word has an exact meaning in each language; if so, the verb *nata* would not make senses to the above sentences. The central question concern here is: Why Koreans are compelled to use *nata* for describing very different world phenomena and human experiences? Why these different experiences are not lexicalized separately by creating a new word for each meaning as in English? Why are the above sentences with different experiences described in the same way using the verb *nata*? What is the common semantic element that is encoded in the *nata* verb, which enabled to have such extended meanings and what is the significance of it? The
paper attempts to answer these questions and to find out the concept that underpins an aspect of Koreans’ worldview.

2. LEXICALIZATION AND CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE

In the 1980s and 1990s, lexicon has gained its importance in discussing syntactic theories. In particular, lexical conceptual structure (LCS) (Jakendorf 1983, Rappaport & Levin 1988, Levin 2008) presented theories about how the meaning of verb is vitally important in determining syntactic structure. One of the basic hypotheses behind conceptual semantics is that “all natural languages have a mental representation called conceptual structure” and “conceptual structure is envisioned as a computational form that encodes human understanding of the world” (Jackendorf 1992, 10) which makes the discussion relevant to the linguistic relativity hypothesis.

The central argument of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is that languages differ how they encode concepts. Languages do not have a concept for every word nor a word for every concept; rather in each language certain concepts are coined and encoded by one word. This is called lexicalization (Jackendorf 1983, Talmy 1985), which occurs when a concept is frequently used because psychologically and economically it is necessary for speakers to encode concepts in a word for ease of retrieval from the unconscious. Jackendorf uses the verb ‘enter’ as an example to show how a conceptual structure can be carved up into lexical items. The sentence “The dog entered the room.” has the same semantic representation as “The dog went into the room.” The difference is that the verb “enter” itself lexicalizes the path-and place-functions in its meaning (Jackendorf 1983, 183).

The lexical conceptual structure is referred as ‘structured lexical representation of verb meaning’ (Levin 2008, 1) and the term ‘root’ is used for naming the idiosyncratic component of a verb’s meaning in English (Talmy 1985, Pesetsky 1995 cited in Levin 2008). For the same function, Korean has the verb stem, which denotes the meaning of both action and descriptive verbs. The verb stem is the most important component in Korean syntactic structure because the meaning and status of verb stem (i.e. processive or descriptive; intransitive or transitive) determines its association with other grammatical elements in the verb phrase (e.g. tense, aspect, mood etc.) and the rest of the sentence (e.g. object, adverb). Ultimately the verb stem controls argument realization within its syntactic structure, consequently determines the event structure. For example, the verb stem po- in the verb po-ta ‘to see’ is a processive verb, which describes an event not a state. It is also a transitive verb thus requires two NPs for subject (THEME) and object (REFERENT).

When we observe the world, what we see and experience is either an entity which is moving or located somewhere. That is why motion and location events are basic and all other events should be construed as such events (Jackendorf 1983). The division between two concepts - EVENT and STATE is crucial to understand what is happening around us and to make a sense of the world (Jackendorf 1983, Dowty 1979, Pustejovsky 1992). Comrie’s (1976, 13) defines these important concepts as:

“states are static, i.e. continue as before unless changed, whereas events and processes are dynamic, i.e. require a continual input of energy if they are to come to an end; events are dynamic situations viewed as a complete whole (perfectly), whereas processes are dynamic situations viewed in progress, from within (imperfectly).

The Korean language distinguishes the conceptual distinction between process and state clearly by having verbs divided into ‘Processive verb’ and ‘Descriptive verb’ categories. The ‘Processive verb’ (e.g. kата ‘to go’, mekta ‘to eat’) describes processes and actions,
and the ‘Descriptive verb’ (e.g. *khuta* ‘to be big’ *kipputa* ‘to be pleased’) describes states. The category of Korean verbs can be divided even further into four verb types with the copular *ita* and existential verb *issita* (Seo 1944) to denote different concepts as explained earlier about the concept of ‘possession’.

Jackendoff developed conceptual structures for verbs of spatial location and motion, which describe states and events and said, “A clear linguistics test for the distinction is the possibility of occurring after *What happened/occurred/took place was (that)* ...; events happen, while states do not.” (1983, 170). Jackendoff (1983, 173) presents conceptual structures for Event and State like below:

(9) a. [Event GO ([Thing x], [Path y])]  
b. [State BE ([Thing x], [Place y])]

For the conceptual structure for Events, there is one basic type of motion event, represented by the primitive predicate GO, which describes motion of the theme along a path. (Jackendoff 1983, 172, 174). We can apply this conceptual structure to the verb *nata* and fill the variable *x* with the information and *y* with OUT which is the Path information of *nata* as below.

(10) “*nata*”: [Event GO ([Thing x], [Path OUT])]

The conceptual structure of *nata* will be discussed in detail with various descriptions in section 3.

In studying motion events, Talmy (1985) specifically analysed the verb root to see how lexicalization is taking place and said “lexicalization is involved where a particular meaning component is found to be in regular association with a particular morpheme” (1985, 59). He examined systematic relations between the different semantic elements in a motion event and explained four components:

Motion: Movement or the maintenance of a stationary location  
Figure: A moving or conceptually movable object  
Ground: A reference-point object with respect to the Figure’s Path or site  
Path: The course followed by the Figure respect to the Ground (1985, 61)

He also added Manner and Cause as semantic elements in the motion events. Talmy (1985, 1991) compares motion events in different languages and classified them according to how the notion of Path is encoded into the verb and presented two types: the ‘Verb-framed languages’ encodes Path in the verb root (e.g. Spanish) and ‘Satellite-framed languages’ expresses Path in a satellite (e.g. English). Korean belongs to the ‘Verb-framed languages’ in which Path is conflated in the verb (Choi & Bowerman 1992). For example, a spontaneous motion of water oozing out of the ground is expressed by the verb *nata* which is conflated with the Path ‘out’ and the manner by the verb *sosta* ‘to ooze’ and they are connected by the connective suffix –*a* to form a compound verb *sos-a nata* ‘ooze out’ as in (11). In English the preposition ‘out’ is used for Path separately and the manner is expressed in the verb ‘ooze’.

(11) [Figure] [Ground] ([Manner] [Path] [Motion + Deixis])  
mul-i ttang wui-lo sos-a na-a-o-ass-ta  
water-NOM ground-above-to ooze-CONN out-CONN come-PST-DEC  
'Water oozed out above the ground'.
In the following section, lexicalization of the verb *nata* is examined to determine the
common semantic element.

3. The verb *nata* and its lexicalised concept

The verb *nata* is a processive and intransitive verb, which describes an event of “what
happened” and expresses a spontaneous motion. As examined above, Korean has the
characteristics of verb with Path conflated because Korean does not utilize spatial
prepositions such as ‘in’, ‘out’, ‘up’ ‘down’ etc. as in English. In Korean, Path information
is incorporated in the verb meaning except for three locative particles, -ey ‘to’ –lo ‘to’ –
eyse ‘at’ or ‘in’ (Choi & Bowerman 1992, 88).

A motion described by the verb *nata* denotes that a movement is made from one
location to the other and the Path is ‘out’. In Choi & Bowerman’s study they made a
complete list of nine Path verbs in Korean (1992, 89). Among them *nata* and *tulta* are
translated into “exit” and “enter” instead of “in” and “out” to emphasize that they are
verbs not prepositions. However, when these verbs are combined with the main deictic
verbs like *kata* ‘to go’ and *ota* ‘to come’ to make compound verbs *nakata* ‘go out’ and
*naota* ‘come out’, the semantic element of Path is clearer, which is ‘out’.

When the verb *nata* is used as the main verb, various verbs (V1) can be preceded
the main verb (V2) denoting the Manner as shown in the Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Lexicalization of Manner + Nata verb</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflation pattern: [Path] – [Motion]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Manner] [Path] – [Motion] [Path] – [Verb]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phi-e- ‘bloom’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>il-e- ‘rise’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kKay-e- ‘wake’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sayngky-e ‘happen’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sos-a- ‘gush out’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The meaning of these compound verbs indicates that Choi & Bowerman’s observation that
“When Path verbs are used as the main verb, the meaning in which case they express
motion in a rather abstract, holistic way.” (Choi & Bowerman 1992, 89) seems to be true.

In the following section, we analyse different descriptions to determine how
extended meanings are derived from the common semantic element of the morpheme *na*
in *nata*. These are not a complete list of semantic interpretations of the *nata* verb but
chosen to illustrate the point.

3.1 *Nata* with animated subject

The verb *nata* is used for describing *birth* of animated entities such as baby, animals and
*sprout* of plants. The main characteristic of intransitive verbs is describing a spontaneous
motion and it takes the single argument structure with one NP as a subject.

Using Talmy’s (1985) typology, the description of birth of a baby is analysed and
the semantic components of the motion event can be identified: baby is the moving object
[Figure] and the [Motion] is described by *nata* with conflated [Path] ‘out’. [Ground] is
optional as it can be inferred as *seysang-ey* ‘to the world’ without explicitly mentioning it
or it can be stated *wuli cip-ey* ‘in our family’ as in (12).
The verb *nata* is used for describing birth meaning ‘be born’ or ‘come into a being’ but *tayenata* is also uniquely used for birth of human beings and it is conflated with Path and Manner, which is not mentioned in Talmy’s typology but noted in Choi & Bowerman (1992).

The manner implicates the process of conceiving a baby and pregnancy. In describing the birth of a baby, generally the [Source] is not expressed with the verb *nata* in the sentence but it can be easily inferred (Lee 1993). So the semantic interpretation of this motion event is that the baby moved its location from mother’s womb out to the world spontaneously. Normally this is the case; babies are born following the natural labour process, which takes place spontaneously by itself following its own course. It is a baby’s self-initiated motion, where neither mother nor doctor does have much control over bringing the baby out to the world. In English the same event is described by the passive form, which highlights a very different perception of one of the most important human events. In considering Koreans’ calculation of age which includes 10 months of foetal life in mother’s womb (when a baby is born he/she is one year old), the way Koreans describe a baby’ birth makes a perfect sense, which highlights Koreans’ thought and view of human life and birth.

The same event can also be described by the transitive verb; *nayta* is the transitive form of *nata*, which is also Path conflated verb with the meaning ‘out’ thus, “The general meaning of *nayta* as a main verb is that the subject takes something X out of a place Y that is bounded place” (Lee 1993, 216). The transitive clause involves two NPs for subject and object hence it is used for describing a different observation and experience.

However, *nayta* is not the correct form of transitive verb for animate subjects as we can see in (13a). In this case, *nahta* ‘to give birth’, ‘to produce’ is the correct word as in (13b).

(13a) 

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Name-NOM baby-ACC take out-PST-DEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For ‘Younghee gave a birth.’</td>
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</table>

(13b) 

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name-NOM baby-ACC give birth-PST-DEC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Younghee gave a birth.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reason can be explained by the Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH), which Jackendoff (1983, 188) uses for providing clues as to how the semantics of motion and location has major implications in the overall of the semantic interpretation. He argues that the overall of semantic fields depends on what sorts of entities may appear as theme and reference objects, and what sort of relations assumes the role played by location in the field of spatial expressions. (13a) is ungrammatical because a mother (Theme) cannot take a baby (Object referent) out of her body herself because the motion is the baby’s spontaneous movement, which cannot be caused.

A wonderful sprouting motion of new leaves is also described by the verb *nata*. The conceptual structure is the same as below.
(14) “nata”: [Event GO ([Thing SAYSSAK ‘new leaves’], [Path OUT])]

(15) Figure Motion-Path
sayssak-i na-ss-ta
new leaves-NOM sprout-PST-DEC
‘The new leaves have sprouted up.’

The subject’s spontaneous motion is described by the change of location from undergrowth to out of the ground denoted by the morpheme na which is conflated with Path ‘out’. Again, the source can be easily inferred as the ground or a tree depending on the context, e.g. new sprouts from bare branches in spring or after pruning. Similarly having swuyem ‘beard’, yetulum ‘pimples’, twutuleki ‘rash’ and even i ‘tooth’ are also described by the verb nata. The spontaneous motions occur with the change of location of these objects coming out from under the skin. However, for beard, pimple, rash and tooth as a subject, the transitive form is ungrammatical due to the Thematic Relations Hypothesis (TRH) in which humans cannot make beard, pimples, rash or tooth appear on the skin as they appear naturally and spontaneously. But humans can sprout new leaves by cutting or planting a seed, hence say ssak-ul nayta ‘sprout new leaves’ is grammatical.

(16) a. swuyem/ yetulum/twutuleki/-i/ka na-ss-ta.
    beard/pimple/rash/tooth-NOM appear-PST-DEC
    ‘Beard/pimple/rash/tooth has appeared.’

b. *swuyem/ yetulum/twutuleki/i-ul/lul nay-ss-ta
   beard/pimple/rash/tooth-ACC make-PST-DEC
   *‘I’ve made beard/pimple/rash/tooth appear.’

3.2 Nata with emotion as subject

In describing one’s mental or emotional status, English uses ‘be + adjective’ form as in (17.a) and (17.b):

(17) a. ‘I am pleased/sad/annoyed/happy.’
    na-nun kipputa/sulphuta/encchanhta/hayngpokhata
    I-TOP am pleased/sad/annoyed/happy.

b. ‘I am angry/excited/interested/bored.’
    na-nun hwa/sin/caymi/silcung-i/ka na-ss-ta
    I-TOP am angry/excited/interested/bored.

However, in Korean, certain mental/emotional status is expressed by using descriptive verbs as in (17a). Whereas in (17b), the verb nata is used for describing feelings such as “I am angry”, “I am excited”, “I am interested” and “I am bored”. Why are these mental states categorised differently from “I am pleased”, “I am sad”, “I am annoyed” and “I am happy”? In linguistic expressions, some feelings and emotions are regarded as concrete objects (Lee 1993, 212). The semantic interpretation from the conceptual structure of the nata denotes that emotions such as anger, excitement, interest and boredom are held internally and then ‘coming out’ spontaneously.

(18) “nata”: [Event GO ([Thing SIN ‘excitement’], [Path OUT])]
Hence these emotional experiences are lexicalised in the processive verb nata with the Path ‘out’. It shows that unlike English, emotions are categorised differently in Korean: some are expressed in states by descriptive verbs and some in motions by intransitive processive verbs.

Descriptive verbs have the same syntactic characteristics as intransitive verbs as both types are not able to take an object. However, descriptive verbs tend to take double subjects to describe non-action status (Seo 1999, 147) as in (4).

(4) tongsayng-i hwa-ka na-ss-ta.
    brother-NOM anger-NOM come out-PST-DEC
    ‘My brother is angry.’

As we can see in (19) emotional experiences that are expressed by the verb nata can be transformed into transitive sentences by using the transitive verb nayta whereas those expressions by descriptive verbs cannot.

(19) tongsayng-i hwa/sin/caymi/silccung- ul/lul nay-ss-ta
    brother-NOM anger/excitement/interest/boredom-ACC express-PST-DEC
    ‘My brother got angry/excited/interested/bored.’

3.3 Nata with symptoms & illnesses as subject

In describing illnesses, Koreans use a number of different ways of expressing their conditions. One of the most commonly used expressions is using the descriptive verb aphta ‘be sick’ or ‘be sore’ as in (20).

(20) meli/tali/mok/pal-i/ka aphuta
    head/leg/throat/arm-NOM sore
    ‘(My) head/leg/throat/arm is sore.’

The nata verb is used for describing certain bodily process symptoms such as high temperature, cough, yawn and sneeze as in (21).

(21) ye/ki/chim/hapum/caychayki-i/ka na-n-ta
    high temperature/cough/yawn/sneeze-NOM come-out-PRS-DEC
    ‘I’ve got a high fever/cough.’
    ‘I cough/yawn/sneeze/cough’.

As the conceptual structure illustrates in (22), these symptoms have a tendency to break out spontaneously without the agent’s initiation or external force and they are classified as the same motion events encoded by the morpheme na-. There is no word for the corresponding concept in English: ‘yawning’ and ‘sneezing’ are described by the intransitive verb, but high fever is not and cough/coughing can be expressed in either way.

(22) “nata”: [Event GO ([Thing KICHIM ‘cough’], [Path OUT])]

When the agent takes an action, the action verb hata is used:

(23) kichim/hapum/caychayki-ul/lul ha-n-ta
    cough/yawn/sneeze-ACC do
    ‘I cough/yawn/sneeze.’
However, with a symptom like high fever, the agent has no control over the condition hence, yel-ul hata is ungrammatical. Also when we apply nayta, the transitive form of nata, it is clear that these conditions cannot be expressed in the causative form, as they are spontaneous occurrences.

(24)  *kichim/caychayki/haphum/yel-ul/lul  nay-ss-ta
cough/sneeze/yawn/high fever –ACC  make-PST-DEC
 *‘I made cough/sneeze/yawn/high fever.’

But when sori ‘sound’ is attached after kichim ‘cough’, the sentence is grammatical because one can make a coughing sound. Similarly, certain bodily processes such as tears, perspiration, blood and runny nose are also described using the verb nata as they are ‘coming out’ from the body spontaneously.

(25)  nwumul/ttam/phi/khosmul-i/ka  na-n-ta
tears/perspiration/blood/runny nose-NOM come out-PRS-DEC.
 ‘I have tears/perspiration/blood/runny nose.’

When these expressions are transformed into transitives using the transitive verb nayta, khosmul ‘runny nose’ is ungrammatical because it cannot be caused whereas nwumul ‘tears’, phi ‘blood’ and ttam ‘perspiration’ are fine as they can be caused by watching a sad movie, a needle and eating hot food or doing exercise respectfully.

3.4 Nata with senses as subject

When encountering various senses of taste, smell and sound, the verb nata is used for describing the experiences. As the conceptual structure of nata illustrates in (26), we can smell roses because the scent ‘has come out’ from the roses naturally and spontaneously.

(26)  “nata”: [Event GO ([Thing HYANGKI ‘scent’, [ Path OUT]])]

(27)  cangmi kkoch hyangki-ka  na-n-ta.
rose  flower scent-NOM  come out-PRS-DEC
 ‘The scent of roses comes out’ = ‘I smell the scent of roses.’

After biting an apple the experience is described in (28), as the sour taste of apple also comes from the apple naturally and spontaneously. If an apple is sweet, then the expression would be ‘tan-mas-i nanta. ‘It tastes sweet’.

(28)  i sakwa-nun  sin mas-i  na-n-ta.
this apple-TOP sour taste-NOM  come out-PRS-DEC
 ‘This apple tastes sour.’

When hearing the sound of a baby crying, nata is also used for describing what happened.

(29)  aki  wu-nun soli-ka  na-n-ta.
baby cry-REL sound-NOM  come out-PRS-DEC
 ‘There’s the sound of a baby crying.’ = ‘I hear a baby’s crying.’

Koreans view that senses such as smell, taste, and sound are coming out from somewhere so that they take a notice of them. They are treated as the same kind of spontaneous motion events denoted by the semantic representation of ‘moving out’ by the morpheme ‘na’. In English, there is no equivalent verb for describing these different events. Instead,
English uses different sensory verbs such as ‘smell’, ‘taste’ and ‘hear’ for each description. In other words, English speakers do not perceive these events as the same event type.

3.5 Nata with natural disasters as subject

(30) “nata”: [Event GO ([Thing CICIN ‘earthquake’], [ Path OUT])]

The occurrence of natural disasters such as cicin ‘earthquake’, sanpul ‘bush fire’, hongsu ‘flood’ and sako ‘accident’ are all described using the verb nata denoting that spontaneous motions broke out onto the surface to see. In English, these are translated into different types of verbs and lexical items as we can see below (31). Interestingly in English, the word ‘outbreak’ is used for fire and war which indicates similar perception of the events as Korean.

(31) a. samchung-eyse pul-i na-ss-ta.
    3rd floor-LOC fire-NOM break out-PST-DEC
    ‘A fire broke out on the 3rd floor.’

b. kosoktolo-eyse cha sako-ka na-ss-ta.
    freeway-LOC car accident-NOM occur-PST-DEC
    ‘A car accident occurred on the freeway.’

c. Queensland-eyse hongswu-ka na-ss-ta
    Queensland-LOC flood-NOM occur-PST-DEC
    ‘Queensland had a flood.’

d. ilpon-eyse cicin-i na-ss-ta.
    Japan-LOC earthquake occur-PST-DEC
    ‘Earthquake occurred in Japan.’

When we transform these natural disasters such as a flood and an earthquake into caused motions using the transitive verb nayta, they are not grammatical. This is because these phenomena are not caused, but are natural occurrences which happen without an agent’s initiation, but a bushfire can be caused by arson, hence sanpwul-ul nay-ta is grammatical.

There are many more expressions using the verb nata and its compound verbs for describing various phenomena and experiences providing extended meanings. For example, English expressions such as “I remember.” kiek-i na-n-ta, “There was a rumour.” somwun-i na-ss-ta, “A lot of profits were made.” maeh-un iik-i na-ss-ta, “He is an extraordinary character.” ku-nun na-n salam-i-ta are all expressed by the verb nata. A further study will look into these extended semantic representations expressed by the verb nata as the space is limited here.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have investigated the conceptual significance of the verb nata by analysing its semantic, lexical and syntactic structures.

As shown, various phenomena of the world and human experiences are described using the verb nata in Korean. When compared with corresponding English descriptions, English uses variety of lexical items and grammatical structures to express the same phenomena and experiences. There is no corresponding word or verb equivalent to nata in English with the same semantic representation. Using Talmu’s typology of motion events
and Jackendoff’s conceptual structure for the analysis of the verb *nata*, the study reveals that the path information conflated in the verb *nata* which is ‘out’ is the key in identifying the common semantic element. It confirms Talmy’s (1991) point that Path is the ‘core schema’ of motion events. As *nata* is a processive, intransitive verb, which describes a spontaneous motion, the lexicalised meaning encoded in the morpheme *na*- is ‘move out spontaneously’. With various entities as a theme, the overall semantic interpretation can be derived from the core common element denoted by *na-. As Jackendoff argues thematic structure provides the means to organize a semantic field of events and states coherently and give us the overall interpretation of events (Jackendoff 1985, 209).

The conceptual structure denoted by the morpheme *na*- is related to spatial understanding and perception, which is fundamental to human cognition. An aspect of Koreans’ reality is expressed by the verb *nata* in which they regard spontaneous motions whose path is ‘out’ as the same—whether it is birth, illness, senses, natural disasters or fame.

**Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Accusative particle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTR</td>
<td>Attributive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONN</td>
<td>Connective suffix</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEC</td>
<td>Declarative</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Locative particle</td>
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<td>NOM</td>
<td>Nominative case particle</td>
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<tr>
<td>PST</td>
<td>Past tense</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRS</td>
<td>Present tense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REL</td>
<td>Relativizer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOP</td>
<td>Topic marker</td>
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</table>

**References**


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Expressing Confucian Culture Through Kagok Songs and Their Kisaeng Performers

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University of Auckland

In contemporary Korea, there are two quite different types of vocal genres and both have the same Sino-Korean name of kagok (歌曲). The first kagok genre encompasses songs written since Pongsŏnhwa (Balsam Flower, 1919). Most Koreans recognize these diatonic style songs as kagok. The second kagok genre is a type of traditional song cycle accompanied by a chamber ensemble, in which the poems (sijo), are related melodically but not textually. This kagok used to be called Mannyŏn changhwanjigok (萬年長歡之曲) which can be translated ‘Songs of ten-thousand-years of joy.’ The origin of kagok is traced back to the lyric songs, Chŏngkwajŏng samgigok (鄭瓜亭-三機曲), in the Koryŏ dynasty (918-1392). Chŏngkwajŏng samgigok almost disappeared in the seventeenth century because of its too slow tempo. The fastest part (saktaeyŏp) of the song was transformed into kagok.

Kagok was enjoyed by kisaeng and the male literati (sŏnbi) at private parties (p’ungnyubang) in the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910). During the parties, literati composed poems (sijo) on kagok’s texts in terms of their experience and social ideology of Confucianism. They sometimes sang kagok, otherwise, professional kagok singers (kagaek) and professional male musical instrumentalists (yulgaek) were invited and gave performances.

The civilizing process during the Chosŏn period has been extensively discussed elsewhere; briefly, the Confucianizing process--conceived and launched by state officials--aimed at transforming society and state in accordance with a Neo-Confucian moral vision. Kagok music-making was no exception.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how musical aspects of kagok were integrated with social and cultural aspects of the Chosŏn dynasty on the basis of neo-Confucianism (Confucianism), which was the national ideology of the Chosŏn dynasty. The following musical aspects will be examined to meet this purpose: kagok’s philosophy, vocal quality, vocalization, the performance position, texts and performance order. In addition, kagok singers, kisaeng will be introduced as professional musicians, poets and artists.

1. PHILOSOPHY OF KAGOK

The philosophy of Kagok music has undeniable ties to Confucianism, which embodied the sense of the performers and esthetic sensibility of the Confucian society during the Chosŏn dynasty. From the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty Ye禮 (rites or rituals) and ak楽 (music) was emphasized as the practical method to control the people for the
Confucian society. This musical belief was called Yeak sasang (‘Ideology of rituals and music’).

In Sejong sillok (Annals of King Sejong) [1418-50], the purpose of music for the literati in the Chosŏn dynasty was based on Confucianism: it was to cultivate human nature to the loftiness of sainthood by blending the spirit and men into one, to create a universe where heaven and earth are in one accord and a cosmos in which yang [representing the sun, male, right and day aspects] and yin [representing the moon, female, left and night aspects] exist in perfect balance. It originated in China and was adopted by the Chosŏn dynasty to control the people.

The concept of ‘perfect balance’ in Sejong sillok was also adopted from one of the Confucian classic texts ‘Zhongyong.’ It literally means “middle-common.”

The ultimate! These songs are straightforward, but not overbearing. They wind about but do not bend over. When pressing near, they do not crowd; when moving afar, they do not drift away. They move, but within bounds; they repeat but do not bring boredom. They make one be attentive but do not make one worrisome. They are enjoyable, but not in an uncontrolled fashion. They are useful, but not consuming; they are vast, but not shouting; giving but not wasting. They are taking without hoarding, managing without smothering, forthcoming, but not dissipating.

As it was stated, the main function of early music was to promote moderate behavior and contribute to a smooth functioning of the state. In addition, music was treated not as a sounding art but a broad ethical concept, which is called p’ungnyu ūmak. In order to achieve the goal of music’s ‘perfect balance,’ kagok has been adopted Confucius virtues.

2. VOCAL QUALITY (ŪMJIL)

The Korean word ūmjil (ūm-sound jil-quality) refers to a singer’s timbre, dynamics and volume, which can be translated as vocal quality in English. The ūmjil of female kagok is so clear, light and soft that the sound is peaceful, lyrical and thin in texture. It does not produce a soubrette or dramatic coloratura sound. These sounds are produced more orally than nasally. Hong Won-ki, for example, did not allow either male or female kagok singers to make nasal sounds.

In female kagok, timbre change appears very often between the chest sound and

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4 Hwang Hyung-ki 1985: 32.
5 Woskin, Kenneth De 1982: 23.
falsetto. The falsetto technique is used in only female kagok songs, which have the softer, lighter and brighter tone. The falsetto sound is produced above middle F in the vocal range; on higher notes, the head sound ensures singers sing more softly. Otherwise, the notes below middle F are produced by the chest.

[Plate 2: Chosŏn yŏnŭi siksa (Women’s supper in the late Chosŏn dynasty) painted in 1902 by Joseph de LA Nézière]

In contrast, male kagok never used falsetto techniques in singing but the chest sound was always used. Using the chest sound makes the singers sing with a louder voice, especially at a higher pitch. A strong and powerful sound can be produced from the chest resonance. Males in the Chosŏn dynasty were strongly encouraged not to be weak, light and passive but strong, brave and active. The roles of men and women show a rigid distinction in the Chosŏn dynasty. A good example is the rule that males and females do not sit together, after they reached the age of seven. (Namyŏ ch’ilsŏn pudongsŏk) This aimed to prevent personal contact between men and women outside marriage. In addition, family members even husband and wife did not have a meal together in the upper and middle classes; males had meals in their room, each with portable dining tables, which were always served by female servants or wife. Females had meals together with only females.

The above painting was painted by a foreigner in the late Chosŏn dynasty. The totally different dining custom from a Western country probably looked strange for the foreign painter. It is natural that differing gender roles also affected the vocal style of music-making, in accordance with society’s expectation at that time.

The ‘flow’ of kagok singing was often described as being like a spring breeze, a green willow tree or the sleeves of a robe. All of these images express not artificial beauty but natural beauty and harmony. Consequently, female kagok requires neither the higher pitches of the soprano, nor a very low sound. The vocal range of kagok is not wide, around two octaves, which is a comfortable sound for kagok singers and audiences.

3. PRONUNCIATION OF KAGOK TEXT

Cho Soon-ja, the Korean Intangible Cultural Asset of Kagok, often reveals that the singer’s mouth is never opened wide, and her lips always cover the teeth during kagok singing. The singer’s mouth gradually changes shape during her singing. This movement is able to produce the sound from the hard palate, because it requires the mouth to be wide open. Hong Won-ki also explains this technique in his female kagok notation book. The strong sound of syllables such as ‘kka’, ‘ppa’ and ‘jjia’ from the hard palate should be sung on the soft palate, sounding like ‘ga’, ‘pa’ and ‘ja’.  

The gradual change of singer’s mouth technique affects the pronunciation of the diphthongs and double vowels in the text. They are sung by gradually separating the two vowels. For example, the word ‘toego’ should be sung as ‘to-i-go’ in the first section of the first song of the kagok han pat’ang and t’aep’yŏng is sung as t’a-ui-p’yŏ-ui-ŏ-ŏng in the first two syllables of t’aep’yŏngga.

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6 Hong Won-ki 1981: 23.
7 Joseph de LA Nézière. (French painter), from his collection of paintings L’Extrême-Orient en images 1904.
10 Hong 1981.
The reason that the female sound is especially not strong and coloratura but soft and light, is again related to Zhòngyōng, ‘perfect balance.’ Confucian governments, as in the Chosŏn dynasty, emphatically inhibited extremes of behavior. Women in the Chosŏn dynasty were meant to be passive and avoid behavioral extremes: they were not allowed to shout or make eye contact with older people and men. They were required to be calm. Even women’s footsteps should be silent. The following extract shows how Confucianism was firmly entrenched in women’s lives during that time.

According to Confucian morals, women could not stroll in their garden or venture out during the daytime except under certain conditions. Two of the conditions were receptions for royal visitors or Chinese envoys, and welcomes or farewells for family members on trips. To see off and greet members of her family was an expression of affection and therefore could not be prevented. As a rule, women were allowed in the streets only at night, after the men were restricted to their homes by a 9 P.M. till 2 A.M.

When she went outside the house, a woman had to veil her face. She was not to be seen by men who were not close relatives . . . Considering such social conditions, it was not surprising that women’s social life in the Yi [Chosŏn] dynasty was limited to special groups and occasions. Most involved gatherings of neighbor women or relatives on special occasions such as the New Year festival, the Full Moon festival, and birthdays.11

4. VOCALIZATION (PALSŏNG)

Although the female kagok singer’s voice is not very loud or strong, the sound itself is always clear and conveyed with tension during the long phrases. While singing, it is important not to push the sound out of the mouth, but keep it resonating within the body, usually for thirty seconds, for one breath. In order to do this, long breaths are essential. The longest breath in female kagok is around one minute and twenty seconds, through three syllables, in the slowest song, p’yŏngjo Isudaeyŏp, of kagok han pa’t’ang. To sing a long phrase within one breath, singers required special training in breath control.

During the breath management of singing, a singer should keep a physical equilibrium. “To be skillful, a voice user must learn to maintain equilibrium between the mechanics of airflow regulation and vocal-fold resistance to the air in order to accomplish precise coordination between the two.”12 In kagok singing, this physical equilibrium should accompany the emotional equilibrium, which is one of the important goals of kagok singing. Emotional equilibrium is also the aim of music learning in Confucianism, which is the cultivation of human virtue. Yi Sŏng-ch’ŏn described equilibrium as one of the aesthetical characteristics of Korean traditional, classical music.13

In the Chosŏn dynasty, women, especially, required enormous patience, which was one of the essential ethics. They had to keep ‘the rules of conduct for women.’ In order to keep these rules and to follow the traditional idea of seven evils ‘Ch’ilgŏjiyak ’, women were prohibited from disobeying parents-in-law, bearing no son, committing adultery, jealousy, carrying a hereditary disease or garrulousness, otherwise they would be expelled from the home. They were not allowed remarriage for their life span, although, upper class Korean men maintained several wives, and it was possible for an ordinary man to remarry.14 Women were not allowed to be jealous of their husband’s concubine but should suppress it. Emotional equilibrium is the result of patience and refinement from anger,

sorrow and joy. *Kagok*’s long breath control requires enormous patience as well, which led to emotional equilibrium.

5. THE PERFORMANCE POSITION (*CHASE*)

During the Chosŏn dynasty, the overall image of the woman was ‘natural,’ ‘soft’ and ‘light.’ The ideal, beautiful, Korean woman had very thin, light eyebrows, a small mouth and slim and narrow shoulders. As can be seen in [Plate 1], during the Chosŏn dynasty, the beautiful woman was neither active nor smiling. In the picture, her face is bent slightly down and her eyes are also downcast. This appearance corresponds to a *kagok* singer on the stage whose eyes are downcast with the head slightly bowed.

![Plate 1: *Huwŏn yuyŏn (After Garden Party)* in the eighteenth century. Female *kagok* singing accompanied by *kŏmun’go*](image)

The performance position, *chase*, is considered to be an important aspect in *kagok* singing. Hong Won-ki emphasized: “To be skillful in singing, *kagok* singers should sit on a floor with the right posture and peaceful face, tightening the lower abdomen area. Even if a singer is very talented and has a good voice, he/she cannot make a good sound without *kagok*’s authentic posture.” The performance position of *kagok* follows the Korean traditional living style, that is, to sit on the floor without a chair. The actual sitting position between male and female singers is again different. Male singers traditionally sit in a fixed cross-legged position with hands on their thighs. Female singers sit with their right knee bent up in front of the chest and the left leg folded under the right. The hands are folded over each other on the raised knee. This was the typical sitting position for women even in everyday life in the Chosŏn dynasty, and it is sometimes carried through to the present day. The following photo of Cho Soon-ja and her teacher Yi Chu-hwan at a recital in Japan, in 1964, shows this performing position.

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The above woman’s posture seems tense, introverted and passive, but the male’s position seems more relaxed and positive than the woman’s one. Passive social customs of women in the Chosŏn dynasty affected every manner of women’s lives including their clothes and sitting postures.

Today, however, Cho Soon-ja rejects the traditional woman’s performance position for two reasons. Firstly, the women’s performance position makes singers’ breath control difficult because the body shape is too tight to breathe. Secondly, today there is no reason for women to have such passive manners. The human rights situation between men and women in today’s Korea is one of equality.

6. KAGOK TEXT

Vocal music can more closely express social attitudes and the cultural and individual experiences of its creators, than instrumental music because of the texts (noraetmal). Kagok also reflects the social attitudes and customs of the Chosŏn dynasty through its texts. Today, kagok’s texts have been researched under the Korean traditional poetic genre ‘sijŏ.’

Ethnomusicologists such as Alan Merriam, Bruno Nettl and John Blacking emphasized the importance of studying the text of songs. “One of the most obvious sources for the understanding of human behavior in connection with music is the song text. Texts, of course, are language behavior rather than music sound, but they are an integral part of music and there is clear-cut evidence that the language used in connection with music differs from that of ordinary discourse.”  

The illustrations of the literati and kagok singers’ main interests and the attitudes of the Chosŏn dynasty in the text are obvious. Through the texts, kagok became especially the vehicle of female emotional expression, because other ways of emotional expression were very limited under Confucian society. Outside the palace, the literati and kisaeng both enjoyed not only the beauty of nature but also extra liberties. These arts were regarded as the literati’s p’ungnyu which symbolized nature and freedom. The following

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16 http://www.chosoonja.org
table shows an analysis of such typical subjects in one suite for both male and female *kagok* songs in *Kagokpo* (The *kagok* notation book) by Yi Chu-hwan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sadness of waiting</th>
<th>Enjoyment of life</th>
<th>Chinese tale</th>
<th>Appreciation of nature</th>
<th>Prosperity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 songs (53.3 %)</td>
<td>3 songs (20 %)</td>
<td>2 songs</td>
<td>1 song (6.6%)</td>
<td>1 song</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table 1: The analysis of the subjects of female *kagok*]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Patriotism</th>
<th>Bravery</th>
<th>Enjoyment of life</th>
<th>Chinese tale</th>
<th>Appreciation of nature</th>
<th>Prosperity</th>
<th>Diligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 songs (30.7 %)</td>
<td>3 songs (11.5%)</td>
<td>9 songs (34.6%)</td>
<td>2 songs (7.6%)</td>
<td>2 songs (7.6%)</td>
<td>1 song (3.8%)</td>
<td>1 song</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table 2: The analysis of the subjects of male *kagok*]

The table above shows that the themes of texts are strongly related to their personal emotions, full of intimate feelings (usually in relation to love, to nature, to self-pity) rather than social or political propaganda. The most popular subject of female *kagok* songs was ‘the sadness of waiting for their lovers.’ This subject occupies eight of the fifteen songs (53%). This fact reflects *kisaeng*’s miserable life style. They longed for their lovers, who visited them only occasionally and then left without warning. This circumstance were often observed in Korean poetry in classical Chinese (*Han’guk hansi*) and *kagok* anthologies. One Korean literature scholar thoroughly analyzed *kisaeng*’s identity and receptive femininity through the Korean poetry in classical Chinese, which were written by *kisaeng* and their lovers. Composing poems and singing *kagok* were the vehicles of expression of their insight and concerns. In *Kogum kagok*, their sorrows of separation were dealt with three different levels.

In contrast, male *kagok* songs convey ‘enjoyment of life’ (34.6%), ‘patriotism’ (30.7%) and ‘bravery’ (11.5%) instead of ‘sadness of waiting’. Patriotism towards the King was the first priority of a male’s life, but the expression of their love towards females, as elegant literati, was almost forbidden in the Chosŏn dynasty.

**7. The Performance Order ( Yöiju sunsŏ)**

*Kagok* songs are collected together in *han pat’ang* and sung in a predetermined order like a ‘suite’. The fifteen female *kagok* songs which make up *kagok han pat’ang* can be divided into three major groups (songs 1-4, 6-9, 10-14) with a bridging song (song 5) and a final song (song 15). The first group of four, the original *kagok* songs, (1. *Isudaeyŏp*, 2 *Chunggŏ*, 3. *P’yŏnggŏ*, 4. *Tugŏ*) are sung in *p’yŏngjo* mode. The second group of four, also original *kagok* songs, is in *kyemyŏnjo* mode and these have the same titles as songs 1 to 4. The third group consists of more recent songs which have longer texts than the original songs. The tempo is faster than the original songs, except for the final song (song

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18 Park Yong-sun 2003: 26
20 Kawamura, Minato 2002: 100.
15). This is in a slow tempo and has a tranquil mood. These fifteen songs are sung without a break.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Tempo</th>
<th>Mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <em>Isudaeyōp</em></td>
<td>One beat = 20</td>
<td><em>P'yōngjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>Chunggō</em></td>
<td>One beat = 25</td>
<td><em>P'yōngjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <em>P'yōnggō</em></td>
<td>One beat = 30</td>
<td><em>P'yōngjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <em>Tugō</em></td>
<td>One beat = 45</td>
<td><em>P'yōngjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <em>Panyŏp</em></td>
<td>One beat = 80</td>
<td><em>P'yōngjo</em> + <em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. <em>Isudaeyōp</em></td>
<td>One beat = 20</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. <em>Chunggō</em></td>
<td>One beat = 25</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. <em>P'yōnggō</em></td>
<td>One beat = 30</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. <em>Tugō</em></td>
<td>One beat = 45</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. <em>P'yōngnong</em></td>
<td>One beat = 50</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em> + <em>P'yōngjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. <em>Urak</em></td>
<td>One beat = 55</td>
<td><em>P'yōngjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. <em>Hwan'gyerak</em></td>
<td>One beat = 55</td>
<td><em>P'yōngjo</em> + <em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. <em>Kyerak</em></td>
<td>One beat = 60</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. <em>P'yōnsudaeyōp</em></td>
<td>One beat = 75</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. <em>T'aepp'yŏngga</em></td>
<td>One beat = 45</td>
<td><em>Kyemyŏnjo</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table 3: Order of female kagok han pat'ang]

The overall performance order of kagok shows that there is a gradual tempo increase from one song to the next, until the last song, which is in a slow tempo. This is achieved by the quickening of tempo within each group of songs. The tempo increase is related to the idea of the Korean literati. They considered that a slow-paced life style was elegant and a faster one was vulgar or frivolous. For example, the literati only walked slowly with their hands folded behind their backs because they considered themselves elegant and intelligent people, different from ordinary people.
The first song, ‘Isudaeyŏp’ is in the slowest tempo of kagok (twenty beats in a minute), and represents their dignity and grace. Chun Inpyong also described the aesthetical view of music in the Chosŏn dynasty as follows:

If a person is to be a gentleman (Kunja), music and morality always have to be present in his daily life. Music has to be used for personal mind control and as a vehicle of enlightenment for the citizen . . . Music has to be always in a slow tempo and have peaceful melodies. Music in fast tempo and with loud sounds should be treated as lascivious music.”

As the singers become more involved in the kagok performance, they experience more emotional and physical warmth. This results in an increase in tempo and is seen as reflecting the literati’s relaxation of their social and political morals. The tempo of the third group (songs 10-14) is faster than the first and the second group. The fourteenth song can be considered the climax of kagok han pat’ang.

The finale song ‘T’aepyŏngga’ is sung in a tranquil mood. Its tempo is dramatically reduced. It decreases from seventy-five beats to forty beats per minute. The text is about the prosperity of the nation. The Korean musicologist, Chang Sa-hun depicted p’ungnyubang phenomenon as follows.

Kagok was often enjoyed by the literati during a banquet with alcohol. Initially, in spite of starting to sing, the literati’s attitude is still stiff with tension because of their social position. As the appreciation of songs increases, the party atmosphere loosens and there is an increase in warmth and laughter. As they became more involved in kagok, they became more drunken and more ‘human’ in nature. They forget their social position and begin talking about humorous tales and sexual innuendoes. They enjoy the feeling of freedom as an everyday human being. However, the literati could not return home without dignity and grace, so they must revert to their slow pace of life. This reflects their dignity and courtly manners.

8. KAGOK SINGERS, KISAENG

Little research has been done on the origin of female kagok and singers (kisaeng,) although a lot of research has been done on male kagok and the music itself. Kisaeng were called talented ladies (kinyŏ, ki means talent and yŏ means female), or artistic talents (yegi, ye means arts and gi means talent), before the Japanese colonization. In spite of kisaeng’s great contribution to kagok as singers, composers and audiences, they were marginalized in Korean traditional music history. In addition, it is extremely hard to find any record of female kagok singers in kagok’s old manuscripts and anthologies.

Kisaeng have been researched by Korean literature scholars through the traditional tales and their literature, rather than by Korean musicologists. Louise McCarthy researched kisaeng in the Koryŏ period in her Ph.D dissertation through the analysis of the traditional poetry book, Tongguk Yi Sanggukchip by Yi Kyu-bo. There are few and limited publications in English on the subject. If research focused on kisaeng not only on its association with entertainment, even prostitution, but on the fact that many of the women were important musicians, poets and artists, the education of kisaeng and their works would become critically valuable. Much of the music written at this time was created, performed and appreciated by those members of kisaeng themselves.

21 Chun Inpyong 2000: 120-121.
**CONCLUSION**

Anthony Seeger stated that singing was “part of the social reproduction.”

Kagok, the classical vocal form, is part of the social reproduction of the Chosŏn dynasty. Kagok sound alone is not the most significant aspect. The philosophy and social context in the Chosŏn dynasty were equally important. More than any other genre, kagok, which was the most loved, contained the aesthetic views of the elite social group (literati and kisaeng) of the Chosŏn dynasty focused on Confucianism.

In this paper, kagok’s aesthetics in conjunction with musical sound, vocal quality, musical form, vocalization and timbre have been explained. Unique vocal qualities clearly relate to female roles in the Chosŏn dynasty, and female vocalization is similarly related to the social ethics of Confucianism (such as avoiding loud sounds and therefore using falsetto techniques).

The different aesthetics of Korean traditional music were often only described through abstract theories from old Confucian references, without showing musical examples. Therefore, in this paper an analysis of the above features (vocal quality, musical structure, text, vocalization and performance posture) went some way to rectifying this.

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Kuunmong and the Sinosphere: Focusing on its Title

MYOUNG IN YU
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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that to fully understand the Korean novel Kuunmong we need a fine grasp of the Sinospheric context in which it was produced and circulated.

First, it contrasts the popularity of the editions in Classical Chinese (Hanmun) with that of the editions in Korean from a statistical angle. This helps to pay more careful attention to the Classical Chinese editions and their readers, irrespective of in which language the novel’s manuscript was written. The shift in interest from author-centred thinking to reader-response approach gives a stimulus for understanding the work within the scope of a Sinitic intellectual tradition.

Then, it presents a considerable number of traces having used kuunmong as an expression or a word before the release of Kuunmong. The quantity of these examples—a result of a corpus-based approach—will be more than sufficient to unveil the kuunmong’s core meanings such as e.g. ‘immensity’. This paper therefore attempts to outline erudite contemporary readers’ probable expectations of Kuunmong.

1 INTRODUCTION

It may be useful to start out with a brief discussion of the significance of the novel Kuunmong (1687–8) in the literary historiography of Korea. The work is widely believed to have been written initially in the Korean vernacular, i.e. the present-day national language and script, and then translated into Hanmun (Classical Chinese). Its author is no other than Kim Manjung (1637–92, henceforth ‘Kim’, unless otherwise stated) who has been highly decorated as “the only writer of national literature in premodern Korea” (Kim 1930).1 In addition, it was created more than a half-century prior to its Chinese counterpart, viz. the Honglou meng (ca. 1754). In short, the work and its author “contributed exactly what from the viewpoint of a westernized concept of literature was most essential to” (Egert 1999, 67) the reconstruction of national literary tradition. It is thus beyond dispute that Korean scholars have attempted to decorate the novel with the honour of an eternal monument of national literature. In the light of this canonization or monumentalization of Kuunmong, it should be easy to understand why no serious attention has been given to (the editions of) the Kuunmong circulated in Hanmun (Rutt 1970) and its Sinitically-educated readers. It is also self-evident that the nationalistic intellectuals have reluctantly accepted the Kuunmong’s ‘non-Korean cultural heritage’. Its Siniticness or Siniticity has been stigmatized even as Chineseness, i.e. ‘undesirable foreignness’ or ‘unwelcome intruder’.

Given the literary-historical status of Kuunmong (and due to the limitations of space), it goes without saying that there are a large number of symptomatic examples of this sort of intolerance as well as of heroization or nationalization of the author, which eventually indicate questionable scholarship.2

1 For a detailed account of Kim T’aejun’s studies on Kuunmong, see Yu (2008).
2 A comprehensive analysis of the nationalistic attitude of Korean academia will become available in my forthcoming dissertation in German (English working title: Kuunmong and the History of Korean Literature
It is not to be doubted that the old story *Kuunmong* needs to be constantly reinterpreted in the light of changing situations. However, the chauvinistic approach that has been maintained by influential Korean academics for the benefit of displaying a glorious literary tradition is questionable. With this in mind, this study attempts to propose different interpretations—to be precise: renew the old, forgotten interpretations—of (the title of) the work. By doing so, it can also suggest an opportunity to apply *Kuunmong* to such research frameworks as ‘circulation of knowledge’ or ‘flow of ideas’ in the East Asian context. This will only be possible from a Sinitic angle, i.e. approaching the novel as a product of a long Sinitic tradition and trying to comprehend the Sinitic tradition of Korean literature.

In this regard, Marion Eggert and Daniel Bouchez offered seminal ideas on how to deal with the work for the sake of the prevailing academic discourses (see below). So, it is appropriate to focus on the readers of the Hanmun editions. Furthermore, in order to offer a simple yet representative counterexample to the nationalistic approaches, this paper will be limited to considering the expectations that erudite contemporary readers probably had of the title. This is indeed merely one aspect, but a not unimportant one—as a work’s title is a not unimportant part of it.

### 2 **Significance of Hanmun editions**

From the viewpoint of exploring an alternative to understand the title on the basis of a Sinitic literary tradition, Eggert’s (1999, 69) opinion is of special interest. It reads:

One might also point to the effective use made of Chinese language [i.e. Hanmun] puns throughout the novel [*Kuunmong*]; indeed, the title itself can be seen as such a pun on the famous Yunneng (Cloud-Dream) which hosted the erotic dream encounters with a goddess sung about by Song Yu [fl. 3rd century BCE] in his “Gaotang-fu” [Rhapsody on the Gaotang Shrine] and “Shennü-fu” [Rhapsody on the Goddess]. Such a pun would only have made sense to people lettered enough to read the novel in Chinese.

She addressed the need for careful consideration of (the editions of) the novel written and circulated in Hanmun as well as of the educated readers’ reception and response. The ratio of the editions (derived from Cho Hŭiŭang 1999, 49–64, 206–18, 760–80, 851–6) in the table below gives a clear idea of the significance of Hanmun (H in Table 1) editions, in contrast with Korean (K) editions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><em>Kuunmong</em></th>
<th><em>Sa-si namjönggi</em></th>
<th>Ch’unhyang chŏn</th>
<th>Hong Kiltong chŏn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korean</strong></td>
<td>H K</td>
<td>H K</td>
<td>H K</td>
<td>H K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hand-written</td>
<td>69 71</td>
<td>76 111</td>
<td>21 119</td>
<td>1 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woodblock</td>
<td>97 31</td>
<td>— 4</td>
<td>1 74</td>
<td>— 34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>letterpress etc.</td>
<td>9 15</td>
<td>3 19</td>
<td>10 103</td>
<td>— 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>175 117</td>
<td>79 134</td>
<td>32 296</td>
<td>1 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hand-written</strong></td>
<td>292</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of primary importance is the ratio of the editions in Hanmun to those in Korean (175:117) and their woodblock-printed editions (97:31). In addition, the comparison to the three other works clearly indicates the popularity of *Kuunmong* in Hanmun. In this respect, it is of secondary importance whether the work was initially produced in Korean or not. At this point, it is safe to say that the sharp contrast (between the novels) clearly reflects the

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Studies). It centres on the modern critical literature on the novel and outlines the development of the discipline.
educational background of the majority of the readers of *Kuunmong* and refers to its distinct Siniticness—or globalness.

3 Previous Explanations for the Title

It seems to be difficult to find a satisfactory translation or explanation of the title *Kuunmong*. Here again, Eggert (2001) gives a good place to start:

> While Korean scholarship does not seem to have struggled much with this name but was content to see it as hinting at the illusory nature of the love story involving nine people, Western Koreanists have had troubles translating it correctly. Is it a Cloud Dream of the Nine, as one translator says (Gale 1922), or rather a Dream of Nine Clouds, as most others suggest?

The title *Kuunmong* can be convincingly explained solely on the basis of elements immanent to this work such as the number of main figures, nine (one and eight), “the cloud as frequently recurring leitmotiv—most often employed on the encounters of Yang Soyu with his eight predestined wives”, and “the [hero’s] dream as a structural device connecting the different layers of reality” (Eggert 2001). The possibility of this explanation may have caused the academic indifference. Yet there had been some rudimentary attempts prior to Eggert’s accounts. This kind of study has been called *p’yejeron* (discussion about the title) and is carried out as a part of *chujeron* (discussion of the main theme) or *sasangnon* (discussion about the ideological background) of the novel. Thus, Korean scholars have usually attempted to illustrate the significance of a certain ideological or religious background of the text, focusing on its title. It will be convenient to categorize the previous studies according to ‘religions’ as follows.

On the basis of the Taoist context: *kuun* by itself is a Taoist term that means “clouds of nine colours” and refers to “the dwelling places of the Immortals” (*Zhongwen dacidian, Dai Kan–Wa jiten*). The single characters or rather the terms consisting of one character, *ku* and *un*, are also regarded respectively to carry a symbolic meaning in the Taoist context. Therefore, as can easily be imagined, it has been attempted to bring “the Taoist elements scattered throughout the book” (Eggert 2001) to the fore with particular emphasis on the Taoist traits of (the part of) the title. For instance, Pak (1998, 366, 429, 433) tried to point out the remainder of the title (i.e. *mong*) as a Buddhist symbol and to highlight the author’s religious views. In doing so, he tried to demonstrate the title as an expression of the Confucian scholar’s (as well as his work’s) idiosyncratic syncretism, i.e. *kuun* for Taoism and *mong* for Buddhism.

On the basis of a broad conception of the Confucian context: as such titles as “A Study on the Science of Divination of ‘9’ in *Nine cloud dream*” (Pae 1994) and “Yijing Cosmology in *Kuunmong*” (Eggert 2002) reveal, much attention was directed to a possible correspondence of the female protagonists’ personality traits with the eight trigrams of *Yijing*. In this scheme, the remainder or the hero is, of course, to be regarded as the centre as being analogous to the Absolute (*taiji/t’aeegûk*) in the middle surrounded by the eight trigrams. By remarking on Kim’s deep knowledge of the ancient system of “cosmology” or “divination” and by demonstrating the well thought-out positioning of the protagonists putatively based on the system, these studies made a great deal of effort to highlight the genius of “the writer at the highest level of the time” (Sôl 1999, 104).

All the studies proposed new interpretations with considerable validity. In such a scheme concentrating only on a particular religion or a mixture of religions and on a

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3 I would like to express my gratitude to Eggert for allowing me to use this hitherto unpublished paper.
particular part of the title as if it were only a religious symbol, there is, however, no place and no need to take the trouble to deal with the title as a whole and as a literary expression. Eggert apparently noticed this defect and attempted to overcome it by centring on a passage from a Buddhist commentary as follows (Eggert 2001):

The very same page of the Ogahae [Kihwa’s (1376–1433) Kūmganggyông ogahae sŏrŭi, “the most widespread version of Kūmganggyông during Kim Manjung’s time”] provides also an explanation for the title of the novel, Kuumongo.

Guifeng Zongmi’s commentary as quoted in the Ogahae edition provides an answer that differs from both interpretations. It explains the six similes for the worldly dharmas of the sagugye—“like dream, illusion, bubbles, shadows, like dew and also like lightning”—in terms of a slightly different chain of similes found in the Bodhiruci trl. of the Diamond Sutra: “like stars, shadows, lamplight, illusion, dew, bubbles, dream, lightning, clouds”. Nine phenomena are enumerated here, including both dream and clouds (while the six similes feature only the dream). In the light of this passage, ummong may be nothing else than a pars pro toto for all nine phenomena of ephemerality, and Kuumong would mean, in essence, “the nine-fold vanity”. This is not to deny, of course, that the number nine also alludes to the nine main characters; indeed, I will propose still another textual reference for the title later which again stresses the love affairs. However, this resonance between commentary and title enhances the likelihood that the novel is indeed deeply tied to the Ogahae edition.

Her explanation, i.e. “the nine-fold vanity”, is convincing as to the novel’s message of “ephemerality”. Yet, what seems to be lacking, though, is a solid approach from the textual point of view. It is true that in Kuumong, the sutra is mentioned, above all in the most important and easily noticeable parts: at the beginning and at the end. However, Kim never mentioned—or rather we cannot yet prove it by any means—that he himself read the Kūmganggyông ogahae sŏrŭi or Kūmganggyông. In his Sŏp’o manp’il that has been used as the almost single primary source regarding his weltanschauung, there is no sentence that might be connected with the sutra and its commentary at all.

This is not to say that Kim would not have been aware of the Buddhist sutra. Religious influence on literature is not to be underrated. It is thus possible that Buddhism (and Taoism) had a lasting influence on him. One could also guess that this erudite Confucian had a direct encounter with Buddhism, an officially restricted religion at that time. The conventional explanations would provide a favourable opportunity to confirm his border-crossing spirit. However, the philological basis of the previous approaches does not seem to be substantial enough. The lack of further sources is a good excuse, as also can be seen by Bouchez (2006, 409):

This sheds some light on the meaning of the title: Yunmeng (K. Unmong) was a location in the Chu kingdom that appears frequently in this literature [Kuunmeng]. In Sima Xiangru’s [179–117 BCE] Fu of Zixu [“Zixu-fu”, Rhapsody of Sir Fantasy] it has even been linked with the number nine when one of the characters of this book derides the Chu envoy’s boasts about the wide hunting grounds in the Yunmeng area, saying that his own kingdom could easily swallow a kingdom eight or nine times the size of Yunmeng.4 In Chinese tradition, Sima Xiangru’s poems were reputed to satirize the emperor. However, there has been no documentary evidence attesting to the fact that Ku unmeng was ever intended, understood or, still less, used in that way. [Underlining is mine] More likely, to Kim Manjung, a person well aware of traditional interpretations, such literary parallels and allusions were just a means of pleasing himself by suggesting his feelings about the king’s [Sukchong?] behaviour.

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4 The passage from “saying” is inaccurate. The original passage with translation will be quoted later.
Regarding the context of the whole “Zixu-fu” and the opinions of premodern as well as modern commentators, the use of the motif could allude to meaningless boasting. Apart from the plausibility of his explanation, the lack of further sources is indeed a huge obstacle. Before discussing this and other problems, it will be helpful to examine another explanation. As shown above, Eggert (2001) also concentrated on the motif related to the Yunneng Marsh. Her more specific view is as follows:

King Huai of Ch’u [Chu] during the late Warring States period is said to have had there a blissful dream encounter with a fairy, the goddess of Witch Mountain (Wu-shan), and the poet [Song Yu] who is ordered to retell the story again dreams of the same fair lady, but is rejected by her. This is the most erotically charged literary motif from ancient China, but it allows only for mental, not for physical wish-fulfillment. Unmong therefore evokes a thoroughly Chinese, pre-Buddhist understanding of sexuality and desire as intrinsically mental, in other words: illusory in nature.

The Yunneng Marsh had been used as “the most erotically charged literary motif” in Chinese literary tradition. On the other hand, it had been also used as a satire on irresponsible rulers, as Bouchez attempted to argue. Furthermore, it is quite reasonable to assume that the Kuunmong’s author would have known about these motifs since “this story is based on two fu [“Gaotang-fu” and “Shennü-fu”] by Song Yu, both transmitted in the Wenxuan” (Eggert 2001), which found a wide circulation in Korea (Hô 1984). This also applies to “Zixu-fu” of Sima Xiangru.

Their achievement to explore an alternative to tracing the roots on the basis of a Sinitic literary tradition deserves special notice. In order to elaborate their ideas, it is indispensable to examine some weak points of their accounts. In general, they are still conceptualized within the author-centred framework like the conventional studies. In this framework we are only predestined to suffer from the lack of sources. Another problem is the huge time gap (almost two millennia) between the motifs and Kuunmong. It cannot be ruled out that the motifs related to the Yunneng Marsh would have been used in a different or transferred sense during the course of time.

To sum up, it is crucial to trace the uses of the motifs within a broader range of the Korean intellectual stratum up until the release of Kuunmong. A work’s title may be a kind of secret code or symbol that is expected to excite the readers’ curiosity. Therefore, it needs not necessarily be understood at the first glance. However, a title as such is what ought to be understood by readers, sooner or later; or at least what ought to give them the feeling that they have finally somehow understood it. For this, authors may tend to take an average or lower level of knowledge shared by contemporary readers into account. Then, they probably begin to grasp the meaning of the title by recalling all of the literary associations that they knew before beginning to read a novel as well as while and after reading.

4 TRACES OF KUUNMONG BEFORE KUUNMONG

The following traces are extracted from Han’guk munjip ch’onggan (HMC) of the Institute for the Translation of Korean Classics (ITKC). The corpus of HMC consists of 598 munjip works (vol. 1 to 288) covering from the 12th to the 19th century.

5 For instance, Watson (1971, 29–30) commented: “Surprisingly, the work ends with a passage in which the emperor is shown renouncing such pleasures, opening his parks and ponds to the use of the common people, and adopting a policy of frugality in government. Whether this last represents the real message of the poem, as Ssu-ma Ch’ien, who records the work in his biography of Ssu-ma Hsiang-ju, seems to have believed, or is merely a bow to didactic convention, the reader must decide for himself.”
Table 2: Search results for kuunmong

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>no.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Life</th>
<th>publ.</th>
<th>九雲夢</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Im Ch’un (HMC 1: 231)</td>
<td>12th century</td>
<td>1222, 1713</td>
<td>臨軒一望大千界，不言胸中九雲夢</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kwŏn P’il (HMC 19: 346)</td>
<td>1478–1548</td>
<td>1671</td>
<td>胸覩九雲夢，何用情長柱</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kim Inhu (HMC 33: 66)</td>
<td>1510–1560</td>
<td>1802</td>
<td>異日金鸞殿上人，九雲夢香心胸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sim Hăisu (HMC 57: 225)</td>
<td>1548–1622</td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>增益胸襟九雲夢，重逢刮目對珪璋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Sŏng Munjun (HMC 64: 64)</td>
<td>1559–1626</td>
<td>1682</td>
<td>特吾九雲夢中一物耳又何必見竹之形</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yi Ch’unyŏng (HMC 66: 439)</td>
<td>1563–1606</td>
<td>1648</td>
<td>臨瀚海而望胡天胸中不言吞九雲夢矣</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kwŏn P’il (HMC 75: 5)</td>
<td>1569–1612</td>
<td>1632, 1742</td>
<td>緑耳生赤瀾，胸次九雲夢</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sin Minil (HMC 84: 8)</td>
<td>1576–1650</td>
<td>1720</td>
<td>胸襟吞吐九雲夢，尊酒流連動十日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hwang Chonghae (HMC 84: 436)</td>
<td>1579–1642</td>
<td>1713</td>
<td>度量雄偉莫敢窺，九雲夢渾渾無邊</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>O Suk (HMC 95: 78)</td>
<td>1592–1634</td>
<td>1646</td>
<td>楚客休誇九雲夢，今吾縱目隘寰區</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Yi Kyŏngsŏk (HMC 95: 405)</td>
<td>1595–1671</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>胸吞九雲夢，曾不足芥蒂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yu Kye (HMC 117: 31)</td>
<td>1607–1644</td>
<td>1690, 1805</td>
<td>平生九雲夢，於此愧零星</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Pak Changwŏn (HMC 121: 15)</td>
<td>1612–1671</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>胸襟九雲夢，身事一匡床</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ch’oe Sŏch’ŏng (HMC 153: 434)</td>
<td>1646–1715</td>
<td>1721</td>
<td>胸裏橫吞九雲夢，筆端還有一江山</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sŏ Chong’a’ae (HMC 163: 233)</td>
<td>1652–1719</td>
<td>18th century</td>
<td>九雲夢曾不芥蒂者或之不足論也</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Kwŏn Tugyŏng (HMC 169: 120)</td>
<td>1654–1725</td>
<td>19th century</td>
<td>城西九雲夢，萬象赴層麾</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Yi Kwanmyŏng (HMC 177: 166)</td>
<td>1661–1733</td>
<td>18th century</td>
<td>之人也箇是氣於九雲夢之中間以出之</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Yi Ühyŏng (HMC 180: 376)</td>
<td>1669–1745</td>
<td>1766</td>
<td>八九雲夢不足言，風生兩腋欲翻翻</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clearly visible that many of them are finally to be traced back to “Zixu-fu”. The passage, which Bouchez mentioned as well, reads:

香若雲夢者八九，於其胸中曾不芥芥。
Qi could swallow eight or nine parks like Yunmeng,
And they would not even be a splinter or straw in its throat [rather: ‘in its breast’ or ‘on its mind’; ‘in its heart’s middle’ or ‘in its inner heart’]. (Knechtges 1987, 69–71)

The same and similar expressions had been used so often and meaningfully that one of those, i.e. *t’an unmong p’al ku* 香雲夢八九 (swallowing Yunmeng eight or nine [times]),
has been finally lexicalized as an idiom that refers to an “extremely wide inner heart” (this is a subentry of yunmeng in Dai Kan–Wa jiten).

Back to the table: the putative change of ku’s place from the end to the front of unmong and the unmistakably strong collocation of the three characters give us an opportunity to observe these uses as factually constituting an expression, or even a leitmotif. P’al can still be observed within the four results (numbers 3, 6, 17, 18). However, there are almost no cases of p’al-un-mong or un-mong-p’al in the whole ITKC. This means that unmong and p’al only have an extremely weak collocation and only in connection with ‘the term’ ku. As a result of this, it is safe to say that most of those authors and their acquaintances and followers (i.e. the possible readers of Kuunmong in Hanmun) knew about the locus classicus of all those expressions and preferred kuunmong (14 cases) as a condensed form or a word to all other expressions derived from “Zixu-fu”. This was even more than combination un-mong-ku (7 cases) with the same length of three characters (Table 3 and 4 below).

| Table 3: Search results for the expressions related to the passage from “Zixu-fu” |
|-----------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 香若雲夢者八九 | 香若雲夢者八九 | 香夢者八九 | 香雲夢八九 | 雲夢八九 |
| 0           | 4      | 0      | 5      | 5      |

| Table 4: Search results for the combinations without p’al |
|----------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 香若雲夢者九 | 香雲夢者九 | 香夢者九 | 香雲夢九 | 雲夢九 |
| 0           | 1      | 0      | 2      | 7      |

Now, the emphasis shifts to the form. The listed passages in Table 2 are mainly from verses. With this in mind, the kuunmong in those examples is still to be regarded as a sort of stopgap that the rhyme system may have forced the authors to use. Whether this is the main reason for using the compacted form or not, it is crucial, in order to put final emphasis on the assumption that kuunmong was used as an expression, to recall the fact that the compacted inversion has also been used in prose texts four times (numbers 5, 6, 15, 17). They, as such, obviously do not have such strict rhyme rules. Furthermore, there are two further prose passages (see below) from outside the corpus of HMC. The examination provides some useful indications of a much wider circulation of kuunmong.

At this point, it is safe to assume that all readers who were exposed to the passages listed above would have probably perceived a certain association and had certain expectations when they saw the title Kuunmong for the first time. Discussing this association, which might also have a particular influence on their reading and appreciating the novel, will be the main task in the next section.

5 Core meanings of kuunmong

Due to the limitations, only three representative cases from Table 2 can be examined, and then the aforementioned passages from other corpora.

Yu Kye (no. 12) once considered his “kuunmong (or ‘aspiration’) of the whole life as disgraceful trifles, finding himself facing [an expanse of sea]”, probably in exile around 1651 at the age of 45.6

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6 He was banished to Yŏngwŏl in Kangwŏn-do. Naksansa (temple) that the verse’s title “Naksa Tongdae mang yang” refers to is also located in this province. He was once mentioned in Sŏp’o yŏnbo (1992: 30). Yu Kye was a disciple of Kim Changsaeng (Kim Manjung’s great-grandfather) as well.
The passage from Sim Hūisu (no. 4) illustrates a quite different mood. In 1617, he gave a farewell poem to one of his younger colleagues who was about to make a journey on a congratulatory mission to the Ming court as its Secretary. He encouraged the envoy “to more expand the inner heart’s kuanmong (or ‘magnanimity and ambition’)” while staying in China and “eagerly expected [him] to have become an outstanding personality at the next reunion”.

The next example (no. 15) comes from an afterword written by Sô Chongt’ae to a verse collection of his younger colleague Yi Hŭijo (1655–1724) and Yi’s brother. In a passage, after praising their ability to depict tremendous—so terribly tremendous that ordinary poets would not dare to—sights of nature in verses, he cites two anecdotes together to advise them what to be cautious about. One is from Mengzi (“Jin xin shang”), which of course nearly every student of the time should have read; moreover, it is an anecdote about Confucius. The other is surprisingly from “Zixu-fu”.

昔吾夫子豈不嘗登岱嶽小天下哉而如九雲夢曾不芥滯者卑之不足論也
In olden times, our Kongzi, how would he not have ascended the Daiyue [or ‘great mountain’] and considered the world to be tiny? But such a thing as the phrase ‘kuanmong, even not getting stopped as if’ by a straw’, [I] despise it [and it] is not worthy of discussing.

On the one hand, this example, as one of few examples, illustrates a possible negative image of kuanmong and a negative evaluation of this manner of boasting. On the other hand, it indicates something about the author’s and his acquaintances’ familiarity with the idiom. For the purposes of this paper, the latter is of primary importance.

Kuanmong was used not only in private texts like all the above but also in official texts or state matters (e.g. Chosŏn wangjo sillok, Sŏnjo, k. 138, 34th year [1601], 6th month, 20th day, 2nd entry). King Sŏnjo tried to persuade his Chief State Councillor to remain in office with praising words as follows:

惟卿碩德，實予薦臣；清標如十丈薊，迥出塵埃；沖襟吞九雲夢，浩無津涯。
You my minister, a man of eminent virtue, are truly a loyal retainer. [Your] integrity is, like a ten chang tall lotus, goes far beyond [this] mundane world; [your] open-minded heart [is, as if] swallowing kuanmong, endlessly vast.

A well-versed Korean, Hong Ilkhan (1586–1637), once used kuanmong even in a (brush) conversation with a likewise erudite Chinese who knew, of course, the expression—to be correct: the Chinese was, in the former’s view, expected to comprehend it. The mission’s secretary on a 1624 congratulatory mission to the Ming court described his sincere aspiration or desire or restless heart to experience more from China—to be precise: everything that he had read and heard from and about the Sinospheric centre at first hand. He used the idea of kuanmong in an imposing way when he was asked by a Chinese licentiate as to why he had been riding on horseback on the journey, instead of in a comfortable palanquin. The last example (Hwap’o sŏnsaeng choch’on hanghaerok, k. 1, 9th month, 19th day) of this study reads:

且余豈若小婦人然哉 深車載帷 縛束我形骸 掩闕我心眼 宜以長鞭快馬
隨意縱騁 或穿過名園花竹 或登臨勝地樓臺 或承傳古先遺風 以寬了九雲夢胸襟
不亦可乎

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7 Perhaps, in a similar way that Bouchez attempted to illustrate
In addition, how could I [behave] like a little woman? Deep in a wagon, [behind] the drawn curtain, as if I restrained my body [and] covered up my mind’s eye. Of course, [I] should speed on horseback with a long whip, freely, at will, releasing the reins (or following my goal). Perhaps passing by flowers and bamboos in famous gardens, perhaps ascending towers in scenic places, perhaps deeply seeking remained customs [handed down from] the old generations, [I will] have broadened [my] kuunmong’s (or kuunmong-like) inner heart. Isn’t [it] also correct?

Regarding all the examples examined in this study, it is to be suggested that ku is no longer a mere number that could be replaced with any other number. It is true that it is still a number that can be located in front of unmong (18 cases in Table 2, and 2 cases in the last two quotations) or behind (9 cases in Table 4), but the number is a stable and inseparable component of the expressions derived from Sima Xiangru’s “Zixu-fu”. Finally, it can be assumed that as a whole, ku and unmong build such a strong collocation that kuunmong can be regarded as a proverbial expression. Regardless of what every single erudite reader in the seventeenth and the following centuries may have wanted to receive or expected to obtain from the novel Kuunmong, they would have been exposed the expression’s core meaning—the intersection of all the meanings examined above—and its associations. This can be summarized as follows.

*Kuunmong*: an inverted abbreviation of t’an unmong p’al ku and other similar expressions which usually mean ‘immensity’. Depending upon context and person using it, its idiomatic use also refers to ‘magnanimity’, ‘ambition’, ‘aspirations’, ‘desire’ etc. on the highest level, respectively; even ‘vanity’ or ‘ephemerality’, when used ironically.

The title of the Kim’s novel could be, as Bouchez suggested, understood as KuUnmong, or as others prefer: Kuun Mong. This study’s corpus-philological approach inspired by reader-response criticism provides one more option to perceive the title as being an open allusion to kuunmong. This result also sheds light on the old interpretation that has been lost in the last few centuries. Accordingly, the title can be understood as Kuunmong. Such subtitles as *The Highest Immensity* or *The Innermost Desire* or simply *The Desideratum* or anything else that the summary above suggests can be considered in order to assist present-day readers in appreciating the novel.

**6 CONCLUSION**

As for the scope of Kuunmong studies, it is to be hoped that the outcome of the present paper will contribute to a re-reading of the novel, e.g., as a literary expression of a fulfilment of the author’s desires, which has recently been attempted by several studies (Kang 1999, Yi 2002, Yu 2007). Moreover, this kind of research will be a step towards a richer and more inclusive understanding of Kim’s thought and works.

This paper concludes by addressing aspects raised by the methods applied above. The comprehensive examination of the previous studies on Kuunmong, which is being done in the scope of my dissertation project, brings out some fundamental problems in their basic concepts and methods. As indicated in the introduction, one of the major problems is that there has been a definite bias in favour of constructing a pure Korean literary tradition. For the sake of ostentatious display of an imagined or desired history of national literature placed at the top of the academic agenda, the majority of researchers have tried to weave a continuous thread from past to present. For this purpose, they have concentrated on a few extraordinary individuals such as Kim, by focusing on their genuine Koreanness and their outstanding achievements. Regarding a much broader range of the intellectual stratum in premodern Korea, the works of authors such as Kim Manjung seem, in my view, to represent unique appearances rather than the average mainstream of
Korean intellectual history. In order to take a first step towards filling this gap and providing an alternative framework to overcome the nationalistic tendencies in Korean scholarship, this study has adopted the two approaches that are already established in neighbouring disciplines.

One is reader-response criticism. Inspired by this, the present study has adopted the idea that the novel *Kuunmong* may have been a product of the zeitgeist as well as the single author, i.e. a product that also reflects what he shared with his contemporaries, or rather what they shared with the author. This concept allows an opportunity to pay more attention to the readership and to emphasize the necessity of a comprehensive approach to the intellectual stratum. This approach is certainly not considered to be innovative anymore. However, in the scope of the research field of Korean premodern literature (and other fields with similar traits), it is a very challenging approach, as demonstrated in this study, not because the technique is new, but because ideological constraints have led to a deliberate neglect of this approach.

The other one is corpus philology. These are nothing but the standard tools of a modern philologist: searching, extracting, sorting, indexing, calculating, and evaluating etc. This common approach which is borrowed from corpus linguistics and conceptualized here has been adopted on its most primitive (in comparison to the linguistic studies with their elaborated methods) level and relies on a rather unbalanced corpus. For instance, the *munjip* corpus of HMC is merely a corpus, an incomplete one—although the most extensive one available. Furthermore, this only reflects a fraction of the intellectual scene: overproportionately on Confucian side. It means that the representativity and the balance of the corpus are quite questionable.

In this regard, there are a number of problems that remain to be solved. Besides extending the number of corpora from various sources, it is mainly a matter of developing usable annotated corpora out of the existing raw databases and providing advanced and refined search methods. Of course, all this cannot be done in the foreseeable future. With this in mind, it is still difficult to gain new insights relying solely on these approach methods. However, as demonstrated in this paper, even with primitive methods and the corpus full of shortcomings, it can be effectively applied to provide a considerable number of counterexamples against the conventional and questionable theses. Thus, the present study that profits greatly from the corpus-based systematic approach will probably not remain an isolate case. This kind of corpus-philological approach will be of crucial importance for the premodern texts that contain traditional ideas. This is especially true for those written in Hanmun, which are almost not produced anymore and for which our intuitive and empirical knowledge is thus very limited.

**REFERENCES**


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The Humanitarian’s Dilemma: The experience of international NGOs in North Korea.

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ABSTRACT

Until the drastic reduction in the flow of international aid precipitated by US sanctions in 2005, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) conducted significant operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK solicited assistance from the international community in 1995, after a major flood and subsequent chronic food shortage. Over subsequent years the country became increasingly dependant on international assistance. Given this dependence on foreign aid by one of the world’s most isolated, repressive and potentially dangerous regimes and the recent withdrawal of many aid agencies, it is timely to examine the impact of INGO operations, not only in humanitarian terms but with regards to economic, political and social development. After discussion of the various theories relating to the role of INGOs in economic, social and political development, including their potential to promote democratisation, the paper examines the impact of the activities of international aid organisations participating directly or indirectly in the provision of humanitarian aid, assistance or development in the DPRK. Based on the findings of 10 semi-structured telephone interviews with relevant INGO personnel, INGO documents and other economic and social data, the paper examines the impact of INGOs on three key areas: Humanitarian objectives, economic development and political/social development.

Until the drastic reduction in the flow of international aid precipitated by US sanctions in 2005, International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) conducted significant operations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The DPRK solicited assistance from the international community in 1995, after a major flood and subsequent chronic food shortage. Over subsequent years the country became increasingly dependant on international assistance. By 2001, North Korea received more food aid from the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and US government than any other country. Similarly, private relief aid to North Korea significantly increased, with approximately 130 organisations worldwide providing over US$1.66 billion in aid between 1995 and 2000. Given this dependence on foreign aid by one of the world’s most isolated, repressive and potentially dangerous regimes and the recent withdrawal of many aid agencies, it is timely to examine the impact of INGO operations, not only in humanitarian terms but with regards to economic, political and social development.

After discussion of the various theories relating to the role of INGOs in economic, social and political development, including their potential to promote democratisation, the paper examines the impact of the activities of international aid organisations participating directly or indirectly in the provision of humanitarian aid, assistance or development in the DPRK. Based on the findings of 10 semi-structured telephone interviews with relevant INGO personnel, INGO documents and other economic and social data, the paper

1 We would like to acknowledge Professor John Casey for his valuable input for the draft of this paper.
examines the impact of INGOs on three key areas: Humanitarian objectives, economic development and political/ social development.

In summary, INGO representatives reported that the impact of their work in the DPRK was mixed. Some INGO representatives said that they had some success in meeting their humanitarian objectives, in particular in alleviating food shortages in targeted areas. Some respondents said that they felt they had made progress in the delivery of programs to develop the North Korean economy. These same organisations also reported that the aid provided to the DPRK served another purpose – that is that it gave North Koreans a sense that the global community cares and that they are connected to this community. Other aid and development agencies, however, were not confident that their programs were successful. Some interviewees said that through contact with North Korean refugees in China they discovered that the most vulnerable in the population never saw any aid, while others said they believe that aid was diverted to the political elite or the army. All the INGOs interviewed described the extraordinary lengths the North Korean regime went to ensure that the populace was not “contaminated” through contact with aid staff, noting how the degree of government control placed real limits on where and when INGO representatives could travel, what type of activities they could pursue and with whom they could interact. There were mixed reports regarding the implementation of monitoring devices such as morbidity tracking, nutritional surveys, market surveys and price surveys. Finally, all respondents agreed that the presence of INGOs to date has not had any discernable impact on political or social structures.

These findings do not preclude INGOs assuming a greater role in “civil society” building in the future but given the ongoing humanitarian crisis and that many INGOs are questioning whether recent programs have done more harm than good, is it worth considering a change of approach? The outcome of current US sanctions notwithstanding, it appears that many agencies would seriously re-consider re-entering North Korea unless certain monitoring and access conditions are met. So, should INGOs make aid to the DPRK conditional? If so, should conditions go beyond access to those that allow implementation of more complex and longer term programs directed at economic and social development? What would be the political implications of such a change in the approach? Indeed would such a shift be possible? Even then, INGOs are more likely to become a force for liberalisation not democratisation, by giving momentum to economic change. How then, can INGOs fulfil this potential role?

**THE ROLE OF NGOs IN FOSTERING REGIME CHANGE**

**Theories about the role of NGOs in fostering regime change**

Much of the INGO-related literature in the 1980s and 1990s focuses on those INGOs active in the Third World, seeing them as ‘apolitical’ development organisations often engaged in micro-level programs such as the delivery of services. This literature has tended to evaluate the role of INGOs with regard to their potential to alleviate poverty or promote economic development and studies their approach to technical development practices such as health provision or rural development (Thomas 1987; Cerna 1988; Wellard and Copestake 1993).

Interpretations of the role of NGOs in regime transition can be broken down into three interrelated areas: economic, political and social.

The economic role centres on the links and the dynamic interactions between the processes of democratisation and economic transformation. It is generally believed that economic reform produces new interests which demand political voice and political
expression and demands for institutionalisation and democratisation. Voluntary associations, NGOs, religious organisations and other civic groups are key providers of services where states and markets are weak, and, in theory, nurture the social values, networks and institutions that underpin successful market economies (including trust and cooperation). The development of market relations creates conditions conducive to the activation of civil society and/or a withering away of an authoritarian regime because, as Huntington maintains, economic changes “extend political consciousness, multiply political demands, and broaden political participation.” (Huntington 1968). Thus, economic reforms are expected to make a society more pluralistic and stimulate the people to increase their awareness of civil rights and consciousness of their legitimate demands. As people become less tolerant of repressive regimes, the regime is pressured to foster liberalised changes and tolerate some demands of civil society. Furthermore, as observed by Eisinger, who adopted Alexis de Tocqueville’s paradox in his concept of political opportunity structure, people revolt, not when things are worst but when closed opportunities have begun to open up (Eisinger, 1973).

In the political role, voluntary associations are seen as a crucial counterweight to states and corporate power, and an essential pillar in promoting transparency, accountability and ‘good governance’. It provides channels for voice, debate and decision-making, and strengthens skills as future political leaders. (Lipset; Diamond et al 1990).

The social role views NGOs as a form for ‘humanizing capitalism’ by promoting accountability among corporations, respect for labour rights and new experiments in ‘social economics’ that combine market efficiency with cooperative values. The social role nurtures a caring, cultural life, positive social norms that foster stability and skills of citizenship (often under the heading of ‘social capital’) (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Woolcock 1998).

The role of international NGOs as potential builders of civil society.

Despite a focus on indigenous NGOs, much of the literature on regime transition also acknowledges that international organisations can be important, if not central players, in regime change. Laurence Whitehead argues that “Two-thirds of the democracies existing in 1990 owed their origins to deliberate acts of imposition or intervention from without...It is not contiguity but the policy of a third power that explains the spread of democracy from one country to the next” (1996: 9). In addition to the economic impact of developmental programs (which possibly leads to economic liberalisation and eventually democratisation as discussed above), this literature argues that INGOs can support internal change in other ways.

In a recent article, Sreeram Chaulia argues that INGOs can act as vehicles through which superpower foreign policy interests can initiate and shape regime transitions. Citing the recent revolutions in the Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, Chaulia argues that they are not authentic democratic uprisings supported by local NGOs but were largely brought into being by organisations substantially backed and led by the US. He refers to several international agencies such as Freedom House as having a history of being headed and staffed by ex-CIA high-level planners and personnel and argued that these personnel were instrumental in defining these agencies’ role in shaping the course of regime change (Chaulia 2005). Another area of scholarship focuses on the role the European Union has and can continue to play in contributing to democratisation in Europe (Pridham 1994). In terms of types of INGOs, some scholars regard western economic aid agencies and the Catholic Church as “catalysts of democratisation” in the post-communist world (Weigel 2003). Others focus on human rights INGOs and how they can establish and spread
international human rights norms which can then trigger fundamental political changes leading to the demise of communism (Hyde-Price 1994, 2000).

In this literature it is argued INGOs can provide information / access to the outside world thus challenging regime interpretations of the outside. In the case of the DPRK, this information could show that, contrary to DPRK propaganda, the international community cares about the plight of the North Korean people.

INGOs can also provide anti-regime forces moral support. Democratisation theorists have argued that through denouncing the repression of domestic groups, international groups may force the regime to consider some of the costs such repression may have for the country’s international reputation while giving these groups a sense that they are not isolated completely. In South Korea, organisations such as Amnesty International and Asia Watch generated international sympathy for the pro-democracy movement through their documentation and publication of the authoritarian regime’s violation of human rights. Similarly, in South Africa, INGOs are credited as playing a prominent role in building widespread international intolerance of apartheid and eventually shaming the South African government into officially repealing apartheid laws and drafting a new constitution.

Once regime transition has gathered momentum, Anne Hudock (1999) describes more direct material and logistical support activities open to INGOs interested in regime change. These include INGO provision, directly or indirectly, of medicine, food, funds, currency and fuel and means of transportation or communication to anti-regime movements; and more radically, acting as a cover for arms shipments.

However, many question whether INGOs have succeeded in civil-society capacity building. Citing a range of evidence, Hudock points out that international support for Southern NGOs tends to empower donors and international agencies not the other way around. (Interestingly this theme can also be found in the 1980s literature on developmental NGOs cited earlier. See in particular Thomas 1987). They are various characteristics that set the NGOs of Southern and western/developed nations apart. For example: In developed countries NGOs are internally funded, while in developing countries they are externally funded and so open to foreign influence/interference (or at least to such criticisms). In developing countries NGOs are seen as supporting democratic process, in developing they are occasionally accused of undermining state institutions.

Hudock argues that while international resources being ploughed into capacity-building of Southern NGOs may increase their numbers and influence, the building up of the NGO sector does not necessarily give voice to the poor and marginalised in these societies. According to Hudock international funding for Southern NGOs creates two main problems:

Firstly, the funding of projects tends to involve these NGOs in a lot of bureaucratic and administrative tasks, in both applying for funding and in the monitoring and accounting for expenditures, drawing resources away from 'front-line' work. Secondly, in order to meet donor targets, Southern NGOs will seek to work with groups and individuals where positive results are easiest to achieve, for example, those with easy access, organisation skills and easily attainable goals (Hudock 1999: 120).

Related to this, it is worth noting the imbalance that exists in the numbers, capacity to influence and resources between NGOs from industrialised and developing countries. For example, countries from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be unrepresented in transnational NGO networks (Florini and Simmons 2000).
The North Korean famine and INGO operations

The cumulative and interrelated effects of the sudden demise of Soviet aid, the collapse of the socialist world market, structural problems of the command economy, and the droughts and floods of the 1990s resulted in the North Korean economy contracting by about 30% in the period 1991-1996.

Economic decline coincided with a widespread and devastating famine. Food shortages have been relatively common in recent times, but it was not until a major flood in 1995 that the DPRK acknowledged a widespread food crisis. Since that time, it is estimated that between one and two million people have died from famine-related causes. Evidence suggests that children have been the most deeply affected section of the population. According to a joint Food and Agriculture (FOA) and World Food Programme (WFP) 2002 report, North Korea has one of the highest rates of acute malnutrition in the world with 42% of children found to be chronically malnourished (stunted) (FAO and WFP 2002).

In response to the chronic food shortages and severe flooding, in 1995 the DPRK solicited assistance from the international community. Since that time the country has become increasingly dependant on this assistance. By 2001, the DPRK received more food aid from the UN WFP and US government than any other country. Reporting on US aid contributions (which totaled $1.1 billion by 2004) for the US Congress, Analyst in the Congressional Research Service, Mark Manyin notes that about 60% of US-sourced assistance took the form of food aid, and about 40% the form of energy assistance channeled through the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) (Manyin 2005). Similarly, private relief aid to the DPRK has steadily and significantly increased. Between 1995 and 2000, total international aid provided to the country amounted to US$1.66 billion (Flake & Snyder 2003).

The support that the international community extended to the DPRK in the period 1995-2000 concentrated mostly on alleviating the food shortage and on medical treatment and hygiene. Approximately 130 organisations worldwide, including nearly a dozen larger INGOs, participated in the humanitarian response to the DPRK food crisis at some point during the humanitarian response effort. Some of the larger INGOs involved include Oxfam, the Red Cross, Caritas International (the relief agency of the Roman Catholic Church), Medicines sans Frontiers, Action Contre la Faim, and World Vision US.

It is also important to note that there are many South Korean civic groups (and some Japanese groups) active in the DPRK and along the Sino-Korean border (Manwoo Lee 1994, 185). Many of these organisations are aligned to either Christian or Buddhist organisations and the majority tend to focus on providing assistance to North Korean refugees. Among these organisations are: the Citizen's Alliance for North Korean Human Rights; Citizens’ Alliance to Help Political Prisoners in North Korea; RENK (Rescue the North Korean People! Urgent Action Network); the Buddhist group Good Friends; the North Korea Freedom Coalition; Mintongryun (the United People’s Movement for Democracy and Unification) - a national coalition of workers, youth, farmers, students, religious groups, writers and journalists; the Eugenbell Foundation; Pommimnyon, the Pan-National Alliance for the Reunification of Korea.

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2 Figures for mortality rates during the famine vary widely in different research. Andrew Natsios, former vice-president of World Vision US and current head of US Aid, weighs up different evidence to support the argument that the famine is likely to have cost at least 2.5 million lives. Natsios (2001: 201-5).

3 Note that over 90% of U.S. food assistance to Pyongyang has been channelled through the UN World Food Program (WFP), which has sent over 3.6 million metric tons (MT) of food to the DPRK since 1996.
Changes in the Humanitarian Situation in 2004

Since the DPRK nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when the DPRK reportedly admitted that it has a secret uranium enrichment nuclear program, the dollar amount of US aid has fallen by an order of magnitude. No US funds have been provided to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization for energy costs since early 2003, and the Bush Administration’s position is that it would like to permanently end the KEDO program. US food aid also has fallen considerably in recent years. Now South Korea and China are the DPRK’s two most important providers of food. These countries send almost all of their aid directly to the DPRK with virtually no monitoring (Manyin 2005).

Relations with the North government and INGOs have also changed substantially in recent times. US sanctions makes it very difficult to source supplies from the US without a range approvals (other wise it is trading with the enemy). On 15 September 2004, the North Korean agency liaising with INGOs since 1995, the DPRK’s Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee (FDRC) announced that from now on the presence of international NGO would be scaled down. By the end of August 2004, the international staff presence was 63 at UN agencies, 14 for International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and a 46 at 10 other smaller INGOs: ADRA (Switzerland), Campus fuer Christus (Switzerland), CESVI (Italy), Concern Worldwide (Ireland), Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (Germany), Handicap International (Belgium), PUM Interlife (Sweden), Premiere Urgence (France), Triangle GH (France), and Save the Children (UK).

Table 1: US Assistance to North Korea, 1995-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar or Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Food Aid (per FY)</th>
<th>KEDO Assistance (per calendar yr; $ million)</th>
<th>Medical Supplies (per FY; $ million)</th>
<th>Total ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Metric Tons</td>
<td>Commodity Value ($ million)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$9.5</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>19,500</td>
<td>$8.3</td>
<td>$22.0</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>177,000</td>
<td>$52.4</td>
<td>$25.0</td>
<td>$5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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<td>$50.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>695,194</td>
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<td>265,000</td>
<td>$74.3</td>
<td>$64.4</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>350,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>40,200</td>
<td>$25.5</td>
<td>$3.7</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>$55.1</td>
<td>$0.0</td>
<td>$0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,063,894</td>
<td>$695.8</td>
<td>$405.1</td>
<td>$5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Figures for food aid and medical supplies from USAID and US Department of Agriculture; KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) figures from KEDO. Cited in Manyin (2005)

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4 Although some INGOs noted that sourcing from US has always posed challenges. “The US Govt is not deliberately obstructive but heavily bureaucratic – it is a licensing problem I would imagine if we were purchasing and shipping from the US we would be spending an enormous amount of time waiting for approval for licences and that puts a time lag on anything.” Stephen Linton, Eugen Bell.
PART II: THE IMPACT OF INGOs:
REALISING HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES AND EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Realising humanitarian objectives

All INGOs interviewed for this study emphasised how the relief of human suffering remained the principle goal of their operations, although the focus of some programs, such as the Red Cross, moved from emergency relief to longer-term health programmes, disaster preparedness and response and capacity building programmes to bridge the gap between relief and development.

While it is not possible to establish a clear link between aid and any changes in the welfare of the North Korean people, particularly in the absence of rigorous monitoring, the latest nutrition figures suggest some improvement. A nutritional survey carried out in October 2004 by the Central Bureau of Statistics and North Korea's Institute of Child Nutrition (ICN), with the assistance of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) found that malnutrition among children in the DPRK declined between 2002 and 2004. This is evidenced by lower rates of stunting and wasting. However, proportions of stunted and underweight children, at 37% and 23% respectively, remain “high”, according to World Health Organisation criteria. Moreover, the assessment found that the nutritional status of mothers has not improved, with almost one in three women with young children remaining malnourished and anaemic (UNICEF 2005: 72).

In terms of realising humanitarian goals, interview responses and various INGO documents show that some agencies believed they were successful, some believed they weren’t, while most admitted they couldn’t tell for sure and others added that it didn’t matter.

Some INGO representatives said that they witnessed improvements in the health of those reached by feeding programs, particularly young children. In 2004, in an interview in the Washington Post, UN Humanitarian Coordinator in DPRK, Masood Hyder says that now is not the moment for the international community to give up on aid to North Korea, just when cautious changes are gradually emerging.

We did not fail. Lives were saved; we are helping turn the situation around. The malnutrition, stunting and maternal mortality rates, while still high, have fallen. Above all, we have established preventive capacity: Another famine cannot happen while we are here and properly supported. Washington Post, 4 January 2004.

In this interview Hyder also responded to allegations that WFP assistance is diverted to the North Korean military. He said “While we cannot guarantee that every sack of grain goes where it should, there are good reasons to believe -- foremost among them the impressive results of last year's nutritional survey -- that the great bulk of it does” (Hyder 2004).

The responses of our interviewees and evidence suggest that the humanitarian inspired efforts have not completely failed. In a CARITAS document prepared for an emergence appeal it said that: “So far Caritas feels confident that most of the aid is reaching the right people and no major aid diversion has been discovered. Although some

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5There are many other possible factors influencing changes in nutritional status include ongoing support from China and South Korea. Also, according to the WFP has said that North Korea’s domestic food production particularly has stabilized.
CARTIAS workers mentioned that some donated food etc will end up in markets ...but with a market economy developing, chances that food and non-food donations are sold or bartered increase.” (CARITAS 2006)

Other groups seriously doubted whether aid reached the right groups of people. According to Marine Buissonniere, Secretary General, Medecins Sans Frontieres:

Within North Korea you don’t reach the disadvantaged... I talked to refugees [in Seoul] and I explained to them that from this period to this period so much aid went into your country and they laughed their heads off. They said ‘do you think we saw any of that?’ ...When they managed to hear the international news - by listening to a South Korean radio or whatever on the border – they thought that the West was lying. They thought that the international community probably never sent the amount they claimed. (Buissonniere 2005)

An Action Contre la Faim report titled “The inadequacies of Food Aid in North Korea” released in 2000 questioned the agency’s success in reaching the needy:

It is very unlikely that food aid in North Korea reaches the most vulnerable people. The total amount of food aid in ’99 covered a major part of the estimated food deficit. Unfortunately, reports from North-Korean refugees in China underline that some people are still starving to death in North Korea. As in other countries, a famine is not necessarily due to the fact that there is not enough food but that the food is not reaching some parts of the population. One of the main weaknesses of food aid in North Korea is that it is distributed through channels completely controlled by the regime and mainly targets institutions, especially children institutions. But the most vulnerable children are not in these institutions.

The Action Contre la Faim report also expressed concern over North Korean government reports on the agency’s recipients “The number of beneficiaries on the ’98 list was undoubtedly inflated. It may mean that Action Contre la Faim distributed aid to nearly 50,000 non-existent beneficiaries. Where did the aid go? What did the authorities do with the “surplus”? We do not have any answers to these questions.”

The report concludes that food aid was “distributed in a selective way, to an inflated number of beneficiaries and without any effective control” and that, in reality, “no agency working in North Korea can confirm that the food aid is actually reaching the final beneficiaries and is not diverted. It is virtually impossible to prove that part of the aid is diverted but it is also impossible to prove that all the aid is reaching the intended beneficiaries” (Action Contre la Faim 2000)

At virtually every point, the North Korean government has placed roadblocks in the way of the donor community, and more than 10 years into this process, the relief effort remains woefully below international standards in terms of transparency and effectiveness. Up to half of aid deliveries do not reach their intended recipients (Haggard and Noland 2005)

**Progress in the delivery of programs to develop the North Korean economy**

Many of the agencies interviewed attempted to incorporate some form of development or rehabilitation into their humanitarian programs. For example, since North Korean authorities have allowed some free market activities, some INGOS and UN agencies have financed a smallholder credit scheme. INGOs have also attempted to introduce new seed varieties and double cropping. Kathi Zellweger of Caritas-Hong Kong described a number of development oriented programs initiated by Caritas:

We provide new farming equipment and as this needs maintenance and repairs and we are in the process of establishing a workshop to train farm mechanics and tractor drivers. We provide new inputs for fish farms combined with expertise and training programs….Instead
of importing from China, CARITAS has supported the production of clothing locally, thus providing job opportunities and exposing the factory management to international practices as well as saving on international transport costs for our donations. We also collaborate with The Korean Association for Supporting the Disabled (KASD)– a semi-governmental organisation in North Korea. Important components of our collaboration are assistance for KASDs office set-ups, supporting the production of training materials and organizing exposure and study tours to China (Zellweger 2005).

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has also invested in industries such as sericulture (silk worm farming), weaving and textile mills and also in a range of small cooperatives producing clothing and soft toys and the like (UNIFEM 1994). An International Fund For Agriculture Development (IFAD) report notes how women have built on skills acquired in their traditional role as managers of household finances to increasingly take charge of a variety of credit-financed household income earning activities. In response, IFAD developed household-oriented credit services to support these “off-farm activities” with about 60% of loans going to female headed households. A recent IFAD report notes how loan recovery is near 100 percent and that the female recipients of loans have demonstrated considerable acumen in their development of relatively complex and financially successful sideline businesses. (International Fund For Agriculture Development 2001).

Conditions on the ground: the degree of government control on INGO operations

In some cases INGOs and the UN agencies with which they collaborated have enjoyed increased access to the groups they assisted. For example, the World Food Program was able to open four satellite offices throughout the country. For the most part, however, working conditions in North Korea remained difficult for INGOs.

Marine Buissonriere of MSF described the “continuous obstruction” by the authorities affecting “how we could work, where we could go, whenever we were asking something that they considered out of the scope of what would be allowed.”

According to a Caritas report planning field visits was a continual challenge. “Travel plans need to be submitted at least a week in advance, although from Caritas’ experience, some flexibility can usually be negotiated at county level” (Caritas 2006)

One significant hurdle was the inability to deploy Korean speaking aid workers. Marine Buissonniere said that “basically – we had no ability to choose our own translator and our North Korean guides were present all the time.” She added that this had a range of ramifications for MSF’ humanitarian work. In particular, it undermined the building of relationships with locals.

Contact with the population very strictly controlled…Being in direct contact with patients, in itself, was a challenge. Because of some very….you had to go through government-appointed translators, you couldn’t have your own. The number of translators was limited in the first place, as the number of questions which are related to health history of a family, etc which a normal doctor would ask, but you couldn’t ask in a NK context because you were not allowed to. It was very difficult to follow on (think she meant follow up) patients – see them twice in a row for doctors – things which may seem completely natural, but which in a NK context were not considered proper by the authorities (Buissonniere 2005).

Monitoring and accountability

Food aid to North Korea has come under criticism because the DPRK government restricts the ability of donor agencies to operate in the country, making it difficult to assess how much of each donation actually reaches its intended recipients and how much is diverted
for resale in private markets or to the military. According to a Caritas appeal document as of late 2004 the number of inaccessible counties had remained steady (around 44). Some INGOs said that, for a period, they gradually had increased access to the groups they assisted. For example, the World Food Programme was able to open four satellite offices throughout the country. There were also concerns about reliability of data. To address this issue UNICEF provided capacity building programs to the DPRK Central Bureau of Statistics.

In 2004 UN Humanitarian Coordinator in North Korea, Masood Hyder noted that cautious changes are gradually emerging. “Change, albeit gradual and cautious, is all around us. There is greater openness. We have recently been granted access to a local market in Pyongyang. Mobile phones have arrived. Adjustments in prices and pay levels are having a major -- though not always salutary -- impact. Food aid monitoring visits have risen by nearly 50 percent in the past two years. … Will the world stand aside or help the process along?” In North Korea: First, Save Lives Washington Post, 4 January 2004.

According to a Caritas report the number of monitoring visits has improved considerably over the period of their operations, but in Spring 2005 there was a reduction of approved field visits. In addition, needs and impact assessments as well as evaluations remained difficult to undertake, due to what the DPRK government described as “national security considerations”. The report describes how the “government only provides information on a ‘need to know’ basis and little is known about how information is collected and analyzed. (CARITAS 2006).

Marine Buissonniere of MSF said “there basically isn’t any data that could have been the basis for development of relevant intervention, relevant program, were basically treated as state secrets. It was almost impossible to get any reliable health data. Extremely difficult to measure accurately the extent and severity of malnutrition in such a context.”

The Action Contre la Faim report (from December 2000) stated that:

this notion of geographical access is partly an illusion. In fact, even within the accessible counties, the North Korean authorities usually conduct the expatriate staff to the county towns but not all over the county. …In September ‘99, the county of Musan, in North Hamggyong province, inaccessible since the beginning of humanitarian intervention in North Korea, eventually became accessible. However, it soon became evident that only the county town was accessible and that the rest of the county was off-limits.

Some argued that large INGOs did not make monitoring a priority at the outset. Stephen Bell of the Eugen Bell Foundation said:

A lot of these organisations did not put a lot of emphasis on accountability in the beginning and then as soon they begin to find that there is a problem then try to build it back into the system that already exists. That’s always very difficult.

Manyin (2005:2) argues that South Korea and China have compounded problems around access and monitoring. They are now North Korea’s two most important providers of food and send almost all of their aid directly to DPRK with virtually no monitoring.

**Impact on political or social structures**

As discussed much of the political science literature has given attention to the role of INGOs to act as agents for social and political change. We have also noted how some aid agencies have argued that an increased INGO presence in North Korea holds some promise for the development of North Korean civil society. Proponents of engagement
argue that in the long run, aid could fundamentally change the character of the North Korean regime by increasing the DPRK’s exposure to and dependence on the outside world. However, in the course of interviewing and researching for this paper, we did not discover any reports of INGOs having any discernable impact on North Korea’s political or social structures.

Ewa Eriksson, the East Asia Desk Officer for the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, was perhaps the most cautiously optimistic. She said that the presence of aid agencies may have some impact:

Well, I feel people feel less isolated when they see expatriates moving around in the country and engaging with them at a community level - bringing new ideas, new technology, discussing their issues, their problems (Eriksson 2005)

Other interviewees said they felt their programs would have no significant long lasting impact. According to L. Gordon Flake, Executive Director of The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation), INGOs have had no discernable impact on the society or polity:

At this point the NGO impact is extremely limited. There is very little ongoing impact and the scope of it is tiny…I wouldn’t want to for a second try to overstate it. …They are having impacts, but at an individual, local, institutionalised level. It is not going to change the North Korean nuclear program. What you really want to do is move from are these grandiose claims that they are affecting the political or economic context (Flake 2005).

Instead Flake believes smaller organisations such as the South Korean based agency the Eugene Bell Foundation are likely to have a longer term impact:

It was those who were able to kind of carve out a niche, where they were able to avoid the politicization of either side and kind of target those forgotten populations that didn’t have any strong political ramifications….And so the ones that really come to my mind are things like the Eugene Bell Foundation – with Stephen Linton. They were able to set up this network of TB hospitals, serviced with food, equipment, X-ray machines and medicine etc. They are hitting the very bottom of the population. So, in a broad sense it is not significant right – it doesn’t impact on the stability of regime, it doesn’t impact on NK period. It is just kinda good, very humanitarian work. But you can question the overall relevance on a broader scale (Flake 2005).

Interesting, however, Stephen Linton, Director of the Eugen Bell Foundation, said that he was not interested in fostering internal change and argued that such attempts could be counterproductive:

North Korea is a post colonial state and that means it has a visceral, almost violent reaction against outsiders telling them what to do – in fact, it’s more likely they will deliberately do the opposite. If you want them to do what you want to do, you have got to figure out a way to make them think that it’s their idea – that they want to do it, otherwise they’re not going to do it just for spite’s sake because the legitimacy of the regime is based on just saying no to big powers or you tell them the less likely they are to respond and you just basically write your ticket out of there. So if an NGO tried to get actively involved in social change in North Korea – you know before the ink was dry on the first sentence, they would be on an aeroplane. And there have been organisations that have done that and are now gone.

Propping up a dictator?

Some agencies have gone further and believe that aid arguably has helped keep the current North Korean regime in power. Oxfam and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) are among several INGOs which have pulled out of the DPRK. For MSF, this goes beyond complaints at restrictions on their work to a conviction that the DPRK state is itself the
problem - a view argued by Fiona Terry in 2005 when she was Director of MSF in Australia. In an article in the London Guardian she says that “Food aid to North Korea only props up Kim Jong-Il’s grotesque regime. It should be stopped.” (The feeling was, of course, mutual. It is no coincidence that the NGOs most critical of the DPRK were those that have pulled out and ceased their operations. (Organisations that were publicly critical of the regime were no longer granted entry)

According to L. Gordon Flake, the presence of aid regimes may have in some ways reinforced the regime:

Perversely, the relative control maintained by the DPRK government meant that in times of shortage and deprivation, North Koreans had few viable alternatives and thus had incentive to be more rather than less loyal to the regime. The only way to survive was to find ways to move closer to the centres of power... Ironically, the international aid community’s reliance upon official government distribution mechanisms likely encouraged and enforced loyalty to the regime.

Kathi Zellweger, CEO of Caritas Hong, also considered the potential to prolong the status quo but said she felt that in the end the benefits of aid probably outweighed the disadvantages.

I have to admit that from time to time I ask myself if -- once the North Koreans are free to talk -- the mothers, the children, the doctors, the farmers, the staff at orphanages, the old folks, will praise or blame me for having collaborated with the DPRK government in order to provide humanitarian aid. During my recent visit to Seoul, I had the opportunity to speak to a few defectors. One had been in South Korea for almost ten years; the others were more recent arrivals. I asked each one of them about aid as well and all -- some after thinking awhile -- replied that providing aid should continue and that even if not all aid was reaching the right people, it still helped and had a trickle-down effect. We know full well by giving to this certain group of people, you are essentially allowing the regime to put its resources elsewhere. We believed in (engagement). It is much easier to close the door than to open it further. Walking out of North Korea is the easy option. What have you gained at the end of the day?

An Update Report on the Humanitarian Situation by Caritas released in 2004 noted:

What is interesting is the fact that the DPRK officials have expressed an interest in more technical assistance and development-oriented support. But that would mean that the quality of interaction has to improve, that there is a need for better transparency, for more data and information, more policy dialogue and a change in the working relationship to a partnership approach. The people dealing with UN agencies and NGOs are aware of these requirements; but those that have made the decision to request development assistance probably are not.

PART III: THE ROLE OF INGOs IN THE FUTURE

Can aid be conditional on reform?

Questions as to the consequences of INGO intervention aside, the other question is whether such a democratising role for INGOs is even possible in the DPRK. In this regard it is important to acknowledge the overriding significance of local societal context. Before a democratic transition can begin there must be a political community receptive to democratic aspirations. After the regime change has taken place, the same community must respond to the new possibilities for political participation. The stability and overall direction of the process will depend on this larger social context.

Three aspects of the DPRK context make plans to promote change appear somewhat ambitious. First, North Korean civil society, if it exists at all, is significantly
underdeveloped. The 2001 report of the Freedom House pointed out that, in the DPRK, “even fundamental elements of civil society do not exist, not to mention the rule of law” and that there is no room for anti-establishment powers (Chosun Ilbo, April 5, 2001). Second, while INGOs provided substantial aid in the years 1995-2000, few remain on the ground (primarily thanks to US sanctions) while others such as Amnesty has never operated in the DPRK. Third, there is ample evidence, such as the ongoing nuclear standoff, that the North Korean government is not particularly responsive to international pressure.

There is also an issue of whether INGOs are willing to play such a role. This question may depend on the degree to which you assign these organisations agency and independence. It should be emphasised that the mandate of all INGO organisations discussed in this paper, at least as it is expressed in relevant mission documents, is purely humanitarian – that is they professed an “apolitical” approach to assisting the disadvantaged and not to play a role in promoting regime change. But is separation really possible?

“It is misguided to separate the humanitarian and human rights discourses. North Korea would have faced difficulties in the 1990s regardless of its regime type. But it is difficult to imagine a famine of this magnitude, or chronic food shortages of this duration, occurring in a regime that protected basic political and civil liberties.” Haggard & Noland (2005)

A more fundamental issue is the applicability of these theories themselves. Underpinning the theories described above are interpretations of civil society rooted in the specific historical experiences of a few selected countries. This may mean that the concept (and therefore the theories) may share significant limitations in understanding how and when the DPRK will experience political, social and economic change. Historical circumstances, intellectual contexts and institutional arrangements have influenced how the term civil society has been interpreted. The term first emerged in the context of the emergence of capitalism in Britain and Europe - a time when those who controlled capitalist production sought access to political power. Thus, the notion of a confrontation between social forces from below and state power from above began to dominate European civil society discourse. Since then, civil society tends to refer to a realm separate from - often contrasting with or indeed counterbalancing - yet interdependent with state power. However, in reality, no civil society is completely free from the state. In particular, in East Asian countries with Confucian culture, the state has dominated civil society, and thus civil society has not been as much separated from the state as in the Western democracies (Cotton 1992). It may be that the existence, role and/or type of society in North Korea will offer new insights but also challenge some assumptions which have been drawn from the study of civil society in western societies. One indicator of this divergence between theory and reality has been the effects of recent experiments with the market in China and Vietnam. In these two contexts the introduction of market relations has not produced widespread civil society activation or regime change. Instead scholars argue that the introduction of capitalist relations in these countries has had a major impact on the state and status of society particularly in terms of making society more complex and difficult to control from a centralised authority (Halpern 1989; Pierre 2000).

Nevertheless, the DPRK’s economic disarray and its recent pragmatic foreign policy have heightened the expectation that the country might tolerate a degree of economic liberalisation, if not political, liberalisation, which might contribute to activation of its civil society. Recently, the DPRK has stepped up its contacts with the outside world,
seeking rapprochement with other countries. It normalized diplomatic relations with many capitalist countries, and Kim Jong Il has made rare foreign visits to China and Russia. The DPRK’s dire economic situation necessitated an aggressive approach to other countries for economic gains, including cooperation with capitalist markets for hard currency. North Korea has also indicated several other changes in the economic realm, including an emphasis on the study of market-oriented economy in its efforts to adapt to the international society.

Moreover, the choices for those seeking to change the DPRK are pretty limited. In a society where the regime has successfully monopolised all sources of news and information, where there is no access to independent newspapers, radio stations, the Internet or even an international telephone service, where there are no independent unions or indeed, organisations, and no freedom of travel, INGO programs may be the only “liberalising” tool available. Even if INGOs are agents of US policy to expand geopolitical influence, in Chaulia’s (2005) words “vehicles of strategic penetration” (incidentally, a view shared by the North Korean leadership) if the outcome is democracy then perhaps it doesn’t matter. The value of democracy is not necessarily diminished if the US supports it and has strategic interests in the state under question. At the end of the day North Koreans still need a break. As Cotton (2000) argues, the on-going deprivation of the citizenry, the regime’s nuclear capacity and their history of exporting comparably deadly weaponry is sufficient grounds to justify INGO (and foreign government) intervention. He writes:

Policy [toward North Korea] should be framed in order to encourage internal change. Here the focus should not be the present regime – which is incorrigible – but the social and economic dynamics of the country. As the result of famine and the decay of the former socialist economy, sizeable tracts of the country are being left to their own devices. The proto-market relations that are developing there should be encouraged by aid programs provided in the name of multi-lateral agencies. North Korea will depend for some time to come on international relief and food supplies. At the very least, these should be delivered in such a way as to foster local civil society and individual enterprise. An international quarantine, apart from imposing extraordinary suffering on the ordinary people, would obstruct the exercise of such leverage.

But ultimately the question may boil down to a choice between saving lives and fostering internal change. Pridham defines conditionality as ‘deliberate efforts to determine from outside the course and outcome of the regime change’ (2001: 57). Is such a policy possible? Current indications are that waiting for the DPRK regime to change its ways is pointless and will only prolong the suffering of the North Korea people.

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The Reorganisation of Local Administration in South Korea: The Debate on Democracy and Efficiency in Local Governance

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ABSTRACT

Local democracy is an important part of a democratic system, serving as a ‘school of democracy’ and offering citizens many opportunities of political participation. Although in recent decades, models of local administration focus on service provision rather than participation, local elections continue to be part of democratic traditions in many established democracies. In newly democratising countries, local democracy can serve as an indicator of democratic deepening. Korea’s century-old tradition of centralised administration ended in the 1990s, when (some) powers were devolved to lower administrative levels. A democratic layer in the form of councils and directly-elected heads of administration was added, greatly increasing opportunities for political participation and administrative accountability. The first fifteen years of local democracy have not been without problems, and criticism is raised regarding the (perceived) high costs and lack of relevance of local politicians. In order to increase efficiency the current government is set to restructure administrative divisions. While several reform plans are circulating, the debate focuses on administrative gains, without regard for the political effects of the reform, indicating that the role of local democracy in the progress of democratic deepening remains undervalued.

INTRODUCTION

Korea can look back to centuries of centralised administration. Efforts to introduce local autonomy and democracy in the Republic of Korea bore little fruit in the 1950s and centralised rule continued throughout the years of authoritarian rule by Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988). The opposition movement included the introduction of local autonomy and local democracy in their demands to break the power of the central government. In the 1990s, a new democratic layer in the form of councils and directly elected heads of administration was added to the existing administrative system, without considering reform of the long-standing divisions first. Local democracy added over 4,000 electoral positions to the political arena, greatly increasing opportunities for political participation and administrative accountability. The first fifteen years of local democracy have not been without problems, and criticism is often raised regarding the (perceived) high costs and lack of relevance of local politicians. The discussion about the need of local self-government and the form suitable for South Korea continues. In 2008, the government announced plans for local government reform, aiming at greater efficiency. So far, there has been little discussion about the reform’s effects on local democracy, indicating that the connection between local democracy and democratic consolidation is undervalued.

This phenomenon is not unique to Korea. The need for local democracy has been under discussion by both politicians and political scientists, in studies on public administration as well as democracy and democratisation. Attitudes on local democracy
are often informed by the focus of the analysis: on input or output orientation. The former stresses the participatory approach of local democracy while the latter focuses on service provision. Many newly democratising countries are overcoming a history of central administration, so that local democracy takes on additional importance in the process of democratic consolidation. The consolidation process is a multi-faceted phenomenon conceptualised from various analytical angles, such as political actors, institutions, and political parties. In this paper, the focus is on one particular institution, namely local government. In a mature democracy, democratic institutions can be found at all levels of government, from the national government down to the lowest level of district and city administrations. Democratic consolidation is thus not complete until democracy has permeated through all levels of government. With this understanding, the Korean opposition movement in the 1980s had hoped that local autonomy would deepen democracy, revitalise citizenship and open local administration to public scrutiny.

Since the introduction of local councils in 1991, decentralisation in Korea has progressed slowly. Central government agencies are reluctant to devolve power and still hold control over many aspects of local government, including work responsibilities, organisation, staffing and, most importantly, finance of local governments (Lee 2006). After the position of administrative head has become subject to regular elections, administrative transparency improved but opportunities for participation remain few. The involvement of local parties and civil society groups is limited, as they failed to advance neither civic engagement nor governmental responsiveness. The promise of local democracy has thus so far not been fulfilled. As a result, this aspect of local government is largely disregarded by both politicians and the general public in the debate on administrative reform.

This paper takes the current discussion of local government restructuring as a starting point to look at the development of local democracy in South Korea, its shortcomings and also at attitudes towards local democracy. The first section looks at the literature on the role of local democracy, while the second part presents the local administration system in Korea and its shortcomings. In the third section the reform proposals and their outcomes are presented. The final section sums up the argument and stresses the need for more debate on the benefits of local democracy on democratic deepening in Korea.

**LOCAL DEMOCRACY**

Local democracy is an often-neglected aspect in the discourse on democracy and democratisation. Popular discussion often focuses on national-level politics and assumes that local democracy is a given. In a similar vain, most of the literature on democratisation overlooks local democracy and concentrates on the national level.\(^1\) The virtues of local democracy have been praised since the mid-19th century. Alexis de Tocqueville stressed the importance of local government, writing in 1835: ‘In the township as everywhere, the people are the source of social powers, but nowhere do they exercise their power more immediately’ (2000, 59). Mill (1910) describes local government as 'school of democracy', as local self-government extra opportunities for political participation, both in electing and being elected to local office, for citizens who otherwise would have few chances to be politically active. Moreover, local politics deals with issues that have direct relevance to the daily life of citizens, such as traffic conditions and environmental problems. For this reasons, locally based groups can form around local issues and activate local participants

\(^1\) Exceptions include Held 1996; Sorensen 1998; Stoker 1996.
who are directly affected. Participation in local groups reduces financial and time
constraints for participants who otherwise would have to be present in the capital to exert
influence. Advocates of local democracy also suggest that access to politics is easier for
new participants at local level (Elkin 1999). Local government thus spreads political
power to a wider group of participants.

At the same time, local activities are ascribed with further far-reaching effects on
behaviour and attitudes regarding democracy per se. Local politics provide the training
ground for a democratic citizenry with increasing civic participation in local politics and
empowerment in the broader democratic process. Participation at local level is seen as
promoting individual liberty and democratic values, ideally transforming the way people
think and behave (Barber 1984). Moreover, advocates stress the importance of democracy
at the local level for a healthy democratic system as part of the division of power within a
state. On the horizontal level, power is balanced between executive, legislative and
judiciary while vertically, the different levels of government control each other. In unitary
administrative systems like Korea, regional and local governments should cover this role.

In administrative terms, local governments show the virtues of limited scale. Being
local, they remain accessible to their citizens, serve as a first port of call for all citizens,
reinforce local identities, and distribute resources in the light of specialist knowledge. A
centralised administration, especially if based in the cities, often fails to address
adequately the needs of outlying areas, such as fishing communities. Opponents of local
government, on the other hand, point out that this can also facilitate parochialism and
separatism within one country (Langrod 1953). Localism is seen as undermining national
equity. Centralised rule guarantees nationwide uniformity and equal and uniform
treatment of all parts of a country, but fails to take regional diversity and differences into
account (Jones and Steward 1983).

Centralised rule means fewer opportunities for direct input by citizens, thus
affecting local democracy negatively. Democratisation implies greater equality between
the different levels of government, thus challenging the notion of centralisation. In order
to activate internal autonomy, administrative decentralisation needs to include the
devolution of powers from the centre beyond the delegation of tasks to lower levels. Local
government should enjoy discretion in the decision-making process without the
intervention and influence of central government agencies (Page 1991). Important
components of local government are the transfer of personnel matters to lower levels and
the power to make independent decisions on finance, regarding both revenue raising and
spending. As part of decentralisation, there should be a shift in attitudes in the central
administration, away from a culture of control and regulations to one of co-operation and
assistance. Local administration becomes more accountable to citizens when elections for
local officers and councillors are held and other measures such as referendums and recalls
are introduced. However, this is often little more than window dressing if no measures for
decentralisation and the delegation of powers to lower levels are undertaken.

Local government has undergone substantial changes since the idealistic writings
of de Tocqueville and Mill in the 19th century. In the aftermath of World War II, many
countries extended services for welfare provision, which was placed largely in the domain
of local governments. As a result, attitudes towards local governments changed and a
more utilitarian approach was promoted. The size of bureaucracies increased while rules
and funding were largely provided by the central government, limiting the flexibility of
local governments. Output and results were stressed over participation, and the importance
of results was enhanced rather than bureaucratic procedures (Hood 1994). Towards the
end of the 20th century, some countries implemented measures to downgrade local
government in favour of service provision, labelled as ‘new public management’. In this
approach, governance becomes a keyword, indicating many services are cut or outsourced
while citizens are treated as customers who are consulted directly, without the need for
representatives. Local governments are expected to engage in market-oriented reforms and
encouraged to become efficient and customer-led authorities. Local governments strive to
reduce the direct provision of services by delegating tasks to private organisations. In this
model, local representative democracy is hollowed out, as elected representatives play
only a minor role and have little influence on policy making. Accountability shifts from
citizens (through elections) to the central administration (through supervision and audits).

This approach was favoured, for instance, in the 1980s in the United Kingdom but
it also revealed two contending views of local democracy: local institutions either ensure
financial and technical accountability or electoral and political accountability (Cochrane
1996). The later position stresses popular participation and local government as a site for
collective decision-making. Democracy is measured by citizens’ input, emphasising ‘government by the people’. In contrast, the output perspective focuses on efficient
administration and sees local government as efficient service provider, representing ‘government for the people’. These two beliefs are not mutually exclusive but reinforcing
and complementing. Ideally, local governance sustains democratic legitimacy by
combining input legitimacy as well as output legitimacy.2

In many countries, the balance between the two positions has shifted over the
years, and South Korea is not immune to this trend, except that the shift is happening in a
compressed timeframe. Local democracy was introduced in the early 1990s but calls for
streamlining and greater efficiency have been constant over the last fifteen years. Corruption scandals mar the system and falling voter turnout indicates citizens’
disenchantment with local democracy. The current government is promoting territorial and
functional restructuring, with a firm focus on improving output. The development of local
democracy is largely absent in the discussion, although it was one of the main demands of
the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s. The following explores the reasons for this,
before turning to the current reform proposals.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH KOREA

For centuries, Korea had been characterised by a highly centralised governmental system.
Power concentrated at the national level, in the capital while local governments merely
followed policies and directives. The Republic of Korea, created in 1948, was established
as a unitary state, with a three-tiered administrative system. The country is currently
divided into 16 regional governments and 230 local governments.3 At the regional level,
there are seven metropolitan and nine provincial administrations.4 The lower level consists
of city (si), county (kun) and district (ku) governments. The units are further divided into
up, myon, and dong for purely administrative purposes. Elections for mayors and local
councils were held in the 1950s and in 1960, but local democracy was suspended under
the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. The lower
administrative levels thus stayed under direct central control until the early 1990s. The
Ministry of Home Affairs (now Ministry of Public Administration and Security, MOPAS)

2 See Scharpf (1999) for further discussion.
3 With growing urbanisation, these numbers are constantly changing. Currently, there are 69 districts, 86
counties and 77 cities, including two in the special province of Cheju-do.
4 Seoul is dedicated as a special city under direct control of the prime minister’s office while Cheju-do has
been designated as a special administrative island.
appointed the heads of local administration who merely implemented the policies of the central administration.

The Korean constitution grants local governments the power to take actions that are not explicitly prohibited or assigned elsewhere. At the same time, the constitution also allows the central government to use regulations to control the lower levels. The central government uses this proviso to tightly control local spending and taxation, thus limiting the scope of local decision-making substantially. As a result, local administration in Korea in practice follows the *ultra vires* principle, which permits lower level governments only to engage in activities the central government has specifically assigned and authorised. Under a *ultra vires* system, administrative decentralisation therefore is particularly important for the development of democracy at the local level but also more complicated (Smith 1985). This affects both the locus of administrative power, i.e. devolution, as well as greater citizen involvement, i.e. local democracy.

During the 1980s, the demands of the Korean pro-democracy movement included greater local autonomy (Oh 1999; Pae 1988). The opposition hoped that local elections would create alternative centres of power throughout the country that could be utilised as local bases to challenge the power of the central government (Kim and Chung 1993). The involvement of many decision-makers in many different localities also promised the diffusion of power within the country. Moreover, the opposition expected to recruit supporters and activists at grass-root level to broaden their bases and to spread democratic values across the country (Lee 1992). In addition to the revitalisation of citizenship at lower levels, it was hoped to open local administrations to public scrutiny and thus improve services. The logic of the opposition was thus mostly driven by input-orientated legitimisation beliefs.

The implementation of local democracy and decentralisation progressed slowly. In 1991, elections for the newly created regional and local councils were first held for the first time, and in 1995 both councils and the heads of administration offices were directly elected. Since 1998, elections are held in four-year intervals, two years after National Assembly elections. The electoral system has been changed in each round of elections, confusing some voters. Initially, local parties only competed at the regional level, with no direct party involvement at the local level. This was changed prior to the 2006 elections, leading to further politicisation of local government (Hwang 2006).

As in many other countries, voter turnout for sub-national elections is lower compared to the national level and has declined over the last fifteen years, from 68% in 1995 to just over 50% in 2006. Politicians at the national level continue to regard local politics as an extension of national politics. Since the local elections are held at the mid-term point of the National Assembly, politicians and voters alike treat them as a referendum on the national government (Kang 1999). In 2006, for instance, the main opposition party (GNP) campaigned under the slogan:”Stern Judgment on the Central Government”, while many voters saw the election as a precursor for the presidential elections in the following year (Lee 2009). Local issues generally play only a minor role in local election campaigns and local races are largely overlooked. In the media, there is a distinct focus on the “big races” for the gubernatorial positions in Seoul, Pusan and Kyonggi Province.

The division of power between a council and a directly elected administrative head reflects the power structure at national level, a weak legislative and a strong executive. Mayors, governors, and county and district heads are popularly elected and cannot be recalled by the councils. Mayors take the initiative in the policy-making process and are
often the public face of the administration, receiving most press coverage. Local councillors have not increased their visibility as their influence is restricted by their limited powers. In order to push projects and policies, councillors often seek the favours of the mayor, leading to a patron-client relationship between mayor and council (Park 2000). The balance of power is therefore in favour of the mayor (Park 2006). While citizens are now better represented in the decision-making process at the lower levels of administration, these councils have limited powers and cannot vote the mayor out of office. A motion to allow citizens to recall mayors was introduced in 2007 but so far, no mayor has been recalled (although notions have been filed in Hanam City). Effectively, elected leaders are only held accountable by citizens every four years; in-between elections, the central government continues to be the control mechanism of local administrative leaders. This is reinforced by the position of administrative vice-governor/mayor, one of generally two deputies. While the deputy for political affairs is selected by the administrative head, the deputy for administrative affairs is appointed by the central government, usually a high-ranking career bureaucrat.

The development of local democracy is often hindered by underdeveloped local party sections as well as the lack of meaningful networks among local interests. The local government system is affected by the party system at national level and its problems. Political parties remain weakly institutionalised and lack distinctive political programmes. Regionalism continues to influence election outcomes substantially, although to a declining degree (e.g. Kim, Choi and Cho 2008). There are three main political regions in Korea, the Honam area in the southwest dominated by the Democratic Party (DP), the Kyongsang area in the southeast dominated by the Grand National Party (GNP) and the central region, dominated by a third party (currently named Liberty Forward Party [LFP]). With one party dominating in one particular area, many councils are virtual ‘one-party states’. Effective conditions of party competition are absent, contravening the democratic ideal (Hwang 2006). In general, parties have low membership rates and are weak at the grassroots level. Since 2004, party offices below the city and county level are prohibited by law to avoid corruption and wastage of funds. Local parties are thus often little more than support groups for the sitting representative in the National Assembly or regional and local council.

Other criticisms have been directed at the local government system. Over the last fifteen years, many localities tried to create a unique image and pursue independent policies. This ranges from the designation of local mascots to prestige programmes, such as the construction of international airports. These activities have received substantial criticism, especially from opponents of local autonomy (e.g. Chosun Ilbo 28 December 2007). For most of the history of the Republic, the state justified centralisation with the need of balanced regional development – although in reality, the results are quite different. Initially, many local governments imitated national strategies, so many special industrial zones were created that never fulfilled their potential. Inter-regional competition

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5 The recall has two phases, petition and vote. Petitions for the recall of administrative heads and council members with a minimum of signatures (at least 10% for gubernatorial leaders, 15% for local leaders, 20% for councillors) are submitted to local election commissions after a limited period of time. After validation, a vote is called which needs a minimum quorum of 33% and a majority of votes to lead to a resignation. The first recall motion in Hanam City stumbled over technical errors and low turnout in 2007.

6 Although party names do change, regional support remains remarkably stable.

7 At the regional level, many councils are dominated by one party, with a few proportional seats won by other parties. In local councils, one party often dominates, and independents play a greater role. However, these are frequently former party members who failed to gain party nomination, reducing the diversity of views represented.
increased, often labelled as divisive and wasteful (Kim 2002b). Recent examples are the applications for international sports events like the Olympic Games by a number of local entities. International bodies are careful to spread events across national and continents, so too many concurrent applications reduce the chances of winning. One reason for the failure of Pyongchang in Kangwon Province to be nominated as host city for the 2014 Winter Olympics lies in the earlier dedication of Inch’on as host of the Asian Games in 2011. Despite the setback, Pyongchang is set to try again for 2018.  

At the same time, Pusan is preparing a campaign to host the 2020 Summer Olympics. Some coordination between the bids would certainly increase the chances of a Korean success.

The remuneration of local councillors is another point of contention. Initially, councillors were only compensated for travel costs related to their work. Some remuneration was introduced in 2006, but the amount is still relatively small, so that representatives have to rely on other sources of income, often their personal wealth. This excludes the less wealthy sections of the population, while existing local elites are more likely to enter local politics. The prevalence of a local oligarchy can lead to arbitrary and undemocratic behaviour when, for example, councillors are also part of the local business community and pursue policies favourable for their friends and business partners (Lee 1996). The dominance of local landowners has been noted in some rural areas (Lee 2006). While local elections opened many more opportunities for political activities many citizens are lacking finances and support networks to stand in elections. These are less than ideal conditions to encourage participation and citizen engagement, as envisaged by Mill and other proponents of local democracy.

On the administrative side, the decentralisation process advances slowly, as the central administration is reluctant to devolve power, in particular the power to raise revenue. Legacies of pre-existing institutions tend to endure changes of internal and external conditions (Stinchcombe 1965: 148-149). Despite the political will to promote decentralisation, administrative procedures are changed much slower. Centralising attitudes and tendencies still contravene decentralisation. The balance of power stays clearly in favour of the central administration, creating only a ‘democratic façade’ (Seong 2000: 129). The independent activities of local governments were often limited to truly local matters such as waste collection and tourist management. This is partly due to a (perceived) lack of ability of lower level administrations (e.g. Korea Times 28 February 1998). Local governments, and in particular councillors, thus have limited opportunities to pursue individual policies but are tied by tight finances and central control. A majority of local entities is not financially independent but relies on transfers from the central government that are often tied to specific projects (e.g. Oh 2002).

In spite of the noted limitations, decentralisation has brought administrative reform to Korea, creating a more accessible and responsive administration. These modifications bring tangible results for the everyday life of citizens such as easier access to the administration and a reduction of paperwork (Im 1996). The bureaucracy is becoming more transparent and approachable because the heads of the administration are no longer appointed but popularly elected, giving them an incentive to plan and implement new functions to improve services. This includes the modernisation of (unreasonable and complex) administrative procedures, generally involving the use of new technologies such as online applications (for examples from Seoul see Kim 2002a). However, these changes do not register as a direct result of the introduction of local democracy, although they are often instigated by elected heads. Positive outcomes are often overshadowed by negative

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8. Pyongchang also lost an earlier bid for the 2010 Winter Olympics to Vancouver/Whistler.
assumptions such as wastefulness and non-transparency. Examples include ambitious projects like regional international airports becoming white elephants and a large burden on local budgets (e.g. Chosun Ilbo 28 December 2007). Bribery scandals of both officials and elected councillors have eroded the trust in government agencies. Elections are invariably followed by a number of scandals over violations of election laws.\(^9\) Citizens’ trust in local government is low, with only a quarter of Koreans expressing trust in local government (although this was slightly higher than the result for central government at 22.3% [Shin 2005, 59]). In terms of perception of corruption, local government also fares better than the central government but 40% of the population still consider local government officials to be corrupt.\(^10\) In light of the low regard for local democracy, the future trajectory of local administration is under debate.

**Reform Proposals**

In recent years, the discussion of a fundamental restructuring of the country’s administration has increased. Former President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) favoured the physical relocation of the capital from Seoul to Chungch’ong-namdo as a measure of decentralisation. Previous projects such as moving governmental agencies to Kwachon and Taejon have been unsuccessful and Roh’s proposal was also scaled down substantially. The relocation of national government agencies aside, Roh lacked a systematic approach to decentralisation (Lee 2008). In 2008, the topic returned to the agenda. Prompted by globalisation and economic restructuring, the three-tiered administrative structure has been described as outdated, since it was created over 100 years ago and “no longer meet[s] the needs of our communities in this modern, 21st-century digital era” (President Lee Myung-bak, 9 September 2008 at a KBS-Townhall meeting). Larger units are expected to reduce duplicity and to increase the quality and efficiency of public services. On the negative side, the voices of citizens may become less prominent in the policy-making process since larger units tend to have less direct contact with citizens.

The need for reform has been recognized, in particular the benefits of territorial restructuring. There are substantial differences between units in terms of size and population.\(^11\) This has been an ongoing process over the last decades, with an increasing number of mergers of cities and counties in close proximity to each other. The latest proposal to this end involves the incorporation of Masan, Changwon, Jinhae and Haman into one city. A number of surveys confirm some consensus on the necessity of restructuring. In December 2008, about two thirds of local councillors were found to be in favour of restructuring (Herald Biz 2008). The support was lower among the mayors and governors, as this group stands to lose its influence: 12 out of 16 higher level administrative leaders opposed restructuring, while the views of lower level leaders were divided: 97 (42.2%) were opposed while 116 (50.4%) favoured restructuring (Chosun Ilbo 8 Sep 2008). Citizens in Suwon also supported the need to reform the administrative system: a quarter called it ‘very necessary’, while a further 46% thought it was ‘required’ (Suwon Ilbo 2008).

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\(^9\) Between 1995 and 2006, 142 local government heads (22%) were prosecuted on bribery, election law violations and other offences, as well as 763 local councillors (Kim 2008, 43).

\(^10\) 45% thought central officials to be corrupt (Park and Bae 2008, 11).

\(^11\) Suwon and Songnam in Kyonggi Province, for instance, each have over 1 million inhabitants while Kyeryong city in Chungch’ong-namdo only has 35,000 and many counties even less. In terms of territory, Ulsan Metropolitan City is twice the size of Kwangju Metropolitan City. Among the lower units, differences are even bigger: Andong City’s territory consists of 1520.6km\(^2\), while Kuri City comes to a mere 33.3km\(^2\).
Local government reform has been contemplated before. In 2006, for instance, a National Assembly committee was formed to consult on administrative reform but the proposals brought no further action. In mid-2008, the discussion picked up again. President Lee Myung-bak strongly favours a change as part of his policy of administrative reform and streamlining, and the National Assembly formed another special committee in November 2008. With the next local elections slated for mid-2010, changes in the relevant laws become more pressing, especially if an extensive consultation period is included in the process. Given the current antagonistic mood in the National Assembly, this seems very ambitious. The Minister of Public Administration and Security amongst other politicians is pushing to complete the restructuring process before the elections. The necessity of a referendum has been discussed but dismissed by proponents for a quick change (Yonhap News 7 October 2008; Chosun Ilbo 8 October 2008). In March 2009, a GNP-committee working on local reform suggested holding a referendum in November 2009, so the changes can be implemented prior to the 2010-elections (Han’gyŏrye 27 March 2009). The discussion continues at the time of writing.

A report prepared by MOPAS in October 2008 warned that the process should be extended to around ten years to guarantee a smooth transition of administrative processes and personnel (DongA Ilbo 7 October 2008). A leading Korean civil society group, the Citizens’ Coalition of Economic Justice, also called for a prolonged consultation period to include the voices of local people and their views on mergers.12 There a valid reasons for a more comprehensive approach. Undertaking the reform in a short timeframe increases the likelihood of mistakes and the need for future adjustments. The burden of adjustment on the existing bureaucracy will be substantial, as they have to decide on streamlining process and ultimately redundancies to achieve the expected gains in efficiency. In addition to the employees in the lower levels of administration, politicians will also be affected. Completing the restructuring process shortly before the next round of elections will put substantial strain on the current representatives and parties, as they will not know where they will compete in the next elections. Regional and local councillors will fight each other for nomination and seats, leading almost certainly to increase conflict prior to the election. Other candidates will be frustrated to lose their constituency and leave local politics. There are also potential side effects for national elections. Currently, constituencies for the National Assembly follow the general geographical structure of counties and wards. Local restructuring could also affect these constituencies, possibly reducing their number.13 This will add another layer of debate to the reform agenda, as decisions could be influenced by parliamentarians’ concerns about the electoral effects at national level rather than potential improvements in local administration.

A number of proposals for local government reform are currently in circulation. The proposals focus firstly on territorial restructuring, which in turn entails the merger of units and thus reduction in employees and expenditure, affecting local government functions. The restructuring follows existing boundaries, i.e. rich, urban areas will merge with each other while rural areas around bigger cities are amalgamated, which might have detrimental effects on the outlying areas. The DP and some GNP-members revived the 2006-proposal suggesting the creation 60 to 70 units by combining provinces and cities into one level. Across the country, between two and five of the existing units are expected to be combined into larger units. The capital area would be divided into several smaller

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13 An interesting scenario would be a reduction of directly contested seats in the National Assembly and an increase in proportional seats. See also Weekly Chosun 24 November 2008.
units, thus breaking the domineering influence of Seoul on national politics and economy. This model eliminates the regional level of administration, the position of mayor and governor as well as regional assemblies. The smaller opposition party LFP proposes a confederate system, bringing urban and rural areas together but has not yet presented a detailed proposal. The Blue House favours a ‘5+2 plan’: the abolition of the current provinces into seven large districts, namely five different zones (the capital area, the Chungh’ong-area, Honam, the Southeast, and Taegu/Kyungsangbukdo), plus two economic blocks (Kangwon Province and Cheju-do). This would create economies of scale, compared to independent units such as Shanghai and Tokyo, but critics already point out that this model is prone to be affected by central government influence (DongA Ilbo 7 October 2008). It also fails to address the existing imbalances between the different regions, and cements the domination of Seoul over the nation. In March 2009, the GNP proposed a combination of the reform plans: the unification of the cities and counties to create 60-70 units as well as the abolition of provinces in favour of five to seven regions (Han’györye 27 March 2009). The latter would not have councils but their leader would be elected directly by citizens. These leaders would have substantial public profile and overshadow other local politicians. At the same time, these positions could serve as stepping stones for national politics, as Lee Myung-bak, a former mayor of Seoul himself, has experienced. For ambitious politicians, this is a lucrative proposal but personalises local politics further.

The discourse on local government reform focuses on increasing efficiency and potential synergy effects but the proposals are far weaker in addressing the problems of the current local government system noted above. This is reflected in the views of the respondents in the Suwon survey: more than half of the participants cited ‘economic effects’ as the main reasons for the need of change, while ‘local history’ came second with 18%. The knowledge about the plans among survey participants is rather limited; about 12% claimed to know a lot and a further 42.2% ‘a little bit’. That leaves about 45% of people with little or no knowledge of the restructuring plans (Suwon Ilbo 26 November 2008). This is hardly surprising, given that reports in newspapers on reform plans are infrequent. Journalists generally focus on the gains in efficiency of greater units without providing details of the effect on political representation and participatory activities. Neither local democracy and the role of elected representatives nor the relationship with the central government and the devolution of power are mentioned in greater detail in the discussion. Exceptions include National Assembly representative Kwon Gyongsok who raised the uncertainty of the central government’s influence on the new entities (Han’györye 7 November 2008). Without this debate, however, the reform will limit the development of local democracy and ultimately the consolidation of democracy in Korea.

CONCLUSION

The failure to include local democracy in the imaginary of citizens touches on other problems in Korea’s democratisation, such as the underdevelopment of local civil society (Kim 2006) and the lack of institutionalisation of political parties (Hermanns 2009). The discourse on local reform focuses on administrative efficiency with little regard for local democracy and the role of the central administration. Democratic legitimacy is mainly defined by the results, the output side, treating citizens are customers. Input by citizens and active participation are not encouraged. This trend can also be observed in other countries that introduced ‘new public management’ measures in the 1990s (like New Zealand and the United Kingdom). These are, however, established democracies with a

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14 This is the topic of more detailed research that cannot be presented here for space limitations.
long history of local elections. There has been no talk of abolishing these elections, despite low participation rates. On the contrary, measures to encourage participation are pursued in many established democracies. In newly democratising countries like South Korea, the importance of local democracy in the process of democratic deepening should not be underestimated. For this reason, the importance of local democracy should be incorporated in the discourse on administrative reform in South Korea. So far, the few comments in favour of local democracy have not received the attention they deserve.

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Constructing a Buddhist Imaginary in Colonial Korea (1910-1945)

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ABSTRACT
Studies on Korean Buddhism under Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) often focus on political issues. However, inadequate attention has been given to Korean Buddhists’ use of the new media. Han Yongun (1879-1944) is famous as a would-be reformer, political figure, and poet. But he was also a key Buddhist figure in the new media. His reform agenda would have been unimaginable without it. This paper sketches critical features of the new media in Korean Buddhism during the colonial era, focusing on the need for would-be reformers to imagine Buddhism in the lives of adherents. I commence with an overview of early Buddhist publishing efforts, before turning to an analysis of the 1919 “Declaration of Korean Buddhist Priests.” I then examine the context of Han’s work as well as his last major publication. Ultimately, this paper concludes that while mass publication allowed for the construction of a Buddhist imaginary, it also underscored the difficulties in articulating a vision of how Buddhism might function in a modernising society.

1. INTRODUCTION
Studies on Korean Buddhism under Japanese colonialism (1910-1945) often focus on plans for reforming institutional Buddhism, Japanese influences, and Buddhists’ involvement in the independence movement. However, with the notable exception of Sørensen (1990), inadequate attention has been given to Korean Buddhists’ use of the new media (i.e., journals and newspapers).

Han Yongun (1879-1944) is famous as a would-be reformer, political figure, and poet. But he was also a key Buddhist figure in the new media. His reform agenda would have been unimaginable without it, and throughout his career he employed the new media for Buddhist purposes. Indeed, he arguably exploited the potential of print and mass publication more fully than any of his peers. This paper takes Han as an example to examine the function of the new media in Korean Buddhism during the colonial era.

I commence with a sketch of early Buddhist publication, and then turn to an analysis of the 1919 “Declaration of Korean Buddhist Priests,” a document delivered to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. I argue that the “1919 Declaration” highlights two principal difficulties confronting Korean Buddhist activists: first, difficulty with envisioning Buddhism apart from the state; and second, difficulty in imagining how Buddhism could or should function amid changing social conditions. Han’s private notes are then examined to illuminate the difficulties in which he worked and to contextualise his publishing and writing activities from the 1920s. Ultimately, this paper concludes that while mass publication allowed for the construction of a Buddhist imaginary, it also underscored the difficulties in articulating a vision of how Buddhism might function in a modernising society.
2. CONTEXTUALISING BUDDHIST PRINT IN COLONIAL KOREA

By the time Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, it was no longer possible for Korean reformers and activists, whatever their political orientations or religious loyalties, to ignore the potentialities of the people at large. Though cultural nationalists/gradualists and the more radical agitators for independence agreed on little else during the colonial period, they at least tacitly agreed on the necessity of involving the people for social, political, and cultural change. Print was central to such broad social involvement. Moreover, this shared recognition of the need to expand political constituencies and loyalties was as much a consequence of print as a cause for exploiting print to specific ends.

In this respect, the Korean case presents a variation of Anderson’s thesis on the relationship between print-capitalism and nationalism (1986, esp. 40-49). In Korea, print-capitalism did not organically lead to nationalism and linguistic levelling or the vernacularisation of writing (i.e., “unification of speech and writing”) across social classes. Rather, nationalism, in its early stages, underscored the importance of print used in conjunction with the vernacular, which in turn led to the growth of print-capitalism. This is not altogether surprising. The emphasis on uniformity between speech and writing developed only in the late nineteenth century, in reaction to the failure of the China-centred Choson (1392-1910) state and largely under the influence of the western-inspired reforms undertaken in Meiji Japan (1868-1912).

Korean Buddhists, both clerical and lay, quickly took advantage of the burgeoning print-capitalism for religious and cultural purposes, and on balance, the world of Buddhist publication was rather small. Although it is difficult to determine the reach and influence of Korean Buddhist publications during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945), it is nevertheless clear that they competed for advertisements and thus competed against each other as well as other print media. Competition partly explains three general features of these Buddhist publications. First, many were short lived, in some cases barely making it past the first issue, while others were disbanded and then restarted under the same or a different name, thus leading to great confusion, as in the case of Pulgyo (Buddhism)/Sin Pulgyo (New Buddhism) (Kim and Yi 1996, 17-19). Second, failed journals seem to have served as a training ground for later, more successful ventures. Third and most importantly, these publications would increasingly tend to carry articles on a broad range of topics. It seems safe to assume that this indicated a desire to attract a broader readership, or at least that the economic lessons of the 1910s had been learnt.

The careers of Han Yongun (1879-1944) and Kwŏn Sangno (1879-1965) illustrate these points. Both acted as editors for Buddhist journals in the first decade of Japanese colonial rule, that is, before the easing of publishing restrictions that occurred under Japan’s policy of “cultural rule,” implemented in the aftermath of Korea’s March First Movement of 1919. Kwŏn preceded Han, serving as editor and publisher of The Korean Buddhist Monthly (Chosŏn Pulgyo wŏlbo), which ran for nineteen issues from early in 1912 to late in 1913 (Kim and Yi 1996, 26-28). Han, too, acted as editor and publisher in his first venture, Mind Only (Yusim), which survived for only three issues during the final quarter of 1918 (ibid., 45-46). On the face of it, The Korean Buddhist Monthly was relatively more successful. But unlike Han’s Mind Only, Kwŏn had significant institutional backing.

Kim and Yi ascribe the failure of The Korean Buddhist Monthly to a refusal to publish anything related to politics, since, according to the journal’s explicit editorial policy, it would treat only “simple religious issues [lit., qualities]” (tansunhan chonggyo sŏnggil) (Kim and Yi 1996, 28). However, it is questionable to say that The Korean
Buddhist Monthly was entirely non-political. It was sponsored by a Korean Buddhist organisation which had aligned itself with the Japanese by agreeing, in 1910, to a merger between Korean Buddhism and the Sōtō Sect of Japanese Buddhism. If nothing else, such an affiliation made the journal implicitly political. Moreover, in nineteen issues from 1912 to 1914, it serialised Kwôn’s *On the restoration of Korean Buddhism* (Chosôn Pulgyo kaehyöngnon), a plan for Korean Buddhist reform. Kwôn’s *Restoration* was clearly written in response to Han Yongun’s *Treatise on the reformation of Korean Buddhism* (Chosôn Pulgyo yusillon) which had been completed in 1910 and was published in 1913. Whereas Han, the would-be radical reformer, argued for sudden and thoroughgoing change to Korean Buddhism as a whole—an idea exemplified in his proposal that priests and nuns be allowed to marry—Kwôn took a far more conservative position and counselled the virtues of caution and respect for Korea’s Buddhist traditions (Yang 1993, 163; cf. Park 2007, 22).

The fact that both Han’s *Mind Only* and Kwôn’s *Korean Buddhist Monthly* folded suggests the limitations of political explanations. There clearly were not enough readers for journals run by either a radical or a conservative reformer. Therefore, it would seem that, rather than politics, the critical factor was the print-capitalistic environment in which these journals had to function. Indeed, this point is clearly underscored in the failure of Kwôn’s institutionally-backed *Korean Buddhist Monthly*.

But were there many potential readers to begin with, that is, what was the nature and extent of literacy in the years leading to and during the Japanese Colonial Period? This is a thorny question if one attempts to interpret the meaning of the existing figures. A literacy survey undertaken by the Japanese Government-General in 1930 suggests that well over half the population was illiterate in Korean (reprinted in Kimura 1993, 641-642). The measurement for literacy also had a low baseline, asking whether the respondents knew the Korean alphabet. There is, of course, nothing historically uncommon about defining literacy by such a standard (i.e., some basic knowledge of a given script). Moreover, it is obvious that there would have been a broad range in levels of literacy throughout the population. However, commercial publication can be taken as an indirect measure of literacy. (On this question in the Japanese context, see Rubinger 2007.)

Whatever the precise numbers, it is certain that by roughly 1912, there was a sufficiently large readership to support an increasingly robust commercial publishing industry. But publication during the 1910s was characterised by a curious contrast among what was published, how it was published, and the effects of publication (Kwôn 1990). First, modern western printing technology for movable type was imported from Japan, but the economic efficiency of this technology was maximised in the printing of classical fiction (*kososōl*) in the Korean vernacular. However, not all of these stories originally had been composed in the Korean vernacular or even in Korea. Instead, such classical fiction also encompassed vernacular translations and adaptations of classical Chinese and Sino-Korean stories. It also seems likely that publishers drew on late-Chosôn Korean vernacular translations/adaptations of pre-modern Chinese vernacular fiction, though this question has not yet been adequately studied. Thus, despite the absence of information about print runs, sales, and business decisions, it is obvious that publishers were largely capitalising on converting available manuscripts in Korean into printed editions.

Second, in the 1910s, Korean translations and adaptations of Japanese fiction were seriously threatening the economic viability of “modern [Korean] fiction” (*sinososōl*). Paradoxically, the increasing mass availability of a range of classical fiction in Korean helped to stimulate a renewed interest in modern Korean fiction. In this respect,
“classical” and “modern” were complementary rather than antithetical, with the “modern” riding on the coattails of the “classical” (Kwŏn 1990, 182).

Finally, the modern printing press also encouraged a renewed interest in Korea’s elite intellectual and literary heritage, that is, in the literature and classics as written in classical Chinese (Han’ak). Not surprisingly, however, commercial publishers ultimately focussed on profits, and in the marketplace, Korea’s classical intellectual heritage could not compete against vernacular fiction (Kwŏn 1990, 181-182).

Though classical fiction continued to be a mainstay for publishers over the following decades, publisher-catalogues attest to a readership with increasingly diverse choices. As McHale notes of the case of colonial Vietnam, “[w]hen one examines what Vietnamese published and read between 1920 and 1945, it becomes clear that Vietnamese thought about far more than revolution and the nation” (McHale 2004, 7). Precisely the same can be said of Korea.

In retrospect, it is clear that Kwŏn and Han undertook their publishing activities at a particularly competitive time. Market forces thus help partly to explain their failure. Indeed, 1912, the year in which Kwŏn launched the Korean Buddhist Monthly, marked the start of a remarkable period that lasted through 1918, the year in which Han’s Mind Only was launched and failed. During those six years, a vast number of classical stories were published in the Korean vernacular, so that it is possible to characterize this period as “the golden age of classical fiction” (Kwŏn 1990, 182, 204 and 210).

But neither Kwŏn’s conservative vision for a renewed Korean Buddhism, nor Han’s radical, youth-oriented vision for a thoroughly modernised Korean Buddhism, attracted sufficient readers. Notwithstanding the importance of competition for readers, market forces and politics, it is reasonable to conclude that the greatest problem facing Buddhist publishing at the outset was to be found in Korean Buddhism itself. There simply was a lack of readers willing to pay for journals dealing primarily with Buddhist topics, regardless of the journal’s political slant. It is therefore not surprising to find a sense of a shared mission—and just as likely, desperation—among the leading Buddhist figures of the early colonial period. This can be gleaned from the fact that the contributors to Han’s Mind Only comprised a virtual “who’s who” of notable Buddhist intellectuals, including Kwŏn himself as well as Pak Hanyŏng (1870-1948), Paek Yongsŏng (1864-1940), Yi Nŭngwha (1869-1943) and others (Kim and Yi 1996, 45-46).

However, reform-minded Korean Buddhist leaders and intellectuals were also faced with the problem of history. By this I mean not just the historical forces that had led to the weakening of Korean Buddhism during the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910)—and to which they were attempting to respond—but also the question of how they, as clerics (or in Yi’s case, as a lay adherent), could or should envision Buddhism’s role in Korean life. This question was fundamentally political in at least two respects. First, it required consideration of the relationship between institutional Buddhism and the laity, and second, that of institutional Buddhism and the state. There was at least some shared interest in the first question, notwithstanding differing points of emphasis among the various figures. The second proved more problematic, however, and it is ultimately unpersuasive to see this as a consequence of Japanese colonialism.

Instead, the relationship between institutional Buddhism and the state had been an issue throughout Korean history. Japanese colonialism merely underscored the importance of the question, and Han was conspicuous for his sustained interest in the relationship between institutional Buddhism and the state as well as the consequences of that
relationship for the health of Buddhism as a whole. At the end of his career, he would write a novel (lowbrow) that traced the role of Buddhism in a woman’s life. The significance of that novel is addressed later. It is first necessary, however, to assess the role of Buddhism in Korean life and history as depicted in the 1919 “Declaration of Korean Buddhist Priests.”

3. IMAGINING KOREAN BUDDHISM’S PAST AND FUTURE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1919 “DECLARATION OF KOREAN BUDDHIST PRIESTS”

As Park has noted, there was no clear correlation between “modernization” and “nationalism” in the minds of Korean Buddhist reformers in the early twentieth century. Moreover, what constituted “modern” in the minds of reformers was neither self-evident nor unitary. Park comes as close as possible to offering a workable definition when noting that the “utmost interest of Korean Buddhists was to present a socially viable form of Buddhism” and that this presentation drew heavily on the methods used by Christians, methods that, as employed by some Korean Buddhists, aimed at creating “a sense of connection among the [Sangha], the laity, and society” (Park 1998, 21-22). The question is, what role did Buddhist clerics imagine Buddhism playing in the lives of Koreans?

This question can be approached through the “Declaration of Korean Buddhist Priests” which was signed by twelve Korean Buddhist clerics. The document was discovered in Paris in 1960 and has a sketchy history. It seems to have been intended originally for distribution at the Paris Peace Conference (May 1919) and was then published in November 1919 in conjunction with the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. (The Provisional Government had formed in April of that year, and a Korean Buddhist had been dispatched as a representative to it.) Apart from the historical confusion surrounding the document, there is also the matter of linguistic confusion. Korean, Chinese, and English versions of the document apparently were printed (Kim 1992, 82). In addition, there is an available Japanese-language version which I have used for the following overview (reprinted in Kim 1992, 82-83n55).

The first section of the document notes the Buddhist teachings of equality and compassion, before proceeding to a critique of Japanese militarism, expansionism, and aggression towards its neighbours. Such actions clearly contradict Buddhism (thereby demonstrating the hypocrisy of Japan’s external expressions of honouring Buddhism), and the document emphasises the desire for independence and how that desire was manifested in the March First Movement. The section concludes by noting that its signatories cannot remain silent bystanders in view of the fact that Japan’s crimes have reached a highpoint by butchering tens of thousands of innocent men and women in suppressing what was a peaceful movement.

The following section names Han Yongun and Paek Yongsŏng, the two Buddhist priests among the thirty three people who signed Korea’s 1919 Declaration of Independence, and then notes that there were many other Korean Buddhist clerics who in the immediate aftermath of the declaration participated in the unfolding independence movement, offering up their lives and assets. It then addresses the means by which the Japanese can exercise control (e.g., through police officers [Jap., keikan] and the army [Jap., guntai]) and draws a clear link between the evils of such measures and the suffering of the twenty million Korean people. It concludes by emphasising that armed revolt in the face of injustice and suffering is the tradition of Korea’s forefathers.

The third and longest section of the document provides the historical context, and its main focus is on the role of Buddhism in Korean history. The author/s note
Buddhism’s long history in Korea, allude to its loss of prestige and suppression by the government during the Chosön dynasty (1392-1910), and recall Korea’s compassionate role in transmitting Buddhism to Japan centuries earlier—something that clearly contrasts with Japan’s lack of compassion for the Korean people. It is then that the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-1598) under the leadership of Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598) are invoked, and the author/s emphasise that Korean Buddhist priests, both high and low in rank, sacrificed their lives to protect their country. The author/s attribute this to the deep and long-lasting relationship between the state/nation and Buddhism in Korea (Jap., kokka to Bukkyō to no innen) and go on to discuss the Japanese colonial regime’s complete disregard for Korea’s history and its people’s traditions and culture. The section concludes by emphasising that colonial policies seek to destroy the Korean people and that due to Japan’s evil measures, Korean Buddhism has lost the freedom it had enjoyed for two thousand years under “the protection of the Korean nation” (Jap., Kankoku kokka no hogo). According to the document, Korean Buddhism is about to be driven to extinction.

The final, short section starts by expressing a commitment to working with the Korean people for the attainment of freedom and independence. It emphasises that Korean Buddhism is well suited to that task and vows that “in order to be saved from Japan-isation and destruction, we seven thousand priests and nuns will join together, rise up, and repay the country though we might die.” Here the Buddhist religious element is especially pronounced. Hotsugan (Jap., prayer, petition, vow, etc.) recalls Amida Buddha’s original vow to save all sentient beings (Jap., hongan), which in turn recalls the Buddhist teachings of equality (Jap., byōdō) and compassion or mercy (Jap., jihī), both of which are named at the outset of the document as Buddhism’s two guiding principles.

As suggested through the synopsis, this document argues that Korean Buddhists have a role to play in Korea’s struggle for independence. This role is couched in Buddhist soteriological terms (i.e., the compassion and mercy of Amida) as well as in historical terms (i.e., Buddhists’ participation in fighting the Japanese during Hideyoshi’s invasions). Moreover, the mention of Han Yongun, Paek Yongsŏng, and the contributions of other Buddhists to the independence movement in the aftermath of March First suggests that the actions of Korean Buddhists exemplify Buddhist soteriological teachings on a practical political level. Such actions are, according to the text, nothing less than a continuation of Korean Buddhism’s historic role in protecting the country/state/nation which is itself presented as synonymous with the Korean people as a people, that is, as a race with its own culture, traditions, and history.

In light of these claims, the defensive tone of the third section is striking. It is true that the “laws and ordinances” (Jap., hōrei; Kor., sach’allyŏng, or “temple ordinances”) enacted by the Japanese in 1911 seem to have confounded the Korean Buddhist institution as a whole and served to align Korean Buddhism with Japanese colonial interests. But that set of laws in and of itself does not suffice to explain the relative ease with which that process occurred, and read against the Japanese colonial context and the unfolding of the March First Movement itself, this document demonstrates—both in terms of content and as an artefact—the weakness of patriotic or nationalist sentiment in the Korean Buddhist institution as a whole.

First, the fact that two of the thirty three signatories to the Declaration of Independence were Buddhists is less cause for pride than shame. One might reasonably expect better from a religion with so long a history and with such a deep connection to the nation and the people. Second, the document was discovered in Paris in 1960. To my knowledge, no copy of it or anything like it was widely disseminated in Korea itself, and
“seven thousand priests and nuns” did not rise up together to battle the Japanese. Third, since it appears that the document was composed after the events of March First for promulgation at the Paris Peace Conference (which it seemed would recognize Korean independence), the Korean Buddhist institution as represented by the document looks much like a Johnny-Come-Lately to the cause of national independence. This would seem to account for the defensive tone in the third section of the document. Moreover, in light of the dates surrounding the document, it might be read as a cynical, self-serving attempt to find a place for Korean Buddhism in a new political climate, that is, in an independent Korea. Prior to the Paris Peace Conference the recognition of Korean independence seemed possible, and so one can see reasonableness in its approach: an exculpation of recent lapses owing to the Japanese presented against claims on behalf of Buddhism’s patriotic/nationalist credentials.

Only two of the signatories of the “Declaration” can be positively identified, but their identities are sufficient to suggest further the complex circumstances in which the document was produced. O Sŏngwŏl (dates unknown) had in 1910 worked with Han Yongun and Pak Han’yŏng to stop a merger of Japanese and Korean Buddhism proposed by Yi Hoegwang (1862-1933), then the head of Korean Buddhism’s representative body that had been organized in 1908 (Yi 1993, 145-146). The events of 1910 centred on religious questions, however, and need not necessarily be seen in a nationalist, patriotic, or anti-Japanese light. In contrast, the only other identifiable signatory, Kim Kuha (Ch’ŏnbo, 1872-1965), in fact, had taken a position in 1910 in the organization headed by Yi Hoegwang (cf. Kim 1992, 84). Apart from signing this document, he also made donations to the independence movement after March First. However, in 1925, he resigned from his abbotship at T’ongdo Temple after priests there accused him of embezzling temple funds to make those donations (Yun 1994, vol. 2, 171; Yi 1993, 298-299).

In retrospect, the 1919 “Declaration” is conspicuous for its engagement with ideas that were highlighted by the March First Movement, specifically the people as an ethnic/racial group (Jap., minzoku) and the nation-state (Jap., kokka). Such an emphasis would have been understandable for anyone committed to safeguarding the future of the Korean Buddhist institution when there was hope of Korea gaining its independence. But the document seems to have “disappeared” once the possibility of independence was dashed. In sum, it is clear that the document’s aim was the protection of the Korean Buddhist institution rather than Korean Buddhism or anything else.

The document is therefore equally conspicuous for its platitudes and empty rhetoric. In particular, it is remarkable how little its authors had to work with in depicting the relationship between the Korean Buddhist institution and the lives of ordinary Koreans. Instead, the focus is not on the people, but rather the relationship between the institution and the state. It is thus not surprising that the Korean Buddhist institution as a whole followed a predictable path in acquiescing to the demands of the secular state during the colonial period, and the fact that the secular state was foreign further underscores the degree to which institutional Buddhism was state oriented. This too explains the apparent apathy of many Korean Buddhist clergy towards political questions as well as many of the overt collaborative activities in which Korean Buddhists became implicated: the Japanese state granted Korean Buddhists a degree of prestige, and given the opportunity, they supported it.

Of all the important Buddhist figures during the colonial era, Han Yongun is therefore most conspicuous for two reasons. First, his advocacy for the reform of Korean Buddhism was organised around his conviction that Korean Buddhism must re-
conceptualise itself and break its historical connection to the state. Second, he emphasized the responsibility of the individual, and among Korean Buddhists of his era, he seems to have been the first to have done so. He was also consistent on these points.

In the years after his failure with *Treatise*, he turned his attention to younger clerics who must have seemed to him to hold greater promise for change. In “On the Buddhist Youth Alliance” (Pulgyo ch’ôngnyŏn tongmaenge taehayŏ), a lengthy essay published in 1931 in the journal *Buddhism* (Pulgyo), for instance, he returned to topics similar to those that he had addressed in *Treatise* some two decades earlier as well as in the early 1920s when, fresh out of jail, he published articles criticizing the colonial government’s regulations concerning Buddhist temples. A core element among these and other writings was his repeated insistence that his readers take responsibility and exercise what control they had, precisely the idea that had defined his *Treatise*. It is therefore significant that his last major literary work, *A Terrible Fate*, imagined the role of Buddhism in the life of an impoverished woman, and in so doing, sat in contrast to the rationalistic views he had long espoused.

**4. IMAGINING BUDDHISM THROUGH FICTION:**

**HAN YONGUN'S *A TERRIBLE FATE* (PANGMYONG; 1939)**

An unpublished essay by Han, “Some Remarks on the Literary Arts” (Munye soŏn), offers insight into the difficulty he had contextualising himself as a writer (Han 1980, vol. 2, 192-196). This difficulty arose from the tension between traditional, elite Korean views of literature, which were rooted in Confucianism, and Western notions of literature, which were largely imported through Japan. Literature was, of course, just one area in which tradition and modernity collided in Korea from the late nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries. But due to the influence of Confucianism in Korean intellectual history, changes in the conception of literature were of no small significance. Three were most important.

First, writing became a profession. Second, the definition of literature expanded. In addition to poetry, sanctioned by the Confucian tradition, fiction—novels and short stories—and plays became classifiable as literature. Third, the professionalization of writing and expansion of the definition of literature occurred in tandem with the development of literary criticism and literary-historical scholarship. As a consequence, literature, in the broadest possible sense, became increasingly complicated. While some modern professional authors might have seen themselves as artists, mass publication put the written word in the hands of an increasing readership with its own tastes. As discussed above, traditional Korean fiction was a publishing mainstay throughout the colonial period, while modern literature—Korean or translations of foreign literature—typically encountered more chaotic circumstances in terms of publication and attracting readership (see also Kim 2008; Kwŏn 2008).

Han’s essay suggests that he found himself stuck between the old and the new. On the one hand, he was not resistant to the expanded, modern view of literary genres. On the other, he was something of a traditionalist in that he saw literature in functional terms, that is, in much the same way as in the Confucian literary tradition. What was different, however, was the literary and intellectual context. For Han, the demands of popularity—which he himself was happy to meet—paradoxically meant didacticism (cf. Yu 1992, 72). He was, in sum, no modern literary aesthete, considering himself an artist above the mass of readers. His activities as a publisher had taught him the importance of meeting readers’ expectations, at least in terms of how a story was told.

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A Terrible Fate, which was his last major literary effort, was in many respects among the most important things he wrote. It embodied his belief that popular literature (read: lowbrow) was nothing to be ashamed of. But it also embodied his approach to Buddhist propagation through mass print media. Serialised in Chosôn Ilbo from May 1938 through September 1939, A Terrible Fate was, unlike most of his other novels, set in early twentieth-century Korea (Han 1980, vol. 5, 6-290). It was, in short, Buddhist propagation through a novel, delivered in a newspaper for the widest possible readership.

Its female protagonist, Sunyŏng, lives in the countryside, not far from Paekdam Temple (where Han, in fact, had spent his early career as a monk). When we first meet her, she is fourteen years old, hungry, overworked in the farm fields, and by turns too hot and too cold. In addition to her physical discomfort, she is also sad and lonely due to her personal family circumstances. Her mother died; her father remarried; and then he died. She has no brothers or sisters and is under the care of her stepmother. One day she happens to meet a middle-aged woman by the name of Ms. Song who will, together with a younger lady named Unok, conspire to convince Sunyŏng to leave home and go to Seoul. Unok skilfully exploits Sunyŏng’s sense of physical and emotional impoverishment. What follows traces Sunyŏng’s life through further and further degradation, first at the hands of Ms. Song and Unok, who manipulate her into working as a bar-hostess, and later, at the hands of a man whom she loves and marries and who ultimately betrays her. Much of the story makes for grim reading, because, apart from Sunyŏng’s suffering, it also deals with addiction to various drugs (from the smoked to the injected) and prostitution. Early in the story, however, a Buddhist element is put in place when Sunyŏng’s life is saved by a Buddhist nun. At the end of the story, the Buddhist element is highlighted when Sunyŏng decides to seek out the nun who had saved her life, and discovering that the nun had died, Sunyŏng makes the decision to become a Buddhist nun herself.

In many respects, A Terrible Fate thus corresponds closely to the classical fiction that enjoyed popularity throughout the colonial period, even though it was set in contemporary Korea. As noted above, Han saw nothing wrong with writing for popular tastes, and the story’s sharp—albeit implicit—didacticism put it squarely in the lowbrow category. However, what is most remarkable about the use of Buddhism in the story is how Han is forced to accommodate not only popular literary tastes, but also popular religious sensibilities. Though Sunyŏng suffers, she is ultimately saved through her conversion to Buddhism. Indeed, her discovery of the true motives of the people who had harmed her leads to her discovery of religious truth. On the other hand, those who had intentionally hurt her ultimately suffer. They are, if effect, punished.

The way in which Han envisioned Buddhism in A Terrible Fate differed markedly from the rationalistic, superstition-condemning views that had characterised his Treatise decades earlier. It also marked a sharp departure from the family-oriented views that had characterised his Treatise and had so closely resembled those of Japanese Buddhist reformers (Jaffe 2001, 165-241). Indeed, in A Terrible Fate, family is the locus of problems. As Walraven has recently noted, the “modernistic discourse” found in Han was also characterised by “Confucian prejudices” (Walraven 2007, 20). It is, therefore, not surprising to find both tension and accord between such modernising impulses and Confucian prejudices in Han’s “Remarks.” Indeed, A Terrible Fate encapsulates Han’s views on literature (nothing wrong with aiming for popularity), his roles as a publisher and writer (aim for the largest possible audience), and his career as a Buddhist (propagate Buddhism at the grassroots level). Yet the story he told veered uncomfortably close to a form of Buddhist superstition that he himself had condemned from early in his career. In
effect, *A Terrible Fate* marked the culmination and undoing of a career of writing to propagate a modern form of Korean Buddhism through mass print in the vernacular.

5. CONCLUSION

As Buswell has noted, the “religious lassitude” of Chosŏn-dynasty Buddhism was exacerbated by “the inability of Buddhists to spread their message beyond the confines of the monastery” (Buswell 1997, 119). However, this was no longer true by the early twentieth century. Modern print enabled Buddhists to spread their message, but that capability raised the question: what was that message? Indeed, modern print created (or at least, highlighted) a predicament that still exists: Buddhist monks must balance the teachings of their religion with the needs of the laity (cf. Buswell 1997, 118-120).

In the case of the Buddhist reform movement in Korea during the colonial period, it is thus possible to see the use of modern mass print as part of a more fundamental tension between literate and oral cultures. Indeed, McHale’s summary of the Buddhist reform movement in Vietnam sounds uncannily familiar: “a movement by literate, text-oriented monks to develop a print culture that would eradicate the practices of oral culture” (McHale 2004, 160). Yet for all Han’s criticisms of the Buddhism of such an oral culture and all his activities on behalf of a modern print culture to support a modern Buddhism, in *A Terrible Fate*, he too found it difficult to imagine a modern Buddhism that would appeal to readers or indeed, even suffice to save his protagonist.

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Factors influencing labour migration of Korean women into the entertainment and sex industry in Australia

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ABSTRACT

Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of Korean women have migrated overseas to find work in the entertainment and sex industry. Over this time Australia has become one of the key destinations for these women. This paper explores recent patterns of migration of Korean women into Australia and their experience of working in the Australian entertainment and sex industry. Informed by the findings of semi-structured in-depth interviews with 21 Korean workers, this paper identifies various pull and push factors that may contribute to migration flow of Korean women into the Australian entertainment and sex industry. With the primary factor underlying their decision to be financial, that is the capacity to earn more money, other influential factors are related to the global trend of internationalisation of employment; the increased internationalisation of Korean culture; established networks of international employment; the use of an effective means of recruitment; economic conditions in Korea; Australian immigration laws; the relatively more constraining Korean legal regime governing operation of the sex industry; and the demand in Australia.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of Korean women have migrated overseas to find work in the entertainment and sex industry. Over this time Australia has become one of the key destinations for these women. Investigations by government and law enforcement agencies in Australia observe that a significant number of Korean nationals have worked, both lawfully and unlawfully, in the sex industry in Australia. The Attorney-General’s Department confirmed that, between 1 March 2004 and 31 March 2007, 530 Korean nationals were found working lawfully in the sex industry in Australia and 135 Korean nationals were found working unlawfully in the same industry (e-mail communication, 2007). A government report on non-Australian citizens working in the sex industry over a twelve-month period in 2004/05 shows that the top nationality in this category was South Koreans (Australian National Audit Office, 2006, 75). The record also shows that Working Holiday (WH) visas were the most favoured visa class for these Korean sex workers (208 holding WH visas out of the 244 cases identified). In the financial year 2004-05, 222 South Korean WH visa holders were encountered workinglawfully in the Australian sex industry, with 16 found in New South Wales. In the financial year 2003/2004, 63 South Korean WH visa holders were found working lawfully in the sex industry, with 52 found in NSW (ANAO, 2006).

Despite the growing number of Korean women working in the Australian sex industry, due to the often stigmatised nature of their work, very little is known about the nature of their migration or their life and work in Australia. This research explores recent patterns of migration of Korean women into Australia and their experience of working in the Australian entertainment and sex industry. Specifically, it identifies key “pull” and “push” factors of migration flow of Korean women to Australia and explores various aspects of their living and working conditions in Australia.
2. METHODOLOGY

The paper is the result of analysis of data related to Korea women working in the entertainment and sex industry in Australia collected between February 2007 and April 2008. It is based on three distinct forms of information: (i) quantitative information derived from survey questionnaires answered by 21 Korean women who worked or have been working in the entertainment and sex industry in Australia, (ii) qualitative information derived from in-depth interviews with 21 Korean women, (iii) data collected from interviews and written communications with 13 informants government/non-government organisations and the industry, which had extensive knowledge about and experience of working with Korean sex workers in Australia. Relevant secondary source materials, including articles in the Korean and Australian media, academic publications and government and NGO reports, were also used.

Due to the nature of the work the women did, gaining access to Korean women working in the entertainment and sex industry in Australia was not easy. Two strategies were used to allow the researcher to approach potential interview participants. Firstly, organisations that were supposed to have a high level of contact with sex workers in Australia were contacted and asked to help with the recruitment of potential interview participants. They were asked to make initial contact with potential interviewees, using their established contact with Korean workers. Some organisations agreed to distribute leaflets to their Korean service users requesting participants. Korean community organisations were also used as a contact point to Korean women. Secondly, advertisements on community papers and internet websites were used to approach a broader group of Korean women working in Australia. As a result, a small number of women responded to the leaflet and advertisements and agreed to participate in the interviews. Snowballing methods were also employed with each interviewee being asked if they could suggest other potential interviewees at the end of the interview.

3. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

The women interviewed worked in a range of workplaces including karaoke bars, room salons (hostess bars), massage parlours and brothels. Each type of establishments had different sets of working hours and conditions. They were willing participants in the industry and many were lured by job advertisements, readily available on the internet, which often exaggerated the benefits of a move into the industry. Also despite their legal status (the majority had a working holiday visa that allowed them to work up to 20 hours a week), they were, in many cases and to different extents, victims of deception, exploitation, control and illegal activities. They were often vulnerable to verbal abuse and other controlling behaviour by their brothel owners, managers, and/or madams which were often enforced through a long list of house rules related to being late, absent or quitting without due notice. These rules were often subject to changes at employers’ discretion. More than half the women felt that they were deceived about their eventual working conditions and found their working conditions to be either worse or much worse than what they expected or heard. This was particularly the case among karaoke and room salon workers. Even though it was not directly ‘sex work’, being unknown to most outside the Korean community, including Australian service providers and authorities, their work usually had a sexual aspect. To outsiders operators generally inferred that they were only expected to provide routine waitress style services. This had the effect of making essentially invisible in the Australia labour market. With most officials unaware of their real role these workers fell outside existing legal structures, and in this study we found
they were more likely than sex workers to be subject to exploitation and poor working conditions.

Interviewees frequently revealed during their interviews that Korean employers were more likely than employers of other ethnicities to, in different ways, control their employees through withholding (referred euphemistically as “managing”) their earnings, or dictating to women their working times and the fees they charged. Despite their various social and health needs, many women had little information about the mechanisms or sources of support they could access and only received or expected to receive limited support from informal sources such as from other friends in the industry, customers or family in Korea. The research also found that the existence of brokers in Korea connected to employers in Australia; friends or colleagues already employed in Australia; and the availability of a visa that allows visa holders to work, namely the Working Holiday scheme, facilitated their entry into the Australian sex and entertainment industry.

In addition to having to deal with abuse, disrespect and maltreatment by the employers and/or customers, these women from Korea often encountered difficulties when attempting to access health and other services. They said that there was a lack of external sources of support in general with several reports of a relative poor quality of life and suffering from feelings of social isolation. How well these women coped with difficulties and problems tended to be contingent on various other factors including the existence of friends doing the same work nearby; various individual characteristics such as individuals personality; the short and long term personal goals of individuals; the relative value they placed on the money earned from their work; the degree to which they felt that had control over their situation; and religious beliefs.

4. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF KOREAN WOMEN INTO AUSTRALIA

In this research, Korean women’s movement to and employment in the Australian entertainment and sex industry was always the result of their voluntarily choice. In-depth interviews with these women, however, suggest that their choice has been influenced by various forces, both structural and situational, at play. Although economic necessity was often the primary motivation, there was a diversity of economic, social and individual circumstances shaping their motivation. In most cases, women did not have one single reason but a combination of many reasons that led them to come to Australia and find a job in the sex and entertainment industry: for better employment prospects; for better income; to obtain a new life experience; to learn English; to extend their study abroad; to support family members back home, to pay off personal debts; or to gather capital for starting their own businesses. This suggests that the importation of Korean women into the Australian entertainment and sex industry cannot be attributed to a single factor but to many interrelating factors and that it should be understood within the context of interconnected economic, social, cultural and political realities.

Their migration dynamic in particular reflected the interplay of ‘push’ factors and ‘pull’ factors. Push factors may include negative aspects that make them leave Korea such as: economic motives; the trend of global movement; increased internationalisation of Korean culture; economic conditions in Korea; and the relatively more constraining Korean legal regime governing operation of the sex industry. Pull factors may include positive aspects that induce them to come to Australia such as: established networks of international employment and their use of effective means of recruitment; immigration laws and prostitution laws in Australia, and the demand in Australia. In fact, these factors
are closely related to each other to have compound impact on Korean women’s migration into the Australian entertainment and sex industry.

4-1. Economic motives

In all cases of Korean women interviewed in this study, the major motivation for their involvement in the Australian entertainment or sex industry was usually economic necessities, although also influenced by social and individual circumstances. The social reality that entertainment or sex work could earn more money than other work available to them might also have influenced their choice of work in Australia. Although, in most cases of the women, data was not available to indicate the socio-economic level of their family in Korea, the women were not necessarily from the lowest-income families in Korea and it was not necessarily poverty but economic necessity that played the most significant role in their entering into the industry in Australia. For various reasons depending on the individual situation, all the women wanted to make money more than they could do from doing other work. All agreed that it was all about money. Priority was on making as much as possible as fast as possible. Some had to earn their living or support their families back home. Others needed to earn large sums of money to take home or to finance particular goals, such as more study, paying off personal debts, or gathering capital for starting their own businesses or for the lease/purchase of an apartment. Half of 10 sex workers interviewed were financing or had financed their study in Australia through their work. With little language and more limited job options in Australia, many women were easily placed in economic difficulty, which pressured them to turn their eyes to entertainment or sex work as it was one of the fast and available ways in which they could earn their living. As one karaoke worker put:

“When working at a restaurant, I could hardly afford to pay the rent. Although I worked eight hours a day, seven days a week, there was always no money left for me. Then I got involved in this work in a hope to make money little easily. Now I can afford to send some money to my parents (W, 24, karaoke worker)”.

The fact that such work paid more than many other jobs available to them as well as offered comparatively flexible working hours might have functioned positively on their decision to enter the industry. They all agreed that money was the major attraction that pulled and kept them into the industry. Sex-related workers, in particular, often believed that this was the only way to improve their material position. One woman claimed that growing up in a poor family often increased these women’s likelihood to become economically and emotionally needy and attracted to luxurious life style that sex work could offer. She explained:

“Except for some, most of working girls are from a relatively poor family. They do this work only for money. For all that, there’re some girls who rather spend their money on luxury shopping. But I understand them. They may be trying to get what they were never able to get (M, 29, brothel worker)”.

After all, it was money that made them enter and remain in this line of work. As another put:

“My initial intention was to work just for two weeks in order to earn money for my enrolment in college. But the money that I could earn from this job made me continue to work for more than a year. For anyone who wishes to start this work, I’d like to advice to think twice (C, 25, room salon worker)”.

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4-2. The trend of globalisation and internationalisation in Korea

The overriding trends of globalisation and internationalisation in Korea might have impacted on the increasing importation of Korean women into Australia. One of characteristics of the process of globalisation and internationalisation in Korea is that it has led to an increase in the numbers of Koreans venturing overseas to travel, study, in particular to learn English (Shin, 2003). Many women in this study indicated that one reason they came to Australia was to have the opportunity to travel around in a new country and learn English. A small percentage did not have a sex work experience back in Korea but willingly choose to entry the Australian industry as it gave them the opportunity to experience a foreign country. Fuelled by the spirit of adventure, they often perceived and described their involvement in the Australian entertainment or sex industry to be a short-lived and auxiliary part of their global exploration.

Their movement to Australia, in fact, corresponds with a fast-growing global trend since the 1980s, that is feminised labour migration especially in the sex industry (Gallin, 2003). This trend has often thrived on a structural process of chain migration in which individuals who have already found employment in the overseas market arrange for their friends or colleagues in the home country to follow (as explained by Kempadoo and Doezema, 1998, 247). For the majority of the women in this study as well, friends with an experience of working in Australia were an important source of job information and a motivating force in their coming to and employment in Australia (see Table 1). With the help of friends already in the Australian industry, many said they were able to get enough information about possible risks before they came to Australia. By the same token, they were well aware of the need not to be controlled by employers by making contracts or receiving advance money but to choose employers that adhered to good practices.

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<th>Table 1: Information source of employment in Australia</th>
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<tr>
<td>Work type</td>
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<td>Internet(broker)</td>
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<td>Community magazines</td>
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4-3. Established networks of international employment and the use of an effective means of recruitment

International employment networks based in Korea and the use of an effective means of recruitment may have played a significant role in the entry of Korean women into the Australian entertainment and sex industry. As outlined earlier, various media articles have reported that established organised networks between organisers in Korea and operators in Australia are heavily involved in small/medium-scale operations that legally or illegally recruit and bring in Korean women into Australia. These networks have developed effective recruiting techniques. Publicising tempting job offers through the use of various channels, from advertisements in the press to posting blogs on the internet, they have been able to take advantage of modern technology to achieve their goal. The use of internet, in
particular, offers recruiters a user-friendly, fast and anonymous means of recruiting accessible to a broad group of women.

Interview findings also suggest that there were a large number of recruiters in Korea who were working as agents for Australia-based Korean recruiters of entertainment and sex workers. To maximise their business profit, many of the Korean business owners and madams in Australia seemed to be linked to these agents in Korea and form a group of organisers to bring in women. These people usually formed a small group of organisers (e.g. two or three people) rather than a large organised crime group as their importation of the Korean women into Australia did not necessarily require illegal activities such as the production of fraudulent documentation. According to the interview data, a group of organisers often included one or two females, typically madams. These madams seem to play an important role in advertising and making contact with the women. One woman, working as a massage parlour madam, explained:

“The recruitment of the workers is usually the responsibility of the madam. I use this particular internet website based in Korea to recruit Korean girls. I constantly put an ad on it. If I successfully bring in a girl, I get $1,000 per person from the business owner. Brokers get the same amount (D, 28, massage worker)”.

Many women were lured by job advertisements that exaggerated the benefits of working and living in Australia. One woman said:

“Overstated advertisements are really responsible. They say you can earn $2,000 a week and you’re given a free airline ticket if you work more than six months. If you’ve been in the industry for many years and become an old face, it sounds worthwhile as it’ll at least give you an opportunity for overseas travel (R, 22, karaoke worker)”.

4-4. Economic conditions in Korea

The economic conditions in Korea represented by the economic downturn and increasingly limited employment options for young people might be another push factor. Interviews with many women indicated that the economic downturn in Korea (especially since the Asian economic crisis or in Korea the so-called IMF crisis in later 1990s) was pushing more and more women to migrate overseas in search of work and take up employment in the sex and entertainment industry. Many women suggested that the decline was concentrated at the low-price end of the market, which may be responsible for their coming to Australia. One karaoke worker explained:

“The new laws might have had some impacts. But it is business as usual. The depressed economy rather led many customers to tighten their pockets. And the business got more and more competitive. Competition amongst girls got keener and keener. The top 10% of girls earn an extremely high income when the rest struggle to survive. The gap in their incomes sometimes becomes as big as more than 100 million won a month. For me, things are rather better here in Australia (S, 25, karaoke worker)”.

Related to economic downturn another push factor may be the growing unemployment rate among young people in Korea. According to a recent OECD report (Organisation for Economic co-operation and Development, 2007), the employment rate of young people in Korea remains relatively low, at 27% in 2006, compared with the OECD average of 43%. It is also reported that increasingly young Koreans are taking on "non-regular" positions (e.g. part-time or fixed-term jobs) with none of the security or benefits offered in regular employment (Fifield, 2008). In addition, with the world’s highest rate of higher education
enrolment, unemployed college-educated young people account for more than one-third of unemployed youth in Korea today (Bae and Song, 2006). It has also been argued that in Korea higher educational qualifications may not necessarily offer a substantial advantage in the labour market in Korea (Bae and Song, 2006). This circumstance means a more limited range of employment opportunities are available for young women like those in this study. With or without higher educational qualifications, many women in this study were previously engaged in low-paid work and often found it difficult to support themselves in Korea. Some faced difficulties in obtaining employment elsewhere before they entered the sex and entertainment industry. Under this circumstance, many women in this study sought opportunities for overseas employment and found them in the Australian entertainment and sex industry as they could more easily avoid detection of their work from family and friends.

4-5. Immigration laws (WH visa)

Australia’s Working Holiday (WH) visa may be also important in influencing the influx of the Korean women into the Australian sex and entertainment industry. Australia allows Korean women to come on a working holiday visa and work as a sex worker. Unless there is a breach of visa conditions or any indication of sexual slavery or people trafficking, Australian law enforcement agencies are not required to take any action against sex workers on WH visas. Korea is one of the main source countries of working holiday makers in Australia. In this study as well, the majority of women also came to Australia on working holiday visas. They often referred to easy access to visas and work permit under the working holiday makers program (e.g. internet application and no requirement for language test) as a reason for their choice to come to Australia. One said:

“Compared to U.S. and other countries, it is very easy to get a visa for travel to and work in Australia due to Working Holiday visa. Some countries like Japan and Canada, although also offering WH visa, require some kinds of language test (H, 28, brothel worker)”.

A recent audit report on visa management in Australia (ANAO, 2006) indicates that recent government attempts to prevent temporary residents from working in the sex industry did not progress due to the legality of sex work in Australia. In Australia, there is still a discussion about the need to review elements of the WH visa arrangements in Australia, which can be abused by migrant sex workers, business operators or traffickers. The Australian government, in particular, suspects a link to an organised racket trading in sex workers using the WH visa (ANAO, 2006). Oppositions such as the Sex Workers Association, however, say that banning foreigners on temporary visas from working in the sex and entertainment industry in Australia could result in stimulating the growth in the illegal brothels and underground sex trade (Han, 2007). They say that, even without the WH visa scheme, many women would come and work illegally in Australia.

4-6. 2004 new anti-prostitution laws in Korea

Another push factor behind Korean women’s entry into the Australian entertainment and sex industry may be the more constraining legal regime governing operation of the sex industry under the new anti-prostitution laws in Korea. While the illegality of sex work has been reinforced in Korea, sex work is largely legal in Australia2, even for migrant workers with a temporary work permit. A dramatic increase in the number of Korean

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1 The higher education enrolment rate, as in 2006, reaches 70% and around 80 % of high school girls enrol the higher educational institutions in Korea (Kim, 2008).
2 Prostitution itself is not illegal in Australia whereas laws regarding brothels vary according to states. In some states, brothels are regulated by local council planning laws while they are illegal in others.
nationals who received WH visas since 2004 may reflect the growing number of sex workers who entered Australia as an effect of the 2004 new anti-prostitution law in Korea. One explained; “It [the new law] in fact made many working girls come to Australia. Although there are a lot of businesses still operating, it certainly became little harder to make money there [in Korea] (M, 29, brothel worker)”.

More notable with the new law, is that it seems to have an impact not only on the women only but also on the business operators, presumably those who might have been forced out of Korea as a result of the new anti-prostitution law. Research findings suggest that they often set up a business in Australia and brought in work practices as well as the women from Korea. In media reports seen earlier, Korean victims of sex trafficking were usually found in Korean-owned/operating businesses, which were suspected of having connections to the sex trade, organized crime and human trafficking operations.

4-7. Demand in Australia

The increasing importation of Korean women into the Australian entertainment and sex industry is in part attributable to a growth in demand for sex and entertainment related services provided by Asians, which is closely related to the flourishing of Asian-style entertainment and sex-related businesses (e.g. karaoke bars, room salons, massage parlours, brothels) during recent decades in Australia. This growth may in part be attributed to the growth in Asian immigration into Australia. There are other signs that there is strong demand for Korean sex workers. We reviewed the advertisements for adult services that featured in a local community magazine in Sydney, called ‘Central’ issued on 12 December 2007. We found that 70% of the 20 advertisements offered sexual services from Asian females and of them, over 40% mentioned Korean women or more commonly they used the term “girls”. One anonymous source from the industry (a man who identified himself as a Korean brothel employee and gave an account of the industry) estimated that over 60 % of the sex businesses in Sydney were owned by Asian-Australians (mostly Chinese and a small number of Koreans), of whom many were former sex workers themselves. He said:

After three to four years in business, these women get to learn how easily the business makes money and, in some cases, start their own business. This has facilitated a rapid increase of Asian businesses in the sex industry in Australia. Men tend to shop around and seek new faces, which has also contributed to the expansion of the industry (telephone interview, 2007).

In Australia, concerns have arisen that the proliferation of Asian brothels has resulted in a huge supply of imported illegal labour (Clennell, 1999; Orhant, 2000). The supply of Korean women into the Australian entertainment and sex industry can also be explained in part by the profitable nature of bringing Korean women into the industry. One key informant said that an increasing number of Asian-run businesses hire Korean women (usually on temporary visas) and regularly place ads for workers in Korean on the internet, or in newspapers or community magazines. In the case of Korean employers, young Korean women may be preferred as they share a common language and cultural background. However, their temporary visa status and often their limited knowledge of standard industry practices in Australia, may mean that they less pay and poor working conditions that local employees and are thus a source of greater profits.

5. Conclusion

Many people, particularly those with little exposure to or knowledge of the sex and entertainment industry, may be inclined to judge Korean women in this industry as being
at best opportunistic and at worst morally questionable. Even when they get to learn about
the plight of these women, many may still blame the women for “choosing” to put
themselves in such a situation. But “choice” must be placed in a complex context. These
women might have made such decisions in extraordinarily difficult circumstances, their
choice may be between a host of undesirable options. Others are doing the best for
themselves and /or those they support. As a society we should stay focussed on how best
we can protect these women from abuse and exploitation and ensure their basic human
rights and welfare.

Through findings drawn from survey questionnaires, in-depth interviews and
secondary data, this research generate not only greater understanding of the difficulties
and problems that Korean entertainment and sex workers experience in Australia but how
Australian and Korean policy makers and community services organisations can best
design and target services to support them. Through its capacity to combat the spread of
deceptive or abusive conduct legal and community services and support can be a key way
of protecting the rights of migrant sex workers and reducing the risk of them becoming
further marginalised. What is required will be a concerted and coordinated effort at all
levels from policy makers and law, migration and health related government agencies to
community service organisations and other NGOs and individuals within the community.

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The Xiongny archaeology: questioning the connection between the traditions of the early Mongols and ancient Koreans

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ABSTRACT

The archaeology of the Xiongny demonstrated the presence of considerable settled population with plough agriculture and developed pig breeding, possessing the Far Eastern type of heating system (kans) and many objects originating from the eastern Asian cultures.

Scholars, basing on archaeological, ethnographic and lingual findings, distinguished in the Northern China the Mongol-Manchou-Korean centre of the ancient agriculture. It is this cultural centre which he tied the appearance of such a specific heating system as kan with. Scholars agree in that kans are not typical of the Chinese culture and the formation of heating systems of the type is connected with the territories of Korea. We have suggested that the term of kan has been kept in the Buryat language. The Korean name for kan is gudyl, ondoli. In the Buryat language there is the word handali with the meaning of “a seat, a bench”. Not only the phonetic closeness of the Korean and the Buryat words ondoli - handali is obvious here but also the common sources of formation of the notion of kan. We state that the Xiongny agriculture and the settled mode of life are to be connected with the traditions of the early Mongols and ancient Koreans.

The Xiongny archaeology was first pointed out in Buryatia by Yu. D. Talko-Gryntsevitch (1899). He mentioned the three necropolises with princes’ tombs, about 30 ordinary cemeteries and a big number of the Xiongny culture artifacts. Besides there are 3 fortified settlements and 5 unfortified ones. The Xiongny monuments are mostly found along the valley of the Selenga and its tributaries – the Dzhida, the Khilok and the Chikoi.

It was the Chinese chroniclers who created the image of a nomad people wandering along the edgeless steppes in search of subsistence: “… have no towns, no settled life, no agriculture …” (Bichurin, 1950).

Nevertheless archaeological excavations in Buryatia called in question the chronicler’s phrase about the absence of settled life and agriculture among the Xiongny. G. P. Sosnovskii, stated the existence of settlements among them and came to conclude that they led a semi-nomad life (1934). The new excavations of the Xiongny settlements, even in the small number of the studied monuments, prove the high level of settled agriculture. It follows from this that archaeology of the Xiongny is a complex where nomadic and settled modes of life are closely interrelated. These two modes of life supplement each other and present an entire social phenomenon.

The Xiongny erected settlement’s complexes of various kinds. The Ivolginskoye settlement by the city of Ulan-Ude is fortified by several rows of moats and ramparts; inside there are dwellings and household constructions. Also there are some monuments analogous to the settlement of Bayan-Under which probably served as palace-seats of the

1 This research was made possible by support of RFN № 08-06-00328; RFH № 08-01-00390.
local leaders. The unfortified settlements are have also been studied. They occupied rather large areas in the basins of the Chikoi – the Durena and of the Dzhida – the Yenkhor.

The Ivolginskoye settlement is one of the most deeply studied fortified settlements of the Xiongny. The long-term excavations undertaken by A. V. Davydyova and following publications serve as an important source of reconstruction of the settled life of the Xiongny society (1995, 1996). The settlement was located at the bank of the Selenga's tributary. The settlement occupied a rather large area of a rectangular shape 348 x 216 m., edged by a water barrier – the bed of the river on one side, and on the three other sides – by moats and ramparts. According to the plans the Ivolginskoye settlement had a linear scheme of building development and the dwellings were constructed by straight streets leading to the river. The studying of the part of the settlement revealed the constructions of various functions – dwellings, production, administrative and household objects.

It is dwellings that have been most deeply studied. The most prevailing type of a dwelling is a dugout and a semi-dugout with a dabbled roof. In the corner of a dugout there was a stove made of stone slabs. From the stove along the walls of the dwelling stretched a flue which also served as a heating canal – kan. Alongside the dugouts there were on-ground dwellings in the settlement. A rather prospering household is proved by a big number of pits – cellars, covered by tops, in which grain, meat, fish, forage could be kept. The ingrained features of a settled mode of life are also testified by the well which was constructed between the two dwellings; the walls of it strengthened by a square frame.

The materials, obtained at the excavations of the settlement and the entombment, give the complete notion of household mode of the Xiongny. The herd is determined by the bone remains. It is of importance that alongside such animals as the horse, the cattle, the sheep and the goat the Xiongny also had the pig and the dog as domesticated animals. They also kept the domesticated birds: the bones of the hen have also been found in the excavations.

The high level of agriculture is demonstrated by cast-iron ploughshares, tips of shovels, mattocks, sickles, millstones found at the excavations. The museum collections and the findings of the excavations in the Ivolginskoye settlement and in the settlement of Durena present more than 30 ploughshares. The Xiongny cultivated the soil not only with ploughshares but also with shovels and mattocks. There have been found grains of such cereals cultivated by the Xiongny as millet, barley and wheat at Ivolginskoye settlement. Grains of millet have also been found in the two graves of Ilmovaya pad and in one of the barrows of the Noyin-Ula. The crops was picked up with sickle-like knives 17-20 cm long and sickles. The grain was milled with millstones, samples of which are found in the materials of the explored settlements. The grain was kept in cellars of round shape which were about 2 m in diameter and 1,5 m in depth, and also in huge ceramic vessels (at Ivolginskoye settlement there have been found a pot 1,09 m high and 0,75 m in diameter).

A. V. Davydyova was the first scholar to study the settled life traditions in the Xiongny culture in details. The question arose – should scholars connect the agricultural findings with the Xiongny culture? Basing on the evidence of written sources about the presence of Chinese deserters and captives among the Xiongny and on the anthropological analysis inclined in favour of the connection of the settled mode of life features of the Xiongny with Chinese ethnic surrounding (1985). D. L. Brodianskii also considered the builders of the Xiongny kams to be Far Eastern craftsmen (1985).

There also have been stated other opinions. G. P. Sosnovskii and A. P. Okladnikov though the Xiongny to be the bearers of the settled traditions. S. V. Kisselyev shared the
opinion. According to him, it was very doubtful that Chinese farmers or deserters being in the position of captives could have the right to erect fortified settlements (1957). S. I. Rudenko also supported the idea of the inherent settled tradition among the Xiongnu but along with significant borrowings from China. Among the borrowings he pointed plough agriculture; eating rice, moreover, with bone sticks; the Chinese type of the semi-dugouts; the best samples of the ceramics; the wooden lacquer plaits; the part of the bronze works and definitely, silk fibers (1962).

An assumption has been made by some scholars that Mongols are the people of Eastern Asian origin and the genesis of Mongolian culture is connected to the regions of the Far East (Tamya Jitsuro, 1973); Kyzlasov, 1975; Kychanov, 1980; Dashibalov, 2003). The archaeological distinguishing features of the early Mongols are the developed settled tradition, expressed in square houses with kams, the agriculture, pig breeding and domesticating of the dog.

The entire complex is the most distinctly demonstrated by the materials of the Xiongnu settlements of Buryatia. It is here where the dwellings with kams have been studied, and there have been found more bones of the pig and the dog than those of the horse and the sheep. It is noteworthy that the dog is represented here by the three breeds – the husky, the big wolf-like dog and the dog. It is rather striking that the reminiscence of the ancient agriculture, pig breeding has been kept in the Buryat folklore (Dashibalov, 2004). The mode of life of Ivolginskoye settlement is revealed in the Buryat saying: «The pork is delicious, the life in a dugout is warm». It is significant that in the Buryat language there is a widely spread expression «dogs and pigs», it is used when speaking about domestic animals in the collective meaning. It is important to say that the part of the terminology, connected with agriculture, and also the term “pig” is of the Mongolian origin proper (Starikov, 1967; Rassadin, 1984).

We have suggested that the term of kan has been kept in the Buryat language. The Korean name for kan is gudyl, ondoli. In the Buryat language there is the word handali with the meaning of “a seat, a bench”. Not only the phonetic closeness of the Korean and the Buryat words ondoli - handali is obvious here but also the common sources of formation of the notion of kan.

Thus, the data of archaeological monuments of Buryatia distinctly demonstrate that the settled agricultural complex of the Xiongnu has obvious eastern Asian roots – among them are semi-dugouts with kams, agricultural instruments of cast-iron, cultivating of the millet, ceramics traditions. We state that the Xiongnu agriculture and the settled mode of life are to be connected with the traditions of the early Mongols.

Among medieval Mongolian nations, Kidans received wide popularity. They were known to have a cult of pigs. Their culture originated in South Manchuria, a region with an ancient tradition of pig-breeding. V. Starikov has published quite interesting materials connected with the cult of pigs. There are Mongols in South China, YunNan province. They have been dwelling there since the times of Qubilai Qahan (Yuan dynasty, XIII-XIV centuries). They are surrounded by the Chinese and Dungan nations who call them “MengGu”. Their self-name is “MengGuWa, MengGuLe». On their ancestors day these Mongols slaughter pigs in order to sacrifice them to their spirits.

Mongols are mentioned in Mongolian chronicles as MengWu or MengWa. Sources say that they “… use pigs and dogs as their domestic cattle. They are fattened for slaughter”. Consequently, pigs and dogs are among the main animals bred by Mongols.
We have to pay attention to the fact that the term gahai “pig” is an independent one in the Mongolian language. This is a proof of independent pig-breeding.

There is an excellent Buryat proverb: “Dalain olzo dalan honogoi, daidyn olzo dalan zheleki” - “Marine quarry lasts seventy days, soil crops last seventy years”. Central Asian cattle-breeders did fishing in a sea so the event of receiving enough food for seventy days came into a proverb. The names of marine animals are well preserved in Mongolian languages: Buryat hab zagahan, Khalkha-Mongolian hav zagas, Kalmyk hav “seal”; Buryat and Khalkha-Mongolian halim “whale”. Besides, the Mongolian language has such a notion as whalebone - elzhin. Rivers and lakes of Mongolia and Buryatia have no place and lamprocy, but their names are present in the language – halbin u mud zagas. Probably, ancient Mongols’ ancestors ate marine trepangs (holothurian). The Mongolian word hizhi points at this. It is also important that the Mongolian language has independent words which stand for animal fat (oooh) and fish fat (eer). Also, animal and fish bones are divided in the language.

Marco Polo’s book contains directions to Mongols’ native land and the culture of their ancestors. In the chapter which describes the city of Qara-qorum it is said that Tatars had lived in the land of Juurchets with large rivers and enough water, from that land “they moved northwards to the grassland all together”. Describing Mongolian food, Marco Polo notices twice that Mongols eat horse-flesh and dog-flesh. Here we see two different traditions mingled. Horse-flesh belongs to the nomadic milieu while dog-flesh is a favorite meal of Oriental nations. Just as the bed (ondoli) was a rudimentary element in the XIII century yurt (according to “The Secret History of the Mongols”), so dog-flesh remained in the Mongolian cuisine, according to Marco Polo. Marco Polo describes the palace of Qubilai with “a large lake and many different fish. The Great Qahan ordered to take in fishes and eat every time they wanted to”. Marco Polo testifies that Mongols had a god Nachigai by name, the protector of their sons, cattle, and bread, which is significant. Marco Polo also mentions that there were many swine in Mangi area.

The latest genetic research of Buryats have shown their closeness to Koreans which is quite clear if we take into consideration the given material.

Thus, the archaeology of the Xiongny demonstrated the presence of considerable settled population with plough agriculture and developed pig breeding, possessing the Far Eastern type of heating system (kans) and many objects originating from the eastern Asian cultures. Should these traits be related to the Chinese ethnos alone or to some other people of the Far Eastern origin?

There is a considerable basis for considering the eastern Asian complex in the Hunnu culture to be related to Mongols. V. S. Starikov, basing on archaeological, ethnographic and lingual findings, distinguished in the Northern China the Mongol-Mancheszhu-Korean centre of the ancient agriculture. It is this cultural centre which he tied the appearance of such a specific heating system as kan with. Scholars agree in that kans are not typical of the Chinese culture and the formation of heating systems of the type is connected with the territories of the Russian far East and Northern Korea (Artemyeva, 1988). D. L. Brodyanski consider that kan appeared in the Far Eastern part of the area of its spreading, among such cultures as krounovckaya, tkhesonry (Korea), the upper layer Xia-jia-dian (1985). It is important to note that one of the mentioned cultures – upper layer Xia-jia-dian – is related to the ancient Mongols.

“The Secret History of the Mongols” is a so-called life encyclopedia of the 13th century Mongols. Meanwhile, this source contains quite rare and, consequently, even more valuable proofs of the fact that Mongols had been living in quite different, non-nomadic conditions before they inhabited Central Asian grasslands.

A study of “The Secret History” shows that fishing preserved its significant role in the economy of medieval Mongols: when children, Chingghis Qahan and his brothers went fishing at Onoron river (16. p.24). Fishing was widely spread at Kilkho river.

Language expressions of the XIII century which have preserved in the “Secret History” are a testimony of the former significance of fishing. For example, “The Secret History of the Mongols” contains proverbs which could not emerge under a grassland nomadic way of living. The genesis of these proverbs is connected with a culture which was acquainted with fishing. When Chingghis Qahan sends his true friend Suebe’eteyi to take hold of the sons of Toqto’a, he uses an undoubtedly ancient expression: “If they become fish and [swim] into the Tenggis ocean, will you, Suebe’eteyi, not become a large-game net, a small-game net, scooping and netting them up?” (16. p.95). In another example, when in 1231 Ogoedei Qahan rode out against China and fell ill, Prince Tolui who was beside him, said: “I have split the trout’s back and sliced the sturgeon’s back” (16. p.140).

Judging by the first Russian translation of “The Secret History of the Mongols” by P.Kafirow, even in Chingghis Qahan’s times Mongols would construct wooden beds in their yurts made of felt. Those beds imitated traditional Oriental plank beds. The Chinese text of “The Secret History of the Mongols” contains a description of how Temuejin’s foes were looking for him by “looking in the yurt, the cart, and under the bed”. P.Kafirow explains that the plank bed is the scaffolding “set up in the yurt for sitting and lying”. Here we provide different variants of the translation: S.A. Kozina – “looking in the yurt, the carts, and everywhere, even under the beds”; Ch.-R. Namzhilov’s Buryat translation from Mongolian - «Gerten oro zho oro dere, tushelgetei handali doogurn» (16. p.29). In the second translation it is seen that the Buryat name for “bed” – handali - is close to the Korean pronunciation of the word “plank bed” – ondoli (11).

One more fact is of interest to us. It is mentioned in “The Secret History” that people who dwelt in the valley of the Selenga river would pound millet in mortars. It is possible that the Merkits could be engaged in agriculture (16. p.61). It is also interesting to mention that little Temuejin was afraid of dogs, as mentioned in the source. It is hard to see now whether this could be a real fact or it could have some hidden sense. In Mongolian tales, dogs have been looked upon as ancestors (G. Potanin’s materials). According to Chinese chronicles, ancient Mongols of the Dunkhu and Wuhuan tribes had the cult of dog.

Marco Polo’s book contains directions to Mongols’ native land and the culture of their ancestors. In the chapter which describes the city of Qara-qorum it is said that Tatars had lived in the land of Juercets with large rivers and enough water, from that land “they moved northwards to the grassland all together”(13. p.232). Describing Mongolian food, Marco Polo notices twice that Mongols eat horse-flesh and dog-flesh (13. pp. 236, 306). Here we see two different traditions mingled. Horse-flesh belongs to the nomadic milieu while dog-flesh is a favorite meal of Oriental nations, Koreans, for instance. Just as the
bed (ondoli) was a rudimentary element in the XIII century yurt (according to “The Secret History of the Mongols”), so dog-flesh remained in the Mongolian cuisine, according to Marco Polo. Marco Polo describes the palace of Qubilai with “a large lake and many different fish. The Great Qahan ordered to take in fishes and eat every time they wanted to” (13. p.251). Marco Polo testifies that Mongols had a god Nachigai by name, the protector of their sons, cattle, and bread, which is significant. Marco Polo also mentions that there were many swine in Mangi area.

Thus, “The Secret History of the Mongols” and Marco Polo’s book contain data which deal with non-nomadic, non-grassland way of living.

The first investigators of Mongolian history considered them to be native dwellers of Central Asian grasslands. In the end of the XIX century, runic writing monuments and ancient Turkic statues were discovered in Mongolia (6). This was a proof of the fact that medieval Mongolia had been inhabited by ancient Turkic nations. A study of the Altaic languages has shown that most of the Mongolian words which reflect grassland landscape and fauna have been borrowed by Mongols from Turks (5; 14; 18). Consequently, linguistics data have pointed that Mongols inhabited the grasslands later than Turks. Meanwhile, translations of Chinese materials have shown that Mongols inhabited regions to the East of Xing An mountains (15).

Science has two hypotheses on the origin of the Mongols. They are the indigenous hypothesis and the migration hypothesis. We have decided to see if these hypotheses are true. For that, it was necessary to use the data of a scope of sciences - archaeology, anthropology, folklore studies, and linguistics (7; 8; 9; 10; 11). Newest genetic studies were also taken into consideration. We supposed the sources to preserve some facts, remnants or memories of the Mongolian previous non-nomadic way of living.

The research was carried out in the territory adjoining Lake Baikal. Significant attention was paid to Buryats who present the northern border of the Mongolian habitat. In order to understand ancient Mongolian history, it is particularly important to use materials from the remote parts of the area. Grassland Mongolian culture is located on the focal point of Eurasian nations movements, therefore it is extremely complicated and heterogeneous. We consider that woodland areas around Lake Baikal could preserve elements of the ancient Mongolian culture. These elements were untouched by the grand migrations which changed the ethnic and political map of Mongolia many times.

This supposition is well supported by the fact that the Buryat language is closest to medieval Mongolian, the language of “The Secret History of the Mongols”. Also, it is mentioned in “The Secret History of the Mongols” that Alan Qo’a, the ancestor of Chingghis clan was from the land of the Khori-Tumat tribe. All researchers agree that the lands adjoining Lake Baikal were mentioned in the chronicles. These lands have preserved geographical and tribal names, significant for Mongols, such as Bargujin and Horilar. These names have been mentioned in the epos. It is also quite important that the areas around Lake Baikal have been archaeologically investigated. Representative anthropological material has been gathered, genetic studies are expanding. The epos, mythology, and language of the Buryats have been investigated thoroughly.

A study of the Buryat folklore finds a fact which is non-characteristic for a nomadic nation – plots connected with pig-breeding. It has been reflected in all kinds of Buryat verbal art, both in minor folklore genres - proverbs, sayings, wishes, riddles, and in major genres – fairy-tales and epos (1; 2; 3; 4).
Here are some examples. Proverbs: *Nokhoin ugide gahai husaha* (When there is no dog, the pig barks); *Gahaihua halyu bulgan turehegui, tenengehee sesen uge garahagui* (No pig shall deliver otter and sable, no fool shall say smart words). Riddles: *Gahai guya ganzagaldazha yadaab* (One could not load a boar ham - ice); *Geegegui aad, bederdeg, gemteegui aad, yolodog* (It has not lost anything but it looks for; it is not injured but it moans - pig). Wishes: *Gazar hadarha gahaitai bolozho, galabtaduuldahe neretei bolozho baigaaray*! (May you have a pig to dig the ground, may you have a name to sound forever!). Fairy-tales: Buryats have a “Pig-breeder” fairy-tale which is devoted to an only son keeping seven pigs. Pig-breeders are also met in the “Stupid wolf” fairy-tale. By now, people have almost forgotten the expression – “*gahai myahan amtatai, gazar ger dulaahan*” (pork is tasty, life in a dug-out is warm). This expression points at a settled life-style and pig-breeding of Buryats’ ancestors.

Among medieval Mongolian nations, Kidans received wide popularity. They were known to have a cult of pigs. Their culture originated in South Manchuria, a region with an ancient tradition of pig-breeding. V. Starikov has published quite interesting materials connected with the cult of pigs (17). There are Mongols in South China, YunNan province. They have been dwelling there since the times of Qubilai Qahan (Yuan dynasty, XIII-XIV centuries). They are surrounded by the Chinese and Dungan nations who call them “MengGu”. Their self-name is “MengGuWa, MengGuLe». On their ancestors day these Mongols slaughter pigs in order to sacrifice them to their spirits.

Mongols are mentioned in Mongolian chronicles as MengWu or MengWa. Sources say that they “... use pigs and dogs as their domestic cattle. They are fattened for slaughter”. Consequently, pigs and dogs are among the main animals bred by Mongols. We have to pay attention to the fact that the term *gahai* “pig” is an independent one in the Mongolian language. This is a proof of independent pig-breeding.

There is an excellent Buryat proverb: “*Dalain olzo dalan honogo, daidyn olzo dalan zheleiw*” - “Marine quarry lasts seventy days, soil crops last seventy years”. Central Asian cattle-breeders did fishing in a sea so the event of receiving enough food for seventy days came into a proverb. The names of marine animals are well preserved in Mongolian languages: Buryat *hab zagahan*, Khalkha-Mongolian *hav zagas*, Kalmyk *hav* “seal”; Buryat and Khalkha-Mongolian *halim* “whale”. Besides, the Mongolian language has such a notion as whalebone - *elzhin*. Rivers and lakes of Mongolia and Buryatia have no plaice and lamprey, but their names are present in the language – *halbin u nud zagas*. Probably, ancient Mongols’ ancestors ate marine trepangs (holothurian). The Mongolian word *hizhi* points at this. It is also important that the Mongolian language has independent words which stand for animal fat (*ooh*) and fish fat (*eer*). Also, animal and fish bones are divided in the language (11).

A special study of geographical terminology in Altaic languages was carried out by L.V. Dmitrieva. She compared the main geographical terms and notions which stand for natural phenomena as most of them have a relation to the most ancient epochs in the histories of these languages. This work has proved earlier conclusions about Turks’ grassland origin. Their botanic vocabulary was connected with this conclusion. A principally important conclusion was made about Mongolian languages: “This list proves that ancient Mongols lived in places with mountains and rocks with passages and passes. However, at the same time there was a grassland with hollows, sands and this region adjoined a sea” (12. p.173).
We should notice that the main character of a well-known Buryat epos “Alamzhi Mergen” was born in the East “where the sea slumbers”. When he goes to battle with foes, Alamzhi Mergen puts on fish skin boots characteristic for Oriental cultures. Certainly, this ethnographical detail in clothes is a relic of a non-grassland culture. This can be correlated with Chinese chronicles which say that “MengGu Mongols make armor of shark skin”. Therefore the emergence of the above-mentioned Buryat proverb is not occasional.

We should say that agricultural themes in folklore are widely spread. These proverbs contain ancient roots: «Anzahanaa husor argaa oloho» - “to use a plough to make a living” and “Uhehooshie baigaa haa anzahanaa argali bu alda” – “even if you die, hold the plough”. This proverb says that soil provides not only bread but other meals – fruit and vegetables; “hainaar gazaaraa eldee haash - eldeb hooltoi huukhash» - “the better you work on your land – the more food you will have”. There are riddles which are connected with agricultural tools: “Gazar dooguur galba nuube” “something flat sleeps in the ground” (ploughshare). “Zaan yamaan soo zuudah shara taby” - “a gray wolf was let in a flock of a hundred goats” (sickle).

The latest genetic research of Buryats have shown their closeness to Koreans which is quite clear if we take into consideration the given material.

Thus, “The Secret history of the Mongols”, together with other sources, opens new pages in the history and culture of Mongolian nations.

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The role of multinational companies in shaping the copyright institution of Korea: theoretical considerations

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ABSTRACT

Rapid advancement in technology and increased trade across national borders led to an international trend towards valuing technology and knowledge-based assets. Consequently, there is a growing recognition that adequate intellectual property protection is necessary in order to sustain a firm’s competitive advantage created by these assets. In this newly emerged digital era, record companies have proactively transformed themselves from a “record-centric” model to a much broader range of digital products.

Korea presents a unique and interesting copyright institutional environment with strong IT infrastructure and rapid growth in demand for digital technology. By examining the evolutionary link between the operation of multinational recording companies and the institutional environment of copyright in Korea, this study attempts to demonstrate the role of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in shaping the institutional environment of the host country.

The institutional perspective provides the theoretical foundation. The focus of the institutional theorists in International Business so far has been limited to the unidirectional flow of influence— the institutional environment of host country dictates the operation of MNEs. By examining the link between the copyright institution of Korea and multinational recording companies, this paper contends that institutional environment is not static, but evolves dynamically over time and the evolution reflects the dual institutional interaction with MNEs. That is, institutions both affect and are affected by MNEs.

1. INTRODUCTION

Two major themes that have received the attention of scholars in the field of International Business in recent years have been technological development and globalisation. Rapid advancement in technology and increased trade across national borders led to an international trend towards valuing technology and knowledge-based assets. Consequently, there is a growing recognition that adequate intellectual property protection of all forms - patents, trademarks, copyrights, and trade secrets – are necessary in order to sustain a firm’s competitive advantage created by these assets.

In this digital era, the music industry at large has emerged as a complex and dynamic industry that struggles with the problem of integrating creative resources and copyright protection (Hirsch 2000; Lampel et al. 2000). In particular, the issue of copyright for firms is of greater importance as measures to garner and protect the creative works are perceived necessary for competitive advantage in the global context (Lampelet et al. 2006). In recent years, record companies have proactively transformed themselves from a “record-centric” (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 2008, 5) model to a much broader range of digital products and platforms. The digital technology combined with the high-speed internet have revolutionised the way record companies create and distribute music (Gasser 2005). Therefore, the major recording firms have
developed innovative business practices utilising global networks and superior ability in product development, procurement, manufacturing, distribution and marketing to still play a major role in the global market.

Against this backdrop, Korea provides an interesting case study setting for the study of link between copyright institution and multinational firms (MNEs) in the music industry. Korea presents a unique copyright institutional environment with strong IT infrastructure and rapid growth in demand for digital technology. The value of copyright dramatically increased in recent years to the utmost important incentive for creation and innovation in Korea. By examining the evolutionary link between the operation of multinational recording companies and the institutional environment of copyright in Korea, this study attempts to demonstrate the role of MNEs in shaping the institutional environment of the host country.

The institutional perspective provides the theoretical foundation. The focus of the institutional theorists in International Business so far has been limited to the unidirectional flow of influence— the institutional environment of host country dictates the operation of MNEs. By examining copyright institution of Korea, I contend that institutional environment is not static, but evolves dynamically over time and the evolution reflects the dual institutional interaction with MNEs. That is, institutions both affect and are affected by MNEs.

2. THEORETICAL LENS: INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

The theoretical lens this paper uses to explain the link between firms and copyright institution of the host country is the institutional theory. The common founding premise of the institutional theory is viewing organisations as a social construction rather than as the product of technical phenomena based on rational choice (Westney 1993). Following on from that foundation, the institutional theory addresses the issue of how institutional environment shape the nature of economic activity and become established as authoritative guideline for social behaviour for organisations in that particular environment (DiMaggio 1994, North 1990, Scott 2004). Hence, the central tenet of the institutional theory is that individual and organisational activities are strongly shaped by institutions in a given environment (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Scott 1995). Particularly, MNEs operating outside its home country are acutely affected by host country’s institution because they are subject to and constrained by the isomorphic pressures of the host country.

*Figure 1. The traditional institutional perspective of MNE and host-country institution link*
2.1 MNE as an organisation shaped by the host institution

As illustrated in the above diagram, the institutional theory suggests that MNEs are under pressure to adapt to local practices and be consistent with their local institutional environment (Kostova and Roth 2002). This idea of conformity, or isomorphism, is a central construct within the institutional theory (Westney 1993) and it captures the extent to which the organisational designs adopted within same institutional fields tend to become increasingly similar over time.

Taken together, a common point of departure for most scholars is that organisations respond to isomorphic pressures in order to acquire legitimacy viewed as appropriate in their environment. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms by which institutional isomorphic change occurs: coercive, mimetic, and normative. The first isomorphic pressure, coercive isomorphism, stems from political influence and the where a powerful constituency in the environment impose certain organisational procedures and structures on the organisation. Second, mimetic isomorphism results from standard responses to uncertainty as organisations model after similar organisations in the environment that they perceive to be successful. Finally, normative isomorphism is associated with professionalization through which personnel within the organisations adopt the patterns of professional organisations that they view as legitimate.

Therefore, each institutional domain is composition of distinctive institutional pillars and mechanisms. The isomorphic pressures to conform to rules, norms and values within the institution dictate characteristics and behaviour of all organisations in that domain. Hence, the traditional view amongst the institutional theorists has been that the success of organisations in the international expansion depends on their ability to achieve and maintain isomorphism by conforming to these guidelines within the host country institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Hillman and Wan 2005, Meyer 2001, 2004, North 1990, Oxley 1999). However, by limiting their attention to studying the extent of institution as a factor influencing MNEs’ decisions, the research on the role of MNEs in the institutional environment has been rather neglected. MNEs hitherto have been considered merely as an agent shaped by host country institutions.

2.2 MNE as an agent of change to the host institution

If MNEs are viewed as a mere passive agent seeking conformity to the institutional pressures organisations, I contend that it fails to create the complete theoretical picture. A number of scholars (Child and Tsai 2005, Oliver 1991, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) argued that organisations may be able to mobilise resources in order to establish resistance and independence from the institutional pressures and can be proactive and change their institutional environments by developing strategic responses. Similarly, other scholars also suggested that MNEs may be positioned to influence their institutional environment (Dohan et al. 2006, Hall and Biersteker, 2002). Meyer (2004) and Ramamurti (2004) point to the pivotal role MNEs play specifically in emerging countries and the need for the understanding of the role of MNEs in order to develop policies which adequately deal with the impact of these organisations (Meyer 2004, Ramamurti 2004).

Despite the call to extend the research agenda of institutional theory by looking at the reverse causation of foreign organisations on the host country institutions, this issue has received little attention from researchers. Therefore, I argue that while extensive researches in IB have focused on the strife of MNEs to achieve legitimacy by adapting to these isomorphic pressures (i.e. the top half of Figure 2), implications and causation of the presence of MNEs in foreign institutional setting (i.e. the bottom half of Figure 2) have
received very little attention. For richer and more holistic understanding of the relationship between institutional environment and firms in IB context, studying the role of MNEs in shaping the host country institution deserves greater attention of scholars.

Hence, I attempt to examine the effects of the reverse flow from the MNEs to the host countries’ institutions. In doing so, I focus on three key aspects of host country institution- regulative, industrial and cognitive institutional aspects- which will be explored further in the next section.

By focusing on a relatively neglected aspect of the institutional theory framework- the impact of MNEs in shaping the institutional environment over time- I argue that MNEs is not only a passive agent that are shaped by the institutional elements of the host country, but it also plays an active role in shaping the host country institution. Therefore, the proposed theoretical framework examining the link between institution and MNEs is as the below diagram. It highlights the interactive relationship between the two main actors where institutions both affect and are affected by MNEs.

*Figure 2. Proposed theoretical framework of MNE and host-country institution link*

3. **Korean Copyright Institution**

The copyright system has been one of the most essential institutions applied in the developed world to facilitate the creation and dissemination of cultural works through business enterprises. The importance of copyright has escalated as the global economy moves towards information- and technology-based economy from traditional manufacturing economy. Copyright as institution affects multiple layers of the society and actors in it.

In this section, I focus on three institutional aspects of copyright in an economy. Scott (1995) suggests that a country’s institution is characterised by regulative, normative and cognitive aspects. These three ‘pillars’ of institution, according to Scott (1995), govern the behaviour of organisations and their interactions.
Regulative (or legal) aspects of institutions represent laws and sanctions that guide and regulate the behaviour of firms and individuals (Scott 1995). These sanctions and laws guide individual and organisational action as individuals or organisations accede to them for reasons of expediency, preferring not to suffer the penalty for non-compliance (Scott 1995). The regulative pillar has strong influence on how organisations come into existence and how they operate (North 1990, Scott 1995).

According to Scott (1995), normative (or social) institutions define the beliefs or actions that are expected of individuals and firms arising from both values and norms. In other words, Scott’s normative pillar is grounded in what is viewed as appropriate for, or what is expected of, organisations. Though they often do not carry the sanction of law, normative institutions can be very significant guides and constraints to actions and organisations will comply with them for reasons of moral or ethical obligation, or a necessity for conformance to norms of the society or professions (Scott 1995). Much of the writing on normative constraints emphasises how the normative expectations assume a taken-for-granted form; the ways of organizing become unquestioned, and alternatives become unthinkable (Tolbert and Zucker 1983).

Cognitive (or cultural) aspects of institutions embody cultural rules of a specific country or region that guide behaviour and understanding of the nature of reality (Scott 1995, 2002). These cognitive institutions develop over time through social interactions among various participants. Although often undocumented, these institutions are important in framing business behaviour and characteristics and organisations will abide by them often without conscious thought (Zucker 1983). The taken-for-granted or subconscious behaviour can have a big impact on commercial activity (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2001, Scott 1995, 2002).

Applying the three pillars framework of a country’s institution by Scott (1995) to our proposed theoretical framework leads to the more detailed illustration of the constituents of copyright institution. In analysing the constituent of the copyright institution against the backdrop of Scott’s three pillars framework, the most obvious constituent of a country’s institution that affects firms’ adoption of copyright practices is government, which is authorised to exercise coercive power. In particular, copyright legislations enacted by the legislative arm of government, effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism in implementing those obligations and the penalties imposed upon violators are explicit indicators of the government’s commitment to protect the rights of copyright owners. Secondly, the business practice and strategies adopted by MNEs in copyright industry become the norms and standards for other firms in the same industry to follow. Finally, the way the general public perceives copyright protection and their activities in relation to the rights of the creators also present a country with a distinctive characteristic of its copyright institution.
Figure 3. The institutional framework of copyright

4. MNEs in Korea

The theoretical framework will be applied to the empirical setting of the major multinational recording firms operating in Korea. The Korean music industry was not open to foreign firms until 1969. Foreign firms started to sell their products in Korea from 1969 through licensing agreements with Korean firms. However, it was since 1986, after a successful trade talk between the Korean and US governments in relation to opening up of Korean music market, that the foreign major recording companies entered the Korean market.

In 1988, EMI formed a joint venture with a Korean company, Gyemong, while Warner Music formed a wholly-owned subsidiary in Korea in the same year. Sony Music also established a wholly-owned subsidiary in 1989, while Polygram (predecessor to Universal) which was in a licensing agreement with Sungeum formed a joint venture with 80% ownership in 1990. In 1991, BMG started a direct distribution in 1991. By 1991, then all the ‘big 5’, before it became ‘big 4’ after Sony-BMG merger in 2004, entered the Korean market (Music Industry Association of Korea 2006).

Table 1. The big 5’s entry to the Korean market

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<td>Polygram</td>
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<td>BGM</td>
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Joint venture (with Gyemong)  
Wholly-owned subsidiary

Source: Music Industry Association of Korea 2006
Since their establishments in the Korean market, the majors made a significant growth in sales and royalty payments until 2001. In 2002, the 5 major MNEs accounted more than 40% of the Korean music market.

This paper will be used as the theoretical foundation in future research to study a case of MNEs’ influence on the Korean copyright institution. Firstly, the multinational recording companies’ operations since they made their presence in the Korean market will be categorised into three major headings;

(i) flexibility in sales format;
(ii) expansion of business networks; and
(iii) copyright protection

Secondly, the Korean copyright institution will also be analysed under three headings; legislation, industry and public perception. The Korean Copyright Act, first enacted in 1957, which has undergone a series of amendments, will be carefully reviewed. The focus will be on the changes or new additions of sections dealing with protection of foreign works and digital works. In looking at the industrial aspect of the Korean copyright institution, the main focus will be comparing the business practices of major Korean music firms with the major foreign recording firms. The preliminary observations have revealed that business models of major online Korean music service provider such as Bugs Music, MelOn and Cyworld are strikingly similar to that of the multinational recording firms, further suggesting the impact of MNEs on the Korean copyright institution. Finally, the cognitive aspect of the copyright institution in Korea will be analysed by the general perception of the Korean society towards copyright protection. This element will also provide interesting insight in the context of the Korean Confucian culture. A long-standing explanation for relatively high copyright infringements in Asian countries has been the Confucian value system found in these countries, which has view intangible assets as something to the shared rather than as something to be exploited. The study of the link between public perception and MNEs’ presence will provide valuable insight whether this long-standing Confucian values still dominate the Korean society or the general public in Korea has moved towards western value system of recognising individual ownership and their commercial rights.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH

Based on the preceding discussion, I formulated that the institution of copyright consists of three main aspects; regulation, industry and cognition. By examining these three aspects, I attempt to suggest that the formation of the copyright institution is influenced by the presence of MNEs. The utility of this proposed framework depends on subsequent case study research examining these propositions. Without empirical case study research, it is difficult to draw coherent conclusions- or maybe even with empirical case study, as Frith suggested (1988) the details of musical copyright are themselves a somewhat “incoherent response to changing circumstances”- yet some general links can be made from the discussions in the previous chapters.

Firstly, copyright legislations governing the activities relating to the copyrighted materials have been amended in recent years and the changes reflect the evolving nature of the business operations of MNEs. The business structure of MNEs in the music industry has been transformed remarkably as a result of the introduction of digital technology. A rapid technological advancement combined with the development of new products and changes in business practices by MNEs made the existing copyright regulations
continuously inadequate and outdated. Hence, the government of host countries with heavy presence of MNEs, such as Korea, are likely to be influenced to make changes to their legal framework to reflect these changes.

Secondly, the business operations of firms within the music industry have become strikingly similar. This suggests that large-sized MNEs in many cases lead the industry by demonstrating their ability to use the most advanced technologies in production, distribution and marketing. MNEs’ operations in foreign market are influential to local businesses and the local firms model themselves after the MNEs by modifying their existing business practices. An increasing homogeneity of business practices in music industry, in terms of digital music files, online sales, joint marketing and copyright protection, indicate that Korean firms are influenced by these foreign firms which they perceived to be successful.

Finally, the presence of MNEs in increasing number of countries makes the general public of host countries to be more conscious of brand name, image and products of MNEs than ever. Although implicit, the public forms certain perception towards the MNEs and it acts as a factor in determining the purchasing pattern of the MNEs’ products. In that spirit, the “carrot and stick” approach in dealing with copyright piracy by MNEs— that is, bringing legal actions against the illegal users and offering educational and promotional campaigns— is an illustration of MNEs’ attempt to influence the general perception of the host country citizens. However, further study will be required to see if this approach is effective in Asian countries which are heavily influenced by the public ownership Confucian values.

In sum, this paper was motivated to highlight the MNEs as an influential factor forming the copyright institution of a host country. It outlined the theoretical framework of the development processes of MNEs operations in the music industry and the changes in the copyright institutions of Korea to test the validity of the proposition. Future research should involve empirical study that will provide insights into how MNEs exert influence over institutional constraints and socio-political regimes in Korea. It is hoped that the theoretical framework this paper provides contributes to the literature on institutional theory by extending the definition of institutionalism.

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Pyramid Subcontracting and OHS in the Sydney Construction Industry

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ABSTRACT
Subcontractors in the unionised tiling sector in the Sydney construction industry have sought to increase their profit by reforming tile-laying arrangements through the expansion of pyramid subcontracting since the late 1980s. Traditionally, a tile-layer had multi-skills as many different tile-laying tasks had to be performed by a highly-skilled single tile-layer. However, the tile-laying process within pyramid subcontracting has been subdivided into several tasks by the narrowing of each tiling worker's role within tile-laying teams. Pyramid subcontracting has produced a cash-in-hand wage system and informal employment. Ethnic small tiling subcontractors and middlepersons in the tiling sector have played a major role in employing co-ethnic tiling workers through informal employment relations.

Furthermore, lower contract rates of pay along with highly competitive tendering situation within the pyramid subcontracting structure require middlepersons as small business owners and their workers to work harder and quicker. This change accompanied by narrow subdivision of tile-laying tasks and the growth of larger, heavier and thicker tiles, natural stone and pavers has produced negative outcomes for tiling workers' occupational health and safety (OHS) in the Sydney construction industry.

1. INTRODUCTION
The construction industry has long been noted in regard to OHS issues. Subcontracting in the Sydney construction industry generated negative externalities in terms of workers' OHS. In order to cope with these problems, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the Building Workers' Industry Union (BWIU) (now known as the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU)) developed three OHS policies including a prevention policy, a workers' compensation policy and a rehabilitation policy to cope with the problems caused by subcontracting (Shin, 2002, 110-112).

The CFMEU policies have limited the spread of negative impacts of subcontracting across many highly unionised trade sectors in the Sydney construction industry. However, the union's policies had only limited success in the tiling sector because, since the late 1980s, subcontractors introduced a particular form of subcontracting referred to as 'pyramid subcontracting'. Traditionally, all tiling workers, skilled tile-layers, labourers and apprentices, were employed by tiling subcontractors. However, this employment arrangement was started to change within the pyramid subcontracting in the tiling sector was introduced. Pyramid subcontracting occurs when a tiling subcontractor sub-lets tile-laying work to a middleperson who engages any additional tiling workers (CFMEU, 1997, 13). Subcontractors in the unionised tiling sector have sought to increase their profit by reforming the tile-laying arrangement through the expansion of pyramid subcontracting.

Traditionally, a tile-layer had multi-skills as many different tile-laying tasks had to be performed by a highly skilled single tile-layer. However, the tile-laying arrangement within the pyramid subcontracting system has been subdivided into several tasks by the
narrowing of each tiling worker's role within tile-laying teams. These changes along with
the introduction of larger, heavier and thicker 'porcelain' tiles and natural stone have
downgraded the standards of OHS for tiling workers.

Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyse how changes in tile-laying
arrangements and the increased use of larger, heavier and thicker tiles, natural stone and
pavers have impacted on tiling workers' OHS standards focusing on Korean tiling workers
since the late 1980s. In order to achieve the objective, firstly, this paper investigates often
undocumented tile-layers' OHS issues in informal employment in the non-unionised
sector. Secondly, it identifies how the narrow subdivision of tile-laying tasks has impacted
on the tiling workers' OHS. Thirdly, this paper analyses how the increase in tile size,
weight and thickness of tiles, natural stone and pavers has impacted on the workers' OHS.
The data for this paper draws on interviews with Korean tile-layers and the first author's
participant involvement.

2. INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT, UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS AND OHS ISSUES

Ethnic small tiling subcontractors and middlepersons in the tiling sector have played a
major role in employing co-ethnic tiling workers through a cash-in-hand wage system and
informal employment relations in the Sydney construction industry. This informal
arrangement produces many negative OHS outcomes for the tiling workers. The ethnic
small firms turn a blind eye to OHS issues due to lower contract rates of pay and
competition for gaining tile-laying work and discrimination towards undocumented
workers. Furthermore, many undocumented workers are not aware of their health and
safety rights (Goldsmith, 2002, 11).

There are three types of OHS induction training required for working on
construction sites to reduce workplace injuries and diseases; general OHS training, site-
specific training (compulsory) and work activity OHS training (optional). Firstly, general
OHS training is known as the 'Green Card' certificate course. This induction program
covers issues such as the consultation requirements of managers, safety sign information,
risk management, committee responsibilities, first aid and protective equipment. It also
offers information about workers' compensation and injury management and is aimed at
all new workers in the construction industry including self-employed workers,
tradespeople, apprentices and supervisors. Secondly, specific site OHS induction is
designed to familiarise any worker entering a construction site with the specific hazards
associated with that particular site (Andonakis and Loosemore, 2006, 3).

However, many undocumented construction workers do not attend these two
compulsory induction courses because they wish to avoid exposing their illegal status,
while in some cases undocumented workers use documented workers' Green Cards to
avoid trouble with the Department of Immigration (Korean Tile-layer 2, Interview
10/01/2009).

One Korean undocumented worker's absence of OHS training, his injury, and the
employer's misconduct on the injury and compensation claim, provide clear, illustrative
evidence of the negative outcomes of OHS in informal employment. The author
interviewed the undocumented tile-layer more than 10 times formally and informally from
2006 to early 2009 to solve his workers' compensation claim and for research purposes.
His case was brought to a workers' compensation lawyer in July 2006. The undocumented
tile-layer who worked for a small tiling business in the housing sector explained:

I did not receive any safety training and site induction courses. When I was injured on 10
May 2004, I had a Green Card but it was not mine. As I put my foot down to walk down the
stairs, I slipped because the plastic I had put my foot onto was extending out beyond the end of the tread (Korean Tile-layer 2, Interview 10/01/2009).

He explained his employer's misconduct regarding the injury and workers' compensation claim as follows:

My employer did not want me to go to the hospital and I was driven home. ... I noticed continuing pain on the left side of my chest, my left knee and some pain in my lower back as well as a sensation of pressure in the back of my neck. ... I returned to Korea on 11 November 2005 and have been unable to work in Korea as a result of the injuries ... I returned to Australia in March 2006 to confront my employer and make a claim for workers' compensation and try and get medical treatment. My employer had told me not to make a workers' compensation claim (Korean Tile-layer 2, Interview 19/07/2006).

The undocumented worker worked for his employer on a casual and cash-in-hand basis, therefore the employer denied existence of an employment relationship with him. He was able to obtain a few statements from ex-workmates at the construction site confirming his employment relations with the employer. The Workers' Compensation Commission accepted these statements and asked his employer's insurance company to pay workers' compensation to him.

3. NARROW SUBDIVISION OF LABOUR AND TILING WORKERS' OHS

Korean tile-laying small businesses have driven themselves and their workers to work longer and harder to maintain stable incomes or increase their profit in a highly competitive tiling sector in the Sydney construction industry. To increase efficiency, they have subdivided tile-laying tasks to require each tiling worker to finish a narrow range of duties repetitively and quickly in a tile-laying team. For instance, the grouting task, under an extended subdivision of labour, has demanded Korean female grouting workers to use their shoulders and arms repetitively and quickly. As a result of the narrow division of tasks, female grouting workers lack variety in the range of work they do. Consequently, many suffer from a serious OHS problems (Korean Middleperson 1, Interview 28/02/2005; Korean Middleperson 3, Interview 05/04/2005; Korean Middleperson 4, Interview 18/05/2005). Unskilled and temporary Korean working holiday makers (WHMs) in a tile-laying team perform continuous labouring duties such as lifting, carrying and lowering heavy tiles and cement boxes, and shovelling sand and cement to make mortar and spread mortar on concrete floors for screeding. A Korean middleperson mentions how repetitive tile-laying in a crouching position for floor tile-laying produces negative OHS outcomes:

A skilled tile-layer is doing only [the] screeding task in [a] crouched posture for efficiency for one year [to be eligible to be considered competent and achieve a higher skill level. This can be serious because Korean tile-layers use this position [as] it has proved to be more efficient than the kneeling position. In some cases, a tile-layer could not do screeding even if the tile-layer has about 15 year's tile-laying experience because the tile-layer has mostly installed tiles to walls. These narrowly divided tasks such as screeding and wall tile-laying require using some parts of body continuously and speedily, which negatively impact on back, shoulders, knees, arms and hands (Korean middleperson 3, Interview 05/04/2005).

Without job rotation, these narrowly subdivided and repetitive labouring duties can produce strain injury/disease in tiling workers' shoulders, backs and arms. The narrow subdivision of tile-laying tasks in a team not only causes deskilling but also increased injuries in the tiling sector.
4. **INCREASE IN TILE SIZE, WEIGHT AND THICKNESS AND OHS**

In the 1990s, the development of technology allowed tile manufacturers to produce more beautiful floor tiles which were bigger, harder and thicker. This change encouraged builders, subcontractors, homeowners and designers to use tiles in locations other than wet areas such as bathrooms and kitchens (Cass, 2005, 8). This new trend gave manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, builders, designers and tiling subcontractors the opportunity to increase their income by selling and installing more tiles. The tile consumption has more than doubled during the last decade, as shown in Table 1. The amount of tiles consumed in 1997 was 17,262,200 square metre which equated to 1.05 square metres per capita (Stock, 1998, 14). The figure was estimated at over 40,000,000 square metres in 2007, which equated to approximately two square metres per capita (Halliday, 2008, 18). Also, owners of homes and buildings could enjoy colourful manufactured tiles with relatively cheaper prices than natural stone as well as expect to increase value to their properties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Tile Consumption</th>
<th>Consumption per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>17,262,200</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Over 40,000,000</td>
<td>Approx. 2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Stock (1998, 14); Halliday (2008, 18)

In contrast, the growth of larger and heavier tiles has produced negative outcomes for tiling workers' OHS. This subsection analyses the relations between the increase in size and weight of tiles and natural stone, and tiling workers' OHS. Firstly, this subsection explains the growth of larger and heavier porcelain tiles. Secondly, it identifies the relationship between increase in tile and natural stone size and weight and the changes in the nature of tile-laying arrangement and OHS. Thirdly, the subsection analyses how the change in the production method of installing pavers impacts on tiling workers' OHS.

4.1. **Growth of Large and Heavier Porcelain Tiles**

Traditionally, the more popular size of ceramic tiles was the 200 mm __ 200 mm format for wall tile-laying and the 300 mm __ 300 mm format for floor tile-laying. The weight of a piece of ceramic tile was approximately 200 g while that of a box with 25 pieces of ceramic tiles was around 5 kg. This trend started to change from the mid 1990s. One Korean tile-layer explains that his previous employer, an Italian tiling subcontractor, which was a tiling subcontractor as well as tile retailer, started to sell larger and heavier 'porcelain' tiles from the mid 1990s (Korean Middlepersons 2, Interview 12/01/2009). Over the last decade, larger and heavier porcelain tiles have become the fastest growing category in the tiling sector (KTA, 2005: 1).

There are several reasons how and why larger and heavier porcelain tiles have become so popular in the tiling sector. Firstly, there was concern amongst homeowners about particles in the air, principally dust mites, which are capable of triggering allergic reactions in asthma sufferers. This prompted growing numbers of homeowners to choose tile, stone or timber flooring in preference to carpet, particularly in northern New South Wales and Queensland where carpet can rot in humid coastal environments (Stock, 2008a, 38). Secondly, in the 1990s, the development of technology allowed tile manufacturers to produce harder porcelain tiles which were less expensive than natural stone (Cass, 2005, 8). This development enabled the areas of the home suited for tiling to be extended-into the family room, the dining room and even the bedrooms. Thirdly, from the mid 1990s,
many Italian and Spanish manufacturers released large-format porcelain tiles, which contributed to the trend of using a combination of particular texture and colour in a range of formats - for example, 300 mm _ 300 mm for wall tile-laying and 300 mm _ 600 mm for floor tile-laying (Stock, 2008a, 38). Fourthly, large-format tiles are considered elegant by some homeowners (Korean Subcontractor 1, Interview 11/06/2005). In addition, it is believed that larger and heavier porcelain tiles installed in bathrooms and kitchens add considerable value to a property (Stock, 2008a, 38; Korean Tile-layer 1, Interview 09/01/2009).

Table 2: Prices of Ceramic and Porcelain Tiles and Marble from Italy in 2005 (AUD, m²)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceramic</td>
<td>24-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porcelain</td>
<td>75-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marble</td>
<td>90-110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korean Middleperson 2 (Interview 12/01/2009)

The popularity of porcelain tiles with owners of homes and commercial buildings is still increasing even though it is much more expensive than standard ceramic tiles, as shown in Table 2. The reasons include durability and hardness, availability of various colours, textures and sizes and also because the porcelain tiles were less expensive than natural stone, granite and marble, as shown in Table 3 (Riedstra and Cass, 2007, 52; Korean tile-layer 1, Interview 09/01/2009; Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009). These changes have enhanced the incomes of wholesalers, retailers, builders and tiling subcontractors because the prices of porcelain tiles are much more expensive than those of ceramic tiles, as shown in Table 2.

Most porcelain products have rectified edges with tight joints that replicate the look of natural stone such as marble and granite. The other reason for the popularity of strong porcelain tiles is the lower cost of maintenance, particularly for lobby areas compared to medium strong marble. Also, the corresponding reduction in the number of grout joints enhances their visual appeal (Korean Subcontractor 1, Interview 06/01/2005; Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009).

Table 3: General Nature of Tiles and Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Colour</th>
<th>Hardness</th>
<th>Texture</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ceramic</td>
<td>White/Grey</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Cheap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Stone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Granite</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Expensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Marble</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Expensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porcelain</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Less Expensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Riedstra and Cass (2007: 52); Korean Tile-layer 1 (Interview 09/01/2009); Korean Middleperson 2 (Interview 12/01/2009).

4.2. Changes in Tiles, Nature of Tile-laying and OHS

An industry survey of tile retailers conducted by Tile Today revealed the most popular tile formats are the 400 mm _ 400 mm for floor tiling, and the 300 mm _ 600 mm for wall tiling, in all tiles including ceramic and porcelain tiles and natural stone (Tile Today, 2008, 6 and 8). For porcelain tiles, the most popular formats are the 300 mm _ 600 mm and the larger formats. Furthermore, the natural stone and porcelain tiles have become
larger and heavier. The weight of a piece of porcelain is over 6 kg while that of a box containing 3-4 porcelain tiles is over 25 kg. Currently more than 30 per cent of porcelain tile boxes are over 30 kg in the tiling sector (Korean Tile-layer 1, Interview 09/01/2009; Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009).

This trend causes extreme difficulties for tile-layers preparing for the wall and floor tile-laying because these wide, long and thick tiles require bigger cutting machines and take a longer time to cut than ceramic tiles (Korean Tile-layer 1, Interview 09/01/2009; Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009; Korean Middleperson 3, Interview 09/01/2009; Korean Subcontractor in Housing Sector 1, Interview 09/01/2009). Also, larger tiles produce hardship for tile-layers due to the increased weight of the tiles. Larger tiles are difficult to handle and may often require two tile-layers or special lifting devices, which were originally used in the glass industry (Stock, 2008b, 40).

However, lower contract rates of pay in a highly competitive tendering situation require small business owners and their workers to work harder and quicker with larger and heavier tiles. This trend produces negative outcomes on tiling workers' OHS standards. Tile-layers deal with harder and longer cutting demands, heavier lifting and lowering and installing larger and heavier porcelain tiles and natural stone such as granite and marble. Large format tiles and natural stone can frequently vary in thickness ranging from 8 mm to 20 mm. These thick, hard and large materials can not be cut by hand cutters used for ceramic tiles which do not raise dust. However, tile-layers need to use cutting and drilling electric machines to accurately cut and drill these large format porcelain tiles and natural stone. These processes raise high levels of dust with very fine particles of porcelain tiles and natural stone (Korean Subcontractor in Housing Sector 1, Interview 09/01/2009). Also, these fine particles with other dust on tiling sites can go deeply into the tiling workers' lungs. This dust can build up in their lung which causes long-term damage. A tile-layer in the housing sector explained:

There are high levels of fine dust in the tiling sites; however, workers think there is not much dust because they can not see very fine dust without bright sunshine. The fine dust is caused by many factors including mixing sand and cement as well as cutting and drilling for large, hard and thick porcelain tiles, granite and marbles (Korean Subcontractor in Housing Sector 1, Interview 09/01/2009).

When this dust issue is combined with Korean workers not wearing masks, their lungs are more at risk. In general, Korean-born skilled tile-layers are not concerned about their OHS. Many workers do not use personal protection equipment (PPE) such as face masks, goggles and hard hats (Alcorco, 2002, 141).

In addition, Korean tile-layers also need to take more care when using cement which they use more frequently than non-Korean tile-layers because they prefer to apply the mortar-down method with cement and sand mixing mortar for floor tile-laying. The mortar-down method can reduce tile-laying costs because of not using glue, as well as saving working time because tile-layers can skip the screeding process and create an appropriate foundation for an accurate floor level. Even though they frequently use more cement, the tiling workers ignore OHS standards and do not wear masks (Alcorco, 2002, 141). The Korean workers focus more on finishing a given task quickly. When the author campaigned to legalise Korean-born undocumented tile-layers working in Sydney in 2000, some undocumented workers exhibited signs of tuberculosis in the physical examination for gaining the 457 working visa as a result of not using a mask while mixing cement and sand (Shin, 2002, 177).
The tiling workers' lung problems may be worsened due to the increase in the size and thickness of tiles and natural stone and continued non-used of face masks. A brochure published by the WorkCover NSW explains how 'silicosis' is a serious lung disease. WorkCover NSW identifies:

Silicosis is caused by breathing in dust that has 'silica' particles in it. Some natural stone and tiling materials such as granite, sandstone, sand and concrete contain silica. The big danger is from the very fine particles of silica that go deep into the lungs. The fine particles of silica can build up in the lungs and scar them. ... There is also evidence that breathing in silica dust may cause lung cancer (WorkCover NSW, 1990, 2).

With the subdivision of tiling tasks and practice of not wearing PPE, the danger of silicosis may increase for specific workers such as skilled tile-layers and lower skilled tiling workers. The skilled tile-layers can be in danger from the very fine particles because they cut and drill large, hard and thick granite and sand stone under the current narrow subdivided system. The unskilled tiling workers can be damaged by using more sand and cement repetitively without rotation in tile-laying teams.

The common issue regarding OHS problems relates to heavier tiles and narrowly subdivided tile-laying tasks. In some cases, unskilled Korean workers, mainly young WHMs, repetitively lift and carry over 30 kg tile boxes and put them down on tiling sites. Many tiling workers easily find a 20-30 kg piece of porcelain tile and natural stone and over 60 kg box of tile and natural stone in the tiling sector. These heavy porcelain tiles and natural stone are difficult for tile-laying workers to manage and they can be a cause of injury (Korean Tile-layer 1, Interview 09/01/2009; Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009; Korean Middleperson 3, Interview 09/01/2009; Korean Subcontractor in Housing Sector 1, Interview 09/01/2009). Boxes of porcelain tile and natural stone weighing over 60 kg are clearly unsafe for tiling workers. As a guideline, the National Code of Practice for Manual Handling analyses that "the risk of back injury increases significantly with objects above the range of 16-20 kg" and advises "to keep the load below this range or within this boundary and no person should be required to lift, lower or carry loads about 55 kg" (NOHSC, 1990, 35).

Taking advantage of this advice, the CFMEU limited the size of cement bags to 20 kg on the Australian construction sites. Brian Parker, an Assistant Secretary of the CFMEU, highlighted: "The Union banned the use of 40 kg cement bags in the 1990s and had written agreements with head contractors (builders) to only use 20 kg cement bags" (CFMEU, 2000, 15). However, the union has not paid attention to the increasing weight of the tile boxes which can weigh up to 60 kg (Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009). The CFMEU's ignorance of the increase concerning the weight and size of tiles resulted in allowing its growth. This failure weakened the position of workers and middlepersons who could then not stop the introduction of heavy and large format tiles which reduced OHS standards.

Strong competition due to the oversupply of micro and small sized tile-laying businesses lowers contract rates, which in turn forces middlepersons and their workers to work harder in order to maintain or increase income for middlepersons. This situation, and the narrow subdivision of labour, drives tiling workers to speed up tile-laying work through the repetition of tasks without rotation. This process can result in severe OHS problems such as strain on back, shoulders, knees and waist. Therefore, most Korean tile-layers, in particular, older workers, have suffered from severe pain in their backs, shoulders, knees, waists, arms and hands. A 50 year old tile-layer raised some serious issues relating to casualisation and OHS as follows:
I am a casual, self-employed tile-layer, so I stay at home when I do not have a job. However, when I have work, I work extremely hard to recover wages for the day off, which badly impacts on my body. Due to these pains, the number of days off has increased (Korean Tile-layer 1, Interview 31/03/2005).

He also commented about the weight and size of tiles, treatment, retirement and skill formation as follows:

Current larger and heavier porcelain tiles have damaged my body more than light ceramic tiles. I feel pain all over my back, shoulders, knees, arms and legs. I take Panadol, a pain killer, every day and regularly get treatment from a masseur to release my muscles. When I feel severe pain, I see a Korean acupuncturist three times a week. I learned tile skills in Sydney about 10 years ago, so I can do all kinds of tile-laying work now. ... I am 50 years old now. I think I need to retire from tile-laying before I am 55 years old. Previously for tile-laying, high level skills were important, but now it requires even higher skills and more strength (Korean Tile-layer 1, Interview 09/01/2009).

Another Korean tile-layer argues that tile-layers will retire from the age of 50 because of the problems associated with the larger, heavier and thicker tiles and natural stone (Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009). This 'profit-oriented' sector and the 'customer-friendly' designs produce major problems for tiling workers' OHS standards and create huge disadvantages for the tiling workforce, particularly Korean tiling workers.

4.3. Change in Production Method in Paving and OHS

Chinese manufacturers started to produce natural stone pavers with minimum cost from early 2000. The new luxury pavers attracted wholesalers, builders and designers due to relatively cheap prices, beautiful designs and hard surfaces. Therefore, paving firms have gradually changed their main pavers from concrete pavers to natural stone about five years ago. These new natural stone pavers are much heavier than concrete pavers. As a result, this change of pavers required the introduction of new paver-laying methods with mortar, a material mixing sand, cement and water, as an adhesive for tile-laying which is the same as the mortar method in tile-laying (Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009; Korean Middleperson 3, Interview 09/01/2009). The mortar-down method of tile-laying has seen a gradual deskilling in the last 10 years with fewer tile-layers being able to lay tiles with mortar as an adhesive instead of glue (Class, 2006, 178). In contrast, many Korean-born tile-layers have had many years of experience using this method for tile-laying on walls, floors and stairs in Korea and in Australia (Shin, 2002: 141). As an example, a specialist paving company deployed Korean tile-layers via Korean middlepersons for natural stone paving to increase its profit for a huge project in the Sydney construction industry (Korean Middleperson 2, Interview 12/01/2009).

This paving company built up a natural stone manufacturing company in China which has provided a huge amount of natural stone for 'luxury' public streetscapes, domestic projects, commercial sites and educational institutions such as the Camperdown Campus of the University of Sydney. A Korean middleperson working for the specialist paving company mentioned:

About 90 per cent of our paving materials are natural stone and the general size is 300 mm _ 600 mm, and the thickness is approximately 35mm. The weight of one piece of stone is approximately 30 kg which is approximately two and three times heavier than that of a piece of porcelain. Some are even heavier and sized 600 mm _ 400 mm _ 60 mm in format. These weigh over 40 kg which is 20 kg heavier than a piece of concrete paver. I usually lay these pavers by myself except for laying pavers on stairs. I have hit the natural stone many times with a rubber hammer for good leveling. I have worked 6 or 7 days a week from 7 am to 5 pm, about 9 hours per day. This paver-laying has greatly damaged my body. ... I have serious
pains in my shoulders, back and knees due to lifting, carrying lowering, laying heavy pavers and continuous hammering. So, I take Panadol, a pain killer, every day and often see a masseur. I bought a massage machine which I use every second day for my back and shoulders (Korean Middlepersons 3, Interview 09/01/2009).

This profit-oriented sector and the customer-friendly 'luxury' and larger pavers as well as the narrow subdivision of tile-laying tasks have produced negative OHS outcomes for tile- and paving-layers.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper examined how the transformation of the tile-laying arrangements within the pyramid subcontracting structure influenced the tiling workforce's OHS standards from the late 1980s. Since the late 1980s the tiling sector has experienced an ongoing organisational transformation, particularly due to the increased division and specialisation of tile-laying tasks within the pyramid subcontracting structure.

Tiling subcontractors introduced pyramid subcontracting which caused high competition between many small sized tile-laying businesses. As a result, the competition lowered contract rates of pay in the tiling sector. With lower contract rates of pay, tile-laying small businesses have introduced the narrow subdivision of tile-laying tasks in tiling teams to maintain or increase income. Furthermore, the profit-oriented and customer-friendly management strategy introduced larger, heavier and thicker porcelain tiles, natural stone and pavers without consultation with the CFMEU and tiling workers. The union did not pay attention to the growth of larger, heavier and thicker tiles, natural stone and pavers. This situation, combined with casualisation, the use of the crouching position, narrow subdivision of labour, repetitive tasks, and not wearing PPE, has produced serious OHS outcomes for the Korean tiling workers.

In order to achieve a long-term solution for appropriate skill formation and OHS standards, the head contractors, subcontractors, workers and the CFMEU need to follow the EBAs in order to abolish pyramid subcontracting and to return to permanent or self-employed employment system.

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**Interviews**

Korean Tile-layer 1 was interviewed on 31 March 2005 and 9 January 2009. At current interviewing time, he had 10 years experience in Australia.

Korean Tile-layer 2, overstayed, was interviewed on 19 July 2006, 6 October 2006, 5 November 2006, 15 November 2006 and 10 January 2009. He was injured at a housing sector site.

Korean Middleperson 1 was interviewed on 28 February 2005 and 22 February 2006. In 2006, as a senior middleperson, he was running a small tiling business in the unionised tiling sector for more than 10 years.

Korean Middleperson 2 was interviewed on 3 April 2005, 3 May 2005, 8 February 2006 and 12 January 2009. He used work for Italian Subcontractor D in the housing industry and worked for a few subcontractors in the unionised tiling sector from 2003.

Korean Middleperson 3 was interviewed on 5 April 2005, 10 April 2005 and 9 January 2009. He used be an office worker in Korea; however, he came to Australia in 1998.

Korean Middleperson 4 was interviewed on 18 May 2005. As a tile-layer, he was working for more than 40 years in Korea and in Australia.

Korean Subcontractor in Housing Sector 1 was interviewed on 8 January 2004, 4 March 2005 and 9 January 2009. He came to Australian in 1986. He used be a cleaner in Australia; however, learned tile-laying skills from a Lebanese tile-layer.

Korean Subcontractor 1 was interviewed on 11 May 2005 and 11 June 2005. He was the CFMEU NSW Branch Tiling Sector Organiser from October 1999 to November 2000. He completed a Construction Management course for two years at the University of Technology of Sydney and Drafting course for one year at a TAFE.
The Bride(s) From Hanoi: South Korean Popular Culture, Vietnam and "Asia" in the New Millennium

Stephen Epstein
Victoria University of Wellington

ABSTRACT

In recent years South Korea has witnessed an efflorescence of cultural productions that highlight the nation's increasing encounters with the foreign generally and Asia more specifically. Growing travel for Koreans within the larger region, a popular discourse that celebrates the success of the Korean Wave across the continent, a dramatic increase in labor migration and, perhaps most significantly, a meteoric rise in international marriages are all reconfiguring Korea's understanding of its relationship with its neighbors. Inevitably, this recalibrated understanding is also being reflected--and refracted--in popular media.

This paper is part of a broader project examining the spate of recent Korean television dramas and reality-cum-talk shows that draw attention to Korea's relationship with Asia. In this paper I will discuss popular understandings of Korea's contemporary encounter with Vietnam with a particular focus on a series of Korean television productions, such as the reality show SadoN cheoeum boeoggesumni (Meet the In-laws), that draw attention to the relationship. In particular, I will be considering the extent to which these shows are: a) inculcating a hierarchical sense of Korea's relationship with an Asian hinterland; and b) promoting a radical shift in Korea's gendering of the "foreign" from male to female.

In recent years South Korea has witnessed an efflorescence of cultural productions that highlight the nation's increasing encounters with the foreign generally and Asia more specifically. Growing travel for Koreans within the larger region, a popular discourse that celebrates the success of the Korean Wave across the continent, a dramatic increase in labor migration and, perhaps most significantly, a meteoric rise in international marriages are all reconfiguring Korea's understanding of its relationship with its neighbors. Inevitably, this recalibrated understanding is also being reflected--and refracted--in popular media.

This paper is part of a broader project examining the spate of recent Korean television dramas and reality-cum-talk shows that draw attention to Korea's relationship with a larger Asia. In particular, I argue that these shows are inculcating a hierarchical sense of South Korea's relationship with an Asian hinterland, and simultaneously promoting a radical shift in Korea's gendering of the "foreign" from male to female. I want here to restrict my discussion to a small subset of such programs that focus on encounters between South Korea and Vietnam. Although the South Korea-Vietnam relationship has unique features that have created an ambivalent, fraught history, these ambiguities also allow Vietnam to serve as a particularly fruitful site for exploring Korea's evolving relationship with its continental neighbors, and perhaps, despite its unique features, even to stand as a metonym for developing “Asia” in South Korean popular culture.

To be sure, in the last three years, a striking number of productions have appeared that suggest a special place for Vietnam currently in the South Korean imagination. Most
notably, a disproportionate number of dramas that treat international marriage have singed out relationships between Korean men and Vietnamese women, including *Hanoi Shinbu* (The Bride from Hanoi; SBS, 2005), *Hwanggeumui sinbu* (Golden Bride; SBS, 2007), *Kkocheul chajeureo wattanda* (Flowers for My Life; KBS, 2007), *Sanmomeo namchononeun* (In the Southern Village over the Mountains; KBS, 2007), and *Barami bunda* (The Wind Blows; KBS, 2008), the last three of which feature Vietnamese-born actress Ha Hoang Haiyen (Ha Ji-eun) who has become a South Korean citizen. Likewise, over this period, reality/talk shows such as SBS’ *Sadon choeoum boepgesseumnida* (Meet the In-laws) and *Reobeu in Asia* (Love in Asia)¹, and Minyeodeurui suda (Beauties' Chatter) on KBS have featured numerous Vietnamese women among their guests. Recently the two genres merged in *Eoneu beteunam sinbuui majimak pyeonji* (A Vietnamese Bride’s Last Letter), a June 2008 MBC production that discussed, and partially dramatized, examples of international marriages gone tragically wrong.

Of course, the extraordinary rise in the number of Vietnamese in South Korea plays a key role in spawning increased attention to the Korea-Vietnam relationship. As a *Maedil gyeongje* (Maedil Business) article notes, only one Vietnamese national resided in Korea in 1990. By 2000, however, this figure had risen to 19,000, and by the end of 2005, there were 39,410.² The numbers are continuing to grow rapidly, especially through international marriage: according to the Korean Statistics Office, the total number of Vietnamese brides married to Korean men nearly doubled to 10,131 in 2006 from 5,822 in 2005.³

Nonetheless, given the spike in marriage partners from multiple countries,⁴ other factors must account for the disproportionate prevalence of Vietnam in dramatizations of international relationships. Some of these factors likely reflect practical matters: access to Korean-speaking actresses such as Haiyen to play Vietnamese brides may foster Vietnam’s prevalence in dramas, as will the potential for Korean actresses to pass more plausibly as half, or even fully, Vietnamese than as natives of several other countries. Dramas, however, will also find it a profitable strategy to treat issues that resonate at a deep level, and the South Korea-Vietnam relationship has features that encourage repeated appearance: ⁵ certainly, a shared past as peripheral nations within the Confucian Sinosphere offers a mutual sense of cultural and historical proximity, as does the experience of post-colonial civil wars between divided northern and southern halves. That both wars notoriously involved an ideological clash between communism and capitalism and drew in large external powers, most notably the United States, further draws the nations together.

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¹ See e.g. episodes 7, 36,47, 59, 106, 132.
³ The situation is even more striking in Taiwan where, according to Taiwan’s Central Research Institute, Vietnamese brides account for 35% of 338,000 foreign brides in Taiwan. For more on the situation in Taiwan specifically, see Wang Hong-Zen and Shu-ming Chang, “The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-border Marriage Business in Taiwan and Viet Nam” *International Migration* 40:6 (2002): 93-116.
⁴ Between 2001 and 2005, the rate of international marriage as a percentage of all marriages increased almost threefold from 4.8% to 13.6% of the population. See Gavin Jones and Hsiu-hua Shen, “International marriage in East and Southeast Asia: trends and research emphases,” *Citizenship Studies* 12:1 (2008): 9-25.
⁵ Ethnic Koreans, such as the joseonjok and, to a lesser extent, the goryeo saram, also seem to show up disproportionately in films and television dramas as well, for they provide a rich palette of issues to draw upon.
Moreover, South Korea's own participation in the Vietnam War has left an emotional legacy that underpins a variety of encounters in popular culture, as when noted travel writer Han Biya (1998: 68) finds that she must address the war and Korea’s role within it in the first few pages of her account of her trip to Vietnam. Han’s need arises because Korea’s legacy in Vietnam encompasses feelings of guilt, especially in a very concrete manifestation: thousands of children of mixed Korean-Vietnamese descent, the Lai Dai Han, a significant proportion of whom were abandoned by their fathers. Notably, both The Golden Bride and The Bride from Hanoi include characters of mixed heritage and depict Korean men as both desirable partners and subject to moral failing.

What I wish to focus on today, however, is not these fictive depictions, but the discourse propagated in representations of international marriage in the Korean media more broadly and their intersection with this new surge in reality shows. A majority of marriages between Korean men and Vietnamese women have occurred through brokers, a tendency that has become increasingly prominent since requirements for setting up matchmaking agencies were liberalized in 1999. The role of brokers has aroused controversy, especially as a result of occasionally disturbing advertising campaigns such as a poster, which apparently even caught the attention of the 2006 US State Department report on human trafficking, proclaiming as a virtue of Vietnamese brides that “they never run away.”9 Others ads have treated Vietnamese women in objectifying terms that suggest marketing a commodity. One particularly egregious example lists such traits as “Pretty features, and the finest bodies in the world”; “A thoroughgoing spirit of chastity—divorce completely impossible”; “Unlike Chinese and Filipina women, they have excellent cooking skills”.

Only marginally less offensive have been media portrayals like the 2006 Chosun Ilbo article entitled Betewnam cheonyeodeul, huimangui ttang, koriaro (“Vietnamese maidens coming to the land of hope, Korea”). This piece drew criticism for its demeaning portrayal of women seeking foreign husbands and its fulsome self-congratulation. In particular, protesters denounced the article’s blithe attachment of a photo in which the faces of the prospective Vietnamese brides were clearly visible, while the Korean men involved remained discreetly turned away from the camera. The caption below the photo

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7 The young mixed-race child in The Bride from Hanoi is not the child of soldier but apparently a Korean businessman from the more recent wave of contact. An earlier film Laattaihan, which appeared in 1994, dealt with the topic head on.

8 The medium of introduction appears to differ somewhat depending on the national provenance of the bride. According to research done by the Ministry of Health and Warfare, matchmaking agencies are of particular importance in the case of Vietnamese, Mongolian and Russian women, in contrast to, e.g., Chinese-Koreans (networks of acquaintances), ethnic Chinese (direct meetings), and Filipinas (religious organizations). See Hye-Kyung Lee’s “International Marriage and the State” paper from the 2006 International Conference of International Marriage, available at <http://www.cct.go.kr/data/af2006/multi/multi_0303_Hye%20Kyung%20Lee.pdf>.


10 This poster may be seen at <http://i-guacu.com/191>.
read “Korean princes, please take me home.” 11 Although the Chosun Ilbo removed the photo from the Korean version of the story after protest from local NGOs, 12 the English language online version continues to run the picture, albeit editing out for international circulation the opening paragraphs that suggest the arrival of Korean men rescuing maidens in distress and offering a significantly different editorial slant in its title “Finding Love Overseas the Perfunctory Way.” 13

Such articles have more optimistic and compassionate television sequels in the SBS shows Love in Asia and Meet The In-Laws, which showcase couples living in successful international marriages in Korea. 14 The shows are clearly a well-intentioned attempt to humanize the numerous foreign brides from elsewhere in Asia who have taken up residence in Korea and to promote intercultural understanding generally. While Love in Asia focuses on the couple itself, Meet the In-Laws, which debuted in 2007 as a segment on the show Iryoil jota (Happy Sunday), derives its particular piquance from bringing the couple’s in-laws together for the first time and flying members of the bride’s family to Korea. As journalist Kim Tae-eun writes, “The greatest virtue of Meet the In-Laws is that it causes us to meditate on the homogeneity (donggilseong) of the peoples of Asia.” 15 The show thus fosters a growing regional identity.

Nonetheless, whether intentionally or not, the show also establishes socioeconomic hierarchies within this homogeneity that encourage a view of Korea’s locally privileged position. By its very premise, Meet the In-Laws tends to preclude couples from wealthier backgrounds who have married on more equal terms, whose relationships have evolved more organically, and whose parents may have already met. Because of its desire to tug at the heartstrings, the show almost unavoidably depicts a higher standard of living for Korea. Furthermore, although marriages do, of course, occur between Korean women and migrant laborers from Asian countries, as far as I am aware Meet the In-Laws has never used a couple in which the wife is Korean and the husband a foreigner. In other words, Meet the In-Laws both mirrors, and further encourages, Korean attitudes of superiority to an Asian hinterland, which are then coded in gendered terms.

The format of the show generally falls into two halves. In the first, the viewer is invited to visit the bride’s new home, to see how she has been welcomed into the community and how she now lives happily with her Korean husband and in-laws. The second half of the show returns to the woman’s home village overseas and films the way of life there, before showing “video letters” (yeongsang pyeonji) of the bride and parents speaking to one another while still separated. As the show’s climax, the parents are revealed in the Korean studio to be reunited with their daughter and to receive the traditional first ceremonial bow from the couple to the bride’s parents. For the rest of

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12 http://www.thanhniennews.com/overseas/?catid=12&newsid=14873
14 We might reasonably hypothesize that shows such as Love in Asia and Meet the In-laws that are designed to promote intercultural understanding wish to both convey a sense of Korea’s growing multicultural diversity and excite viewer interest with novelty by introducing couples from a wide swath of the international community, and may not have great concern with featuring nationalities in accurate proportion to the actual number of marriages that occur. International marriages of Koreans with Chinese nationals, both Han Chinese and ethnic Koreans, with whom cultural proximity is most apparent, are even more noticeably underrepresented on these shows.
today’s talk, I want to focus on excerpts from one 2007 episode, which I have chosen both because of their current ready availability on YouTube, and because they typify the relatively circumscribed patterns of representation to be found.\textsuperscript{16} In the climactic section, we witness the presentation of the video letters that go back and forth between two Vietnamese brides in Korea, cousins to one another, and their families back home. The transition to the letters from the more lighthearted material that has preceded is marked by a shift in the background music to an instrumental piano and string composition that signals an emotionally heightened, melancholy tone.

A threefold split screen technique simultaneously presents the video letter that the bride has sent back to Vietnam, the reaction of the family as they view her letter, and the reaction of the bride in the studio in Korea as she in turn watches her family react to her letter. The multiple screens allow for an easy juxtaposition of (and inevitable comparisons between) Korea and Vietnam. Some contrasts, such as differences in clothing that suggest Korea’s cold winter weather in distinction to Vietnam’s more subtropical climate, while underscoring difference, are relatively neutral. Others, however, evoke a significant economic disparity: we observe, for example, the arrival and installation of a television and VCR within the bride’s former home, as members of a large extended family come together to watch. The numbers that gather imply that a special event is in store, that television is a rarity, and that the level of development is low. While juxtaposed village scenes often place together rural Vietnam and rural Korea on the show, differences regularly obtrude: scenes in Korea underscore the nation’s aging, late-capitalist countryside in contrast to the more even age distribution of the bride’s homes, where one seems to encounter a thriving, even teeming, if poor, environment. One should also remember that the majority of SBS’ intended viewing audience is the mainstream, urban Korean public. For such viewers the presentation evokes a sense of nostalgia in suggesting the communitarian bonds and extended families that are dissolving in the move to high-tech, city-dwelling, low-fertility nuclear family units. And while the twofold evocation of nostalgia creates an affective connection to both rural Korea and Vietnam, it also fosters the sense that Vietnam exists within a vastly different developmental space.

Members of the brides’ families take turns speaking in response to the messages from the two young women located in Korea. Both, typically for the show, send reassurances to their families not to worry as they are being well taken care of. By having the brides comfort their families, the show also reassures its audience of Korea’s moral goodness and the survival of a cherished defining characteristic of Korean identity, \textit{jeong} (perhaps best rendered here as “affection”). The Vietnam-based parents and families in turn offer multiple requests to their daughters/ sisters to be dutiful daughters-in-law/wives. This injunction, frequently expressed on the show, subsumes Vietnam within a traditional Confucian patrilocal framework and acknowledges a position within that hierarchy that reinforces the gendering of Korea as male and leader.

The dominant emotion evoked by the segment, however, is longing for absent loved ones, and this is reinforced in several aspects that seem determined to elicit tears from the viewer. Another aspect of split screens is their ability to allow continual reaction shots, often of weeping subjects, which urge viewer empathy with these transplanted brides. It is difficult indeed to view these shows and not feel an upsurge of emotion because of their concerted attempts, manipulative but undeniably skillful in their genuine

\textsuperscript{16} See the two clips available via <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9X4DsQwZfl> and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_aZ-ULsF5Q>.
raw reality, to touch on powerful, universal human sentiments. The show brings its audience into a heightened emotional realm with frequent reference to peak life markers such as childbirth, weddings, and death that bind the two countries together in reminders of common humanity. Typical examples found within just a five-minute sequence in this episode include an image of the loving Korean husband with his hand on his pregnant wife’s tummy; multiple references to the poor health of the bride’s father; an older sister in Vietnam reminding her younger sibling that she has promised to have a baby and to come to visit, the sister’s further remark that she cries at times because she misses her so much, and the bride’s frail grandmother stating “I want to see you one more time before I die.”

Korea, it hardly need be said, is a land whose inhabitants know well the pain of divided families. The show offers emotional catharsis through its reunions but displaces Korea’s lingering grief over separation onto others. One unnoticed function of these shows, I would argue, is that they take the place of Geu sarami bogo sipda [The Person I Miss], which quietly disappeared from Korean television in 2007, after its long successful run in helping to reunite families that had suffered agonizing separations, often as a result of strained economic circumstances. The emotions evoked by that show, with its frequently intense reality theatre, have been transferred from a purely domestic audience to create a sense of shared experience with others in the larger Asian region. An implicit message, however, is that South Korea, and South Korean television, has now graduated, or outgrown, the need for such shows to suit an entirely domestic setting.

I use the metaphors of maturation here very deliberately, for Meet the In-Laws promotes not only a gendered relationship between Korea and Asia, but one in which Korea takes on the role of elder guide to Asia as a younger partner. Both are reflected in reality, when Korean husbands take much younger wives from elsewhere in Asia, as is evident in this episode, but this discursive tendency appears in more subtle ways as well. The climactic revelation of the bride’s parents from backstage occurs at a moving moment. The bride, who at this point is weeping upon hearing her grandmother’s emotional plea, is asked by the show’s host, Nam Hui-seok, a surprising question: does she remember the lullaby that her grandmother sang her when she was a child? Yes, she does. As she sings this tune, so evocative of childhood, while choking back tears, her parents appear from behind.

Even more strikingly, as the show approaches its conclusion shortly after the tearful reunion, Nam, seen virtually towering over the other Vietnamese women who have accompanied the featured guest, asks one if she misses her mother as well, in tones clearly reminiscent of an adult addressing a child. When the woman answers eung (“yeah”), she generates laughter among the audience. An awkward moment of cultural misunderstanding follows, as the woman, flustered, issues a challenging waeyo (“Why?”). It is, however, the host’s turn to be taken aback when she responds to his inquiry about how she feels upon seeing her friend reunited with her parents. She feels both bad and good: happy for her friend, but sad not to see her own mother. Nam then speaks in a condescending tone, again, as if to a child, telling her that she too should work hard so she can go see her own mother once more. Stifling her own tears, she moves off-camera. A subtitle that coincidentally appears at this point just before the credit roll makes evident

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17 If only to judge by the occasions I’ve viewed this with others in Korea, I feel confident in saying that there is rarely a dry eye when the shows have finished (including my own). It is not uncommon to see the hosts themselves of such shows wiping genuine tears away when families are reunited.
the desire to stage-manage these encounters: “We are accepting applications from foreign daughters-in-law who are caring for their in-laws and managing happy (dallam) families.” In other words, troubled brides need not apply, and the appearance of harmony between Korea and its newly arrived brides will be maintained, recreated and propagated. Nonetheless, the encounter just witnessed highlights that even so, jarring moments can intrude.

Some final observations and questions by way of conclusion. What are the larger implications of the arrival of shows such as Meet The In-Laws? Certainly to an extent they simply reflect public recognition of a noteworthy demographic trend. At the same time, these shows’ modes of representing Vietnam and Asia in the popular imaginary and their intertwining with gender issues deserve careful attention. If Korea’s popular culture images of its connections to Japan, for example, fraught as they may be, suggest Korea at its most modern and sophisticated, connections to a larger Asia replay Korea’s most cherished sense of itself as a nation that retains a sense of “soul” (without the ‘e’), that is, as an agrarian society where jeong still reigns supreme. Since the turn of the millennium one finds increasing evidence of a radical shift in Korea’s gendering of its encounters with the foreign away from the aggressive male intruder, whose presence in Korea has often been symbolized in tropes of rape and violation, as in gijichon (camtown) fiction, to the foreign as the female to be dominated and domesticated within the national fabric.

Indeed, where are Vietnamese men in Korea’s popular representations of its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbor? Other than reminders of the fathers and brothers of brides, left back in the home country, they have until now been conspicuously absent. But perhaps further change is afoot: the 2007 independent film Cheoem mannun saramdeul (Hello, Stranger) centers upon the friendship between a North Korean refugee in the south and a male Vietnamese migrant laborer while this year’s The Wind Blows has its male Korean protagonist find that his love interest continues her relationship with a Vietnamese boyfriend. As a new generation of mixed Korean-Vietnamese children is born on the Korean peninsula itself, and pho restaurants proliferate on the streets of Korean cities, interest in the country is continuing to grow. How the representation of Vietnam evolves is unpredictable but will undoubtedly be fascinating.

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From the Center of Different Peripheries: Constructing Cultural Content in a New Age of Diversity

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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses some of the convergent and divergent marketing and promotional strategies that the Korea Culture & Contents Agency (KOCCA) has developed and implemented in the Beijing and Los Angeles branch offices. This paper is a timely study because of KOCCA’s recent efforts to develop new strategic inroads between the creative and cultural industries in Korea, China and the US as a type of panacea for rescuing Korean content production, which has suffered from ailing ancillary markets and piracy, among other things. It is hoped that the preliminary findings in this paper will offer new insights into a possible research framework for investigating cross-cultural linkages between the Korean, US and Chinese audio-visual and creative industries with a view toward developing successful future collaborations in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is commonly known that the transcultural spread of Korea’s popular culture, so-called Hallyu, began experiencing momentum in the late 1990s. Since then, Korean content has been appreciated for its simultaneous universality and ‘Korean-ness’. Since this time we have seen a transnational ebb and flow – in the soft-power ways that Nye (2004) explains – into other Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, Vietnam and Japan, among others. In return, the expansion of these markets invigorated Korea’s cultural industries to thrive and to systematize a foundation for further development. In fact, Hallyu has overflowed into other industry sectors such as food, fashion and computer gaming, drawing an increased base of tourists to Korea who are eager to study and travel in the ‘Land of Morning Calm’ as well as dine at Galbi Jeeps – perhaps looking for a glimpse of Dae Jang Gum in the kitchen. Here are a few images of the Korea Tourism Organization’s annual tourist information booklet published in English – auspiciously named ‘Hallyu’ – which promote sites related to top-selling drama and filming locations as well as music and cultural events. All in all, Hallyu has transformed Korea’s image from a little-known part of Asia to a thriving trendy place to be, to know and to experience.

This international spotlight on Korea has been well-discussed within numerous ‘Hallyu’ conferences, refereed journals and the popular press in and outside of Korea. Clearly, a long history of cultural policy in Korea, accentuated differently by various government administrations such as Korean Cultural Content Agency (KOCCA) and Korean Film Council (KOFIC), has provided a sturdy backbone to the rise of this Korean Wave and a new age of transnational cultural flows. In this paper I explore the overall nature of Korea’s policy support to the cultural industry and where KOCCA belongs. I particularly examine KOCCA’s convergent and divergent marketing strategies that have been developed and implemented in Beijing, Tokyo, the UK and Los Angeles offices since it was created in 2001 under the guidance of president Kim Dae-jung (a.k.a. the ‘Cultural President’). It examines the KOCCA’s endeavor for international collaboration between the creative and cultural industries in China, Japan and the US in an attempt to
increase its competitiveness against these other countries’ bigger-budget media products and to gain access to larger markets under the classification of a co-produced ‘domestic’ product (which Brian’s paper discusses in more detail).

This paper particularly explores what is less-known, that is, how in each place and in each case soft power flows of popular Korean culture have manifested themselves in different ways. Divergent circumstances in each city have resulted from geographical specificity in which consumer consumption patterns, market peculiarities and larger bilateral trade relations between Korea and the aforementioned nations are in flux: Beijing has its larger-than-life audiences of closely-monitored and government-approved content coupled with the current overwhelming consumption of unofficial/pirate Korean DVDs and CDs; Tokyo has its young and middle-aged female fandom toward Hallyu stars such as Bae Yong-joon, Lee Byun-heon and Rain; and Los Angeles offers one of the largest Korean Diasporic communities and consumers of Korean cultural content as well as Korean-American content creators’ and other producers’ making valuable contributions to ‘the scene’. In the realm of film, Gina Kim (Never Forever), Grace Lee (American Zombie) and Michael Kang (West 32nd Street) come to mind, as well as hundreds of other Korean works across the audio-visual entertainment and IT industries. These three cities are strategic centers from which the Korean government has launched aggressive cultural industry-promotional initiatives. Here I refer to the establishment and maintenance of offices, public venues and events run by KOCCA in each of these cities. KOCCA has experienced different challenges for achieving its aims in different markets, as discussed shortly. It is hoped that the preliminary findings in this paper will offer new insights into cross-cultural linkages between the Korean, and other countries’ audio-visual and creative industries with a view toward developing successful future collaborations in the Asia-Pacific region.

**Policy Support**

Back in 1999 after realizing the cultural and economic benefits of the rise of Hallyu, Korea’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) began ramping up its budget for creative and cultural industry and initiatives.1 The Basic Law for the Cultural Industry was established in 1999 to foster development of this domestic industry. Since then and through the Roh Moo-hyun government, Korea’s cultural policy has relaxed or removed regulations that have threatened to weaken the legs on which the cultural industry stands (2008 MCST). In 2000, for the first time in history, cultural budgets exceeded 1% of the government’s total budget, which boosted cultural infrastructure for libraries, museums, and cultural centers (Kim, Lee and Son 2003). Over a ten-year period, the government doubled its financial commitment toward the arts and culture more generally.2

In a somewhat cyclical way, the MCT has both funded and become enlightened by KOCCA, KOFIC, Korea Broadcasting Institution (KBI) and Korea Game Industry Agency (KOGIA) about the impact of soft power and the value of Korea’s cultural content as a core national export item. These organizations attempted to offer efficacious support for the domestic industry while raising world recognition of Korean culture, that is, of the generating-income kind. Since its inception, KOCCA, and the governments of Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak for that matter, have all walked a fine line between cultural and economic imperatives – particularly in regards to the Screen Quota

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1 The MCP later became known as the Ministry of Culture, Sport and Tourism (MCST) since 2008.
2 Cultural budgets have steadily increased from: 47.6 billion won (0.63% of the total budget) in 1994 to 120 trillion won (1.3% of the total budget) in 2004 (MCST 2008).
System (SQS) and larger trade negotiations with the US; many of us know that in early 2006, Korea’s SQS was cut in half from 146 days to 73 days. Rather than competing against the US on these types of complex trade matters, the Korean government has found innovative strategies and pathways for developing its domestic industries – and KOCCA is one of them. Simply speaking, KOCCA is designed ‘to help promote Korean programs and products abroad’ (Russell 2008: 122). KOCCA aims at nurturing cultural industry and cultural technology in support of areas such as planning, merchandising, and delivering cultural content. The rise of KOCCA since 2001 is part of a wider, long-term government vision in which the cultural content industry is a core part of the nation’s advancement for the future – or so the government believes.

In what feels like an unprecedented ranking – certainly unprecedented for somewhere such as Australia – the creative and culture industries are now regarded as significant for national development, as in the case of the Bio-tech, Nano-tech, environmental and space industries. According to KOCCA (2007), in 2003 the cultural industry generated 66 trillion won (3.8%) out of a combined profit of 1,741 trillion won generated by all industries. This added value ratio increased two-fold between 1990 (3.2%) and 2003 (6.5%). Seo Bying-moon (2005), director of KOCCA’s home base in Seoul, has gone on record as saying: “to create cultural production worthy of $100 million US dollars, all the cultural industry needs is paper and pencil, whilst other industries need the import of raw materials in producing domestic goods.”

KOCCA’s hosting various showcases of Korean cultural contents at venues such as the International Digital Content Conference (DICON) and Seoul Character Fair aims at enhancing the recognition level of Korean cultural industries and their products, and accordingly providing regional, national and international networking and business opportunities under one space. Across these 3 major cities, though in slightly different ways, The KOCCA officially supports: manhwa (Korea’s manga), character, animation, music and digital content (e.g. fashion, e-learning, mobile content and edutainment). Nonetheless, having these diverse areas to support, KOCCA has had difficulties in catering for the different needs arising from different industries, and its lack of efficiency and specialization were criticized by members of industry.

KOCCA’s chaebol-like supporting style, which concerned all content areas without specializing in a certain field, often induces conflicts with other organizations for overlapped activities, causing unnecessary use of funding. For example, the KOCCA USA office shares the office space with the KOFIC, often causing conflicts with each other when the KOCCA included films as part of its promotional campaigns. It was heard that

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3 KOCCA’s key objectives are: 1) making a foundation for content creation; 2) fostering overseas market expansion and exports; 3) nurturing creative talents; 4) developing cultural technology – in an IP (owned by Korea) sense; 5) facilitating financial investments and loans; and 6) maintaining a policy framework.
4 In 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2006, CT was selected as one of the promising future industries by the government. President Roh Moo-hyun announced a new vision for the cultural industry in 2003, mandating that the government would help the cultural industry become one of five cultural majors in the world (The Hankyoreh 13 August 2003).
5 The number of known employees in the cultural content industry soared from 200,000 in 1990 to 490,000 in 2003. Compared to other growing industries such as manufacturing or the IT industry, the cultural industry creates more added values and provides more employment.
6 Apart from these annual meeting spaces, an internet website Koreacontent.org attempts to offer a B2B e-Marketplace to connect buyers and sellers around the clock and around the world.
7 These complaints were raised in 2005 at the national inspection of the KOCCA, by manhwa, character, animation and music industries (Monthly Digital Content October 2005).
one film professor living in LA was pursued by the KOFIC and KOCCA at the same time, making him feel uncomfortable working with either of them. Film, broadcasting and software have not been part of KOCCA’s domain because they are already supported via organizations such as the Korean Film Archive and others previously mentioned. The MCT envisioned from the start in 2001 that KOCCA works with these institutions on the level of the OSMU (one source multi-use) model,8 which has become one of the MCT’s mantras. KOCCA seems to struggle to balance the ideal and the reality in its administrative efforts. It has been the same with the operation of KOCCA’s overseas branches as global marketing centers. They have collected local industry intelligence and facilitated networking to continue globalization of Korean cultural content. While their objectives were the same, each branch office had to develop its own strategies, best fitting to their working environment.

**KOCCA CHINA**

Established in 2001, the KOCCA China office has attempted to become the business information center for all one’s need-to-know about China, answering the content industry’s strong desire to open roads into this rich yet unexplored market. Apart from offering market intelligence and networking opportunities, KOCCA China is now prioritizing cooperation over export-driven marketing, that is, focusing on the exporting of popular culture. Until 2006, KOCCA China appeared relatively relaxed because Korean content was hot among local audiences and consumers, thus, it only focused on exporting popular culture rather than proactive strategies of servicing complaints of clients and furthering networking. However, as the Hallyu began slowing in China primarily because of an increased hostility towards Korea (Kim Korea Times 5 May 2008),9 this nonchalant business approach was challenged.

The noticeable change in KOCCA’s approach to China is most notable in KOCCA’s a pocket-sized booklet *Chinese Cultural Industry Business Guide* (2007). This book, distributed free for Korean content companies interested in the Chinese market, gives an overview of the local cultural industry and the types of entry strategies, as well as legal and copyright information. While it explains how some individual companies have already entered the Chinese market on their own – with varying degrees of success – without alternating previous market approaches from Korea, this book focuses on how to adapt to the ‘Chinese way’ and how to deal with copyright issues. The first half of the book (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) is about how to make contracts with a Chinese partner and explains a contract process, necessary documents, government offices to contact and censorship and regulatory policies. Even though the book does not give names of contact people, and numbers and addresses of the pertinent institutions, it gives ideas about where to start. The second half of the book (Chapters 4 and 5) is about copyright violation. It introduces case studies of copyright violations that occurred between the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and Business Software Alliance, reinforcing for Korean content creators that they should aggressively protect their copyright as US companies do. It seems natural to follow the footsteps of the US institutions, because of their prior knowledge about China, which has been identified by the MPAA as the number one

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8 OSMU refers to the production and promotion strategy that spins-off a variety of products (Dora pencil cases, shoes, backpacks, etc.) and tie-in campaigns (McDonald’s kids meals, etc.) from one program – aka the ‘Spielberg’ or ‘George Lucas’ full-service marketing thing.

9 According to the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, in 2007 Korea exported $1.4 billion worth of cultural products. While it is higher than that of 2005, the export of dramas, films and music has declined. In 2006 export reached $177 million, showing about 20 percent decline from 2005.
piracy theft, with the 90% rate of piracy (MPAA Press Release 2006). As the KOCCA China’s director Kwon says, the Chinese government recently shows more attention to the copyright protection because it sees piracy as an obstacle to the local content industry’s growth (Seong 2006), but in the meantime Korean content creators should still be alert to protect their rights. This book ensures that it is a separate issue from understanding the Chinese way.

In September 2008 the KOCCA sponsored the 7th annual Korea-Japan-China conference, focusing on strategies and cooperation. Compared to the same event held in 2007 that consisted of the business matching and the government policy meetings with an obvious focus on Korean product export into China, the 2008 event was different. Now cooperation is the key word, because it is the only way into the Chinese market, which is heavily protectionist as a result of its censorship and regulatory policy. So co-investment and cooperation is now the only way forward. KOCCA China tries to bridge the gap between Korea’s and China’s views of the world, which includes creative imagination. So, what the KOCCA China office has to do is bring people together who can potentially bridge this gap: it is a go-between, not a gap-filling role.

Here is a case demonstrating how cooperation between Korea and China came to fruition in a positive way. In China, TV is still the primary content distribution channel and the protectionist policy requires the Chinese content on TV in the prime time hours. Thus, Korea-China collaboration has a much greater success rate when it is fixed on television. The KOCCA China’s emphasis on television is different from the US strategy in this sense (Kwon 2008). For example, in the children’s animation market, foreign animations have to appear on TV after 9:00pm. Jin Delong, head of the Publicity Management Department at the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, observes that more than 1,000 television channels in China, with hundreds of millions of adolescent audiences are having difficulty finding locally-produced animations of good quality (China.org.cn. 28 February 2007). By collaborating in productions between Korea and China, Korean and Chinese bi-cultural product can go on prime time television. Understanding this, Korean animation companies have developed working relationships with Chinese partners since 2003. *Space Hip Hop Duck* was the first official co-produced animation to occur in 2003 between Sunwoo Entertainment and Shanghai Animation Entertainment Studio and it was aired on the CCTV in China. Since then, many Korean animation companies jumped into this new-found blue ocean with the support from KOCCA China. One of the recent cases is the production of 3-D animation *Tao the Magical Chinese Kid* by Korea’s G&G Entertainment and China’s Motion Magic Digital Entertainment in China in 2007, and this project has a merchandise plan coming along with it, aiming to utilize the KOCCA’s much emphasized OSMU model.

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10 It is different from Korea where Internet has been rising as a main content distribution channel and thus internet laws dealing with it have been fixed.
KOCCA Japan

The KOCCA Japan office was established in 2001, and since then KOCCA Japan has hosted industry events such as Korea-Japan Cultural Contents seminar, Drama Original Sounds Korea 2007, Korea-Japan Visual Business Forum in order to support promotion of K-pop to the Japanese market, connecting Korean and Japanese content creators and fans. As KOCCA Japan’s director, Hong Jeong-yong states in the website, its main goal is expanding the industrial relationship between Korea and Japan through hosting and participating in various cultural events. According to KOCCA, Japan’s marketing manager Isojaki Taichi (Goh 2006), the KOCCA’s sponsoring big events for free has provided spaces for content creators from both countries to get together and also has been inspiring the Japanese government, which benchmarked KOCCA’s supporting scheme. Due to the spread of Hallyu, Korea’s image in Japan has been positively turned around\(^\text{11}\) and this has been an advantageous point in pursuing KOCCA Japan’s operation.

The KOCCA Japan’s transformation in 2005 should be understood in the same context. It is renamed the Korean Cultural Content Center, with an obvious mission of reinforcing the spread of Hallyu and maximizing profit from the existing Hallyu content such as Winter Sonata and Dae Jang Geum by following the OSMU model.\(^\text{12}\) This change was due to the government’s recognition of the weight of Japan in the cultural content market – number two in the world, followed by the US – and the increased consumption of Korean content in Japan (Park 21 Digital Times January 2005). This invigorating action was ironically timely because Korean the content’s winning streak over the Japan market nosedived in 2006. For example, Korean film exports decreased 50 percent in 2006 compared to that of 2005, which was largely due to a dramatic drop in film exports to

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\(^{11}\) According to the KOCCA Japan’s survey about the recognition level of Korean contents in Japan, the recognition level of Korean cultural contents increased 20.7% compared to 2 years before (Lee Digital Times 13 December 2006).

\(^{12}\) Between two products, ten profit models were developed: 1) TV broadcasting; 2) DVD; 3) VOD; 4) publishing; 5) merchandising; 6) main character’s right of likeness; 7) OST; 8) musical; and 9) animation.
Japan (KOFIC 2007).KOCCA Japan had to work harder to support Korean content to enable it to be consumed and perceived in a positive way.

In a much smaller way than the Chinese Cultural Industry Business Guide discussed above, KOCCA Japan gives attention to how to do business in the Japanese way by publishing a report entitled Entering Japanese Market With Strategic Killer Contents (2009). Here, cooperation is again a key word for the ideal business model based on the win-win situation. It analyses current trends in the Japanese cultural industry/market and achievements of Korea’s contents within it so far, lists cases of successes and failures, and recommends ways of doing business in Japan. For example, it is recommended for a Korean content creator to gain trust from the business partner: he/she should be patient and spend at least two years showing continued interest in the Japanese market before having an official business meeting with a potential partner.

KOCCA USA

Compared to the Chinese and Japanese markets in which the recognition level of Korean products is higher, thanks to Hallyu, the KOCCA USA office has to deal with a market in which the Hallyu effect does not exist. Korean cultural content, even if it is good quality, is nothing in the US. Hence, its main job is to enhance the recognition level of Korean products to the US industry by hosting promotional events and participating in annual international showcases such as the Asia Pacific Entertainment and Media Summit. Hee-sun Seo, director of KOCCA USA, says the main task is networking with the US cultural industry people (Jeong Miju Hanguk Daily 1 October 2008). In order to achieve this goal, KOCCA USA has hosted and participated in a number of industry events including: an international marketing professional training program; film/animation screening; Korean contents showcases; a Korean digital contents (online game) contest; and the establishment of the annual Dari Awards ceremony, which was for Americans who bridged Korea and US culture (dari in Korea means bridge).

However, seeing the KOCCA’s going to the US market manifested in the website written in English, it is clear that there is a gap between the ideal and the reality. In her welcoming statement, director Hee-sun Seo talks of figures to address how attractive the US market is to Korean content creators: ‘US represents the largest market for the entertainment industry … a success in US translates to a worldwide success of the project.’ Even though it is understood that this statement was aimed at Korean content creators (Dear Leaders in the Korean Cultural Contents Business!), it is hard to miss the reality that the KOCCA considers the US as a place to conquer rather than a country to seek partnerships. At the same time, if it is for Korean content creators, the question is why the website is not operated in Korean as well as English. The ideal expressed in this opening statement is different from what KOCCA USA is really doing, which is networking, showing that KOCCA USA has a long way to go to redesign its strategies.

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13 In 2005, Japan purchased 74.1 percent of Korean film exports and in 2006 this ratio dropped to 50.1 percent (KOFIC 2007).
14 It has hosted a number of events including: an international marketing professional training program; Korean contents showcases; an annual Dari Awards ceremony for Americans who bridged the gap between Korean and US culture (dari in Korea means bridge); and a Korean digital contents (online game) contest.
CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS & FUTURE PROSPECTS

Since the late 1990s, the cultural industry has grown in both quality and quantity. The government’s support with raised budget allocation enabled this growing industry to facilitate overseas market exploration. The KOCCA was in the middle of this change. The rise of creative and cultural industry and a nation’s support to it is not something found only in Korea. For example, the UK also supports the growth of creative and cultural industries for the same reason, that is, a significant source generating employment and profit (DCMS 2007). Nonetheless, differences also exist. The UK perceives itself as a ‘strong’ player in a global cultural market and has to get ready for fierce competition rising from other countries (2007), and thus its support plan also focuses on ‘unlocking creative talent’ and ‘helping creative talent flourish’ (DCMS 2008). Compared to the UK, Korea, which probably is one of the rising competitors, prioritizes to reach out to the world because even though Korea has quality cultural products, its global recognition level is much lower than that of the UK, the US and Japan. Hallyu exposed Korean contents to the larger Asian market, enabling Korean content creators to dream of going global.

The KOCCA has been hell-bent on reinvigorating Hallyu, that is, international conspicuous consumption and overt awareness of Korean cultural content production, which since early 2006 has suffered from ailing ancillary markets and piracy, among other economic and industry challenges. KOCCA China and Japan’s transformation occurred while coping with these challenges. In the meantime a new understanding of Hallyu came: it is no longer the spread of Korean cultural content in only one way, but was the trigger that opened up two-way cultural flow in Korea and other countries through collaboration.

In a realistic sense, KOCCA cannot force local industry practitioners in China and the US for instance, to partner Korean content creators. In addition, KOCCA cannot guarantee that the governments of China or the US will warmly accept international collaboration projects, which is one of the major pitfalls that Brian’s paper discusses. The KOCCA China and Japan’s late realization, that is, ‘when in Rome, do as the Romans do’ may sound the very basic, but significant milestone for all content creators in Korea. KOCCA’s decade-long overseas activities seemed to come to a conclusion, finding a new direction of going forward.

In 2008 the Lee Myung-bak government was established and impacted on the cultural administration. The MCST (2008) criticized the previous Roh government because it did not invest more in the cultural industry compared to what the IT industry was given. Ironically, the funding for KOCCA actually decreased in 2008 compared to 2007. In 2009 the Lee Myung-bak government merged the KOCCA and four other associations (Korean Broadcasting Institute, Korea Game Industry Agency, Cultural Contents Center, and Digital Business Group under Korea SW Industry Promotion Agency). While the name KOCCA is retained, it has become a larger umbrella organization. The MCST announced this move, aimed at removing overlapping investment in between these five organizations and thus enhancing efficiency in pursuing

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15 The size of the UK’s creative industries is now comparable to that of its financial services industries, which consist of 7.3 per cent of the economy. It employs 1.8 million people, including those working in related industry sectors (DCMS 2007).

16 According to the KOCCA website, the government funding decreased from 51,228,000 won in 2007 to 47,028,000 won in 2008.

17 The new organization is going to be in charge of a total of a 186 billion won budget in order to carry out its projects (Hankyung Daily 19 April 2009).
promotional activities. Nonetheless, this move gives cause for concern for the members of the industry because it may lead to losing areas of expertise some institutions already had achieved. While KOCCA China and Japan shows that catering for different market needs is important in further developing the spread of Korean cultural contents, the creation of a mega-organization seem to be out of synch with this revelation. The cultural roadmap of the Lee government is just being shaped now. It is still too early to predict where it will go and what it will achieve. KOCCA’s further development also depends on this.

REFERENCES


18 The decision of making this mega-organization was protested by the Korean Broadcasting Institute and Korea Game Industry Agency, which claimed that this plan is executed without consultation process as a top-down action (Han Digital Times 9 September 2008).

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Japan and Korea as a Source of Media and Cultural Capital

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ABSTRACT
Japan and Korea have made significant growth in cultural exchange from 1980 up to the present. The regional economic growth has enhanced the cultural flow between the media industries of the two countries continue to play a major role in consolidating a new regional social network. This paper examines the government regulations and cultural threads, which have led to the increase in cultural exchange and how they have interacted with each other in bringing different and changing cultural interpretations. The growth in cultural flows between the countries, despite historical antipathy, is creating a new cultural geography. An examination of a selected Japanese media text remade for television and its’ content related to the new cultural geography emerging in East Asia. The focus is initially on Japan whilst concomitantly using Korea and its’ more recent television media production of the selected text to delineate the new regional cultural geography. Of great importance in the process of the emergence of media and cultural ‘capital’ and a new cultural geography is the political change. Respective Government instigated media policy and regulations formally control the television industry in both Japan and Korea. The organisation of the Japanese broadcasting industry is summarised.

INTRODUCTION
Japan and Korea have made growth in cultural exchange from 1980, particularly since 1998 up to the present. The regional economic growth has enhanced the cultural flow in the geographic region as well as between the two countries. The rapid expansion of communication technology including broadcast and communication satellites, the internet and mobile telephones has conjointly accelerated the process. Media industries, principally film, television, popular music, anime and manga continue to play a major role in consolidating a new regional social network. This paper examines the changes in government regulations and cultural threads, which have led to the increase in cultural exchange and how they have interacted with each other in bringing different and changing cultural interpretations. The growth in cultural flows between the countries, despite historical antipathy, is creating a new cultural geography. The process of regional cultural evolution, in the latter part of the twentieth century has originated in Japan. One Japanese media product created from an original manga text for television has been selected and examined and its’ content related to the cultural matrix emerging in East Asia. The focus is initially on Japan whilst concomitantly using Korea and its’ more recent remake television media product to further delineate the new regional cultural geography.

The paper considers in part the re-making of one Japanese popular culture text from the manga Hana yori Dango, written by Kamio Yoko and released between 1992 and 2004 in Japan. The text was remade into a television anime in 1996, broadcasted by Asahi Television; then into an anime film in 1997 by the Toei film company. Due to its continuing popularity, it was remade into a television drama in 2005. A sequel followed in 2007 and in 2008 a pro-sequel. The original manga was remade into a Taiwanese television drama called Meteor Garden, using a Taiwanese cast for Taiwanese audiences initially in 2001 and again in 2006 and 2007with ensuing Taiwanese productions(Lim
Currently a Filipino broadcast company is looking to acquire the licence for remaking *Hana yori Dango* for a local audience. Another remade version of *Hana yori Dango* was recently completed in Korea using Korean casts and Korean house production for 2009 and has just been released by the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) (*Hana yori Dango* 2008). The original Japanese *manga* has been translated into thirteen languages. Such remaking of popular culture texts into sequels and prequels across Asia is a creative, dynamic and powerful force, which I call the ‘soft power’ phenomenon and soft power has in turn created cultural threads and cultural capital.

The paper also illustrates the re-creation of the original text into different media forms. It determines the core transformations for audiences in Japan and Korea. Analysis of the elements retained, transformed and additional elements introduced with various forms of the original text into the differing media products. Edward Hall’s theory of cross cultural communication is applied to conceptualise the cultural transfers in the remaking process (Walker, Walker, and Schmitz 2003). An increasing number of remade products have been transferred pan-Asia. Since 1990; taking Fuji Television as a case, one hundred and fifty to two hundred Japanese television programs were sold and have been shown in East Asia. (Murakami 2005). More than five hundred Japanese television dramas have been shown across Asia (METI Report 2003 ). They have created “media capital” (Curtin 2004, 2003) in Asia and lifted what McGraw has called “The Gross National Cool Product” (MacGray 2002), which in turn has contributed to Asian national economies. Many Japanese *manga* have been remade into TV dramas, TV dramas have been remade into films, and films have been novelized into books and books have been remade into other media forms. These media forms have contributed to easing the boundary between Korea and Japan.

**HISTORICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE JAPANESE AND KOREAN RELATIONSHIP**

Although Japan and Korea are neighbours in the South Asian region, and share Eastern cultures through historical contact with Chinese culture, Buddhism and the like historically a number of barriers have divided the two countries. Some of the barriers include The Japan Sea, separate written and spoken languages, frequent periods of political and military hostility, compounded by the fact that Korea is on the Asian mainland and was the obvious route for invasion of Japan by expansionist Chinese regimes in the past (Yasumoto 2008).

During the twentieth century, Korea discouraged friendly relations between Korea and Japan since Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and maintained occupation in Korea until 1945. At the end of Japanese imperial policies in 1945 and since then, residual ill feeling and the focus of the new Korea as a cold war “hot” conflict zone kept relations at a distance for decades. As a result, there was little interaction between Japanese and Korean media. The Koreans did not want to subjugate their cultural heritage to Japanese culture. However, at this time through to the present, the technology for trans-border electronic communication, for example, television and the internet has evolved at a rapid pace. With the introduction of new technologies, the programming industry was developing appealing formats such as TV drama for providing popular, mass entertainment to broadcast over the expanding electronic media. There was an improvement in relations becoming evident towards the end of the twentieth century. Notwithstanding the broader based picture, there was evidence of some mixed feelings for and against Japanese culture. In 1995, the Japanese Prime Minister Murayama released his statement ‘Apologies to Asian nation who suffered under the Japanese military’; this was a singularly important announcement.
from Japan and was an important precursor to the thawing of relations between Japan and its regional neighbors. The historical antipathy was to change at the end of the twentieth century when the Korean Government implemented a program of easing of previously imposed restrictions on the exchange of Korean and Japanese popular cultural material.

VISIONARY CHANGES TO THE JAPANESE AND KOREAN RELATIONSHIP

Kim Dae-jung, who later became the Korean president, was a visionary in his view of the future relationship between Korea and Japan. He was abducted by the Korean Central intelligence agency (KCIA) in 1973 during a visit to Japan, taken back to Korea, and then imprisoned. In his publication” 金大中 Jail correspondence” written whilst he was in prison he has stated his three ‘han’s

1. Opposed to adverse feelings towards the Japanese.
2. Against the use of military force.
3. To use a harmonious approach towards Japan
(Maeda 2007).

It is noted that Kim Dae- jung, as with the South African visionary Nelson Mandella was awarded a Nobel prize. The improvement in relations between Japan and Korea was facilitated under the presidency of Kim Dae- jung 金大中(1998-2003). He instigated four steps to open the Korean door for Japan, allowing the entry of Japanese Popular Culture into Korea, in 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2003/4(Ishii 2001; Maeda 2007). The first step resulted in an adverse reaction within Korea amongst the mass media, intellectuals and academia in Korea. There was hesitation in accepting this new open door policy. Kim Dae- jung in progressively opening the door between Korea and Japan and increasingly enabling a cultural flow, saw this as the way to improve the understanding of Koreans for things Japanese and conversely Japanese for things Korean. He was pragmatic appreciating that by 1995; eighty percent of Japanese TV anime had already penetrated into Korean society unofficially. The Korean Cultural Promotion research center reports on the findings from a survey within Japan with the question “Do you agree to the Korean Government Open Door Policy towards Japanese Popular Culture? The result was 50.3% positive, 23.7 % generally positive, 12.2 % no real view-matter of personal taste. This sample, with 86.2 percent of the sample not opposing the policy, strongly supports Kim Dae- jung’s vision and has enabled the cultural threads between Japan and Korea to strengthen and cultural exchange to grow(Maeda 2007).

Maeda states that a Korean SBS radio producer reports highly evaluated Japanese award films should be open to Korea, if the assessment of the content as being of ‘high’ quality internationally. We should not just read the article in the newspaper about the Japanese film. We should not read the article about Japanese pop music. We should listen to the music, this is strange phenomenon to keep this anti Japanese feelings in Korea. We should stop this. We have to do it now otherwise Korea delays its growth in economic competitive power. It is time now for Korean to continue with economic progress.

Turning then to the four steps implemented by the Korean government with the vision of Kim Dae- jung. Ishii (2004), Maeda (2006), Korean Cultural Tourist Bureau and Chosen Nippo (2003) instigated the four steps as follows:

The first step - 1988 October 10th

1. Movies & Videos
   Japan and Korea Co-production film
1.1. Japanese actors participation in Korean Film
1.2. Four Award films(Cannes, Venice, Berlin, Academy)
2. Print publication
   Anime, Manga

The second step - 1999 September 10th

1. Movies & Videos
   1.1 70 international Film festival awards.
   1.2 No age restricted film
   1.3 No animefor movie theatre
2. Music
   Singers less than 2000 seats (No live, Record, video)

The Third Step - 2000 June 27th

1. Movies & Videos
   1.1 Restricted
      Films except 12-14 years under.
   1.2 nor restriction for international
      Film festival awards films.
   1.3 restricted
      Anime in the theatre, Only international film festival awards anime
2. Music
   Japanese music in Korean Accepted all albums except Japanese lyrics.
3. Games soft
   All game soft (PC games, On-line games)
   Except videogame using a video game machine.
4. Broadcast
   Sports, Documentary,
   Cable ,TV, Satellite Broadcast (keep the second step conditions)

The fourth step - 2004 September 16th /January 1st

September 16th

1. Movies & Videos
   Released all restrictions
2. Music
   CD, Tapes,
   Lyrics in Japanese.
3. Games soft
   Released all restrictions

January 1st
4. Broadcast
   Cable, Satellite:
   Life Information, educational programme, movie, Theatre anime (restricted
   Shown in Korea)
   All Japanese Lyrics, TV drama (restricted 12 years above),
   Co production TV drama,
   * Entertainment programme(Variety, Talk show)  not open
   彼愛放送
   Life Information, educational programme, movie, Theatre anime (restricted shown in Korea)
   All Japanese Lyrics ,TV drama(Co production TV drama).
   **Some restrictions remain-Entertainment programme (Variety, Talk show)
There was a gap, after the third step, between 2000-2004 where political events influenced the Korean President’s policy of opening the door of Korea to Japan. Primary issues being the Japanese history textbook, ownership of Takeshima Island and the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.

**JAPANESE MEDIA INROADS INTO KOREA AND THE KOREAN WAVE**

Japan already possessed a sophisticated and dynamic media industry. The South Korean government had been careful initially to prevent exposing the Korean media industry to more open competition from Japan. Notwithstanding the initial reticence of the Korean government in accepting Japanese media content, for distribution in Korea, some *anime* was screened, without government approval, in Korea before 1998 and with government approval after 2004. A greater range of content except *anime* was accepted and screened in theatres post 1998 The impact and success of Korean television dramas in Japan known as *Kanryuu* (Korean Wave) was initially a surprise to the Korean media industry. The well-known Korean drama ‘Winter Sonata’ with strong love story elements was broadcast in NHK and created cult status in Japan. NHK is historically known by orthodox mottos and concentrates on broadcast news, cultural and educational programming. Winter Sonata was the for runner of a number of Korean productions distributed and receiving acclaim in Japan. This ongoing outcome of media transfers fully confirmed the vision of Kim Dae-jung, some examples of media transfers from Japan to Korea are in Table 1.

| Japanese Content distributed in Korea (Adapted; Maeda, 2006) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anime: Astro Boy, Tiger Bam, Captain Harrock, Witches Sally, Candy Candy | Anime: Evangelism, Princess Mononoke | Manga: Tacchi |

**Table 1**

**JAPANESE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT**

Of great importance in the process of the emergence of media capital and a new cultural geography, despite the opportunities for piracy of media content, are the regional political changes. Government instigated media policy and regulations formally control the broadcasting industry in both Japan and Korea. Japanese regulations control the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation *Nippon Hoso Kyokai* (NHK) and the National Association of Commercial Broadcasting NAB broadcasting content. In 2003, the Broadcasting Ethics & Program Improvement Organization (BPO) was established.

The Japanese television broadcasting industry in Japan is very diverse. There are one hundred and twenty seven domestic television stations(NHK 2008). The five main ones are in Tokyo. The industry is comprised of two main broadcasting systems. One is the public broadcaster, *Nippon Hoso Kyokai* (NHK) and the other is the body of
commercial networks within NAB. NHK is Japan’s public broadcaster comprising NHK General television and NHK Educational television, three satellite services (NHK BS-1, NHK BS-2, and NHK Hi vision-High definition television). The United Kingdom’s British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) radio company was the model for the 1926 founding of NHK (Penn 2003). NAB consists of commercial broadcasting industries inclusive of networks and committees. All commercial broadcasters have to apply to and become a member of the NAB before they are authorised to broadcast. The primary function of NAB is to make regulation and policy controlling the content of television and radio programmes of the commercial broadcasters within government regulations. NAB audits the credibility of viewer’s ratings, make recommendations regarding programmes for specific age groups. NAB is a self-regulatory authority. (Katayama 1999)

The function of BPO plays important roles in Japanese broadcasting media. They act as a mediator between the audience and NHK and NAB. Before 1969, NHK and NAB controlled the regulatory framework and policy. Historically as the association was formed with the two broadcasters, a need was seen to add a third party. BPO has to report audience opinion to NHK and NAB as well as ensuring that the rights and ethics of content fall within government policy (Shimizu 2007).

Before the late 1990s the Korean government legislation restricted the exportation and importation of television, music and film productions; however, from the late 1990s government legislation and technological changes were dynamic. Taking the case of Korea and Japan as an example shows how the lifting of some restrictions after 1990 has improved media transfers. In 1998, Japanese films were officially exported to Korea for the first time. Japanese pop musicians performed in Korea with audience restrictions to 2000 people (Ishii 2001; Maeda 2007). In 2004, both the Korean and Japanese markets were further opened with regard to importation of popular culture productions and both governments began to support co-productions with funding and legislation (Ishii 2001; Maeda 2007). Before the four-step Korean Government policies Korea was very restrictive to the importation of Japanese media products and so Korea was producing ‘ unofficial’ video compact discs and the remade versions were based on the Japanese television drama stories (Yasuki 2005). This ‘ unofficial’ video compact disc production accelerated in the region to the detriment of copyright protection. Terry Flew notes “Media Policy has been central to the development of media in all of its forms. Government policy institutions regulate the ownership, production and distribution of media, and seek to manage and shape cultural practices in order to direct media institutions towards, particular policy goals” (Flew 2007):171.

**EXTERNAL INTEREST IN JAPANESE POPULAR CULTURE-COOL JAPAN**

The word ‘Cool’ in respect to the media industry first appeared in the Japanese media in 2002. Douglas McGray, an American journalist wrote his thesis called “Japan’s Gross National Cool” and published in the ‘Foreign Policy’ magazine, An American Diplomat journal in 2002. (McGray 2002) and the following year, the translation of his article Cool Japan Sekai o Kappa suru Nippon no kakko yosa was published in Chuokoron. He stated that the national power is normally measured by gross national product (GNP) and gross domestic product (GDP). Douglas McGray has created the initialism GNC ‘Gross National Cool’ measured by ‘Cool’ countries like Japan known for their pop culture products (Sugiyama 2006). In another words, Japan is known as GNP Number Two, but GNC Number One. Popular culture content from Japan is now penetrating into other countries. Sugiyama notes the article on Japan “Cool Japan, Japan as Pop Super Power” in
the French Newspaper ‘Le Monde’. He argues that Japan conveys super power influence though popular culture.

The image of Japan, viewed from outside Japan, is now far more complex than the vision of the nineteen sixties when the contemporary vision of Japan at that time was represented by the stereo-types of temples, the Imperial Palace, ancient castles, kimono, samurai swords, Mt. Fuji and the like. Japan today still rightly retains the iconic visions but a view now reinforced by quality products and services; as evidenced by cameras, computers, a plethora of electronic devices, and the high speed train pioneer Shinkansen and many other outstanding examples of technical progress from the nineteen sixties through to the present time. Japan is further evolving with ‘GNC’ and ‘soft power’. The Japanese parliament Diet recognises the importance of ‘GNC’ noting, "We will also formulate 'The Japanese Cultural Industry Strategy', which will enhance the competitiveness of areas that represent the good traits and uniqueness of Japan ... and present them to the world"(Contents Sangyo Kokusai Senryaku Kenkyuukai Gijiroku 2006).

AN ICONIC REMADE JAPANESE MANGA PRODUCT

The changes in government regulations, particularly in Japan and Korea have enabled texts in both the original form and remade forms and formats to cross national boundaries within the respective legal frameworks. Some texts were remade within Japan and others were remade in other Asian countries such as Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore China. Perhaps one of the strongest examples of the remaking of Japanese popular culture texts crossing the national divides is the case of the manga Hana yori Dango (1992-2004), a love comedy in the genre of Girls manga by KamioYoko. The plot centres on a simple and poor teenage girl, who goes to a high school for wealthy people, forced upon her by her parents. The high school is dominated by a gang of handsome but arrogant students called F4 (Flowers four), who are heirs of the most influential families in Tokyo. In the beginning, the gang leader, Domyoji hates Tsukasa that he makes everyone in the high school play tricks on her, however she gradually gains Domyoji’s respect and later he falls in love with her. The lovers end up getting together after going through a series of painful challenges.

Manga can create ideal characters, able to express movements and emotions not so readily translated into traditional television productions. Harada points out that Manga can be artistically cute yet mentally challenging, funny yet serious, innocent yet lecherous, wholesome yet sensual, tender yet violent, or display these qualities simultaneously. Manga and anime are aiming to fuse reality and fantasy that have something to offer to everybody” (Harada 2007). Manga literacy and image alliance have become global beyond the language level. Pictures principally replace writing in manga.

In studying the original manga of Hana yori Dango one needs to understand the formatting used. This manga does not have page numbering which makes references more difficult to identify. Each element of the story is located in a particular space. The space for the particular scene is known as koma. Script is contained within a bubble, fukidshi in approximate space to a particular scene. The story’s script relating to a particular scene is written inside of fukidshi, by using different writing style, size. Onyu onomatopoeia, mimetic words are frequently used to express an emphatic feeling such as being sad, happy, surprise, anger, doubt. The manpu using ‘marked’ artistic style expresses feelings, nervousness, embarrassment etc. Using such techniques brings the reader to the reality of life in a fantasy presentation. Han yori Dango uses more of these stylistic features than other manga.
Each character in the story represents a quite strong image of a new style of youth. Verbal and non-verbal expressions are the miniature social circle of the current society. When the Japanese economic bubble bursts, in 1990 many Japanese unique popular culture appeared into the Japanese society. ‘Chapatsu’ boom, dyed blond hair fashion everywhere on the street, Purikura (print club photo shot), Kogyaru (dressing Lorita, Gothic fashions) wearing Atsuzoko Boom, long thick heal boots, wearing cosplay maid clothes and etc. Overseas Studies to US and Europe had a prestigious status and became quite popular in the Japanese society. Many episodes centre around these unique street cultures. *Hana yori Dango* is a strong example that the many elements of the texts are linked with the social phenomenon in Japan. These element were transformed into Korea and created another society.

*Hana yori Dango* was remade into a TV anime in 1996, broadcast by Asahi TV. It was then remade as an anime film in 1997 by the Toei film company. Due to its popularity, it was remade into a television drama in 2005. A second series, *Hana yori Dango 2*, was made in 2007. In 2008 it was remade as a TV drama *Hana yori Dango: Final*. The original *Hana yori Dango* was remade into a Taiwanese TV drama called Meteor Garden, using a Taiwanese cast for a Taiwanese audience, initially in 2001 and again in 2006 and 2007. Currently a Filipino broadcast company is looking to acquire the rights for remaking *Hana yori Dango* for a local audience. A Korean remaking of *Hana yori Dango* in Korea is using Korean casts and Korean house production for 2009. The Chinese company Funan BSTVC has made a Chinese version of *Hana yori Dango* allowed for computer viewing but not for broadcasting. Such remaking of popular culture texts into sequels and prequels across Asia is a creative, dynamic and powerful force, which I call the ‘soft power phenomenon’ and provides strong evidence of the expansion of cultural exchange and the reinforcement of cultural threads.

*Hana yori Dango* crossed cultural boundaries from its Japanese source, initially into Taiwan in 2001 and later into Korea in 2008. The reason for the gap in time between the transfer to Taiwan and later to Korea will be the subject of further study. Cultural proximity, with the impact of global migration may, or may not, be regionally based however, it may be appreciated that in East Asia cultural proximity has a significant regional aspect to it. Hall proposed that the most basic goal of communication, presupposing that the communication is allowed, was “transmitting meaning as closely as possible to the way it was conceived”. He posited an ideal communication process where messages travel without distortion between a sender and a receiver. It may be useful to review the cultural communication model of Walker, Walker & Schmitz adapting Hall (Hall 1990). The ideal communication process would be simple. Communication and inter-reaction in real life situations is very complex. One often has to consider the impact of the cultural frames of the sender and the receiver, especially if these are different. Walker *et al* argue that our cultural frames act as the perceptual window or filter through which individuals define them, others and the world. An individual’s cultural frame is informed by such variables as language, style, stereotypes, etiquette, socialisation, value orientations, non-verbal languages, etc.

When senders and receivers have mismatched cultural frames, this results in messages contaminated by mismatched expectations, misinterpreted messages, feedback, etc. and ‘noise’ – meaningless or distorted signals which place a burden on communication. Viewers view television programs subliminally using the same process. If the viewer perceives that the program’s cultural frame is incongruent with their personal frame they would be aware of the “noise,” rendering the program less satisfactory and making it more difficult to appreciate and empathise with the characters In *Hana yori*
Dango during the remaking process from one culture to another, the element changes to suit the targeted audience; by example, genre, format, language, plot, main characters, expression of emotion, verbal and non-verbal expression.

An analysis of an audience segment in Japan of Hana yori Dango was carried out. The sample size was 429 Japanese blogs with inputs from 426 females and three males across a spectrum of ages from ten to eighty-four years. The survey was carried out from August 31st 2007 to September 1st 2007 using TBS blog. 70% of the viewers are in the low teens, 20% are in the twenties and thirties and the balance are in the forties to the eighties. One concludes from the blogs that the primary audience for the television representation of Hana yori Dango is female.

Hana yori Dango was been released in Korea by KBS at the beginning of 2009 for TV presentation and the spin off DVD’s very recently. Table 2, which follows, illustrates some of the changes in the remaking from the original manga format of Hana yori Dango to TV drama.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Manga</th>
<th>Japanese Drama (TBS)</th>
<th>Korean Drama KBS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Genre</td>
<td>Love Comedy</td>
<td>Trendy drama</td>
<td>Love Story</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation of main characters</td>
<td>Modern, passionate, physically strong, breaking the female mould</td>
<td>Trendy, modern, independent, cute</td>
<td>Fashionable, modern, independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressions of gender</td>
<td>Promoting new style Strong</td>
<td>Authenticity</td>
<td>Assertive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressions of emotion</td>
<td>Non verbal, pictorial</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal expression</td>
<td>Swear words</td>
<td>Irony</td>
<td>Irony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story tension</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Story remake</td>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Additional scene in Japanese context</td>
<td>Scene omitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture transference</td>
<td>Visual representation</td>
<td>Culture representation through some Proverbs</td>
<td>Meaning loss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience</td>
<td>Early teen female</td>
<td>Teen to adult female</td>
<td>Teen to adult female and male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

**CONCLUSION**

The growth of media and cultural capital emanating from Japan and Korea has been restrained because of historical antipathy between Korea and Japan. This antipathy against Japan has reduced over time because of regional vision, positive leadership and reinforcement and understanding of the positive regional cultural aspects and a willingness to embrace that that is good. The Japanese Prime Minister Murayama’s repent for Japan’s military excesses and more importantly the vision, commitment to change and the courage of the Korean past president Kim Dae- jung has dramatically changed the regional cultural
landscape. The changes in Korean media controls championed by Kim Dae-jung has enabled Korea to overcome the inherent concern of Japanese media domination derived from the Japanese mature and diverse media resources. This change has also enabled Korea to be able and confident in its own media industry as evidenced by the sale and success of its media and allied spin off products into Japan through the phenomena of Kanryuu.

Korea has exhibited the courage to embrace change and in turn, Japan has more recently begun to appreciate the intrinsic value of its culture. Japan is further evolving with GNC and soft power. The Japanese parliament Diet is now recognises the importance of GNC noting, "We will also formulate 'The Japanese Cultural Industry Strategy', which will enhance the competitiveness of areas that represent the good traits and uniqueness of Japan.

Hall proposed that the most basic goal of communication, presupposing that the communication is allowed, was “transmitting meaning as closely as possible to the way it was conceived”. The regional political benefit deriving from an anthropologist’s appreciation of one of the essences of human nature would seem now to be permeating East Asian societies to the regional benefit.

The industry of remaking from original texts thrives in Japan and has both domestic and international appeal. Hana yori Dango, is an iconic example of an original manga text that has been transformed into other formats and crossed the cultural divide. The Kanryuu also illustrates the potential for cultural inroads into Japan from Korea and the transfers of popular culture transcends historical constraints and bodes well for regional harmony and the evolution of a new cultural geography.

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The significance of geomancy in understanding T’aengniji

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ABSTRACT

In the beginning of the 20th century, Yi Chung-hwan’s (1690-1756) T’aengniji was introduced as being the first Korean book on human geography. In contrast to other features of T’aengniji, the inclusion of geomancy has often been regarded by scholars as a weakness which lowers the standing of T’aengniji as a modern geography book. Some warned that T’aengniji should not be read as a book on geomancy; others either defended its inclusion pointing out scientific reasoning behind the geomantic terms employed or belittled the importance of geomancy saying that it was included merely for attracting readers.

This article aims to evaluate the significance of geomancy in T’aengniji. This will contrast with the previous evaluations, which had been based often on modern academic points of view. This study will evaluate that geomancy was one of the most important aspects of Yi’s philosophy by discussing how geomancy was introduced as a vital factor in T’aengniji, how often geomantic statements were made and how seriously geomantic interpretations were referred to.

Yi Chung-hwan’s (1690-1756) T’aengniji is regarded as the most important Korean classic on selecting desirable living sites in Korea. After its completion in the early 1750s it had been widely read by being hand copied until the beginning of 20th century, when it was first printed. Presently, more than eighty different hand-copied T’aengniji manuscripts are kept in public and university libraries in Korea alone. The number of the extant hand written manuscripts of T’aengniji exceeds that of any other kind of manuscripts found in Korea. This confirms that it had been one of the most widely read Korean treatise.

T’aengniji is made up of four sections: “Introduction”, “Discourse on the Eight Provinces”, "Discourse on the Selection of Livable Places" and “Conclusion”. New titles were often given to T’aengniji as it was copied, because it examined a diverse range of topics. There are more than twenty different titles of the manuscript. No other writings in Korea show such a variety of manuscripts and titles.

The importance of T’aengniji started to be publically revealed when it was printed for the first time in Korea in 1912. In his preface, Ch’oe Namsôn introduced it as being the first Korean book on human geography. Ch’oe’s view had been generally accepted among scholars. Some scholars, however, came to claim that T’aengniji is more than

* This is based on my PhD thesis and its improvement. See Yoon, Inshil Choe, “A Study and Translation of T’aengniji”, PhD thesis, The University of Auckland, 1996

1 This article uses the Kwangmunhoe version of T’aengniji as the text. This is because the version is the first printed version in Korea and has been used as the text in most translations that have been rendered so far. They include the translations by Yi Iksong (1971), Yi Yong’ak (1975), Ch’ông Yong’ak (1977), Ch’a Ch’angyong (1994), Hŏ Kyŏngjin (1996, 2007), Yoon Inshil Choe (1998) and Yi Minsu (2005).

2 There are also privately owned T’aengniji manuscripts and some of them are on Internet sites, for sale.

3 Ch’oe Namsôn, Editor’s note, Yi Chung-hwan, T’aengniji, Seoul: Chosŏn Kwangmunhoe, 1912.
geographical literature. Hong Isŏp initially classified *Taegnijji* as a book on geography. Later, Hong proposed that it could also be read as a book on history and political psychology. Other scholars argued that “*Taegnijji* was not only a book of geography but also one of philosophy and thought”. These views were highlighted in Han Ugún’s opening speech of Chindan Academic Society’s 18th symposium. In the speech, he introduced *Taegnijji* as a masterpiece of human geography of the late Chosŏn dynasty and an important source of information for understanding the political and economic history of that time.

While scholars of various academic fields agree to accept *Taegnijji* as a fine piece of writing with excellent view points, its inclusion of geomancy has often been controversial. Ch’oe Namsŏn acknowledged the inclusion of geomancy in *Taegnijji* but suggested that its geomantic content should not be regarded as superstition as there are reasonable points in it. Hong Isŏp initially defended the inclusion of house geomancy saying that this has not marred *Taegnijji* at all. He argued that Yi Chung-hwan’s thoughts were the product of his time. He later argued that it should not be read as a book on geomancy, although it had been read as such. Hong argued that what Yi Chung-hwan wanted to convey was his thoughts on the social economy.

Yoon Hong-key viewed the inclusion of geomancy as one of the weaknesses of *Taegnijji*. The inclusion of geomancy is considered to be the main reason why Yoon criticised *Taegnijji* of the [environmental] deterministic idea, which is regarded as an outdated concept in the relationship between humanity and environment. However, he accepts its inclusion in *Taegnijji* on the grounds that the geomantic conditions contained in *Taegnijji* seem to have some scientific basis. For example, Yi Chung-hwan's recommendation of open plains as an ideal geomantic condition "is explained by the fact that open areas provide vast cultivable land," and Yi's comment on the colour, compactness and texture of soil can be regarded as indications of soil fertility.

Yoon Hong-key’s interpretation that geomantic conditions in *Taegnijji* has some scientific basis is echoed in Kim Chŏngshim and Choe Young-jun’s statements on the topic. Choe argued that the terms that Yi Chung-hwan used in describing the conditions

4 Hong Isŏp, *Chosŏn kwahaksa* (History of Science in Korea), Seoul: Chŏng-ŭmsa, 1946, pp. 250-251.
7 Han Ugún, "Kaehoes (opening speech)", *Chindanhapo*, vol. 69, 1990, p. 126.
8 Known as *P'ungsu* or *P'ungsuchiri* in Korean, Geomancy refers to the art of finding auspicious sites by evaluating surrounding mountains, water flows and the layout of places.
9 Ch’oe Namsŏn, op. cit.
10 Hong Isŏp, (1946), *op. cit.*
11 Hong Isŏp, "Yi Chung-hwan ŭi sahoe kyŏngjeron (Yi Chung-hwan's Socio-economical Perspectives)," *Yonseic‘unch’u*, no. 116, 10 December 1957.
for habitable places do not have superstitious connotations. They denote firm land, quality water and open terrain, which are also presently required for a desirable house site.\textsuperscript{15}

Ch\'ong Tuhi (1988) acknowledged \textit{Taengniji} as a geography book. On the other hand, he considers Yi Chung-hwan as an historian with an excellent appreciation of history\textsuperscript{16} and argued that geomancy was employed as a means, that is, “to draw public interest”.

I do not agree with Ch\'ong's view because his argument is not based on solid evidence and seems to have stemmed from his modern academic perspective. The present study attempts to understand the significance of geomancy included in \textit{Taengniji} from Yi Chung-hwan's own viewpoint rather than from that of a particular modern academic discipline.

**PRIORITY, WIDTH OF COVERAGE AND WEIGHT THAT GEOMANCY RECEIVES IN \textit{TAENGNJI}**

In my opinion geomancy is one of the most important ideas that is contained in the book.\textsuperscript{17} This is based on the fact that geomancy is introduced as the foremost condition for a desirable living place and it is widely and seriously covered in \textit{Taengniji}: geomancy is placed first when the four criteria required in selecting desirable places are discussed. "Discourse on the Selection of Livable Places" begins with an introduction as follows.

In the selection of a place to live the first consideration should be the geomantic conditions of the place. The other factors to be taken into account are; livelihood, social atmosphere and natural scenery.\textsuperscript{18}

After the completion of the introduction, a detailed discussion of the four criteria starts with the “Geomancy” section.

Geomantic discussions or descriptions are not confined to the "Geomancy” section. Places are also evaluated based on geomantic qualities in "Discourse on Eight Provinces" and "Discourse on the Selection of Livable Places", particularly in the ‘Scenery’ section. In fact, a geomantic tone prevails in most parts of \textit{Taengniji}.

The way geomantic discussions and interpretations are carried out is diverse. They range from the whole country level down to an individual mountain or village level. "Discourse on Eight Provinces" begins with explaining how the Korean peninsular is geomantically related to the Kunlun Mountains, which ancient Chinese considered to be the backbone of the world.

A branch range of the Kunlun Mountains extended to the south of the great desert and formed Mt Yuwulu in the east, ending abruptly, to form the Liaodong Plain. Over at the other end of the plain, the mountain range rose again to form Mt Paektu which is called Mt Buxian in \textit{Shanhaijing} (The Book of Mountains and Seas). The mountain range ran 1,000\textit{ ri} to the north, between the two rivers, and moving toward the south it made up the Ninggu Pagoda.\textsuperscript{19} A mountain range which extended behind became the head of all Korean mountain ranges.
This has often been the way traditional scholars and geomancers described the physical geography of the Korean peninsular. The description of the prominent mountain ranges as “extending” and “forming” mountains and plains is a geomantic one.

Geomantic interpretations are also found at a provincial level. In T'aengniji each province is introduced as being connected to high mountain ranges, often from the north. For example, Hamgyông and Hwanghae provinces are introduced by mentioning how branches from Mt Paektu stretched to form mountain ranges and other prominent landforms in the provinces. The following is the introductory passage of Kyôngsang province.

Kyôngsang is the best province in terms of its geomancy. It lies to the south of Kang'wôn Province and it adjoins Ch'ungch'ông and Chôlla provinces to the west. To the north there is Mt T'aebaek which is projected high in the sky and geomancers classify it as a water-type star mountain.\(^{20}\)

One cannot but take the first statement made in introducing Kyôngsang province as a serious expression of the importance of geomancy. It does not leave any room to think otherwise.

Geomantic interpretations are found at a capital and city level, too.

\[\text{Kyôngju}] \text{ is called "Tonggyông" (Eastern Capital) nowadays and is governed by a mayor. The main administrative centre lies in the middle of the left branch of Mt T'aebaek and geomancers name it hoeryonggojo (The Landform of a Dragon Looking Back on his Ancestor).}\(^{21}\)

Geomantic interpretations are found at a settlement and a village levels.

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In general, the fortunes of the inhabitants on riversides fluctuate because of the geomantic shortcomings of the sites. Only settlements along streams can enjoy the tranquillity, scenery and the advantage of irrigation.\(^{22}\)

In Kyôngsang Province, Kâmho Village in Taegu, Kach'ôn Village in Sôngiu and Ponggye Village in Kûmsan have wide fields and fertile rice paddies. Their population has not decreased since the Silla dynasty. They have good geomantic and economic conditions for people to live there for many generations.\(^{23}\)
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Geomantic interpretations are also found at an individual mountain level.

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[Mt Wôlch'il] has such fine and beautiful features that it is categorised in geomantic landscapes as "the fire mountain in the morning sky."\(^{24}\)
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The quotations above reveal that serious and decisive geomantic descriptions are made in "Discourse on Eight Provinces " as well as "Discourse on the Selection of Livable Places" at all levels. There is no doubt that geomancy receives the highest priority, has a wide coverage and a heavy weighting in T'aengniji.

\(^{20}\) Yi Chunchhwan, (1912), op. cit., p. 15.

\(^{21}\) A geomantic term which describes a landform where the main mountain range encircles the area in a semicircle so that the end of the mountain range faces the main mountain range which it originated from.

\(^{22}\) Ibid., p. 73.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 77.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 22.
**GEOMANTIC TERMS USED FOR SCIENTIFIC QUALITY?**

While pointing out the inclusion of geomancy as one of the weaknesses of *Taengniji*, Yoon Hong-key defended it by saying that the geomantic condition included in *Taengniji* seems to have some scientific basis. He argued that Yi Chung-hwan's recommendation of open plains [as an ideal geomantic condition] "is explained by the fact that open areas provide vast cultivable land," and Yi Chung-hwan's comment on the colour, compactness and texture of soil can be regarded as indications of soil fertility. His view is later shared by some scholars. The passage explaining geomantic conditions that Yi Chung-hwan proposed is as follows.

How should geomantic conditions be approached? First of all the outlet of water course is to be examined, then the terrain, and the shape of mountains. Then one needs to look at the colour of the soil, the water courses, the court mountain and the court water flow.

I do not think Yi’s explanation of the six conditions has a scientific base. Some of them are barely scientific. The following is the explanation of the court mountain and the court water flow, the mountain and water in front of an auspicious site which look as if they are bowing toward the site.

Generally, whether a site is for a house or a grave, if a big river flows towards it, the site may enjoy initial prosperity but later be doomed to lose fortune. One must watch incoming water courses. The incoming water must be in accordance with the direction of an incoming mountain and flow slowly and meander in order to mix their *yin-yang* energy.

The necessity of mixing *yin-yang* energy is a key element in ancient Chinese cosmology. Resorting to it, however, does not warrant scientific explanation.

**QUOTATIONS OF GEOMANCER’S REMARKS**

Kim Chôngshim stated that whenever Yi Chunghwan expresses his opinion on geomancy he quotes geomancers’ remarks. Unlike her claim, however, not all the statements regarding geomantic qualities of places include quotations of geomancers. These are shown in the quotations made in previous pages of this article. The following are more examples of landscape analysis without quotations of geomancers.

Together with Mt Tobong, Mt Samgak forms a beautiful landscape. The rocky summit is shaped like numerous flames rising in the sky. It has a special aura which is difficult to describe. This mountain, however, has no supporting mountains, nor many valleys. In the olden days there used to be the Chunghângsa Valley but it was flattened when Pukhansansâng Fortress was built. Since Mt Paegak and Mt Inwang on the inside of the fortress look rather ominous, they are no match for Mt Song'ak which is free of any malicious spirit. The only good point about them is that a branch of theirs called Mt Namsan stretches up the Han River to form a geomantically favourable area.

Mt Kuwâl also has the shape of an oncoming mountain turning around to look at the original mountain range.

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25 Ibid.
26 Yoon Hong-key, (1971), *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.
28 Ibid., p. 65.
29 Ibid.
These quotations reveal the author’s own classification of landscapes into certain types according to geomantic principles. This clearly demonstrates that the author did not always depend on quotations from geomancers.

Kim Chŏngshim also interpreted Yi Chunghwan’s quotations of geomancers’ remarks as an attempt to overcome geomancy. I consider that the reason why other geomancers statements were quoted in Taengniji was to back up the author’s arguments by referring to authoritative figures or books on geomancy.

The content itself proves it, which is shown in the following.

Generally the best mountains are shaped like high towers and pavilions, as explained by geomancers....

However the incoming and outgoing directions of flow have to accord with [geomantic] principles; only then can the place be auspicious so that its owner will produce many descendants. Those geomantic principles are not discussed here in detail because there are books on the subject written by geomancers.

This quotation starts with the descriptions of what geomancers regard to be the best mountain and ends by suggesting to resort to the books written by geomancers. That is, both geomancers and their writings are considered to be worth consulting.

The above examinations contradict what Kim Chŏngshim contested. Although Yi Chunghwan quoted geomancers’ comments instead of making direct statements in some cases, he also expressed freely his own view on geomancy.

**Quotations of Other Sources**

Examining how other quotations are made will shed light on whether quotations are made to distance the author from geomancy. Among the Korean reference books quoted in Taengniji, Shipsanggi (Record of Ten Excellent Places), Tongpyŏn (General Writings), yugi (remaining records) and a work referred to as chŏgi (written record) are works of geomancy or geomantic prophecy.

In Taengniji, the use of quotations is not confined to the explanations of geomancy. “Chiji (Regional Gazetteer) is quoted to describe Mt Chiri as the abode of a Taoist god and a gathering place for supernatural beings” while Koryŏsa (The History of the Koryŏ dynasty) is mentioned in referring to a place. Shanhajing (The Classic of Mountains and Seas), Tangshi (The Annals of the Tang Dynasty), Hanshu (The History of the Han Dynasty) and Songshi (The History of the Song Dynasty) are also quoted for their reference to places or for anecdotals purposes.

Shanhajing, the first book cited in Taengniji, is quoted in explaining Mt Paekdu as follows.

Over at the other end of the plain, the mountain range rose again to form Mt Paekdu which is called Mt Buxian in Shanhajing.

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30 Ibid., p. 43.
31 Ibid., p. 43.
32 Yi Chung-hwan, (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 64.
33 Ibid., p.2.
Tangshi (The Annals of the Tang Dynasty) was quoted to explain the place which was the ancient territory of Koguryo.\footnote{Ibid., p. 3.}

The old boundary extended beyond the Amnok River and reached the Chingshi Mountain Pass [in Manchuria]. The so-called Anshi and Baiyan fortresses mentioned in the Tangshi are located in this area.

Songshi (The History of the Song Dynasty) was initially quoted to identify a place with one mentioned in history.\footnote{Ibid., p. 39.}

This is the very place which was recorded in Songshi as a place where a palace was built against a big mountain.

Quotations are made not only on places but also on incidents or judgements. Songshi was quoted a second time in explaining the unusual practices of the royal family of the Koguryo dynasty.\footnote{Ibid., p. 40.}

In Songshi, the fact that in the mid-Koguryo dynasty, some kings took their younger sisters [who were related to the legendary dragon lady] as their wives is criticised because [the author of the book] was not aware that this was practised only in the royal family, and not amongst commoners.

While Hanshu was mentioned to describe Puffers, which an historic person ate,\footnote{Ibid., p. 40.} Mingshi was quoted when evaluating Ming generals' contribution in resisting the Hideyoshi invasion. It was argued that it was not fair that Chen Lin (Chin Lin) was honoured, due to Yi Sunshin's efforts while Yang Gao (Yang Ho), who also contributed to the fighting, was imprisoned.\footnote{Ibid., p. 10.}

Thanks to Yi Sun-shin, upon returning home in the year of musul [1598], Chen Lin reported more decapitations than any other Ming general and was awarded land. In Mingshi there is a commentary on the Ming general's contribution to the Eastern expedition. How could the [people of] China know of the achievement of Yi Sunshin? While Yang Gao was imprisoned regardless of his contribution, Chen Lin, thanks to Yi Sunshin, acquired fame and received a generous reward. Such was the reward and punishment meted out by the Ming Emperors.

It is clear that Mingshi was quoted as integral evidence of the unfairness in history. The above quotations clearly indicate that reference materials in Taengnij are included to give weighting to statements.

**CONCLUSION**

The examinations made so far point out that geomancy was introduced in Taengnij geomancy with highest priority, was covered widely and was treated in a serious and yet balanced manner. Some scholars argue that Yi Chungwan quoted professional geomancers’ remarks in order to distance himself from geomancy. After thorough examinations of the text, I conclude that the quotations are made to reinforce the author’s view. This is in line with other bibliographical sources such as Koryōsa, Tangshi, Hanshu and Songshi. When Yi Chungwan explained his view he often sought support from credible sources.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 3.  
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., p. 39.  
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 40.  
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 10.  
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 23.
Unlike some previous scholars, I believe that geomantic viewpoint and geomantic evaluation of places by Yi Chunghwan is an essential part of Taengnijji. Failing to appreciate the importance of geomancy in the book would lead to an improper evaluation of the Korean classic.
Library Materials and Services at the Harvard-Yenching Library for the Korean Studies Scholarly Community

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ABSTRACT
Through an overview of special in Harvard-Yenching Library, this paper investigates what kinds of primary sources related to Korean Studies in Harvard are available, and how they can be accessible to scholars worldwide. In this overview process of special collections, the following types of materials are examined: Korean rare/old books, manuscripts, old maps, photos and films, and archival collections. While majority of the collections are in Korean, some of old maps and archival collections are mixed with English or other languages including Japanese and Western languages. Some of the specific selected titles are examined as samples in order to display why these are crucial sources to Korean Studies scholars and how valuable these materials are. Research outputs and findings related to the special collections at Harvard-Yenching Library are also reviewed in this paper.

This paper also presents crucial sources and tools for access to the special collections including citations and full-texts, and guides to some important collections but relatively less known to scholars and students in Korean Studies at the same time. Accessibility of the special collections at Harvard-Yenching is another issue discussed in this paper, in relation to on-going digitization projects and microfilming projects of archival collection finding aids and Korean rare/old books.

INTRODUCTION
The Harvard-Yenching Library is one of the most prominent libraries for researchers in East Asian Studies. The mission statement of the Harvard-Yenching outlines the goals of the Library:

“The Harvard-Yenching Library of the Harvard College Library is a preeminent research collection on East Asia. It supports the teaching and research activities on East Asia at Harvard and, to the extent feasible, the larger scholarly community.”

Accordingly, the Korean Collection at the Harvard-Yenching Library serves a role in supporting research and teaching programs in Korean Studies at Harvard.

HARVARD-YENCHING LIBRARY
The history of the Harvard-Yenching Library demonstrates how to the development of its collections has reflected the mission statement. The history of the collections at the Harvard-Yenching Library goes back to 1879, though the Library itself dates from 1928 as an organized library. In 1879, Chinese was first offered as part of Harvard University’s regular curriculum, and a group of Bostonians engaged in the China trade invited Ge Kunhwa, a Chinese scholar from the city of Ningbo in Zhejiang Province, to give instruction in Chinese at Harvard. At that time, the small collection that was bought for his courses, the first acquisitions of Chinese books in any East Asian language at the Harvard
College Library, marked the beginning of a Chinese collection. A Japanese collection was similarly started in 1914 when two Japanese professors, Hattori Unokichi and Aesaki Masaharu, came to Harvard to lecture, and donated several Japanese publications on Sinology and Buddhism to the Harvard College Library. In 1928, these two language collections, consisting of 4,526 volumes in Chinese and 1,668 volumes in Japanese, were transferred to the newly established Chinese-Japanese Library of the Harvard-Yenching Institute.

A Korean collection at the Chinese-Japanese Library of the Harvard-Yenching Institute was officially inaugurated in 1951, and the name Chinese-Japanese Library of the Harvard-Yenching Institute was changed to Harvard-Yenching Library in 1965 in order to reflect more accurately the expanded nature of the Library’s collections. Currently, within the Harvard-Yenching Library, there are five language collections – Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Western language collections – on East Asia. The management of the Library was transferred in 1976 from the Harvard-Yenching Institute to the Harvard College Library.

At present, the Harvard-Yenching Library is the largest university library for East Asian research in the Western world. The Library’s collections encompass over 1.2 million volumes, including approximately 140,000 volumes in Korean. The Library subscribes to over 6,700 current periodicals and journals, including more than 1,000 Korean journal and periodical titles.

Collections at the Harvard-Yenching Library have been developed mainly in the humanities and social sciences related to East Asia, but the Library has gradually evolved into a research library that encompasses East Asian materials in all fields of the academic disciplines.

The Library allows access to library stacks and reading rooms to students, faculty, scholars and researchers from other universities, colleges, and research institutions if they present a current institutional ID and register at the library circulation desk.

**Korean Collection at the Harvard-Yenching Library**

According to the official record of the Harvard-Yenching Library, the Korean Collection at the Library began with 372 volumes from the Harvard-Yenching Institute’s Chinese-Japanese Library in 1951. 372 volumes from the Chinese and Japanese collections were identified by Dr. Kaiming Ch’iu, the first librarian of the Chinese-Japanese Library of the Harvard-Yenching Institute, as old Korean books, and he made the decision to establish the Korean Collection with those 372 volumes since there was already a need for a Korean collection at Harvard.

In 1952, Korean language courses were offered for the first time at Harvard with the arrival of Dr. Seo, and Professor Edward W. Wagner became the first faculty member in Korean Studies at Harvard in 1958. At the same time, Mr. Sungha Kim was appointed as the first Korean Librarian at Harvard, and started to develop Korean collections further.

The following two books summarize the history of the Korean Collection at Harvard University and its development thus far:

Yoon, Choong-Nam. Habadû Han’gukhak õi Yoram : Habadû Yench’ing Tosõgwan Han’gukkwan 50-Yôn / Yun Ch’ung-Nam Yökkûm 허바드한국학의요람 : 허바드옌칭도서관한국관50년 / 윤충남역음; Cradle of Korean Studies at Harvard University. Ch’op’an. Sõul T’ükpyölsi서울특별시: Úryu Munhwasa글유문화사, 2001.
Within the holdings of the Korean Collection at the Harvard-Yenching Library, the following materials are of particular interest to researchers and scholars in Korean Studies:

3.1. Korean rare books

The Library holds approximately 4,000 titles of Korean rare books. The majority of these books are in either printed or manuscript form, originally bound in oriental style (Hanjŏk 漢籍) and written in either Hanmun (漢文) or old Han’gŭl (옛한글). The Korean rare book collection includes predominantly pre-1910 publications, but there are also a few exceptions from the colonial period. The majority of the Korean rare book collection was acquired by Mr. Sungha Kim in the 1950s and early 1960s with great support from Professor Wagner of Harvard and Professor Young-gyu Min of Yonsei University, according to Mr. Kim’s report in 1980.

The oldest work within the Korean rare book collection is dated 1222, and the title is Soha Sonsaeng chip 西河先生集, a literary work by a poet from the late Koryo period, Im Ch’’un (林椿). In addition to this oldest title, the Korean rare book collection includes approximately 400 titles of local gazetteers; about 400 titles of genealogy records; about 450 titles in Korean religions; and about 450 titles of Pangmok silgi. There is also some classical fiction written in old Han’gŭl, books of medicine, textbooks, and various other topics in the collection.

The entire collection of Korean rare books at the Harvard-Yenching Library was reviewed and annotated by rare book specialists over three years. Mr. Choong-Nam Yoon, the second Librarian for the Korean Collection at the Harvard-Yenching Library, published a five-volume set with the results, titled The annotated catalogue of Korean rare books at the Harvard-Yenching Library, Harvard University, in 2005 before his retirement. The publication information is as follows:


In July 2007, the Korean rare book digitization project began as a three-year project with the support of the National Library of Korea. Works were chosen for digitization if they were not found in Korea anywhere, so naturally the majority of the manuscripts in the Library’s Korean rare book collection were included, along with some rare printed editions. A total of 469 titles and 952 volumes of rare books were identified by two Korean rare book specialists from the National Library of Korea in early 2007 for inclusion in this project as books not found in Korea. As of April 24, 2009, 421 titles/564 volumes of Korean rare books from the Library have been digitized, and all of the digitized images are already available through HOLLIS <http://hollis.harvard.edu>, Harvard’s online catalog, and open to the public.

As an example, the following screen capture shows the cover image of Sukch ’ŏn chea to宿踐諸衙圖 <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:1199847>, displayed through PDS (Harvard University’s Page Delivery Service). Korean rare books are scanned from the front cover to the back cover page, regardless whether they are in their original binding format or not. Some books were bound in-house after they were acquired by the Library, while others were kept in their original state, so other cover pages do not necessarily share
the oriental binding format of this title.

The following screen capture shows one of the pages in *Sukch’ŏn chea* to which contains a detailed map of Korean government offices in the 1800s. Users can print the images in PDF format as they wish.

All digitized Korean rare book titles are browsable in HOLLIS, Harvard’s online catalog, by clicking on “National Library of Korea - Harvard-Yenching Library Korean rare book digitization project” from the following webpage:

[http://hcl.harvard.edu/research/guides/korean/part2.html#manuscripts](http://hcl.harvard.edu/research/guides/korean/part2.html#manuscripts)

The link leads to a list of digitized Korean rare book titles sorted by date as shown in the HOLLIS screen capture below. By clicking on “Internet Link” next to each title, a user can see scanned image files of each title:
Some prominent and noteworthy rare book titles in the Korean rare book collection at the Harvard-Yenching Library have been introduced by a well-known scholar, Hŏ Kyŏng-jin. He published a book, *Habŏdū Taehak Yench’ing Tosŏgwon úi Han’guk kospŏdŭl* 하버드대학예정도서관의한국고서들, in 2003 after spending time at the Harvard-Yenching Library as a visiting scholar. Many other scholars have published scholarly articles based on their research in the Korean rare book collection at the Harvard-Yenching Library.

### 3.2. Archival collections

There are innumerable archival collections at Harvard, but the following archival collections are particularly relevant to Korean Studies and useful for researchers in the modern and contemporary history of Korea:

#### 3.2.1. James H. Hausman Archive

James H. Hausman (1918-1996) served with the U.S. armed forces in Korea between 1946 and 1981. Born in New Jersey, he was a veteran of World War II. He went to Korea in 1946, but returned to the United States to serve at the U.S. Dept. of Defense in 1950 at the outbreak of the Korean War as an expert on Korean military affairs. He returned to Korea in 1956 and served as a Special Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command for the next 25 years. Professor Carter Eckert successfully arranged the donation of Hausman’s personal collection. The Archive includes 26 boxes containing Hausman’s correspondence, photographs, newspaper clippings, official documents, books, videos, etc. The contents of the Archive were mostly collected between 1946 and 1981.

#### 3.2.2. Gregory Henderson papers

Gregory Henderson was a former Foreign Service Officer, a specialist on Korea, and the author of *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex,* published by Harvard University Press in 1968. He served with the United States Foreign Service posted in Korea from 1948 to 1950, and witnessed the Korean War as well as Korea’s political situation before the War. He went back to Korea in July 1958 as a cultural attaché, remaining until 1963.

His papers include materials from the Allied Occupation period to the 1980s, mostly historical materials boxed in 9 cartons including his writings, documents, conference proceedings, correspondence, his lecture notes from Harvard and Tufts, etc.
3.2.3. Gillette papers (1945-1948)

These are the papers of Francis Edwin Gillette who was a top rank government officer in the Kyongsang province from 1945 to 1948, the Allied Occupation period in Korea. The Gillette papers include archival materials relating to the United States Army Military Government in Korea, 1945-1948. They cover Korean politics, Communist and leftist activities, national security, “counter-propaganda,” and administration. The papers also include documents on Korean personalities, summaries of selected articles from the Korean press, memoranda on problems encountered by the military government, documents on repatriation, welfare, and agricultural matters, documents relating to the establishment and operation of military government in South Kyongsang Province, and documents on public information. The Gillette papers are stored in 2 boxes.

At Harvard, finding aids for the archival collections and personal papers can be searched through the online system OASIS (Online Archival Search Information System http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/advancedsearch?_collection=oasis).

3.3. Audio-visual materials

Since the 1990s, visual materials are frequently used for research and teaching programs in Korean Studies at Harvard, and the Library has been acquiring audio-visual materials extensively. Library users have shown especially high interest in and need for Korean feature films, documentary films, and some selected TV dramas, and by the same token, the Library started in 2006 to collect Korean comic books (manhwa) in response to a faculty request.

For the convenience of users in browsing the Library’s current holding lists of these special format materials, the following webpage offers links to the different categories:

http://hcl.harvard.edu/research/guides/korean/part9.html#films

The categories of the Library’s current holding lists are as follows:

**DVDs and Videos**
- All South Korean feature films 한국영화
  - Horror 공포
  - Action 액션
  - Comedies 코미디
  - Buddhism-related films 불교
  - Animation 애니메이션
  - TV Dramas 드라마
  - Documentaries 다큐멘터리
- All North Korean films 북한영화
  - Animation 애니메이션
  - Documentaries 다큐멘터리
- Comic books 만화 (Manhwa)
- Music/Audio materials 음악

In 2008, the Harvard-Yenching Library was chosen to be one of the members of the HubLibrary program of KOFIC (Korean Film Council). From this program, the Library
received 132 DVDs of Korean feature films and 395 volumes of Korean cinema-related publications to add to the Library’s existing holdings. Currently, the Library holds about 600 titles of DVDs and videos from South and North Korea, and about 200 titles of Manhwa.

As for visual images, Harvard’s online system VIA (Visual Information Access http://via.lib.harvard.edu/via/deliver/advancedsearch?_collection=via) allows users to search and view digitized images online. Slide images are also searchable through VIA by keywords. The following screen capture shows one example of a digitized image brought up by searching for Diamond Mountain (Kumgangsan); the image was taken in 1918 by a Western photographer, Ernest Henry Wilson.

3.4. North Korean materials

From the beginning of the Korean Collection at Harvard, Librarians for the Korean Collection have put much effort into acquiring North Korean materials as well as Korean materials published outside of Korea, especially those published by Korean-Russians, Korean-Chinese, and Korean-Japanese. Many Korean-language periodical titles published in Russia have been obtained in microfilm format by exchange with the National Library of Russia in the 1990s, and some unique North Korean materials, including North Korean textbooks, were acquired from the Yenbian area. According to Mr. Choong-Nam Yoon’s book Habadā Yench’ing Han’gukkwan Charyo yŏn’gu, the Korean Collection of the Harvard-Yenching Library contains approximately 3,500 titles of North Korean materials. Mr. Yoon worked consistently to collect North Korean materials from the Yenbian area, especially from the Yenbian University Library, and was able to acquire copies of approximately 500 titles of North Korean scholarly materials on history, literature, and law published in the 1940s and 1950s.

There are also more than 200 titles of North Korean animation films, feature films, and documentary films available for users.

3.5. Online resources

The Library subscribes to the following Korean Studies online databases:

Journal article full-text databases:

DBpia
There are many other individual titles of PDFs online, such as Chosŏn haengjŏng 조선 행정, Iche ha ch'ŏnsi ch'ejegi chŏngch’ae k sar’yo ch’ongsŏ 日帝下戰時體制期政策史料叢書, and so forth.

Harvard’s research guide webpage for Korean Studies, “Digital Resources for Korean Studies,” lists all subscribed databases as well as some useful freely available online resources; its URL is as follows:

http://hcl.harvard.edu/research(guides/korean/

The following screen capture shows the webpage:

**Access**

All titles in the Korean Collection at Harvard appear in Harvard’s online catalog, HOLLIS Classic (<http://hollis.harvard.edu>), regardless of their cataloging status. All ordered items and ordered-received items are also found in HOLLIS Classic.

Recently, Harvard Libraries implemented a new version of HOLLIS (http://discovery.lib.harvard.edu/) for better access and more convenient searching. It is still a beta version, but soon all Harvard online catalogs, including VIA, OASIS, and HOLLIS, will be searchable through HOLLIS as a one-stop portal searching system. The new system seeks to provide easy and convenient access to Harvard Libraries’ holdings regardless of their format.
The following screen capture shows the search results for Korean history:

For the Harvard-Yenching Library’s newspaper titles, the Library has designed a finding aid for searching newspaper titles by language, region, and other publication information. Its URL is as follows:

http://hcl.harvard.edu/libraries/harvard-yenching/collections/newspapers/search.cfm

This finding aid is particularly useful when users do not have specific titles in mind, but want to search by language or region only with broadly defined categories. The following screen capture shows the search results for Korean newspapers in the Korean language published in Korea:
Travel Grant Program

The Harvard-Yenching Library offers an annual Travel Grant Program in order to assist scholars from outside the metropolitan Boston area in using Harvard-Yenching's collections for research. Priority consideration is given to scholars at institutions where there are no or few library resources in the East Asian languages, and no major East Asian library collections are available nearby. Detailed information can be found on the following webpage, and around October of each year, the travel grant program announcement is posted to the Korean Studies Listserv:

http://hcl.harvard.edu/libraries/harvard-yenching/travel_grant_program.html

Each academic year, five grants of $400 each in Korean Studies are awarded on the basis of merit to faculty members and to graduate students engaged in dissertation research. Each grantee is also provided with free photocopying privileges for up to 100 sheets.

REFERENCES


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Library services for Korean studies at Monash University

JUNG-SIM KIM
Monash University Library

ABSTRACT
Monash University Library has both book and non-book materials to support research, teaching and study in Korean studies. The foci of this collection have been on the social sciences, language, history, architecture and music of Korea.

We have several ways to provide information to our users. These include:

- The Library subject guide for Korean studies provides information on Monash University Library Catalogue, Korean databases on the Web as well as Monash University Library databases.
- Library information literacy. The library offers information literacy to undergraduate, postgraduate, and higher degree research students in Korean Studies as well as to staff.
- Asian Libraries in Melbourne (ALIM) is a collaborative venture between Monash University and the University of Melbourne Libraries. The two libraries share resources, expertise and collection development.
- Librarian for Korean studies. Her role is to assist anyone who studies or researches Korea. Users can contact by email, phone, or visiting the library to find information on Korea.

The paper focuses on the services at the Monash University Library, though it also raises other matters such as cooperation between libraries for Korean databases, information delivery and other services to users.

1. History of Korean collection
The establishment of the Korean Studies Research Library (KSRL) at Monash University in 1992 was a major step in the creation of a world class research collection of materials to support the emerging research program of the National Korean Studies Centre (NKSC). A $150,000 grant from the Australian Research Council facilitated the establishment of Monash University Library’s Korean collection. The key purpose of the collection was to serve researchers in Korean Studies in Australia and especially in Victoria. Researchers have access to a core collection of Korean and English language materials essential for their research programs, the library catalogue to sources held in the National Library and in other universities and colleges in Australia, and the services of a specialist Korean Studies Librarian. After the Asian economic crisis began in mid-1997, many Australian universities eliminated or reduced the number of subjects on Korean studies due to financial problems. The NKSC also closed after that. Since the closure of the NKSC, the Korean Studies Research Library has operated as the Korean collection under the Asian Studies Research Collection of Monash University Library at the Clayton campus.
Korean language materials in the library are catalogued using the McCune-Reischauer Romanisation system. The Korean Studies Librarian is available to the Asian Libraries in Melbourne (ALIM)\(^1\) team.

Monash University Library has both book and non-book materials to support research, teaching and study in Korean studies. The foci of this collection have been on the social sciences, language, history, architecture and music of Korea.

2. **Library Services**

There are several ways to provide information to our users.

2.1 **Library Subject guide – Korean**

Each library subject guide helps students and other users find resources on the Web. It has links to the Library Catalogue to help users find materials held in the Monash University Library, and links to databases where users can search for articles on their topics. The library subject guide also provides links where students can get guidance in citing and referencing student assignments and papers.

A copy of the Korean subject guide Webpage\(^2\) appears above. It uses the same headings as other Arts subject guides in Monash University Library. Materials found in

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the Monash University Library can be found under the headings of Library catalogue, Microforms, and Literature (see red arrows above). Other headings link mainly to Web-based information or resources which Korean users can access freely from anywhere. Even though the Korean collection of the Monash University Library is the largest in Australia, it is small compared to major research libraries in Korea and the United States. Our budget is relatively small, making it difficult to purchase the often very expensive Korean databases. Thus, we emphasise free databases, which have articles in both Korean and English. In addition, library users can access Asian Studies databases for non-Korean language materials (see blue arrow above).

2.2 Library Information Literacy – Korean

Monash University Library provides information research skills (formerly known as information literacy) and learning skills to all Monash University Library users. The Library hopes that academic staff can incorporate such training in introductory subjects. There is a blog in this area entitled Literacy & Learning @ the Library, where librarians and learning skills advisors exchange ideas, information and opinions.

Early this year the Korean Studies Librarian approached Korean academics to discuss information literacy in Korean studies. It was agreed to provide information for the Korean translation subject. The Librarian created a Webpage in the Korean subject guide page (see “translations” under Literature above). The purpose is to provide materials which are not easily found in library catalogue such as short stories.

To solve this limitation, the Librarian checked each translated work and each original work of fiction. Each original and translation can be found by going to the translations page of Korean studies subject guide, where students can click on the item and find it in the Monash University Library catalogue, (see http://lib.monash.edu.au/subjects/korean/translations.html. A small section of this list appears below). This information was given to students during a class held at the Library.

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2 http://lib.monash.edu.au/subjects/korean
3 http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/information-research-skills/
4 http://www.lib.monash.edu.au/learning-skills/
5 http://blogs.lib.monash.edu.au/wordpress/
with the Korean Studies Librarian.

Students and staff interested in translation may find the following item available at the Monash University Library:

- *Han’guk munhak po ’nyo’k so ji mongnok* = Bibliographies of Korean literature in foreign languages

In addition, the following information can be obtained on the Web:

- Korean short story index = *Han’guk tanp’yo’n soso’1 saegi* ([http://www.hawaii.edu/asiaref/korea/SSIndex/ssmain.htm](http://www.hawaii.edu/asiaref/korea/SSIndex/ssmain.htm))
- Korea Journal web site ([http://www.ekoreajournal.net/archive/index.jsp](http://www.ekoreajournal.net/archive/index.jsp))
- *Munhak Yo ’ngyo’k chakp’um so ji cho ’ngbo* ([http://artsonline.arko.or.kr/trnsinfo/trns_all_result.html?function=T](http://artsonline.arko.or.kr/trnsinfo/trns_all_result.html?function=T))

### 3. ASIAN LIBRARIES IN MELBOURNE (ALIM)

To solve limitations of resources in Asian studies, some libraries have joined in cooperative ventures sharing materials and human resources. Asian Libraries in Melbourne (ALIM), a project supported by the Monash-Melbourne Protocol, is a collaborative venture between the Monash University Library and the University of Melbourne Library. The two libraries share resources, expertise and collection development. They meet twice a year—once at the University of Melbourne and once at Monash University—to discuss projects, ideas and other issues.

The ALIM cooperation is especially important in Korean studies in the area of architecture where the University of Melbourne Library uses the Monash University Library Korean collection to service the Korean portions of the subjects in Asian Architecture and Architectural Conservation in East Asia two subjects taught by Dr Qinghua Guo at the University of Melbourne. The Monash University Korean Studies Librarian prepares webpage and gives user education on Korea for both subjects at the University of Melbourne as part of ALIM project. Before 2000, Monash University Library also provided materials on Korean law to the University of Melbourne.

#### 3.1 Korean Architecture Resource ([http://alim.monash.org/alimarchkor.html](http://alim.monash.org/alimarchkor.html))

![Korean Architecture Collection at Monash University Library](image)

This webpage is one of the ALIM Webpages to provide information on Korean architecture resources on the Web for the University of Melbourne Asian Architecture
class use. Early in second semester the Monash University Korean Studies Librarian goes to the Baillieu Library, the University of Melbourne. She presents on Korean architecture resources to the Asian Architecture library resources class. Prior to the class, she consults Dr Guo and Bick-har Yeung, East Asian Librarian, the University of Melbourne, to select the class materials. She prepares a list of titles of books, videos, and DVDs according to the discussion, and then the list goes to the Monash University Library’s Document Delivery to provide those items for semester loans to the University of Melbourne. During the library class, some items are shown to the students. Items are held in the East Asian Collection area of the University of Melbourne Library until the end of second semester and then return back to Monash University Library.

3.2 Architectural Conservation in Korea

Architectural Conservation in Korea

Library holdings on Architectural Conservation in Korea

Architectural Conservation in Korea Resources on the Web

Library holdings on Architectural Conservation in Korea

- Law
- Reference books
  - Dictionary of Korean art and archaeology = 한국문화재론의사전
  - Choensin konchuk Yong-Han teesajon = 昭信建築英韓大辭典
  - Konchuk Han-Yeong Yang-Han tano sajo = 건축학요한행한사전
  - Kurim uro ponun Hanguk konchuk yongyo = 고려의보고한국건축어
  - Sinpyon Hanguk konchuk sajo = 導韓建築辞典
- Journals
  - Konchuk yoksajong [electronic resource] 건축역사연구
    [Full-text] Data cumulates 1992 to June 2000
- Korean architecture
  - (http://alim.monash.org/alimarchconk.html)

The first semester of 2009, there was a library resources class for the Architectural Conservation in East Asia. This is for Master’s degree students who are eligible to use document delivery or inter-library loan system. Postgraduate students can also use the Melbourne-Monash Intercampus Loan (MMICL) for borrowing available items. So for this subject, material did not go to the University of Melbourne Library from Monash University Library. Instead, the Korean Studies Librarian spent time to prepare the above webpage to help student to search or find materials from Monash University Library catalogue. She also put some information on architectural conservation in Korea on the Web. Because of none of the students in the class can read or speak Korean, the Librarian provides search guides about how to find resources from the National Research Institute of
4. SUBJECT LIBRARIAN

Many articles mention the changing role of the subject librarian (Dale, Holland, and Matthews 2006; Hardy and Corrall 2007; Yakushiin 2005) from traditional roles to today with considerable digital aspects. Feldmann (2006) concludes that subject librarians offer much in the way of customer service, interaction and relationships with students and university staff, a perspective strongly conscious of user perspectives, knowledge built over time of academic staff needs and concerns, intimate knowledge of the resources in a discipline, instructional skills with an ability to teach to first-year students, graduate students, and academic staff as well as experience with virtual reference, creating tutorials, web page design, etc.

At the Monash University Library, the Korean Studies Librarian’s role is to assist anyone who studies or researches Korea. Users can contact her by email, phone, or visiting the library to find information on Korea. According to Kim (2001, 259), the role of the Korean Studies Librarian is as follows:

The librarian’s primary duties are selection, acquisition and cataloguing of Korean language material, and to liaise with academics and students of the department. Additional duties include rostered time on the Matheson information desk to assist clients to locate relevant sources of information across all campuses, prepare and deliver classes on using the Library catalogue and information resources.

The Korean Studies Librarian catalogues Korean materials in Voyager clients, checks records from Libraries Australia, OCLC or Library of Congress Catalogue. If records are not found from those cataloguing services, the Korean Studies Librarian creates new records and then uploads these to the Libraries Australia. The Korean language records are displayed in Romanized Korean as well as Korean script.

5. KOREAN DATABASES – FEE BASED

Earlier, we mentioned the difficulty of acquiring Korean databases with a small budget of Korean collection. Last year, Monash University Library got a trial database named “e-Korean Studies Database”.

This database is a recent initiative to bring all the various Korean subscription databases to one site and under one search engine. It covers all academic disciplines including the arts and humanities, social sciences, natural sciences, medical sciences, and physical education. It includes various sources such as monographs, periodicals and newspapers, dissertations and research reports, law, classical literature, dictionaries and encyclopedias and video lectures. The trial databases Webpage was in Korean but users can change their interface language into English, Chinese, and Japanese. The integrated “E-Korean Studies Database” includes KISS, KSI e-book, DBpia, KRpia, Digital Culture Art Course, KoreaA2Z, Kdatabase, Kpjournal, Korean History & Culture Research Database, History Cultural Series, and LawnB’s Legal Information.

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6 http://www.nricp.go.kr
7 http://www.nl.go.kr
8 http://www.riss4u.net/
Early this year, the Korea Foundation, the members of “the Task Force on Korean Online Database Price Negotiation”, and Korean databases vendors made an agreement to reduce the subscription fee of this integrated “e-Korean studies database”. This was announced to the eastlib email list server and the libraries that joined trial database in April 2009. Although the reduced subscription fee in US$ was still too much for Korean collections in Australasia that did not subscribe to any Korean database, at Monash University we have negotiated a reasonable price with the assistance of the Korea Foundation. Hopefully, by the time this paper is formally delivered at the KSAA conference, we will have an integrated e-Korean studies database, which will benefit our users enormously.

6. Conclusion

This paper outlines library services for Korean studies at the Monash University Library. We not only provide service to Monash University staff and students, we also provide services to others such as the University of Melbourne through ALIM and to others on a less formal basis. While limitations in budget and staff time mean we cannot do everything, we aim to improve our services as much as possible. Please contribute any ideas and suggestions to the email address below.

References

Dale, Penny, Matt Holland, and Marian Matthews. 2006. Subject librarians: engaging with the learning and teaching environment. Aldershot: Ashgate.


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RISS International: A Gateway to Korean Research Information

SOOJI LEE
Korea Education & Research Information Service (KERIS)

ABSTRACT

RISS International is the single gateway to access comprehensive resources about Korea and Korean Studies. It has been developed and managed by the Korea Education and Research Information Service (KERIS) in Korea, a governmental agency under the Ministry of Education and Science & Technology (MEST) in Korea. It provides an opportunity to access approximately 1 million fulltext Korean Journal Articles, Theses & Dissertations produced in Korea. The Korean Journal Articles database includes articles from core journals of individual research fields in Korea, such as History, Korean Language and Literature, Religion, Political/Social Science, Education, ICT, and so forth. In addition, RISS International offers the KERIS Union Catalog, the only bibliographic database of university libraries in Korea, and the database is a basis for the location of the materials and ILL/DDS service if a material is in non digital format. RISS International is a fee based service for institutional members abroad. Ever since its launch on November 2007, 14 institutions joined RISS International and have utilized the service to facilitate research activities of Korean Studies.

1. OVERVIEW

RISS International1 is the unique gateway to comprehensive research outcomes of Korea. With its easy to use search and retrieval interface, it provides professional resources regarding Korea and Korean Studies for researchers and librarians of the world. The Korean Journal Article database covers more than 80% of the core journals2 of each research field in Korea, and the number of core journals included in RISS International has grown rapidly. In addition, the KERIS Union Catalog, the national bibliographic database of resources located at university libraries in Korea, has been the primary location to find resources regardless of the format as digital or non digital. As reported from the recent survey, the KERIS Union Catalog is ranked on top as the major point of entry to find scholarly information, and the main purpose of utilizing the KERIS Union Catalog and the fulltext databases is to find resources for professional research papers and to write theses and dissertations3.

The idea for developing a research information service for foreign researchers outside Korea began in 2006, when the number of visits to RISS (Research Information Service System) from outside Korea was starting to increase. After optimizing the information architecture and the front-end user interface for the efficient IR system, RISS International started its pilot testing on November 2006, with 13 foreign institutional members. The results of the RISS International pilot testing was reported in Boston, USA in March 2008, in front of East Asian librarians who attended CEAL Meeting of 2008. Fulltext of Korean Journal Articles, Korean Theses & Dissertations have been successfully

1 RISS International: http://intl.riss4u.net
2 Core journals of the individual research fields in Korea are evaluated and selected by Korea Research Foundation (KRF, http://www.krf.org), and the number of journals reaches app. 1,500 as of March 2009.
3 User Survey Report 2008, 16-17
downloaded even with local viewer software, and MARC records of the KERIS Union Catalog have been imported to foreign local bibliographic tools such as OCLC Connexion and individual IRS where Unicode was supported by the system.

RISS International is the service operated by the Korea Education & Research Information Service (KERIS, http://english.keris.or.kr/es_main/index.jsp), a nonprofit organization advancing higher education through efficient use of Information Technology, under the Ministry of Education and Science & Technology (MEST) in Korea. Different from other commercial vendors in Korea, KERIS considers the full-text and MARC records of RISS International as a national asset, so that anyone who is majoring in Korean and Korean Studies should be able to access the resources provided by RISS International without a high cost barrier. RISS International is open to the researchers and librarians abroad with minimal operational and site maintenance cost by individual member institutions.

2. WHAT DOES RISS INTERNATIONAL COVER?

As the most comprehensive research information service, RISS International covers; 1) more than 1.6 mil fulltext of Korean Journal Articles, Korean Journal Articles Expanded, Korean Theses & Dissertations, 2) more than 8 mil bibliographic records of university library holdings including monographs, serials, and a variety of non-traditional materials, and 3) fulltext of primary resources of Korean History have been added recently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fulltext</th>
<th>MARC</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>Theses &amp; Dissertations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KJA*</td>
<td>490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KJAE</td>
<td>KISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBPia</td>
<td>204,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,087,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Table 1] RISS International Contents (as of Mar. 2009)

Usage statistics shows that 30,000 bibliographic records are added per month, and 417,000 fulltext KJA/KJAEs are downloaded monthly and 693,000 theses & dissertations are downloaded per month as of March 2009. Bibliographic records are uploaded to the KERIS Union Catalog by more than 200 university libraries, which consist of 100% of all 4-year university libraries in Korea. TOC is also available for the recent publications. Among 1,500 core journals registered in the Korea Research Foundation (KRF, http://www.krf.org), researchers can access 84% of them, and it will be up to 100% by the end of 2009. As for theses & dissertations, more than 90% of the most recent publications are included via the dCollection system which utilizes metadata harvesting over OAI-PMH.

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3. How does RISS International Work?

Major features of RISS International includes; 1) Federated Search of multiple resources, 2) a fulltext download service for KJA/KJAEs, theses & dissertations and Korea History Online, 3) ILL for non digital materials, and 4) MARC download service.

3.1 Federated Search

Researchers of RISS International can perform federated searches for various resources from multiple locations, for example; 1) KJAE comes from commercial database vendors, such as KSI (KISS) and Nurimedia (DBPia), 2) part of Korean Theses & Dissertations whose metadata is harvested over OAI-PMH is located at individual university libraries and linked to RISS International, 3) fulltext of historical resources provided by Korea History Online comes from 19 historical institutes such as Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Academy of Korean Studies, and the Korean Democracy Foundation, and so forth.

There will be major shift in search engine in the course of year 2009, and the important features being added are; 1) intuitive interface for advanced search option, 2) searches limit by language, 3) automatic typo detection, 4) related search, 5) word completion, and so forth.

![Figure 1] Federated Search Result

3.2 Fulltext

There are three types of fulltext provided by RISS International; 1) KJA/KJAE, 2) Korean Theses & Dissertations, and 3) various types of fulltext from Korea History Online.

3.2.1 KJA/KJAE

Approximately 0.5 million Korea Journal Articles (KJA) had been selected and digitized by the Korean Knowledge Information Management Project developing nationwide academic infrastructure including fulltext databases in the fields of Education, ICT, Culture, and Science & Technology of Korea. KERIS was assigned as the National Education and Research Information Center in 2001 and has focused on digitizing academic resources, especially in university environments.

Korean Journal Articles Expanded (KJAE) comes from two different commercial vendors in Korea: one is Korea Studies Information Co., known for its fulltext database KISS; the other is Nurimedia which also markets its fulltext database, known as DBpia, in and outside Korea. Apart from the federated search of all the resources, fulltext open on the conditions that each individual member institution is signed up. Researchers can
access the fulltext of KISS only if the institution that s/he belongs to pays the annual subscription fee to KSI. Librarians or Information Professionals of the institution should check the availability of fulltext by contacting KSI. Fulltext from DBPia will be accessed by any researchers of RISS International member institutions5, and each member institution should pay for the use dependent upon the number of downloads. Pricing policy and payment options will be negotiated between Nurimedia and RISS International, and it will be announced to RISS International member institutions in the near future. Librarians or Information Professionals of the member institutions should be in charge of updating institutional information whether they are part of the consortium or not, so that researchers of his/her institution will not be left out from accessing essential fulltext for their research.

3.2.2 Korean Theses & Dissertations

The total number of theses & dissertations produced over the past half of the century in Korea is about 1 million, and more than sixty percent of the texts available at RISS International are in PDF format downloadable with Acrobat Reader. Recently, particularly over the past 5 years, the dCollection system developed by KERIS and implemented to the university libraries has contributed to harvest metadata for up-to-date federated searches of theses & dissertations as they are produced. By the end of year 2008, the dCollection system has been implemented in almost all 4 year university libraries which produce more than 95% of the theses & dissertations of the year.

3.2.3 Korean History Online

Various types of fulltext related to Korean history have been added to RISS International since Dec. 2008. Fulltext such as materials about the Korean independence movement, modern day newspaper articles, Bibyeonsa Deungnok, and Seungjeongwon Ilgi, provided by Korean History Online are composed of materials linked to the participating institutions where those fulltext have been digitized and archived. These fulltext are open to researchers of RISS International member institutions as Korean Theses & Dissertations are as well.

3.2.4 KOCW

Began in 2008, KOCW (Korea Open CourseWare, http://www.kocw.net) has been the official web publication of the university courses and lectures, as other worldwide OCW and OER initiatives does. There are about 200 open courses from the universities in Korea, and the subject area varies including Computer Science, Psychology, Education/ICT, Social Welfare, and so forth. RISS International will extend its contents to open educational resources of various file/content types so that researchers and educators will be able to experience how online courses work under the university environment in Korea. Individual courses are composed of at least 15 video recorded lectures with lecture notes and syllabi, and lecture files will be added monthly from May 2009 onward continuously.

3.3 ILL

When a material retrieved by the federated search in RISS International happens to be in non digital format, researchers of the member institutions can request an Inter Library Loan if it has at least one holding library, which means that a responsible librarian or information professional can photocopy the material to deliver. A Librarian or information professional should authenticate whether the users belong to the appropriate

5 It excludes member institutions who participate in Korean Online Database Consortium initiated in the United States (aka the Consortium).
institution first, because s/he will pay for the cost and deliver the material to the users. The ILL service of RISS International does not work reciprocally at this moment, so that the central fee management system issues the invoice to RISS International member institutions only at the end of each year.

![ILL Process Diagram](image)

**[Figure 2] ILL Process**

### 3.4 MARC download

Librarians or information professionals can download MARC records to process Korean materials for their online catalog. MARC records originated from KORMARC standards are ready for the conversion to MARC21 format so that RISS International member institutions can utilize the records in the course of “Order to Cataloging,” only if their IRS or bibliographic tools support conversion to MARC21. MARC records of the recently published materials in Korea are created and FTPed by the Korea Book Trade Promotion within 24 hours of the publication everyday, and these records are marked with a bright orange icon in the result lists. About 100 records have been added to RISS International (KERIS Union Catalog) since approximately 25,000 new books are published per year in Korea. Romanization to the descriptive fields will be added applying the McCune Reischauer rules from the third quarter of the year 2009.

### 4. How Do I Get Access?

The RISS International is a fee-based membership service targeting institutions abroad. Librarians or information professionals of the institution should apply for the membership submitting the signed agreement. The membership fee is $1,000.00 (USD) flat per year regardless of the institutional size and enrollment. The fee will cover site management and the operational cost of RISS International. University libraries gain access through IP ranges registered by the primary contact librarian or information professional; otherwise access will be authenticated by a referring URL.

#### 4.1 Requests for Membership

If a librarian or an information professional tries to access RISS International, s/he will be directed to the page below asking for a membership application or trial service. The most important issue on the application is to register IP ranges/referring URL according to the institutional characteristics. Users of RISS International member institutions will only be able to access the site over the registered IPs and referring URL. In addition, accurate information about individual subscriptions to other fulltext databases offered by KSI or Nurimedia will allow users to gain the fulltext they need efficiently.
4.2 Trial Service

Researchers, librarians and information professionals of non member institutions can request a “Trial Service Account” of RISS International. The only information required to open the account is an email address and the account will be valid for 7 days. Users with trial service account are not allowed to open fulltext, but they can experience the process to retrieve the information they need, including exporting/emailing and ILL.

5. ADMIN TOOLS

Only the primary contact person of the member institution can access the Librarian Only page with his/her particular IP address registered, where s/he can review the usage statistics, confirm the ILL process and the ILL invoice. RISS International usage statistics reports search hits and the number of fulltext downloaded by individual member institutions. The ILL librarian will be able to monitor and confirm the transaction, including who makes the requests, where the materials are, and the cost.

6. SUMMARY

As the most comprehensive scholarly outcome service of Korea, RISS International should be a prerequisite to researchers abroad whose professional interest lies in Korea and Korean Studies. It is the only service to allow researchers to perform a federated search and to obtain the materials whether they are digital (fulltext) or not (ILL). Since its
official launch, RISS International has tried to include as much scholarly resources as possible regardless of the location. In addition, RISS International is the only service to provide MARC downloads with conversion to MARC21 format in order for librarians and information professionals to process for their online catalog where, in most cases, researchers begin their search for the materials.

**REFERENCE**

Yangch'ŏn Kwŏn Kŭn and the Confucian canon

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Confucianism has played a significant role in shaping Korean societies for centuries. It has provided administrative and bureaucratic structures, shaped social, familial and cultural realms, been the foundation of educational systems and learning, and constructed moral, intellectual and religious frameworks for people to understand and interpret the world. Behind all of these facets Confucianism remained informed and supported by a canon of authoritative literature and a cumulative tradition of commentaries. For intellectuals in pre-modern Korea, the meaning and significance attributed to the canon and its commentaries derived from the questions posed to these bodies of knowledge. As time and circumstance changed, so too did the questions asked of this knowledge and, accordingly, the importance attached to parts of the canon and its commentators fluctuated. For present day scholars of Korea, exploring how Confucian intellectuals approached and understood the canon and commentaries provides a means to chart an important facet of the topography of Korean intellectual history.

**Yangch'ŏn Kwŏn Kŭn**

In this paper I will be looking at the late 14th century scholar-official Yangch'ŏn Kwŏn Kŭn 陽村 權近 (1352-1409) and his writings on the Confucian canon. Kwŏn is a particularly important figure to explore when we look at the broader picture of Confucianism in Korea's history because his writings on the Confucian classics represent both the earliest extant commentaries in Korea and the beginning of the Confucian commentary tradition which continued up until the 20th century. Since Kwŏn's commentaries provide the earliest available picture of how Confucian intellectuals of that time understood the canon, once we have determined his particular perspective we can then appreciate the preoccupations and interests of later Confucian exegetes. Another point that makes Kwŏn important to examine is that he was a pivotal figure in the late Koryŏ/early Chosŏn intellectual landscape. Kwŏn was at the centre of court affairs for the best part of his life; he occupied bureaucratic positions that determined policy, education, civil service examinations, correspondence and foreign affairs; furthermore he was educated by and fraternised with other prominent intellectuals of that time. In other words, Kwŏn was located physically, professionally and intellectually at the heart of domestic and international affairs for Koryŏ and Chosŏn, and he was enmeshed within a coterie of key intellectuals, thus making his writings perhaps the closest we can come to probing the issues and ideas that occupied the minds of that time.

**Kwŏn's Writings on Confucianism**

Kwŏn's extant writings are peppered with references to Confucian texts, ideas and personalities, but among his writings he dedicated two works specifically to Confucianism. He wrote these books in 1390-1, a time when he was pardoned from a year of exile yet decided to stay in retirement in the countryside. Because Kwŏn directly addresses Confucianism in these two books, they provide the most sensible place for us to begin our examination.
The first of these books is his *Iphak tosŏl* 入學圖說 (*Diagrams and Explanations for Beginning Students*, hereafter *IHTS*), a primer on key Confucian texts, topics and themes. Kwŏn's “Biographical Chronology” shows the provenance of this text:

Hongmu 23 (1390), at the age of 39:
...Seventh lunar month, exiled again to Ikchu 益州; wrote *Iphak tosŏl*.\(^1\)

This version of the *IHTS* comprised twenty-four chapters and according to its epilogue was printed in Chinyang 晉陽, in Hongwu 30 (1397). A later version of the *IHTS* appeared around Sejong 7 (1425) and this edition expanded on the earlier one to include an extra fourteen chapters. This 1425 edition was divided into an upper and lower portion with, with the former reflecting the first version of the text and the latter being the appended chapters. Subsequent to this publication, three other editions of the *IHTS* appear: one in Nangu 陸州 around 1545, one in Yongju 榮州 in 1547 and finally one in Japan in 1648. All of these editions of the *IHTS* comprise an upper and lower portion as found in the 1425 edition.

The second of Kwŏn's books on Confucianism is the *Ogyŏng Ch'ŏngyŏnlok* 五經淺見錄 (*Record of Humble Thoughts on the Five Classics*).\(^2\) This book is a collection of commentaries on each of the Five Classics and Kwŏn's biography shows that he was working on these commentaries around the same time as the *IHTS*.

Hongmu 24 (1391), at the age of 40:
First lunar month: went to the capital and received a pardon. Third lunar month: returned to Yangch'ŏn in Ch'unchu, examined and corrected the order of [passages from] the *Record of Rites*. Also wrote *Record of Humble Thoughts on the [Book of] Changes*, [Book of] Poetry, [Book of] Documents and Spring and Autumn Annals.\(^3\)

In this record we see that in 1391 Kwŏn had finished writing four of his *RHT* but was still working on the *Record of Rites*. The commentary on the *Rites* was a project bequeathed to Kwŏn by his teacher, Yi Saek 李穉 (1328-1396), which he did not finish until 1405 when the *Veritable Records* show Kwŏn submitting the book to the court for publication. Following this, Kwŏn's son, Kwŏn To 權蹈 (1387-1445), had his father's commentary on the *Rites* republished in T'aejong 18 (1418), after which they were published once more in Sukjŏng 31 (1705) by Song Chŏng-gyu 宋廷奎 (1656-1710).

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\(^1\) Kwŏn, Kŭn, Yŏnpo 年譜, *Yangch' ŏnjip* 陽村集, 4b: 洪武二十三年庚午。公年三十九。...

\(^2\) See Kwŏn, *Ogyŏng Ch'ŏngyŏnlok* 五經淺見錄. (Sŏngnam: Hangŭk ch'ŏngsin munha yŏnguŭŏn, 1995). Hereafter all references to the *Record of Humble Thoughts on the Five Classics* will be abbreviated *RHT* when referring to the whole collection of commentaries and *RHT-Changes*, *RHT-Odes*, etc., when referring to Kwŏn's particular commentary on each of the canon. Citations from the *Ogyŏng Ch'ŏngyŏnlok* will be made in the format of “101a” referring to page 101, “a” being the upper reproduction (“b” signifying the lower), and “1” indicating the reproduced page on the right (“2” indicating left).

\(^3\) Kwŏn, *Y CJ*,  Yönpo: 5a:

\(^4\) *Taejong Sillok*, 12: 6/11/17 02. References to the *Sillok* such as 12: 6/11/17 02 refer to the second event recorded in book twelve for the seventeenth day of the eleventh month of the 6th year of T'aejong.
Tracing the legacy of Kwŏn's two books on Confucianism over the following centuries shows that his writings continued to circulate among scholars long after his death and that his thoughts were appreciated as part of the intellectual history of Koryŏ and Chosŏn. A sketch of this legacy shows that T'oege Ye Yi Hwang 退溪 李滉 (1501-1570) consulted Kwŏn's IHTS when composing part of his Ten Diagrams of Sagely Learning 聖學十圖 and other 16th century figures such as Kim Chang-saeng 金長生 (1548-1631), Kwŏn Kûk-jung 權克中 (1560-1614) and U Yŏ-mu 羿汝楨 (1591-1657) were probing Kwŏn's writings on the Documents, Analects and Changes. Over the next two centuries scholars continued to consider Kwŏn's contributions and particularly in the 1700s their focus turned to his writings on the Greater Learning and Record of Rites.

**Kwŏn on the Confucian Canon**

In these two books what does the Confucian canon represent to Kwŏn? First, we see that Kwŏn understood the Confucian canon to be a repository of basic, foundational knowledge that all aspiring scholars-officials needed to know. Kwŏn's introduction to the IHTS shows the importance he placed on grasping the basic ideas of the canon. Here Kwŏn explains that although novice students would visit seeking guidance in understanding the meaning of Confucian texts, he found that they failed to grasp even the most basic ideas; this experience prompted him to compose the IHTS. For the purpose of our examination, its objective of helping students understand the basic meaning of Confucian texts makes the IHTS a particularly useful starting point. The book in fact represents a collection of what Kwŏn saw as the most essential knowledge a person was required to know in the late 14th century of Koryŏ.

The knowledge summarised in the IHTS covers a number of fields, first of which is basic concepts from the classics. Kwŏn explains in writing and through diagrams the meaning of important texts like the Greater Learning, Doctrine of the Mean, Mencius and Analects. He also summarises the key points of the each of the Five Classics, then expands on each of the Classics to explain particular concepts, like the different permutations of trigrams and hexagrams from the Changes, arrangement of ancestral tombs according to the Rites and basic ideas of heaven, man, mind and nature as found in Cheng/Zhu thought from the Song.

Diagram 1: IHTS, Kwŏn’s diagrams for the Greater Learning (top) and Doctrine of the Mean (below)

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5 Kwŏn, Kûn, *Iphaktosol* 入學圖說. (Ŭmsŏng: Kwŏn O-ch'ŏl ka, [1547] 1929), 3. Hereafter references to *Iphaktosol* will be abbreviated IHTS.


7 Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 31-44.

8 Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 51.


12 Cheng/Zhu thought is the body of interpretative literature and the philosophical re-evaluation of Confucian thought that stems from the Cheng brothers - Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) and Cheng Hao 程颢 (1032-1085) - and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200).

Another field is practical knowledge. Kwŏn describes how hexagrams and trigrams from the *Changes* relate to the cardinal points,\textsuperscript{14} days, months, seasons, years and the sexagenarian cycle.\textsuperscript{15} In other chapters he explains the path of the sun and moon from different perspectives,\textsuperscript{16} even the phases of the moon\textsuperscript{17} and the arrangement of burial mounds.\textsuperscript{18} In the *RHT-Documents* Kwŏn also spends significant time elaborating on cosmological phenomena and how they inform the arrangement of days, months and seasons of the year.\textsuperscript{19}

Kwŏn's discussion of practical knowledge draws from a reservoir of abstract knowledge contained within the canon. Throughout both books Kwŏn pauses to explain the mysterious workings of heaven and the nuances of the relationship between heaven as a metaphysical source of all truths and principles and man's responsibilities to heaven, himself and his civic duties. Perhaps the best instance of this is found in the opening two chapters of the *IHTS* where Kwŏn explains the relationship between Heaven, Man, Mind and Nature firstly from a unified perspective and secondly from an individual perspective. In the latter discussion he delineates Heaven's position as the ubiquitous source of all principles, phenomena and morality, following which he links it to the moral and ontological dimensions of man through the moral and soteriological notions of “sincerity” and “respect” 

\textsuperscript{20} Even in the discussion of mind, man and nature, Kwŏn reiterates the fundamental position of heaven and its principles as though it is the warp and weave of the ontological fabric of man.\textsuperscript{21} Garnished discussion of the Five Phases is another case where he expounds abstract notions and then connects it to reality. Firstly he provides an account of the two cycles of the Five Phases, namely their emergence and dissolution,\textsuperscript{22} then in subsequent chapters he highlights the role that the Five Phases play in defining the seasons and months of the year.\textsuperscript{23}

To support his discussion and arguments, Kwŏn frequently invokes the moral credibility of historical figures in the canon. Since the personalities found in the canon are located in antiquity it provides Kwŏn with historical support for his argument. For example, Kwŏn evokes the sage kings Yao and Shun not only as moral paragons and models of wise leadership but also lauds their role in calculating the calendar year and seasons, making observations of constellations, and instituting perfect rule over their domains.\textsuperscript{24} In arguing about the danger of heirs of kings and rulers abusing their positions of power and luxury, Kwŏn cites the three Zhou Kings\textsuperscript{25} and Three Kings of Yin\textsuperscript{26} from the “Against Luxurious Ease” in the *Documents*.\textsuperscript{27} In yet another case Kwŏn draws on the

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\textsuperscript{14} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 63-5.
\textsuperscript{15} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 79-80, 81-4.
\textsuperscript{16} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 87-8, 89-91.
\textsuperscript{17} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 92-5.
\textsuperscript{18} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 44-50.
\textsuperscript{19} Kwŏn, *RHT-Documents*, 101a2-102a2.
\textsuperscript{20} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 7.
\textsuperscript{21} For discussion of man, mind and nature see Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 8-11.
\textsuperscript{22} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 56-7.
\textsuperscript{23} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 98.
\textsuperscript{24} Kwŏn, *RHT-Documents*, 101a2-102b2.
\textsuperscript{25} The three Zhou kings are 大王, 王季, and 文王.
\textsuperscript{26} The three Yin king are 中宗, 高宗 and 祖甲.
\textsuperscript{27} Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 74-6. Also see Legge, *The Shoo King*, “The Book of Chow, Book IV, The Great Plan”, 320-
songs of the Dukes of Zhou and Shao from the *Odes* to exemplify the ideals of ordering one's family affairs, one's responsibilities to ruling the state and making the world peaceful. To make his argument in this case Kwŏn assembles a diagram and summary in the *IHTS*, while in the *RHT-Odes* he provides an expanded explanation. Kwŏn further bolsters his argument by citing songs of the remaining thirteen states in the *Odes* as examples of the consequences of not following the appropriate paths. Kwŏn thus frames historical knowledge as being tightly entwined with moral authority and presents figures of the past as paragons of virtue, disgrace and normative values. Underlying this portrayal is the notion that antiquity provides visions of society, ideal and otherwise.

Diagram 2: *IHTS*, Kwŏn’s diagrams for “Against Luxurious Ease” (top left), the odes of Zhou Nan (top right) and State Winds for the Thirteen States (bottom centre)

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The way Kwŏn engages with and presents these fields of knowledge from the canon is to adopt, adapt, improvise and, of course, simply explain. Kwŏn adopts knowledge from the canon by directly quoting or duplicating text and images. In these instances information from the canon is clear, concise and authoritative enough to be transmitted without modification. We see Kwŏn do this where he quotes large portions from the *Odes, Documents and Changes* in his commentaries or where he has lifted diagrams straight from other sources, such as with representations of the Five Phases or the arrangement of musical tones and notes. Although the majority of adopted knowledge comes from the canon, it must be noted that the canon is not the exclusive source that Kwŏn consults in this manner. Peppered through his writings are direct quotes from a range of Chinese commentators, as discussed below. However, Kwŏn does not confine himself to the writings of these commentators either for we find a case of Kwŏn adopting knowledge directly from one of his contemporaries in the chapter on 'Diagram of the twelve months and hexagrams' in the *IHTS*. Here Kwŏn includes a diagram that his peer Chŏng To-jŏn (1337-1398) composed. Kwŏn obviously privileged the canon as the primary source of knowledge, followed by the writings of Chinese commentators, but the inclusion of Chŏng’s diagram indicates that where Kwŏn recognised knowledge as being well articulated, correct and precise, he did not hesitate to incorporate the information directly into his discussion. Therefore, the canon happens to hold the concentration of authoritative knowledge, but such knowledge is not confined to antiquity and can equally be found in the words of one’s contemporaries.

The place where Kwŏn most clearly adapts knowledge from the canon is in his own diagrams. By adapting knowledge Kwŏn paraphrases from the canon and injects his own of interpretations to bridge elliptical gaps. In the introduction to the *IHTS* he explains that he based his initial diagrams on Zhou Dun-yi's 周敦頤 (1017-1073) “Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate” and Zhu Xi's commentaries, then he chose maxims from scholars and consulted the canon, and where possible worked them into diagrammatic form and

31 Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 56, 57.
included his opinions.\textsuperscript{34} One particularly good example of this adaptation from the canon and commentary is where Kwôn discusses the “Great Plan” 洪範 from the Documents in the IHITS. In this case, text from the original chapter was summarised into a diagrammatic form in the \textit{Diagrams of the Six Classics} 六經圖, a book compiled by Yang Jia 楊甲 and supplemented by Mao Bang-han 毛邦翰 during the Southern Song. The diagram is composed of two concentric circles with the fifth of nine divisions located at the centre with the inner ring listing the remaining eight divisions. In the outer ring it simply states “Great Plan” and “water”. Later, Hu Guang 胡廣 (1370-1418) elaborated on this diagram when he compiled the \textit{Greater Collection of Book of Documents} 書經大全.\textsuperscript{35} The concentric circles are replaced with eight of the nine divisions arranged in a circle around the fifth division at the centre of the diagram. The eight divisions branch out from the centre like spokes and their key constituents are listed. Kwôn adapts this version of the diagram by reconfiguring it into two diagrams, an upper and lower 上下, and in the upper portion he arranges the first four divisions along the top from right to left. These four divisions have their constituent elements summarised beneath them and then Kwôn links them to the fifth division located at the centre of the diagram. From the fifth division lines extend downward to the remaining four divisions which are arranged from right to left and have their constituents listed beneath them.\textsuperscript{36} In effect, Kwôn had continued a process of adaptation that originated in the canon and extended through generations of commentators, with Kwôn injecting a little of his own thoughts into the process. This chapter is by no means the only case, for we can see Kwôn adapting other canonic materials such as from the \textit{Great Collected Notes to the Book of Documents} 書傳大全, where Kwôn takes a diagram of lunar phases found in the and divides the diagram in two to show clearly the waxing and waning of the moon and how the different phases relate to different days.\textsuperscript{37}

Diagram 3: IHITS, Chǒng Tŏ-jŏn’s diagram (top left), diagram of the “Great Plan” found in \textit{Diagrams of the Six Classics} (top right), in the \textit{Greater Collection of Book of Documents} (bottom left) and the upper and lower portions of Kwôn’s adaptation in IHITS (bottom right)

\textsuperscript{34} Kwôn, IHITS, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{35} See “Diagram of the Nine Divisions of Kija’s Great Plan” in \textit{Greater Collection of Book of Documents} 書經大全. The same diagram is also reproduced in many texts from the Ming onwards, including the “Diagram of the Nine Divisions of the Great Plan” in the \textit{Great Collected Notes to the Book of Documents} 書傳大全.
\textsuperscript{36} Kwôn, IHITS, 70-1.
\textsuperscript{37} Kwôn, IHITS, 92-3.
Since the canon is not replete with explanations, let alone diagrams, of everything, Kwŏn took the liberty of improvising his own interpretation of what certain themes and issues meant and how they related to each other. His most iconic improvisation is the opening diagram of the IHTS where he attempts to capture the unified nature of heaven and man. Even in other chapters he takes texts and arranges their key constituents, notes their features and connects their main points, such as is seen in his chapter on the Great Learning,39 Doctrine of the Mean,40 the State Airs 國風 from the Odes41 and his conceptualisation of the essence and function of the Five Classics,42 to name but a few.

38 Kwŏn, IHTS, 5.
39 Kwŏn, IHTS, 22-31.
40 Kwŏn, IHTS, 31-44.
41 Kwŏn, IHTS, 104-7, 108-112.
42 Kwŏn, IHTS, 51-4.
Accompanying all of the diagrams and constituting the body of Kwŏn's commentaries is simple textual exegesis. In both the IHTS and RHT Kwŏn provides extensive written explanation of texts, concepts and the philosophical mechanics of the canon. Kwŏn explains the origins of texts and issues, the circumstances surrounding certain compositions and the historical background. For example, Kwŏn's commentary on the Changes discusses the origin, composition and formation of the Changes, including the role of King Wen, the Duke of Zhou and Confucius. Kwŏn even explains the history of the Changes from the time of the Chin through to the Tang and its more recent developments at the hands of the Cheng brothers and Zhu Xi in the Song. His evaluation and explanation even includes an acknowledgement of commentators whom he considered

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43 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 21a2-21b1.
44 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 21b2-22a1.
to have offered unorthodox interpretations.\textsuperscript{45} For particular songs from the \textit{Odes} Kwŏn devotes a considerable amount of time to explaining the circumstances of their composition, where they were composed and by whom. In the beginning of his \textit{RHT-Odes} Kwŏn speculates on the provenance of the two opening collections of the \textit{Odes}, Zhou of the South and Shao of the South, and he argues that based on the content and observations made in certain of the songs they could only have been composed by people at the heart of court affair.\textsuperscript{46}

**Kwŏn on Confucian Commentators**

Integral to Kwŏn's interpretation and explanation of the canon is his engagement with commentators and their commentaries. The problem with the canon, although not stated explicitly, is that it is incomplete, patchy, ambiguous and inconsistent. Attempting to evoke knowledge from this hoary past, let alone ascribe authority to its content and personalities or distil maxims and precepts, is difficult and demands explanation and interpretation. By the time of Kwŏn a well established body of commentary literature accompanied the canon and Kwŏn had little choice but to address both. In fact, the canonical value ascribed to particular commentators and the contending interpretations within the body of commentaries meant that in any discussion of the canon it was impossible to avoid looking at how others dealt with the canon. So for Kwŏn, dealing with the commentaries was as important as dealing with the canon itself.

Clarifying earlier commentaries is a prominent feature across all of Kwŏn's writings on Confucianism. A large part of the first two chapters of the \textit{IHTS} reveals Kwŏn paraphrasing and explaining the intricacies of Cheng/Zhu thought on heaven, man and his nature.\textsuperscript{47} Then, at the end of several pages discussing these issues Kwŏn pauses to clarify his position: “All of these meanings originate in the maxims of the Cheng [brothers] and Zhu [Xi], [they] are not my conjectures”.\textsuperscript{48} Throughout Kwŏn's writings the reader encounters an interlocutor who queries Kwŏn about the themes he covers and this literary device enables Kwŏn to add further layers of elucidation and qualify potential misunderstandings regarding his own interpretations. For instance, following the above mentioned discussion of Cheng/Zhu thought the interlocutor asks Kwŏn seventeen questions such as why he summarised Zhou Dunyi's "Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate” 太極圖說 the way he did, whether he misinterpreted concepts, why in summarising four elements (元亨利貞) from the Changes he included the character on sincerity 誠, how his explanation of “material force” 氣 and “constitution” 質 relate to the reality of man and beasts, whether the mind is empty and how so when it is full of principles from heaven, and what makes people virtuous or not.\textsuperscript{49} This kind of interrogation is not confined to this chapter. In Kwŏn's various \textit{RHT} we see even greater frequency of clarifying Cheng/Zhu thought. In \textit{RHT-Odes} Kwŏn begins his discussion by speculating on the provenance of the songs about the “Two Southerners” 二南 - the Duke of Zhou and Duke of Zhao – and ties in Zhu Xi's proposition found in his \textit{Shijing Jichuan} 詩經集傳.\textsuperscript{50} Kwŏn also refers to Zhu's interpretation of the meaning of certain songs like “Gwan ju” 關雎 and explains to the interlocutor why there appears to be certain inconsistencies in Zhu's interpretation of

\textsuperscript{45} Kwŏn, \textit{RHT-Changes}, 21a2-22a1.
\textsuperscript{46} Kwŏn, \textit{IRHT-Odes}, 109a1, 109a1-109b2.
\textsuperscript{47} Kwŏn, \textit{IHTS}, 6-11
\textsuperscript{48} Kwŏn, \textit{IHTS}, 11. 若其義意皆本程朱格言. 非愚臆說也.
\textsuperscript{49} Kwŏn, \textit{IHTS}, 12-22.
\textsuperscript{50} Kwŏn, \textit{RHT-Odes}, 109a1.
this song when compared to others. In Kwŏn's treatment of the *Documents* he continues this trend although he looks less at Zhu's interpretation and more at his student Cai Chen 蔡沈 (1167-1230) who compiled the *Shujing Jichuan* 書經集傳. Regardless of this shift in focus from Zhu to Cai, clarifying the canon and the commentaries remains the centrepiece of Kwŏn's commentary and he begins his discussion of the *Documents* with a quote from Cai, followed by a discussion about the nomenclature of the chapters of the *Documents*. Further into his commentary Kwŏn discusses the constellations recorded in the “Canon of Yao” and cites Cai's remarks on the event. Kwŏn continues on to qualify both the original record of the *Documents* and Cai's interpretation of the constellations, the five phases and “Great Plan”, the historical order of certain songs, even the fate of K'ija, to cite but a few instances. The same trend of qualifying Cheng/Zhu interpretations is also found in Kwŏn's other writings, such as *RHT-Changes* where he uses Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi's *Yi Chan's Treatise on Change* 伊川易傳 and *Fundamental Meaning of the Book of Changes* 周易本義 to elucidate the meaning of hexagrams. In many of these cases Kwŏn is taking problematic points in Cheng/Zhu interpretations as the basis of his discussion.

At first glance it appears as though Kwŏn is placing all of his emphasis on clarifying Cheng/Zhu commentaries on the canon and this has lead many scholars to regard Kwŏn as simply supporting, if not furthering their interpretation. This, however, is not the case. There are two features of Kwŏn's attitude that demonstrate this, first of which is that he by no means restricts his focus to the Song period commentaries of Zhu and Cheng: instead he looks at other commentators from the Yuan and even earlier. There are of course usual Confucian personalities such as Mencius and Zhou Dunyi, but others appear such as Han Yu 韓愈 (768-824), and a raft of enigmatic figures such as Mr Yi in the *RHT-Documents*, Mr Yo鈞氏 in the discussion of the *Mean* in *IHTS*, Dong Gong 董公 and Mr Hwang 黃氏 in regard to the *Greater Learning* and Yuan commentator Wu Cheng 吳澄 (1249-1333) numerous times when discussing the *Changes*. The breadth of commentators that Kwŏn incorporates into his writings reinforces the point that Kwŏn's concern was not with rigidly supporting particular school, thinker or interpretation, but rather than he was more concerned with distilling truth from the canon and mitigating against heterodoxy.

The second point that shows that Kwŏn was not slavishly following Cheng/Zhu thought is that he criticises their interpretations where he feels their commentaries are amiss. In *RHT-Changes* when looking at the hexagram Pi 比, for example, Kwŏn cites Zhu Xi's *Fundamental Meaning of the Book of Changes* note that “The three characters ‘Bi/pi is auspicious’ are a mistake” but then moves on to propose his own opinion that the

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54 See Kwŏn, *RHT-Documents* in Kwŏn, Kūn, (Kukyŏk) Samgyŏng Ch'ŏngyŏnllok: si · sŏ · chu'yŏk. tran. Yi Kwang-ho (Seoul: Ch'ŏngmyŏng munhwa ch'acaen, 1999), 60-61. The AKS compilation of Kwŏn's commentaries seems to have inadvertently omitted several pages of the original.
58 Kwŏn, *RHT-Documents*, 105b2.
59 Kwŏn, *IHTS*, 35-44.
61 Kwŏn, *RHT-Changes*, 25a2. 本義比三也三字疑衍文

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phrase in its entirety is not an interpretation of Pi alone, but must be taken with the rest of
the phrase and Pi is subtle way to help all people in hierarchical positions enjoy auspicious
outcomes. For the hexagram Mang 蒙 Kwŏn disagrees with Cheng Hao and Wu Cheng
who interpret a character as representing father or wife, and instead thinks that it
represents a mother dealing with difficult circumstances. In discussing other hexagrams
Kwŏn politely offers alternative historical explanations to Zhu in the case Lin 亜, while
concerning interpretations of Tai 泰 he simply expresses concern that Cheng Hao's
interpretation “is not sound”. Not only does Kwŏn find fault with Cheng and Zhu with
other hexagrams but his criticism extends to discussion of the other classics such as the
Odes where, for example, Kwŏn is trying to explain why certain poems are grouped
together when they were composed in different areas and he concludes that the
explanation provided in Zhu's Shijing Jichuan is incorrect. Even at the beginning of his
RHT-Odes Kwŏn opens his commentary by questioning Zhu's claim that the Duke of Zhou
was the “son of heaven”. After outlining the historical circumstances to the contrary,
Kwŏn stresses the need to be most prudent and rigorous, suggesting that Zhu somewhat
hastily, if not recklessly, ascribed the appellation to the Duke of Zhou. Yet another
example is in the RHT-Documents where Kwŏn differs from Cai Chen's commentary over
interpretation of the number of songs included in a particular chapter. The fact that
Kwŏn did not unquestioningly support Cheng/Zhu thought indicates again that Kwŏn was
a critical scholar more interested in the pursuit of truth than in solidifying and supporting
intellectual lineages.

Kwŏn's critique of Cheng and Zhu is relatively mild when compared to his critique
of other Confucian commentators. In his commentary on the RHT-Changes Kwŏn
launches a scathing attack on Yuan writer Wu Cheng. He chastises Wu for attempting to
correct certain characters, misinterpreting or misreading certain phrases and characters,
suggesting “other worldly” interpretations that are not in line with what Confucians
usually think and even falling into heterodox thought of Buddhists. Kwŏn is also
critical of commentators and scholars in his other writings but in a more general sense. In
RHT-Documents, for instance, Kwŏn criticises later generations of scholars for their
misinterpretations and misunderstanding, even accusing some of them of being
“amateurish”. He also points out that scholars have missed the meaning of certain

62 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 25a2.
63 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 24b1.
64 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 30a1.
65 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 27a1-a2. 恐木安.
66 For example, see Kwŏn's discussion of the hexagrams 否, 大有, 像, 损, 妊, 潭, and 中孚 in RHT-
Changes.
67 Kwŏn, RHT-Odes, 110b2.
68 Kwŏn, RHT-Odes, 109a1.
69 Kwŏn, RHT-Documents, 105a1-a2.
70 For example, Wu changing the character 腹 to 腹 in hexagram 腹 (Kwŏn, RHT-Changes,24b2) and
changing 大人 to 大人 in hexagram 委 (Kwŏn, RHT-Changes,25a1).
71 See hexagrams 腹 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes,23b2; 臘 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 24b1; 蒙 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes,
24b1; 腹 Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 27a1.
72 See hexagram 腹, Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 29b2.
73 See hexagram 无心, Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 32b1-b2.
74 Kwŏn blames the misunderstanding of a certain phrase from the chapter “Tai Ji” 太甲上 in the
Documents on later generations of “amateurs” 好事者 who referred to the meaning in terms of 故, see
Kwŏn, RHT-Documents, 105b1-b2. Kwŏn further accuses later generations of failing to understand what the
phrases and that “scholars of today” 今之學者 read Cai Chen's commentary on the Documents and take him to be talking about the ruler using people. In this instance Kwŏn identifies the problem as “scholars” misreading the meaning of the characters 必 and 使, thinking that they apply to people's affairs, when Kwŏn argues that Cai originally meant the characters to refer to self-cultivation. Kwŏn even points out where earlier Confucian scholars made mistakes in distinguishing characters when they dealt with old versions of the Documents.

Kwŏn's evaluation of commentators and commentaries extends beyond Confucians to include a critique of Buddhists. In the IHTS Kwŏn cites Buddhists as holding a particularly shallow view of what constitutes human nature and dismisses Buddhist notions of emptiness. After an extended discussion about astronomy, paths of the sun and moon, and constellations, Kwŏn notes in RHT-Documents how Buddhists conceive of the path of the sun but scathingly dismisses them, saying that he fears they are yet to establish a proper argument. In the commentary on the Changes Kwŏn attacks Buddhists from yet another angle, mocking their heterodox idea of “love for all without distinction” and their lack of concern for family relations, their notions of the annihilation of the self and its ethical implications and lastly Hwaŏm philosophical position.

**REASSESSING KWŎN IN THE TOPOGRAPHY OF LATE 14TH CENTURY CONFUCIANISM**

What then does Kwŏn's orientation towards the canon and its commentaries tell us? Furthermore, how does this relate to our understanding of Kwŏn and the broader intellectual climate of the late 14th century? From the above we have seen that Kwŏn understood the canon as a reservoir of knowledge that forms the foundation for educated literati to function in society. This knowledge has additional dimensions: it provides practical knowledge that defines, orders and explains society and the world; it provides abstract knowledge of metaphysical principles that underpin man, society and the world; it is a record of historical events and personalities that embody the consequences of moral decisions and actions; and it provides visions of ideal Confucian societies from antiquity. Entwined within Kwŏn’s treatment of the canon is extensive use of centuries of commentary literature, which he uses to support his arguments, qualify points of uncertainty and address discrepancies in the epistemological fabric of the canon. Kwŏn thus approaches the canon, commentaries and commentators with a critical eye. He probes and explores the nuances of the canon and he interrogates the writings of commentators to draw out their truths, highlight their mistakes and correct their misunderstandings. When we attempt to evaluate Kwŏn's approach to the entire Confucian corpus, we see that far from following one particular thinker or school of thought he approaches the entire Confucian corpus in a non-sectarian, independent and inquisitive way.

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75 Kwŏn, RHT-Documents, 107a1.  
76 Kwŏn, RHT-Documents, 103a1.  
77 Kwŏn, IHTS, 11.  
78 Kwŏn, IHTS, 14, 17.  
79 Kwŏn, RHT-Documents, 102b2  
80 See discussion of hexagram 兮 in Kwŏn, RHT-Changes, 28a1-a2.  
81 RHT-Changes, 41a1-42a1.  
82 RHT-Changes, 40b2-41a1.
The breadth of Kwŏn's interest and the critical manner in which he regards the
canon and appraises commentaries has implications for how we regard Kwŏn's place in
late 14th century Koryŏ intellectual history. Usually Kwŏn is characterised as merely a
“neo-Confucian” scholar in English language scholarship or a “Sŏngni hakja”性理學者
in Korean scholarship. The problem with this designation is that it is commonly
understood in terms of the intellectual proclivities of later scholars such as Yi Hwang and
Yi I of the 16th century. The issues of principle and material force, not to mention the
importance they attached to Zhu Xi and his thought are taken to represent orthodox neo-
Confucianism in Korea. Based on Kwŏn’s orientation towards the corpus, the array of
texts and issues he consults and his critical approach to these bodies of knowledge we
need to ask whether this designation truly encapsulates Kwŏn orientation. While Kwŏn
did indeed speak about “neo-Confucian” issues, consult their writings and agree with
some of their ideas, equally he looked beyond Song period writers to the original sources
to answer his questions, he broadly consulted commentaries and was even critical of Song
thinkers where he felt necessary. Therefore to simply label Kwŏn a “neo-Confucian” is to
uncritically privilege a portion of his writing while at the same time under emphasise, if
not ignore, the countervailing nuances present in his hermeneutic orientation.

If the term “neo-Confucian” is problematic, how then do we define Kwŏn and his
orientation, let alone attempt to characterise the broader intellectual trends of his time?
Peter Bol in comparing the response of Chinese literati to examination curricula in 1070s
and 1313 has shown how the literati responded to policies in different ways and in this
analysis he has revealed that even among Yuan intellectuals there was considerable
diversity in their intellectual positions and understandings, some even holding critical,
sceptical and ambiguous attitudes towards Cheng/Zhu thought while remaining within the
“Daoxue world”. The diversity in attitudes that Bol explains shows two important points
that relate to Kwŏn: first, that the critical attitude of Kwŏn towards the canon and
commentaries is consistent with intellectual developments that were taking place in Yuan;
and second, that looking more broadly at “intellectuals” or “literati”, even using broader
terminology such as “Daoxue”, helps bring to light the textures of the intellectual climate.
These two points suggests that we need to consider that Kwŏn's attitude towards the canon
is perhaps part of a wider trend among intellectuals in Koryŏ and Yuan and that broader
designations may help us appreciate the textures of their thoughts.

This proposition and even the argument of this paper share some resonance with
the scholarship of John Duncan who has explored and re-evaluated late Koryŏ intellectual
history, noting initial similarities that late-Koryŏ/early-Chosŏn intellectuals shared with
Yuan literati, but then arguing that the intellectual diversity and conflicts among these
intellectuals more closely resembled the debates between legalist, bellettrist and moralists
of the Song. Duncan goes on to suggest that the apparent inconsistency of Confucianism
in the late-Koryŏ/early-Chosŏn lies not with their lack of understanding of doctrine but
more with the intellectuals trying to find answers to the practical issues that they faced.
Whether the intellectuals recognised this themselves or not, it nevertheless indicates that
Cheng/Zhu thought simply could not provide answers to all of the pressing issues facing
the state and society. In other words, intellectuals had no choice but to look beyond the
body of Cheng/Zhu knowledge to others bodies of knowledge to find the answers they

83 Bol, Peter K, “Examinations and Orthodoxies: 1070 and 1313 Compared” in Culture and State in Chinese
History: Conventions, Accommodations, and Critiques, Irvine studies in the humanities, eds. Theodore
were looking for. If, as Duncan proposes, the intellectual climate of the late 14th century is one of variety, conflict and pluralism due to intellectuals seeking answers to the socio-political issues they faced, could Kwôn Kún's orientation towards the canon and commentaries mirror broader intellectual trends of that period? This paper has shown Kwôn's independent and critical hermeneutic position: his searching, interrogating, questioning and critiquing the canon and commentary from an intellectual perspective, but it has not looked at how his intellectual orientations informed his actions in social and political realms. Delineating what the nexus between Kwon’s intellectual orientation towards the canon and his role in political and state affairs is the question that arises from this paper. Was Kwôn judging the canon and commentaries not only by their internal consistencies but by their relevance to resolving social and political problems? Were doctrinal authority and allegiances to particular schools of thought subordinate to practical and applicable knowledge?

This paper questions our common understanding of Yangch'on Kwôn Kún, a late 14th century intellectual who lived in the late Koryô and early Chosôn. It argues that Kwôn's hermeneutic orientation towards the Confucian canon and its commentaries shows him to be a critical, inquisitive and independent thinker who, although agreeing with Song thinkers on many points, was also critical of their interpretations. The implication of this study is that it directly questions whether designations we have used to characterise intellectuals like Kwôn, such as “neo-Confucian”, have actually inhibited us from appreciating the breadth and nuance of his thought. In uncritically using this terminology we have overlooked the dynamics and diversity in this one person’s thought, which in turn raises then question of whether we have overlooked similar features in the works of other thinkers. Furthermore this paper approaches the larger question of how we attempt to characterise a period of intellectuals in a way that gives expression to their common interests, yet is broad and flexible enough to account for their differences and divergences in their thought.

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Taegjong Wangjo Sillok
Some Remarks on the Importance of Traditional Taxonomical Reference Books for Conceptual History and on Traditional Notions of Religions in Korea and East Asia

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ABSTRACT

Concepts and notions and their history are the subject of explicitly philosophically driven disciplines, other disciplines also from the humanities deal with their notions and concepts rather at the beginner’s level and leave it there. As a result, it is often difficult to orientate in culturally based disciplines as Korean studies, because pre-modern Korean or Sino-Korean literature is, as Chinese literature, only to a certain extent comparable to European traditions. Sufficient reading experience may adjust a lot of these difficulties, but it does not protect against possible limits of native concepts and does not necessarily promote consistent notions. So far, concepts and notions have been extracted from continuing diachronic entities, in literature partially from genre-discussions, and in history from historical criticism, too.

An indeed not revolutionary, but not yet considered approach is the study of the taxonomic meshwork of notions in pre-modern reference works, which could moderate here insofar as these writings provide us with pre-modern comprehension of notions and allow us to measure their range, both diachronically and synchronically. I will thus argue not for a rejection but for examining the extent of equivalence of pre-modern and modern terms on a sort of generally accepted basis. In this paper I use as a case study the notion of religion, which, like history, literature or philosophy, did not exist as such but as a functionally organized net of religious terminology.

1. INTRODUCTION: THE NOTION OF RELIGION IN EAST ASIA

The religious studies is a remarkable but somehow curious discipline, because it is so disunited or united in disunity in case of the question of the notion of religion. Exotic subjects as Korean studies have barely enough scholars to assume the well-founded achievement of some notions and terminology, but in religious studies it has sometimes even been converted that there is any possibility to find a stable definition for the notion of religion. In East Asian studies it is at least to some degree impossible to define what Korea, Japan or China should mean, however, it seems to be more appropriate to compare religious studies with subjects as social science, law or medicine in which every one would agree on the contents without having any explicit definition of the own subject. If a scholar of Korean studies ever will be ask about his or her object of research, he or she might try to find a definition on the basis of territory, language, or ethnicity, but this is, of course, convincing only at first sight and the problem of finding a definition of religion in religious studies may seem not as strange as it may have been at first sight.

On the other hand, no scientific discipline could be accused of trying to assure itself of the necessary notions and terminology. From an East Asian point of view one could argue that we have a notion of religion at least for the last century, which is borrowed from and similar to the European notion of religion. This notion became broadly accepted as a ‘collective singular’, despite all original limitations to Christian belief, and
since then it describes non-Christian and Christian religions as well as lots of religious phenomena. The term shukyo (chin.: zongjiao; kor.: chonggyo) became accepted firstly in 19th century Japan\(^1\) and it disseminated quickly in China and Korea as well. Other than still stated outside the sphere of Buddhist studies this term not a neologism but can be traced back to a Buddhist term which is translated in the *Digital Dictionary of Buddhism* by Charles Muller as “essential teaching” or “core teaching of a given tradition” as well as „hidden principle“ (for chong) and „the act of explaining this principle appropriately to others“ (for kyo).\(^2\) Especially the first meaning seems to bundle various teachings and traditions within Buddhism and seems to be a connection point for applying this notion also to other religious traditions of East Asia.

2. **Shukyo as Pre-modern Collective Singular and Notion of Religion?**

In early 18th century, the Japanese scholar Tominaga Nakamoto (1715-1746) applied this term as a ‘collective singular’ for Buddhism and Manichaism in China and thus developed it further.\(^3\) Michael Pye seems to be the first who pointed out such an early use of shukyo in Japan, but it is rather problematic that he implied in this context that the Japanese or East Asian shukyo is not at all dependent on the European notion of religion. However, it is not as easy as Pye meant, for historical as well as for formal-logical reasons and despite the implicit tribute he paid to traditional East Asian orders of notion and terminology.

Another interesting case might be the debates of the three teachings (chin.: sanjiao; kor.: samgyo) in early China and the final use of sanjiao as a ‘collective singular’ for Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism. The connection here is of course the very same character “jiao” for teaching that also appears in zongjiao., but it seems to be rather questionable sanjiao could be understood not only as a ‘collective singular’ but also as a pre-modern notion of religion.\(^4\) Sanjiao might be a precursor of shukyo and a reason why Tominaga came up with a general term for religions without any numbers, although he explicitly speaks about the two shukyo Buddhism and Manichaism. However, as there is no further evidence that Tominaga referred especially to the term sanjiao instead of “jiao” in connection with the number of collected religious traditions, this will be left out in this chapter.

2.1 Historical Objection

To discuss the use and understanding of shukyo/zongjiao/chonggyo from a historical point of view, it might be necessary to explain some of the developments in Japan, for China and Korea were mainly adopting the Japanese discourse or at least the resulting terminology since the late 19th century. The discussions and debates on religion and an appropriate terminology which took place in Japan since the mid 19th century were neither

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\(^1\) Research concerning the process of coining a Sino-Japanese term for the western notion of ‘religion’ is presently conducted by my colleague Hans Martin Kraemer. For a short description see: [http://www.ikgf-religions.de/](http://www.ikgf-religions.de/). I would like to express my thanks to him and all other colleagues of the Bochum consortium for all the comments and discussions directly and indirectly connected with this paper.

\(^2\) See: [http://www.buddhism-dict.net](http://www.buddhism-dict.net) [date of access: 01.06.2009].


scientific nor descriptive. Japan faced a religio-ideological threat from the European powers in the sense that their national religion was understood as a main characteristic of and a necessary condition for a modern nation-state. Thus, Christianity stood in the center of the discourse as something that has to be imitated and avoided at the same time. When paying attention to the fact that many Japanese (and to a lesser extent also Koreans and Chinese) understood and still understand themselves as unreligious, one might tend to explain this not only as a secular tradition but a clear orientation of the term shukyo on the Christian types of religion. Japan created Shinto and divided it finally in spheres of the ‘profane’ and the ‘religious’, but in Korea and China, on the other hand, civil governmental institutions probably had been too weak to create a counterpart on their side. In sum, it might be possible to interpret Tominaga’s shukyo not only as a ‘collective singular’ but also an early notion of religion, but there is no historical connection between this notion on the one hand and the final definition of shukyo as translation of the western term ‘religion’, for the engagement in a discourse on the translation of the Western term ‘religion’ indicates that a broadly accepted notion of religion did not exist until the late 19th century. If Tominagas thoughts reflect the reception of Christian religions in Japan, he should be interpreted as a pioneer and nothing more, but also nothing less.

2.2 Formal-Logical Objection: The Difference Between Sign, Object, and Interpretant instead of Signifié and Signifiant

As to the discussion on the use and understanding of shukyo/zongjiao/chonggyo from a more conceptual or philosophical point of view, it might be helpful to reflect on ones own presuppositions. Firstly, this might be the basis of conceptual history, i.e. the assumption that concepts become relevant when they form a term. ‘Religion’ is thus religion since this term was formed and/or in use. Secondly, in terms of the underlying sign theory, it is usually de Saussure, i.e. the distinction between signifié (the signified) and signifiant (the signifier), we are referring to. Thirdly, we have to agree with the existence of a religious sphere and the equation of the various forms it could take – otherwise it would be impossible to identify them as religions and to draw comparisons between them.

Whereas the third presupposition is rather basic, the first, however, is not provable at all. Conceptual history has all the authority of a historical sub-discipline, and even its weak point – the assumption of a so-called ‘sattelzeit’ (saddle age) in 18th century Europe, which formed most of the important European concepts because of a structural change following the period of enlightenment and revolutions – is seen even by philosophers as a “meaningful and correct heuristic anticipation”. This conceptual presupposition reminds us to distinguish between the language of the sources and scientific language and to use modern terminology such as nation, state, science or religion as careful as possible. Strictly speaking it is even not acceptable to apply these terms to pre-modern history. However, in the case of religion Michael Pye found the term shukyo in early 18th century Japan, and as this term was formed and referred to a ‘collective singular’ of religion it is necessary to conclude, that East Asia then also had its own early notion of religion.

The second presupposition seems to be not worth of the name, but it is in fact the trickiest. The widely known model of sign by Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) is simply dyadic (binary) and in many situations not at all sufficient. Instead of this I will try to apply a triadic (trinary) sign model, which allows us to incorporate the level of interpretation. For this purpose, I would like to use model of sign by Charles Sanders

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Peirce (1839-1914), which is also not at all unproblematic, because of we find a triadic structure not only at the surface – were it serves to purpose – but also on every level underneath, which seems to indicate a sort of unconvincing overall trinity belief. However, to my understanding it already might be helpful to consider that interpretation should be part of the sign model because an interpretation of a sign is nothing static and it seems to be dangerous to confuse historic interpretations and our own, or just to ignore some of them.

The model by Peirce distinguishes between sign (i.e. the term or signifier), the object (i.e. the signified), and the respective interpretant. If we apply this model, we are asked to differentiate between all involved interpretants in time and space, and thus we have to state that Tominaga probably had his own term for a ‘collective singular’ of religions and applied it to Buddhism and Manichaeeism (and probably also to other East Asian religious traditions), but we can no longer claim that this must have been a notion of religion. In the dyadic model only the sign and its reference proofed equity between the Western ‘religion’ and the Eastern ‘shukyo’, but in the triadic model in becomes clear that Michael Pye simply insinuated that the interpretation or understanding of ‘religion’ by Tominaga and readers today is almost the same, because the dyadic frame does not allow to distinguish between the equate pairs of sign and object. I do not like to argue that Pye’s examination is simply inconsistent and wrong; to my understanding he follows a broadly known presupposition, which makes inconsistencies hard to detect. I myself found Pye’s interpretation very convincing until I learned to recheck this with a triadic sign model.

In conclusion, it is not convincing to argue that East Asia had its own early notion of religion. But has a traditional East Asian notion necessarily to follow Western patterns?

3. TERMINOLOGICAL STRATEGIES FOR THE FIELD OF PRE-MODERN EAST ASIAN RELIGION

On the basis of the triadic model of signs there might be at least three options to improve our understanding pre-modern East Asian notions and concepts of religion.

a) with regard to the ‘sign’ one could analyze structures of and relations between modern terms of the modern religious field and to project (and finally to recheck) this findings back to a certain pre-modern era

b) with regard to the ‘object’ of religion one could project the modern notion of religion back to pre-modern times in order to essentialize religion and to avoid the conclusion that East Asia had no religion until the mid of the 19th century only because of sake of conceptual history; it is then necessary to build a pre-modern corpus of religion on this basis and to identify conceptual structures therein

c) with regard to the ‘interpretant’ one could try to waive or relativize modern notions of religion by identifying pre-modern terminological concepts and/or semantic fields; the findings could furthermore improve the more or less eurocentristic discourse on the notions of religion

Options a) and b) are marked by the same problem insofar as they can only be applied on the basis of the Western notion of religion (or its East Asian reincarnation). Surprisingly enough, scholars of East Asian religion tend more to option b) and neglect option a). Option b), however, can not be discussed here in detail, because a corpus of religion is still
under construction. Robert Ford Campany has tried so far to apply this approach in some case studies back to conceptual level and found it useful.6

In order to avoid the limited and homogenized modern terminology, I use the index of Mathews’ Chinese-English Dictionary to translate back names of various East Asian religions into an early modern Chinese which still contains terminology and expressions in Literary Chinese to a great extent.7 Missing English entries are given in squared brackets, names in transliteration, and interlinear translations of the Chinese terms in round brackets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>Literary Chinese (Number of Character and Line Number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Buddhist, etc.”</td>
<td>1762 p p -c23 p p-mun (Dharma-School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1774 p m -6 p m-hak (Sanskrit/Brahman Teaching, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982 pul -12 pul-kyo/pul-to (Buddha-Teaching/Way, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3722 kong -26 pul-mun/pul-ka (Buddha-School, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5824 s k -68 kong-hak (Emptiness-School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-a8 s k-to (Shakya-muni-Way, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-a9 s k-mun/s k-kyo (Shakya-muni-School/Teaching, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Catholicism”</td>
<td>[6361] ch’n [-t1 ch’n-chu-kyo (Heaven-Ruler-Teaching)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Confucianism]</td>
<td>[3143] yu -3 yu-hak (Scholars-Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-4 yu-kyo (Scholars-Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-13 yu-mun (Scholars-School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3720] kong -8 kong-kyo (Confucius-Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-b13 kong-mun (Confucius-School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[6136] to -16 to-hak (Way-Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Islam]</td>
<td>[2309] hoe -11 hoe-[hoe]-kyo (Turkish-Tribes-Teaching, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Judaism]</td>
<td>[7528] yu -c2 yu-`ae[-kyo] (Judea-Teaching, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Lamaism (Mongol)]</td>
<td>2383 hong -16 hong-kyo (Red Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Lamaism” (Tibetan)</td>
<td>2297 hwang -20 hwang-kyo (Yellow Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Manicheism”</td>
<td>4541 ma -a2 ma-ni-kyo (Manichean Teaching, translit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Nestorianism]</td>
<td>1129 ky ng -a1 ky ng-kyo (Luminous Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Sorcery” &amp; “Witchcraft”</td>
<td>125 ch m -16 ch m-s (foretell-divine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-17 ch m-sul (Fortune-teller-Arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2625 sa -16 sa-kyo/sa-to (Heterodox Teaching/Way)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-31 sa-sul (Heterodox arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7164 mu -8 mu-sul (Shaman-Arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-11 mu-p’ung (Shaman-Wind/Custom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7279 yo -11 yo-sul (Supernatural arts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Superstition]</td>
<td>4450 mi -3 mi-sin (deluding belief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Taoism”</td>
<td>2707 s n -8 s n-ka (Immortality/School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2881 hy n -12 hy n-hak (Mysterious/distant/dark Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-16 hy n-kyo (Mysterious/distant/dark Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-45 hy n-mun (Mysterious/distant/dark School)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6136 to -b12 to-kyo (Way-Teaching)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-b22 to-mun (Way-School)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mathew gives explicitly two characters as denominator in names of religions, the character kyo (to teach), which appears in the term for religion (*chonggyo*) and is the main

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denominator today, and to (way/path). However, there are still a few additional conclusions to make.

Although not given as denominators, there are some other characters which like kyo and to often appear in second position, ka (family/school), mun (gate/school), and hak (teaching/to learn) respectively. Besides the second position, characters in first position could also applied as a sort of denominator, especially names of founders (sōk/Shakyamuni, kong/Confucius, and mo/Lao, who is, however, not given in this dictionary), names of main representatives (yu/scholars for Confucianism and sōn/immortals for Daoism), and also main ideological contents or contents of teaching (kong/emptiness, hyōn/mysterious, or to/path). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in the section on sorcery and witchcraft, where we can find a large part of what is given today as shamanism, the character sul (art/skill) is used four times as a denominator, and although not given in this dictionary sul was also applied to Confucianism. It is also not at all surprising that the character sa (heterodox) is given in the section on sorcery, although it should rather be understood as a religious denominator with a political connotation, because until the late 19th century most of the given religious traditions might have been characterized by the ruler and/or administration as heterodox.

To develop this further it is necessary to apply option c), but it is not all unquestionable to what extent a pre-modern interpretant could be “extracted” from the sources.

4. Examination of Historical Interpretants: Religion in Traditional Taxonomies

A useful source for the construction of a pre-modern interpretatorial scheme might be encyclopaedias and other taxonomically organized works⁸, and it was at least to some degree under discussion in how far pre-modern encyclopaedias and the taxonomical order therein represent orders of knowledge resilient enough for analysis. In his dissertation on the rubric of leishu (kor.: yusō) in the Chinese Collectanea of the Four Treasuries (Siku quanshu; kor.: Sago chōnsō), Christoph Kaderas criticizes Michel Foucault and Georges Luis Borges for inadequately concluding a weird and fanciful Chinese world view from traditional encyclopaedias.⁹ His criticism seems to be legitimate insofar as I, too, would not argue that the fact that phoenix, dragon and unicorn have been used as main examples for three types of animals in some encyclopaedic works can be interpreted as an indication that scholars in pre-modern East Asia understood these mythical creatures as existing animals. Kaderas argues correctly that these taxonomical orders do not represent a scientific word view but an order for their literary tradition. In fact, it is here not necessary to argue at all, because most encyclopaedic works represent a scriptural world simply by definition. One might add that this was the world the scholars lived in, and that thus the extent of validity of these taxonomies could be questioned but not the validity of the taxonomies itself.

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⁸ It is interesting to note that taxonomies are barely used to create pre-modern semantic fields, although their importance is well-known. In a workshop on 19.12.2008 in Bochum on the subject of the formation of the notion of religion in East Asia and Western Europe („Die Entstehung des allgemeinen Religionsbegriffs in Ostasien und Westeuropa“), however, Joachim Gentz used some traditional bibliographical and encyclopaedic taxonomies for his paper on the formation of the notion of religion in East Asia („Die Entstehung des allgemeinen Religionsbegriffs in Ostasien“).

⁹ Christoph Kaderas, Die Leishu der imperialen Bibliothek des Kaisers Qianlong (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1998), 266f.
It is important to note, that religion, a ‘collective singular’ of religions, or the like do not appear in traditional taxonomical orders as such, and this might support the argumentation that East Asia never developed a notion of religion – if one is willing to apply the European frame of conceptual history to East Asia. However, as shown in table 1, Literary Chinese used a number of denominators for religious traditions and made them comparable, and these findings should now be rechecked within the frame of taxonomical orders. As examples I choose four outstanding encyclopaedic works of taxonomical relevance from China and Korea, the “Taxonomic Collection of Matters and Writings of Ancient and Modern Times” (Gujin shiwen leiju) by Zhu Mu from Song-Dynasty, the “Taxonomical Treatises by Chibong” (Chibong yusŏl) by Yi Su’gwang (1563-1628) and the “Collection of Treasures from the Garden of Taxonomical [Writings]” (Yuwŏn ch’ŏngbo) by Kim Yuk (1580-1658), both from Chosŏn Dynasty, and finally the “Complete Collection of Illustrations and Writings of Ancient and Modern Times“ (Gujin tushu jicheng) by Jiang Tingxi (1669-1732) and others from Qing Dynasty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encyclopaedic work</th>
<th>1st rank category</th>
<th>2nd rank category</th>
<th>3rd rank category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gujin shiwen leiju (fasc. 1-170: 1246)</td>
<td>Qianji 1: tian-dao-bu (heaven’s path)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236 fasc.</td>
<td>Qianji 22: ren-dao-bu (men’s path)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qianji 33: xian-dao-bu (immortals and Buddhas)</td>
<td>xian (immortals) dao-shi (masters of the path) dao-guan (Daoist shrines) fo (Buddha) seng (monks) fo-si (Buddhist monasteries)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qianji 38: ji-shu-bu (skills and arts)</td>
<td>bu-shi-zhe (diviner) wu-zhe (shamans)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qianji 48: shen-gui-bu (ghosts)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bieji 1: ru-xue-bu (Confucian learning)</td>
<td>Bieji 13: li-yue-bu (rites and music)</td>
<td>li (rites)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chibong yusŏl (app. 1614)</td>
<td>Fas.e: kun-to-pu (ruler’s path)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 fasc.</td>
<td>Fas.e: yu-to-pu (Confucian path)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fas.e: in-sa-pu (human affairs)</td>
<td>che-sa (sacrifices)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fas.e: ki-sul-pu (skills and arts)</td>
<td>pang-sul (geometry) mu-kyŏk (shamans)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fas.e: oe-to-pu (outer paths)</td>
<td>sŏn-to (immortal’s path) su-yang (alchemists) sŏn-mun (meditation school)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuwŏn ch’ŏngbo (1643)</td>
<td>Fas.e: 1-3: ch’ŏn-to-mun (heaven’s path)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 fasc.</td>
<td>Fas.e: 5-7: chi-to-mun (earth’s path)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fas.e: 8-10: che-wang-mun (emperors and kings)</td>
<td>o-je (five sacrifices) chong-myo (ancestral shrines) sa-jik (deities of the earth)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fas.e: 21-22: ye-pu (ritual)</td>
<td>che-chŏn (sacrifices)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fasc.28: in-to-man (men’s path)</td>
<td>[not applied]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Fasc.29-32: in-sa-man (human affairs) | ūn-il (hermits)  
sôn (immortals)  
to-sa (masters of the path)  
sôk-kyo (Shakayamuni teaching)  
mu (shamans)  | [not applied] |
| Fasc.47: pu-rok (supplement) | sin-kwi (ghosts)  | [not applied] |

**Gujin tushu jicheng**
(1725)

| 10,000 fasc. | ming-lun-hui-pian ('register’ to illustrate the relationships) | huang-ji-dian ('canon’ on the supreme regulations) | sheng-xue-bu (sacred learning)  
jun-dao-bu (ruler’s path)  
zhi-dao-bu (regulating the path)  |
|---|---|---|---|
| bo-wu-hui-pian ('register’ to broad [investigation of] things) | yi-shu-dian ('canon’ on the skills and arts) | bu-shi-bu (diviner)  
xing-ming-bu (astrologer)  
xiang-shu-bu (physiognomist)  
kan-yu-bu (geomancer)  
wu-xi-bu (shamans)  | [...5 other entries…]  |
| shen-ji-dian ('canon’ on ghosts and the strange) | fang-shi-bu (diviner)  
shi-jiao-bu (Buddhism)  
dao-jiao-bu (Daoism)  | [...60 other entries…]  |
| li-xue-hui-bian ('register’ to the learning of the way) | li-yi-dian ('canon’ on rites and ceremonies) | si-dian-cong-bu (on sacrifices in general)  
tian-di-si-dian-bu (sacrifices to heaven and earth)  | [...26 other entries…]  |

It has to be noted that not all given taxonomical divisions and subdivisions contain religious or quasi-religious contents. The paths of heaven, earth, ruler, and men contain no reference to religious practice, but are given here to illustrate that the use of the term to/dao (way/path) seems to be that of a denominator, but not for a specific religious field. This is echoed even in Chibong yusōl, where Buddhism and Daoism are labeled as outer paths, and others than Yi Su’gwang probably would have named it ‘wrong’ paths or heterodoxy.

Another general observation is that ‘collective singulars’ of religious traditions have put at different levels, in *Gujin shiwen leiju*, for example, Daoism and Buddhism could be found in one collective category, in Yuwôn chongbo, however, the ‘religious’ focus is broader and not restricted only to Daoism and Buddhism, but no collective term is applied and all are simply classified as ‘human affairs’.

Furthermore, we have to note a couple of inconsistencies and some of them can not be explained satisfactorily. In *Gujin shiwen leiju* and Yuwôn chongbo, the distinction between Confucians on the one hand and Buddhist and Daoists on the other is rather severe, whereas in Chibong yusōl a ‘path’, the wrong one however, is ascribed even to Buddhists and Daoists. But on the sub-categorical level Chibong yusōl ascribed a ‘path’ only to the Daoists and described the Buddhists as a school.

And finally, denominators as kyo/jiao, to/dao, hak/xue, or sul/shu are applied rather carefully, and especially the accumulation of sul/shu within the category of ‘arts and skills’ seems to allow the assumption that these taxonomies are organized according to
function, and thus an independent religious category like ‘Immortals and Buddhists’ in Gujin shiwen leiju could also be interpreted as a lack of function or even ‘parasite’.

5. CONCLUSION

The material basis of this conceptual approach is not all sufficient and the conclusions that can be drawn from this are very preliminary. Yet, I dare to record that ‘collective singulars’ have been used in pre-modern literary Chinese and that the level of conceptualization is rather sophisticated, but dependent on the scope and volume of the work. Furthermore, I would like to hypothesize that the lack of coherence, which could be explained by stating that even European philosophers were at that time not able to keep a formal coherence, has not necessarily to be interpreted as a lack of development. The encyclopaedist were extremely able to systematize and applied at least the level necessary for the organization of the taxonomy. The religious part of the taxonomy seems to be non-consistent, but only if we apply a Western notion of religion to it.

As to the notion of religion itself, I found it noteworthy that systematization is here not only a matter of generic terms and upper level categories. Religious traditions are classified not as religions, but in view of a number of characteristics which makes them comparable. This leads to the question whether it is really helpful to establish, as in Europe, a notion of religion, or to understand it as what I could grasp from traditional encyclopaedic works, that is, religion is not an independent sphere, but constituent to many traditions and cultures, at least in East Asia.

REFERENCES:


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Pushing the Envelope for Transnational Political Advocacy: Unconventional Channels in EU-DPRK Relations

Mr Steve Chiung Lok Wai
Chinese University of Hong Kong

INTRODUCTION

North Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the last Communist and closed economy in the world, has experienced dreadful economic decline since the great famine in the mid 1990s. To solve this problem, Pyongyang government was forced to open up the national market and slightly deviated from the ‘juche’ rationale. Since then, market liberalization has gradually sprouted, exemplified by the establishment of two Special Economic Zone. The country leader, Kim Jong-il, undoubtedly is in need of some grand guideline to realize a 'slow and incremental opening' of North Korea. Many external players, including the former socialist countries in the Eastern Europe, can and would like to provide advice to Pyongyang.

This paper examines the networks of economists and experts emerging in the context of the current reforms in North Korea. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF), one of the most influential NGOs in Germany and Asia, organized an annual EU-DPRK Workshop since 2004 and invited numerous European economists who have worked in transition economies to exchange experiences with North Korean officials who are now responsible for economic modernization in the DPRK. They had formal contacts with North Korean officials may provide 'knowledge-based' ideas or policy suggestions to them directly or indirectly. So, in this article, the central theme is to reveal that there's an epistemic community working behind the traditional governmental and non-governmental relations between EU and DPRK, concurrently, measures how this non-governmental channel being built and developed, and assesses this channel on whether it's helping and directing the policy reform in North Korea in reality.

EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Epistemic community has been a new academic focus of scholarship in international relations (IR) in recent years while non-state actors (NSA) has become one of the relevant players in the international political spectrum. In the traditional study of IR, the state-centric was the dominant approach and state is the unitary actor in the global arena. However, since the early 1990s, when IR scholar Alexander Wendt developed the constructivist approach with the inclusion and justification of the importance and contribution of the non-state actors (NSA) and non-governmental organizations to the global politics, epistemic community has become one of the new developing non-state actors in shaping the national and transnational policy making process.

In the study of epistemic community, Thomas Risse-Kappen was the very first scholar by making use of the idea of knowledge, values and strategic concepts, to reconceptualize the change of the Soviet leader's mindset by inviting the Western liberal internationalist community, which included the supporters of arms control as well as
researchers in Western Europe. This transnational network with 'new thinkers' in the foreign policy transformed the Soviet's Foreign Policy.¹

After the pioneer works by Risse-Kappen, Peter Haas followed accordingly from the basic ideas developed by the previous scholars and generalized them into a detailed and concrete definition of what expert group is. Haas argued that modern decision-makers had faced growing technical complexity and uncertainties in addressing policy issues, and thus increasingly had relied on knowledgeable experts. A network of such experts can create an 'epistemic community' in which members are professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. They have a share of technical knowledge related to a particular field as well as normative principles, causal beliefs, and a shared conception of interests. Because of their claim to expertise, such expert groups can diffuse norms and values as well as technical knowledge and thereby influence policy outcomes.

Therefore, the definition of what epistemic community means²:

1. a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members
2. shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basic for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes.
3. shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise
4. a common policy enterprise - that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.

How to affect policy

In recent years, epistemic communities have been developing as a new coming agent which affects the domestic and international policy formulating process. Through different channels or means, the communities can make significant importance and contribution to the government consultation process and finally direct the policy outcome.³

First, through organizing some consultations with policy makers (such as invitation lecture, issue-oriented debate and discussions), the epistemic community with think-tanks and intellectuals on specific policy issues can provide essential, specific and practical thoughts on the how to reform and re-develop the government policy in those policy areas specifically.

In addition, another important channel for intellectuals and scholars to convey their opinions is through conferences and public policy debates. Research institutes affiliated


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with universities and various governmental agencies are the likely host for policy-oriented conferences. They invite professors and research fellows from leading universities and research institutes and present their analyses on specific topic at the international conferences and debates. Generally speaking, these activities present excellent opportunities for researchers to voice differing opinions in front of the top leaders.

Furthermore, Policy NGOs are also one of the possible potential channels which the intellectuals and scholars can involve in the policy formulation process. This common practice is so called 'Channel 2 Diplomacy', which refers to the activities of retired government officials, scholars, and think-tanks members who actively participate in all kinds of forum, meetings and other activities. These forums or academic conferences set up an academic-to-official exchange network which fulfills the strong desire for policymakers to make some ideas exchange with the scholars in this circumstance.

**FRIEDRICH NAUMANN FOUNDATION: EXAMPLE OF AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY**

Friedrich Naumann Foundation was established in 1958 by the first German Federal President, Theodor Heuss, is the Foundation for liberal politics from Germany. Its programs at home and abroad aims at promoting the principle of freedom of the individual in human dignity.4 The Foundation sees itself as an agent of organized liberal and enjoys close links with Germany's Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Liberal International (LI).

The Foundation has built various foreign offices in Africa, America and Asia. Enhancing political dialogue and providing political counseling are the Foundation's main activity both at home and abroad. In close cooperation with the Center for Local Autonomy and the Graduate School for Local Autonomy at Hanyang University in Seoul, it supports research, exchange and training of academics, civil servants and politicians particularly between South Korea, North Korea and Germany. One of the major achievements was providing three economic knowledge transfer and exchange platforms through expert study tours and international conferences and seminars between the European scholars (with the fully support by the European Union (UN)) and the North Korean officials. These dialogue programs involve policy makers, party officials, civil servants, researchers and the private sector from the North Korea and Europe in intense discussion and intellectual exchange on sharing the experience of the economic transformation issues of the past Eastern Europe countries and the practical solution to the current North Korea economic reform strategy

Inside this community, the four notions described by Peter Haas can fully applied and it can be regards as an epistemic community

**Shared Normative and Principled Belief**

From what Haas described, a shared normative and principled belief is which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members. In this sense, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane provided the meaning of a principled belief is consists of normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust.5 In this category, beliefs in collective sense are expected to be morally driven and aim to protect world interests.

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By looking closely at the founding principles of the FNF, the programs, no matter at home and abroad, are aimed at promoting the principle of freedom of the individual in human dignity. Inside the principles, it can be divided into four parts and the under-lying values of the principles are laid on normative-driven mentality: the idea of liberal policies and the individual, the right to private property, the idea of liberal policies and civic society, the protection of individual freedom and the protection of citizens against violence from within and abroad. Therefore, in this sense, the spirit of the founding principles of FNF reveals the normative value of this community, as it promote and consolidate the civil rights of the peoples.

Moreover, according to the report of the Workshop, Mr. Ulrich Niemann, the ex resident representative of FNF stated that "it is truth of life that people can only become real friends when they start to know and to understand each other... openness, trust and mutual information as well as sometimes also compromises are central preconditions for mutual good understanding and relations." It highlighted the basic attitude of the FNF on this historical meeting with the North Korean counterparts is that they wish sincerely to provide an alternative and practical solution in order to revise and provide another ways of economic transformation.

Shared Causal Belief

Another set of criteria which Haas described about the expert group is that it must have a shared causal belief. In their definition of epistemic community, cognitive regime theorists speak of 'casual belief' and knowledge about 'cause-and-effect relationships' which are offered to policy makers in situations of uncertainty. A cause is that which brings about an effect, and action, phenomenon, or condition. In this sense cause and effect are correlative terms.7

A shared causal belief is which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basic for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes. In a much more concrete sense, causal beliefs, is beliefs about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites, whether they are village elders or scientists at elite institutions.8

In this sense, the scholars' community from the FNF was providing a causal belief on how to reform the North Korean economy in a transitional economic perspective. As there are numerous possible pathways for a single country to transform its economy from a centrally-planned one into a market-driven economy, no matters on the pace, steps or priority, country like North Korea hesitated which paths would be the best option for the economic development in North Korea. In the theoretical study of transition policy, some countries like the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries preferred the policy called 'shock therapy' approach as the ruling government decided a revolutionary and rapid change of domestic economy by removing all the government control and subsidy on economy and followed by political reform also. Another set of countries, such as China

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and Vietnam, preferred a rationale called 'gradualism' which means the change of the economic structure in gradual steps and no political reform will be resulted. As a result, under this policy uncertainty and without any objective and authoritative advice, the group of economic scholars from the FNF, provided a set of potential economic transformation strategy and pathway toward the North Korean officials and also helped to predict the possible outcomes in respective reform, e.g. Dr. Dusan Triska digested the different forms of restructuring the economy in various transitional economies and suggested that the 'Czech Way' would be one of the possible applicable model for North Korea's economic reform.

**Shared Notions of Validity**

In addition, a shared notion of validity is also one of the essential criteria of forming an epistemic community. Haas stated that a shared notion of validity is intersubjective and internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise. Generally speaking, it is meant to be referring to those intellectuals' consensus that the adopted solution is a valid solution for the problem at hand.

First, all community members have an academic training and most of the received their doctoral degree on economics or Korean studies. For example, Professor Ruediger Frank holds a Master's degree in Korean Studies, Economics and International Relations and a PhD in economic and also has spent one semester as a language student at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang in 1991-1992 with support from the German Academic Exchange Service. Concurrently, Professor Bruno Dallago obtained his PhD in Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and currently working on some research projects on local development for the Balkans states. Therefore, judging by the content as well as the level of background education of the community members, it can be assumed that they share the criteria for valid knowledge that are accepted in the economic studies.

**A Common Policy Enterprise**

Finally, Haas presented an epistemic community should exist a common policy enterprise, that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a competence.

One of the common goals which the expert group of the FNF is that through working closely between the EU and the DPRK, these cooperation activities with the DPRK would finally transform the economy in the North into a more market-driven economy so that more benefit will be brought to the common people in the North so as to increase the living quality of North Korean.

As refer to the hidden political objective of FNF, the FNF would like to promote the East-West Germany experience to North-South Korea in order to assist them to finally achieve a similar political outcome. As a German-based NGO, the FNF supports research, the exchange and training of academics, civil servants and politicians particularly between South Korea and Germany as well as knowledge transfer and exchange through expert study tours and international conferences and seminars. Moreover, the political dialogue program involves policy makers, party officials, civil servants, researchers and the private sector in intense discussion and intellectual exchange on various issues of high political relevance between South Korea and Germany. Beneath those interaction and dynamics between two countries, the Foundation aims politically at dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas by bringing in the very unique German experience of national reunification and European integration. Also, in regards to the topic of the workshop,
cases of East-West Germany were deliberately designed and mentioned for North Korea, such as the topic of 'Experiences with the Treuhand agency in Germany' by Dr. Brigitta Kauers, he discussed the essential role played by the Treuhand agency in shaping the privatization policy of the former East German companies after the re-unification. It helped to endorse the labor promotion law to protect the employment opportunity of the East German and massively raised the competitiveness of the previous state-owned enterprises in the East Germany so as to narrow the structural different between the East and West Germany. Therefore, in order to promote the positive lessons drew from the re-unification of East-West Germany, the FNF controlled the political and discussion agenda so as to assist and contribute to a peaceful re-unification in Korean peninsula.

**Epistemic Community in FNF Matters: How Did the Ideas Developed, Transferred and Influenced the Policymakers in North Korea**

After confirmation of the status of the epistemic community, then, questions would be raised on how did the ideas from this community being developed and transferred to the policy-makers in Pyongyang. In addition, throughout the various channels, how the ideas rooted from this community eventually did influence the policymakers and to what extent or how successful of the ideas affected the policy outcomes in North Korea.

**Characteristics of the Scholars**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workshop on Economic Reforms and the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK (31 August to 4 September 2004)</th>
<th>Second Workshop on Economic Reform and the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK (12-14 October 2005)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czech Republic:</strong> Dr. Dusan Triska, <em>Chairman of FSP/CD-F (Contractual Digital Floor)</em> and former Deputy Minister of Finance</td>
<td><strong>Czech Republic:</strong> Dr. Dusan Triska, <em>Chairman of FSP/CD-F (Contractual Digital Floor)</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark:</strong> Dr. Geir Helgesen, <em>Nordic Institute of Asian Studies</em></td>
<td><strong>Germany:</strong> Dr. Brigitta Kauers, <em>Federal Ministry of Finance</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden:</strong> Prof. Ari Kokko, <em>Stockholm School of Economics</em></td>
<td><strong>Hungary:</strong> Dr. Andrea Szalavetz, <em>Institute for World Economics</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy:</strong> Mr. Luca Brindelli, <em>Brindelli e Associati Law Firm</em></td>
<td><strong>Ireland:</strong> Prof. Dr. Michael P. Cuddy, <em>National University of Ireland</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy:</strong> Ms. Sara Marchetta, <em>Brindelli e Associati Law Firm</em></td>
<td><strong>Italy:</strong> Prof. Dr. Bruno Dallago, <em>University of Trento</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United Kingdom:</strong> Dr. Tony Michell, <em>Vice Chairman NDC</em></td>
<td><strong>The Netherlands:</strong> Mr. Max Van Der Sleen, <em>ECORYS Group</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany:</strong> Prof. Ruediger Frank, <em>University of Vienna</em></td>
<td><strong>Poland:</strong> Dr. Jacek Mironski, <em>Warsaw School of Economics</em></td>
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<td><strong>Sweden:</strong> Prof. Dr. Ari Kokko, <em>Stockholm School of Economics</em></td>
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<td><strong>Austria:</strong> Prof. Dr. Rüdiger Frank, <em>University of Vienna</em></td>
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Within these epistemic communities, the FNF invited totally around seven to nine academic professors, professional lawyers, United Nations officials, NGOs representatives and officials from the European Union to come and provide their academic knowledge and professional experience on how to transform a economy from government-planned to market-oriented.

According to their resumes, inside these groups of experts, in terms of nationality, they all commonly come from various European countries, such as Czech Republic, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Hungary etc. Moreover, in their research or professional experience, they are all majorly shared on the field of economic development and transformation, for example, Professor Ruediger Frank researched tremendously on the transformation of socialist systems in Europe and East Asia, Professor Ari Kokko written numerous books about how foreign direct investment positively affected the recipient countries on their economic transformation and development and Professor Bruno Dallago written numerous books about economic liberalization in the Eastern Europe.

Density among Members

The other actor related factor is density, which means the frequency and period of meeting and discussion between different members in this community. However, the density of the interactions between the members of the network is relatively low, which is not unusual for transnational network.\(^9\)

Two types of interactions in this network were explored. First, the most comprehensive, centralize and influential interactions are to be found on the two big EU-DPRK Workshops, which in each of the workshops there were more than 20-30 European participants are invited and around 6 to 7 of them are European economic experts and therefore formed their epistemic community. These members, although only 3-4 of them are invited in both workshops, would meet in the conference and discussed and exchanged their ideas, perspectives and information on the transitional strategies with the North Korean officials. During the two-day workshop, their interactions are basically through several formal and informal means of communication. Formally, such as presentation, follow-up discussion session and working group, and informally, such as tea break talking and field study.

Second, the smaller network is upheld separately by irregular interactions on a less frequent basis and consists of different combination of members. For example, in the first EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004, Dr. Geir Helgesen, Ari Kokko and Frank Rudiger were served as the senior researchers in the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) in 2001 and 2005 respectively. Actually, NIAS is one of the leading institutes in the Nordic countries and it's well-known of organizing numerous Nordic-North Korea research projects and academic workshops, such as the International Workshop on Social Welfare and Economic Development: North Korean-Nordic Dialogue held in 1-3 November 2005, at the Nordic Centre, Fudan University, and in Shanghai. During these years, they both conducted and published several research articles which are related to the field of economic transition, such as the 'North Korea's Economic, Political and Social Situation' authored by Dr. Geir Helgesen.

Moreover, in the workshop in 2005, Dr. Andrea Szalavetz and Bruno Dallago were also co-working in the same research institute, Transformation, Integration and

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Globalization Economic Research (TIGER). TIGER is the leading independent economic think-tank in East Central Europe. It is affiliated with the Leon Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management (WSPiZ), a well-known business school in East Central Europe, located in Warsaw, Poland. They worked and co-authored a book called "Small Economies' Adjustment to Global Tendencies", which is about different countries' experiences on transforming theirs' economies.

**Communication Channels (1): Seminars and Study Tours**

Since spring 2004, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) organized series of training seminars for the North Korea's official, specifically for those who are working in the trade, business and financing departments. All of the seminars are co-organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. Here is the table of the previous seminars which organized by the FNF since 2004

In the most recent one in 2007, the FNF had invited two economic experts from Germany, Mr. Georg Koopmann from the University of Hamburg and Dr. Lutz Werner who currently serves as Head of Division at the Department for External Economic Policies of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology to Pyongyang. The seminar was focused primarily on building trust between foundation and the North Korean counterparts and also to provide new knowledge on trade and investment to North Korea in order to help them to further opening up its economy to the outside world.

Also, since autumn 2005, FNF has been organizing study tours on various subjects for the North Korean officials who are responsible for the economic reform programmes in North Korea. In their very first visit to Germany, ten economic and financial experts from Pyongyang were invited and the delegation were expected to consolidate their technical knowledge on market economy which they gained while participating at the seminars organized by FNF in North Korea before. Apart from theoretical knowledge on budgeting, expenditure, monetary and fiscal policy, the North Korean economic and financial experts gained also practical insights into the organization of the German financial institutions as well as into methods of tax collection.

The North Korean delegation visited the Bundestag (German Lower House), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, the Federal Ministry of Finance as well as the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), the German Federal Central Bank and the European Central Bank. The programme included also meetings in the Federal Statistical Office, the State Ministry of Rhineland-Palatinate, the tax office of Mainz as well as the Institute of Finance at the University of Mainz. In many of these institutions the North Korean delegation was the first visiting group from DPRK ever.

**Communication Channels (2): Presentation and Discussion Sessions**

During the two big conferences, scholars and officials' ideas and experiences presentations played an essential role in the knowledge transfer process and context. Under this communication channel, presentation is an efficient and direct way to present author's ideas and belief, and through verbal and intellectual exchange, ideas from one side can formally and informally shared and transfer to the receivers and thus contribute to the goal of knowledge transfer.

In the last two conferences, presentations were divided into different sessions with its clear and specific focus of topics. For example, in the EU-DRPK conference in 2004, presentation sessions are generally divided into four sessions, with specific topics on 'sharing experiences in economic modernization', 'examples of international co-operation
in the area of economic reform', 'methods to develop economic, trade and investment relations between the EU private sector and the DPRK and 'DPRK's economic modernization initiatives: possible co-operation with the EU'. In each session, scholars from the European countries prepared a concrete and detailed presentation on respective topic and present among those North Korean officials.

**Communication Channels (3): Field Visits**

Other than normal communication channel, the Foundation also organized several opportunities for the European experts to visit factories and industrial plant in North Korea, including the Textile Plant in Central Pyongyang which produced suits for men in relatively small numbers for the Chinese and South Korean market as well as greenhouses near the city where mainly water melons and cucumber are grown (imported from Netherlands); The Taedonggang Brewery which is a popular and widely distributed beer in the Pyongyang area; The PyongSu Pharmaceuticals, a joint venture pharmaceutical factory; Tongil Market, with consumer goods such as vegetables, fruit, bread, meat and fish; Kaesong Special Economic Zone (SEZ); "March 16" Wire Factory in Pyongyang which is a joint venture production line for computer cables, a shoe factory and a factory for sealing materials/rings in the Kaesong Joint Industrial Zone.

Throughout the visits, the European economic experts could receive and witness a more direct and first-hand experience about the real face of the economic situation and development in North Korea, and be able to provide a more suitable and realistic economic advice to those Korean counterparts. Moreover, the field visits could also be served as a valuable and friendly arena to further their academic discussion into a practical policy advice.

**FROM IDEAS TO POLICY: WHAT ARE POLICY IMPACTS FROM THE EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY TO THE NORTH KOREA ECONOMIC REFORM?**

**IT and software development**

While in the second workshop on economic reform and the development of economic relations between the EU and the DPRK in 2005, Dr Jacek Mironski, the head of Business Communication Department at Warsaw School of Economic in Poland, presented his idea on how information and communication technology (ICT) would enhance the human resource development, labor market optimization and productivity. It's indeed that ICT is considered by many developing countries as a leverage for socio-economic development. This view is encouraged for example by India's success in the software industry. At the same time, the Information Technology (IT) sector development in North Korea was long to be premature and slow in progress. But, since the stimulating ideas which raised and discussed between Dr. Mironski and with North Korean officials, North Korea decided to modify its IT strategy by further and extend their cooperation with the European countries and tried to borrow their lessons and experiences. Therefore, since recent years, there were growing numbers of European companies which started to hold joint company or IT projects with the North, and this new road was built upon the ideas during the last two workshops, such as the Nosotek (Number One Software Technology) JV Company was founded in 2007 and is the first foreign-invested joint venture company in the IT-industry on software and research development in North Korea.

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The strengthening of the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in mining industry

During the EU-DPRK Workshop in 2005, there was a quite hot and interactive discussion on the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) presented by Dr. Bruno Dallago, and the discussion on how to modernize the state-owned enterprises and how to enhance the ownership of SMEs on one of the working group discussion. The ideas which presented and discussed provided a stimulating factor that drove the North Korean government to focus not only on the large-scale enterprises development, but also to the SMEs. In his presentation, he presented several arguments which positively support the existence of the SMEs in a transition economy, including SMEs can assist the large state-owned companies in sustaining the economic system of socialism, SMEs can attract additional foreign financial investment and accumulate professional knowledge and entrepreneur skills while vertically integrated with large firms, and SME can play a balancing role which between the detrimental effect of socialism and the positive side of capitalism. Concurrently, during the working group discussion, the North Korean officials raised several questions which are related to how to establish SMEs and the importance of property right in sustaining the economic growth during the transitional period. In the discussion, the officials were further reinforced with the idea that there was no contradiction between centrally planed economy with the creation of SMEs and the essential role of it during the transformation. Therefore, it's indeed important for the ideas which developed by the European economic expert in providing an authoritative advice to the North Korean officials and shape the policy change in the SMEs development in the late 2006.

In December 2006, as the DPRK government passed the 'Small-Medium Coal Mine Development and Management Regulations', which allowed any business, organizations, or association, regardless of size or function, to go into the mine development business in an attempt to encourage development of underground resources, even gold mining-rights were given to some business.\(^1\) In particular, the strengthening of self-supporting operations and autonomous management, along with other market economy measures, have been deemed new steps forward in line with the July 1 Economic Reform Measures passed in 2002.

**Legal development**

The insufficient of legal protection on foreign investors was one of the most important reasons why there was a limit number of companies to invest in North Korea. Because of this, which coincide with the ideas which provided by the two European economic experts in the EU-DPRK Workshop, direct the reform motive and momentum to the development of a concrete and friendly legal system which aimed to develop North Korea as an investor-friendly country. This policy channel was materialized when according to a 49-year-old official said in an interview with the Yonhap News Agency after returning from his seven-day trip to North Korea for an economic workshop, he said that he heard from North Korean officials that they are now working on a legal framework to attract more foreign direct investment.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) The Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES). 2007. DPRK Takes Measure to Reel in Mining Rights. *NK Brief* No. 05-7-4-1. Available at <http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/admin/upload_file/nk_brief/NK_Brief_NK_070411_1.pdf>.


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In the EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004, Dr Rudiger Frank presented his idea on the topic 'successful strategies to attract and retain foreign direct investment', which stressed that a secure and transparent environment would provide a attract spot for foreign investors. According to his comment, a secure environment means that there is a clear regulatory guidelines and rule setting which the investors would understand it easily. Moreover, any transactions related to trade have to be free and the host country has to provide protection against arbitrary expropriation. On the other hand, a transparent market area, means the macroeconomic datas like GNP, trade statistics, inflation rates, are openly accessible and therefore trust would be built up in consequence.

Since then, On January 11th, 2005, the North Korea newspaper announced that the government is going to start a law office called 'The Pyongyang Law Office', which is an independent corporate body, has started its operation to provide services for the solution of legal matters arising in various sectors. Therefore, by adopting the idea raised by the European economic experts, the North Korean government in accordance established a legal office which handles legal issues which related to foreign investment and set up clear rules and guidelines for the investors which provided higher sense of security for investment.

CONCLUSION

Ironically, taking economic reform is an inevitable task for the DPRK authority to handle as the more it isolated the poor of her national economy. According to Mr. Ulrich Niemann, the ex-resident representative of the FNF, commented that the DPRK has no official intention to transform their center-planned economy to market economy as there has been no comprehensive reform process since then. But, he said that North Korea wants to improve its economy, as they're looking for solutions also from the systems abroad.

However, with carefully studied on transition economies, the North Korean official fully understand that it's unwise to simply and directly copy from the reform model from the Chinese gradualist approach as the domestic economic structure and the international circumstances are different from that period of time. Therefore, they decided to widen their scope of knowledge by asking for the help from the European counterparts, which is the FNF. The FNF subsequently invited numbers of economic experts, who has knowledge or experience in working on East European socialist transformation policy, to provide ideational support toward the North Korean officials and eventually directed their policy outcomes.

Through various channels, including confidence building before the two Workshops, such as the seminars and study tours, and the presentations and site-visits, demonstrates that North Korean officials are taking these conferences and knowledge transfer seriously and eventually decided to put the ideas into practical policy outcomes.

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Project-based Self-study of the Korean Language

YOUNG-A CHO
Monash University

ABSTRACT
One of the most constant challenges language educators confront is how best to enhance the learner’s cultural awareness as well as to improve communication skills. This paper presents a case study of project-based self-learning in which students develop autonomous and collaborative learning skills through the understanding of Korean culture. The case study is based on two projects undertaken by three undergraduate students in Australia who were studying Korean. One project was carried out jointly by two students and the other by a single student. Both projects involved viewing Korean dramas to analyze Korean cultural aspects in Korean dramas, the comparison of Korean culture with Australian and Japanese cultures, and discussions with Koreans. The analysis of students’ journals and final project reports suggests that this type of learning activity is more effective than conventional classes in terms of the acquisition of cross-cultural competence and the development of autonomous and collaborative learning skills. This type of project-based self-study is also useful for the teaching of less commonly taught languages because it does not increase teachers’ workload significantly as is often not the case with project-based teachings.

1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the number of students studying Korean in Australian higher education institutions has increased considerably as the Korean Wave boom has created renewed interest in learning Korean. Despite that, the Korean language education in Australia still has a long way to go before it will actually be sustainable. All Korean programs in the Australian universities typically face difficulties in maintaining advanced level courses with low enrolments, as the main growth is limited to the beginner level.

Apart from low enrolments, there is another challenge which affects the advanced level courses. As the level of study goes up, diversity of students’ backgrounds also increase. For example, in the same course there are the students who have been on a student exchange program in Korea for one year, and the others who have studied only in Australia and possess varying degrees of communicative competence. This is, of course, a very common problem across all Less Commonly Taught Languages.

In particular, under the current economic downturn, the diversity of students’ background as well as the low enrolments are threatening the very existence of the advanced level courses ever before. Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop the relevant and appropriate curriculum which accommodates the diversity of students’ Korean proficiencies and enables them to learn Korean according to their needs and goals. At the same time, the curriculum should also be financially viable.

To respond to this situation, a project-based self-learning approach was implemented at the third year level of a Korean course at Monash University. This paper investigates three main issues which emerged from this case study.

(1) How does the project accommodates the diversity of students’ backgrounds?
(2) How does the project develop students’ autonomous and collaborative learning skills?
(3) Is the project based self-learning model as effective as conventional classes in terms of the acquisition of cross-cultural competence?

2. CASE STUDY

This study investigates the teaching method used in a third year level unit, KOR3002: Project in Korean 2 at Monash University during the second semester of 2008. This unit is not a core unit of the Korean major but can be counted towards to its major. The unit is specially designed to provide broad, differentiated opportunities for students who are self-directed and highly motivated. It aims to expand students’ linguistic competence and knowledge of a topic area of students’ choice by allowing them to undertake an in-depth project.

Students worked on the projects for the whole semester (13 weeks) and had fortnightly regular consultations with the unit coordinator throughout the semester. The students were required to submit their project proposals including a detailed plan and its assessment methods, which was worth 10% of the final grade, within two weeks of the commencement of the semester. The rest of components were negotiated between the unit coordinator and the students through consultation. Detailed components were varied among the students, but they mainly consisted of fortnightly journals and an individual or group project and the final reports.

Students were allowed to carry out the project as a group or individually. The topics and assessments were chosen by the students in close consultation with the unit coordinator. As all of them were interested in Korean dramas, the projects involved viewing of Korean dramas to analyze Korean cultural aspects. To enhance cross cultural awareness, the projects included the comparison of aspects of Korean culture with other cultures. Australian and Japanese cultures were chosen for comparison, since the students were familiar with those.

2.1 Subjects

There were three undergraduate students (one female and two male ones) in this unit. Their ages ranged from 21 to 23. All three students started the beginner course ‘Korean 1’ together in 2006, which is for students who have no previous knowledge of Korean. However, by the time they took this unit, their levels of Korean proficiencies became quite varied. Despite the fact that all were studying Korean at the third year level, their journeys in studying Korean were different. After the second year, one student went to Korea as an exchange student, while the other two continued their study in Australia. The detailed information about the students is as follows:

a) Student E: A female international student from Japan who had been studying in Australia since secondary school. She was doing Korean as her major. She had completed two years of her three-year Bachelor of Arts degree and had been to Korea as an exchange student for one semester.

b) Student M: A male Japanese heritage local student who had completed two and a half years of his three-year Bachelor of Arts degree. He was doing Korean as his minor and studying Japanese at an advanced level. He was taking this unit as an elective.

c) Student S: a male local student who had completed four and a half years of his six year Bachelor of Arts/Science double degree with two diplomas in Korean and
Spanish. He was doing Korean as a diploma and had studied an advanced level of Japanese in his Bachelor of Arts degree. He was also very interested in linguistics and had completed the similar project based unit, ‘KOR3001: Project in Korean 1’ in the first semester of 2008.

2.2 Data collection method and analytical procedures

Data for this study was collected from students’ project proposals, reflective journals, interview recordings, writings and final reports. In addition, notes from the consultations with students were used to provide information relevant to this study.

The group consultations were conducted for 60 minutes in length and 6 times during the semester. The individual journals were submitted by the students fortnightly 6 times during the semester.

3. DISCUSSION

3.1 Diversity of students

Students’ different proficiency levels and their personal and academic interests were reflected in the projects. As students’ preferred choice, a joint project was carried out by the two male students and an individual project was chosen by the female student (Student E) who had been to Korea. It was obvious that E’s proficiency was higher than the others and she felt that she would not be able to maximize her language ability in a group project. As E’s main goal was the improvement of her Korean, she tried to make use of every opportunity for utilising her Korean, which was why she wrote the proposal in Korean, while others did in English. She also aimed to watch five Korean dramas and one film each week, while the others aimed to watch one Korean film several times with both Korean and English subtitles.

Another example of the variations that affected the students’ choice of the projects was their academic interests. Student S, who was doing three languages, was very interested in linguistics. Naturally his interest in linguistics was reflected in the group project. For example, he conducted the group project for which he and his project partner watched a Korean Movie Sanchaek (Stroll) in order to improve their understandings of the language and cultural knowledge. They focused on the specific aspects of the language such as rudeness/politeness or showing gratitude in ‘natural’ communicational situations, with reference to English and Japanese for comparison. Student S noted in his journal “research sociolinguistics in Japanese / English” for the task to be carried out. According to his first journal, he spent 2 hours to search for sociolinguistic articles online and also read about differences in body language between the languages for four hours and searched for reading on Japanese sociolinguistics for a half hour.

He also applied his knowledge to the analysis of the Korean politeness system. For instance, he made observations on first three scenes of the movie after watching it several times and compared the sentence endings over scenes. He observed that three sentence endings were used: (1) casual form between two friends; (2) ‘yo’ form was used between two males and female work colleagues; and (3) ‘imnida’ form was used between a police officer and parents at a police station. This observation provided him with an opportunity to verify his knowledge of the Korean politeness system which was previously acquired from the Korean class, but this task also enabled him to apply his analytical skills to a close investigation of the different register used among these people as shown below:

<At 8:22 on DVD counter>
1. Applying for a job

Young lady, previously unknown, and middle aged man

They use ґ form, but it’s different to the ґ form between the colleagues. I think the lady uses a different intonation pattern to show a formal register.

<At 10:35 on DVD counter>

Again the boss is using ґ form, but the intonation has changed the register again. It’s still sort of formal, but somehow more “explaining” and less “asking”.

I don’t want to ask any questions about intonation yet, because I can’t really hear the differences yet. It would be good if there was a computer program that could draw out a line for it! However, it might be worth taping the various parts, and asking the person from just the voice if they think the person is being polite, or formal, etc. I think this is hard to study at the moment.

3.2 Autonomous learning

Students learn best when their learning objects meet their individual needs and interests (Scarino, Vale, Mckay and Clark 1988, 3). However creating learning objectives which reflect their own needs and interests was a quite challenging task for students. To clarify their needs and interests of learning Korean for the proposal, students went through various challenges and adjustments.

One of issues all three faced was defining the scope of their projects. It was very difficult for the students to choose a topic without given guideline. Through consultation with the unit coordinator, the students managed to narrow down their topics and made some progress with the outline of project. However the proposals were still too ambitious to be accomplished in a limited time frame. This issue was raised in a consultation time, but they decided to go ahead as planned but agreed to review and modify the proposal later on. This approach was taken by the coordinator to enhance learners’ self-awareness in setting out their own learning path and assessing their own achievement in sensible ways (Sercu 2002, 61). It was also important that the role of the unit coordinator should be seen as a facilitator who assists the students to be responsible in developing their own learning process.

As autonomy is an ‘ability to take charge of one’s own learning’ (Holec 1981, 3), the students’ awareness in having responsibility for their own learning is crucial to the success of any project based learning. Later when the students realised that their proposals were not achievable, they requested the unit coordinator grant approval for modification of their proposals. For example, Student E had difficulty with the time management. Through consultations, she realised that she allocated too much time to watch dramas. She reduced, therefore, the number of films and the dramas that she aimed to watch, in order to focus more on preparation for interviews with a Korean.

Interviewing a Korean after watching drama or films was part of the both projects. This task was quite difficult for all three students, in particular, for Students S and M. In the interviews, they managed to ask some questions prepared in advance, but had trouble understanding interviewees. Their Korean proficiencies allowed them to understand only a few fragments of sentences and words like “saram” and “neunde”. Student S reported that they learnt that “neunde” was used very often, but did not realise that it was used that often. To understand the interview, Students S and M made an attempt to transcribe the whole recorded interviews, which they soon discovered to be very time consuming. As
this strategy was not successful, they needed to take other steps to rectify it. They used the technique which they had acquired from the listening comprehension exercises of the previous Korean units. Their reform strategy was to make possible answers to their interview questions and actively listen out for those in the interviewees’ answers. This technique appears to be successful. This is shown in the S’s journal below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scene or snapshot</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Guessed Answer from Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opening Scene: Late-ness</td>
<td>How would you tell someone you were going to be late?</td>
<td>Say “sorry but I have some work to do, or I have a lunch appointment” [Apologies and give excuse] [Sorry is in form of 미안하다]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If you have an appointment, is it strange to come late? How late is ok?</td>
<td>Maybe not strange, but you would wait only 5 or 10 minutes. If you were going to be late, you would ring ahead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interview was still challenging, but the evaluation of the task by the students was positive. They regarded the interview as an index of their Korean proficiency levels and a good learning experience. They reported that the interview was good for showing them the level of their Korean, and they gained numerous communication skills in using intonation and body language in the interview. They also learnt to use more language strategies for the next time. This positive learning outcome was also shown in their final journals which were submitted at the end of the semester. They reported that they would definitely do a shorter interview next time, with anticipated answers prepared in advance, and conduct a follow-up interview to clarify what they have not understood in the first interview. This process clearly shows how learners construct a meaningful learning from their own evaluation.

The language proficiency determines the nature of the interviews, because different topics and interviewees require different levels of language proficiency. Student E also found the interview hard at first, but she became better at it as the project progressed. As a result, her interview skills and Korean have improved immensely over the course of the project. She evaluated herself that this project enabled her to engage in more in-depth conversations with her Korean friends. She usually conversed with them on light topics, but this project forced her to prepare the interview questions which required the use of more advanced vocabulary and grammar. This project also provided her an opportunity to enhance acquisition of cross-cultural competence by discussing Korean culture which she observed in Korean dramas or films. The most frequent topics of the discussions were about Koreans’ behaviors or the expressions Koreans used in the dramas, which she often compared with those of Japanese. “Learners are not usually challenged to think about their perceptions of other cultures” (Sercu 2002, 69), but this activity prompted her to acquire a deeper understanding of similarities and differences of the two cultures and refined her perceptive abilities, both of which were found in her final journal. Her self-evaluation about the interview activity was very positive, as she began to understand more deeply about the values, culture and customs of Korea.

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3.3 Collaborative learning

Group work is commonly employed in many study areas as a means of promoting student-centred learning, collaborative learning, and intercultural understanding (Lee 1998, Zhou and Mo 2007). Furthermore, the value of group work is regarded as being linked to the function of developing teamwork skills, which is directly related to the students’ future jobs. However, the characteristics of group work and its linkage to its assessment often produces delicate issues such as fairness in the allocation of workload among group members and group cohesion. When there are one or more members who do not cooperate willingly, their group performance is affected. Therefore, interaction, negotiation and collaboration are important factors in promoting learners’ autonomy (Lee 1998, 238).

The team project in this study was evaluated favourably by the participants, as it provided an avenue to improve their language skills as well as to observe each others’ study habits and methods. In particular, writing the final report together was apparently an enjoyable experience, as they discussed everything they worked together in the semester. According to Zhou and Mo (2007, 41) students enjoy receiving feedback from their peers, which is regarded as useful, and their self-revision is also stimulated by peer revision. M and S also enjoyed the peer review and the benefit of the group project of correcting each others’ mistakes and sharing study techniques, resulting in the improvement of their Korean language proficiencies. For instance, M learnt from S how to transcribe the interview and S learnt from M how to check if his understanding of Korean sentences was correct by back-translating the English translations of the original Korean sentences into Korean with the help of online translators. Furthermore, they respected each others’ skills, cared about each others’ work and worked together to ensure overall project success. For instance, S was more active and led the project, but he also appreciated that M was very helpful in confirming ideas that he had about Japanese culture when they were brainstorming what to observe in the video in relation to Korean culture. This confirms that through social interaction processes learners are able to be more autonomous (Little 1999).

3.4 Project Based Self-learning Model versus Conventional Classes

The Project Based Self-learning Model was students’ preferred choice in contrast to conventional classes which was, although, seen as an avenue for building their foundation of their language acquisition. It was apparent from the students’ comments that the project enabled them to enhance their capacity of autonomy. The time they spent for this project, was 93.75 hours (Student E), 75.8 hours (Student S) and 45.5 hours (Student M) respectively.

I think the best thing about the project is that we are allowed to make mistakes which we learn from. For example, the teacher knew we would not be able to hear words that we didn’t already know on the tape recording, but because we discovered it for ourself, we were probably much more willing to try other strategies (like putting the work in to pre-guess answers) than if we had just been told so in class. I think that for this project I learnt more about the objectives we set… culture, body language, etc. (Student S)

This project was quite different from the usual class, it felt like a different way of learning and I felt that I learnt more than the usual classes. The journal was definitely a good idea as it requires regular work as well as a reflection on my own progress and valuable feedback as well. I think it might be a good idea to have the journals in class as well from perhaps level 4 or above. This project was very interesting as it not only focused on the language itself but also all the aspects that surround language in communication and it seems like something that every language learner should learn. (Student M)
According to Esch (1996) and Lee (1998), flexibility is one of the key factors for establishing a supportive environment which enhances independent learning. The students’ journals also indicated that “the role of teacher as a facilitator was important for strengthening their own autonomy” (Kelly 1996, Lee 1998). The consultations with the unit coordinator provided the students with a platform to express their difficulties and also encouraged them to be proactively committed to their own learning.

The students regarded the autonomy of their learning as one of the best outcomes of the project based learning. However, they generally perceived that this type of learning was only suitable for highly self motivated students who also had a certain level of language proficiency.

The journals also helped as it set work to do and regular practice for Korean as well as noting down difficulties and questions that came up, it seemed to be a good idea going the journals fortnightly rather than just at the end. (Student M)
The reflective journals were good to show us working consistently, and to make us think about the way we were learning. It also helped us to revise what we were discovering as we went, so I think we probably learnt more through doing the journals than if we didn’t revisit the observations and questions and answers that we had written down. It was good doing them fortnightly rather than just once at the end, and they also improved my typing! (Student S)

4. CONCLUSION

Contrary to some negative views on learners’ autonomy, which are “often wrongfully associated with lack of direction, learner laziness, loss of quality and omission of linguistic accuracy work” (Sercu 2002, 61), this study has revealed that the Project Based Self-learning Model can be more effective against or as effective as conventional classes in relation to the acquisition of language and cross-cultural competence.

The Project Based Self-learning Model used in this study has accommodated the diversity of students’ backgrounds better than the conventional classes because of its flexible structure, which is essential for the autonomous and collaborative learning. Being consistent with the findings of previous studies of the similar type, this model has also demonstrated that collaborative learning provides learners with meaningful and more authentic contexts for learning, thereby increasing the effectiveness of collaboration and enhancing their learning.

This model did not increase teachers’ workload significantly compared to those of the conventional classes. However, if the number of students is larger than five, it may not be the case, as the workload of monitoring students’ progress may exceed the normal teaching load. Therefore, with a large number of students, this Project Based Self-learning Model may be introduced partially. Another thing to consider is that, as the students in this study noted, this type of autonomous learning may not be suitable for learners with low motivation, as autonomous learning requires various meta-cognitive processes such as planning, monitoring, reviewing and writing.

Notwithstanding its limitations, the findings of this case study clearly show that the Project Based Self-learning Model can be an alternative way of offering a higher level course in Less Commonly Taught Languages.

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Students' Motivation, Learning Experiences and Learning-Style Preferences: A Survey on Australian College Students of Korean

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University of New South Wales

ABSTRACT

This paper presents findings of a survey study. The purpose of the survey is to investigate the motivational factors, learning experiences and learning-style preferences of the learners of Korean at the Sydney College (Ultimo) of TAFE NSW. The survey is also to examine views on cultural components which should be placed in the language program and the first image or impression of Korea and Korean people. To this end the survey questionnaire is divided into four sections: reasons, learning experience, learning style and first image. Compared with the general trend, the significant growth of the program at TAFE NSW is extremely interesting and worthy of investigating - whether the students are willing to become a member of Korean ethnolinguistic group or just have a desire to gain economic advantages: what social distance they perceive from Korea and Korean people. Answers to these questions have implications in organizing the language and socio-cultural content in similar language programs. Completed questionnaires were collected from 55 students at the College and have been analyzed using quantitative methods. I argue that there should be more non-award practical Korean programs for general public and business people in the community. The paper concludes that practical goals related to putting the language to some type of use should be emphasized in such language programs.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Background

In 1998, the Sydney College (Ultimo) of Technical and Further Education New South Wales (TAFE NSW) started a Korean language certificate course for its students and professional people with approximately 20 enrolments. Since its introduction, the Korean language program has been continuously growing and the College now offers four different certificate courses organized into six classes with 15-30 students in each class. Compared with the general trend of Korean language programs in Australian schools and universities, the significant growth of the program at TAFE NSW is extremely interesting and worthy of investigating.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the motivational factors, learning experiences and learning-style preferences of the learners at the College. In addition to investigating these aspects, the survey will examine views on cultural components which should be placed in the language program and the first image or impression of Korea and Korean people. To this end the study is divided into the following sections:

1. Reasons for the Study of Korean Language,
2. Learning Experience and Expectation,
3. Learning-Styles Preferences, and
4. First Image or Impression of Korea and Korean People
2. Previous Studies

Gardner and Lambert (1972) found two types of motivation for second-language learning: "integrative motivation" and "instrumental motivation". The 'integrative motivation' is defined as "a willingness to become a member of another ethno-linguistic group" (p 12). That is, those who were interested in studying the language in order to be able to identify with the target people, or because they were interested in understanding the culture and way of life of the target language group, were regarded to have integrative motivation. On the other hand, the 'instrumental motivation' indicates "a desire to gain social recognition or economic advantages through knowledge of a foreign language" (p 14). Thus, those who wanted to study the language for practical or utilitarian purposes, for example, to fulfill an educational requirement, to get a better job, or to read material in the language were instrumentally motivated.

It appears to be difficult, however, to draw a strict distinction between the two types of motivation because they are not mutually exclusive and because, as Gardner and Smythe (1975: 218-230) themselves admit, both instrumental and integrative motivation can be modified in the course of a language study. If someone is enjoying a language course, for whatever reason, this might well encourage positive attitudes to eventual payoff in terms of job prospects, social recognition and even integrating in certain special circumstances.

Motivation can also vary according to a specific learner group or a certain cultural setting. Gardner and Lambert (1972) found in the Philippines study that an instrumental motivation was more positively related to language learning in a foreign language setting. However, a study by Svans (1987) shows that European and American university students were found to have more integrative motivation in learning Norwegian than Middle Eastern, African and Asian students, who were more instrumentally motivated. Svans discussed the findings in relation with the closeness in culture, i.e. the Europeans and the Americans have more in common with the Norwegians.

Shumann (1976) suggests that motivation for learning foreign languages is oriented from social factors outside the classroom. Employing the term "social distance" (defined as cultural, technical, economical and political status) between the foreign-language learner groups, Shumann claims that the perceived status the target language has for the learner group plays an important role in developing a specific type of motivation. The effect of socio-political factors on attitudes and motivation was well reported in a longitudinal study by Dornyei and Csizer (2002), which examines how the huge sociocultural transformation that took place in Hungary in the 1990s after the collapse of Communist rule affected school children's attitudes and motivation towards five foreign languages-English, German, French, Italian and Russian-taught at schools. The study reports that during the examined period (1993 and 1999) there was a significant decline in the students' language learning commitment to all the languages except English which maintained its position as the most influential world language.

The notions of attitude and motivation have been continuously used by many researchers and are considered to be factors affecting the learning of a second language. Gardner (1985) emphasizes integrative motivation by making a distinction between integrative motivation and integrative orientation, which refers to "the more immediate goal [reason] of learning the second language" (p 11). The importance of integrative motivation is further discussed in Gardner (2001) where he shows why integrative motivation is a complex phenomenon and how it is related to success in second language acquisition. He claims that second language acquisition refers to the language
development of near-native-like level, which "requires identification with the second language community" (p 2). In other words, integrative motivation is crucial for second language learners to reach at the level of native-like proficiency.

As studies suggest, there are various factors which can influence the motivational orientation of a specific learner group but it is possible to single out or group some important motivational factors influencing student language choice, learning experience and performance. One of such efforts is Dornyei's recent study (2006), which analyses characteristics of L2 learners in order to identify their motivational profiles. The study shows that there is a very consistent relationship between motivational patterns and performance level. This is supported in M-K Kwon and S-Y Lee (2005) where adult learners of Korean were investigated.

The motivational factors or profiles do not always control the content of language programs but it is important to provide objectives and learning experiences more suitable to the needs and interests of learners. The learner factors are closely related to curriculum planning and language teaching approaches. Nunan (1988), for example, proposed an integrated approach where all aspects of teaching and learning are interrelated, and the needs, interests and abilities are negotiated. This, in turn, brings our attention to the notion of learning style, which refers to "any individual's preferred ways of going about learning" (Nunan 1991: 168). It is widely accepted that such personality variables as ethnicity, age, educational experience, etc. will have an effect on one's preferred learning style. Willing (1988: 150-1) investigates biographical variables such as ethnicity, age, education level, length of residence and proficiency among adult learners of English as a second language, and the most surprising finding was that biographical variables have no significant correlations with the learning preferences of the learners.

3. Research Questions and Method

Based on the studies that have been reviewed above, the current study explores and attempts to answer the following questions: What particular reasons or motivations does the group in the survey have in relation to learning Korean? Does the group have a willingness to become a member of a/the Korean ethno-linguistic group or just wish to gain social or economic advantages? Does this group have the flexibility or desire to learn about Korean culture? What aspects of learning activities are most or least enjoyable in the Korean classes? What preferred ways of learning does this group have? What social distance or cultural closeness does this group perceive in relation to Korea and Korean people? Answers to all these questions will have implications in three areas: promoting the type of Korean language program, organizing the language and socio-cultural content in the program, and the practicality of the curriculum process.

The data was gathered by using the method of questionnaire. This way I was able to collect data quickly and economically. The survey questionnaire were distributed by the College instructors to the students who have been studying 1 to 1 and 1/2 years, asking them to complete the questionnaire during their rest time on campus. Completed questionnaires were collected from 81 subjects / students at the College and have been analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Data collection and interpretation from questionnaires will always involve a certain degree of inaccuracy. Although the major questions used were of a "forced" nature (i.e. respondents were given a limited choice of answers), this was tempered by, where necessary, an open-ended option in which the respondents could offer an alternative.
II. THE RESULTS

1. Subjects

1.1 Gender and Age Group

Of the 81 respondents in the study, 54 (66.7%) were female and 27 (33.3%) were male. They were mostly in their 20s (60.5%), and people who were 40 or over (14.8%), in their 30s (13.6%) and under 20 (11.1%) were relatively small.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>54 (66.7)</td>
<td>under 20</td>
<td>9 (11.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>27 (33.3)</td>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>49 (60.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>11 (13.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40 or over</td>
<td>12 (14.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2 Ethnic Background

The respondents come from various ethnic backgrounds. Students with Chinese background formed the largest portion (30%), followed by Anglo-Saxon or Scottish Australians (12.3%), Vietnamese (9.9%) and Indonesians (8.6%). Other ethnic backgrounds include Chinese-Malaysian (4.9%), Chinese-Indonesian (3.7%), Filipino (2.5%), Indian (2.5%), Japanese (2.5%) and Thai (2.5%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>30 (37.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Saxon Australian</td>
<td>10 (12.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>8 (9.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>7 (8.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-Malaysian</td>
<td>4 (4.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese-Indonesian</td>
<td>3 (3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>2 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>2 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>2 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>2 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11 (13.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Length of Study: the Korean Language

Most respondents (61.7%) have studied Korean less than 1 year and just less than a third (27.2%) of the respondents have studied the language for about 1 year. Students who have studied Korean for 2 or more years were very small.

<sup>1</sup> Other backgrounds include German, Lebanese, Korean, Taiwanese-Japanese and Uzbekistan-Korean.
Table 3: Length of Study: Korean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Study</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td>50 (61.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 1 year</td>
<td>22 (27.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About 2 years</td>
<td>6 (7.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 2 years</td>
<td>3 (3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Why Study Korean?

There may be various reasons for learning foreign languages and the main reasons are summarized often in three categories: cultural, educational and practical purposes. To find out what relevance is ascribed to various reasons often designated for the learning of Korean, thirteen statements were put to the students, with an open-ended option to give an alternative. The respondents were asked to give the three most relevant reasons. The results are shown in the table below.

Table 4: Reasons for the study of Korean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>No (%) out of 81 per item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) To understand TV drama and films in Korean.</td>
<td>47 (58.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) To hold conversations with Korean people.</td>
<td>39 (48.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Found the Korean language interesting.</td>
<td>34 (42.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Have a personal relationship with Koreans.</td>
<td>26 (32.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) To be able to get around Korea.</td>
<td>24 (29.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) To understand Korean people and their way of life.</td>
<td>21 (25.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) To get a good/better job.</td>
<td>12 (14.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) To communicate in writing in Korean.</td>
<td>15 (18.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9) To enjoy Korean music and other types of art.</td>
<td>12 (14.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10) To read Korean newspapers and magazines.</td>
<td>8 (9.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11) To enjoy Korean literary texts.</td>
<td>5 (6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12) Motivated by “Hallyu” (Korean wave).</td>
<td>4 (4.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13) Encouraged by family members to study Korean.</td>
<td>3 (3.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14) Other reasons(^3)</td>
<td>2 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents saw the relevance of almost all the reasons, but the following three reasons were shown to be very relevant to students' choices:

1) to understand TV drama and films in Korean;
2) to hold conversations with Korean people; and
3) found the Korean language interesting.

Very important for the students was learning Korean with a view to being able to understand Korean TV dramas and films in Korean and holding conversations with

\(^2\) Some students gave more than three reasons, which were reflected in the statistics.

\(^3\) Other reasons include: “As a member of Cassiopeia (Dong-Bang-Shin-Ki official fan club), my role is a translator. Learning Korean will help me communicate with other fans across the world with same interest.”
Korean L1 speakers. They also learn Korean because they find the language interesting. These responses indicate that the students are strongly conscious of both integrative and instrumental outcomes when choosing to study the Korean language. It seems that many students were initially motivated by Korean popular media and entertainment culture sweeping through Asia and beyond under the name Hallyu (Korean wave). This seems to have led them to their desire to talk with Koreans and their interest in the language itself. Thus, the students have their practical reasons for learning Korean but these reasons seem to be motivated by or closely related to their interest in the Korean culture featured in TVs, films and other types of popular media.

Beside these reasons, three reasons receiving strong support from the students as being relevant or very relevant for their choices were:

4) to have a personal relationship with Koreans;
5) to be able to get around Korea; and
6) to understand Korean people and their way of life.

In addition to the hope of understanding the popular cultural media, the capacity to hold conversations and the interest in the language itself, the reasons for learning Korean were closely related to personal motivation - having a personal (e.g. boyfriend or girlfriend) relationship, travelling around Korea and understanding Korean people and their way of life. In these responses, the perceived relevance of putting the Korean language to personal use is obvious. The students wish to use the language in personal situations and when travelling overseas, but they also wanted to learn the language to understand the Korean culture and people better. Thus their learning Korean was oriented from both instrumental and integrative motivation.

For most respondents, job prospects, written correspondence, Korean music and arts were not the immediate reasons for their study of Korean, and the capacity to understand newspapers and magazines, literary works and family influence on their motivation do not appear to be very relevant. Strangely, Hallyu (Korean wave) as a social phenomenon was not relevant either, despite the fact that Korean TV drama and films were most relevant to their reasons. There are three possibilities for this contradictory response: one, the concept expressed as an abstract word was not fully understood by many respondents; two, they did understand the concept but the whole range of socio-cultural phenomenon was not the reason that attracted them; and three, the respondents simply chose the concrete reason over the intangible abstract concept.

The results discussed above suggest that there were two important motivational factors influencing student choice.

- A utility factor - the capacity to understand Korean drama and films; the aspiration to communicate in Korean; the hope to put the language to use overseas.
- An interest factor - the interest in the Korean language itself; the personal relationship with Koreans; the interest in Korean people and their way of life.

These factors are not surprisingly new, but the results emphasize that more attention should be paid to the practical goals related to using the language without losing everyday socio-cultural contexts. When assessing the results as a whole, it seems reasonable to state that the respondents in this study were instrumentally motivated but the instrumental
reason was developed or modified through cultural or personal motivation. Course developers and instructors, therefore, need to note the importance of the utility factor, especially the emphasis on the speaking and listening skills, but at the same time it should also be noted that the respondents strongly expressed their interest in Korean culture and people. They did not lose their integrative sight in studying the language. What this implies to instructors or curriculum planners is that throughout the language study, more background or cultural components should be introduced and taught, and if circumstances are permitted, a separate provision such as 'culture' course should be made to be able to meet the needs of students.

3. Learning Experience and Expectation

Now we turn to classroom situations to see what the respondents actually experienced and what they wish to learn most. To find out what the learners actually had experienced in the classroom, the students were asked to give their views on classroom practices they experienced, by completing the following open-ended statements: (1) The aspects of language learning I most enjoyed were ...; (2) The aspects of language learning I least enjoyed were ...; and (3) The aspects of the Korean culture I found most interesting were .... The respondents' answers were categorized for each statement and are set out below under each sub-heading in order of frequency.

**Most enjoyed aspects:**
1) Conversation and speaking practice;
2) Role-play, games and fun ways of teaching/learning;
3) Learning to read and write, and comprehension;
4) Learning the Hankul alphabet;
5) Learning Korean as a new language;
6) Korean songs, dramas and films;
7) Korean culture.

The types of answers summarized above suggest that students were enjoying oral and other language skills, as well as cultural aspects that were presented in interesting ways. Some of the comments dealing with the aspects of language learning they most enjoyed were as follows:

**Conversation and speaking practice:**
"I most enjoyed the conversation practice..."
"I enjoy learning about simple conversations that I can use in daily lives...."
"Interaction with other people and practicing to speak Korean"
"Practice Korean language with other classmates"

**Role-play, games and other fun ways of teaching:**
"Being able to learn it in a fun way made it easy to remember it."
"Play card game in class"
"Games and role play were interesting"
"Daily conversation through fun and games"
"Through role-play and games, I enjoyed learning new vocabulary."

**Learning to read and write, and comprehension:**
"Learning to read and write"
"Being able to read texts early is very rewarding"
"Learning how to write and read in Korean"
"The ability to understand the writing..."
"Understanding the language"

**Learning the Hangul alphabet:**
"Learning the alphabet"
"Theory behind the way the alphabet was formed."
"Different writing style to English is interesting."
"Writing - alphabet in Asian form looks impressive"
"Learning Hangul and learning more and more vocabulary"

**Learning Korean as a new language:**
"Learning a new language not similar to English"
"Knowing more about the Korean language..."
"Learning new vocabulary and grammar"
"Getting to know other people's language"

**Korean songs, dramas and films:**
"Understanding Korean songs, dramas and movies"
"Korean TV drama"
"Watching dramas, listening to songs"

**Korean culture:**
"Knowing more about ....the way that Korean people live"
"Korean customs and their way of life"
"Korean culture"

On the other hand, learning grammar, memorizing vocabulary, numbers, and homework and tests, were unpleasant parts of language learning. Comments were also made about problems with some classroom practices and management. Observe the summary and comments below.

**Least enjoyed aspects:**
1) Grammar;
2) Vocabulary and pronunciation;
3) Learning numbers;
4) Homework and tests;
5) Classroom practices/management.
6) Grammar;
7) Vocabulary and pronunciation;
8) Learning numbers;
9) Homework and tests;
10) Classroom practices/management.

The respondents' comments which referred to the aspects they least enjoyed include:

**Grammar:**
"Grammar was difficult"
"Trying to memorize and understand the Korean grammar"
"Differentiating the topic particle and subject particle"
"Honorifics and grammar is difficult."

**Vocabulary and pronunciation:**
"Memorizing vocabulary"
"Understanding pronunciations"
"Similar words and confusing meaning"
"How to sound Korean"
"Remembering vocabulary and grammar"

Learning numbers:
"Learning the numbers"
"Numbers - it's so confusing."
"The alphabet and number"

Homework and tests:
"Homework"
"Tests sometimes give a little bit pressure."
"Home study"

Class management:
"Repetition of writing exercises"
"Waiting for other students to finish. Sometimes other students are too slow."
"I don't like spending time on browsing online education website at school..."
"Too fast"
"Doing presentation / role play in front of class"

Although the above aspects that students referred to as least enjoyed are also essential parts of language learning in Korean or other languages, they should be taken as problematic areas that might be playing a role as an impediment to their learning or aspects which should be improved in future course development as well as classroom practices. In particular, more attention should be given to the choice and use of materials and effective teaching strategies with the resource materials.

Along with the language learning experience, students were also asked to give their views on the cultural aspects they found most interesting. As summarized below, the most interesting cultural aspects include the way people show respect to other people, food and drinking, entertainment media, lifestyle and way of thinking, and history. Body language of Koreans and their traditional costumes are also interesting cultural elements to the students.

**Most interesting cultural aspects:**
1) Showing respect, relationships and associated language;
2) Food, drinking and table manners;
3) Music, drama and films;
4) Way of life and way of thinking;
5) History;
6) Body language;
7) Traditional costume.

Here are some of the comments made in relation to the above points:

**Showing respect, relationships and associated language:**
"The way they show respect to different aspects of life and people"
"The different ways to speak to different people"
"I find the emphasis on age, seniority, deference and respect to older people or people of higher rank/status interesting."
"Relating people with different expression"
"The different degrees of politeness"
"Relationships between different members of society and associate language"

**Food, drinking and table manners:**
"Food"
"The food culture is quite attractive."
"Food incl. table manners"
"Eating and drinking habits"
"Drinking culture"
"Korean dinner manners"

**Music, drama and films:**
"Movies and drama"
"Korean songs"
"Korean drama and lifestyle"
"Music and TV drama"
"TV drama, movie stars, celebrities"

**History:**
"The history of Korea"
"Korean history (ancient and modern)"

**Way of life and way of thinking:**
"Lifestyle"
"Learning about special occasions, i.e. Chosuk, weddings ..., beliefs such as the 'double spring' year, match-making, fortune-telling"
"Work ethic, patriotism, homogeneity, culture, politics..."
"What Korean families do, how young Korean differ from the other generation and way of life in Korea"
"Very different way of thinking from us"
"Woorinara ['our country'] spirit"

**Body language:**
"Their style of speaking and body action is very dramatic."
"Gestures"
"Traditional behavior"

**Traditional costume:**
"Korean traditional dress. Very artistic"
"Traditional costume"
"Korean clothes"

To reach some understanding of what was seen as a desirable emphasis on culture in the language work, the students were asked to give their opinions on what cultural aspects they wish to learn more about, and as summarized below, the responses were similar to the aspects they found most interesting and enhanced their desire to learn more about those cultural aspects. The students wanted to learn more about aspects such as Korean lifestyle, art and entertainment, culture-specific language, history, and food.

**Cultural aspects: wish-to-learn more:**
1) Lifestyle, customs and daily life;
2) Art, entertainment and media;
3) Culture in the language;
4) History;
5) Food and cooking;
6) Others (e.g. fashion, business, literature, education).

Comments expressing the cultural aspects they wish to learn more about include:

**Lifestyle, customs and daily life:**
"I like to learn more about what their everyday life is like."
"Lifestyle, working holiday"
"The way Korean people live their daily life"
"Customs, etiquette"
"Their values at different age groups"
"Korean family customs and relationships"

**Food and cooking:**
"Food, cooking and diet"
"Cooking, human relations/interactions"
"Cooking Korean food"

**Art, entertainment and media:**
"Entertainment culture"
"Korean traditions, films, art"
"Korean martial arts, drama on TV and history"
"Korean traditional musical instruments"
"Art, including films and TV (especially documentations and current affairs)"

**History and politics:**
"History, especially past-Korean war"
"Korean history, fashion, stories, drama, food, etc."
"Relationship between North and south Koreas"

**Culture in the language:**
"Slang, the recent words, the trends at the moment"
"The traditional and very formal way to write or speak in Korean"
"How to use honorific to intimate words"
"How to react with people and language to use and speak with them"

**Others:**
"The younger generation's fashion, music, interest, etc."
"Business relationships"
"Education in Korea"
"I would like to learn how to wear a Korean traditional dress hanbok"
"The reason why they have strong characters"
"It's literature I wish to read once I get to learn more of Korean"

Overall, the respondents seem to favour the placing of more emphasis on practical speaking and listening skills. At the same time many of them wish to learn more about general everyday life and culture of Korean people. Others are interested in learning more about some specific Korea-related topics such as history, politics, business, education and fashion. It is necessary to integrate the cultural components of general nature into the language program, and as for the content-based social topics about Korea, it may be desirable to offer a separate course or a series of lectures where possible.
4. Learning-Style Preferences

To find out how the students like to learn Korean in the classroom, the respondents were asked to rate the preference of each statement concerning learning-styles using a four-point scale (i.e. 1, 2, 3 and 4 in order of preference). The statements were modified from Willing (1988) and contained 20 items relating to various learning activities and methods. The results are shown in Table 5 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning preferences</th>
<th>No (%) out of 81 per item</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By conversation in class</td>
<td>46 (56.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through pictures, TV drama and films</td>
<td>33 (40.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My teacher to tell me all my mistakes</td>
<td>26 (32.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By writing something</td>
<td>25 (30.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean words by doing something</td>
<td>21 (25.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By studying Korean grammar</td>
<td>19 (23.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By reading</td>
<td>18 (22.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By going out with the class</td>
<td>15 (18.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By listening to Korean songs</td>
<td>14 (17.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through games</td>
<td>13 (16.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By listening to cassettes, CDs, etc.</td>
<td>2 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As observed above, some activity types received high ratings. Two learning methods were most preferred, and these were learning by conversation practice in class (56.8%) and through pictures, films and videos (40.7%). This learning-style preference reflects the findings dealing with the aspects of language learning they most enjoyed, which was presented in the previous section. Other preferable learning methods include learning by error correction, writing something and doing something. Learning types that received low or very low ratings (16.1%-18.5%) include learning by using set-up situations, listening to Korean songs, and strangely learning through games.4 Students did not support the idea of listening to or using cassettes and CDs.

It seems that many students do have rather fixed ideas about what is taught and how it is learnt. It is likely that students' previous learning experiences and personal background account for common and individual learning styles shown in the results. Every learner's wants and desires may not always be catered for in language programs, but such wishes could influence the effectiveness of teaching and the acquisition of language, therefore practicing language teachers need to take them into account in teaching and developing resource materials.

5. First Image or Impression of Korea and Korean People

The first image or impression one perceived from a target-language country and its people will have an effect on the continuity of the student's language learning in the future and their intention to integrate into the target culture, as well as their current enthusiasm and performance. To find out what first image or impression the learners of Korean perceived

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4 It seems that the respondents are saying here that they enjoyed learning through games and fun ways but those are not their own preferable learning methods.
of Korea and Korean people, the respondents were asked to give their first perception by completing the open-ended statement: "The first image or impression I had of Korea and Korean people was ..." The overwhelming majority of the respondents gave very positive comments on Koreans, Korea and its culture, while some respondents gave mixed or neutral views. Comments on negative images or impressions were very minimal. In the following, comments are presented in three categories: positive, neutral and negative.

5.1 Positive perception

The positive image or impression of Korean-speaking people that the students perceived is summarized in a variety of positive attributes such as sincere, kind, lovely, respectful, polite, fun-loving, high spirited, friendly, hospitable, hard-working, honest, straight, interesting, humorous, proud, nice, gentle, close bond, welcoming, vibrant, united, neat, good-looking, good skin, stylish and good at arts and sports. Some of these positive comments on Korean people are listed below:5

**The people:**

"Sincere, kind, lovely"
"Very respectful and polite, fun loving and very high spirited"
"Very friendly"
"Hard working, honest people"
"Funny and interesting"
"Friendly and hospitable"
"Proud, hard-working, sensitive"
"Polite, nice and gentle"
"Koreans have a very close bond to each other - the sense of "togetherness."
"Most people are very nice, very welcoming."
"Vibrant. Korean people are brash, very united, enjoys going out in groups."
"Neat, hard-working"
"Good looking, gentle people with good skin"
"The Italians of Asia, good at arts, sports, etc."
"Korean people are very stylish.
"Korean people - polite, they value manners."
"Proud of their country, good sense of humour"
"Very straight, honest people"

Students also gave positive comments, though smaller in number, on Korea, its culture and its media productions. To them Korea was a country which has both old and new: rich in culture with a long history and yet technologically advanced. They perceived positive impressions of both traditional costumes and modern fashion. Two of the national brands, Tae-kwon-do and Kimchi, were among their first images of Korea, while Korean entertainment such as TV drama and music along with Korean celebrities greatly appealed to them. Such comments include the following:

**The country, culture and media:**

"Korea is an interesting country with very interesting culture."
"Korea - technologically advanced"
"Korean traditional dress"
"Fashion"
"Long history, old palaces/temples, delicious food"

5 Many attributive words were repeated in the responses and such repeated comments are avoided or minimally listed here.
"Tae-kwon-do"
"The TV drama, Korean celebrities and Kimchi come to mind."
"Their music and TV are great!"
"Korean drama"

Overall, the majority of students had a very positive perception of Korea, its culture and people, and it seems that this was attributable to various forms of direct or indirect contacts and experiences. Their orientation for Korean was strongly influenced by their prior positive perceptions and experiences, and their learning of Korean seems to have reinforced their attitudes towards Korea and its culture. This tells why the first image or impression perceived by Korean L2 learners is critical for the choice of Korean, its increase of demand and the sustainability of a Korean language program.

5.2 Mixed or neutral image

The first image or impression perceived by some students was mixed or neutral. These students saw both positive and negative sides, and commented in a neutral or dispassionate way. This feeling was expressed in contrastive words such as 'proud and selfish', 'friendly but conservative', 'rude and romantic' and 'divided but rich in culture'. Most comments were focused on the general character of Korean people and society. Observe the following mixed and neutral comments:

"Proud of themselves. Selfish and highly confident about themselves"
"Words [speaking] so fast, high temper, good skin"
"Place emphasis on hierarchy"
"Traditional and reserved"
"They are polite people but some of them rarely show their true intentions"
"Very friendly on the outside but always keep to themselves a lot"
"Friendly but conservative"
"Very polite, quite conservative though"
"A bit rude. Very romantic and cool"
"Hasty, emotional, curious, friendly, divided country, rich culture"
"They have their own character, they love to eat and drink."
"Korean food, Korean war, Korean comfort women"
"Similar to Japan and China, except they have a few different cultures"
"Feel they have a lot of things in common with Chinese."

Generally speaking, the above statements on the first images or impressions the students received are fair and insightful in that the comments represent quite an accurate and balanced view on the typical character of Korea and its people. The respondents seem to have observed Korea from an international perspective and as objectively as they could. This is not a bad sign in terms of the students' attitude towards Korean. Rather, it demonstrates the students' analytical capacity, which could lead to a deeper understanding of Korea. Below we will briefly look into the negative comments.

5.3 Negative image

The comments on negative perceptions of Korea were minimal in number and were most likely based on the respondents' own personal experience and observations. Most comments were made on the appearance, behaviour and quality of Korean people. Take a look at the following comments.

"Small eyes"
"Very formal"
"Very smelly - they smell like bulgogi (BBQ)."
"I felt that they are a bit insular keep to themselves"
"Most Korean people are not that nice"
"Blunt"
"Not good at English"
"Isolated culture"

It is questionable how much these comments may be generalized and what effect they may have in forming their attitude towards Korea and the study of Korean, but they make some point - at least in that the students were frank about what they felt and experienced. We are not sure in this research whether negative images or impressions like the above would change for the better or worse through the study of Korean and beyond, since we live in a contradictory world of words: 'The first impression lasts' versus 'Don't judge a book by it's cover.'

6. Any other comments

The students were given an opportunity to make any additional comments regarding their learning of Korean. The comments were mainly requests and wishes concerning class and external activities such as more conversation, movies and songs, effective methods, proficiency test and a home-stay. Below is a list of such comments.

"I really like to have opportunities for conversation in Korean"
"I think Korean is a hard language to learn because it's a hard language for beginners, especially the listening part due to the verb conjugation. If something can be formulated to help beginners ease into the listening, then it would be really great."
"I would be keen to take official proficiency test, but know very little about this"
"More movies/songs in class, especially more things related to the real world"
"If there's a homestay program from TAFE, it would be great"
"A variety of learning is great, eg. We watched a movie about the demilitarized zone which I found very interesting"

**SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION**

The key findings in this survey study can be summarized as follows:

- The reason for the students learning Korean at the technical college is very practical - to be able to speak with Koreans;
- The students were found to be more integrative and less instrumental, with the strong majority of them being motivated culturally;
- The most enjoyed learning experiences were conversation class, language activities, songs and films, whereas the least enjoyed aspects were grammar, vocabulary, numbers, homework and tests;
- The most interesting cultural aspects the respondents found were different ways of showing respect and politeness, food and drinking (including table manners), songs, drama and film, history and lifestyles, in that order.
- The cultural aspects they wish to learn more about include current lifestyles, cultural customs, food and cooking, art and entertainment, history and recently created words including slang.
- The respondents liked to learn Korean through conversation practice in class, visual resources, error corrections, meaningful writing exercises and activity-based vocabulary learning more than any other ways.
• The absolute majority of the students perceived or maintained very positive impressions and images about Korea and its people, while some were neutral or mixed in their perception and students with negative images were very minimal.

In short, the findings show that the respondents are very practical and integrative (rather than instrumental) about their learning of Korean, and very positive about the target country and its people. They wish to learn conversational Korean through fun language activities, to be aware of everyday life in Korea with updated information and to do something interesting, for example, something relating to food, cooking and entertainment culture. It is desirable that the Korean program at the College and other institutions with similar educational goals and settings should reflect the findings.

Furthermore, it is desirable to set up a socio-educational program or institution in metropolitan cities such as Sydney in collaboration with the Korean governmental initiative such as the King Sejong Institute project initiated and managed by the Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Education represented by and acting through the National Institute of the Korean Language. To promote Korean widely in the community, it is inadequate to rely only on education through school and university programs. We need not only elite-oriented tertiary or systematic educational programs but also a well-structured community-based life-long educational program. Currently there are one or two private operators offering fee-based community Korean programs in Sydney, but there is no socio-educational model of a Korean language program supported and operated by government organizations for free or at face cost in Australia. This is in contrast to the active involvement by the Korean government in North and South Eastern Asian countries for promoting Korean. It is worth noting that the Hallyu phenomenon, though comparatively minimal in mainstream Australian society, has gained considerable popularity among the Asian migrant community in Sydney and other big cities, and that there are a considerable number of Australians such as public servants, business people, families of international marriages, families with adopted Korean children who need, or wish to have access to community-based Korean programs.

CONCLUSION

It seems reasonable to conclude that practical goals related to putting the language to some type of use should be emphasized in such language programs; more attention should be paid to the cultural components through media and practical activities; and entertaining methods should be applied to lessons to keep promoting an interest in the language. More importantly both institutional and community efforts should be made in providing more non-award socio-educational models of Korean programs for the general public, government employees and business people in the community.

SELECTED REFERENCES


Discourse Functions of 'Adnominaliser (ass/eossdeon, eun, neun, eul) + geos-ida'

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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates discourse functions of the Korean form ‘adnominaliser (ass/eossdeon, eun, neun, eul) + geos-ida’ which is frequently used in written and spoken Korean. Although there has been some research undertaken on this particular form, most has focused on the discourse functions of ‘eul + geos-ida’, which is more grammaticalised than the other forms ‘ass/eossdeon, eun, neun + geos-ida’. It is true that the latter forms are less grammaticalised but it is also true that they are often used as grammaticalised function words. This study has identified the fourteen discourse functions: (1) emphasis and assertion, (2) universal truth or norm, (3) paraphrase or additional information, (4) cause or reason, (5) inference, (6) logical result or conclusion, (7) demonstration, (8) suggestion, (9) exhortation or order, (10) self-talk of encouragement, (11) self-assurance, (12) problem, (13) exclamation and (14) demand of explanation.

1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is a preliminary study on the discourse functions of the Korean form ‘adnominaliser (ass/eossdeon, eun, neun, eul) + geos-ida’1. This form is mainly used for relative clauses as shown in the examples below. In other words, (1) and (2) have the structure of ‘A is B’.

1) i chaegi ne ge jul geoya.
   This book is the one which I am going to give to you.

2) i chaegi gimseonsaengnimi billin geosida.
   This book is the one which Mr Kim has borrowed.

The examples (3) and (4) cannot, however, be interpreted as having the structure of ‘A is B’. ‘Eul + geos-ida’ in (3) is used to show the ‘intention’ of the speaker, and ‘eun + geos-ida’ in (4) is used to emphasise the statement ‘Mr Kim has borrowed this book.’ In other words, these forms are used as grammaticalised function words.

3) naneun oneul i chaegul sumiege jul geosida.
   I will be going to give this book to Sumi.

4) gimseonsaengnimi i chaegul billingeosida.
   It is that Mr Kim has borrowed this book.

Among these forms, ‘eul + geos-ida’ has long been recognised for this function and included in Korean language textbooks, grammar books and dictionaries, while the other forms (‘ass/eossdeon, eun, neun + geos-ida’) have not received their due attention. Most textbooks do not teach these forms, and Korean grammar books and dictionaries list only one or two discourse functions of these forms, if there is any mention at all. Since ‘eul +

1 The Korean government’s official system of romanisation is used in this paper.
geos-ida' is well researched and documented, this paper will concentrate on the forms of ‘ass/eossdeon, eun, neun + geos-ida’, (henceforth, ‘+ geos-ida’).

2. DISCOURSE FUNCTIONS OF ‘+ GEOS-IDA’

The most often mentioned functions of ‘+ geos-ida’ in the literature of Korean linguistics and education are ‘emphasis, assertion and statement of universal truth or norm’. Most of these studies have, however, analysed ‘+ geos-ida’ sentences in isolation, that is, out of their contexts. As will be shown later, many usages of ‘+ geos-ida’ are heavily dependent on context, in particular, preceding sentences or utterances.

Apart from Korean linguistics and education, Korean academics in the field of Japanese education and linguistics in Korea have conducted several studies on the comparison of ‘+ geos-ida’ and the Japanese equivalent, ‘no da’\(^2\). These studies have analysed ‘+ geos-ida’ sentences in their contexts, identifying more discourse functions of ‘+ geos-ida’.

The functions identified so far will be reviewed and categorised in this section. The sources of the examples in this paper are given at the end of each example. Many examples are drawn from other studies and if their original sources were known, these are also given, as in (14), to show their authenticity. These examples are mostly from Korean novels and short stories.

2.1 EMPHASIS AND ASSERTION

Emphasis and assertion are the functions most often mentioned in previous studies, including Kim(1984), Bae(1998), Shin(1993), Choe(1994), Kim(2000) and Han(2002)\(^3\). They all suggest that ‘+ geos-ida’ is used to emphasise or assert the statements that speakers make, as in (5), (6) and (7). In particular, Ko(1986, 261) suggests that emphasising the statement can be seen as showing a speaker’s firm belief about his statement and, therefore, it is more appropriate to call this function ‘assertion’.

\[(5)\] siganeun geumin geosida. (Gungnipgugeowon 2005, 728)
\[(6)\] sulgwa dambaeneun geongange haeroun geoya. (Gungnipgugeowon 2005, 728)
\[(7)\] saramdeureun mueonji moreuneun haengbogeul kkeunimeopsis chuguhago itneun geosida.
   (Nam & Ko1985, 72)

2.2 UNIVERSAL TRUTH OR NORM

Another function often mentioned is universal truth or norm, which is discussed by Bae(1989), Nam(1991) and Yang(2005). All the examples are about ‘universal truth or norm’ and ‘+ geos-ida’ can be replaced with ‘+beopida’, which is used to state truth or norm.

\[(8)\] haeneun dongjigeseo tteuneun geosida. (Nam, K. 1991, 87; Yang 2005, 59)
\[(9)\] gangi deureosulseol ttaen gwarohamyeon an doneuneun geosida. (Nam, K. 1991, 87; Yang 2005, 59)
\[(10)\] coreun apeseoneun mureupeul kkulko annyeon geosida. (Nam, K. 1991, 87; Yang 2005, 59)
\[(11)\] ireol taeneun jamjako innueun geosida. (Nam, K. 1991, 87; Yang 2005, 59)
\[(12)\] coreuneun bomyeon bandeusi jarireul yangbahaeya haneun geosida. (Bae 1989, 40)

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*\(^2\) I would like to express my gratitude to Seok-Beom Cho and Jung-Sim Kim for their help with the articles written in Japanese.*

*\(^3\) Shin(1993, 120) and Kim(2000, 89) mentioned these emphasis and assertion functions but they did not provide any examples.*
I have to say before moving on to the next function that the first function ‘emphasis and assertion’ and the second one ‘universal truth or norms’ are closely related. In other words, when you are making a statement about a truth or norm, you can state it firmly. Therefore, the distinction between these two functions is not clear-cut in many cases.

**2.3 Paraphrase or Additional Information**

‘+ geos-ida’ is used to expresses the content of the preceding sentence more clearly or precisely in the following sentence (Lee 2004, 76). This function often involves the use of transitional words such as ‘jeuk’ (that is), ‘geureoneukka’ and ‘malhajmyeon’ (that is to say) in the beginning of the sentence as can be seen in (16), (19) and (20) respectively.

(14) ‘honjaseo masigo honjaseo chwihaeoya doel ge duryeopdaneun geoyao’ nam baksaneun biroso ge uimireul aradeureotda. jeongsuneun eorowoseo sureul masigo chwihago sipeotjiman chwihaneun geu sungan, chwiharyego sureul masineun geu sunganui oerouni duryeoun geosietota. (abeoj, 49 from Lee 2004, 76)

(15) cheolminui sokseunneun peonhaetda. mwonga soksiwonhi pulliji annueun hwahaeui silmarireul chatgi wihae haengbokaetdeon janggoeseo chueogui himneul billryeoneun geoyeotda. (seoinneun yeoja, 232 from Lee 2004, 76)

(16) dan guneun jejeongilchiui ji baehjoseo, gojoseouni seong janggwa deobureo jubyoneun bu jogeul tonghapago ji baehag wihaesindeurui jo sangeul haneure yeongyeolskyeotda. jeuk, gak bujokgyuui sin ang chegyereul chonggwalmyeonseou juyeon bujogeul jibaehagoja ha yeoteon geosida. (1990’s Senior High School Textbook guksa: sang, 18)

(17) urin jigeumo ongat gono seoseo heamege itseummida. ongat beonhoe, mangsan sogeseo heamege inneun geosimnida. (urisaneun dong ane, 140 from Han 2002, 38)

(18) (Omitted) geonganghagi ireul de eopdeon saramdeuri gapjagi sujeoreujeo moksumeul illeun sutjaga urinaeseomando han hae 2man 5cheonmyeongida. bujeongmaekgwia simgeunyeongsak, noechullhaye geosi bulsie doryeonsawa geupsareul ireukineun geosida. jagi moxumi jasinui geosi aniraneun teusida. (gukwakkotanggi, 173 from Han 2002, 38)

(19) machim geu jung han sarami seolseul jangsaerul sijakae bogedagdo tangeul para mokdougeul mandleureu ga jigo ma meocheor ui jibeseo sinsereul jidaga sigol geuui jibe i ri saenggyeo cemeoniege geu doneul matgig naeryeogang saie geu geu ri saenggin geosieotda. geureonikka uri cemeoneunnamu doneul seuljeok tuyoonghaeseo jibeleu gyeyakian geosieotda. (geu manteon singaneun nuga da meogeossieukka, 112 from Han 2002, 39-40)

(20) japchoman haedo geureota. nonbate jaranan japchoneun goksigeul wihae coejeol su eopsi ppobanajejam, japo geu jacheneun keyeolko ‘japcho’ga anira geu nareumui jonjae iyureul jinigo ida. malhajmyeong keodaran saengmyeonggi janchie hautche dongchamhago inneun geosida. (odumakpyeonji, 62 from Han 2002, 40)

The examples (17) – (20) are from Han (2002, 38-40), who actually uses different explanations for them. She suggests that ‘+ geos-ida’ in (17) is used for assertion or persuasion based on fact, and those in (18) - (20) are used to make a subjective statement based on the understanding of an event or the result of speakers’ analysis. A close reading of these examples, however, clearly shows that all can be categorised as paraphrase or additional information.

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4 Kim, Lee & Kim (2008, 273) also found from the analysis of a speech corpus that transitional words such as ‘jeuk, geureomeuro, machimmae, tatarseo, dasi malhajmyeon’ are often used in the beginning of ‘+ geos-ida’ sentences.
2.4 CAUSE OR REASON

Han(2002, 35-36) and Nam, Y(1991) suggest that ‘+ geos-ida’ is also used to explain why the situation mentioned in the preceding sentence happened or what caused it to happen.

(21) geureona sangeungwa hamkke dasi gangdugeul georeo doragariraneun nae barameun irueojijianatda. yeojaa jmyeot myeochi chimareul napulgeorimeodagawaseoneun sangeuneul ppaesaga beorin geosida. (yeolhanbeonjae sagwanamu, 63 from Han 2002, 35)
(22) geureona urineun 30bundo andeooe gyoebogkungeul nawaya haetaed. muneul dadeul siganieoteongeosida. geunyeowa naene banjjeum jeojeun momeul ikkeulgo kapero deureogatda. (yeolhanbeonjae sagwanamu, 195 from Han 2002, 35)
(23) yojuueum a ideureun pareubureotteurgi swip da. kalsyumi bujokan geosida. (Nam, Y.1991, 11)

2.5 INFERENCE

This inference function is discussed by Lee(2004), Nam(1991) and Ji(1984). As shown in the example sentences below, ‘+ geos-ida’ can be used to express an inference that you draw about something by using information that is mentioned earlier or in context.

(24) jeongsudo emgoejuchum geunyeoui dwireul ttaratda. geunyeoneun eoneu gaeksil ape meomchwoseoseo yeolsoro bangmuneul yeoreotda. jeongsgua keopisyobeseo gidarineun Dongan geunyeoneun peureonteue ga isseotdeon geosida. (abeoji, 132 from Lee 2004, 76)
(25) geuhyeoreo gaji hakseorei natanago geuui hakseoreun ihchojeotijumanguemsegiga deoee geuui gwhakjeogeojeu jungmyeongdooeotda. yeoksi geuui saenggagueun oratdeon geosida. (Nam 1991, 11)

2.6 LOGICAL RESULT OR CONCLUSION

The form ‘+ geos-ida’ is used at the end of the statement you are making to express that it is a logical result or conclusion of what you have just said. This function often involves the use of transitional words such as ‘geureokie’ (thus), ‘geuraesoe’ (so), ‘geureoki taemune’ (therefore) and ‘ttaraseo’ (hence) in the beginning of the sentence, as shown in (26), (27), (28) and (29) respectively. This function of ‘+ geos-ida’ is equivalent to the English expression ‘that’s why…”.

(26) do(do)ran got giriiraneun tteusimnida. geureokie urineun sarameuroeseo motal jiseul han ttae indo(indo) eogeunnanda go mallagon haetdeon geosimnida. (uri sa neun dongane, 78 from Han 2002, 39)
(27) seonsaengnimneun tatteutan boei doemyeon haksangdeuerege kkotssireul nanwojueotda. "i jogeuman kktotss aneuneuk kkgotgwu julgiwa ipi deureo itgo, i sssaseul dalmeun ssiaeto hamkke deureo itsueumida. machangajiro uriga saraganeun hyeonjaeneun, hyeonjae soge mirareul geudaero damgo itsueumida. ssiaet soge kkochi deureo itdeut hyeonjae sogeumni miraeui kkoche areumapge jarago itsueumida. geuraesoe ssiaetul tange simji anko dumyeon mallaseo jungneun geothereoreom hyeonjaeui sigandeureul uri maemun soge jeongseongkkeot simeojudi anumeuyeon, najunge kkocheul bogo sipeodol bul suga eomneun geonnida. (yeontangil 2, 107 from Han 2002, 39)
(28) mummyeongindeurirago jaccheohaneun hyeonjaeui urideul salmuneu jasinui iguel wihae nameul huisaengskisioneum geoseuro irueojoe itda. ireon bijeonghago naenghokan ildeureul

5 Ji(1984, 53-57) used the different term “statement based on a situation”.
6 The examples (26) (27) and (28) are drawn from Han(2002,39) and (29) from Kim, Lee & Kim( 2008, 272). Apart from (26), they used only the last sentence of each example text. The preceding sentences were drawn from the original sources. Han(2002) and Kim, Lee & Kim( 2008) gave different explanations for these examples.
7 ‘Do’ and ‘indo’ in parentheses are written in Chinese characters in the original source.
The form ‘neun + geos-ida’ is used when you show someone how to do something.

(30) moningppangeul baneuro jareulttae chakgak! (Photo of a bread roll ommitted)
ireoke jareuneun geoyeoyo!(Google search)
(31) gimbabaeun ireoke mandeuneun geoyeoyo. (Google search)

2.8 SUGGESTION

The form ‘neun + geos-ida’ is also used to make a suggestion that involves both the speaker and the hearer. In this case, ‘eottae?’ (What do you think?) often follows, as in (32) and (33). (34) is suggested by Lee(2004, 77) as an example of “resolution” but it should be categorized as ‘suggestion’.

(32) “ja, jigeumbuteonun jusawiga wangida! algenna? jiwigohareul mangnohonhago jasawireul deonjoseo jusawiga sikineun daero beolchigeul suhaenghaneun geoya, eottae?” (Google search)
(33) “seonaengnim, geureom yaoe sueopaeyo.”
’chunde yaoe sueobirani, nyoseokdeul jeongmal nagago sipeun moyangiorguna’ yeogikkaji saenggagi migmja maneun han gaji jihyega tteollatda.
"geureom joa, yaeudera. nagagiro haja. dan jigeum hago inneun danwon mamuirireul hago nagadorok haja. eum? chumim ‘nugil’ sosol danwone eomeoniwa adeul iyagiga naoji? eomeoniwa adeureul seolullo bonaego doralo tae baljageuleul boryeogo, adeureul geuriwohaetdeun geu maemuel uri saenggakamyeonseo nungirireul georeobodorok haja. geureom oneureun iron sueopgwa hyeonjang silseupkkja haneun geoya. eottae? jochi? modu da ganeun geoya!!”
aideureun “ne!”hago daedapadeta. (Google search)
(34) ‘joen suga itda. yodaecum iryoire uri deungsangalkka? achimbuteo jibeul biuneun geoya. jekkatgeotdeurisankkae ttarael geoya eojeol geoya.’ (seoinneun yeoja, 128 from Lee 2004, 77)

2.9 EXHORTATION OR ORDER

Lee(2004, 77) suggests that the form ‘neun + geos-ida’ is used when you try hard to persuade or encourage someone to do something.
2.10 SELF-TALK OF ENCOURAGEMENT

The form ‘neun + geos-ida’ is also used when you try to convince yourself to do something, as suggested by Choe(2006).

(37) yakaejiji malja. yakaejiji malja. gimsajanghantegaji anke hae jun geonman saenggakaja. dasi sijakaneun geoya. museun irideun hal su isseul geoya. (gaeul donghwag I, II from Choe 2006, 14)

(38) jogeumeun himdeureo. geuraedo gwaenchana. gihoeneun daeume tto inneun geo anigesseo? (hwaing deo yeolsimni haneun geoya geuremyeon doneun geotgeji wiman bomyeonseo jwajoolhaji maljagu wireul boji mallaneun mari aniya ollyeoabogido hago naeryeoabogido hago juwireul dulleabogido haeyahaneun geojana) (Google search)

2.11 SELF-ASSURANCE

You try to assure yourself that something is true, often in order to make yourself less worried or to deny an unpleasant reality.

(39) "heoojija...."
   "ne?"
   "cheoeumbuteo neowa noneun ceulli jhanasseo."
   "museun mareyeo?"
   "motdeuren cheokaji ma. neodo naega museun malhaneunji algo itjana. wae sogyeotji?"
   "mwol sogyeotdaneun geojo?"
   "oneul dangsin abeoji maennasseo."
   machimnae ol geosi watdaneun saenggage du nuneul kkok gamatda.
   "geuraeschoyo? geuraeschoyo?"

<kumil geoya...... teullimeopsi...... nan jigeum kkumeul kkugo inneun geoya......>
(Google search)

2.12 PROBLEM

Im (1972:44) first identified this ‘problem’ function of ‘+ geos-ida’, which is used to describe a problem that arises unexpectedly.

(40) maak oechulharyego haja biga oneun geosieotda. (Im 1972, 44)
(41) gjakkutui yeolmae dakieneun geuyi pari jhalbeun geosida. (Im 1972, 44)

2.13 EXCLAMATION

Han (2002, 42-43) suggests that ‘+ geos-ida’ can be used for exclamation.

(42) (neon) wae geureoke yeppeungeoya? (Han 2002, 43)
(43) jeo yeo janeun wae jeoreoke hang sang areumdaun geoya! (Han 2002, 43)
(44) aeneun wae ireoke yeppeun geoya? kkok nareul dalmatjana? (Google search)
2.14 Deman of Explanation

The ‘+ geos-ida’ form is used to demand the explanation of why something has happened. For example, (44) is translated literally as “what are you doing now?” but this expression is usually used when we do not understand why someone is doing a particular thing. Therefore, the real meaning of this question is “why are you doing this?” In other words, you are demanding the explanation of their behaviour. We also use the ‘+ geos-ida’ form with ‘why-questions’ when we are surprised or annoyed by something and are asking why it happened.

(46) jigeum wno ha neun geoyo? (Google search)
(47) geureonde ejebameneun wae an on geoyo? "wae an ogino. bappaseo mot ongeoyo.
   jeorago bulgogi meokgi sireossueulkka~ (Google search)
(48) ginn: sasul geoghaksaengdeul ga undeneun seoinyeong ssi sil eohaneun saramdo isseul geogatayo.
   seo: je apeseon ti annaseo moreugesseoyo. sil eohaneun saramdo itgin it eul geoyo. jiegachet sueobe deul eogasseul ttae deadeul 'wa~ga anin 'eo?hanneun pyo jeongjeosseoyo.
   wonaksueoppsigane yeol simin bundeurijanayo. han beoneun hwajangsireseo bol il boneunde bakkeseooyahaksaengdeuri "seoinyeong wae on geoyo?"ra myeon sugeundaedeoragoyo.
   cheoemeu geu reoke saenggakasin bu deuldun manasseul geoyo. i jeneun jom dallajiji anasseulkka, geureonsaenggak ha neun bundeuri ijenmani jul ji anasseulkka saunggakaeyo. (mel beon iryosinmun, May 23, 2008, p.47)

3. Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that ‘adnominaliser (ass/eossdeon, eun, neun) + geos-ida’ forms are used extensively as gramaticalised function words in written and spoken Korean. That is, it has identified the fourteen discourse functions: (1) emphasis and assertion, (2) universal truth or norm, (3) paraphrase or additional information, (4) cause or reason, (5) inference, (6) logical result or conclusion, (7) demonstration, (8) suggestion, (9) exhortation or order, (10) self-talk of encouragement, (11) self-assurance, (12) problem, (13) exclamation and (14) demand of explanation.

As mentioned before, this is a preliminary study, requiring further study for better and clearer understanding of the ‘+geos-ida’ form. Notwithstanding its limitations, the findings of this study clearly show that ‘adnominaliser (ass/eossdeon, eun, neun, eul) + geos-ida’ forms should be included as grammaticalised function words in Korean textbooks and reference books such as grammar books and dictionaries.

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   Ihbonmunhwahakbo 29: 1-17.


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Kim Chi-Ha’s *Pansori* and Oe Kenzaburo:  
Focused on Grotesque Realism in “Ttong-Ba-Da”  
Exemplified by Oe Kenzaburo  

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**ABSTRACT:**

*Kim Chi-Ha* is a poet who fought for democracy and the right of the suppressed populace in Korea, under President Pak Chung-Hee’s regime. His poetry is significant in Korean Modern literature for its unique development of ‘*Damshi* (narrative poem)’ that links modern western genres of poetry with traditional Korean art forms. ‘*Damshi*’ is the mixture of ‘*Daeseol* (epic storytelling)’, ‘*Gamyungseuk* (mask play)’ and ‘*Pansori* (musical ballad)’, the traditional genres that were used in criticizing an oppressive ruling power and enforcing resistance in the powerless people. A satire and a parody is the key expression. *Kim Chi-Ha*’s poetry is looked into two different categories before and after imprisonment. It is not just a classification by the time he wrote but by the distinction of the themes of poetry.

His early poetry is the portrayal of the alienated human condition by modernization, bringing the concept of ‘*Minjoong* (The Populace)’. Most of lyric poems at this period are compiled in his first anthology of poems ‘*Hwangto* (Yellow Soil)’ published in 1970. Kim stated in his post-script that he wanted his poems to be the poetries of action which moves forward from the dark reality towards freedom and light.  

*He* was sentenced to death in 1974 then to life imprisonment, resulted total of 8 years served in and out of prison as a political offender, after having written *Damshi* ‘*Ojeok* (Five Thieves)’ in 1970. His translated English poems are published under the tile ‘*Cry of the People and Other Poems*’.  

In 1980s, *Kim Chi-Ha* shifted his themes of poetry from the political resistance to the cosmic unification. His view of how to free the oppressed human condition was philosophized, seeking wisdom to find balance and harmony between all the beings in the world. The philosophy of all existence in the world as containers of life is developed further into a theory of life which incorporates Korean traditional ‘*Dong-hak*’ and other eastern thoughts.

*Oe Kenzaburo* conducted a hunger strike in 1975 for clamping down *Kim Chi-Ha* to imprisonment. *Oe Kenzaburo* is a Japanese author who received the Nobel Prize in 1994. *Oe* has made a constant effort to rebuild Japanese identity after the war among international community, especially in Asia. He has brought into a light of an issue of the Koreans in Japan in several of his novels and visited Korea in 1995, as his first foreign country after having received Nobel Prize. At that time, *Oe* took part in the Symposium titled ‘Fifty Years of Liberation and Fifty Years since Defeat in War: Toward

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1 Kim Chi-Ha, 1982. *Taneun Mokmareum euro* (Burning Thirst); The Anthology of *Kim Chi-Ha*’s Poems, Changjacketwa Bipyungs, Pajoo, Korea. P. 170-1
Reconciliation and the Future’. Later, Kim Chi-Ha and Oe Kenzaburo had a public conversation and were recorded in the Asian culture critique magazine the Positions.  

In this paper, I will focus on Kim Chi-Ha’s Pansori ‘Tsong-Ba-Da(The Sea of Excrement)’ first titled ‘BoonSSi MoolEo, implying a parody about a Japanese named Mr. Boon(Dung) who is a symbolic entity as a hostile power, Japanese Imperialism in history. The imperialism overlaps with dictatorship that suppresses Minjoong, which creates multilayered harmful forces to populace. Oe Kenzaburo quotes Kim Chi-Ha’s Damshi as an example of the expressions of grotesque realism which will bring regeneration and coexistence through a satire and laughter in his book Syousetsu no Houhou (Methods of Novel Writing). The grotesque realism in Kim’s Tsong-Ba-Da will be explored.  

INTRODUCTION

Kim Chi-Ha is was born in 1941, in JunRaDo, the famous place for Dong-hak Peasant Revolution in 1894, which was an anti-government, anti-yangban (the aristocratic class, opposite to Ssangnom, the lower class) and anti-foreign uprising. In 1966, Kim graduated Seoul national university majoring the Aesthetics. He participated in a demonstration against humiliating diplomacy on a treaty with Japan while he was a student in 1964. His major themes of poems are Dong-hak philosophy and the life of the Korean populace. He tries to link modern Korean literature to a traditional genre of Korean literature and create a unique style of narrative poetry, Damshi. His anthology of poems, Hwangto( 1970), Taneun mokmareum euro(1982), Aerin(1986), Joongsim eui gueroum (1994) was published as in Korea and Nagai anyami no kanata ni(1972), Kimu Jiha, Minsyu no koe (1974) and English translated version, Cry of the People and Other Poems(1974) published in Japan. Kim received Lotus prize in 1975 and several other literary prizes.

Kim is known to be an activist who fought for democracy and the right of the suppressed populace under President Pak Chung-Hee’s regime. Kim’s narrative poem ‘Ojeok’ caused him to be imprisonment in 1970. He was sentenced to death in 1974 for the involvement in ‘Min-chung-hak-ryun , communist incident’ and later sentence reduced to life imprisonment. Kim’s original name is Kim Young-Il, using literary name Chi-Ha by himself. Kim said that he can see many signboards with the suffix Chi-Ha, which means under-ground, in streets of Seoul in 1960s. For examples, Chi-Ha coffee shop, Chi-Ha barbershop, Chi-Ha restaurant. Then he made up his mind to use that suffix as his literary name, though he changed the Chinese characters from 地下 to 芝河. The statement symbolically shows that his intention to work for the under-ground, suppressed people.

‘O-Jeok(Five Thieves)’which disclosed a critical view on the harmful authoritarian power, namely, Plutocrat(Big businessman), Aristocrat(Senator), Technocrat (High position public officer), Autocrat (Generals), and Bureaucrat(Ministers), was written in a genre of Damshi. In this poem, Kim expresses an illegality and corruption of the leaders of modern society at that time, by graphic depictions of sufferings of ordinary populace, using the parody which used in Pansori which is a traditional musical sung by one professional singer.

Japanese Nobel laureate and activist, Oe Kenzaburo wrote about Koreans in Japan in several volumes of his fictions and has made a constant effort to rebuild Japanese identity after the war among international community, especially in Asia. Upon Kim Chi-

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4 Oe Kenzaburo Syousetsuno Houhou, Iwanami Shouten, Tokyo. 1978.
5 www.artnstudy.com/kimjiha/main.asp
Ha’s imprisonment, Oe went for a hunger strike together with other Japanese writers in 1975. Oe Kenzaburo was born in 1935 in a town called Ose in Shikoku where his family lived there for several generations. Oe studied French literature at the University of Tokyo and his major themes of his writings were influenced by Jean-Paul-Sartre. In Yoku wakaru Oe Kenzaburo 6 the track of his writings are illustrated in 8 different chronological categories. Memushiri kouchit(Nip the Buds, Shoot the Kids, 1958), Kojintekina teiken(A Personal Matter,1964), Manengannen no futoboru(Silent Cry, 1967) which later has contributed for winning The Nobel Prize, Atarashii hitoyo mezameyo (Rose Up O Young Men of the New age,1983) Moe agaru midori no ki( The flaming Green Tree Trilogy, 1993-1995) and recent Sayonara watashi no hon yo( Farewell My books, 2005) are only a small representative lists of his extensive writings. After Oe’s first son Hikari was born as a mentally-handicapped person, the issue of coexistence as a father to his son has been theme in many of his novel.

Oe and Kim have similarity in many aspects of literary thinking. 1) Both of them are ardent lovers of democracy defending the right of the weak, marginalized group of people, both of them to be called activists. 2) Both of them have a critical view on the issue of modernization that brought destruction of nature and the fact Asian countries are merely mimicking the Western tradition. 3) Both of them value the way to bring about coexistence between the differences by using satire and laughter as a carnival or as a traditional musical. 4) Both of them emphasize the importance regeneration by connecting individual life to universal life of Cosmos.

However, there are differences that 1) Kim’s concern is the populace, therefore, he tend to move as a drive, doing it together and aiming for a community based and global achievement whereas Oe’s concern is an individual, therefore, Oe tend to think about individual autonomy in his own situation. As an example, Oe wrote about the forest in Shikoku, his home town as a symbolic birth place for everybody, trying to find the link individual life with Cosmos. Kim wrote about Dong-hak philosophy, Korean philosophy incorporated with Asian wisdom, of which the belief of one universal life all connected and should revere every one of them, trying to propagate this philosophy to the world. 2) Regeneration, Oe uses term Saisei(再生) that means rebirth from a death and a defeat and Kim uses word Saeng-Seong(生成) that means growing life from a life gained by an enlightenment. Oe thinks regeneration can be achieved by the effort to coexist through education, especially learning from history, whereas Kim thinks regeneration can be achieved by the recognition of the cosmic life in every being in the world. It is not the function of the intelligence but the intuition to understand the interconnectedness of individual to cosmic life.

Oe wrote about Kim Chi-Ha’s narrative poems in his ‘The Image System in Grotesque Realism’ in 小説の方法 (Methods of Novel Writing) in 1978. Oe wrote that after Japan’s defeat in the War, Japan and her surrounding countries were faced with the task of regeneration. This essay will examine the way to bring about coexistence between the differences by using satire and laughter in Kim Chi-Ha’s Damshi Ttong-Ba-Da. It will be explored through Oe’s Illustrations of Kim’s poems and explanations. I will present relevant parts of the Pansori ‘Ttong-Ba-Da’ sung by Yim Jin-taik in the original Korean with a script explaining the lyrics in English. It is not translated into an English narrative poem but will be a text to convey the meaning of the Korean narration.

6 Ed. Bunrei genkyu proje, 1994. Yoku wakaru Oe Kenzaburo, Japan Mikusu, Tokyo
MAIN BODY

Kim’s narrative poem ‘Ttong-Ba-Da(Sea of Excrement)’, first titled using the Japanese term of story ‘Mono katari, BoonSSi MooEo(糞氏物語) in Korean, which is not generally used in Korea. By a deliberate selection of the title, Kim implies that the story is a parody of a Japanese named Mr. Boon (Dung). Story unfolds that Mr. Boon’s family had been an enemy of Korea for generations, who is a symbolic figure representing the Japanese imperialism. ‘Ttong- Ba-Da’ is consisted of 12 short episodes that are as below:

1) Natural Consequences
2) Mr. Boon Sam-Chon-Dae
3) Sam- Chon-Dae’s family history
4) A prohibition order on moving a bowl
5) Having a hard time to obey the rule
6) Sam- Chon-Dae visits Korea
7) Visit a kisaeng house
8) Living-room of the kisaeng house
9) Noisy atmosphere among Pro-Japanese and Japanese
10) A scene of confusion and disorder
11) Having a bowl movement on General Lee’s statue
12) Death from a falling from the statue

Ttong-Ba-Da is written in a genre of narrative poem named Damshi by Kim Chi-Ha himself. Damshi, unlike Western Ballard which incorporates a story line that develops mostly by character’s conversation and the theme is hidden in the story line, unfolds through a narrator and reveals clear message. For example, the episode starts with “I will tell such a story” or ends with “Such a story has handed down.” Therefore, Kim’s narrative poems have a closer connection to the Korean traditional genre of Pansori rather than Western Ballard. Pansori can be described as a long epic song or a solo opera drama which carried out by a professional singer. It appeared as a mode of folk literature in 18 century Korea when the populace start to grow after the Feudal system collapsed. It reflected a collective consciousness of the society at the time, using parody and satire.

Kim Chi-Ha’s Damshi is rooted in Pansori and Kim borrowed the traditional genre of Pansori deliberately in order to put his political idea in 1970s since he knew that aesthetics of satire and parody in Pansori. Song Kwang-Sung wrote in his thesis that “Kim’s narrative poem has a factor of an epic story in form and content and a characteristic of ballad in expression and technique.” Im Sang-Seok wrote in his thesis that Kim adopted Pansori and made a new genre Damshi in order to harmonize a specific political drive and the universal aesthetics of traditional genre in which there already is a presence of political orientation. Im wrote that “The pre-modern scene of Pansori is adjusted to the presence of Damshi by its timely modification and fusion with political purpose.” Ko Hyun-Cheol wrote in his article that Kim’s Damshi should be categorized as a Modern Parody, which reflect present situation through old tradition. This was brought to be highlighted by Russian formalists and Michael Bakhtin’s grotesque realism. Ko quotes Kim Chi-Ha that the literature in 1970s should be MinJoong (ordinary

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7 Song Kwang-Sung, 2005. ‘A Study on Narrative Poem Tatong-Ba-Da of Kim gi-Ha, Korean Language Education, Hnamam University, Taejon, Korea p.60
8 Im Sang-seok, ‘The Political Presence of Kim Chi-Ha’s Damshi and the Adoption of Pansori’ PhD Thesis, Korean Literature, Korea University. P.23
people)’s literature of a satire and should be in a form of the people’s literature such as Pansori and Folk tales. 9

Oe exemplifies Kim Ch-Ha’s Tatong-Ba-Da as Grotesque realism quoting Mikhail Bakhtin that Dong is a lively substance since it makes earth futile and brings about new life. Oe point out that Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea of Satire and laughter of populace is the image of grotesque realism. Oe wrote that the Japanese in Kim’s Pansori Tatong-Ba-Da caused a carnival by the action of moving bowl on top of the statue and by the counter act of Korean populace’s clearing the dung. Oe argues that one of the major features of Grotesque realism is that a highly spiritual and abstract idea comes down to a physical, bodily dimension. The earth and body is one united body which cannot be separated. Oe quotes Bakhtin’s thought that the people’s joyous, unreserved laughter in a carnival is the most important part of art.

In the end, I turned to François Rabelais, a forefather of Blake and Yeats. He connected the small body of a human being with the universe. He thought that human laughter is more important than rationality. He also thought about the meaning of the human body, about human desire, appetites, excretions and death and rebirth. These were very human thought. 10

The idea of grotesque realism relies on emotion as laughter rather than on reasoning. In order to achieve a regeneration, the essential process is degradation which lower down all spiritual, abstract idea into concrete bodily desire and material level to form a grotesque body which is “a comic figure of profound ambivalence: its positive meaning is linked to birth and renewal and its negative meaning is linked to death and decay. In Rabelais’ epoch (1500-1800) “it was appropriate to ridicule the king and clergy, to use dung and urine to degrade; this was not to just mock, it was to unleash what Mikhail Bakhtin saw as the people’s power, to renew and regenerate the entire social system.”11

In this Pansori, Tatong-Ba-Da, Japan’s new militarism and self interested behaviour of pro-Japanese Korean is depicted as a harmful opponent who damages life of populace, such as farmers, workers and students. In order to achieve regeneration and coexistence, Oe emphasised the importance of diversified ways not a single united direction and the need for self discipline. Oe writes, “For the purpose of having an achievement in self control, the Korean poet Kim Chi-Ha’s literary work has an educational power.”12 Oe explains that the Japanese image expressed in Tatong-Ba-Da contains not only a satire but also sadness and an elegy as a human being. However, Oe is wondering the fact that there was no mentioning about ‘regeneration’ even though talking about a death.

Kim Chi-Ha wrote about anti Japanese colonialism in 1970s when Korea is well independent. What he is raising an issue here is that we should aware the economical domineering power of Japan and Korean dictatorship that nurtures this happening. Kim In-Hwan wrote in his ‘Kim Chi-Ha’s Damshi’ that the Japan in Kim’s poem is not a country Japan but a symbolic entity as Japan which exists in Korean society. The enquiry that Kim addresses is not what is about Japan but what does Japan do to Korea. Japan means an international monopoly that forces Korea to accept all the unequal subcontracts, a petty official that helps America to perpetuate the division of the Korean peninsula, to

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stir up political situation by encouraging dictatorship and corruption. Kim Chi-Ha recognizes that Japan is in the middle of a hostile power and he tries to conjugate various social movements against it. Kim In-Hwan explained that a struggle for imperialism overlaps a fight for dictatorship and slide down to a multilayered combat, joining a struggle for freedom of expression and strife for women’s liberation. In other words, Tatong-Ba-Da is a gathering place of all unfair oppressive powers that weigh down on populace like a sea of excrement.

Kim Chi-Ha’s philosophy and value system for which is just or fair to populace is based on Dong-hak ideology that cosmic life is growing within every human beings, animals, and plants. To serve the man as an interconnected god( Hanulim) is an uppermost principle. Dong-hak is a Religious thought that originated from Korea in 1860 by SooWoon, Choe Je-woo, who was born in1822 and originally a Confucian scholar. Choe believed in a doctrine of transmigration that nobody can avoid the rhythm of the time in Cosmos, called Un-Se(運勢),can be translated as a ‘fate’. He further developed the oriental thought of Ki(氣), the fundamental energy of cosmos, into ChiKi (至氣), the amazing energy of God. As a prayer, Choe wrote “Chi Ki Keum Chi, Won Wi Dae Kang, Si Cheon Ju, ChoHwa Jeong, Young Se Bul Mang, Man Sa Ji” “(至氣今至 願為大降 侍天主 造化定 永世不忘 萬事知)” The meaning is “Please let me reach to the amazing energy of God now. I wish you come down generously. When we serve God, the marvels of nature unfold and when we don’t forget this forever, we know everything.” Kim Chi-Ha’s equal right of human being is as serious as respect and revere god.

Kim Chi-Ha further developed in a new universal global view, emphasizing on the differences between the Western democratic idea and East Asian thought. Kim points out that in the east, revering human being as a part of interconnected universe is the humanism where as in the west, respecting human rights based on a legal, institutional system of Western Democracy. Kim talked about Chi (氣), an invisible but alive energy as a basis for a creative supplement to the limit of Western science. Kim argues that western thoughts are binary-oppositional thinking but the East Asian notion of Chi, is a non dualistic system, unifying all that opposed and contradictory thought.

‘Tatong- Ba-Da (Sea of Excrement)’ can be heard from http://pppfc.tistory.com/558

**Story starts with a song of Natural Consequences: 2minutes20 seconds**

It has been said from ancient,
One who had a sword met with destruction by the sword,
One who had money was ruined with the money,
Everything in the world and all that happen to human being are
Natural consequences of one’s own deeds.
A strong person who believes only his strength
Thrusts himself to be collapsed
A good climber of trees can fall down from the trees
A good climber of mountains can slip down from the cliffs
A good swimmer can have cramps to be drowned
An absorbed brick layer can go through clattering down of bricks
Chattering person is prone to be abused verbally
Writing a harsh remark is prone to have a trouble by a slip of the pen
Participating in demonstration is prone to be involved in court case.
One who is good at bribery, in taking an advantage, an opportunist, a speculator
When they make a mistake, their various skills are all self destructive,
People said that it was an overly smart person who brought about their own ruin.
Hey, I am going to tell you a fabulous story.
Listen to me well with glaring eyes, with straining ears,
By the chant of ‘Good’ ‘Doing well’
Let’s play with elation. ‘Jota (Excellent)!

**Oe quotes episode 2 Boon Sam Chon-Dae : 2minutes**

1) There lived an incredible Japanese whose sir-name is ‘Boon( ), meaning is excrement,
Name is ‘SamChonDae’ in their pronunciation ‘Zotto Matte’, meaning is ‘wait a moment’.
This fellow was so greedy that he ate everything he can lay his hand on,
Once he swallows, even caustic soda, he never spit it out.
His tummy is fat as Mt. Fuji or Mt. Glutton,
Height is one yard three inches five Poon (=0.1 inch) ,
Round tummy like a drum, thin neck as beans,
Knock-kneed like a duck, look-at-me bottom, help-me knee
Monkey face, tiny slanted eyes,
Moustache of a mouse aggressively set
An up turned nose, small pop-out mouth
Small gourd ears, flea’s forehead
Wearing a pair of wooden clogs that are higher than their height.
Takak Takak
Two dark testicles sagging down, moving east to west, south to north.
Ttalang ttalang

**Oe quotes end part of episode 3: 40 seconds**

2) クソと朝鮮 不倶戴天（ふぐたいてん）の敵。。。 This family had been an enemy to Korea and Excrement
For a long time, generation after generation.
Family order is ‘Kill the corpse of General Lee Soon-Sin with a sword’
Family motto is ‘Stupid bitch Korean’
Family tradition is ‘Hold the action of moving bowl until the day of revenge’

**Oe quotes first part of episode 11: 50 seconds**

3）起死回生 苦尽甘来！…
Look!
Now the majority of world and rules of nature have given us
The great Japanese, Boon Sam Chon Dae, who has been endured humiliation and sufferings,
A right to inveigle and violate Korea as he likes.
Look! Now go forth! Now at last go out to the world!
Dung which has been put up with for a long time, which dung!
Dung, dung. Yes, this is the very dung.
Pujijik, pujijik…
In such a way, the ground has become a sea of excrements. Oe pointed out that students,
ordinary good people, famers and a day labourers appear try to stop the flood of dung,
shouting ‘Cleaning Dung!’ among them the most ugly beggar lead the crowd is Kim Chi-Ha.
Boon Sam ChonDae had ignored the crowds’ asking, at the end he slid on a sparrow’s shits, fall down from the statue of the General Lee and died. (p.207)
Oe quotes last part of episode 12: 50seconds

4) 天皇へいか万歳
Long live the Emperor!
Students, workers, farmers and a daily labours cleaning the Shits
Burning sunset, falling down Sam Chon Dae.
I am done! It’s fate.
Sam Chon Dae has now finished!
Long live the emperor!
In an old tale, there are many people perished like this.
Even nowadays, not only Boon SamChonDae,
People try to collect dung crazily, nurturing dung ceaselessly.
I am wondering the secret of attraction in dung maybe the ruin itself.

CONCLUSION

Kim Chi-Ha’s Damshi ‘Ttong-Ba-Da’ shows a satire of a symbolic figure, Japanese
named Mr. Boon (Shit), as an imperialist who harms the ordinary people. The event of a
Japanese moves a bowl on top of a General Lee Soon-Sin’s statue brought Minjoong’s
clearing action as if a carnival that brings laughter to all of them together. This will bring a
new social order and coexistence and this is Mikhail Bakhtin’s grotesque realism
emphasizing a satire instead of an intellectual understanding. The idea of grotesque
realism relies on emotion as laughter rather than on reasoning. In order to achieve
regeneration, the essential process is a certain degradation which will lower down all
spiritual, abstract idea into concrete bodily desire and material level to form a grotesque
body.

Kim Chi-Ha’s Damshi has a unique position in Korean literature since it made a
link with traditional genre of Pansori and modern narrative poetry. Kim adopted the
characteristics of political presence in Pansori into Damshi using the same method of
expressions of satire and parody. Kim’s Tatong-Ba-Da is the expression of high spirit of
ordinary people against any oppressive powers, Japanese imperialism as a front runner.
Kim Chi-Ha wrote in ‘Song of race, Song of populace(民族의 노래, 民衆의 노래)’ that
The need for an establishment of true Korean literature, literature of the people is felt ever
since under the Japanese occupation. Kim is acutely aware the importance of the
succession of the traditional Korean literature in modern Korea. Kim Hun-Sun wrote that
Kim’s Damshi has a close connection and similarity with Pansori, in attacking with satire
and presenting laughter to populace. Kim culminates in “Kim Chi-Ha’s poetics shows
three distinctive characteristics. One, it formulates a systematic succession of traditional
genres of literature. Two, it unifies the aspects of an activist and of an artist. Three, it is
ambivalent both in theory and in original creativity.”

Kim Chi-Ha’s early period poems can be categorized as a political activism and a
resistance to oppressive power and unjust, then late period poems as life theory based on
his Dong-hak ideology. Kim Chi-ha wrote in his post-scripts of the first anthology of
poems ‘Hwangto’ that he wanted his poem to be a consciousness of many regrettable
situations in Korean peninsula advancing on all four for the ones who are in lament. Kim
also wrote in his Minsyu no koe(金芝河, 民衆の声) under the title ‘Arts is the reflection

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13 Kim Chi-Ha, 1982. Taneun mokmareum euro(타는 목마름으로), Changbi, Pajoo, Korea p.160
14 Kim Hun-Sun, ‘A Study of Kim Chi-Ha’s Poetics金芝河詩學小考’ 韓國文學研究第4輯
of reality 15 that one should express the contradiction and should have courage to change the reality. Then, Kim wrote in his From a Buning Thirst to Sea of Life(타는 목마름에서 생명의 바다로) that the features of life itself are connected and open to change from individual to totality, from universe to human life through the movement of Ki energy. Kim argues that we should change the direction of destruction of environment and life to a movement enforcing the natural freedom of all lives in universe. 16

Kim Chi-Ha visited Japan in 1998 for the first time and his interview was put on Otodani Tatsuo (音谷健郎)’s Bungakun Chikara (文学の力) Kim said that he visited Japan in order to deliver greetings to the people who had helped him while he was in prison and to find out the possibility to overcome a barrier on historical issues and to start a new relationship between the two countries. To a comment that Kim carries a strong impression of a resistance poet in Japan, Kim replied that his philosophy changed so as the Korean political situation and he explained about his new thought. In the interview Kim mentioned that he discovered the importance of ‘life’ when he saw full of the fluffy tuft of a dandelion in the prison cell, he came to understand the ‘life philosophy’, reading and meditating about Buddhist, Dong-hak, Ecology and Science. Now he believes this philosophy, the traditional East Asian thought should be propagated to the world. 17

Kim further explains that western humanism based on a concept of human civilization as a conquest and as a winning over the nature whereas his new humanism, and Yulryeo thought is aiming for the fundamental change of humanity. Yulryeo (律呂) can be explained as music of Cosmos or the order of universe. It is important to recover the relationship between universe and human by cultural activities that are sensitive to understand the change of universe, for example, the change of weather and environmental problem on earth. Kim suggests that East Asia should make a movement towards ‘East Asia Common Life Organization’. He emphasizes the importance of Asia orientation since Asia has the most population and the impact towards an ecosystem is the maximum.

Kim Chi-Ha’s effort to find Korean’s root in Korean originated philosophy Donghak and to express his political idea using the traditional Korean genre of Pansori, should be recognized and appreciated in Korean contemporary literature. However, his Damshi as a modern Pansori will evolve by the populace and his idea of Dong-hak will be understood by individuals of the world naturally, by its own merit. It is interesting to see further development of his Yulryeo thought and the movement in East Asia. The idealism and the utopia has been always a part of human history.

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North Korea's military and economics: Impact of the current economic situation in North Korea to its military capabilities

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to briefly examine the implications of North Korea’s current circumstances and potential reform on its military capabilities. By analyzing the underlying strengths and weaknesses of North Korea’s economy, this paper speculates on the implications it has on its military capability. The paper finds that the current economic situation constrains Pyongyang from formulating any credible policies and moves, which undermines their military’s armament and preparedness. It also argues that even with reform, at least in the short to medium-term, Pyongyang is unlikely to achieve building a credible military leverage vis-à-vis its adversaries, especially in the conventional forces context.

The study will briefly address the following questions: What are the economic dimensions of defence capabilities management? How can we best measure the connections between North Korea’s political economy and military capability? Is potential economic reform going to be productive or counterproductive in military capabilities context? While it is hard to be definitive, uncovering the answers to these questions will provide better insight of North Korea’s military capability, which is a pressing topic in our understanding of North Korea.

How does a state build and maintain its military? Various scholars have extensively studied both scientifically and theoretically how a state formulates its grand strategy, and how it attempts to build a credible military leverage against its adversaries.1 Amongst these, the body of work known as "defence economics" (at times there are variations of the name) has confirmed that the economic circumstances of a state are pivotal in its defence planning and military capabilities.2 There is now the consensus that economic and political variables often enter the strategic planning process as a burden. Hence for the state, capacity to finance this burden is the key to defence planning.

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The purpose of this brief study is to examine how the pressing domestic political economic issues in North Korea are constraining its military institution from formulating an effective military leverage. It finds that the pressing political and economic situation is compelling P'yŏngyang into a mediocre spiral, failing to reconfigure itself to a "win-win" solution to both its internal and external security concerns.

The contents of this paper are as follows. First, the empirical studies on economics and defense are briefly surveyed. Second, we will examine the issues that arise when examining the impact of North Korea's current economic circumstances in the defence planning context. Third, some of the implications of possible economic reform on North Korea's military capability are examined.

**PREVIOUS STUDIES OF ECONOMICS AND THE MILITARY**

While many studies have looked at the relationship between a state's economy and military capabilities, majority of them focus on the aspect of military expenditures, and there is still much conceptual vacancy in regards to country-specific studies of this topic.

The importance of a state's economy in the military context has been confirmed by various scholars, where there is now the consensus that economics would enter the defence planning cycle as a burden that constrains them from giving them the unlimited capacity for military expenditures. However, there is still the question of why some states spend more than others on defence, and what factors influence a state's defence spending.

Many have examined how states have used military expenditure to alleviate problems in a domestic economy. This is plausible. As Garfinkel correctly argues, military spending is largely determined endogenously, resulting from fluctuation in aggregate economic activity. For instance, various studies have looked at the links between military outlays and economic situations. However, the majority of these studies tended to base their analysis on the United States (US) and capitalist states in Europe. Indeed, patterns of defence spending in less developed countries (LDCs) have been discussed by various scholars, albeit broadly. Knoor argued that due to weaker industrial capacities, LDCs are constrained from developing high-tech armed forces. While the argument is true, we must acknowledge that these states are likely to seek ways to circumvent or compensate for their fiscal constraints. Hence, exactly how these states will attempt to improve their

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situation or maximise their military potential under financially straitened conditions will need further study.

There are also some studies that have addressed the economic behaviour of militarist states, but have failed to go beyond merely explaining that the whole industry of these states are mobilised for war. In the context of military expenditure, conclusions offered by scholars seem to be somewhat vague, and even incomplete. For example, Deger and Sen argue that militarist states do not necessarily spend more on defence, and have to stay sensitive to domestic satisfaction, concluding - more legitimate the ruling power, military outlays decreases, but at the same time, military outlays are also pegged to the level of external threat.

Hence, it is not enough to assume that the link between economic situations and military expenditures (or vice versa) is similar in states with differing economic systems, such as command economy. Moreover, even with the same economic systems, we would wonder whether there might not be other crucial influences of a political, ideological, societal or cultural nature. We therefore, need balanced analysis of both country-specifics and fundamental defence planning processes.

**PREVIOUS STUDIES ON NORTH KOREA'S ECONOMY**

Most of the recent studies on the relationship between economic performance and military capability in North Korea report its zero-sum balance between the military economy and its civilian economy. The internal economic and political hardship in the country is becoming increasingly serious, especially in recent years. Snyder best summarises the situation. He questions how much longer P'yŏngyang can "defy gravity". He argues that poor crisis management and the effects of rigid totalitarian political control on the economy are pushing the regime beyond sustainable limits.

Even in relation to North Korea's military capability, some analysts express critical views. Atkeson gives a good summary of the weaknesses of North Korea's military capability with the following:

P'yŏngyang has built a large domestic arms industry, but the industry lacks technology for production of many modern weapons. Particularly, it produces no combat aircraft. On the other hand, it is a leader in the Third World for adaptation of older models of tactical missiles. But even here its inability thus far to provide accuracy to its weaponry inhibits its capacity for providing missiles of practical military value. This will, of course, be overcome in time.

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13 Scott Snyder, "North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future." *Pacific Affairs* 73, no. 4 (2000). Pg.533

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Chŏng Hyŏn-su argues that North Korea's concentrated investment in the military industry has retarded the whole macro-economy to the point that, ironically, it is having negative returns in the military sector.¹⁵

While critics are correct arguing that North Korea's deteriorating economy and lagging technological innovation are undermining its military capability, they make simplistic assumption about the future. It is one thing for P'yŏngyang to recognise its own weaknesses; it is another for it to remedy its economic, industrial and technological troubles.

Eberstadt correctly argues that, "North Korea's prolonged and far-reaching military mobilisation fundamentally affects its overall economic structure and its patterns of economic performance."¹⁶  Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea could afford to turn a blind eye to the economic difficulties and continue to devote its capital to the defence industry. However today, the situation is hitting a critical level, decreasing their purchasing power, and consequently limiting them from investment in new military platforms from China or Russia. In short, North Korea is facing a dilemma of how it can address its failing domestic economy while maintaining the military that is sufficiently capable enough to deter threats from abroad.

Given the dire economic situation, it indicates that North Korea will require extraordinary amount of capital to revive both its military and civilian economy before it can have a conventional force sufficient to compete with its adversaries. In regards to the civilian economy, starvation, poverty and other privations are widespread. This is compounded by a series of natural disasters. Noland asserts, however, that North Korea's natural disasters notwithstanding, the chief cause of its troubles is poor economic management.¹⁷ That is to say, North Korea's options for remedying its economic problems are essentially non-existent, unless it moderates its policies that prioritise the military.

P'yŏngyang has indeed (within limits) been proactive in domestic economic reform and is welcoming foreign investment in recent years. Some analysts, like Lee Jong-hwa, offers an optimistic view, claiming that North Korea's relatively low cost of labour and its natural and human resources give it the potential to catch up with South Korea (ROK) and other East Asian countries.¹⁸ In this table, Lee summarises three possible scenarios for economic reform:¹⁹

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¹⁵ Hyŏn-su; Chŏng, Yong-hwan; Kim, and Wae-sul Kim, Puk-Han Chŏngchi Kyŏngje-Ron (Seoul: Sŏnyŏngsa, 1995). Pg. 238. (in Korean)
¹⁹ Ibid. Pg.109
| Status quo policy | Short-term political stability  
Increasing economic decline in mid-long term  
Dissatisfaction amongst population, leading to eventual political and social collapse |
|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Timid economic adjustments | Continued isolation of population from external influence (Noland 1997)  
Not viable long-term given severity of economy |
| Reform | Fundamental reforms of institutions and economic policies  
Strong military opposition |

Lee Jong-hwa's analysis is convincing. However, Noland warns against such prospects on two grounds:

Economic revitalisation will require considerable institutional change, and experience has shown that it has been more difficult to reform relatively industrialised economies such as North Korea than it is relatively agrarian economies such as China and Vietnam. Moreover, given the degree of implicit distortion in the DPRK economy, liberalisation would result in enormous shifts in the composition of output.20

Both Lee and Noland concentrate on economic considerations. These, however, are only one side of the problem.

The major concern in North Korea is that the insecure totalitarian regime, well aware of its vulnerability, is unlikely to accept anything that might endanger its political control. Lankov argues that reform would compromise North Korea's isolation, thereby increasing the regime's vulnerability; consequently, North Korea will continue to prefer the status quo for the foreseeable future.21 That is, in the eyes of the regime, political risks far outweigh economic prospects. Another critique of economic reform, by Jeon Jei-Guk, maintains that North Korea's political leadership is too rigid and fragile to make changes. Jeon says that the current divide-and-rule strategy brings only short-term stability, but the most pressing task is to alleviate "competition" amongst North Korea's power elites by "cooperation" in order to improve policy effectiveness and foster the long-term survival of the regime.22 Jeon thinks that the "effectiveness of the balancing act might have passed the point of increasing return and entered the phase of diminishing return."23 The issue here is that the "balancing act", may no longer be an option.

By now, we can agree with the forecasts offered by scholars that North Korea's current economic and political trajectory points to an ever-worsening scenario with minimal prospects of improvement or relief. Nevertheless, these forecasts must be treated with caution, as the outlook may not be as bleak as many predict. Most analysts now conclude that North Korea will continue to "muddle through".24 Among them is Levin, who believes that North Korea will get by somehow, and with minimal reform. He argues:

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20 Noland, "North Korea in Global Perspective." Pg.69
23 Ibid
24 Ibid
While North Korea's production capabilities have undoubtedly declined in the face of severe energy shortages, it is important to remember that its economy is a military economy. Absolute priority has always been placed on producing goods for the military. This remains true today, making it impossible to equate the decline in the export of basic manufactured goods with a comparable decline in the production of goods for the military. The sharp export fall may reflect at least in part a leadership effort to preserve as much as possible of production for the military and to rely on international assistance - rather than exports - to pay for food and other imports required by the North Korean masses. A focus on the highest priority items may also attenuate the short-term impact of declining production on the North Korean military. As for production in what passes for the 'civilian' economy, much of this is useless by international standards. Ceasing production at these factories frees up resources for higher priority purposes. Over time, continued decline will pinch both sectors. But as long as the military's most important needs are met, gradual economic erosion is unlikely to cause the system to collapse.25

Levin's argument leaves the internal problems in North Korea blurred. However, this is to be expected, as there are so many uncertainties that veil the fate of North Korea's politics and economy. The question is "whether the glass is half empty or half full". For the purposes of North Korea's strategic policy making, we could suggest half full. Previous studies offer sufficient evidence of the strengths and weaknesses in North Korea's politics and economics, to suggest that its future trajectory will be upwards.

MEASURING THE IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMICS CIRCUMSTANCES ON MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Examining the economic aspects of a defence is indeed an uphill struggle. Indeed, we could return to the basics by agreeing with Baumohl's claims that the quantity of orders for military goods depends on preparations for national defence and implementation of foreign policy.26 Knorr's argument is also credible: "Whatever the structure of the economy, every society faces the same basic questions in regard to production, distribution, budgeting and management of technology."27 North Korea is not exempt from this. However, our study looks at the problem in the military capabilities context, as opposed to military policies and strategic decisions - making analysis more complex.

Does military expenditure accurately reflect military capability? In fact, one of the major challenges is the difficulty in conceptualising military expenditure. The term "military expenditure" covers a wide variety of expenditure items that go far beyond mere military hardware. Huisken outlined the elements of military expenditure: pay and allowances of military personnel, pay of civilian personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, Research and Development (R&D), construction, pensions to retired military personnel, military aid, civil defence, para-military forces, military aspects of activities that are acknowledged as having a joint civil/military function (e.g. space or atomic energy).28 There are further complexities relating to weapons systems, where expenditure can be divided into "non-recurring" (e.g. R&D, initial investment) and "recurring" (e.g. annual operations) cost elements.29 Hence, given all the complexities involved, quantitative gauging often proves extremely difficult, especially when as Brzoska argues,
"governments are basically free to define military expenditure according to their own wishes and purposes."30 This is quite severe when it comes to North Korea.31

Even when data is available, comparing military expenditures in different states can lead to confusion. This was noted by Holzman in his comparative analysis of military expenditure between the USA and the USSR, in which he explained how data produced misleading results, due to exchange rates.32

Despite the difficulties in obtaining accurate and properly comparable figures for military expenditure, many still see military expenditure as an important index.33 Hamm, for instance, even argues that military expenditure is the "single most important indicator of arms build-up and military capabilities".34 Yet, military expenditure only indicates effort; it does not necessarily reflect the quality or quantity of output. As Huiskens points out, it is simplistic to argue that military expenditure accurately reflects military strength; factors such as the limited definition of currency exchange, the slow acquisition nature of "highly capital intensive" modern military forces, and, in particular, military strength are not directly reflected in military expenditure.35

Another caveat arises from the fact that a state's military expenditure may not reflect its military capability, because a portion of the expenditure is devoted to achieving the state's economic ends. For instance, Takesada claims that North Korea has earned as much as two billion US dollars by selling military platforms to states like Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Cuba, Zimbabwe and Myanmar.36 It is possible that North Korea may be committing to high military expenditure as an investment for higher returns, rather than as a campaign to boost its military capabilities. This would in part explain why they have seldom made efforts to modernise their conventional forces.

North Korea's defence expenditures also give contradictory indications depending on whether we measure it in terms of percentage or comparison (to the US, South Korea, Japan, China or Russia). For instance, in percentage terms, North Korea is in fact devoting a significant amount of its economy to the military. However, the actual size of the budget is actually quite small when compared to other states, making the capacity severely constrained and it has limited capacity to make capital procurements or even paying the bills to sustain its forces to boost its military strength.

Given the vague nature of the concept of military expenditure, this raises the concern of whether we should rely purely on fiscal statistics (at least in terms of military outlays) in our effort to find the relationship between North Korea' economic performance and military capability. Indeed, figures do matter, and to a great deal. However, it is

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31 Noland, "North Korea in Global Perspective." Pg.70.
33 Specifically, figures on North Korea’s military spending are inconsistent. See: Taik-young Hamm, "Puk-Han T’ongkye Charyo Bunsŏk Mī T’ch’uŏnjŏng: Kyŏnggi Ch’ôngryang Mī’ Kunsá’i Rŭl Chungsim Ÿro,” in Puk-Han Yong-Ku Pungpŏtron, ed. Kyungnam University - University of North Korean Studies (Han’ul academy, 2004). (in Korean)
34 Taik-Young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas : State, Capital and Military Power, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1999). Pg.163
35 Huiskens and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Meaning and Measurement of Military Expenditure. Pg. 15-17
equally important to determine how the economic burden is implicating on North Korea's military capability. Despite the secretive nature of the Stalinist state, by analyzing the implicit strengths and weaknesses of North Korea's economy and political structure, it is possible to speculate on the constraints to North Korea's military capabilities and policies. Hence, for now, approximate indicators of growth trends may be sufficient, especially if we are dealing with a state where reliable data is rarely available.

**ARE ATTEMPTS AT ECONOMIC REFORM PROVING TO BE PRODUCTIVE OR COUNTERPRODUCTIVE FOR THE MILITARY INSTITUTION?**

So how does this effect North Korea's military capability? If North Korea aims to compete against its adversaries "head to head", perhaps it does seem unlikely that the situation will change. Minnich answers this by claiming that due to fiscal constraints, P'yōngyang has decided to increase its capabilities through a cheaper alternative, by acquiring asymmetric weapons such as weapons of mass destruction (nuclear), chemical/biological weapons and missiles.\(^{37}\) While this is true, it is a band-aid treatment to its weaknesses and fails to address its military objectives.

Continuing along its current trajectory is not so productive. In terms of investment, the North Korean military is likely to get marginal returns given that it is already lagging behind in a region where military modernization is well underway. As Eberstadt correctly argues, "North Korea's 'military burden' is determined not only by government priorities, but by the specifics of the contest into which it has entered. In all likelihood, North Korea's defence industries have been locked into a competition on highly disadvantageous terms. Confronting the US-ROK alliance in a high-tech (and rapidly innovating) military adversary, North Korean defence industries presumably have embarked upon projects where their rates of return upon capital expenditures were extremely low...attempts at military modernization may be especially costly in an economy where technological innovation lags and international avenues of technology transfer are marginal."\(^{38}\)

Given such situation, even if revenue is gained for military modernisation, it does not necessarily mean that all can be devoted to investment in new military hardware. It would require suitable training, upgrading of infrastructure, reconfiguration of tactics, maintenance resources which will increase further costs both in terms of capital and time. Hence the development of missiles and weapons of mass destruction was the only affordable option to get relatively good short-term returns. The stamina of its validity, however, is questionable, and North Korea will require extraordinary amount of capital to revive both its military and civilian economy to have a conventional force for a credible military leverage.

Reform could be a cure, but it is important to note that reform comes in various shapes and sizes. Focusing too much on alleviating the civilian economy will have negative implications on the military, decreasing purchasing power for investment and consumption. On the other hand, continuing to heavily devote resources to the military would hinder development of the overall economy, and provoking increasing dissatisfaction amongst the population.

We could also argue that North Korea's ruling elites are unlikely to shift away from its military-centric economy simply because its military industry is the most influential,

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and only sector of the economy that has shown positive growth. 39 The military industry is networked to a significant portion of the whole economy, and is pegged directly under the control of the central party. 40 Hence it is apt to decisions based on political interests of regime survival. This suggests that not only is reform unlikely, but also it may compel P’yŏngyang to fail in making logical acquisitions of platforms and equipment needed to effectively and efficiently address its security concerns.

The crux of the problem, therefore, seems to lie in the politics that is fixed to the objective of regime survival and unification. The state's persistence for a highly totalitarian militarised society and dependence on ideology is creating a series of problems for North Korea. The political structure of North Korea that created the rigid, highly centralized command and control system is also proving to be one of its critical weaknesses. 41 Needless to say, an effective and efficient command and control system is the backbone to executing military objectives. 42 Hence rigidness in this area would only constrain North Korea from exploiting its capability in a timely manner, while the over-complex nature of the system comes at the expense of effectiveness and efficiency. Ideology is also retarding the process, compromising pragmatic and innovative thinking. For example, the Sa-dae kunsu rosŏn (Four-Point Military Guidelines) 43 seems to be a "spin-off" doctrine of the Sŏn-kun čhŏng-ch‘i, but it seldom keep pace with reality.

The political problem in North Korea is also compounded by questions regarding Kim Chŏngil’s successor. Various experts conjecture about who will succeed the Dear Leader, but basing any analysis on the likely identity of a successor is fraught with risk. However, we can assume that the next leader will require more effort to legitimise his position than his two predecessors. It is also possible to speculate by looking at the tensions between the bureaucrats and the military elites. 44 Assuming that the military has the upper hand, the military institution may enhance its domestic military leverage - a policing role, or even coup d'état. This however, is merely diverting its focus away from the regional environment, compromising its external security policies. The military could also actualise its military potential by further coercing the neighbouring states, although this too, is counterproductive.

In conclusion, North Korea's circumstances and paranoia over its regime security is overstretched its national budget and is only further underminding its military leverage to meet its strategic ends. This is unlikely to change as the military is the sole institution that can realise its ultimate political objective. 45 Ironically, at the same time reality is eating into North Korea's military power, making its military's quantitative strengths its qualitative weaknesses. While the military leverage is valid, its sustainability is questionable. This is mainly because the combat capabilities of its conventional military forces, which are crucial to any military campaign, are starting to wear off. They may continue to pursue asymmetric tactics and weapons (such as nuclear, chemical and

40 Chŏng, Kim, and Kim, Puk-Han Chŏngchi Kyŏngje-Ron. Pg. 245. (in Korean)
44 See: Chin-moo Kim, "Puk-Han Ŭi Chŏngch‘aeKyŏlchŏng Esŏ Kunbu Ŭi Yŏnghyang," in Puk-Han Ŭi Kunsu, ed. Puk-han yŏn-ku hakkŭ (Kyŏng-in munhwasa, 2006). Pg. 84-85 (in Korean)
biological weapons). However, whether this is the true remedy is dubious for now as there are yet to be any signs of significant progress in their nuclear and missile technology.46

Given the current internal situation, an option that offers good returns is more or less non-existent, and logic suggests that P’yŏngyang will opt for an alternative that implicates minimal short-term repercussions. In other words, the dilemmas and symptoms that North Korea suffers to date indicate that more challenges are expected in the medium to long-term, and it is likely that its strategic objectives vis-à-vis the changing power balance in East Asia will only be denied.

References


46 This is especially the case for WMDs and missiles as they seem to be more of a concern in the diplomatic leverage and proliferation context.

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Decentralization and Transformation of Central State in South Korea: The Role of Local and Civil Society

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ABSTRACT

It has been considered as the key to democratic transition and consolidation, yet the ideal of local democracy was by and large overlooked, limited, or delayed by the dominant state power and central political world in Korea. Even when the wave of decentralization proliferated around the world since the 1970s, the hegemonic central power controlled localities and even dominated the process of decentralization. However, despite the prevailing strong centralism, the rise of residents and civic organizations at the local level vis-à-vis the state is viewed as one of the most striking trends in Korean democracy today. Through various forms of feedback channels including direct participation in policy processes, civil society contributed to the construction of decentralized democratic governance in 1990s-2000s. In addition, the practice of full-fledged local democracy since the mid-1990s has created local political arena which is unexpectedly vibrant. In this paper, by analyzing the case of decentralization movements in this period, I argue that civil society at the local level was surprisingly well-mobilized and institutionalized especially at the agenda-setting stage, although its insufficient capacity at implementation and monitoring process faced serious challenge from the central stakeholders.

1. INTRODUCTION

A number of scholars from a variety of perspectives in recent years have pointed to local government and civil society as integral parts of democratic politics. Robert Dahl (1967, 960), for example, portrayed the political and social life of a locality (small community), which permits a wider range of participation and promotes sense of belongings, as an essential part of democracy. In this sense, the concept of ‘decentralization’ is most frequently employed to describe the changing relationship between the state and society as well as the center and periphery. Diamond and Tsalik (1999, 130) put, “local power can figure prominently in an overall system of checks and balances over the exercise of power.”

Countries in Europe and North America since the 1970s have faced strong pressure for political and administrative decentralization, and many developing countries emerging from authoritarian rule are now carrying out an extensive range of decentralization reform in order to dilute the dominant central power (Treisman 2007). Countries in Asian region are no exceptions to this world-wide trend. Newly democratized countries of varying sizes, economic levels, and political systems are moving centralized power down this path, and even the communist country China and some of Islamic countries have introduced certain forms of local democracy (White and Smoke 2005).

The case of Korea is particularly interesting, because decentralization means the end of over fifty years of dominance of centralism and separation from the prototypical ‘strong state’ for her superiority of state and central power over market, society, and

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1 A lot of political thinkers have praised the value of local politics and democracy. See selective examples such as Diamond Tsalik (1999), Ostrom (1990), Putnam (1993), and Tocqueville (1969).
localities. Prior to the 1990s, the structure of central-local relations in Korea remained vertical so that central agencies and ministries could control and command localities without much consideration of local and civic preferences. In the process of strong state-led industrialization, dominance of the center was a necessary evil in the Korean context. For this reason, although the first Constitution (1948) mandated certain forms of local autonomy such as executive election at subnational level, the authoritarian regime (1961-1987) abolished it and introduced a ‘command and control’ system of intergovernmental relations (Seong 2000, 130-1).2 Through various institutions such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, local subdivisions of central ministries, and appointed mayors, the central government effectively mobilized scarce resources to rehabilitate national economy after the Korean War, and controlled democratic development from below. Thus political, financial, and administrative activities of localities were completely under the supervision of central government. The legacy of strong centralism even created a path dependency in the process of reintroducing local autonomy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the newly launched local autonomy was the product of package deal among political elites at the center (Lee 1996, 64).

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<th>Administration</th>
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<td>○ Delegation of the Authority of Public Security (Police)</td>
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Source: Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA, 2003)

However, under the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun governments, more comprehensive plans for decentralization such as *Special Law on Decentralization Promotion* (hereafter SLDP, 2004) were enacted, as Table 1 indicates. Those laws, although still faced with a lot of limitations as Rozman (2002) pointed out, contained somewhat radical changes, which could be a threat to the status of existing central organizations and political stakeholders. For example, transferring central decision making authority and functions to localities and the abolition of special administrative agencies literally means shrinkage of ministerial power. Indeed, as a consequence of decentralization reform that was intertwined with broader administrative reform programs, some of ministries were at risk of reorganization in the late 1990s. For the central government, the process of distribution of functions between levels of governments, in fact, included bargaining over the jurisdictions with local governments that were subservient to central authority in the past. Through the aforementioned laws, the territorial structure of the state was reorganized in the sense of giving more decision-making power and control over resources, and more responsibilities to the non-central

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2 The regime’s rationale was that it was still far too early to embrace local elections and autonomous administrative system given the confrontational relationship with North Korea (Kim, 2006: 64).
tiers of government. Therefore, despite the existing flaws in those legislations, there is no
doubt that those attempts were more than marginal adjustments.

In this changing central-local relationship, the puzzle is why central politicians and
bureaucrats whose resistance was the main hindrance in past reform efforts agreed – or
compromised – to decentralization reform agendas. Even with the most recent reforms,
some politicians and National Assemblymen proposed the abolition of local elections and
return to central appointment of mayors and governors by pointing out the superiority of a
centralized system (Joong-Ang Daily December 17th, 2000). Conventional understanding
on the development of central-local relations may argue that decentralization in Korea is
conditioned by negotiation among strong interests at the center, and as it is, the
explanation is to some extent true in the history of past series of decentralization reforms
(Kim 2006; Park 2006; Seong 2000). Under this prevailing centralism, is the political
meaning of the latest decentralization reforms really to move away from the former statist
tradition?

Unlike the conventional wisdom stated above, I argue that the laws for
decentralization that have materialized in the legislative branch in the early 2000s would
not exist if it were not for the input from local and civil society. Even if we cannot expect
complete change or massive migration of state power to localities, the consistent and
institutionalized support from below for local democracy can contribute to framing
relevant policy debates and possible range of changes (Moon and Ingraham, 1998;
Campbell, 2004). Top-down decisions for national policies without serious consideration
of local and social preferences are no longer taken for granted. Governors and mayors
publicly criticizing central political power on mass media or citizen demonstrations as an
attempt to change central policies are no longer unusual (Bae and Sellers 2007). Building
on efforts to emphasize the growing voices from local governments and civil society over
decentralization issues, I demonstrate how local governments (associations) and civic
organizations made an impact on the passage of decentralization bills through a) various
types of civic movements, and b) direct participation in the legislative processes as outside
experts, representatives of civic groups, or governmental appointees. I argue that local and
civil societies were surprisingly well-mobilized, institutionalized, and influential
especially at the agenda-setting stage, though their incapacity at implementation and
monitoring process resulted in somewhat skewed decentralization laws in the final form.

2. INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LOCAL POLITICS IN SOUTH KOREA

Korea experienced a remarkable development in democracy in the last two decades since
its democratic transition in 1987, before which time the authoritarian regime had
forcefully suspended the practice of local democracy for thirty years. Even in the 1990s
when political elites endeavored to reorganize local governments, the practice of full-
fledged local democracy was a relatively new phenomenon. Therefore, local autonomy in
Korea is often described as ‘delayed decentralization,’ ‘local democratic lag,’ or ‘late
adoption of local democracy’ (Kim 2006; Seong 2000). These descriptions drew attention
to weak local civil society, weak local capacity, nationalized political systems, or weak
democratic culture among the general public as backdrops for prolonged delay of local
democracy in contemporary Korea. In the postwar period, in particular, the ruling
authoritarian regimes intentionally avoided empowering localities for various reasons.

The series of decentralization under authoritarian regime, therefore, were
incomplete. All politics of decentralization were national, and the bills for reform were
mainly products of package deal among political elites. Voices and preferences from
below were ignored in the processes of reform (Kim 2006). Even under civilian
governments, the logic of national politics was deeply rooted in curving the direction of reform bills in a way that central government maintained a considerable level of leverage over localities and civil society (Seong 2000, 145). Overall, the political power of localities remained functionally and financially limited and politically passive up until late 1990s (Park, 2006).

However, compared to the earlier phase of local democracy during the age of authoritarian regime, the central-local relationship in Korea took a big leap toward local democracy, and this development provided two important circumstances to pursue more advanced decentralization reform in the 2000s. First of all, despite existing limitations and controls from the center, the practice of local elections since 1995 has created “local political arena” that opened up public sphere for local citizens. As Figure 1 indicates, intellectuals as well as local citizens assessed the local elections and autonomy for the preceding 10 years to be a substantial development in terms of political participation, and policy channels from local society to the central government diversified through various new institutions and procedures (Bae and Sellers 2007, 546-7). For example, local citizens can request their governments to disclosure public information (from 1996), present a petition for revising or abolishing local ordinances or bylaws (from 2000), participate in local budgeting process (from 2004), and even oust incompetent local executives (from 2006). In addition, several systems such as neighborhood council were introduced in order to encourage citizen participation.\(^3\) It is hard to say that the rates of citizen participation through these institutions and systems increased substantially, yet at least citizens have “formal” channels to vent their views on everyday issues at the local level. In spite of the existing control of central government and given new opportunity of citizen participation, the influence of citizens and civic organizations on the local politics have become increasingly vocal (Bae and Sellers 2007; Moon 2003), and this growth of local and civil society played crucial roles as buttresses for Roh Moo-Hyun government’s strong drive for decentralization reform.

Second, changes in domestic and global political-economic environments in the 1990-2000s have promoted a favorable circumstance for advancing decentralization. Up until the mid-1990s, the strength of highly centralized and efficient Korean economy received high marks internationally by maintaining the lowest level of unemployment rates and national account deficit, as well as the highest level of prosperity. Yet economic downturn led to the questioning of centralized policymaking and geographical concentration, and general public lost confidence in the central government (Kim 2003).

\(^3\) In addition to these systems and institutions, civic organizations have been funded from the government based on Non-Profit Organization Aid Law since 2000.
Under these favorable conditions for pursuing political, administrative, and economic reform, the election of a ‘decentralization-minded’ President Roh Moo-Hyun and the growth of local and civil society were more than just gathering some brushwood to make a fire of reform.⁴ The following case analysis of decentralization politics around the legislation of SLDP in 2003-2004 will show how local and civil society played a crucial role in materializing the law under these circumstances.

2.1. The Process of Decentralization under the Roh Government

Since Korea’s democratization in 1987, decentralization reform has long been proposed as an integral part of ‘grass-root’ democracy, which was the most recurring (or rhetoric) topic in the political world. In particular, the former President Roh Moo-Hyun employed unprecedented decentralization reform programs as one of the top priorities of his reform agendas. The main goal of decentralization reform in this period was to foster mutually cooperative and equal relations between the center and localities through various types of decentralization strategies such as the transfer of authorities; de-concentration of population, public agencies, and businesses; and the division of labor between them (PCNBD 2004, 20). Unlike those past reforms, decentralization programs in this phase (2003 – present) were carried out under strong political leadership – in particular, a reform-minded president – and decentralists in the governmental reform agencies and committees.

The Roh government claimed that the illness of Korean politics and economy was a result of the inefficient distribution of resources between the center and periphery, and suggested five directions for major reform – what is so called ‘roadmaps’ – such as administrative reform, public personnel reform, e-government, financial and tax reform, and decentralization. Among them, the decentralization roadmap was designed to realign the structure of central-local relations within a given time period. In order to prevent wasteful political debates or delay at the central political arena as did in the past, the roadmap containing somewhat concrete guidelines included “first delegate then

⁴ President Roh (2003-2008) declared himself as a decentralist. He showed strong intent to carry out decentralization, de-concentration, and balanced development policies during his term in office. Surprisingly, even when he was a maverick politician and National Assemblyman, he expressed his great interests in decentralization and de-concentration, had a connection with prominent scholars, and established a private research institute by himself, namely, the Center for Local Autonomy in 1993.
complement,” “local affairs should belong to resident’s hands,” and “must delegate both functions and authority” (PCGID 2003). With these guidelines in the roadmap, ministries and agencies at the center were mandated to draw out a somewhat detailed list of decentralization tasks to be transferred to localities.

In the process of making the roadmap, the central political actors could not take unilateral action anymore. Instead, the roadmap was a product of political deliberation among various stakeholders including local governments and civil society. Since December 2002 when President Roh was elected, the Presidential Transition Committee (PTC), which became the Presidential Committee on Government Innovation and Decentralization (PCGID) after the Roh’s inauguration, organized several meetings, conferences, and hearings to express their opinions regarding the decentralization project from non-political and non-bureaucratic actors. For example, the PTC held conferences with the Civic Movement for Decentralization (CMD), the biggest civic organization devoted to decentralization to settle the different opinions between them (January 21st and February 5th of 2003). Based on the claims from non-governmental actors and local governments, the PTC’s series of surveys, and the experiences of the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA), the Roh administration could map out a big picture for decentralization in 2003 (PCGID 2003). In doing so, politicians became less motivated and took on a wait-and-see attitude, while there were lively debates and tension between civil society/local government groups and bureaucrats in central ministries, because civic groups and local governments favored more radical promotion of local autonomy. Powerful ministries at the center – such as the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) which had to delegate a lot of power and budget to local governments – were clearly reluctant to accelerate the promotion of decentralization. Under these circumstances, the possibility of the passage of the law was not so optimistic by the early December 2003, yet the PCGID and MOGAHA endeavored to reconcile their different interests. As a consequence, the SLDP which was the most important legislation in the history of Korean decentralization was passed in the National Assembly in 2003. This law is meaningful in that central agencies and politicians forcefully and legally mandated the pursuit of decentralization, as Japan did with its Decentralization Promotion Law (1995). Though the SLDP was a somewhat procedural rather than a substantive law, it addressed several important points of decentralization reform.5

To summarize, the decentralization roadmap and the legislation of the SLDP as well as other de-concentration projects under the Roh government reflect the reconciliation of diverse opinions and the debate among vested interests. Due to the long tradition of state-led development and centralism, the role of subnational bodies and civic communities was not noticeable in the past series of decentralization reform, as stated above (Kim 2000). Yet, as time passed and the practice of local democracy consolidated, the concern of local residents, civic associations, and democratically elected local politicians became stronger, and they gradually expressed their views on many local affairs. The growing concerns for decentralized governance from below became strong political resources for decentralists in promoting the reform. The 2000s decentralization reform in Korea, therefore, can be labeled as ‘collaborative decentralization.’

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5 The SLDP raised the following issues in the central-local relationship: a) unbalanced distribution of national and local affairs (75%: 25%), b) imbalance of financial resources between the center and localities, c) restricted legislative and executive power of local governments, d) lack of institutions for conflict resolution, and etc.
2.2 Rise of Civic Organizations and Policy Competition over Decentralization

After the 1990s, civil society successfully transformed their focus of movements from democratization to democratic consolidation and new social movements, and it has created an atmosphere for citizen participation in various policy areas and reform processes (Kihl 2005; Lee and Arrington 2008). Since then, more than 50% of currently active civic organizations were established and some of big civic coalitions have started to enjoy their power over national, regional, and even international affairs (Kim and Moon 2003).

In the 1990-2000s, the most distinctive strategy of advocacy non-government organizations (NGOs) as well as other civic movements was to mobilize at the center in order to influence policymaking process (Lee and Arrington 2007, 81-2). Because their main target and the public’s desire were to transform highly centralized state power and business conglomerates, it was easier to get public support and escape from their parochial position by showing their visibility in central policymaking. In addition, nationalized NGO politics provided geographical advantage in networking with important political figures or making allies.

In this light, Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), which have played a crucial role in promotion of democracy and political-economic-social reform in Korea, expressed their interests in decentralization reform. CCEJ was originally focused on issues of economic justice such as economic inequality, education problems, business-labor relations, urban poverty, consumer rights and so forth, yet since 1993, it has extended its interests to various governance issues (Namkoong, 2007). CCEJ established the Committee of Local Autonomy as one of its specialized policy community and hired several intellectuals in order to advance asymmetrical central-local relationship. By organizing conferences called “Exhibition for Local Government Reform” since October 2000, CCEJ has contributed to national dynamization of the debates on decentralization nationally. Because of its ideologically midway position, CCEJ was more interested in bettering central-local system, while PSPD tended to lean toward “left emphasized” democracy and citizen participation issue. Therefore, CCEJ’s major concern was to upgrade intergovernmental relationship through institutional reforms such as efficient distribution of national affairs between central and local governments, granting educational autonomy, introduction of local police system, and so forth.6

PSPD also organized a coalition for local autonomy (Regional Solidarity for Participatory Local Autonomy) by bonding 18 civic organizations and actively expressed their views on decentralization movement. The direction of PSPD’s decentralization movements reflected its progressive color and thus was mainly interested in checking state power, democratization of local community power structure, and electoral movements.

In addition, some civic groups composed of private experts in administrative reform were concerned with decentralization. For instance, the Citizen’s Coalition for Better Government (CCBG) led by professionals and scholarly groups deeply engaged in issues related to reinventing governments. Unlike somewhat radical groups such as PSPD, this professional group chose to reflect its opinion on decentralization bills through legal, non-confrontational, and midway strategies. CCBG organized monthly policy forum and published many reports on governmental reform issues. Their professional perspectives were taken seriously and considerably incorporated in Roh Moo-Hyun government’s overall reform programs and roadmaps (Namkoong, 2007). As such, nationalized civic

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6 I. Kim, interview on October 26th, 2005.
organizations gradually became professionalized and played as the role of umbrella organizations.

Rather than these national organizations at the central level, however, a local-based civic organization, Civic Movement for Decentralization (CMD) was the most active single-issue civic group for decentralization since November of 2000. Unlike the ‘general-purpose’ civic organizations like CCEJ, PSPD, and CCBG at the national level, the CMD started decentralization movements as a local-based civic group in regional cities by mobilizing local elites as well as residents. By bringing decentralization and regional disparity issues to the fore, it could mobilize local citizens in big cities such as Taechŏn and Taegu which were suffering from devastating economic difficulties. In particular, at the initial stage of the SLDP legislation, the activities and concerns of the CMD influenced governmental bills for decentralization and nationally balanced development. Its activities for the promotion of decentralization progressed in two directions: a) mobilization of NGOs at the grass-root level and b) direct participation in politics.

First, ‘decentralization-minded’ local intellectuals such as local university faculty, local journalists, and local businessmen joined their forces to the CMD and were involved deeply in the movements. In 2001, about 3,000 intellectuals and the CMD members held a mass meeting, namely ‘the National Intellectuals’ Declaration for Decentralization’ in front of the National Assembly (Yŏnhap News, September 3rd, 2001), and declared the ‘local charters’ on March 22nd of the same year. In addition, to prompt at the grass-root level on the issue of decentralization, the CMD organized several academic meetings, workshops, and conferences in cooperation with local governments and their associations. Professor groups in the organization also presented several scholarly works on the effect of decentralization and drew up their own ‘Decentralization Promotion Bill’ and ‘National Balanced Development Bill’ which improved upon earlier versions of the governmental bills in July 2003.

Second, the CMD attempted to influence politicians and central bureaucrats by directly and indirectly participating in real political world. In particular, as one of electoral politics strategies, it invited three major presidential candidates – Lee Hoe-Chang, Roh Moo-Hyun, and Kwŏn Yŏng-Gil – right before the 2002 election, and prompted them to publicly make an agreement to actively pursue decentralization policies if they were elected (Chibang Punkwŏn Kukmin Hyŏpyak Sŏyaksik).7 This electoral strategy was somewhat successful in attracting politicians’ attention to the issues of decentralization. Additionally, the members of CMD personally lobbied for solid support from National Assemblymen to propose the decentralization promotion bills.

As a result of these activities and events to gain public attention and influence governmental bills of decentralization and balanced development, the vague concept of decentralization solidified into a firm request to the central government and political world. The dramatic rise of civic power around the issue of decentralization since 2000s have become critical in setting governmental agendas and the strong request from below was by and large reflected in the final version of the SLDP.8 Indeed, the opinion of civic organizations was seriously considered and adopted by the PCGID and MOGAHA bureaucrats in the early stage of agenda-setting for decentralization. This is because these pro-decentralization actors at the center wanted to gather specific information and proposals that were closer to the real situation of localities, and did not want to be blamed

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7 S. Ahn, interview on October 12th, 2005. He mentioned that the ultimate goal of the CMD was to put decentralization agendas on each presidential candidate’s campaign pledges.
8 Yoon, ibid; S. Ahn, ibid.
for ‘closed decision-making processes’ of decentralization reform. Empowered status of civic organizations in politics was reflected in this changed attitude of central actors in the politics of decentralization in the 2000s. In fact, the final form of SLDP was the product of dynamic discussion and debates among central actors, local governments, and civil society through various types of conferences and public hearings. Therefore, unlike conventional understanding, there have been vibrant and stronger politics at the grass-root level around decentralization reform.

2.3 Partnership with Local Government Associations

Before the 1990s, Korean local governments contributed to national politics by doing a minimal work on local agendas, and local residents were supposed to devote all of their attention to issues of national importance – not to their own community issues (Park 2006). Yet as localities rapidly urbanized and local democracy gradually consolidated after the 1990s, the political actors of localities were expected to play a crucial role with its efforts going to the construction of decent and competitive local communities by promoting decentralization. In addition, the growth of local governments and local political figures has become crucial in national politics as well as that of local communities, and there has been growing criticism on the central government’s excessive control over local governments. Local governments’ pressure for decentralization has been mainly expressed through the activities of four local government associations which were established in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In particular, collaboration with civic organizations was the key to moving the central government toward decentralization.

Through various lobbying activities, local government associations called for a holistic approach to the division of power within the nation by refusing the central government’s incremental strategy. To achieve the goal, “decentralize first and make up later” principle, the four associations organized an executive committee for negotiation with the central government, and prepared their own bill for the promotion of decentralization by cooperating with civic activist groups such as the CMD and CCEJ. For example, four local government associations and the CMD invited some National Assemblymen who were interested in decentralization and held a forum in order to discuss the future direction of the decentralization bills (September 3rd 2003). In addition, the CMD, CCEJ, and PSPD organized several intellectual meetings, workshops, and conferences on an ad hoc or regular basis, whenever there were issues requiring collaborative actions with local governments and their associations. In doing so, civic organizations and local government associations could make alternative decentralization proposals containing more comprehensive and radical decentralization plan against central government’s bills. Therefore, for civic organizations, networking with local governments through four associations was invaluable addition to their empowered position as policy competitor vis-à-vis the state.

2.4 Direct Participation through Governmental Positions

Decentralization reform (broadly political-administrative reform) requires more professional knowledge and a deeper understanding of the nature of governmental affairs, financial system, and policy implementation process than other social issues. In this respect, the trend is professionalization of civil society, and a considerable number of scholarly groups as a part of civil society have been deeply engaged in decentralization

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9 Yoon, ibid.
10 S. Ahn, ibid; I. Kim, ibid.
movement since the 1990s. On the one hand, the scholarly groups as special advisors of civic organizations contributed to facilitating decentralization by shaping public debates and advising political and administrative leaders through professional writings, discussions, media appearances, and scholarly researches on problems and promises of decentralization. Although the role of scholarly groups in the process of democratization movement was limited, they have become crucial groups of civic organization since 1990s. Even civic groups such as CCBG, which is a specialized civic organization for administrative reform, was created by intellectuals in 1997, and about 60% of the standing operation committee are professor groups in the public administration field (Namkoong, 2007). They served as presenters or discussants as representatives of civil society such as CCEJ, CCBG, and PSPD in public discussions, conferences, and hearings with regard to decentralization, and also contributed to various publications and policy reports containing highly technical and specialized issues. Consequently, scholarly groups armed with specialized knowledge provided important discursive background for civic organization activities, and contributed to the formation and direction of reform programs in the earlier stages.

In addition a more direct mode of intellectual groups’ participation in policymaking has been accelerated in Roh Moo-Hyun government. Firstly, a number of scholarly groups that were recommended by civil society became members of governmental advisory committees. The prototypical role of advisory committees is to advice president or governmental ministries and to deliberate policies at a relatively earlier stage of the policymaking process (Schwartz 1998). For instance, the PCGID is an advisory committee dealing with government innovation, reform, and decentralization issues. Yet because it was established by the pledge of President Roh in 2003, it was powerful enough to take initiative in the decentralization and administrative reform. The empowerment strategy for President Roh was placing people who were familiar with decentralization ideas and affiliated with him closely. Many of the chairmen and members of the PCGID had worked closely in civic organizations in the past and received strong support from the president. About 50% of the PCGID members came from university-level institutions and most of them were directly or indirectly related to civic organizations. Under this favorable circumstance, the PCGID could develop a diverse set of decentralization strategies, tasks, and rules, and mandated central ministries to carry out those affairs. The ‘Trojan horses’ left in the committee, as a consequence, made a great impact on the formulation of decentralization bills by diffusing decentralization ideas throughout governmental organizations and putting various interests together.

Second, some scholars directly held higher positions in governmental organizations and orchestrated the overall process of decentralization reform. For example, Professor Byung-Joon Kim who had taught urban public administration and local autonomy at a university in Korea was originally a core member of the Presidential Transition Committee (PTC) from December 2002 to February 2003 for President Roh and had strong academic background and practical experiences in government innovation and decentralization. Kim served in numerous governmental institutions, especially decentralization reform related positions such as the Chairman of PCGID (2003-2004), the Head of Policy Office of the Blue House (2004-2005), and the Vice Prime Minister of

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11 For example, PSPD which aimed to contribute to governmental innovation through monitoring governmental institutions were mostly composed of professionals such as lawyers, professor groups, and so forth (Namkoong, 2007).
12 This is because scholarly groups generally have a tendency to avoid confrontational and illegal “movements on streets.” Namkoong (2007).
Education and Human Resources (2006-2006). The positions were not just nominal. He took the leadership in the whole process of decentralization reform and exercised his authority in the loop of the power circle. In addition, Min-won Lee, a professor of Kwang-Ju University and a specialist in decentralization, was appointed as the leader of the PCNBD. He had worked with the Kwang-Ju branch of CCEJ and Coalition for Innovating Local Governments in the past, and engaged in the issues of local affairs and decentralization. With this substantial political power, it would be a clear mistake to downplay the expertise of qualified outside specialists in comparison with tenured technocrats in central ministries in the politics of decentralization. The political appointees held explanatory seminars and meetings for the National Assemblymen – in particular, members of the Subcommittee on Administrative Autonomy and Subcommittee on Legislation and Judiciary, who were in charge of the passage of the decentralization law, and in doing so, they provided their professional knowledge and ideas which were important for the assemblymen to be familiar with.

As a result, the activities of the political appointees from scholarly and civil society were noteworthy in pushing reform measures in the Roh administration. The Roh administration was often called “committee government” because many governmental committees were established and many core governmental agendas and reform policies were mushroomed in the deliberative process of the committees. Under these circumstances, the participation of civil society in various modes was essential in integrating various groups of social forces and governmental actors. Well-educated and reform-minded specialists in the committees provided innovative ideas to governmental reform projects, and contributed to developing blueprints for decentralization and innovation. Because decentralization, local autonomy, and innovation of government were relatively well-known subjects for civic activists from the academic world, their direct influence over the decentralization produced somewhat ‘feasible alternatives’ (Namkoong, 2007). Scholarly groups under the authoritarian regime were considered as mere outside advisors that legitimized excessive control over localities and civil society, yet scholar groups belonged to civic groups played a role as think tanks widening intellectual spectrum of public debates and providing practical knowledge for current decentralization reform drive.

**3. CONCLUDING REMARKS: DECLINING STATE POWER?**

Even in the era of local democracy, the political debates and legislative politics for decentralization in Korea were mainly held in the central political arena. Conventional understanding on the politics of decentralization may argue that for countries like Korea where domestic political structure is highly centralized and the state has presented obstacles to the promotion of decentralization, vested interests at the center dominate the whole process of reform. Indeed, met with strong resistance from powerful central ministries and non-supportive national politicians, some urgent reform issues were delayed. Up until the late 1990s, the voices from below were largely rejected or ignored by those central stakeholders, because decentralization literally meant sharing powers with local and civil society and shrinkage of central organizations and state power. Even bureaucrats in certain ministries organized mid and street level civil servants and made an opposition group namely “A Team for Keeping MOGAHA” in order to systematically respond to governmental reorganization or massive civil servant dismissal (August, 2003). Under this strong centralism and state power, the series of decentralization reform were not successful.

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However, the politics of decentralization under Roh Moo-Hyun government shows a somewhat different pattern from the past. The growing concerns from civil society and localities contributed to framing political discourses over decentralization issues at the center. The practice of local elections and autonomy for ten years under strong state ironically nurtured the political capacity of local and civil society actors, and broadly shared values and perceptions on the necessity of decentralized governance among them mobilized local elites, intellectuals, civil society actors as well as local politicians for the pursuit of decentralization reform. Therefore, the input and pressure from local and civil society were reflected to a large extent in the final version of decentralization legislation.

Nevertheless, it is hard to say that the strong state is dwindling or collapsed for several reasons: First, the position of local and civil society has become ‘passive’ after they successfully passed the SLDP in December 2003, because the responsibility of implementation of the law belonged to central ministries. The lack of monitoring power could not ensure the faithful implementation of transfer of power to localities, and the opposition from ministries reemerged in this process.

Second, the rise of civil society and localities was dependent upon the top political leader, and thus civic activists could not produce stable influence over the reform. Indeed, in the later part of his tenure in the office, President Roh focused more on relocation of the capital and North Korean issues, and his political allies and advisors faced serious criticism for mismanagement of national affairs and for scandals. Therefore, the discussion about decentralization gradually faded away from the priority of national agendas. Thus, the civil society’s development of policy channels to the center of power is still loosely institutionalized.

Finally, the mobilization for decentralization in Roh administration was quite an elite-centered movement. Local politicians, professors at local universities, businessmen, and local journalists who participated in civic organizations were well aware of the problems stemming from the asymmetric power relations between the state and society. Yet in terms of mobilization of grass-root basis for achieving local autonomy was need to be empowered beyond the level of just formal participation of elections.

Again, despite above limitations, it is still noteworthy to unravel the hidden role of civil society and localities in the politics of decentralization. The theories of pork-barrel politics or political gridlock cannot provide sufficient explanation on recent development of decentralization without the consideration of surprisingly vibrant local and civil society. Even bureaucrats and central politicians recognize the power of civil society and prefer to maintain the status quo under the pressure of reform and loosen connection of political gridlock.

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Koguryŏ Buddhism: Pacifist Religion in a Multi-ethnic Warrior Kingdom

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ABSTRACT

Evidence for Koguryo Buddhism is extremely limited, and even the attribution of that evidence to the period is often contested. This leaves much room for interpretation, but the context must be appropriate, taking into account the nature of the state and its people. After surveying and evaluating all the archaeological and written evidence, it is clear that the evidence has to be compared with that for the neighbouring areas of China. Virtually all the written evidence has ultimately come from Chinese sources and the archaeological materials suggest links with the Xianbei tribes, who founded states bordering Koguryo. Most of the monks connected with Koguryo were probably members of immigrant families recruited into the Xianbei states by the ruling Murong clan. The chief sources of Buddhism entering Koguryo were probably Shentong Monastery in Shandong, Longcheng and the nearby complex of Wanfo tang. The Xianbei, while adopting Buddhism, were like the Koguryo ruling clans; warlike and ruling over vanquished farming populations. This similarity may have been a reason for Buddhism entering Koguryo. The conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that we can only speak of Buddhism in Koguryo for at most 250 years, that it had shallow roots and was mostly confined to the court and to some of the immigrant Chinese and Xianbei refugees. The majority of Koguryo people instead likely retained their indigenous beliefs.

It is unlikely that Koguryŏ Buddhism will ever be well understood because of the scarcity of evidence, which is restricted to small quantities of archaeological data, a handful of epigraphical inscriptions, and a number of late or fragmentary and foreign records. Compounding the problem are the conflicting interpretations of Koguryŏ society by Korean and Chinese historians who read contemporary nationalist concerns back into the past. How one conceives of Koguryŏ society largely determines the understandings reached from the meagre evidence about Buddhism in Koguryŏ.

Koguryŏ was a multi-ethnic kingdom ruled by mounted warrior tribes originating from the north in Puyŏ, with local Ye and Maek farmers and other groups, likely the ancestors of modern Koreans, plus Chinese and Xianbei migrants and captives brought to bolster the rulers’ powers and those living in captured territories. For much of its history, Koguryŏ was fighting aggressive wars of expansion or defending itself against other states and tribal confederations. Apparently then Koguryŏ would seem to have provided little fertile ground for the implantation of a foreign, pacifist religion. Yet in China after 317, Buddhism was favoured by the nomadic and militaristic foreign regimes that conquered North China, partly because Buddhism was non-Chinese and claimed to provide powers to win battles and ward off disasters, could assuage remorse for horrific acts, and provided technicians and advisors in the form of Buddhist monks.1 However, Koguryŏ does not

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seem to have favoured Buddhism to nearly the same extent, possibly because it had fewer Chinese subjects.

**Evidence**

The evidence for Koguryo Buddhism is extremely scarce and largely disconnected. There are no extant funerary stelae for Koguryo monks dating from this period and no texts by Koguryo monks survive. Even the passages attributed to Sǔnnang (d. 512), championed by Korean nationalists as the only Koguryo Buddhist author, were written in China, and may not even be his own ideas. Indeed, I suspect he was a Chinese from a newly conquered district.2 There are at most only four or perhaps five short, some incomplete, inscriptions, some with disputed dates and provenance.3

**Documentary evidence**

The documentary or narrative histories are also less than reliable, for they are late, or foreign, or biased. Of these domestic histories, the *Samguk sagi* dates to 1145 and was by a pro-southern Confucian, a descendant of Silla nobility, Kim Pusik, who saw Silla as the most legitimate of the three kingdoms and had put down a northern, irredentist rebellion by the monk Myoch’ông, who wished to shift the capital northwards to P’yŏngyang, into the old Koguryo heartland. While Kim Pusik cited older Korean sources, his account was heavily reliant on Chinese sources and contained little on Koguryo Buddhism.4

The second domestic historical source is the *Haedong kosŭngjŏn*, a series of hagiographies modelled on the Chinese *Gaosengzhuan* series, compiled on royal command in 1215 by Kakhn (-1230). Kakhn was abbot of Yŏng’ŭng Monastery located near the Koryŏ capital of Kaesŏng. The text is incomplete, only two of at least five chapters extant, but these two chapters probably contained all the Koguryo material available then. All current texts were likely based on only one manuscript found by the controversial monk Yi Hoegwang around 1914. Most of the extant text is based on Chinese sources and is relatively prudent.5

The third domestic source, the *Samguk yusa*, traditionally attributed to the Sŏn monk, Iryŏn (1206-1289), but now known to have additions and notes by Muḡŭk (1251-1322), was based in part on monastic records that fabricated ancient origins for their monasteries and foundresses, which probably accounts for the varying records about Ado (Ch. Adao), for example,6 and for differing dates for the shift of a monastery residence by Pojang in 650 or 667.7 The process of compilation of this book seems to have taken a long time and it may not have been completed or published until 1394, about a century

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after it was started.8 The text then must be considered very unreliable, for it has Adao, who arrived in Koguryō from China in 374, curing a daughter of the Silla king Mich’u (r. 262-286) in 264. Nor had the compilers bothered to correct the evidently contradictory dates as found in its source, the Haedong kosūnjōn.9 Moreover, it has a pro-Silla stance, and can only be used for Koguryō Buddhism with the utmost care.10

Thus historians must also turn to Chinese sources. Hence the earliest record of Buddhism supposedly being present in Koguryō is of a letter to a certain Gaoli Daoren, usually read as a “monk of Koguryō,” by Zhidun (a.k.a. Daolín, 314-366) praising Fashen (286-374). Zhidun and Fashen lived in an area to the south of Kuaijí, which was to the east of the southern capital, that of the Jin, at Jiankáng. This was a long distance from Koguryō, separated by a hostile state in Former Qin. All there is of the letter, unfortunately, are the praises of Fashen, as would be expected in the place it is quoted, Fashen’s hagiography in the Gaosengzhuan:

The Senior Ju Fashen is a pupil of Lord Liu of Zhongzhou [Liu Yuanzhen],11 who embodied virtue…and currently is on Mt Yang in Shan Prefecture.12

As Zhidun and Fashen were gentry monks much given to clever dialogue and the interpretation of prajñāparamitā via the native Chinese xuexue (profound learning),13 the recipient of the letter likewise must have been a member of an elite, fluent in literary Chinese, possibly even a member of the Chinese community inside Koguryō. Descendants of Chinese lived in the Lelang and Daifang regions through the 350s and even as late as 404, and some Chinese refugees like Dong Shou (d. 357) also came to live in Koguryō.14 Given the probable obstacles to communication through the hostile territories of the Former Qin and the Murong Former Yan, it is likely that the Gaoli Daoren was then a resident in southern China, where the letter could reach him and where he could consult Fashen. Hence the sentence, “currently he is on Mt Yang.” There were very few diplomatic exchanges between Koguryō and the Jin, the Samguk yusa mentioning one in 343 and another in 413,15 but these were exceptional, so exchanges of private letters would almost be unheard of.

The 1215 Haedong kosūnjōn even identifies the recipient of the letter as Wangmyǒng, suspiciously meaning “lost name.” Although there were a few monks in Chinese history with that as a name,16 one must doubt this was a genuine name in the circumstances. Kakhun alleges that the fame of this Wangmyǒng had spread as far as Zhidun in the south of China, and the author of this comment, possibly Kakhun, states out of a spirit of patriotism that there then must have been eminent Buddhists in Koguryō in

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8 Ha (2005), 278-279, English summary 314-315.
10 For example, on the stupa of Asoka at the Liaodong Fortress and stories related to Podŏk, see Yi Pyŏngdo, ed. and trans. (1981), Samguk yusa, Kwangju ch'ulp'ansa: Seoul, 4: 100-101.
11 For this person, see Erik Zürcher (1959), The Buddhist conquest of China: The spread and adaptation of Buddhism in early medieval China, 2 vols, E. J. Brill: Leiden, 98, 77.
12 T50.348a12-15.
13 Zürcher (1959), passim.
15 Yi Pyŏngdo (1981), Samguk yusa, 184, 13th year of King Kogukwŏn; 188, 1st year of King Changsu. Lee (1969), 30 fn 91.
the latter period of the 370s. As this and the following hagiography of Üiyôn provide almost no factual information, these hagiographies seem to have been fanciful elaborations built on one or two clues from the Chinese source.

The second mention of Buddhism in connection with Koguryô is the sending of the monk Shundao (Kor. Shundo) to the Koguryô court by Fu Jian, ruler of the Former Qin, in 372, along with Buddhist scriptures and images. This gift by Fu Jian was likely a diplomatic gesture occasioned by his war against the Murong Former Yan in 370. This brought his borders up to those of Koguryô, and Fu Jian needed peace there while he turned his military might south-west to Szechwan in 373. As Former Yan had been an enemy of Koguryô, this was probably an astute move. Fu Jian had not necessarily been particularly friendly to Buddhism, and yet he used Buddhism to advance his own ends. For example, he exempted the monastery of Ju Senglang (ca. 315-400), a pupil of Fotudeng, from his proposed control over monasteries. Ju Senglang’s monastery, later named Shentong Monastery, was allegedly the first in Shandong, and a major centre in the region. It was founded in 351 and was later given tax grants from two prefectures. Fu Jian invited Senglang to court and wrote to him, and regional power-holders such as Yao Xing of Later Qin, Murong De (founder of Southern Yan), Tuoba Gui of Northern Wei and Emperor Xiaowu of Jin wrote to him or venerated him. By the time of Sengyi, a contemporary with Senglang, whose biography was found in a biezhuang (separate biography), this monastery possessed Buddhist images given to Senglang by the rulers of seven countries, including Koguryô and one of its dependencies. The Xu Gaosengzhuang’s “Biography of Sengyi” states that Sengyi came to Shentong’s precursor monastery during Tuoba Wei times and that the monastery had gold and bronze statues from Koguryô displayed in the temple hall. As Tuoba Wei was founded in 386, this means that by around 400 A.D. that Koguryô was in contact with Senglang’s monastery and was sending Buddhist statues there. The monastery was near the base of the famous Taishan, not too distant from the Yellow River, and so was possibly on a marine route to Koguryô across the Gulf of Bohai via the Miao dao island chain to the Liaodong Peninsula.

If the report about Shundao being sent to Koguryô in 372, and then the arrival of Adao in 374, with the erection of a monastery for each of them in 375 as recorded in the Samguk sagi is correct, the similarities in the names of these two missionaries, both with dao as the last element, suggest they may have been sent from Senglang’s centre near Mt.

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18. For Üiyôn, see Lee (1969), 35-36, esp. note 120.
21. Wright (1990), 40, 131 note 21; Zürcher (1959), 185.
24. Xu Gaosengzhuang, T50.647a5-9, 21-23.
Tai, which was favoured by Fu Jian. Yet it seems likely that both monks failed in their mission, as Kakun implies, with Adao allegedly leaving Koguryo for Silla. If so, then who had sent Koguryo Buddhist images to Senglang?

By later times, Buddhism had certainly gained a hold in Koguryo, for of the year 576, the Lidai sanbajoji of 597 records that Uiyon came to Ye, capital of the Northern Qi, to ask the famous cleric Fashang (495-580) a number of questions on Buddhist history. Fashang was the Controller of the Clergy during the Eastern Wei and Northern Qi, a leader of Vinaya and a head of the Southern Dilun School that centred on the interpretation of the Daśabhūmikāśūtra-śāstra (Dilun) by Vasubandhu and certain passages of the Lankāvatāra Sūtra. The knowledge levels of the Koguryo monks must still have been low at that time for them to ask when Buddhism was introduced into China and who wrote a number of sutras and their commentaries, something well known in China in those days.

The Koguryo understanding was probably that belief in Buddhism would simply bring merit of good fortune 福 as King Kogukyang is alleged to have advised the Silla king in the eighth year of his reign (391). Yet it was not until 498 that we find mention of the building of another monastery besides the first two, those for Shundao and Adao. This was the Kunggang Monastery in P’yöngyang. Even if another monastery had been established in 427 as is sometimes suggested (see later), it would seem that the Koguryo images in Senglang’s monastery were probably from the court, possibly commissioned from Chinese artisans, not necessarily from inside Koguryo.

Given that Kakun, and following him, Iryon or his successors, had to rely primarily on the Samguk sagi’s laconic and sparse mentions, plus the Chinese records and a text of marvels, the Su’ijon, compiled by Pak Hallyong (1047-1096), to fabricate hagiographies by much conjectural and eulogistic padding, we have to turn to the epigraphical evidence.

**Epigraphical evidence**

The earliest inscription is allegedly dated 396 and was unearthed in P’yöngyang in the ruins of an old monastery. However, the sate, Yonggaeng 7, in the first of the twelve-year cycle, corresponds to no known date or reign. Some scholars have equated it with the 6th year of the Yongnak era of King Kwanggaet’o (396), but the forms of the last characters, gaeng and nak have no resemblance, the year number would be incorrect, and the cyclical number would be out of synch. The content suggests a date much later than 396. 

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27 Lee (1969), 35-38; Lida sanbajoji 12, T49.104c9-105a8, by Fei Zhangfang, a notoriously unreliable historian.
28 SGSG 186, literally, “handed down the teaching that veneration of and belief in the Buddha-dharma is to seek good fortune.”
29 SGSG, 194, 7th year of King Munja. An alleged earlier mention in 392 of the establishment of nine monasteries (kusa) in P’yöngyang, 2nd year of King Kwanggaet’o, is more likely a reference to the nine courts or juisi 九司 with their nine chamberlains. These were the “top echelon service agencies in the central government,” Charles O. Hucker (1985), A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, Stanford University Press: Stanford, 177. If there were nine monasteries, where did all the believers and monks come from to ordain other monks, only twenty years after the first and likely failed attempts to introduce Buddhism? This looks more like a program of creating a more centralized Chinese-style administration. See SGSG, 187.
30 Kim (1989), 238-239.
The inscription is on the back of a 22cm high nimbus that was attached to a seated Maitreya figure.\textsuperscript{31} In addition to suggestions that it dates to 417, stylistic grounds have made Prof. Hwang Suyong think it belongs to the mid-sixth century or later.\textsuperscript{32} The style looks rather like that of the late fifth to early sixth centuries and to a figure of Maitreya worshipped by people of Northern Wei, such as the Xianbei ruling class, and as just another deity in a heavenly paradise into which one could be reborn.\textsuperscript{33} The inscription reads:

Made an image of the Venerable Maitreya for my late mother… the merit I hope will have the soul of the deceased rise to (the shore of?) enlightenment… the three assemblies of Maitreya… First awaken to the thought of non-birth, and ultimately it must result… in bodhi. If one who has sin at the time of the above vow it will be extinguished… those who rejoice in the welfare of others equally share this vow…\textsuperscript{34}

Note again that this inscription is about good fortune, but here for the deceased, and resembles a more elaborate 279.4 cm Maitreya statue of 516 from Northern Wei.\textsuperscript{35} If it was from a monastery in P’Yŏngyang, it probably dates from after 496.

There is an earlier text, a note in ink on the wall of a tomb of a Koguryŏ fortress that was found in Tŏkhwang-ri, Taean City, P’Yŏng’an Namdo. It is dated 408. But the only reference is that of “the disciple of Sākyamuni Buddha, Mr ???Zhen… [list of titles follows] of Youzhou, who died at the age of 77… and in the 18th year of Yonggo his grave was shifted.” But this Buddhism must have been shallow because the mural depicts many cattle and sheep being sacrificed and alcohol donated for the funeral.\textsuperscript{36} In other words, perhaps the Buddhist dedication was just a formality, possibly written in imitation of funerary inscriptions from the Chinese heartlands. Indeed, the deceased has been identified as Murong Zhen (332-408),\textsuperscript{37} although on what ground I am not sure. This means he was a Xianbei, a descendant of the Murong state of Former Yan that was conquered by Fu Jian in 370, and it is likely that this man fled with others to Koguryŏ then or later in 385 when the area was reconquered by Northern Wei.\textsuperscript{38} Perhaps then the scenes in the tomb mural of animals being hunted and possibly of warfare were like those from the story of Andha-vana found in the various Ahanjing (agama) on the life of the Buddha. The story is that the Buddha cured people whose eyes were gouged out in this garden by

\textsuperscript{31} Hwang Suyong (1980), Han’guk Pulsang ài yŏn’gu, Samhwa chulpansa: Seoul, plates 1 and 2, esp. pp. 40-41, note 11, on doubts about provenance, and note 16 on dates. Oral testimony was that it was found among tiles inscribed with the year, Yuangeng of Da Qin (291-300), written on them, p. 28. See also Wen (2001), in Beifang wenwu, 38, who dates it to 417, and Sach’a munhwa yŏn’gŭwŏn, comp. (1993), Puk Han sach’al yŏn’gu, Sach’al munhwa yŏn’gŭwŏn ch’ulpansu: Seoul (hereafter Puk Han), 313-315 for more detail, and one suggestion is that it dates to 418, but that does not tally with the twelve-year cycle.

\textsuperscript{32} Hwang (1980), 30. This image should be compared with those in Dorothy C. Wong (2004), Chinese Stelae: Pre-Buddhist and Buddhist Use of a Symbolic Form, University of Hawaii Press; Honolulu, 95 fig. 6.4 dated 516 from Shandong, and William Willets (1965), Foundations of Chinese Art, Thames & Hudson: London, plates 124-125, image of N. Wei, early 6th century, and of Eastern Wei, 536 A.D. See also Hwang Suyong (1979), Han’guk Pulsang myol 10: Pulsang p’yŏn’g, Chüngang ibu Tongyang pangsong: Seoul, plate 1.

\textsuperscript{33} Wong (2004), 92, 94-95, esp. fig. 64. Cf. image in Hwang (1980), plate 3, and Nakagiri Hisao (1973), Kaitō no Bukkyō, Kokusho kanbokai: Tokyo, plate 1.

\textsuperscript{34} Kim (1989), 238. … indicates lacunae.

\textsuperscript{35} Wong (2004), fig. 6.4.

\textsuperscript{36} Hô (1984), 4-5.


\textsuperscript{38} Gardiner (1969), 37; Chi Paesôn (1987), “Puk Yŏn e taehayŏ (I),” Tongnang hakchi 54/55/56 joint volume, 858, 860.
an enemy army. This scene is depicted in the Mogao Cave no. 285 at Dunhuang, in which the horsemen are in Xianbei dress. This suggests another link to the Murong clan or tribe and perhaps this was what the Koguryŏ artisans and the court donors thought would be appropriate.

Much debate has been focussed on this tomb, with the contention that this refugee from Northern Yan, a former prefect of Youzhou, had been a devotee of Maitreya, with the words Shijiwen Fo (Śākyamuni Buddha), as in the Milo xiashengjing translated by Ju Fahu or Dharmarakṣa, indicating a belief like those of the Northern Wei people who wished to be reborn in Maitreya’s Tuṣita Heaven. Another opinion is that this term, Shijiwen Fo, was common before the time of these translations and does not necessarily refer to Maitreya. As a result, discussion has turned to the mentions of a ritual of the seven jewels, which could refer to the decorations of altars, pedestals and palanquins for the installation of Buddhist statues, with many festivities, even sword-swallowing exhibitions. Hence, the scenes of “hunting” and dancing might be pictures of the sports accompanying such an installation. However, an analysis of the vocabulary suggests that these scenes are related to rebirth in the Pure Land of Amitābha, and that the illustrations are those of the Pure Land and the palace of the Cakravartin king. These words about seven treasures and natural music et cetera occur frequently in the translations of the Wuliangshou jing series made by Zhijian and Ju Fahu, and would appear to describe a Pure Land. But would a Pure Land permit hunting? Furthermore, one of the murals and the notes to it suggest that the supervisor of the funeral was sent by the Koguryŏ court (chungni 中裏 like Japanese dairi 大裏?), as were provisions for the ritual and possibly for the upkeep of the tomb, perhaps with some elements of the native Koguryŏ worship of ancestors or founder spirits.

Another inscription on a nimbous of a Buddha statue has been dated to 419. The statue is of a standing Buddha that was discovered buried in a 30cm square stone case in a pile of stones in Hach’on-ri, Taeūimyŏn, Üiryong-gun, Kyŏngsam Namdo. The image is 16.2cm high with nimbus and throne, the figure itself only 9.1cm. It is dated Yŏnka 7th year, which Hwang thinks was 539 or 599 A.D. The dating is based on style, which initially suggests the mid-sixth century, but that has been modified on the basis of cyclical dates and the name of the Buddha, and partly because it is similar in style and technique of manufacture to the afore-mentioned Maitreya statue. Thus Prof. Kim Yŏng’tae thinks the evidence for 539 is “very thin” and that the date is more likely to be the seventh year of King Changsu’s reign (419), which conforms to the cyclical date. In any case, the inscription reads:

In the 7th year of Yŏnka, in the kimi year, the abbot of the East Monastery of Nangnung (Ch. Lolang) of Koryŏ, Kyŏng and his disciple Sŏng’yŏn, master and pupils in all forty people, together made (a Buddha of the) Bhadra-kalpa of a thousand Buddhas, who distributed

39 Illustration in Okazaki Takashi (1977), Zasesu Chūgoku no rekishi: Gishin Nanbokuchō no sekai, Kōdansha: Tokyo, 20-21, plates 16 and 17. For the Andha-vana story, see Mochizuki Shin’ō (1933-1936), Bukkyō Daititten, 10 vols, Dipingxing chubanshe reprint of 1936 Sekai seitai kankō kyōkai edn, 3934a-b.
45 Kim (1989), 234.
Certainly, this set of Bhadra-kalpa Buddhas became popular in Northern Wei from as early as around 400. In this case, perhaps with early depictions, only the Śākyamuni Buddha was required. The thousand Buddhas motif was most popular in Central Asia and Northern Wei, especially in the early sixth century. It is difficult to choose between the years 419 or 539 or 599, but if this Buddha is the twenty-ninth, he is not identified, which suggests either a sophistication or a misunderstanding by the writer of the dedication.

One more statue of a Buddha, this time in stone, 39.5cm x 44.5cm, has been dated 489 for it uses a Northern Wei reign era that coincides with the cyclical date. Thus Kim Yong’ae asserts it was probably an import from Northern Wei. The inscription donates the merit of making the statue to seven generations of ancestors. It does not contribute much to our understanding, except for the possibility that Koguryǒ artisans may still not have made many images and so they had to be imported.

The next inscription is also contentious, both for its date and the reading. Found in 1930 in Pongsan-ri, Hwachon-myǒn, Koksan-gun, Hwanghae-do, it is usually dated 571, but that is only a speculation based on the cyclical stems and branches. Some claim that the character ㎏ ūnɡ 应 should be ｃｈ’ａｎɡ 昌, and so could be the last element of Taech’ang, in the ４th year, the rule of Silla King Chinhŭng, which coincides with the cyclical number. The second character is usually read as “four” 四, but others have read it as “west” 西. Kim Yong’ae suggests then it may have been a Silla item, having been found near a border marker between Koguryǒ and Silla. The nimbus on which the date is inscribed is 15.5cm x 9.2cms. The inscription tells of a group of five people, plus a monk, who had created a statue of Amitayus Buddha to pray for their late teachers and parents, in the hope they would meet good teachers and Maitreya to hear his teachings.

In the Ji’an area, around the old Koguryǒ capital of Wando, a 7cm high bronze statue of a seated Śākyamuni was discovered in the Koguryǒ-period strata. It was supposedly found in one of the first two monasteries, but no more evidence is provided. No inscription accompanies it.

A further item, from a private collection, is similar to the 16.2cm high Yǒnka standing Buddha. This item is 18cm high and bears the inscription, “On the third day of the third month of the kiyu year, Master Kakyǒn and his students of Namsan Monastery of Great Koguryǒ made this.” It is said to have been sourced from Yi County, Liaoning Province in the cave complex of Wanfo tang that has sixteen caverns containing Buddhist statues. This was near Longcheng, the old capital of Northern Yan. This item has been dated to 499 A.D. (a date of the Taihe reign of Northern Wei), but Koguryǒ only occupied

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46 Kim (1989), 234; Hô (1984), 33; Hwang (1980), 36. The text is problematic, having been written over in part, and has unusual forms of the characters.
47 Mochizuki (1933-1936), 946b.
48 Wong (2004), 64, 74.
49 Hwang (1980), 36.
this region from around 523 or 524, and so if this was made in that region by Koguryo monks, it probably dates rather to 529. The site of discovery was to the east of the old Northern Yan capital of Longcheng. This then was probably a centre of conquered Chinese and Xianbei populations.

The final examples of Koguryo statuary are two small Buddhist images that were found in a rough-hewn stone case with an inside measurement of 11 x 7.5 x 8 cms. The larger bronze image is of a monk with his staff and is 8.5cm high. The smaller image is of a woman, 3.5cm high. These were discovered on Mt Taesông, six to seven kilometres to the north-east of P’yôngyang. This site had between the capital between 427 and 586. It was probably what was known as P’yôngyang-sŏng or Chang’an-sŏng.

The figurines were laid sideways, together with fragments of cloth, small scraps of paper and chips of incense. The base of the container, a Buddha-niche, is inscribed with the characters 国士, which the archaeologists think is related to the current name for the place, Kuksabong 国士峰, but I think from the photographs that the second character is t’o 国 and not su 国, and so this is doubtful. The male figure is bronze and sits on a lotus throne on the back of an animal. He carries a staff with warning bells in his right hand and holds a gemstone in his left. The animal is said to be a suanni (Ch. sanye), a fabulous lion. The figure is that of Kṣitigarbha who carries a sound-making staff, the khakkara and a cintāmaṇi or “wish-fulfilling gem” in his hands and rides a lion while wearing a hempen cap. The second figure is in two halves, of gold in front and silver behind, the two welded together. Her hands are supposedly in the mudra of the meditation of Amitābha Buddha.

The proposed period of origin would appear to be rather early, for the popularity of Kṣitigarbha by most accounts only really began in the Sui and Tang periods, and the most famous ‘Kṣitigarbha sutras’ were only translated in a later period time, although the dates of translation for several texts are unclear, but could be from before 539, one or two possibly translated by Dharmakṣema (385-433). However, in 650 Daoshi wrote:

Since the country was divided into sixteen kingdoms, the Jin, Song, Liang, Chen, Qin and Zhao (et cetera), four hundred years have passed, and those who have sought salvation by

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54 Geng (2007), 67-68.
58 TKY, 72.
59 TKY, 74.
61 TKY, 75-76.
62 Buk Han, 317.
chanting the names of Guanyin (Avalokiteśvara), Dizang (Kṣitigarbha), Maitreya and Amītabha (are so numerous) that they cannot all be recorded.\textsuperscript{64}

Pictures of Kṣitigarbha had been painted on the walls of a monastery in the south of China in the period 502 to 519,\textsuperscript{65} so there is a possibility that the Taesong figurines date from before 586.

Conceivably there was a link to Shentong Monastery, for Kṣitigarbha was often associated with descending into hell to rescue beings. There he would meet the judge of hell, who in popular Chinese belief is the god of Mt Tai which is to the back of Shentong Monastery.\textsuperscript{66} That may have been grounds enough for Kṣitigarbha to have been popular in the region, and so in one of the cliff-face caves and niches near Shentong Monastery there was a niche for Kṣitigarbha, but it probably dates to the early Tang. We do not know if Kṣitigarbha images were present earlier than that, for the monastery was destroyed in the Huichang persecution of 845 and so much evidence has been lost.\textsuperscript{67}

Perhaps the reason for the location of the figures in the Taesong-san fortress can be found in some of the scriptures devoted to Kṣitigarbha. Although translated by Śīkṣānanda (652-710), the Dizang Pusa benyuanjing\textsuperscript{68} says one will gain ten benefits by making an image of Kṣitigarbha as the earth god 地神 in a clean, south-facing place and putting it in a niche-room there of earth or stone. The image may be of metal or be a painting, and one should burn incense for it. The first of the benefits is a prosperous country.\textsuperscript{69} As an older translation, the Dafangguang shilunjing says that following the practices outlined in this text will protect the state in ten different ways,\textsuperscript{70} and as it uses the word “state-territory” 國土 repeatedly,\textsuperscript{71} the worship of Kṣitigarbha could be a “state project.” Moreover, worship of this bodhisattva promises relief from all sorts of problems and was popular with women,\textsuperscript{72} which may explain the presence of a female “devotee” along with the image of Kṣitigarbha in the casket. I suspect then from the context that the characters 国土 stand for “the country” and may have been short for “Buddha country” 佛国土. In that case, the cache was devoted to the salvation of the kingdom, perhaps in a fervent prayer by the woman whose image accompanied that of Kṣitigarbha. As there were no graves near the site, I conclude it was not a funerary object. Rather, it was found in a collapsed part of the citadel wall, notably on the southern side of the Kuksebong hill.\textsuperscript{73} The item then may have been that of the niche-room, worshipped with incense in a south-facing position.

A considerable distance away, closer to the centre of the citadel and next to a series of tombs, another stone casket was found. It contained fragments of the Lotus Sutra. The casket was buried under a collapsed wall and a large number of broken tiles. The casket was rough-hewn on the outside, 50 x 24 x 30cm, with a lid. Inside was a hollowed out

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\textsuperscript{64} Quote in Kim Chonghui (1996), 52, from Fayuan zhulin 17, T53.411.
\textsuperscript{65} Kim Chonghui (1996), 53.
\textsuperscript{67} Tokiwa Daijo (1938), Shina Bukkyo shiseki tosaki, Kokusho kankokai: Tokyo, 1972 reprint in one volume, 569, 262-263, plate 26.
\textsuperscript{68} See Wang-Toutain (1998), 78.
\textsuperscript{69} Kim Chonghui (1996), 41, citing T13.787a24-28.
\textsuperscript{70} T13.701a4.
\textsuperscript{71} T13.683a28ff.
\textsuperscript{72} Wang-Toutain (1998), 243-246.
\textsuperscript{73} TKY, 72, and map insert.
space, 34 x 12 x 16.5cm. The number of pages of the book is estimated at about a hundred, each probably measuring 16.5 x 7cm, with characters of 1.2 – 1.5cm square, although some were only 8 to 10mm square. They were arranged on average in 10 lines of 15 to 17 characters. The handwriting is a clear kaishu (haesoč’e) or clerical script. About 1,500 characters could be restored, and they came from the sixth fascicle. Translations of the Lotus Sutra were made in 255, 286, 290, 335, 406 and 601. From the terminology, I suspect this is the 406 A.D. translation by Kumārajīva.\(^\text{74}\) The North Korean archaeologists suggest from the location that the text was stored or kept by the royal house.\(^\text{75}\) Yet the quality of the container would seem to militate against this, for it was heavy and rough, more suitable for use in a cache than for everyday use.

**Other archaeological data**

Besides this, in the region of an earlier capital, there is a tomb mural from the Ji’an area, labelled Changchuan no. 1. The tomb was of a relatively high official, and the evidence indicates that the Buddha was worshipped like a god. The murals suggest that the deceased was a keen hunter who had killed many animals, but was now offering precious gems to the Buddha in atonement.\(^\text{76}\) It is dated 400 to 410, with an upper limit of 430, on stylistic grounds. Thus it could belong to the reign of King Kwanggaeta’o (r. 391-412) or the early reign of king Changsu (r. 413-491), and so probably before the capital was shifted to the P’yōngyang area in 427.\(^\text{77}\) Elements of this tomb are similar to those in the tomb of Murong Zhen,\(^\text{78}\) so the person may have adopted the Murong style of Buddhism or have been a Xianbei.

Another mural is that of the Ssang’yōng tomb located between P’yōngyang and Chinnamp’o. It has a mural like those found in Northern Wei. The mural depicts the wife and women of the buried person, the leading individual in the funerary procession carrying what appears to be a smoking censer. She is followed by a monk carrying a khakkara staff, and then the other mourners.\(^\text{79}\) It is thought to be related in style to those of the Yun’gang caves of Northern Wei, for the tomb uses similar octagonal stone pillars, and the murals are dominated by horses, carriages, warriors, and the animal gods of the four quarters.\(^\text{80}\)

The last type of archaeological evidence is that of monastery ruins, mostly foundation stones. Monasteries in North Korea that date to Koguryō times by tradition include the spectacular, cliff-hanging Podōk-am in the Kúmgang Mountains; An’guk-sa in Such’ŏn-gun, P’yōng’am Namdo that is dated to 503; and three in P’yōngyang: Kwangbōp-sa, Pŏb’un-am and Chŏngnŭng-sa, the last dated 427.\(^\text{81}\) But Podōk-am is only attributed to a monk who fled Koguryō in its last years during or after the reign King Anwŏn (r. 531-545), Podōk. This ascription can only be found in a tradition recorded in the Tongguk yŏji sŏngnam of 1486 of the Chosŏn Period. There is no other supporting

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\(^\text{75}\) TKY, 68-72.


\(^\text{79}\) Nakagiri (1973), plate 5, 10-11 in Art Section.


\(^\text{81}\) *Puk Han*, 41-42.
evidence.\textsuperscript{82} Again, for An’guk-sa, it is only the monastery’s own stele of record, the 
_An’guk-sa sajokki_ of uncertain date that claims it was founded in 503 by Hyŏn’uk, who 
left a stupa base.\textsuperscript{83} There is, of course, no corroborating evidence.

Of the three sites in P’yŏngyang, Kwangbŏp-sa is on Taesŏng-san, and the only 
evidence yet again is in the _Tongguk yŏji sŏngnam_ and a monastic-gazetteer on a stele of 
1667, which claimed the monastery was originally built by Adao and was subsequently 
destroyed totally by flames, and was not rebuilt until the end of the Koryŏ.\textsuperscript{84} No details 
are known of the origins of Pŏb’un-am, a hermitage half-way up a scenic hell, but the style 
of piling the foundation stones and tiles found in the vicinity suggest a Koguryŏ origin.\textsuperscript{85}

Chŏngnŭng-sa is a genuine Koguryŏ-period monastery. It is surrounded by 
Koguryŏ mound tombs and is 150 metres from the huge mound tomb celebrating the 
legendary founder king, King Tongmyŏng. It was founded in 427 or 491 for the worship 
of the soul of King Tongmyŏng. Excavations there have found the name of the monastery 
written on pottery, and it has the same layout as Kŭmgang-sa, a known Koguryŏ 
monastery.\textsuperscript{86} The ruins are 132.8m x 223m. There was a single octagonal stupa behind a 
central gate, plus three “golden halls.” This format is thought by some to have been 
imitated by Asuka-dera near Nara. The ruins of Kŭmgang-sa are also in P’yŏngyang. 
According to the _Samguk saga_, Kŭmgang-sa was founded in 498, but it was abolished 
sometimes after the _Tongguk yŏji sŏngnam_ was compiled in 1486. The octagonal stupa 
was originally made probably of wood and is estimated to have been 61.25 metres high.\textsuperscript{87}

Chŏngnŭng-sa seems to have served as a model, for all the stupa bases dating from 
Koguryŏ times are in the same octagonal shape and differ from the stupa bases of Paekche 
and Silla that had _šarira_ (relics) buried beneath or inside a central foundation stone. The 
Koguryŏ stupas probably installed the _šarira_ relics above the foundation stone. Inside the 
stupa it seems four Buddha images were installed, just like those at the “Four-door stupa” 
of Shenton Monastery that is dated 544, and perhaps had murals like those inside the 
stupa of Hŏryuji in Japan. The tomb of King Tongmyŏng was probably shifted here in 
427 when the capital was moved, and so the monastery was probably built as a prayer 
chapel for the divine ancestor, perhaps in 498. It may also be related to the worship of 
Maitreya.\textsuperscript{88}

However, the Simenta or Four-door Stupa, which is to the south-east of the remains 
of Shenton Monastery, has a square, not an octagonal base, and has a single storey, with 
a height of 15.04 metres, nothing like the estimated 61.25 metres of the Kŭmgang-sa 
Stupa.\textsuperscript{89} This square shape was common in Shandong from the late Northern Wei through 
to the Northern Qi period, at least in images. But no stupa of this form dates from before 
544.\textsuperscript{90} The use of images of the Buddha in four directions as found in Shandong derives 
from the _Guan Fo sanmeihaijing_,\textsuperscript{91} a text famous for its mention of the “shadow of the

\textsuperscript{82}_Puk Han_, 53.

\textsuperscript{83}_Puk Han_, 70.

\textsuperscript{84} Lee Hung-Bum/Yi Hŭngbŏm (Dec. 2002), “Kŏkurai jidai Teiryōji garan no kōzō to shisō kiban,” 
_Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū_ 51 (1): 296-293.

\textsuperscript{85} Chen Qingxiang (2004), 150-151.

\textsuperscript{86} _Puk Han_, 69; Geng (2007), 65-66.

\textsuperscript{87} _Puk Han_, 386-388.

\textsuperscript{88} Chen Qingxiang (2004), 154.

\textsuperscript{89} Chen Qingxiang (2004), 156-158.
Buddha” and for its contemplation of the Buddhas and visualisations of them. So the icons in the octagonal stupas may have been the same as in the Shentong Monastery stupa, but not the ground plan.

**ANALYSIS**

A paucity of evidence, much of it controversial in interpretation because of a lack of sufficient context or the imposition of modern, competing nationalisms, place us in much the same position as Kakhun in his attempts to construct hagiographies from fragmentary sources, most originally Chinese. Thus when Kakhun came to deal with the penultimate Koguryó figure, he had to rely on the Gaosengzhuan for the account of Tanshi (Kor. Tamshi), who went to Liaodong in 396, where he taught briefly. Yet Kakhun had to admit that the compiler of the Gaosengzhuan considered this the beginning of Buddhism in Koguryó, contrary to the earlier assertions Kakhun had made. But again, Tanshi’s mission does not appear to have been much of a success, for Tanshi returned around 405 to central China. Kakhun was so desperate for information that he copied all of the remainder of the account of Tanshi’s deeds after his return from China almost word-for-word from the Gaosengzhuan. Although Kakhun naturally objected to Huijjiao’s comment about the beginning of Buddhism in Koguryó, citing Fu Jian’s mission of twenty-five years previous, the fact that Shundao and Adao both seem to have failed in their efforts is not mentioned here.

Finally, the same can be said of Kakhun’s account of Hyŏn’yu, who dates from the early Tang, that is, from after 618 and before 670 when Yijing began inquiring about those pilgrims who had been to India in order to prepare for his own journey to the homeland of Buddhism. Not only had Kakhun no other information on Koguryó Buddhist events from 405 to sometime in the 630s to 650s, he had to rely on Yijing’s account for only about two sentences, if that, and the remainder was praise and speculation. Kakhun in fact padded the account of Hyŏn’yu with the deeds of Sengze and praises of Yijing. In other words, Kakhun had virtually no information from domestic sources on Koguryó, with the possible exception of a couple of brief entries in the Samguk sagi and a tale from the Su’ichŏn by Pak Illyang (1047-1096).

Again, it is a connection with Shentong Monastery that gives information on the last Buddhist activities of the Koguryó monks. The link is again Yijing, who studied under two masters at Shentong Monastery in his youth. Yijing praised his teachers to the skies and saw them as heirs to Ju Senglang, who is named as a great teacher and sage. The first, Shanyu, was a Vinaya scholar; the second, Huixi, a devotee of the Lotus Sutra. Yijing was clearly interested in “Korean” monks, for in his work on the pilgrims

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92 Zürcher (1959), 224-225.
93 See the list of Kakhun’s sources in Chang Hüiok (1991), 23ff.
94 Lee (1969), 40-41; Gaosengzhuan, T50.392b4-6.
96 Lee (1969), 95-96; Yijing, Da Tang xiyu qifu gaosengzhuan, T51.8b-c for Sengze, Hyŏn’yu’s master, and 8c15-17 for Hyŏn’yu. See Yijing’s preface on putting the pilgrims into a historical sequence in his accounts, T51.1a22-23. The first date for a monk is in the Zhenguan era (627-650), 1b29. For Yijing’s enquiries, 7c3. Sengze had several pupils and admirers, see also 7b18-19 and 8b20.
97 Lee (1969), 96.
99 See Lee (1969), 53.
100 Junjiro Takakusu, trans (1896), A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practiced in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671-695), Clarendon Press: Oxford, 199-207, esp. 206: “These two teachers of mine, Shan-yü and Hui-hsi, were the successors of the former sage, (Seng-)Lang the Dhyāna Master.”
to India he recorded seven Silla monks and one Koguryo monk (not listed in a separate biography) out of the total of 56 individuals he counted,\(^{101}\) and he used incidents from the Sui campaign against Koguryo to illustrate a point: “To make a comparison, a single sortie at the town of Liao-tung broke the courageous hearts of the three generals.”\(^ {102}\)

All of the above suggests that Koguryo Buddhism was short-lived, superficial and mostly concentrated around the court. The evidence of Buddhism is almost non-existent when we consider that over ten thousand tombs of Koguryo vintage have been identified in China and Korea, and that ninety of them have murals.\(^ {103}\) Yet only two or three of these murals have Buddhist content, and one of these is for a refugee official and possible advisor to the Koguryo king.

Secondly, there are no stele inscriptions extant for monks, or with mentions of Buddhism, and no large Buddhist statues in stone or metal, or traces of reliefs on cliffs of Buddhist images, and certainly no cave complexes like those of Yun’gang, Longmen or the many other sites of the Northern Wei or later periods, or even like those statues, engravings and remains from Paekche or Silla.

Perhaps a better comparison should be with the Xianbei peoples, similarly warlike and ruling over vanquished farmer populations. It is likely that the Xianbei came into contact with Buddhism around 294 and were influenced by the Later Zhao adoption of Buddhism during the lifetime of Fotudeng. The Murong Xianbei in particular brought Buddhism closer to Koguryo domains, for in 342 the Yan rulers shifted their capital to Longcheng, and the ruler Murong Huang established a monastery nearby in 345. Afterwards, the Former Yan continued to build monasteries in their territories. Successor regimes such as Later Yan and Southern Yan also built monasteries in the north-east and in Shandong. It was Murong De of Southern Yan who respected Ju Sengiang and allegedly donated the tax incomes of two prefectures to his monastery around 399-400.

Furthermore, the Xianbei territories of the Murong clan produced a number of able monks, though it is likely most were from the conquered Chinese populations or immigrants. The Murong clan had adopted a policy of using refugees of eminent clans from the North China plains to help them rule over the conquered local Chinese clans, some of whom, such as the Wang, had been in the Lelang district since Later Han times. In 333, when the Former Yan was established by Murong Huang after the death of Murong Hui, many of these local, indigenous clans supported a revolt by Murong Ren, and so were thereafter under suspicion. This included Dong Shou. The Murong Yan encouraged refugees from the North China plains, who after 317 fled in large numbers, outnumbering the existing residents some tenfold. They were used by the Murong as ministers and officials, and they occupied nearly all important posts, and so the Yan used Chinese immigrants who had voluntarily submitted to Murong rule to control the conquered indigenous Chinese of the Liaodong region.\(^ {104}\) These refugees probably brought their Buddhism with them, and made up the vast majority of the literate elite, and

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\(^{101}\) For the count, see Da Tang xiyu qifa gaosengzhuan, T51.1a-b, b22.

\(^{102}\) Takakusu (1896), xxxv; T51.11b9-10, 譲乎(置 in three versions)城一發下三將之雄心. This may be a reference to the siege of Liaodong fortress in 612, for which see SGSG 20: 204; interpretation difficult.


it is estimated that 95% of officials of the government were from these immigrant
groups.\textsuperscript{105} Among these immigrants (or their descendants) were Sengquan (n.d.) who
erected a Buddha statue at Huanglong, i.e. the Yan capital of Longcheng; Tanwujie from
Huanglong in Youzhou,\textsuperscript{106} who went to India to study in 420; Tanshun, who studied under
Kumārajīva and went south with Huiyuan; Tanwucheng, whose family fled to Huanglong
where he studied and later came to study with Kumārajīva;\textsuperscript{107} Tanhong, also from
Huanglong, who went south into what is now northern Vietnam around 420. Also, there is
evidence ordinary people from Xianbei territories were believers, as with a certain Fuquin
Bilan (?) who had been in the Later Yan army in 396, and even rebellions were lead
against the Later Yan by (ethnically Chinese?) people appealing to Buddhist faith by
installing a Buddhist monk as their pretender emperor.\textsuperscript{108}

It is clear that the Murong Xianbei were strong supporters of Buddhism, as were
the subjugated populations, and so provided sources of Buddhism and even Buddhists to
Koguryō. They were succeeded by the Northern Wei, founded by the Tuoba clan, another
Xianbei group. All built many Buddhist images in stone, and a Xianbei from Northern
Wei, for example, worshipped Maitreya.\textsuperscript{109} The Northern Wei also worshipped the
Thousand Buddhas\textsuperscript{110} and Maitreya faith was important in Northern Wei,\textsuperscript{111} which seems
to be similar to what Buddhist faith Koguryō did have. It is likely that refugees from the
Murong Former Yan, defeated in 370, especially those indigenous to the Liaodong area,
brought elements of their faith to Koguryō, where it seemed destined to remain
predominantly a foreign faith for some time, sustained by Murong and descendants of the
Chinese of the Lelang and other commanderies, or refugees and border residents who
preserved some interest in the culture of the states to the south. This influence may have
been revived via the Wanfo tang caves complex that was begun at least by 499 under the
Northern Wei. This complex was probably a Buddhist centre for Yingzhou and
Longcheng, and its location at Yi County on the banks of the river and on the road from
Longcheng to Liaodong would have made it a conduit for Buddhism into Koguryō.\textsuperscript{112}

Despite the large Buddhist complexes and images produced by their Xianbei and
Chinese neighbours, the Koguryō Buddhist images that have survived are all small and
metal, none higher than 22cm, and the only stone statue that exists, slightly larger, may
have come from Northern Wei. One statue is definitely of Maitreya, another is of
Kṣitigarbha and others are of the Buddha. The common features of the inscriptions,
dedications and murals are of a prayer for good fortune, either for oneself, the ancestors,
teachers or the country. This suggests a popular piety. The statues, all being small,
suggest they may have been for personal use and were portable. Notably, most have not
been found in identified monastery sites, with one exception.

The evidence of the monastery foundations, plus the tomb of Murong Zhen and the
items found at Taesŏng-san, suggest then that the Buddhism that did exist was largely
centred round the court, with the first substantial monastery possibly being only
established in 427, and perhaps a handful after that. Most of the missionaries, such as

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{105} Li Haiye (2005), 113. \textsuperscript{106} Gaosengzhuan, T50.369b14-15. \textsuperscript{107} Gaosengzhuan, T50.370a29-b2. \textsuperscript{108} Kim Sŏngsuk (2005), 105-107. \textsuperscript{109} Wong (2004), 56, 58. \textsuperscript{110} Wong (2004), 74-75. \textsuperscript{111} Wong (2004), 93ff. \textsuperscript{112} Cf. Okazaki (1977), 180, 158 table 204.}
Adao (if true) and Tanshi stayed only briefly, suggesting few believers and little success. The tradition was probably shallow, for if Kim Pusik is to be believed, in 650, Podōk of Pan’yōng Monastery, fled Koguryō to Paekche because Daoism was becoming popular in Koguryō, but perhaps his actions were more related to his perceptions of a possible Chinese invasion and the conscription of Buddhist monks into the military, as in 668 when Yǒn Namgōn entrusted military matters to the Buddhist monk Sinsōng in P’yōngyang, who then betrayed the city to the Tang army. This use of the Buddhist monks as military advisors and technicians was in line with Xianbei practices, as in 395 and in 399, when Ju Senglang was used to forecast the weather and the prospects of success of a military venture for Murong De. Moreover, the mixture of Buddhism and Daoism that may have occurred in late Koguryō, as referred to in a statement of 643 by Yǒn Kaeōmnun, may have had its origins in an area like that to the south of Chang’an, for example, where Daoism and Buddhism mixed among nomadic clans who also supported Daoism because it seemed to be similar to their own ‘shamanism.’ This seems to have flourished in the 490s to early 500s. At most we can speak of Koguryō Buddhism over a 250-year period. It seems to have had a brief flowering from the late 500s, judging from the missionaries of the Sanlun School, who went from Koguryō to the Japanese Yamato court, but almost always only after having studied in China previously. At least one was sent as an envoy. Yet this need to study in Sui or Tang suggests that, contrary to a number of assertions, that there was not a developed doctrinal study of Sanlun in Koguryō. Rather, this study had its origins in the Later Yan territories, probably among descendants of Chinese refugees from the North China plains. Fadu (437-497/500) was a native of Longcheng, which had been captured in 436 by Northern Wei. A practitioner of austerities and a devotee of Amitāyus, Fadu arrived in South China in 477-479, and he became a teacher of Sūngnang, a monk from the Liaodong territories of Koguryō. It is clear that a number of monks involved with Kumārajīva and Sanlun, such as Sengquan, heir to Sūngnang’s monastery in the South, Tanshun and Tanwucheng came from or lived in Huanglong, that is, Longcheng. In addition, a Japanese text dating from before 1259, but based on a work by Junzheng (or Huizheng), the Sīlūn xuanyī (possibly dating before 814), states that “a monk from the state of Gaoli, Dharma Teacher Shi Daolong [i.e. Sūngnang?] journeyed to the descendants of the eight former (disciples of Kumārajīva) in the country of Huanglong, learned what the disciples had heard and studied…crossed the Yangtze and reached Yangzhou.” That would suggest that Sanlun was established in the Longcheng region.

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113 SGSG, 223, 9th year of King Pojang; backed by Samguk yusa 3: 97-98.
114 SGSG, 227, 27th year of King Pojang.
115 Kim Sŏngsuk (2005), 108.
119 Gaosengzhuan, T50,3808b15.
120 See Jorgensen (2005), 82, 116 note 58.
121 This is controversial, as the possibility of confusion has been raised by Hirai Shun’ei (1976), Chōgoka Hannya shisōshi kenkyū, Shunjūsha: Tokyo, 271-272; cf. with Richard Robinson (1967), Early Madhyamika in India and China, University of Wisconsin Press: Madison, 165-166.
122 Kim Sŏngsuk (2005), 107; see also table in Robinson (1967), 163 for the genealogy.
123 Cited in Jeorg Plässen (2002), “The Koguryō monk Sūngnang...” 3. Huanglong is here given as the area around Dunhuang, but that is not tenable. Note, I have not had access to this original text.
after Kumārajīva’s death in 409 or 413, and that Sōngnang joined them from not far over the border in Koguryō. Yet I consider Sōngnang still needed to study with Zhou Yong and make notes before he could even compose his own text.

The fame of the line on Mt She from Sōngnang, who became abbot of Zhiguan Monastery there, probably then reached Emperor Wu of Liang. This royal patronage in turn later attracted a number of monks from Koguryō to study under Jizang (549-623), who claimed to be heir of this lineage. It was largely Jizang’s “Koguryō” pupils who went on to teach Sanlun in Japan.124

The origin of this fascination with Sanlun by monks from the region may perhaps be indirectly sourced to Ju Senglang, for Kumārajīva’s first pupil in Chang’an, Sengrui (352-436), had listened to Senglang preach the Pañcavimsāta (Fangguangming) scripture of prajñāparamitā sometime before 375, the translation of which sutra he later assisted. As the most senior and leader of Kumārajīva’s pupils,125 the connection with Ju Senglang may have created a seal of approval for Kumārajīva’s scholarship, which then attracted the Longcheng/Huanglong group to Sanlun. This then enticed Sōngnang from across the border. Sōngnang then cannot be claimed as a Koguryō Sanlun scholar, for he studied initially in Northern Wei and wrote all of his work in South China and never returned to Koguryō. Indeed, he probably had to verify what he had learnt with Zhou Yong (-485), a most learned man versed in Buddhist philosophy of the Madhyamaka kind and in phonology.126 Most of the Sanlun scholars, including those from Longcheng, moved to south of the Yangtze, which is later where Jizang taught and the students from Koguryō came. There was thus no substantial Sanlun school of studies in Koguryō itself, and it is possible most of the students from there were of Chinese ethnicity.

In order to avoid the nationalist claims that read present requirements back into the past, we should then see Koguryō as a multi-ethnic kingdom, with a semi-nomadic warrior ruling class made up of clans descended from Puyō to the north, local subject farmers of the Ye and Maek peoples,127 plus some descendants of Chinese populations with their roots in the Han Dynasty colonies, and new groups of ethnic Chinese from the bordering states, either refugees or captives brought from the collapse of the Xianbei states, and some Xianbei defectors as well. The last two ethnic groups may have been relatively few numerically, some living on land conquered by Koguryō. As boasted in the words of King Kwanggaeta’o ca. 414, he would have the Han (Chinese) and Ye that he had captured, brought to care for his tomb and as personal dependents used to bolster royal powers against the other aristocratic Koguryō clans.128 Like modern refugees and immigrants searching for a better life, or forced from their homes by violence, these groups, who were probably valued for their skills and used to control selected areas such as Nangnang (Lelang) and Taebang (Daifang) and as buffer forces between the Koguryō conquerors and newly subjected peoples,129 probably maintained an interest in their homelands and

126 For a recent discussion of Zhou Yong, see Nakajima Ryužō (1985), Rikachō shisō no kenkyū: Shidaiju no Bukkyō shisō, Heirakuji shoten: Kyoto, 290-318. Oshima Shōji (2003), Kanji to Chōgokujin, Iwanami shoten: Tokyo, 146 suggests that Zhou Yong was the first Chinese to consciously use the four tones of Chinese. Of course, Sengrui was also versed in phonology.
127 Gardiner (1988), 175.
128 Gardiner (1988), 176-177; SGSG, 188, King Kogukyang, 2nd year, summer, the attack on Liaodong gained 10,000 people who were herded back into Koguryō territory.
intermarried with the local population.\textsuperscript{130} It was probably these people, along with the centralizing royalty, who were the initial supporters of Buddhism and facilitated its introduction. As these migrants and ethnic minorities were valuable as officials loyal to the Koguryō king and state, and were used as Koguryō envoys,\textsuperscript{131} the king may have reciprocated by lending support to their Buddhism. I suspect then that few of the Ye and Maek subject peasants adopted Buddhism, nor many of the Koguryō warriors, who would not have found the pacifist Buddhism attractive. Rather, the Buddhists probably came from the minority ethnic communities and from the royal clan and its immediate supporters.

The Buddhism taken into Koguryō largely came via Xianbei territories and was therefore likely heavily influenced by Xianbei Buddhism. The route this Buddhism took into Koguryō probably began in Shentong Monastery, which seems from a number of hints to have been a focus for Koguryō, possibly because of an initial connection made earlier by Fu Jian. There were three other cave complexes in the vicinity dating from Northern and Eastern Wei. They were in Licheng, near modern Ji’nan, close to the Yellow River, and on a road from Mt Tai.\textsuperscript{132} The references to Beidu in several places in the \textit{Haedong kosuǒgon}\textsuperscript{133} suggest that one route went from near the mouth of the Yellow River and followed the Miaodao islands at the head of the Gulf of Bohai across to the Liaodong Peninsula and then onto Ji’nan and P’yŏngyang. The other route from Shentong Monastery probably went via the old Former Yan capital of Longcheng, with one centre or stop-over at the Wanfo tang cave complex, and then on into Liaodong.

However, as Koguryō had to fight for its survival in its later history against Sui and Tang China, as well as its peninsular neighbours Silla and Paekche, the Koguryō rulers tried to use Buddhism as a diplomatic lever with the Yamato court in particular, but it failed with Silla and Paekche. The evidence shows Koguryō was not a major Buddhist centre, and its Buddhism was a prayer for benefits and was purely derivative. It produced no important Buddhist thinkers, schools or art. The religion was likely that of the small ethnic populations, possibly creoles like Ko Un,\textsuperscript{134} and of the court as a nation-protecting device and for diplomacy. The monks who appear in the historical records were mostly those who went to China to study and make a better life. Few returned to Koguryō, possibly because Buddhism there was not especially favoured, or because they were members of the Chinese ethnic minority. It is likely then that the majority of Koguryō subjects largely maintained their old beliefs, while the ruling elites enjoyed their hunting and military pursuits, as the tombs suggest.

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\textsuperscript{131} Shinohara (2005), 218-219.
\textsuperscript{132} Okazaki (1977), 158.
\textsuperscript{133} Lee (1969), 34; Chang Hŭiok (1991), 135, ref. 271 note 280.
\textsuperscript{134} SGSG, 407, 17\textsuperscript{th} year of King Kwanggaet’o; see Shinohara (2005), 221-223; and Chi Paesŏn (1987), 867-871. Ko Un founded Northern Yan in 407, and was possibly of mixed Murong and Koguryō Ko clan ancestry.
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A Korean Reader’s Insight on Thomas and Its Oral Tradition Origin

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ABSTRACT
This paper demonstrates the genesis of an ancient religious document titled, Gospel of Thomas, from a Korean religio-critical reader’s view. The words of the oral Performer (Jesus) actively circulated among certain eyewitnesses of the era, and these Logia were eventually carried on into the form of a written tradition, under the policy of each individual community. If then, how (or how long) did the oral tradition survive? And how can one relate the oral tradition of Jesus with the canon of the Thomasine community? The record of the Gos. Thom. first appeared in the passage of Hippolytus’ Refutatio 5.7.20 (222–235 C.E.), but it is a general knowledge that the original text was not recreated in the second or third century C.E. in which there were flourishing gnostic texts. The Greek fragment of P. Oxy 654 36–40, with Nag Hammadi Codex II, 2. 34. 30–35.14, argue a fresh insight that the literary traces of oral tradition, revealed in Logia 9, 33, 65 and 66, remind readers that the origin of Thomas is related to a pre-canonical Q period of the first century C.E.

Contemporary readers often ignore the existence of the Jewish customised oral traditions of the Jesus movement, but several ancient texts certify the continuation of the verbal traditions as well as their effects in the world of written tradition. For instance, the Matthean scene in which the soldiers deny the story of the Resurrection of Jesus, clearly depicts a well-known oral tradition circulating in the Jewish-nominated Christian community: “… this story has been widely circulated among the Jews to this very day”. The words of First John, such as “we proclaim to you what we have seen and heard, so that you also may have fellowship with us” and “see that what you have heard from the beginning remains in you”, also suggest the existence and continuation of the oral tradition that was transferred to the following tradition carriers. The testimony of John that “Jesus did many other things as well. If every one of them were written down, … even the whole world would not have room for the books that would be written”, confirms the unaccountable scale of the agrapha of Jesus remaining within the verbal form. This is


2 Mt. 28: 15b.

3 1 Jn. 1: 3.

4 1 Jn. 1: 24. “this is the message we have heard … and declare to you: God is Light …”(1 Jn. 1: 5)

5 Jn. 21: 25.

convincingly epitomised in Gerhardsson’s category of the ‘practical tradition’ that was not expressed in textual words, but in oral forms in the milieu of early Christianity.

**THE ORAL TRADITION WITH PAUL AND APOLLOS**

The continuation of the Jesus oral traditions in the regions where Jews dwelled not only developed in the context of Jewish society, but also progressively spread out to those called ‘Gentiles’ (non-Jewish races). The effect of the continuation is seen in the writings of the Apostle Paul in which Paul seems to have carried the unknown Jewish or Christian scrolls: “when you (Timothy) come, bring the cloak that I (Paul) left …, and my scrolls, especially the parchments.” The fact that the several letters which were written by Paul and sent to his fellow workers for them to carefully carry on the oral Logia traditions, gives rise to the possibility that Paul, who was not one of the eyewitnesses of Jesus on the same level as the twelve disciples, individually operated the ‘anti-Jewish sectarian movement’ on the basis of the unwritten Jesus Logia. The personalised and characterised statement of Paul in the book of 1 Thessalonians (50/51 C.E.) manifests the transferred Word of Jesus for the particular regional group of ‘Thessalonians’:

According to the Lord’s own Word, we tell you that we who are still alive, who are left till the coming of the Lord, will certainly not precede those who have fallen asleep. For the Lord Himself will come down from heaven, with a loud command, with the voice of the archangel and with the trumpet call of God, and the dead in Christ will rise first. After that, we who are still alive and are left will be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air. And so we will be with the Lord forever. Therefore encourage each other with these Words (of Jesus).

As the text is generally recognised to originate around 50–60 C.E., the personally modified concept of eschatology that is not in any synoptic texts, but from an oral Logion tradition, obviously elucidates the reality that the influence of the oral traditions not only remained in the Jewish-led Christian communities, but also brought the result of the oral traditions being spread over many colonies of the Roman Empire in the middle of the first century C.E. Paul’s Roman citizenship (which was his social position) sustains the claim that Paul possessed the privilege to travel everywhere without limitations in the Graeco-Roman world. Like the oral tradition of ‘the Lord’s Supper’, ‘the Resurrection of Christ’

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12 Incomparable even with Mt. 24: 30–31.
13 “For I received … what I also passed on to you (Corinthians)” 1 Co. 11: 23–32. Koester argues that the passage clearly proves that “Paul had received a tradition of an oral version of this account”. Helmut Koester, “Written Gospels or Oral Tradition?” *JBL*, Vol. 113 Num. 2 (Sum., 1994), 293. Ibid, ‘The Synoptic
in the letter of 1 Corinthians is another example of the extended influence of the oral traditions that Paul had perceived:

For what I received I passed on to you: ... that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that He was buried, that He was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that He appeared to Peter, and then to the Twelve. After that, He appeared to more than five hundred of the brothers at the same time, most of whom are still living, though some have fallen asleep. Then He appeared to James, then to all the Apostles, and last of all He appeared to me also, as to one abnormally born.

Although it is not clear that the meaning of ‘according to the Scriptures’ signifies whether the Torah or a written Jesus source such as Agraphe or both of them, one can presume without difficulty that the written story of the post-appearance of Jesus was from one of the oral traditions that the author of the text had partly quoted and re-created from the Scriptural material: “For what I received I passed on to you”. The phrase, “most of whom are still living” brings to mind various ideas about the eyewitness-disciples, regarding what they were doing and where they were living. In this regard, the interpretation that the elderly man Thomas would also be one of those characters, should not be discounted, rather adopted in support of the oral traditions of Jesus in the time where Paul was just one of the carriers of the unknown source (45–60 C.E.) - unless Thomas died and was one of those in the saying “though some have fallen asleep”. The exact quotation of Paul, “remembering the Words the Lord Jesus himself said: ‘It is more blessed to give than to receive’” that was spoken for the Ephesian elders in Miletus, divulges the crucial fact that Paul had previously memorised the oral Logia of Jesus.

Kelber’s argument that oral sensitivities and interpretations of the scripture had permeated into many places of Paul’s Letters, creating for him the nickname of ‘the oral traditionalist’, indirectly expresses the clear perspective of Paul’s oral knowledge, while Patterson’s view that Thomas’ offering insights into community life is equal with Paul’s literary position concerning ‘circumcision’, ‘dietary laws’ and ‘women’s attitudes’, demonstrates the particular similarities in the relationship between Paul and Thomas. The phrase “with many similar parables Jesus spoke the word to them (disciples), as much as they could understand. ... when he was alone with his own disciples, he explained

16 “To the married I give this command (not I, but the Lord): A wife must not separate from her husband” (1 Co. 7:10), and “In the same way, the Lord has commanded that those who preach the gospel should receive their living from the gospel” (1 Co. 9: 14).
everything (again)”\textsuperscript{19}, also suggests Thomas’ attendance when the private instruction was given after the public discourse; he was engaged in the process of \textit{hearing} and \textit{remembering} the Words of his Master. Luke, however, implies that the continuation of the oral traditions or textual sources in the early period did not always spread successfully, but was communicated inaccurately in the process of transmission. For example, the false or incomplete teaching of the oral traditions of Jesus was passed onto a young Jew of Alexandria, called ‘Apollos’ (the short form of \textit{Apollonius}). Apollos was identified when he, as the user of the oral traditions, came to Ephesus, spreading an incomplete knowledge of the Christian ‘baptism’.

He (Apollos) … taught about Jesus accurately (the things concerning Jesus), though he knew only the baptism of John. … For he vigorously refuted the Jews in public debate, proving from \textit{the Scriptures} that Jesus was the Christ. … While Apollos was at Corinth, Paul (asked some disciples at Ephesus), “Did you receive the Holy Spirit when you believed?” They answered, “No, we have not even heard that there is a Holy Spirit.”\textsuperscript{20}

The text of Acts illustrates that the tradition of ‘John’s Baptism (water baptism)’ was communicated to Apollos without the primary instruction or belief of ‘the baptism of the Holy Spirit’. This was discovered by Paul’s observation at Ephesus, where Apollos had visited earlier. The account of the meeting of the ‘eloquent man (one skilled in words)’\textsuperscript{21} with Paul’s fellow workers, called Priscilla and Aquila in Ac. 18: 26, is the point at which the misunderstanding about the oral traditions of Jesus and his teachings was corrected. The phrase “proving from \textit{the Scriptures} that Jesus was the Christ” is not sufficient reason for ignoring the existence of an early written gospel \textit{source} in Apollos’ time (54 C.E.). The origin of the teachings of Apollos, according to Blass, is inferred in two ways: first, the baptism tradition of Apollos was derived from an unknown written gospel material which had reached to the Diaspora Jewish community of Alexandria: second, Apollos obtained his knowledge of baptism either directly or indirectly from someone else.\textsuperscript{22} Even if the two views of Blass are individually supported in the narrator’s explanation of John’s text: “this is John’s testimony … this all happened at Bethany on the other side of the Jordan, where John was baptizing”\textsuperscript{23} and in Luke’s expressions, such as ‘learned man’ and “with a thorough knowledge of \textit{the Scriptures}”\textsuperscript{24}, the uncertain routes by which Apollos could get the oral teachings of the new Jesus doctrine, at least, validate the powerful extension of the early Jewish-led Christian movement through the verbal or unqualified textual traditions.

**The Oral Tradition with Papias**

The view that the oral \textit{Logia} traditions had geographically extended over the whole region of the Roman Empire, can also be seen throughout early Christian history. Fragments of Papias (125 C.E.)\textsuperscript{25}, preserved in the writings of Eusebius (\textit{Ecclesiastical History} 3. 39. 1–

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\textsuperscript{19} Mk. 4: 33–34.

\textsuperscript{20} See Ac. 18: 24–19: 7.


\textsuperscript{22} The view that Apollos went to Ephesus in the summer of 54 C.E., while Paul was on his third journey, is becoming a generally accepted one among scholars. Ibid., pp. 26–42.

\textsuperscript{23} Jn. 1: 1 and 28.

\textsuperscript{24} Ac. 18: 24.

\textsuperscript{25} Papias (70–140 C.E.) who seems to be the bishop of Hierapolis (near Laodicea and Colossae in Lycus,
7 and 14–17)\textsuperscript{26}, demonstrate traces of the oral traditions over the first century C.E.\textsuperscript{27} Papias’ nicknames, such as ‘a hearer of John’, ‘a colleague of Polycarp’ and ‘an early man’, pervade Papias’ experiences of the oral traditions, while parts of \textit{An Exposition of the Lord’s Reports}\textsuperscript{28}, “what I formerly learned … and have carefully stored in memory”\textsuperscript{29} and “and also if any follower of the Presbyters happened to come, I would inquire for the sayings of the Presbyters, what Peter had said, … \textit{what Thomas (had said) or James ... were sayings ... as from the voice which yet lives and remains}”\textsuperscript{30} explicitly declare the movement in which the oral \textit{Logia} traditions still persisted even under the gnosticising conditions of the era.\textsuperscript{31} The role of Papias as an oral \textit{quoter} attests that the oral traditions were passed on through the practice of \textit{memorisation} until the first half of the second century C.E., in which Papias himself believed in the purity and authenticity of the oral \textit{Logia}\textsuperscript{32}, despite his testimony regarding ‘the compositions of the canonical Gospels in particular Matthew and Mark’\textsuperscript{33} and ‘the relationship between Papias and John the disciple of Jesus’\textsuperscript{34}, which were problematic in the eyes of Eusebius.\textsuperscript{35} Further, whether Papias collected the oral traditions from the presbyters or the disciples of the presbyters is of no concern. The main point is that the text of Papias in those sections relating to “what Thomas (had said)” echoes the oral message of Thomas or his community, which naturally responds to the issue of how the oral \textit{Logia} tradition relates to Thomas.

\textbf{The Oral Tradition with Thomas}

Jaffee, Draper, Elman and Gershoni have previously explored the transmission phenomenon of literacy from orality in the Graeco-Roman era, but they all hardly touched the subject within the concept of Thomas text.\textsuperscript{36} Then, what is the literal position of

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\textsuperscript{26} The presently lost text of Papias was written in his old age between the years (98), either 115 C.E. or140 C.E. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{27} The oral sayings tradition of Jesus and the teachings of the apostles were silenced during the third and fourth centuries. Hervieux, (1960), pp. 127–131 & 138.


\textsuperscript{30} Ecclesiastical History 3. 39. 4. Ibid.


\textsuperscript{32} Philip S. Alexander, ‘Orality in Pharisaic-rabbinic Judaism at the Turn of the Eras’ in \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 159–161.

\textsuperscript{33} While Mark recorded the testimony of Peter, Matthew was written first. Farkasfalvy, (1997), pp. 47–68.


Thomas in relation to the oral tradition of Jesus? If one regards the textual figure of Thomas, the oral relationship of Thomas is clearly revealed in the intention of the Thomasine Logiographer who never clarified certain quoted words used in the synoptics and John: “as it is written in the book of the words of Isaiah the prophet” (Lk. 3:4), “for so it is written by the prophet” (Mt. 2:5), “as it is written in Isaiah the prophet” (Mk. 1:1) and “for these things took place that the writing might be fulfilled” (Jn. 19:36). In addition, the Logiographer does not reflect on any statements attributed to Jesus, in opposition to all the writers of the canonical texts: “what is written in the law? How do you read?” (Lk. 10:26), “this is he of whom it is written” (Mt. 11:10), “have you ever read what David did?” (Mk. 2:25) and “it is written in the prophets and they shall all be taught by God” (Jn. 6:45).

Uro, who believes that the written gospels functioned as an extension of the oral tradition, once analysed Logion 14 as the assumed source of the oral traditions.37 Uro found a connection here between Logion 14 and 6,38 and concluded that Logion 14 is the answer to Logion 6, but the argument that the Coptic texts of Logia 6.1 and 14 are older than the Greek version of the Papyrus Oxyrhynchus 654, on the assumption of a later harmonisation39, caused Uro to not define the ultimate category of the Thomas text in relation to the oral tradition.40 The three sections about ‘fasting’ (14.1), ‘prayer’ (14.2) and ‘almsgiving’ (14.3) that are not parallel with chapter six of Matthew, and Logion 14.5–6, which has a close similarity with the passage of Lk. 19: 8–941, unfortunately led Uro to the inference that Thomas was written in the milieu in which Matthew and Luke were already known (the post-canonical period).42 In the same sense that the metaphorical aphorisms are classified as an ‘individual voice’; apart from proverbs, the theory that “the aphorist


37 “Jesus said to them, “If you fast, you will give rise to sin for yourselves; and if you pray, you will be
condemned; and if you give alms, you will do harm to your spirits. When you go into any land and walk
about in the districts, if they receive you, eat what they set before you, and heal the sick among them.
For what goes into your mouth will not defile you, but that which issues from your mouth – it is that which
will defile you.”” Thomas O. Lambdin, ‘The Gospel of Thomas (II, 2)’ in The Nag Hammadi Library in

38 “His disciples questioned him and said to him, “Do you want us to fast? And how shall we pray? Shall we
give alms? And what kind of diet shall we follow?” Jesus said, “Do not lie, and do not do what you hate. For
all things are disclosed before heaven. For there is nothing obscure that will not be shown forth, and there is
nothing covered that will remain without being disclosed.””

39 While there is consistency recognised by scholars between the Greek and Coptic version of Thomas, the
theory, maintained by Uro, that the Greek version of Papyri Oxyrhynchus is just a translation of the Coptic is
not as strong as the opposing view, supported by Guillaumont, Bauer, and Schneemelcher, that the Coptic
text of Nag Hammadi is based upon a Greek version. The literary characteristics of both versions are quite
significant factors, by which scholars decided on the later view of Thomas studies. W. Schneemelcher, New

40 “While the original Greek gospel represented an essentially independent tradition”, the text “has a
complex history of composition and may therefore contains different origin and derive from diverse source”.
Uro, (1998). p. 30. The quality of the Thomas text is also evaluated by the complete Coptic text of Nag
Hammadi. G. William Morrice, Hidden Sayings of Jesus: Words attributed to Jesus outside the Four

41 “But Zacchaeus stood up and said to the Lord, “Look, Lord! Here and now I give half of my possessions
to the poor, and if I have cheated anybody out of anything, I will pay back four times the amount.” Jesus said
to him, “Today salvation has come to this house, because this man, too, is a son of Abraham.”” (Lk. 19: 8–
9).

42 The differences between the Greek fragments and the Coptic suggests that the Coptic was based on one of
may choose either to support or attack the content of the community wisdom, on the other hand, is more applicable to the Logia tradition of Thomas. Regarding the aphoristic sayings, Marcus and Hahn (though Aune pointed out the potential involvement of the ancient Jewish proverbs in the process of oral transmission), discovered that the last part of Logion 33 (“so everyone who comes in and goes out will see its light”) is seen as the gnostic soul which comes into the world and then leaves, because of the additional word of ‘going out’ (actually, *auò etímeú ebol* (“and goes out”)).

The gnostic concept, according to Henaut, may, conversely, be hypothetical in that the aphorism of NHC 2. II, 39:10–18 originally “belonged to the earliest stratum of Thomas where it was deposited by an independent oral transmission and then has been modified in conformity with the canonical Gospels” during the period of the textual transmission. The potential relationship of Logion 33 to Q47 (11:33) certifies the uniqueness of the aphorisms of Jesus in terms of their textual independence as well as the ability by which one can retrace their oral history. Likewise, if one carefully contemplates the Greek Logia, the independence of the Thomas text, in terms of the aphorism, can be more accurately seen. The phrase “for there is nothing hidden that will not be made clear” in P. Oxy. 654. 36–40 simply contains one couplet without the second part of NHC 2. II, 33: 22–23 (“or hidden that will not be made known”), implying the value of the original Greek Thomas text. The textual composition of the Sower parable (Logion 9) in comparison with Mk. 4: 3–849, as an instance, displays the simplicity that reflects the primitivism of the Thomas text.

<table>
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<th>Mark 4: 3–8</th>
<th>NHC II, 2. 34. 30–35. 1450</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. “Listen! A farmer went out to sow his seed. As he was scattering the seed, some fell along the path, and the birds came and ate it up. Some fell on rocky places, where it did not have much soil. It sprang up quickly, because the soil was shallow. But when the sun came up, the plants were scorched, and they withered because they had no root. Other seed fell among thorns, which grew up and choked the plants, so that they did not bear grain. Still other seed fell on good soil. It came up, grew and produced a crop, multiplying sixty, or even a hundred times.”</td>
<td>a. Jesus said, “Now the sower went out, took a handful (of seeds), and scattered them. Some fell on the road; the birds came and gathered them up. Others fell on rock, did not take root in the soil, and did not produce ears. And others fell on thorns; they choked the seed(s) and worms ate them. And others fell on the good soil and it produced good fruit: it bore sixty per measure and a hundred and twenty per measure.”</td>
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45 That is often compared with Lk. 11:33 (‘that those who enter may see its light’) as a close linguistic relation. NHC 2. II, 39: 16–18.


47 Q means Quelle, a German word for ‘source’.

48 Sieber asserts that Thomas is looked upon as one of the closest texts to Luke, but the dependence of Thomas on Luke is not recognised by him, rather his interesting analysis of Thomas indicates the relationship with Q. See Henaut, (1993). p. 275.

49 The text of Mark is commonly recognised as one of the earliest canonical texts written during the 70s of the first century C.E.

GTh-1: A Comparison Between Mark and Thomas

Although the above saying is assumed to be part of an additional style of the final editor on the assumption of ‘having (Logion 41)’ and ‘reaper (Logion 21)’, the phrase, “afmehoot’/(a): (he) took a handful of seeds” which did not appear in Mark’s text (A), offers a form of oral triadic structure. At the same time, one cannot imagine that the phrase about the seeds falling on the rock in the Thomas’ text (c) could have originated from Mark’s nicely descriptive phrase (C). It is implied in the structure survey that the Thomas terms of ‘petra (rock)’ and ‘hds (ears)’ contain a kind of invisual (spiritual) principle of oral teaching rather than the practical terms of “rocky places” and “seed’s root”. If the Markan image of the ‘scorching sun’ is a secondary element, as the author of the text has included it in developing his personalised interpretation, the reference to the seed which “did not take root in the soil”, is quite significant as an orally originating form of Thomas. Crossan, regarding the image of “the rocky soil” asserts that “where it did not have much soil” is Mark’s editorial style, reconfirming the principle that literary simplicity can be as significant factor in evaluating the text’s originality as its authenticity, at some stage.

The argument that Thomas is more primitive than Mark is also proven in the section where the harvest of good fruits is mentioned. The account: “σε αὐτῷ σῆμαινε τό (f): sixty and a hundred twenty’ of Thomas, described from a third-person perspective, is simplistic and more logical for its readers, rather than Mark’s account of “thirty, sixty, or even a hundred times (F)”. The opposing view, that the ultimate source for Thomas was not oral, but stemmed from synoptic traditions and that the immediate source for Mark itself was not literary, but oral, motivated Henaut to presume the probability of a traditional Jewish oral heritage, and that the pre-Gospel source of Mark might have the characteristics of Semitic Greek imagery and the language of the Hebrew scripture for its composition. The affirmation of Henaut that the Coptic text discloses a textual relationship with the Markan tradition, as Thomas had access to the pre-Gospel source of Mark, nevertheless, has less reliability in terms of acknowledging the unique characteristics of the literary composition of Thomas in this comparison. Conversely, the theory that “Thomas does not only have access to living oral traditions but its very gattung is closely bound up with oral hermeneutics”, is more likely in the context of the textual approach.

Since Mark’s story of the wicked tenants (Mk. 12: 1–9) is obstructed by the appearance of additional servants (in order that uncountable numbers of the servants are described after the third servant was sent), the parable of Logion 65 that contains only

51 Jesus said, “Whoever has something in his hand will receive more, and whoever has nothing will be deprived of even the little he has.”
52 “When the grain ripened, he came quickly with his sickle in his hand and reaped it” (NHC II, 2. 37. 18–19).
55 Ibid., pp. 263–266.
58 The narrator of Mark says that the owner of the vineyard sent many other servants after the third servant (that is not even mentioned in Thomas). The third person in Thomas was not another servant, but was the

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the threefold mission of the owner to the labourers, also embraces a component of the oral Logia heritage59, which persuades readers with the thought that the Thomas version of the story is closer to oral speech, as Mark’s story (12: 1–8) is reversely more textualised. The reliability of Thomas is incessantly implied in the case of Logion 66 (“Jesus said, show me the stone which the builders have rejected. That one is the cornerstone”), that exposes ‘an oral proverbial manner of transmission’60, though the text of Mark seems to be a recitation of a written text61: “haven’t you read this scripture: ‘The stone the builders rejected has become the capstone’”62. The Markan phrase of “haven’t you read this scripture”, which is not in Thomas, offers the possibility that the compiler of Thomas, who was free from ‘scribal influence’, would have collected the OT writings (Ps. 118: 22) via a verbal medium, while the Markan tradition affixed by the author is conceivable in the annihilating function, proposed by Gerhardsson, that “traditions lapse and become extinct either by accident or design as the mechanics of traditions”.64 Regarding the manufactured order between Mark and Thomas, Davies, furthermore, argues that the author of Mark, for the case of ‘Jesus’ public ministry (Mk. 1:1–8:22 and 11:1–12:44)’ used the Thomas Logia 13, 22 and 65–66, ‘imitating the portion of Jesus from Thomas’.65

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, from a Korean reader’s perspective, if Thomas had this kind of primitive literary characteristic, one should recognise the origin of Thomas as a free, orally constituted Logia heritage in the pre-Mark period, but not directly related to the pre-Mark written materials.66 The realisation that Thomas lacks synoptic redactional and allegorical features and the distinctiveness of the Logia order, suggests that the literary characteristics of the Thomas text not only belong “to an early stage of the transmission of Jesus’ (oral) sayings, but also to a stage that is comparable to the canonical Gospel sources.”67 The claim that the Logia text contains unique materials from oral traditions, is, therefore, more than just a presumption. The Logia type of Thomas that scholars do not regard as copied or quoted from the traditional Q (Logienquelle)68, is another written source

62 Mk. 12: 10–11.
63 “The stone the builders rejected has become the capstone.”
64 The purely preservative function by which traditions are preserved and transmitted without any changes, and the creative function, by which traditions are “created, grow and pass on through fruitful changes”, also proposed by Gerhardsson in the process of oral transmission. Gerhardsson, (1964). pp. 37–40.
66 This paper is not considered about the pre-Mark source in depth, since there is no existing material for Mark’s Gospel. It seems that the two texts were written for completely different communities in different regions of early Christians in the first century C.E.
68 The scholarly reconstructed text based on Luke and Matthew by Schleiermacher (1832), Weisse (1838)
(accommodating ‘oral traditions’)\textsuperscript{69}, since the content of the two texts is so familiar, given that more than 25\% of Q has parallels in Thomas.\textsuperscript{70} Furthermore, the fact the two texts are around the same length substantiates the authenticity of the Thomas \textit{Logia} to a greater extent.\textsuperscript{71}

\textbf{REFERENCES}


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Ethnic Media in the Globalising Context: Transnational quest for identity of different generations as portrayed in the Korean-Australian media

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ABSTRACT

A significant influx of tertiary education students in the Korean community in Australia has been a significant economic benefit to the Korean community. Together with the provision of share houses, church services, food and groceries, the Korean community has seen a few newly established weekly magazines catering to this group of young and short-term stayers. The paper analyses the ways in which the represented personnel in the weekly magazines are in search of their identities, values and life goals. The represented personnel and readers of the magazines appear to live in a fantasy Western world that they dreamt of for a long time. The paper also analyses a prize-winning autobiography of a Korean-Australian business migrant. The autobiography is an illustration of the reality of ‘cold’ immigrant life that has been observed by many studies. Interestingly, these two groups of people not only demonstrate that they are different in terms of their life goals and their perceptions of life in the West, but they are at times in the relationships between employees and employers. How they can reconcile in terms of their values and life goals may have a significant bearing on how the Korean community can stay in harmony and also constructively in the broader Australia.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Korean community in Australia consists of 60,873 individuals with full- or part-Korean ancestry, according to the 2006 ABS Census. This is a modest increase from the 1986 ABS Census figure of 10,264, in comparison of the population growth of other minority groups. The economic prosperity of Korea since the 1990s has led to a large influx of Korean students, tourists and other short-term stayers in Australia. For example, in 2006, following China (90,287) and India (39,166), Korea supplied the third largest number of students to Australia (31,257) studying at schools, higher education institutes and English language schools (Australian Government 2006). In addition to these influxes of Korean students, the actual Korean populations of major Australian cities are far greater than the figures provided by the ABS Census at any point in time. It is estimated that there are about 100,000 Koreans in metropolitan Sydney and more than 20,000 in greater Melbourne.

By far, the church remains the most significant Korean ethnic institution in terms of maintaining Korean ethnicity and interaction for economic, cultural and educational purposes (Han 1994c). A range of media such as print media, television and radio also constitute an important institution which keeps the Korean population informed of news and information from Korea, the Korean community and the broader Australian society. Generally speaking, the media in the Korean community not only has a role to play in exerting a positive influence on personal and group identity formation, but it also reflects closely the breadth and depth of the socio-economic reality of Korean migrant life.
Despite its significance, the media in the life of Korean immigrants in Australia, has not been given the scholarly attention it deserves except for Kwak (1991).

This paper, which is part of a larger project on the media in the Korean community, is designed to start filling in this gap and (1) explore and describe the ways in which Korean ethnicity is depicted through the media consumed by Korean migrants in Australia; (2) discuss the significance of the media as affecting the formation and maintenance of Korean identity (3) and discuss some selected dimensions of production, distribution and consumption of the media. Cunningham (2002, 268) notes that ‘minorititarian public spheres’ created and utilised by ethnic minorities are different from typical large scale and dominant public spheres, ‘but are nonetheless vibrant, globalised but very specific spaces of self- and community-making and identity.’ We intend to explore the Korean-Australian media’s depiction of ‘self- and community making and identity,’ bearing in mind that the Korean-Australian community and its media operates within the given political-economic context of Australia, Korea and the world system. In light of these, the paper analyses Korean ethnic weekly magazines in Melbourne and a prize-winning short autobiography by a Korean business migrant. Korean migrants in Australia often assume that the young and short-term stayers (sojourners) maintain their own values and pursue life goals that are significantly different from those of permanent residents. This paper attempts to explore how these different values and life goals are portrayed in the contents of the magazines and the autobiography.

Postmodernist perspectives have celebrated their prominence in most disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, especially over the last three decades. Individuals and minority groups have been re-invigorated with such concepts as ‘active audience’ and ‘decentred’ individual subjectivities (Ang 1996). It is undoubtedly important to acknowledge that minority communities, for instance in Australia, have a significant degree of control over respective media cultures through their own patterns of production, distribution and consumption of media texts such as ethnic magazines, satellite TV, and DVDs containing materials originating from their home countries (Cunningham and Sinclair 2001, 6). However, it is also important to examine how the consumption of such media texts takes place in the broader context of the often marginalised life of migrants; how they cope with, and eventually, overcome their dis-located identities. That is, contemporary industrial society has a number of new and unique characteristics that have been brought about by new Information and Communications Technologies, but the fundamental premise under which contemporary society and its media operate still has much more in common with modern society than is often proposed. That is, similar to industrial society or that of modernism, contemporary society can also be discussed using concepts such as dominance, mainstream and peripheries (Cunningham 2002, 269). This is the broad context in which the subjects of analysis of this paper are located.

2. THEORISING DIASPORIC MEDIA AND AUDIENCE

‘The Ethno-specific Mediated Sphericule’ is a concept theorising ethnic media and audience developed by Cunningham (2002, 270) and he illustrates that there are four central components therein. Some of the components are extracted and elaborated for the purpose of this paper as follows. Firstly, they are ‘sphericules’ without critical mass, thus remaining as social fragments. Ethnic media connects an ethnic community to a diverse range of diasporic communities within host environments and around the world, and articulate ethno-specific identities of a given community. Cunningham (2002, 271) notes that no single ethnic community in Australia has been sufficiently well established to be able to fully enjoy the economies of scale in its own right. This indicates that diasporic
media in each ethnic community may be limited in terms of their ability to generate their own news and information and take ‘a fully-fledged role’ in the public sphere. This may engender an extreme degree of commercialisation (Naficy 1993; Kolar-Panov 1997; Cunningham 2002, 272).

Secondly, Cunningham (2002, 273) notes ‘ethno-specific public sphericules are not congruent with international taste cultures borne by a homogenising global media culture.’ Much of the diasporic pursuit of identity is often about remembering past memories, maintaining emotional and/or pragmatic commitment to their past homeland, as well as utilising their links to it for their business opportunities. What Cunningham (2002, 273) calls ‘long-distance nationalism’ can separate an ethnic community from the host country, and cause division among the people within an ethnic community. The latter may precipitates the renewal of the community’s identity and future directions. The consumption of media from the homeland is one of the most common ways of staying in touch with it.

Thirdly, the diasporic media has far greater significance in each ethnic community than the significance of the mainstream media on the general population. The media make up the recognised significant sources of information and entertainment in the ethnic community, and few other mediators are available. Diasporic media may generally pursue commercial benefits and compete severely against each other, without enjoying economies of scale in part due to a small ethnic population, that is, in the context of ‘not fully fledged markets’ (Cunningham 2002, 274). Cunningham (2002, 275) notes that ‘this is small business commercialism which deals with the practical specificities of cultural difference at the local level as an absolute precondition of business viability.’

Fourthly, due to the marginalisation of the ethnic community in the broader host society and its lack of political representation and other opportunities, diasporic media take the key roles of communication beyond some specifically significant organisations such as the churches and temples in specific ethnic communities. According to Cunningham (2002, 275-276), this media-centricity precipitates ‘new configurations of the information-entertainment’, whereby there is also ‘a constant blurring of the information-entertainment distinction, giving rise to a positive sense of a “tabloidised” sphericule.’

Cunningham’s theorising has notable value in understanding ethnic media and audience and it is worth exploring the applicability of his concepts with reference to a range of diasporic media in many ethnic communities. What is less than explicit is the depiction of the marginalised immigrant life of the uprooted or transnational audience. In fact, it is this political-economic dimension of immigrant life which creates specific needs of a diasporic audience and determines media resources for consumption and how and what kinds of diasporic media texts are produced and distributed. As some critiques of Habermas’s original ideal/historical model of the public sphere have noted, the ‘general public sphere’ ignores women and non-whites (or NESB migrants), especially in the era of globalisation (cf. Fraser 1992; Couldry and Dreher 2007).

3. Print Magazines

In Melbourne, there is one Korean ethnic weekly newspaper (Melbourne Iryo Simmun). There are also four weekly magazines published in the Korean community in Melbourne: Melbourne Sky; Melbourne Story; Melbourne Journal; Raon by Korea 21 (Raon is a Korean word meaning literally ‘happy together’). Melbourne Journal is the longest and best established magazine of the four and its target readership is the ‘established’ Korean migrants of Melbourne. Apart from Melbourne Journal with its several years’ history, the
rest are no more than a few years old, *Melbourne Story* being six months old. Their
readership is targeted at tertiary Korean-Australian students and medium- to long-term
stayers with tourist or working holiday or student visas. *Melbourne Sky* (or *Melbon-ui
Haneul*, the Korean weekly magazine) is a little over two-years-old, publishing its 107th
issue on 10 March 2009. The cover stories of recent issues of *Melbourne Sky* and
*Melbourne Story* are the foci of the analysis in this section. A broad analysis of the
randomly chosen *Melbourne Sky*’s 107th issue and *Melbourne Story*’s 25th issue of 9
March 2009 is also provided.

3.1 A Brief Description of the Magazine

The *Melbourne Sky* magazine contains 168 pages including the covers, consisting of a
cover story, Australian news in brief (3 pages), 2-3 current affairs and issues from Korea
(2 pages), sensational news from around the world (3 pages), brief news items from Korea
(2 pages), sports news from Korea (3 pages), news about celebrities from Korea (3 pages),
world news items (3 pages), know-how on dating, sexual health, romantic histories,
psychology of the sexes, cartoons, a profile of a successful professional person, exemplary
success stories, classified advertisements. *Melbourne Story* has 144 pages in total and the
composition of its contents is remarkably similar to that of the *Melbourne Sky*.

3.2 *Melbourne Sky* Cover Story – women’s narratives of their life

Every issue of *Melbourne Sky* has a female cover model or a representative reader. This
section is perhaps a creative way to ‘stay in touch’ with the readership. The female cover
models are chosen from medium to long-term stayers rather than permanent residents in
part because the latter are often known to each other in the relatively small Korean
community in Melbourne and they may not necessarily be proud of being a cover model.
The March 10 edition contains one full page advertisement (p.153) and two more partial
page advertisements (pp.37, 157) looking for models. The magazine pays the selected a
$50 reward. The cover page of *Melbourne Sky* portrays the model while pages 4 and 5
carry two more photos and her brief life story.

3.3 A summary of the Cover Story of *Melbourne Sky*

Ms JY Lee majored in fine arts and graduated from a Korean university in January 2008.
She saved her wages, working for three months day and night, sleeping about 3 hours a
day. Ms Lee’s plan to attend World Youth Day 2009 in Sydney in the presence of the
Pope Benedict XIV was an opportunity for her to escape the uncertainty of whether or not
she should continue to pursue fine arts for her career. Ms Lee thought that her university
life was ‘stained’ by the extra-curricular activities she was involved in for making income
to support her expensive art school program. Eighty youths from Incheon city attended
World Youth Day of whom she was one. Attending the Convention, Ms Lee stayed on
under a working holiday visa. She soon travelled to Melbourne as she had planned in
advance. Whilst Ms Lee expected a lot of ‘positives’ out of the city of Melbourne, she felt
lonely and unwelcomed. A complicating factor here was the breaking up of her four-year-
long relationship with her boyfriend soon after their attending the Convention together.
Walking along Swanston Street in Melbourne, she was overcome by loneliness and
emptiness, and cried aloud for a while. She found it amazing and fascinating that no one
paid her any attention at all. Ms Lee suddenly found herself completely liberated from
such restraints as the need to be conscious of what she should or should not be wearing
and any ‘trivial’ surroundings around her which she had to be conscious of in Korea. That
was her last lachrymal episode in Melbourne after which she decided to be ‘successful,’
telling herself, ‘I will eventually succeed.’ Following her determining moment, she walked

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into a Korean grocery store and picked up a copy of the *Melbourne Sky* which provided her with basic information on English language schools, share houses, part-time jobs. Her life as a back-packer in Melbourne ‘settled’ within a week.

I have completely overcome the sadness resulting from breaking up with my boyfriend. I spend quality time with classmates from my English language school. I eat yummy foods and create great memories with my housemates. Working as a salesperson in a shop, I get to know many foreigners. When I have spare time I pick up my digital camera and visit every corner of Melbourne, riding on trams and trains. … There are so many places worth visiting. The more I see the more I am deeply immersed into Melbourne. One important lesson I have learned is that I should not be in a hurry. I was always anxious and worried in Korea everyday. I am convinced that my life can work out perfectly okay even in the midst of leisurely life in Melbourne. … In my journey back to Korea I might find myself free of all the burdens and worries that I brought to Melbourne with me. I am rediscovering myself and my mind is filled with hope and happiness under the beautiful sky of Melbourne. (*Melbourne Sky* 10 March 2009, 5)

3.4 A Summary of the Cover Story of Melbourne Story

Ms JH Hong used to teach children in a private academy in Korea. She was once happy with her teaching profession, embracing all the beautiful children there. With the flow of time, her teaching passion grew dull. Ms Hong found herself ‘ordering around and demanding’ rather than listening to the children. When she realised that she did not enjoy her teaching job and was not a good teacher anymore she was full of grief. She then applied for a working holiday visa and now lives in Melbourne. In fact, she had spent a winter holiday in Brisbane while she was a first-year university student some years earlier. She travelled through Sydney and Adelaide before settling in Melbourne. Of all the Australian cities, she loves Melbourne most for its many beautiful historical buildings, kind people and their leisurely life styles.

Upon her arrival in Melbourne, Ms Hong took up a job at a holiday motel in Marysville and spent five months there (*Melbourne Ilyo Sinmun* 2009, 5). She met some wonderful people there during that period. The whole town was burnt down by the Black Saturday bushfires.

When I first heard of the news that the beautiful community was burnt down, I could not believe it. I hoped that the fire had spared my five-month residence and the nice people I met there. There is no practical help I can provide for them, except praying for them. The big “family” that I stayed with was great and I had great Christmas and New Year’s parties, dancing all night. They are the people who offered me happiness and great memories. I wish I could do something for them. (*Melbourne Ilyo Sinmun* 2009, 6)

3.5 Originality of News and Information and Focus on Advertisement.

Both magazines seem to report little, if any, news and information created by their own reporters, but instead reproduce that from media around the world. The editor of the *Melbourne Sky* lists the names of major media companies from Korea, China, Russia, Brazil and Australia and that they have contractual arrangements between *Melbourne Sky* and those companies. There is a similar arrangement for *Melbourne Story*. The editors of both magazines also disclaim responsibility for the accuracy of the news, information and the contents of advertisements.

3.6 Discussion and Analytical Interpretation

*Cover story:* Attending international conventions such as World Youth Day has become routine for Korean youth since the 1990s when Korea began to reap the benefits of
economic development plans. Both cover models were not satisfied with their prior work and life, escaped from it, and left Korea in search of a meaningful life. That is, their dissatisfaction with Korean life led them to seek their solution in a ‘global’ context rather than within Korea. However, such dissatisfaction was usually not ‘permissible’ in Korean society before the 1990s. Even if a person was dissatisfied with his/her profession s/he would cautiously look for another professional opportunity within Korea rather than internationally. From our viewpoint, it is puzzling that both Ms Lee and Ms Hong did not seem to have concrete and pragmatic goals they wished to achieve in Australia at their times of arrival although it is often understood that learning English as a foreign language in itself is considered invaluable and that Australia is a popular destination for that purpose.

It may also be characteristic of her generation that she did not hesitate to reveal publicly her personal affairs such as her break up with her boyfriend. Although she was not able to attract any public attention by crying aloud in the street, she quickly interpreted the experience as the experience of anonymity in a foreign land that she seems to enjoy greatly, without indication of being aware that she now faces the cold reality of having to survive in a strange land. In fact, this anonymity leads to uncommitted short-term ‘intimate’ relations for many of them and often causes alarm in the Korean community. Through her ‘awakening experience’ on Swanston Street, Ms Lee learned of a stark difference between Seoul and Melbourne and seemed to have felt liberated from many kinds of social restraints present in Korea. Ms Lee is now remade with new opportunities and identity. She now has a new life goal – being successful, whatever that may mean. Ms Lee’s current life seems completely filled with meaningful activities and she notes that she lives with hope and happiness. Some of the difficulties and troubles she has to endure on an everyday basis seem to be ‘mysteriously put away’ and the readers of the story are not able to speculate much further. It is unclear as to whether the current generation is not well understood or whether such media representation tends to misrepresent or ‘mystify’ their reality. The extent to which Korean diasporic media can make reflective contribution to the formation of Korean identity should be seriously questioned (Thompson 1995). Perhaps the current generation are truly trans-national and are less than well understood.

Ms Hong also was dissatisfied with her profession in Korea and travelled to Australia as a way to escape the burden. The action was a quest for a meaningful future overseas. Undoubtedly, her time in Melbourne is relaxing enough for her to be reflective and she is refreshingly able to think about what to do and how to achieve her new goals. She may even pick up life-long skills and lessons in Melbourne.

Yet, it seems fair to point out that the cover models of the magazines are in the journey of ‘escapism’ and ‘utopianism.’ It appears that these short-term visitors still desire and to some extent live in a fantasy – where they still are longing for and willing to experience an exotic Western world, dreamt of throughout their childhood, not a real world, although the lengths of their stay and the levels of exposure to the actual and local reality would influence the level of their fantasy life over time.

The cover models and the readers of the magazines demonstrate their ambivalent or ‘split’ desires whereby they desire an exotic Australian lifestyle as well as maintain their close – both physical and virtual – contact with the ‘Korean’ society, culture and people by reading community magazines, through which they are informed about Korean community services, DVDs, news and foods.

Another original item of Melbourne Story is a male story (page 28) that is similar to the cover story of the female one in terms of why they left and their quest for their
future plan. This male story carries black and white photos whereas female cover stories carry colour photos. Whilst predominant news and information have been scooped from elsewhere they are chosen to inspire young people for their future success and also to inform young people of immigration-related policies and news, foreign currency exchange rates in the context of the global financial crisis as affecting overseas students. All four weekly magazines are a useful way for Korean sojourners to stay tuned to major news and events from Korea while they are away from Korea. They are even informed of some Australian and international current affairs. It would be inappropriate to label them as ‘trash magazines.’ They seem to serve useful and specific needs of young Koreans staying temporarily overseas. These magazines are probably the key print Korean media they consume during their stay in Australia and this apparently helps them maintain their Korean identity.

3.7 Political Economy of the Weekly Magazines
The primary focus and interest of the two magazines under discussion as well as the other two weekly magazines seems to be advertising. This is closely compatible with Dallas Smythe’s (1977) comment that TV is a ‘free lunch’. Indeed, the weekly magazines are meant to be the sources of advertising revenue, but some pages are filled with entertaining news, sensational information as well as some other useful components such as yellow pages for the Korean community in Melbourne and classified advertisements – flats for rent, flea markets, cars and essential goods for sale. The competition for advertising rights would be severe among the four weekly magazines and one weekly paper especially when there are only about 20,000 to 25,000-strong Korean-ethnic populations in the greater city of Melbourne. Business viability remains a critical issue for the survival of these magazines (Cunningham 2002).

It is worth noting that these magazines provide the newer generation, such as tertiary education students, short-term visitors, working holiday visa holders, with key information to survive in Australia in general. More focus is given to their survival ‘within the Korean community’ and less to the broader Australian society. In this process, this group of people use these magazines as an ‘intra-community’ communication tool through which they begin to form new kind of identity – Korean-Australian-community identity. This identity may not be closely connected to the mainstream Australian society and culture. This Korean-Australian-community identity is a kind of a ‘Korean-in-Australia identity’ as opposed to Korean-Australian identity. On the other hand, the older generational or settled people use these magazines to stay connected to Korean identity.

4. ‘BEYOND THE AUSTRALIAN DREAM’ - A PRIZE WINNING SHORT AUTOBIOGRAPHY

4.1 Broad background of business migrants
The United States has always been the most popular destination of potential Korean emigrants since the enactment of the 1962 Korean government emigration policy, attracting about 75% of all Korean emigrants (KDI 1979, p.41; Kim 1981). However, Australia has also gained popularity, with a flow of nurses and computer technicians beginning from the early 1980s. Potential business migrants were relatively well-off in Korea and the reasons for emigration were not only economic but also non-economic, such as quality of life and better living and working environment. Following the ever increasing trade revenue of the late 1980s, the Korean government encouraged overseas investment. Apart from their wishes to conduct their business overseas, small entrepreneurs have also become dissatisfied with the continually deteriorating environment, air pollution, traffic jams, and other social problems, which have adversely
affected the quality of life in Korea. Better quality of education for children has also been a significant reason to migrate to Australia, saving the children from the so-called ‘university entrance exam hell’ (see Sullivan and Gunasekaran 1989; Han 1996b; 2000; 2003). The major inflow of Korean business migrants to Australia started in 1987.

Of the many reasons for Koreans to emigrate, Jonathan Willoughby-Thomas (cited in Song 1995, p.429), the immigration officer of the Australian High Commission in Seoul, points out that the majority of applicants for emigration were generally tired of their life in Seoul and they wanted to live in a society with the least degree of stress. Some applicants for business migration mentioned to the officer that there were too many obstacles for business activity in Korean society (Han 1996b).

4.2 Summary of the biography

Mr Sang-Soon Kim, the author of the prize winning autobiography, ‘Beyond the Australian dream’ is a Korean business migrant who arrived in Australia with his family in January 1990. Mr Kim graduated as a maritime engineer from the Korea Maritime University in 1974 and his first voyage was to Newcastle, Australia. The voyage was held up in the port for three months due to a maritime union workers’ strike. It was during that period that he learnt about Australia: Australia abandoned its White Australia policy in 1973; enjoying a high GDP; a great social welfare looking after a person’s life from the cradle to the grave; a vast land with a small population; and abundant natural resources.

Mr Kim recalls that Australia was a heaven on earth in the 1970s compared to the socially and politically unstable South Korean society, and that to walk in downtown Seoul was often to be obstructed by the confrontations between demonstrating students and armed police. He was often unsure as to which of the parties he should be in support of. Overall, he was unhappy about his life in Korea.

I was employed as an engineer for an export transport company for eight years, fighting for life against life-threatening sea waves. Then, I was able to pay off my own apartment. But I suffered from relative deprivation when finding out a public servant friend of mine managed to own a much more valuable apartment than mine. This taught me that one’s diligence does not promise one’s future wealth. … Once my children blamed me for asking them to live frugally when I was simply not able to provide a high quality motor vehicle or pay for expensive extracurricular learning activities. I deliberately blamed the lack of my own ability rather than social structural defects of the Korean society in my conversations to my children.

Mr Kim was often troubled by unnecessary hurdles and formalities which he had to undergo on an everyday basis in Korea. Thus, once in the past, he labelled himself as one of those who could not continue to love their own motherland. His frequent travel to the cities of developed countries led him to decide that he and his family would eventually emigrate overseas. In April 1998, he had already been awaiting an approval for family reunion emigration to the United States for eight years and was exhausted of patience. As soon as he came across an advertisement for business migration to Australia he started to pursue it immediately. Applying for emigration and preparing documents took him eighteen months. Mr Kim then resigned from his job, despite his knowledge that he would be promoted in a few months and that the value of his apartment would increase in a few years. As Mr Kim was preparing the required documents for remitting a large sum of money to an Australian bank he experienced a completely unexpected delay of approval by a public servant in the Korean tax office. One of his friends who had also applied for emigration blamed Mr Kim’s unnegetiable and ‘naïve’ integrity, and told him that a bribe of $50 would have prevented such delay. Although Mr Kim desired to feel hesitant as to
whether or not leaving the motherland was the right thing to do, this incident made him put aside all such ambivalence, and he looked forward to his new homeland-to-be.

Finally, I am leaving the motherland that gave me birth, heading to my newly chosen land. I remitted to Australia all the money I had and held the receipt in my hand. I could not fall asleep the last night in the homeland. Although I was leaving for the country long sought-after, I was worried about how to support my son who had just entered his teens. What means would I have in Australia to support my family and my son’s journey to adulthood? I was weighing up between the two lives, one in Korea and another in Australia, divided by Pacific Ocean, throughout the whole night (Kim 2000).

Mr Kim’s migrant life in Australia has been a series of ongoing trials and errors. He was prepared to do any labouring job to support his livelihood. He applied for a job to sprinkle water in a golf link, but was rejected due to lack of experience. When he was employed for menial work at night, or as a porter, he could not last any longer than three days. His physical health could not sustain such work. Mr Kim came across a young man from his hometown and was persuaded to sign a contract to provide cleaning services to a four-storey finance office building in the CBD of Sydney, investing $35,000. Mr Kim employed a few workers, but found it difficult to secure reliable personnel. Overseas students or ‘scoundrels’ were unpredictable as to when they might quit. Some would last for a month and then disappear without having given any indication of wishing to resign whilst they get paid during the week. Mr Kim often visited the workers’ residences on a Friday and had drinks or played card games with them as a way to encourage them to remain as diligent workers. Such efforts did not always impact on the workers’ behaviour. On a number of occasions the workers did not turn at work, in which case the only option was for Mr Kim to carry out the cleaning work himself.

When I was working as a maritime engineer, my bedroom was always cleaned by someone else. As a middle rank manager of a multinational company I had never emptied a rubbish bin. Now I am cleaning and shining objects without knowing who has been using them, worrying in the back of my mind about the possibility that it may be pointed out to me that the job was not done properly.

Mr Kim eventually quit the cleaning work, losing $10,000 out of his investment. He then soon received a call from the Immigration Department and was questioned if he was engaged in a business and why he was applying for a motor repair license. Mr Kim soon got tired of his life in Australia and sought advice from his friends in the U.S. While his document preparation was nearing completion he was visited by one of his esteemed acquaintances and said:

You are not wise. Isn’t packing once for emigration enough and you are doing it twice? I have done it twice. Every time you pack up it costs $50,000 that will support your family for two years. If you don’t like the U.S., what will be your next destination?

Mr Kim purchased a newsagency in February 1995. Having learned much about Australian society he continued his negotiations to purchase it for two years and was able to slash the price by $70,000. A lesson that he learned from this was that he should not be in haste in Australia. However, running a newsagency brings its own problems such as employees pickpocketing phone cards, bus tickets etc. Mr Kim set aside Saturdays for his health maintenance partly because he needs to stay healthy to cover any unexpected absences of workers. Like any other day, he gets up at 4.30am and runs 20km. He finds it the best way to get ready for the day and recharge his energy without cost.
I find that most other Koreans own cars that are better than my own. The colour of my house roof tarnished a long ago. I do not have a golf stick or fishing rod, but I am not ashamed thereof. I am rather happy and satisfied with my life. People tell me that my business is settled and I should be able to relax thus I should be able to afford an expensive car. But I don’t care much for such matters.

4.3 Analysis

Shin Tong-A that published this autobiography is a popular current affairs monthly magazine and is read by world-wide Korean diaspora. Thus this transcultural border crossing story would create new kinds of fantasy of experiencing and living in an exotic Western world. Despite the tiring nature of immigrant life, many readers may choose to regard the story as adventurous and worthwhile going through themselves, which continues to drive more people to pursue the adventure. Cunningham (2002, 272) contends that ‘much diasporic cultural expression is a struggle for survival, identity and assertion.’ This seems to aptly describe the personal short-term and long-term individual diasporic experiences and processes although the nature of their struggles is different. Australia is known as a dream destination for potential Korean emigrants to the West. This autobiographic account vividly describes how a successful professional in Korea develops a dream of a new life in a new land and how he realises the cold reality of migrant life before eventually settling with his newly established identity and gets to appreciate his new self and the surroundings of his new life. This journey is much similar to what many Korean migrants especially as non-English Speaking Background people have experienced (Han 1994a; b; c; 1996a; b; 2000; Lee 2005). As found through another study, media consumption is often a way to overcome or put aside the cold reality of immigrant life or to console their nostalgia. The media consumption includes going to Karaoke, watching video, sticking to Korean media without any language barrier (Han 1994c; 2000). This may be a way to resort to their comfort zone.

Overseas students or short-term stayers like the two cover models are potential employees of Mr Kim’s cleaning business or news agency. The workers’ financial needs are long-term based, but their commitment to the employers is always short-term since such jobs do not offer them much in the way of future prospects. Yet, for Mr Kim, the business requires a large sum of capital and he needs a steady flow of income. This apparently creates a gulf of different expectations from the two broadly different generations.

5. FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

Above all, it is highly encouraging that there are a number of magazines able to cater to the younger generation of Koreans in addition to the media that serve the conventional Korean immigrants in Australia. The characteristics of Korean-Australian ethnicity are much more diverse these days than they were a couple of decades ago. This is apparent not only with an increase in the Korean-Australian population, but also due to diverse educational and professional and other life opportunities which young Korean-Australians and Korean overseas students enjoy, in part resulting from economic wealth that they have ‘inherited’ from the prospering Korean and Australian economies. The juxtaposition of the two broadly different generations under discussion poses a challenge to the ways in which the Korean diasporic media can respond to a diverse range of needs and expectations.

Although these two different generations seem to have different life goals, there seems to be much in common in terms of their material or aesthetic needs in their lives, their efforts to overcome frustrations of personal life and of the social environment of Korean society. Both established migrants and sojourners are in continued search for their
identities and are in their journey of constructing and reconstructing their transnational identities in the context of the globalising world (Han 2000; Mizukami 2007; Han 2008). Interestingly and importantly, it is worth noting that the cover models of the cover stories are much like Mr Kim’s children’s generation. Some of the Korean youth will turn out to be long-term stayers as migrants. Thus, those young people are integral members of the Korean community or social organisations such as Korean churches, at present as well as in the future. The older generation of Korean migrants in Sydney has launched the process of nurturing the needs of younger generation in terms of their integration into the broader Australian society, construction of Korean-Australian identity and representing the needs of the Korean community to the Australian society: for example, English ministry or symposium specifically for younger generation. Perhaps the media may be able to take much more active roles in this process.

Other ethnic communities in Australia have long produced their own ethnic cultural products such as novels, fictions and films, depicting their migrant lives either in English language or with English subtitles, and have been introduced to the broad Australian media. The Korean community has not reached this stage and this may be partly due to its relatively short migrant history in Australia, but this is also due to a lack of concerted effort to achieve such goals on the part of the leaders of the Korean community. Such efforts would lead to tremendous benefits for the harmony within the Korean community and constructive contribution to the cohesion of the broader Australian society.

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Identity Transformations of Chosŏnjok\textsuperscript{1} Migrant Brides in South Korea

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ABSTRACT
Chosŏnjok migrant brides, who used to have dual identities in China, tend to reconstruct their identities in South Korea (hereafter Korea). My twenty-two interviewees went through different identity changes in Korea, and their identities can be categorized into six types: ‘Korean’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Korean Chinese’, ‘neither Korean nor Chinese’, flexible identity, and cosmopolitan identity. The majority of them, however, have reinforced their ‘Chinese’ identity. Their identity transformations are dependent on their backgrounds in China, living experiences in Korea, future plans, and their notions of being Chosŏnjok. Their ‘Chinese’ identity has been reinforced in Korea due to their negative experiences in Korea as well as the centripetal force of China. Their ‘Chinese’ identity is undoubtedly a defensive mechanism to cope with the discriminatory attitude of Koreans towards Chosŏnjok. However, no matter how defensive their ‘Chinese’ identity might be, it cannot mean that these Chosŏnjok migrant brides feel they are as ‘Chinese’ as Han-Chinese. It is because Chosŏnjok know that they are ethnically, politically, and culturally different from Han-Chinese. On the basis of the constructivist theory of identity formations, and my interviews, I argue that their ‘Chinese’ identity is a reactionary, dual and situational identity.

INTRODUCTION
Currently there are 32,000 Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea\textsuperscript{2}. They have experienced their identity transformations in Korea, and such identity changes are common among ethnic return migrants in other countries. Chosŏnjok migrant brides tend to feel that they are more ‘Chinese’ than ‘Korean’ after their migration to Korea.

While there have been some researches on the ethnic return migrations in Japan and in European countries, relatively few studies have been conducted on the ethnic return migration of Chosŏnjok. Even where they are, they are largely descriptive, and ignore the perspective of Chosŏnjok ethnic return migrants themselves. Even less research has been investigated on the Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea, regardless of their great influences on the contemporary Korean society and Chosŏnjok society in China.

This research examines three questions: (1) how have Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea experienced their identity transformations after migration?; (2) why have the majority of them reinforced their ‘Chinese’ identity in Korea?; and (3) what is the meaning of their ‘Chinese’ identity? Considering that the previous studies on Chosŏnjok migrant brides do not pay much attention to the opinions of Chosŏnjok migrant brides, this study tries to look at the real feelings of these Chosŏnjok migrant brides by closely following the data from in-depth interviews conducted in March-May in 2007 and in January-February in 2008.

\textsuperscript{1} Korean Chinese  
\textsuperscript{2} Emigration and Immigration Control Office of the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Korea
I have sampled the twenty-two interviewees from different categories of birth place in China, geographic origin in the Korean Peninsula, socio-economic status, age, educational level, and marital status. Interviews were conducted in diverse settings based upon the comfort level of each individual. In most cases, interviews were held in the restaurants or cafe near their residence or work. Each interview lasted at least three hours. Some of the interviewees were met more than once, and the further interviews were usually held in their home. Throughout the interviews, I paid special attention when they revealed their identities, and the reasons of their identity transformations. This study is also based on secondary sources such as literature review and analyses of government documents. Previous studies which are conducted by authors of different countries, opinions and interests are analyzed. The official websites of China and Korea were used to get the latest information. Furthermore, literary works and media works are also used to understand the public discourse in Korea about Chosŏnjok migrant brides. By doing so, I could get a representative of the identity transformations of Chosŏnjok migrant brides

1 How their identities have been transformed in Korea?

My interviews with the twenty-two Chosŏnjok migrant brides showed that they went through different experiences of identity transformations in Korea. Before their migration to Korea, the majority of them had a dual identity as both an ‘ethnic Korean’ and a ‘Chinese citizen’. However, they tend to reconstruct their national identities in Korea. Their identities in Korea can be categorized into six types: ‘Korean’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Korean Chinese’, ‘neither Korean nor Chinese’, flexible identity and cosmopolitan identity. The majority of them (twelve interviewees out of twenty-two), however, have reinforced their ‘Chinese’ identity.

Their identity transformation experiences in Korea are dependent on four factors: (1) their geographic origin, birthplace, educational level, socio-economic and marital backgrounds in China; (2) their socio-economic status in Korea, relationship with their Korean husbands, existence of children from their Korean husbands, legal status, and acculturation level to Korean society; (3) their future plans such as in which country they will educate their children, or retire; and (4) their self understandings of their being Chosŏnjok.

Generally, interviewees from Liaoning and Heilongjiang Province of China tend to have more ‘Korean’ identity than those from Jilin Province. This is probably because the great majority of Chosŏnjok in the first two provinces are originally from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula which is today’s South Korea. Meanwhile Chosŏnjok in Jilin Province are mostly originated from the northern part of the Korean Peninsula which belongs to North Korea today. Higher educational level and socio-economic status in China normally translated into dual identities (‘Korean Chinese’). Those in first marriages tend to have more ‘Korean’ identity than those in second or third marriages. None of the ‘disguised’ brides identified themselves as ‘Korean’. Those Interviewees who have satisfactory life in Korea, good relationship with their Korean husbands, and children from their Korean husbands developed ‘Korean’ identity more easily than others. Korean citizenship does not seem to play a decisive role in determining their identities. However, for those who identified themselves as ‘Korean’, Korean citizenship definitely plays an important role. Interviewees who plan to educate their children in China or retire to China in their old ages show more attachments to China. Interviewees with positive view towards their being Chosŏnjok tend to develop ‘Korean Chinese’ identity, while

3 ‘Disguised’ bride marry a Korean man to get visa. They divorced with their husband in China to marry a Korean man. However, they maintain marital relations with their ex-husband in China.
interviewees with negative view tend to develop ‘neither Chinese nor Korean’ identity. Cosmopolitan identity is usually developed by those who have transnational living experiences, or those who want to pursue such a lifestyle in the future.

Undoubtedly, different identities of interviewees are the result of their different attitudes to life and living experiences. Interviewees with ‘Korean’ identity have shown higher level of assimilation to Korean society than others. Interviewees with ‘Korean Chinese’ identity were better in taking advantage of their bilingual and bicultural capital. Interviewees with flexible identity often switch their identities according to needs, and they have the strongest adaptability to Korea. Interviewees with ‘neither Korean nor Chinese’ identity are indifferent to national or ethnic identification. Their strongly negative and pessimistic attitudes towards their being Chosŏnjok is impersonated on their ambivalent notion of motherland as well as their negative experiences in both China and Korea. Interviewees with flexible identity or cosmopolitan identity are generally very competent and confident. They try to seek their ways in a wider stage which exceeds the national boundary of China and Korea.

2 Why ‘Chinese’ identity in Korea?

My interviewees have reinforced ‘Chinese’ identity mostly due to their negative experiences in Korea. They normally suffer from low economic status in Korea, because they are in low status and low paying jobs. They are also excluded from the social security and welfare system. They are not in priority of the Korean government’s attention in comparison with non-Korean descent migrant brides. This is because the Korean government assumes that Chosŏnjok migrant brides, who know Korean language and culture, would have fewer difficulties in adaptation. Socio-culturally, Chosŏnjok migrant brides tend to suffer alienation in Korea due to their ‘Sinicized’ culture and ‘dual’ identity. Koreans have highly exclusive notion of identity, which demands not only shared racial descent, but also complete linguistic and cultural proficiency. Therefore, Koreans tend to be disillusioned when they discover that Chosŏnjok have become Sinicized, and are loyal to China. Koreans’ discrimination against Chosŏnjok is also resulted by the low status of China in international community. Legally, Chosŏnjok migrant brides have suffered unstable status in Korea. It is difficult for them to obtain Korean citizenship as the application process is really complicating and time-consuming. It usually takes nearly two years to get the application processed, and not all of the applications are approved. As they would become illegal sojourners if they are divorced from their Korean husbands before acquiring Korean citizenship, many Chosŏnjok migrant brides endure miserable marriage life even when they are abused by their Korean husbands.

These bitter experiences, which are contradictory to their pre-migration expectations about their ancestral homeland, disappointed Chosŏnjok migrant brides and made them hate Koreans. As they came to Korea believing that they are ‘Koreans’, they feel great dismay or even betrayal when they confront discriminatory treatments from their co-ethnics. As a response to such disappointment, Chosŏnjok migrant brides have strengthened their sense of national allegiance and identification with China.

Another reason behind their reinforced ‘Chinese’ identity is the centripetal force of China. Mast Chosŏnjok migrant brides have strong family ties in China. They visit China frequently to reunite with their family members. The lower educational fees and living expenses in China also attract Chosŏnjok migrant brides to China as many of them cannot afford the extraordinarily expensive costs in Korea. Additionally, the increasing power of China in global community also helps them to have pride towards China. The strong Chinese economy and the huge potential of Chinese market attract young Chosŏnjok
migrant brides to China in search of more job opportunities and better career. Furthermore, the inclusive policy of China also has affected Chosŏnjok to become ‘Chinese’. The policy is successful as it not only makes Chosŏnjok become ‘Chinese’, but also gains the appreciation of Chosŏnjok. Chosŏnjok are persuasively taught to be a member of the Zhonghua nation, and the ideology of the Zhonghua family has been successful in promoting Chosŏnjok’s loyalty to China.

3 What is the meaning of their feeling ‘Chinese’ in Korea?

The ‘Chinese’ identity of Chosŏnjok migrant brides, no matter how defensive and strong it might be, cannot be exactly same as the ‘Chinese’ identity of Han-Chinese. It is because Chosŏnjok migrant brides are ethnically, culturally, politically, and emotionally different from Han-Chinese. On the basis of the distinctiveness of Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea, the history of Chosŏnjok identity formations, the constructivist theory of identity formations, as well as my interviews with twenty-two Chosŏnjok migrant brides, I reached following conclusion on the meaning of their ‘Chinese’ identity.

First of all, it is a reactionary identity developed by those who have suffered negative experiences in Korea to express their anger towards their co-ethnics in Korea. If they lead a satisfactory life in Korea, they might have reinforced their ‘Korean’ identity. Or, at least, they may maintain positive feelings towards Korea as they used to do in China. However, being frustrated by unjustifiable discriminations against them in Korea, Chosŏnjok migrant brides developed negative feelings towards Koreans. They strengthened their ‘Chinese’ identity not because they wholeheartedly feel that they are ‘Chinese’, but because they want to distinguish themselves from Koreans who treat them as inferior outsiders.

Secondly, it is a dual identity. It contains ‘Korean’ identity in it all the time. Their identification as ‘Chinese’ cannot totally remove their being ‘Korean’. Chosŏnjok have maintained a dual identity since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. For the majority interviewees, their ‘Chinese’ identity does not conflict with their ‘Korean’ identity. Depending on needs and situation, one identity might be more emphasized than the other, but on one identity can replace the other. Duality in their identities is unconsciously or consciously expressed in their daily lives.

Finally, it is a situational identity which changes depending on situation and needs. As most of them migrated to Korea in their 30s and 40s, they have substantial experiences in both Chinese and Korean societies, and have gone through identity transformations many times. In addition, the possibilities to live a transnational life between China and Korea, and their unsettled future settling, also have a big influence in constructing situational identity.

CONCLUSION

This research expands the general knowledge of ethnic return migrations and the identity transformations of ethnic return migrants in their ethnic homeland by observing twenty-two cases of Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea. The identity transformations of the majority interviewees (reinforcing ‘Chinese’ identity) is in accordance with the general pattern of the identity transformations of many other ethnic migrants in their ethnic homelands throughout the world. However, considering the distinctiveness of Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea (having much better legal status in Korea, and more intimate relationship with Koreans than ordinary ethnic return migrants), their reinforcing ‘Chinese’ identity is an unexpected discovery. Their reinforcing ‘Chinese’ identity demonstrates that ethnic return migration does not always increase their attachments to
ethnic homelands, but can paradoxically renew the sense of nationalist loyalty towards natal homelands.

Secondly, the identity transformation experiences of Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea give some implications to the contending theories of identity formations. Both primordialist and constructivist understandings of identity formations are applicable to their developing a ‘Korean Chinese’ identity. However, their reinforcing ‘Chinese’ identity in Korea lends weight to the constructivist understanding, and it implies that the identities of ethnic return migrants can be separated from blood ties even in conventional East Asian countries where blood ties are often regarded as the most important factor in determining one’s identities. The flexibility and fluidity of their identities also supports the constructivist position in identity formation. Interestingly, all of my interviewees emphasized blood-tie when they talked about the identities of their children from Korean husbands.

Thirdly, the identity transformations of Chosŏnjok migrant brides give insights to the competing nationalisms of Korea and China, as well as their effects on Chosŏnjok. China has pursued Zhonghua nationalism intends to incorporate all the ethnic minorities within its boundaries into the ‘Great Zhonghua Family’. Meanwhile, as a reaction to the increasing number of emigrants and the rising importance of overseas nationals, Korea has pursued ‘de-territorialized’ nationalism, in which the country tries to maintain the national consciousness of overseas Koreans. To a certain degree, Korea’s nationalism encouraged Chosŏnjok to migrate to Korea. However, it caused acute socio-cultural alienation of Chosŏnjok migrants in Korea by the notion of the particularly strong ethnic homogeneity. The clashes between the two nationalisms are almost inevitable, especially when Chosŏnjok become transnational moving back and forth between China and Korea. Although their status became complicated and precarious between the conflicting nationalisms, my interviewees have shown that they are not easily dominated by these ideologies. Instead, they have developed dual and flexible identities. Zhonghua nationalism seems to be more successful to date among Chosŏnjok migrant brides in Korea in their developing ‘Chinese’ identity. However, it might be a temporary phenomenon as most Chosŏnjok migrant brides tend to resent China’s social problems, and feel how ‘Koreanized’ they are when they return to China. As the identities of Chosŏnjok migrants in Korea are largely dependant on their needs and interests, they likely strengthen their ‘Korean’ identity if they lead happy lives in Korea.

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Learning Democracy and Exerting Cultural Citizenship: 
Korean Chinese Migrant Workers’ view of Korean democracy

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ABSTRACT
The 350,000-strong Korean Chinese (Chosŏnjok) migrant workers have brought visible changes in their ethnic communities in China and in their ethnic homeland, Korea. While there have been some studies on the economic and social aspects of their life in South Korea, not much have been done on their learning and perceptions of Korean political culture. Coming from China, where one-party rule and socialist ideology are the norms, Chosŏnjok migrant workers tend to be amazed at South Korea’s political culture, especially during election times.

This paper analyses the various political opinions and political learning of Chosŏnjok migrant workers in South Korea. In particular, it addresses: (1) the main issues for Chosŏnjok in regard to the election; (2) their perception of South Korea’s democracy; and their notions of the national communities of both Korea and China. For this, I conducted a participation-observation of a group of Chosŏnjok migrant workers and their families during the presidential election both in Korea and China through the month of December 2007 before and after the actual election. The Presidential Election of South Korea, which was held on December 19, 2007, attracted much attention from Chosŏnjok migrant workers in Korea (and their families in China) as their immigration status in South Korea would be influenced by the election.

My observation shows a few salient points in their discussions of the election: (1) South Korean style democracy is dangerous, and Chinese-style one-party rule is a more efficient form of government; (2) the majority of Chosŏnjok workers supported Lee Myung-bak, believing he would improve the South Korean economy, which then would be beneficial for Chosŏnjok in general; (3) a smaller number of people supported Chung Dong-young because of their belief that Chung would improve the relationship between the two Koreas regardless of their knowledge that an improved inter-Korean relationship would cause job loss for Chosŏnjok migrant workers. By discussing such issues rather vocally among themselves, the Chosŏnjok migrant workers were in fact exerting their ‘cultural’ citizenship to the national community of Koreans in which they do not have legal citizenship.

1 INTRODUCTION
The 350,000-strong Korean Chinese (Chosŏnjok) migrant workers in South Korea have made great impacts in their ethnic community in China as well as in South Korea, their ethnic homeland. International migration promotes cultural learning and changes, and both groups themselves, sending societies and receiving societies, intended or not intended, are influenced by it. This is particularly true for Korean Chinese ethnic migrants in South Korea, and their migration activities brought serious changes both in their ethnic
communities in China and in South Korean society. It is widely known that the Korean Chinese communities in China have been greatly changed after the substantial number of Korean Chinese migrated to South Korea and other countries as migrant workers (Kwon 2005; Choi 2001; Hö 2001b). Recently, the impacts of international migrations have been studied intensively with new perspectives of globalization and transnationalism (Apadurai 1996, Hall 1995).

While there have been some studies on the economic and social aspects of their life in South Korea, not much have been studied on their cultural and political consciousness and adaptations. In particular, very few people have paid attention to the political perspectives of the Korean Chinese migrant workers on the politics and political culture of South Korea. Coming from China, where one-party rule and socialism are the norms and dominant ideology, Chosŏnjok migrant workers tend to experience a cultural shock at South Korea’s democracy and somewhat boisterous political scenery. Such shocks of Korean Chinese tend to be heightened especially during election times in South Korea.

Studying Chosonjok’s experiences of democracy in South Korea has many implications. First of all, this will shed light on Chinese perspective on Korean style democracy. Considering the importance of China in global stage, understanding Chinese perspective on democracy will help us understand China’s future politics. Secondly, we will gain better understandings on the ethnic affinities and ethnic nationalism among Korean Chinese, for whom Korea is their ‘motherland’ while China is their ‘fatherland’ (Kim Gang-il, Hö 2001b). The identity questions of Korean Chinese has been politically contended among the Chinese government, Korean government, Korean society and Chosonjok themselves (Song 2006). Especially, the conflict between China’s Zhonghua nationalism and Korea’s ethnic nationalism (or long-distance nationalism) has been a hot political and historic issue (Song 2006).

Considering the importance of the Korean Chinese and their political consciousness, this paper analyses the various political opinions and political learning of Chosonjok migrant workers in South Korea. In particular, the paper addresses the following questions: (1) the main issues for Chosonjok in regard to the election; (2) their perception of South Korea’s democracy; and their notions of the national communities of both Korea and China.

For this, I conducted a participation-observation of a group of Chosonjok migrant workers and their families during the presidential election both in Korea and China through the month of December 2007 before and after the actual election. The Presidential Election of South Korea, which was held on December 19, 2007, attracted much attention from Chosŏnjok migrant workers in Korea (and their families in China) as their immigration status in South Korea would be influenced by the election.

2 OBSERVING CHOSONJOK MIGRANTS’ VIEW OF SOUTH KOREAN POLITICS

The participation-observation was carried out at the Seoul Chosonjok Church, where Chosonjok migrant workers gather together especially in winter days when there is less work in construction sector, in which majority of Korean Chinese migrants are involved. In China the participation-observation was conducted in Yanji City, Jilin Province, which is the centre of Chosonjok minority of China. I visited many public places such as market places, bath houses, and tea houses where I chatted with them in a relaxed environment.

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1 Korean Chinese intellectuals have explained the position of Korean Chinese both for their natal homeland, China, and ethnic homeland, Korea. For example, Chŏng Pan-ryong ( ), Kim Gang-il ( ), Hö Myŏng-chŏl (2001a), …
Sometimes the Korean Chinese gathered at the Chosonjok Church exchanged heated debates among themselves, which was not strange at all as they were talking about political issues. In fact, the entire Korean society was in a political mood through the months of November and December regarding the presidential election. It was same in Yanbian, China as most of Korean Chinese watch South Korean TV on daily basis and they naturally were well informed with the daily political issues of South Korea.

No doubt, the election was the most popular issues in their daily conversation. Especially at the Chosonjok Church the Korean Chinese who gathered there would argue amongst themselves sometimes on their preferred candidates, and in so doing, their discussions would reveal many things including their views on South Korean democracy, its policy toward China and Chosonjok migrant workers, Korea-China relations, and the inter-Korean relations between South and North Korea – the issues that I intended to observe. Like their South Korean counterparts, the Chosonjok migrant workers were divided mainly between the two major candidates: Lee Myung-bak (Grand National Party) and Chung Dong-young (United New Democratic Party).

Fine sunny day in front of the Chosonjok Church there are always several Korean Chinese gathering together exchanging information and chatting. It was the first week of November 2007 when I visited the Chosonjok Church in Yonggungdong, Seoul. The second level hall of the church, with an old style steam heating system and minimal light, functions as a convenient gathering place of many Chosonjok men and women when they have less work to do as daily workers especially in winter days. Most of the men and women gathered there work at construction sites, many of which are closed in winter. About twenty Chosonjok men and women were chatting sitting or standing in the hall where there are a few sofas and a vending machine that sells hot drinks. They normally get together with their friends and relatives or people from same hometowns, and they would exchange job, housing, and other information among them. On the same level are also an employment centre run by the Church volunteers, and a small travel agency that deals with air tickets and immigration services. For people who do not have any work, this is a good place to spend time while meeting their friends and relatives.

As the presidential election was only a few weeks away, politics was the main topic of their chatting when I visited them in early November. While many of them do not have voting right if they are illegal migrant workers, some of them have voting right as they hold Korean citizenship. Normally, they are not interested in politics except for Korean government’ policy toward overseas Koreans, particularly Korean Chinese. As there are so many Korean Chinese who want to work in South Korea, Korea’s entry visa regulations were big concerns among Korean Chinese in China and in Korea. Korean government recently changed its policy and it gave some privileges to Korean Chinese and other ethnic Koreans from the former Soviet Union in March 2007 with the launch of the Visitor Employment System. This new system allowed tens of thousands Korean Chinese and Soviet Koreans each year to visit and work in Korea for 3 years. With these changes in the Korean government policy toward overseas Koreans especially those from China and the former Soviet Union, Korean Chinese interests in the presidential election in November 2007 were high. In addition, as the Korean economy showed sluggishness, which resulted in decrease of employment opportunities in Korea, they had keen interest in who will be the next president of Korea.

I joined them and conducted participation-observation. People were casual in their attitude and freely exchanged stories and jokes among themselves. There were about 8 people around and later more people joined the group. They mix Korean and Chinese in
their daily conversation. Some speak Kyongsang Province dialect (a man from Jilin Province spoke Korean with strong Kyongsang accent). I felt that they talked very fast. Most of them are in their 50s-70s, and younger people were not seen frequently. Probably younger ones are working while older ones have less work. In addition, younger people may have jobs in China while older ones without pension choose to come to South Korea to work and make money.

My being an overseas Korean, not being a South Korean to whom many of them feel distance, helped me to approach them easily. Through my field work in three consecutive years at the church and in Yanbian, some of them knew who I am, and they would accept me in their conversation. This made them feel free in speaking their candid feelings and opinions, which might not have been easy if I were someone living in South Korea.

Questions asked to the interviewees include: (1) what are the main issues for Chosonjok in the election?; (2) how do they perceive a democratic election?; (3) how they participate in national community through participating in the election?; (4) how do they feel about their fatherland, China in regard to the election?

3 KOREAN STYLE DEMOCRACY: PERCEPTIONS OF KOREAN CHINESE

Democracy, while still relatively young in its tradition, is firmly established in South Korea especially after the mid-1990s. Koreans saw opposite parties taking turn in power peacefully already more than two decades, which is a clear indication of democratic polity. Meanwhile, politics is always very much dynamic in South Korea with its diversified and conflicting interests of people, and once Norma Field, a well-known Japanese Studies academic, once stated that Korean is the “only country where politics is still alive” (Field 1994). For most foreigners Korean politics must look really vibrant, exciting, and exotic. This is particularly true for the Korean Chinese migrants who came from China where democratic politics is not a norm, but politics is very much suppressed under the strong one-party policy of the People’s Republic of China.

In China their political education is very much the products of official education of Chinese government. Before they come to Korea, their perspective of Korea is very much determined by satellite TV programs they watch on daily basis. They also hear from their Chosonjok family members and relatives who are in Korea. They are well connected with their family members and relatives in Korea through international phone calls and e-mails.

Once in Korea they are exposed to TV, newspapers, talks with Koreans. They normally go through a cultural shock in their initial visits of Korea. They experience that Koreans are culturally advanced, cold, interests-oriented, and generally law-abiding. They also learn about their rights as migrant workers and as Korean ‘nationals’. This is learned partly through the Employment Training Program conducted by the Hanguk Illyok Kwalli Kongdan, which teaches them both national pride and the notions of human/labour rights.

Indeed, most of my Korean Chinese interviewees showed conservative attitude toward politics in general. They normally perceive that politics is not something that they can make input, which is similar to ‘subject’ political culture (Almond & Verba 1980). Their conservative view on individuals’ political freedom and their cultural orientation toward social stability and unity made them feel uneasy about the often ‘wild’ looking political behaviours of Koreans and their political organisations. Many of my interviewees, while expressing their excitement at seeing the presidential election campaigns in November 2007, expressed their fear of the possible disintegration of South
Korean society due to the heated political debates and conflicts revealed during the political campaign.

There has been three presidential elections that Korean Chinese migrant workers saw since the late 1990s: the 1997 election in which Kim Dae Jung was elected; the 2002 election when Roh Mu-hyun was elected; and the 2007 election. Those who had not seen any previous elections in South Korea expressed their serious worries if the heated conflicts of interests might destroy South Korean society. They tend to view South Korean politics and democracy a danger for the nation as well as for international migrant workers like themselves.

Their conservatism also led them to be concerned more about economic issues over political issues. The general economic situation of South Korean in 2007 was not that good and economy was the strong focus of the presidential election. Lee Myung-bak, the candidate of the Grand National Party, who would be elected as the President in the election, was highly popular among Korean Chinese and my interviewees said that this was because of their concerns on the economy of South Korea. One of my interviewees stated:

> Whom do I support among the presidential candidates? Of course, I support Lee Myung-bak. Lee is the one that will revive Korean economy, and this will benefit us, Chosonjok workers who need more jobs in Korea. Lee has achieved a lot in his life, and he is the only one who can lead Korea.

Such economy-oriented political perspective was visible among Korean Chinese. In fact, such a view is prevalent in China. This is well reflected in the attitude of people toward Park Chung-Hee, South Korea’s president who ruled the country between 1961 and 1978. Everyone of my Korean Chinese interviewees were well aware of the former President Park and they acknowledged Park’s contribution to the rapid economic development of South Korea through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Such a view is popular in China regardless of the fact that in South Korea Park is considered as a dubious character by many people. A Korean Chinese scholar at the Yanbian University, Kim Kwang-hui, says that he was shocked at the polarized opinions of South Koreans on the former president of the nation (Kim 2008).

> Some say that China is a big country and such an election (as in South Korea) will be dangerous for the country. Some say that there is already democracy in China – referring to local elections? Chinese government’s role of having achieved such a high level economic development beyond people’s expectation. Others say that China needs democratic elections to be “advanced” as Korea.

Mostly tend distinguish China and Korea, believing that China is different from a small country like South Korea, and it cannot be same as Korea. Mr. Hong: “China is a big country with so much diverse peoples and forces. If there was an election in China such as the one in Korea, China would see a civil war.”

China’s growth and governance became my interests while visiting Harbin and Yanji this time. People whom I talked to about the possibility of China’s becoming politically unstable (as South Korea was in the 1980s) all told me that they were confident that China will remain in stability. People here are very hard-working and they strongly want to improve their life. For them a good government is the one that guarantees public security and promotes market economy, while providing basic economic security to those who have been loyal to the regime (farmers especially).
For example, Mrs. Hô and Mr. Hong say that they are happy with what’s going on in China today. They receive more than 4,500 yuan each month (as pension), which is far higher than average income of ordinary Chinese in northeast. They own three houses (apartments) with life-time pension and insurance. Mr. Hong retired in 2001 at the age of 49, which is hard to believe, from the Yanbian Broadcasting Company, where he worked for more than twenty years. Even now, after several years of his retirement, his company still pays him some bonuses occasionally.

Among Korean Chinese some 80% support Lee Myung-bak, and they are middle-class, officials. We believe South Korea should do well, and this will be good for us as well. China’s experiences of Mao (ideologue, politician) versus Deng Xiaoping (practical politician and reformer) have shown us what kind of leader is better than the other. Therefore, we believe that Lee Yi would be better for Korea.

Chung supporters are lee than 10% among Korean Chinese and they are mostly illegal traders, farmers, and those who want to make money with illegal means.

Post-election discussions (in Seoul and Yanbian)

Even after the election, Chosonjok families in Yanji continue following the election and Korean politics while watching Korean satellite TV. The family I was staying at talked frequently about the election and the new president at dinner table. I have heard a few times people talking about the election a few days after the election at cafes and tearooms (including the International Hotel Lobby in Yanji City).

4 ETHNIC VS. POLITICAL IDENTITIES

Often Korean Chinese whom I observed revealed their dual identities both as a Korean (ethnic Korean) and a Chinese (the citizen of the people’s republic of China). Korean Chinese tend to cherish China’s foreign policy interests in general. For example, they fear of the presence of the US troops in Korea, and tend to believe that the US was trying to check China’s rapid economic development and its rise in global sphere. Therefore, Korea’s close relationship with the US is a general concern for them.

“Are you Chinese or Koreans?” At this question, people had a big debate among themselves. Mr. Lee and others loudly criticised those who obtained Korean nationality as “betrayers” of the fatherland (China). He said: “You’re betrayers! You’re same as those Koreans who tried to be subservient to Americans.” Some others said that South Korea is a minon of the US and Chinese government will not tolerate Americans to enhance their position in South Korea. “I read from a newspaper that Chinese government spokesperson firmly declared that China would not let Americans to increase their presence on the Korean peninsula. This is good.”

Meanwhile, there were also other Chosonjok who shouted that they should not be too negative about Korea. “Don’t talk too negatively about Koreans!” shouted the man.

Those who recovered their Korean nationality were jokingly criticised by others as “betrayers” of China. This was probably due to jealousy. Those who recovered their nationality claimed that Chosonjok should not criticise Korea too harshly as they are all able to make money in Korea.

There are always many Korean Chinese standing outside of the Seoul Chosonjok Church. They mix Korean with Chinese in daily conversation. Some speaks Kyongsang-do dialect (as their ancestors came from Kyongsang Province). They are different from the Yanbian Chosonjok, whom I am familiar with.
Some of them have recovered Korean citizenship. One naturalized Korean Chinese stated that though he obtained South Korean citizenship through naturalization, he is still a ‘Chinese’ instead of being a ‘Korean’.

In the case of the Chinese in New Zealand, the new migrants tend to support ethnic Chinese politicians who show their firm loyalty toward PRC China (New Zealand Herald May 9, 2008 http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz-election-2008/news/article.cfm?c_id=1501799&objectid=10536584&pnum=0). However, many of them showed unsettled attitude toward their true identity. One of my interviewees says:

Being a Chosonjok is not that good at all. We cannot trust anyone (either Chinese or Korean?) In China our life is limited as we don’t know Chinese, the great majority’s language. In South Korea we are called “Chungguknom.” We are same as Koreans. However, I don’t want to be called “Hanguin” and I’m not a Hanguin. We don’t have a clear concept what we are (if we are Koreans or Chinese). Identity questions could be too political and I don’t want to get involved in such political questions. [Fieldwork Notes]

If we don’t’ want to return to China? That’s because it’s very difficult to find jobs there. Even when we don’t work here in Korea, still the weather, language, and freedom and so on… these are better here than in China. Of course, there is discrimination in China. However, being discriminated here in Korea makes us more frustrated. 70% of Koreans are good while 30% are bad (as anywhere). There are some 300,000 to 400,000 Chosonjok here in South Korea. Two thirds of them live OK, making and saving good money, but the rest (one third) fail. They come here through various routes: nationality recovery, marriage, business, relative visits and os no. Among the 2 million strong Chosonjok in China some 500,000 live overseas including SK, Japan, and the US. In 2008 there will be 26,000 new comers here in South Korea.

“Chosonjok are generally honest, but South Koreans are largely dishonest.” The man said that Chosonjok are generally honest while Koreans are dishonest. Another man nearby said that he views differently, saying that he views Koreans more positively. (He is a naturalised Chosonjok.)

South Korean government policy toward Chosonjok: duality – civil organisations and news media may say that Korean Chinese are the same nationals, but the legal status of Korean Chinese does not allow them to be treated equal with other overseas Koreans (wage, legal status, popular perceptions). Considering the popular public opinion, the South Korean government needs to accept Chosonjok, but in reality Chosonjok are the hot potatoes for the South Korean government. South Korean government is not “big” enough to accept all the Chosonjok people, and it also should consider the relationship with the Chinese government.

There are legal contradictions and South Korean government has discriminated against Korean Chinese while it has treated Korean Americans and Korean Japanese more favourably in terms of issuing entry visas and offering various aids including cultural supports.

While in general (big principle) South Korea considers Korean Chinese as the people of the same root and Korean Chinese consider Korea as the homeland of their grandfathers. Small principle – collective life in China – South Koreans tend to disregard the small principle: not understanding the different cultural background of Korean Chinese. South Koreans are not able to understand Chosonjok’s sense of being Chinese citizens. Chosonjok are different from Korean Japanese in terms of their participation in building the new China, which makes them to feel they are the “heroes” of the new China.
South Koreans, not being able to understand all these, they tend to emphasize the blood, history, and territories, which should not be the main problems at this stage. Korean government makes things more complicated and difficult for Korean Chinese between South Korea and China.

South Korean policy – reduces the space of Korean Chinese (nationalistic policy, irredentism, Baekdusan question, Koguryo question and so on) make the position of Korean Chinese even more difficult. Chinese government has many layers of Overseas Chinese departments (Central Government, Province, City, Village…), and lower level governments receive supports from the central government. Therefore, China’s Overseas Chinese policy is powerful and efficient. On the contrary, Korean government does not have any special office that deals with overseas Koreans matters, and the OKF (Overseas Koreans Foundation) does not have much direct power within the government in directing such a policy.

Chinese government does not fear of SK’s policy toward Chosonjok and the Chosonjokof themselves due to their small minority status and small number (xx per cent). However, the Chinese government is sensitive about the Chosonjok and SK government policy toward them.

**Mr. Kim’s opinion on SK government policy**

After President Kim Dae Jung’s inauguration, SK government tried to allow dual citizenship status to all Chosonjok. As the number of Chosonjok is rather small in China, basically the Chinese government does not fear the power of Chosonjok. Nonetheless, the Chinese government pays serious attention to this issue. One evidence is that the Yanbian Airport is still an air force airfield not a civilian airfield. South Korean government caused the historical conflicts between Chinese government and South Korean government (the Northeast Project).

While I have run a travel agency in Yanbian for South Korean tourists, I felt that the two governments’ policies toward Chosonjok have limitations. The two governments did not have much formal discussions but they only conflicted. Worse is the SK government’s contradictory policies. Chinese government tries to include all the overseas Chinese into its arms, but it does not understand the special status of Korean Chinese.

The dualistic policies of the SK government: (1) apparently, SK government’s policy toward Korean Chinese seems to have improved. Now, it allows Korean Chinese to enter and work in SK more freely. It also brought the Chosonjok issues to a light from darkness. However, most of Korean Chinese tend to believe that SK government policy is worse than before. Why?

(1) The fees involved in making Foreigners’ Registration (KRW40,000)
(2) Educational fees (3-day education programme) KRW107,000
(3) Once they found a job, the employer and the worker should appear to the Entry/Exit Office, which is rather burdensome both for the worker and the employer. This should be done each time when new jobs are chosen.
(4) If violated, the fine is KRW1 million. If violated again, enforced exit occurs.
(5) As a result, there always are many Chosonjok who pay their fines at the Entry/Exit Office of Mokdong → this makes Chosonjok believe that South Korean government is making money from Chosonjok. The SK government seems to loosen its control of Chosonjok but in fact it has tightened its control over Chosonjok.
Chosonjok’s opinion about the policies of the SK government and Chinese government

Chosonjok tend to think that they have become farther away from the Peking government. Not because Chosonjok hate the Chinese government, but it is because the SK government made the position of Chosonjok rather complicated and uncomfortable in China. Still 60-70% of Chosonjok think that they are “Chinese.”

Chosonjok tend to think that SK government is not trustworthy. 30% of Chosonjok think that Korea is their ancestral homeland and they feel sad to SK government, which does not allow them free entries of Chosonjok and discriminate them.

We want to ask the SK government how much efforts have they put to embrace Chosonjok? It does not even have a separate government office that deals with Chosonjok or overseas Koreans. Most Chosonjok today think that SK government policy towards Chosonjok is not better than in the past (regardless of the recent changes of regulations regarding the entry visas to Chosonjok and Koreans from the CIS).

It is wished that the South Korean government should deal with Chosonjok problems more rationally. The SK government invested KRW10,000,000,000 to the Koguryo Foundation (currently the Northeast Foundation). However, we should not view SK government only negatively. Chosonjok exist because there is the Korean Peninsula.

When Chosonjok workers return to China, they might reconsider their being ‘Chinese’, says an interviewee. “They will change their perceptions of Korea and China again. Due to their habits of life in SK they will feel uncomfortable and unhappy about the environment, services, and life there. That’s why many of them come back to Korea again, not simply for money, but for a better environment. This has nothing to do with their ethnic identity or political opinion and so on. In fact, national identity and so on are simply the plays of political elites of the two countries. Anyway, Chosonjok have a dual identity, and they can live in both countries. The Koguryo problem that SK caused is a problem for Chosonjok in China. The relationship between Chosonjok and China cannot but become sensitive if such an issue comes up as a problem. I have written couple of articles about the issues and they are available on internet. Nonetheless, we Chosonjok will disappear when there is no Korean peninsula. We should not just see the negative aspects of our relationship with South Korea.”

[Korean-Chosonjok relationship is improving] Some Chosonjok people say that the relationship between Chosonjok and Koreans used be worse, but now it is better. In the past it was much worse. Chosonjok learned both bad things and good things from Koreans. There are both good and bad things for us in our relationship with Koreans.

[Discrimination in China] There is not much discrimination in China, but, as a minority, it is hard for Chosonjok to grow in China.

[Koreans are culturally high] Koreans tend to be more cultured than Chinese. In Beijing if you ask someone the road, they would not tell you. (Or, they even misguide you by giving you a wrong direction). Koreans are so kind in telling you the way. Once I was bitten by a snake in Korea, and I was treated very well by other Koreans and hospital workers, with which I could save my finger (and life). They even did not charge any money for the treatment (through the free clinic led by Rev. Kim Hae-song). With this thankful experience, I wanted to go to Taean (where there was a serious oil spill recently) to repay my debt to Koreans.
[Discrimination in China] Yes, we Koreans are discriminated in China. One recent example is the football incident in which the Yanbian Football Team was unfavourably refereed. Ethnic minorities are discriminated and disregarded in China. China never allows ethnic minorities to move up (in social ladder). One of my customers from Seoran City, Jilin Province told me once: He returned from Korea and arrived at the Changchun Airport and he was told by a Han Chinese man shouting him: “You go back to Yanbian!” That Han Chinese probably did not know that Yanbian is a part of China? He eventually moved to Yanbian even though he had planned to live in Changchun. Those bastard Han Chinese! (Chungguk saekkidul!!) Now, the man, who is a dentist, only deals with Korean Chinese in Yanbian. Some Han Chinese tend to believe that we Chosonjok are the spies of South Korea, and they often shout at us to go back to Korea. Why Han Chinese do this? It’s because they’re jealous to what we’ve achieved and our status (as Koreans who have connections to Korea). In Beijing, which I visit frequently, I did not have such an experience.

Han Chinese tend to judge people from their appearance. To deal with them, one needs to dominate them from the beginning by killing their chi (ki) from the beginning.

{Another person told me that in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture Koreans are not allowed to take certain professions including pilot and diplomatist. This is due to Chinese government’s distrust of ethnic Koreans, which is different from the case in the Soviet Union where many Koryo saram became pilots.}

[Future in China?] Now the basis of our life shifted to Korea from China. I don’t have any intention to move to a third country even though I want to visit many other countries. I will invest in China if I make money in Korea. It will be better that way as there will not be much difference between China and Korea in economic environment. My relatives ask us to come back to China (for a business), but we will wait until we save enough fund for capital. If we return to China, we may do interior business in the areas where South Koreans are residing. Koreans tend not to trust Chinese for that kind of work and I believe we will do well in that business. In any case, first of all, we need some capital for such a business plan.

For me, returning to China and living there is not a serious problem. After all, that’s the country where I was born and lived most of my life. I’m confident that I will do well there as well. Some Chosonjok say that they cannot live in China after they are so accustomed to the life in Korea, but I think they’re just weird. Of course, we need to adjust to China’s political and social environment where we don’t have any political freedom. In China we cannot say what we think and want.

“Though we are Chinese citizens, we wish that our motherland (Korea) will become a prosperous and advanced country. That’s why we’re interested in Korean politics.”

Some say that a good relationship between SK and NK will be beneficial for Chosonjok in general. While others (younger ones) say that it will hurt Chosonjok community in China (as South Korean businessmen and tourists will go to NK and Chosonjok community will be neglected). For this reason they don’t support a candidate like Chung Dong-young who are pro-NK. At this an older man came out and scolded the younger ones, saying “our nation is more important than our immediate interests. Even if we Chosonjok may lose because of the improved SK-NK relations, we should support an improved relationship between NK and SK.” The younger ones, however, did not look persuaded.
Mr. Park (43, Yanji) says that he felt very proud of his being Chinese when he watched the TV program on the daily use of Chinese goods in Korea, Japan, and US. Though he claims that he was one of the first Korean Chinese who knew and contact South Koreans, and he knows so many Koreans as friends and business partners, he really felt proud of being a Chinese with the TV program (South Korean).

Many believe that Communist Party and one-party system the best – efficiency and defects are less than multi-party system. Democracy, demonstrations, and political conflicts could be dangerous and less efficient. Diversity within one party is better than multi-party system.

I felt proud to be a Chinese when I watched a recent Korean TV program which tested people’s life without products made in China. The program tested if people could survive without products made in China in three countries: Korea, Japan and US. People simply could not survive without Chinese products in these countries. This shows the power of China and China’s status in global economy (Field notes).

5 ETHNIC HOMELAND OR NATAL HOMELAND?: KOREAN CHINESE ON THE SOUTH KOREAN POLICY TOWARD OVERSEAS KOREANS

The South Korean government just had launched the Visitor Employment Scheme in March 2007 after the problematic Industrial Trainee System as well as the controversial Act on the Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (1999)². This new system allowed tens of thousand Korean Chinese and Soviet Koreans to enter to Korea for work up to three years within five years of term. The new scheme also allowed those who do not have any relatives in Korea to work in Korea, which was welcomed by Korean Chinese.

They also criticised South Koreans’ discriminating Chosonjok against Koreans Americans. “Koreans call Korean Americans as “topngp’ó” while they call us “Chungguk kyop’o. This is not fair. If we have any crime (Choe), it’s that we have no money while those Korean Americans have money. Look, those who went to America went there to make money while we Korean Chinese went to China to fight Japanese. We fought Japan, but today South Koreans discriminate us and do not treat us fairly! Look China. China accepts huachao who had left China more than 100 years ago.”

“I had a fight with a policeman while drinking at a bar. I protested him why we need a permit to return to our homeland. I asked him: ‘do you need a permit to visit your own homeland?’” “Even if I have a Korean nationality, I would still think I’m a Chinese. The only reason I want Korean nationality is to work in this country for a long term with legal protection. This is not to live in this country permanently.”

Korean Chinese migrant workers tend to have very negative opinions toward Korean society. One says that Korean society is ‘corrupt.’

The Korean society is corrupt. Especially the elite are wrong in this country. In China, when a section of the society faces hardship, the entire country tries to help the sector (or region). But, in Korea it’s not the case. {Here, another man intervened and added that Koreans also try to help their own people when there are needs.) Koreans tend to talk very well. In China when someone only speaks and talks well, he/she is not treated well. In my own case, when my South Korean relative was asked by an official at the entry port if he could be responsible for my staying in Korea, he refused to endorse me.

² This Act was declared unconstitutional due to its discriminating Korean Chinese and Soviet Koreans while it gives privileges to ethnic Koreans from wealthy western countries including the US, western Europe and Japan.
[Training programs for Chosonjok: content of education program conducted by South Koreans] Employment Priority System – MOUs with 14 different countries have been signed so far by Korean government. A three-days training program (20 hours total) by the Ministry of Labour – in the case of non-foreigners, training program includes Korean language class. It also includes the ‘Spirit Education’ (Chongshin kyouyuk) – differences between the socialist and capitalist work ethic and so on

This includes Korean history, emphasis on the hard work, economic development of South Korea. The educational training programme also includes: the laws and regulations regarding labour and employment; the rights of migrant workers; and security measures at work. Interesting thing is that ‘disciplinary training’ is included in the training programme. Chongshin kyouyuk (spiritual education) – this includes socialist society vs. capitalist society – which is translated “ppalli vs. chonchonhi” (quickly vs. slowly) – workers must be hard-working and sincere.

6 INTER-KOREAN RELATIONSHIP AND CULTURAL CITIZENSHIP

Inter-Korean Relationships

Most of Korean Chinese also showed high interests in the inter-Korean relations in the election. Most of them wanted that South Korea would pursue the engagement policy with the North, a continuation of ‘Sunshine Policy.’ In this regard, they supported Chung Dong-Young, the candidate from the Uri Party.

However, the Korean Chinese also showed divisions among themselves on this issue. Some claimed that South Korea should help North while others claim that South Korea should take over the north.

They would loudly debate about who should be the next president of South Korea (as the presidential election will be held on Dec. 19). There were two groups: those who support Chung Dong-young with the expectation that he would bring the two Koreas closer. Meanwhile, some people argued that the two Korea’s coming closer to each other would rob Chosonjok community of their current role as cheap labour for South Korea (this is so as North Koreans would replace Chosonjok). Most people seemed to agree with this. Then, however, some say that even if Chosonjok’s loss of jobs in South Korea might be the result of the closer relationship between the two Koreas, they still want to see Korea’s unification. Some took a more realistic role and they did not want to see the two Koreas coming closer if that should cause loss of jobs for Chosonjok.

Post-election many Chosonjok are worried about the possible tightening of money transferring and other measures including labour market protection. In China elite do not like to see two Koreas unified. Image of the “President” in China and Korea – different (China more conservative). Minority status of CSJ – China’s appeasement policy, alienated, not interested in Chinese politics; more interested in Korean politics.

Between the Severed Motherlands

Many of them raised their voice, urging that South Korea should continue engagement policy toward North Korea.

Here people were divided politically. The Lee Myung-bak supporters mostly were concerned about the economic situation in South Korea as this will impact their employment prospects in South Korea. Chung Dong-young supporters, however minor they might be, were more concerned about the future of Korea, their ethnic homeland. Even Lee Myung-bak supporters, however, showed great concerns about this issue, and
they worried if Lee Myung-bak might devastate the inter-Korean relationship, which has been so far progressive under the last two governments.

It is in this regard that Korean Chinese feel their being ‘Korean’ and exert their ‘ethnic’ citizenship.

**Cultural Citizenship**

Recent academic discussions dealt with the relationship between citizenship and globalization. In particular, scholars have observed the changes of the citizenship concepts with the increasing level of transnationality and the relative decline in the influence of nation-states (Appadurai 1996, Ong 1999). The focus of citizenship has changed and diversified. While the legal citizenship has been important, other kinds of citizenship, i.e., cultural citizenship or ethnic citizenships have emerged. This paper deals with the question of the cultural citizenship in regard to the Korean Chinese ethnic return migrants in Korea and those stay in China.

7 **CONCLUSION**

My observation shows a few salient points in their discussions of the election: (1) South Korean style democracy is dangerous, and Chinese-style one-party rule is a more efficient form of government; (2) the majority of Chosŏnjok workers supported Lee Myung-bak, believing he would improve the South Korean economy, which then would be beneficial for Chosŏnjok in general; (3) a smaller number of people supported Chung Dong-young because of their belief that Chung would improve the relationship between the two Koreas regardless of their knowledge that an improved inter-Korean relationship might cause job loss for Chosŏnjok migrant workers. By discussing such issues rather vocally among themselves, the Chosŏnjok migrant workers were in fact exerting their ‘cultural’ citizenship to the national community of Koreans in which many of them do not have legal citizenship.

They showed great interests in Korean politics, identifying their own interests that might be affected by the election. Many saw the election as a dangerous act that might endanger national security (election as a divisive force). They distinguish China (fatherland) and Korea (motherland) and believe that each country has a different system and needs.

Is democracy the only possible alternative? China’s political thought can bring an alternative in human history (as the French rationalists, enlightenmentalists admired China as a polity that does not need a grand religion such as Christianity – Confucian model. Koreas should not think they are superior to Chinese in terms of democracy – Korean democracy does not look ideal and it has revealed so much problems recently and in the past. Western discourse of human rights – has universal appeal but one needs to consider the practicality that the Chinese situation requires.

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