Preface

This volume represents a selection of the papers presented at the 7th Conference of the Korean Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA), hosted by the Korea Research Institute at the University of New South Wales (KRI@UNSW), Sydney, Australia, from 16th to 18th November, 2011. This conference is held as part of the Year of Friendship between Australia and Korea events, in celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the diplomatic relation between the two countries.

The overall theme of the 7th KSAA Biennial Conference, “Korean Studies in the Era of Global Partnership”, reflects and captures the critical need for collaborative research networks among scholars of Korean Studies, who are scattered in different regions and engaged in a variety of subjects. We hope that this conference will provide an opportunity for scholars to present and discuss the outcomes of their research and develop a global research network.

As the conference encompasses the diversity of the discipline of Korean Studies, the collection of papers in this volume embodies insightful aspects on Korea from a wide range of disciplines including Politics & International Relations, Language Education, Linguistics, Society & Geography, Media Communication & Culture, and Economics and Management. This conference proceedings has three sections: Part A, Refereed papers; Part B, Non-refereed papers; and Part C, Abstract only. Part A comprises papers selected after the double-blind peer review process of full papers, whereas those included in Parts B and C are research papers, only the abstracts of which were reviewed at the requests of the participants.
On behalf of the Organising Committee, we would like express our gratitude to all the participants of the conference, presenting their papers with exemplary intensity and enthusiasm and contributing towards the success of the conference. We also gratefully acknowledge the invaluable contributions of anonymous reviewers who have graciously participated in the review process.

As the chair of the conference and the editor of this volume, we would like to document our wholehearted appreciation to distinguished keynote speakers, Emeritus Professor Kwang Chung from Korea University and Professor Hyaeweol Choi from Australian National University. In particular, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Korea Foundation, the Academy of Korean Studies, the Korean Consulate General in Sydney, the Korea Research Institute of the University of New South Wales, and the Korea Institute of the Australian National University for their financial and others supports to this conference.

Last but not least, on behalf of all the conference participants, we are particularly grateful to the KSAA Executive Committee Members for their wholehearted contributions to the 7th KSAA Biennial Conference.

Professor Chung-Sok Suh,
President,
Korean Studies Association of Australasia
**KSAA Executive Committee**

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<tr>
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<td>Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand</td>
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THE KOREAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALASIA (KSAA)

PROGRAMS

16 –18 November 2011
The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

Sponsors

Hosting Institution
Korea Research Institute (KRI@UNSW), The University of New South Wales
The 7th Conference of the Korean Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA), hosted by the Korea Research Institute at the University of New South Wales (KRI@UNSW), is held as part of the Year of Friendship between Australia and Korea, in celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the diplomatic relation between the two countries.

The overall theme of the 7th KSAA Biennial Conference, “Korean Studies in the Era of Global Partnership”, reflects and captures the critical need for collaborative research networks among scholars of Korean Studies, who are scattered in different regions and engaged in a variety of subjects. We hope that this conference will provide an opportunity for scholars to present and discuss the outcomes of their research and develop a global research network.

The first day of the conference (17th November, 2011) begins with Opening Addresses, followed by a Keynote Address. The Keynote speaker, Emeritus Professor Kwang Chung from Korea University, Korea, presents his paper titled ‘Foreign Language Education and Foreign Language Teaching Materials in Korea: The Chinese Language Primer Nogoldae (Lao Qida, "The Mr. Cathayan").’ In his keynote address, Emeritus Professor Chung focuses on the traditional and historical development of foreign language education in Korea. After the Keynote Address Session, three Concurrent Sessions are held. During the Sessions, scholars present and discuss insightful aspects on Korea from a wide range of disciplines including Economics and Management, Literature, Language Education, Politics & International Relations, History, Linguistics and Society & Geography. The first day of the conference is concluded with Conference Dinner & Best Paper Award Ceremony.

The second day of the conference (18th November, 2011) begins with a Keynote Address. The Keynote speaker, Professor Hyaeweol Choi from Australian National University presents her paper titled ‘Going South: Re-orienting to Korean Studies from an Antipodean Perspective.’ Professor Choi delivers a lecture on some strategic aspects of doing Korean Studies in Australia within the context of greater interdependence between

KSAA 7th Biennial Conference Program
Australia and the region of Asia and the Pacific. During her keynote address, Professor Choi proposes a transnational approach to the history of women in modern Korea. After the Keynote Address Session, Day-2 Concurrent Sessions are held and encompass the diversity of the discipline of Korean Studies, including Library, Media Communication & Culture, Society & Geography, Politics & International Relations, Linguistics, Literature and Language Education. The conference is concluded after the Biennial General Meeting of KSAA.

On behalf of the Organising Committee, we would like express our gratitude to all the participants of the conference, presenting their papers with exemplary intensity and enthusiasm and contributing towards the success of the conference. We also gratefully acknowledge the invaluable contributions of anonymous reviewers who have graciously participated in the review process.

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<td>Sung-Young Kim (University of Sydney)</td>
<td>Neo-developmental States in the Twenty-first Century: Technological Upgrading in the Korean Telecommunications Sector</td>
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<td>Joseph Kim (University of New South Wales)</td>
<td>Interactive Relationship between Cultural Policy and Cultural Industry in Korea: Political and Economic Determinants</td>
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<td>Implementing Public Sector Accrual Accounting: Institutional Entrepreneurs in Korean Local Governments</td>
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<td>Making the New Newer the Influence of Western Literature on Modern Korean Literature: Yi Hyoseok, William Blake, and Walt Whitman</td>
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<td>Kelly S. Walsh (Yonsei University)</td>
<td>Bridging Disappointment: Pak Tae-won’s Kubo and James Joyce’s Ulysses</td>
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<td><strong>Language Education (1)</strong> <em>(Chair: Duk-Soo Park)</em></td>
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<td>Jin Hee Kim &amp; Seung Kyu Han (Yonsei University)</td>
<td>A Study on the Current Status and Improvements of Describing Avoidant Words and Euphemism in Korean Dictionaries</td>
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<td>Jihye Eo (Yonsei University)</td>
<td>An Evaluative Checklist for Teachers’ Books in KLT</td>
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<td>Yee Pei K’ng (University of Malaya)</td>
<td>The Contributions of a Middle Power: Assessing South Korea’s Role in ASEAN Plus Three</td>
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<td>Popular Religiosity and State Control: Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Korean Buddhism</td>
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<td>Gi-Hyun Shin (University of New South Wales)</td>
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<td>Yong-Ju Rue (University of New South Wales)</td>
<td>Gender Differences in Request Strategies used by Korean and Chinese Speakers</td>
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<td>Globalization and Economic Nationalism in South Korea: a Critical View</td>
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<td>Joy. J. Han (University of Melbourne)</td>
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<td>Kyu-Suk Shin (University of Western Australia)</td>
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<td>Alan Libert (University of Newcastle)</td>
<td>International Auxiliary Languages in Korea: Reception and Creation</td>
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<td>Study on Analyzing Directive Sentences in Korean Textbooks - Focusing on Analysis of Linguistics and Syntactic Features in Directive Sentences Fit in Each Level -</td>
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<td>Maintaining a World-class Niche Library Support Service in an Economically Challenging Environment</td>
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<td>Regulating, Exporting, and Defining Joseonese Cinema, 1934-1935</td>
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<td>“A Painter’s Dream Canvas: Korea’s Cinema Billboards”</td>
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<td>Keum Hyun Han (University of Colorado, Boulder)</td>
<td>Contemporary Korean Photography: How Artists Use a Photographic Sensibility to Produce New Knowledge?</td>
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### KSAA 7th Biennial Conference Program

#### Concurrent Session V (13:10 – 14:40, 18th November)

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<td>Changzoo Song (University of Auckland)</td>
<td>Korea’s Desire for and Expectations from Ethnic Korean Brides from China and Uzbekistan: The Ups and Downs of Korea’s Ethnic Nationalism?</td>
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<th>Yooil Bae (Singapore Management University) &amp; Yong Wook Lee (Korea University)</th>
<th>Identity and Interest in Korea’s Middle Power Diplomacy: A Case of Knowledge Sharing Program in Korea’s ODA Policy</th>
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<td>Roland Wilson (George Mason University)</td>
<td>Korea’s Forgotten, Intractable &amp; Violent Conflict: When Will Peace Finally Come?</td>
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226 Victoria St, Potts Point
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Analysis of Leisure Expenditure and Policy Implications
- Using Korean Urban Households Data

Sooyoung Sul
Kyunggi University, Korea.

and

MoonJoong Tcha
Korea Development Institute, Korea
Analysis of Leisure Expenditure and Policy Implications
- Using Korean Urban Households Data

Sooyoung Sul*
Kyunggi University, Korea
and
MoonJoong Tcha**
Korea Development Institute, Korea

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes household’s leisure expenditure by exploring the Korean urban households data and provides policy implications. Among the major findings from quantitative analyses are the significant correlation between leisure consumption and disposable income, and that between leisure consumption and relative price of leisure as expected. It is noteworthy that the income and price elasticities of leisure expenditure different across household groups with different levels of income. In contrast, an institutional change such as the introduction of a five-day workweek and the shock of economic crisis appear to be unrelated to leisure expenditure. Policy implications based on these findings are suggested.

Key words: Leisure expenditure, price index, household income, free time, government policy

* Sooyoung Sul (main correspondent): Kyunggi University, Korea. (T) 82-10-6258-0815, (Email) sooyoung815@hanmail.net. ** MoonJoong Tcha: Korea Development Institute, P.O. Box 113, Cheongnyang, Seoul 130-740, Korea. (T) 82-2-958-4204, (F) 82-2-960-4570, (Email) mtcha@kdi.re.kr. The authors wish to thank Francis Lobo, Ming-Kai Chin and Seok-Kyun Hur for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this paper. Research and editorial assistance provided by Dae-Yong Kim and Elizabeth Pyon is gratefully acknowledged. The authors also thank participants to seminars and conferences for their comments.
I. Introduction

Leisure-related consumption is believed to be important in government circles, with characteristics of “merit good” (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1980). Crompton (2008) also suggested five contributions that leisure provides to alleviating social problems. These explain why governments in many countries implement various policies that affect leisure consumption.

It has been argued that the market for culture, entertainment and leisure related goods and services\(^1\) (hereinafter referred to as ‘leisure goods’ for the sake of convenience) has grown very rapidly, coupled with a rapid increase in individual or household income (Kelly and Freysinger, 2001; Torkildsen, 1992). This argument has particular bearing on Korea, as it experienced both an expansion of the leisure market as well as unprecedented economic growth, despite economic crisis circa 1997-98. According to the Korean Government (2006), the expansion of the market was aided by changes in government policy such as the introduction of the five-day workweek.\(^2\) This belief naturally lead to forecasts that spending on leisure goods would increase in the future as people’s incomes increase or more leisure–friendly schedules become more ubiquitous (Kim, 2006; Chang and Kang, 2007).

However, it is important to identify accurately what the significant determinants of leisure consumption are in order to discuss future changes in such trends. The identification of these trends is also important to governmental policy, especially in terms of affecting leisure activities among the population.

As pointed out by previous studies, leisure consumption in general appears to increase rapidly taking larger share of total income. For example, Nakamura (1997) analyzed US consumer data for the years 1959, 1974, and 1994 and found an increased share of spending on luxury goods and recreation in each case.

Another variable to be considered is price. Traditional consumption theories hold that, in addition to incomes, prices of goods are among the most important determinants of demand. However, it is striking that relative prices are frequently overlooked when leisure consumption is discussed. This study takes into consideration such an important variable and its deterministic effect on consumer behavior.

---

\(^1\) The Korean Government regularly publishes cultural, entertainment and leisure-related spending in its *Urban Household Survey*.  
The major reason to utilize Korean data is that critical variables such as income and price may be clearly traceable within this context. As it is well known, Korea has succeeded in transforming itself from a war-ravaged underdeveloped country to a dynamic developed economy in the span of just one generation. The rapid increase in income associated with this development is expected to allow people more disposable income and the accompanying leisure spending. The fast restructuring of the whole economy and globalization over the past 20 years are also believed to have changed the relative price of leisure goods substantially.

In addition, the time for leisurely pursuits and consumerism has increased thanks to legislation regulating the length of the workweek. The nation also experienced an unprecedented financial crisis in the late 1990s, which might have played a role in reversing leisure consumption trends. While the crisis might affect leisure consumption through changes in the current earnings or relative prices, it is also possible that the crisis directly affected leisure consumption by changing social environment which are not reflected in the changes in income or price.

The importance of this study in terms of contributing to government policy is fourfold: First, the impact of relative price which has been ignored in previous studies in spite of its potential importance, will be addressed, as well as the impact of income. Second, the role of changes in government policy, namely the introduction of the five-day workweek, will be examined. Third, the effect of dramatic societal changes such as the economic crisis will also be analyzed. Finally, the effects of these variables are to be compared across different economic strata and across occupational groups as the data allows this kind of categorization. The results will show how people in different occupations or income groups react to changes in these critical variables. These findings will provide invaluable implications for academics and practitioners as well as policy makers.

This paper consists of four chapters, this paragraph being the conclusion of the first. Chapter II discusses the theoretical basis of the study and research methods used. Chapter III quantitatively analyzes the effect of critical variables on leisure consumption and interprets the empirical findings especially in the context of policy implications. The paper concludes in Chapter IV.
II. Research Methods

1. Leisure Spending in Korea

The importance of leisure consumption to the policy makers is due to the following factors:

(i) leisure consumption rapidly increases as income increases, which has critical implications for modern societies,
(ii) the right to leisurely pursuits is one of the most basic human rights, and
(iii) an increase in leisure consumption is beneficial to society overall for its own sake (Korean Government, 2006; Nelson, 2001). The leisure and entertainment industry, in particular, is regarded as an economic catalyst, as growing patronage has caused it to grow phenomenally.

Figure 1 shows the share of leisure spending in Korean urban households from 1986 to 2007, compared to major budget items such as food and housing. The share of food has been largest, reaching about 45% in early 1986 and then continuously declining with seasonal fluctuation. The share of housing expenditure has been decreasing with moderate seasonal fluctuation as well. The share of leisure expenditure surpassed that of housing in the early 1990s and has been increasing with seasonal fluctuation.

Figure 2 compares the growth rate for the three items. The possibility of unit root problem which may be found in Figure 1 seems not to exist anymore, but seasonality is observed. The figure shows that fluctuation in leisure outlays is relatively stable compared to shelter. This finding differs from our prediction that the fluctuation in leisure spending would be greater since it represents luxury items while housing is a necessity. This may also reflect a large fluctuation in housing price during the survey period.

<< Figure 1 here>>

<<Figure 2 here>>
2. Theoretical Background

1) Consumption Analysis Using Divisia Moments

Traditional consumer theories, such as the classical Marshall (1890), try to analyze consumption patterns by concentrating on the relationship between prices and volume, on the assumption that spending power or discretionary outlays do not change. While this methodology is clear-cut and convenient, the assumption is extreme to some extent as most variables related to consumer behavior are supposed to change over time.

In acknowledgement of this weakness, alternative methods were introduced (for example, Theil, 1967). In particular, analytical methods using Divisia moments have been widely applied to measure consumption patterns in dynamic contexts (for example, Clements, 1982, 2008; Chen, 1999). However, the Divisia moment methodology has rarely been used in the field of leisure research except for Sul (2009) and Nelson (2001) who attempted to analyze entertainment or leisure consumption in Korea and the US respectively. Nonetheless, this study is different from Sul (2009) in dealing with data in empirical analyses and Nelson (2001) in selecting variables included and handling seasonal factors.

This study uses Divisia moments to build a leisure consumption model. Households are expected to determine whether and how much they spend on leisure goods and services during each period. ³ We define \( p_{lt} \) as the (representative) relative price of leisure goods and services during period \( t \) \( t = 1, 2, ..., T \), \( q_{lt} \) as the amount of leisure goods consumed at time \( t \) \( t = 1, 2, ..., T \). The share of leisure spending is \( w_{lt} = p_{lt} \times q_{lt}/M_t \) where \( M_t \) is the total household spending, i.e., \( M_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \times q_{it} \), and \( i \) stands for goods and services consumed by the household \( i \) \( i = 1, 2, ..., n \). In this case, the share of leisure spending across periods \( (t+1) \) and \( t \) as a simple numerical average becomes

\[
\bar{w}_t = \frac{1}{2} (w_{t} + w_{t+1}).
\]

The change in the price of leisure goods and services over periods \( (t-1) \) and \( t \) can be denoted in terms of a logarithm as \( Dp_t = \log p_t - \log p_{t-1} \). The corresponding change in leisure consumption quantity is denoted in a logarithm as \( Dq_t = \log q_t - \log q_{t-1} \).

³ This part of building up the model follows Clements (1982).

⁴ The subscript \( l \) that stands for ‘leisure’ is omitted for simplicity.
The Divisia price index \( (DP) \) is calculated from the weighted average of \( n \) consumer prices, where the weight is computed from the share in spending. The Divisia quantity index \( DQ \), can be obtained by the same method.

\[
DP_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_{it} \times Dp_{it}, \quad DQ_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_{it} \times Dq_{it}.
\]

\( DQ \) stands for the change in total expenditure on consumption goods and services that a household pays for from \((t-1)\) to \(t\), while \( Dq_{it} \) is the change in consumption of leisure goods and services for the same household over the same period.

2) Regression Models and Variables

Using the Divisia moments discussed above, regression analyses will be carried out to determine the impact of relevant variables on leisure consumption. The basic model is adopted from Theil (1965) as follows:

\[
Dq_t = \alpha + \eta \times DQ_t + \gamma \times DP_t + \epsilon_t
\]  

(1)

Here \( \alpha \) is a constant that reflects the trend over time. The coefficient \( \eta \) can be interpreted as the elasticity of leisure consumption with respect to income, as it means percentage change in leisure consumption due to a 1% change in total consumer spending. The coefficient \( \eta \) is expected to be positive. Moreover, if the growth rate of leisure consumption is faster than that of income, or leisure consumption is elastic when income changes, the coefficient will be greater than 1 implying that leisure is a luxury good.

Since \( DP \) is the relative price of leisure goods compared to all other goods and services, coefficient \( \gamma \) is the elasticity of leisure consumption with respect to relative price of leisure goods. The coefficient is in general expected to be negative.

Equation (1) can be extended by considering some other variables. Another important determinant in leisure consumption is the availability of free time to pursue related activities. In particular, this study is concerned with the effects of policy changes on leisure consumption – more specifically, the introduction of a five-day workweek for the first time for large companies in 2002 and its application to smaller firms over time. In the third quarter
of 2006, the system was imposed on all businesses with more than 5 employees. Researchers and policy-makers in Korea firmly believed that this policy change increased leisure time, participation in leisure activities and leisure consumption accordingly. However, this belief has not been rigorously tested. This study attempts to find whether such policy changes actually increased household leisure consumption. If the policy did have such an effect, the coefficient for the variable will turn out to be positive.

Furthermore, one potentially important variable for leisure consumption is structural changes in society, which may have a shock effect on consumers. In the case of Korea, the economic crisis that beset the nation since the third quarter of 1997 was a well-known disruptor that drove various changes in the nation. While it is beyond the scope of this study to identify the specific channels through which this crisis affected leisure consumption, this study seeks to confirm the existence of such effects.

This is modeled in equation (2) by including the two aforementioned changes as dummy variables.

\[
Dq_i = \alpha_i + \eta_i \times DQ_i + \gamma_i \times Dp_i + \tau_i \times d_{FW} + \theta_i \times d_{EC} + \epsilon_i, \tag{2}
\]

where \(d_{FW}\) and \(d_{EC}\) are dummy variables representing the five-day workweek and the economic crisis, respectively, where

\[
d_{FW} = 0 \text{ before 2002} = 1 \text{ otherwise, and}
\]

\[
d_{EC} = 0 \text{ before the third quarter of 1997} = 1 \text{ otherwise.}
\]

The coefficient \(\tau_i\) is expected to be positive, and \(\theta_i\) to be negative.

3) Controlling Seasonal Effects

One variable to be controlled in this equation is the seasonal effect. As this study uses quarterly data, it is possible that the estimation does not accurately reflect the effects of relevant variables on leisure consumption. For example, it is expected that more leisure activities are common during a quarter with more holidays or better weather. In this case, the following quarter’s leisure consumption is generally expected to decrease, which may not properly explain changes in leisure consumption patterns. In order to deal with this problem, this study directly converts data into ‘quarter-over-quarter’ (q-o-q hereinafter) rather than
using a continuous time series. Therefore, equations (1) and (2) can be transformed by defining each variable as the difference between period \( t \) and \( t-4 \), rather than that between period \( t \) and \( t-1 \). In other words, \( Dq_t = \log q_t - \log q_{t-4} \).

While \( q-o-q \) data mitigates the problem of misinterpretation of trends, it is still important to properly deal with fluctuation of leisure consumption over quarters. This phenomenon can be captured in equation (3) by including seasonal dummies in equation (1), where \( q-o-q \) data are used. Equation (3) accommodates increases or decreases of leisure consumption with certain trends when the same quarter in the previous year was used for comparison instead of the previous quarter.

\[
Dq_t = \alpha_i + \eta_i \times DQ_i + \gamma_i \times Dp_i + \sum_{j=2}^{4} \beta_{ij} \times d_{ij} + \epsilon_i, \tag{3}
\]

where \( d_j \) is dummy for quarter \( j \) where \( j=2, 3, 4 \). As the first quarter is used as a benchmark, the coefficient \( \beta_{ij} \) indicates whether leisure consumption in certain quarter \( j \) is different from that of the first quarter.

Taking into account all of these variables, the most comprehensive estimation is carried out as equation (4).\(^5\)

\[
Dq_t = \alpha_i + \eta_i \times DQ_i + \gamma_i \times Dp_i + \sum_{j=2}^{4} \beta_{ij} \times d_{ij} + \tau_i \times d_{FW} + \theta_i \times d_{EC} + \epsilon_i \tag{4}
\]

4) Data

Urban Household Survey data used in this study contains a rather broad classification for leisure–related expenditure, such as “culture, entertainment and leisure-related expenditure.” In accordance with this data, we use this classification for leisure spending. The data period covers the first quarter of 1985 to the third quarter of 2007, with 91 observations. The prices of leisure goods relative to all other goods were calculated using the weighted average of all the consumer goods and services included as components of household spending, where the weight is given based on shares of overall spending.

The survey collected data from about 9,000 urban households with more than one household member.\(^6\) The households included in the analysis differ every year. However,

\(^5\) It is possible that the economic crisis affected leisure spending for a limited time. To take this into account, more estimations were performed using different dummy values; however, the results were similar to those reported in this study.
this change in sampling followed statistical rules and did not erode the representational validity of the study. The survey classified respondents into two categories: ‘employed’ and ‘non-employed.’ Employed households were defined as households whose breadwinners were ‘office workers’ or ‘production workers’; non-employed households were those headed by ‘self-employed’ or ‘unemployed’ individuals.

The descriptive characteristics of each group for the duration of the analysis are summarized in Table 1. On average, during this period, the expenditure of office workers’ households was the highest, which was very closely followed by those of the self-employed. While spending by production workers’ households was the second highest, the difference between this group and the unemployed household group was quite narrow. In terms of free time for leisure activities, the self-employed and unemployed households should have more flexibility, whereas office workers and production workers would not.

<<Table 1 here>>

III. Results and Policy Implications

1. Results

This study first analyzed the patterns of leisure consumption using equation (1), followed by the application of more sophisticated methods, including ‘environmental’ variables such as the economic crisis and the introduction of the five-day workweek, as well as seasonal dummy values.

For all analyses, ‘q-o-q’ data was used. While all the nominal noise factors were neutralized by using the Divisia moment methodology, and seasonal impacts on growth rates were controlled by using q-o-q data, preliminary regressions left open the possibility of serial correlations. Therefore, AR(1) was adopted for all regression analyses, and the reported coefficients for the autocorrelation confirmed that the serial correlation existed.

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6 Non-agriculture, non-fishery households in non-urban areas have been included in the survey since 2003, and the data for previous years are not available. Therefore, these households are excluded for consistency from the analysis.
Table 2 reports the results of the simplest regression. Real and q-o-q variables were used, where relative prices and income were adopted as independent variables. The model using the Divisia moment was structured so that the constant terms contained therein represent effects over time. Table 2 shows that the constants are significant and positive, indicating that leisure consumption trends move upward over time, *ceteris paribus.*

<<Table 2 here>>

All the coefficients have expected signs and statistical significance. The coefficients for relative prices (of leisure goods compared to all other goods) for all household sub-groups appeared significant and negative. In particular, the results explained that unemployed households reacted very sensitively to the increase in prices of leisure goods, by reducing their consumption by 2.01% when the prices increased by 1%. By comparison, the self-employed households decreased their consumption of leisure goods the least (1.23%) when the prices increased by 1%. Following the definition of ‘elasticity’, leisure consumption in all household groups was elastic to price changes, implying that expenditure on leisure in fact decreased as the price increased.

The coefficients for income for all groups were positive and significant, indicating that they increased (or decreased) their leisure consumption (and thus expenditure) as their incomes increased (or decreased). Office workers’ households had the highest coefficient; they increased leisure consumption by 1.46% as their income increased by 1%. Since, on average, their incomes increased by 10% each year, this suggests that leisure consumption went up approximately by about 15%. The coefficients for self-employed and unemployed workers’ households were very close to one, implying that they proportionally changed their consumption and spending on leisure as their income changed.

It should be noted that unemployed households have (relatively) low income elasticity and high price elasticity. Low income elasticity is easily explained by low income levels: when income is low, a larger portion of it might be used for purchasing ‘necessities’, thus keeping the income elasticity for luxurious goods low. A recent study by Gabaldon-Quinones, Manas-Alcon and Garrido-Yseret (2008) used Spanish regional data and also confirms the significant relationship between GDP per capita and leisure spending from simple regression.

Even controlling for income, the price elasticity of households of the unemployed is the largest, indicating that their limited income made them very sensitive to changes in real prices of leisure goods. In contrast, self-employed households had the lowest price elasticity.
This combined with high level of income may suggest that they should be more flexible in allocating their leisure time and thus be able to utilize various kinds of concessions for such activities.

Equation (2) introduced exogenous changes potentially affecting leisure consumption: the economic crisis that Korea experienced in 1997 and 1998, and the implementation of the five-day workweek. Table 3 summarizes the results. Most results are substantially similar to those from equation (1) as reported in Table 2. The importance of relative price and real income was reinforced, and the robustness of the results was confirmed. Nonetheless, the five-day workweek and the economic crisis did not seem to affect leisure consumption significantly. The coefficient for five-day workweek turns out to be negative and significant. However, the significance was at only a 10% level. Moreover, when each sub-group was analyzed, this significance disappeared. These results indicate that exogenous and environmental changes did not affect leisure consumption substantially.

<<Table 3 here>>

While seasonal variations were controlled by using q-o-q data, this does not pre-exclude the possibility of systematic changes in leisure consumption across quarters. The changes in leisure consumption over the quarters may be different for each household group, as they may have different flexibility and tastes in using their time. Tables 4 and 5 are the results of regressions when seasonal dummy values are introduced. Table 4 includes only price and income variables combined with seasonal dummy variables, while table 5 includes the five-day workweek and the economic crisis as well.

Table 4 shows that price and income variables are significant with expected signs. However, compared to table 1, the magnitudes were slightly changed as more variables (seasonal dummy values) are introduced in the model. For employed households, dummy variables for the second and third quarters appeared positive and significant, indicating that they consume leisure goods more in the second and third quarters than in the first. The second quarter goes from mid-Spring to early Summer (April to June) which is characterized by mild weather, suitable for outdoor activities. In addition, the nation has many public holidays and important events during this period, such as Buddha’s Birthday, Children’s Day, Teachers’ Day and Parents’ Day. The third quarter (July to September) includes the summer holidays. Sometimes Full Moon Day (August 15 by the lunar calendar) falls in this quarter, too.
Table 5 contains the results of estimation with all the potentially relevant variables. The table shows that, while the significance of price and income remained robust, that of seasonal dummy values dissipated when more variables were introduced. There were substantial increases in the fitness of models, indicating that Table 5 might be a better model to explain leisure consumption patterns.

### 2. Policy Implications

It is worthwhile to heed De Grazia (1962) and Kraus (1990), who warned that leisure inequality becomes deeply rooted in modern society as some groups of people cannot afford the utility from leisure activities. The affordability of leisure should be very closely related with income, price and time.

If government deems the right of people to leisure as important and agrees that recreation is crucial to keeping people healthy and sane, namely it treats leisure as a merit good, it may attempt to change people's incomes, prices of leisure goods or leisure time to increase leisure consumption. In our case, as households react to income and price changes in different ways based on their profiles, government policies must be formulated accordingly.

While the results changed slightly depending on the model used, in general, income elasticity was highest (and greater than one) for office workers' households, who had the highest average income. This confirms the traditional argument that leisure goods and services have the characteristics of luxury goods. The demand for leisure goods and services will increase faster than the increase of income of the population.

In contrast, income elasticity for households in the lower income groups – production workers and the unemployed – turns out to be close to one or significantly lower than one. In this instance, a policy to encourage leisurely pursuits by providing income subsidies may not properly achieve its goal because a larger portion of such subsidies would be spent on other types of goods and services. If the government aims to increase leisure consumption of these people, it may be more effective to use devices such as ‘leisure activity vouchers’ rather than direct cash-transfer. However, the advice from the traditional textbooks is still valid: Offering
the vouchers will distort consumption feasibility sets and activate the black market for the vouchers.

Relative prices are also substantially important in determining leisure consumption. Price elasticity, in particular, is largest for low income groups such as unemployed households. Direct subsidies to leisure activities so as to lower their prices, such as a leisure activity voucher system would effectively encourage leisure consumption by households with the highest price elasticity and whose breadwinner is unemployed.

For production workers in Korea, price elasticity is lower than one, indicating this sort of policy lowering the relative price would not increase leisure consumption effectively. One possible policy to encourage leisure consumption for this group is to institute flexible working and/or reduced working hours. The problem is that the coefficient for the introduction of five–day workweek did not appear significant. This needs more discussion.

One possible explanation is that, as relative prices and incomes are controlled in the model, the leisure industry has not developed sufficiently to absorb the increased demand from increased free time. For example, amusement facilities have failed to accommodate people with more free time in Korea. Alternatively, but more plausibly, it could be argued that the five-day workweek was not implemented for the whole nation since 2002, but was gradually implemented to a larger number of workplaces. Another possibility is that while the system was nominally implemented, it was not properly enforced, and most workers could not reduce their working hours substantially. Recent survey by the Korean government (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2006) reported that the average duration of leisure activity participation per week increased by only four minutes or less than 0.5%, from 2003 to 2006. A striking finding is that people became to have more leisure time during weekdays and Saturday, at the expense of significantly less leisure time during Sunday/public holiday.

This implies that the introduction of five-day workweek has not increased leisure time, but in fact reallocated leisure time from Sunday to weekdays and Saturday. In brief, a new system has not been effectively implemented. It is possible that the increase in leisure time reduces the income and adversely affects leisure consumption. However, in the case of Korea, this argument is not valid as, despite the introduction of five-day workweek, neither leisure time nor income level has substantially changed. In 2006 survey, still the largest

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7 For example, Table 4 shows that, for non-employed workers, the second quarter was significant while the third quarter was not. This might indicate that they were relatively more flexible in using their time, and did not have to go on vacation during the third quarter when the resorts are crowded and prices rise.
portion of people (44.1%) pointed out that “the lack of time” was the major constraint to leisure activity participation (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2006).

On the other hand, flextime is not commonly used in Korea. Most people start and finish work at about the same time. Allowing workers more flexibility in determining their working hours and times would encourage people to spend more time on leisure activities.

Dummy values introduced to account for seasonal change were significant in limited cases as in equation (3). While the second quarter was positive for all household groups, the third quarter was positive for only employed workers’ households. This result is strongly correlated with scheduled vacations for the employed. If it is better for the development of the leisure and tourism industries to stabilize demand throughout the year as opposed to concentrating on specific seasons, policy-makers may consider making holidays flexible and more widely spread out. A change in school holidays could also achieve this. If each school had some autonomy in setting their vacation time, students and their families would have more flexibility in their leisure and travel, which would increase the industry’s stability and eventually help it to grow.

IV. Summary

This paper explored the determinants of leisure consumption using Urban Household Survey in Korea from 1985 to 2007. The Divisia moment methodology was used to analyze the dynamic effects of relevant variables on spending. Regression analyses with various models show that the relative price of leisure goods and services significantly and negatively affected consumer behavior when it comes to leisure. Income also turns out to be a significant variable, where the highest income group’s elasticity is far higher than one. However, the introduction of the five-day workweek and the economic crisis were found to be insignificant. Depending on the estimation equation, seasonal dummy variables are positive for the second and third quarters for employed households, while only the second quarter was positive for non-employed households.

These findings imply that the increase in leisure consumption since the 1980s in Korea was mainly generated by the increase in income. While the coefficient for leisure good’s price turns out to be significant, the price variable has been consistently increasing, which indicates that the change in relative price only contributed to decreasing leisure consumption. In contrast, the general belief in Korea that a five-day workweek would
stimulate leisure consumption appears not to have a solid empirical foundation. The insignificance of economic crisis in explaining leisure consumption implies that the crisis did not directly affect leisure consumption, but could affect it through changing income or relative price.

The differences in income and price elasticities for different groups of people, and some seasonal effects of leisure consumption for specific groups, should be carefully considered when the government attempts to use certain measures to encourage leisure consumption. The effectiveness of policies to increase budget constraint, to lower down leisure price, to provide more leisure time or to increase flexibility of working time will depend on target consumers’ characteristics including income elasticity, price elasticity and the amount and flexibility of free time. These policy implications derived from the findings were discussed in detail in Chapter III.
References


The Statistical Office of Korea (various years). *Urban Households Survey*.


[Figure 1] Household Spending for Selected Items (Average, 1985~2007)


[Figure 2] Growth Rates of Household Spending for Selected Items (Average, 1986~2007)

### Table 1. Household Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: Sul (2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Households</strong></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expended in 1979</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Avg.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of Households</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Non-employed</th>
<th>Office Workers</th>
<th>Production Workers</th>
<th>Overall</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Office Workers</strong></td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production Workers</strong></td>
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<td>29.2%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
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<td>60.6%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Spending Growth Rate</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Office Workers</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production Workers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Non-employed</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Office Workers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Office Workers</strong></td>
<td>2.151,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Production Workers</strong></td>
<td>2.684,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-employed</strong></td>
<td>2.711,477</td>
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<thead>
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<td><strong>Office Workers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Production Workers</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Avg. Expenditure 2006</strong></th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Office Workers</strong></td>
<td>2.151,419</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Production Workers</strong></td>
<td>2.684,750</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-employed</strong></td>
<td>2.711,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Overall</td>
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<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Price</td>
<td>1.1436***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1773)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Income</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.1308)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0118)</td>
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<td>84</td>
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Notes: Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 3. Explaining Leisure Consumption by Household Characteristics with regard to 5-Day Work Week & Economic Crisis

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Variables</th>
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<th>Production Workers</th>
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<td>0.1016</td>
<td>0.0509</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real Income</td>
<td>1.0005</td>
<td>0.0702</td>
<td>0.0453</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-Days Work</td>
<td>-0.0073</td>
<td>-0.0045</td>
<td>-0.0016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0514</td>
<td>0.0454</td>
<td>0.0401</td>
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Notes: Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

MSE: 0.0034
R square: 0.8432
Obs: 80
Table 4. Explaining Leisure Consumption by Household Characteristics with Seasonal Dummies (real, q – q)

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Non-Workers</th>
<th>Office Workers</th>
<th>Production Workers</th>
<th>Self-Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Price</td>
<td>-1.0713*** (0.2088)</td>
<td>-0.9098*** (0.2266)</td>
<td>-1.1761** (0.4773)</td>
<td>-1.2803*** (0.3297)</td>
<td>-1.0612*** (0.3893)</td>
<td>-1.2803*** (0.3297)</td>
<td>-1.0713*** (0.2088)</td>
<td>-1.2803*** (0.3297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Income</td>
<td>0.9721*** (0.1446)</td>
<td>1.1101*** (0.1497)</td>
<td>1.5811*** (0.2171)</td>
<td>0.6836*** (0.1798)</td>
<td>0.9397*** (0.2329)</td>
<td>0.6819** (0.2959)</td>
<td>0.9721*** (0.1446)</td>
<td>0.6836*** (0.1798)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy (2nd Quarter)</td>
<td>0.1062*** (0.0255)</td>
<td>0.1103*** (0.0264)</td>
<td>0.1794*** (0.0436)</td>
<td>0.0753*** (0.0292)</td>
<td>0.1133*** (0.0381)</td>
<td>0.0921** (0.0413)</td>
<td>0.1062*** (0.0255)</td>
<td>0.0753*** (0.0292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy (3rd Quarter)</td>
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<td>0.0444*** (0.0160)</td>
<td>0.0438** (0.0219)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dummy (4th Quarter)</td>
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<td>-0.0185 (0.0345)</td>
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<td>0.0028 (0.0344)</td>
<td>0.0203 (0.0372)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-0.0168 (0.0136)</td>
<td>-0.0469** (0.0216)</td>
<td>-0.0044 (0.0160)</td>
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<td>-0.0177 (0.0221)</td>
<td>-0.0153 (0.0131)</td>
<td>-0.0044 (0.0160)</td>
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Notes: Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Non-Employed</th>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Production Workers</th>
<th>Office Workers</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP (q-o-q)</td>
<td>0.1096</td>
<td>0.1134</td>
<td>0.1435</td>
<td>0.1142</td>
<td>0.1094</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0318</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Crisis</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.0040 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.0318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Days Work</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>5.15</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>7.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.1965 ***</td>
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Table 5: Explaining Leisure Consumption by Household Characteristics with 5-Day Work Week, Economic Crisis, and Seasonal Dummies.
<table>
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<th>MSE</th>
<th>R^2</th>
</tr>
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<td>0.0035</td>
<td>0.8436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>0.8199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>0.7500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0067</td>
<td>0.5868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0101</td>
<td>0.7148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0108</td>
<td>0.6244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0419</td>
<td>0.4152</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
North Korea's representation of gender relations in the magazine 
*Women of Korea*

Amanda Anderson, 
University of Wollongong, Australia
North Korea's representation of gender relations in the magazine *Women of Korea*

Amanda Anderson
University of Wollongong, Australia

Abstract

In this paper I will critically analyse the text and images published in the English version of the magazine *Women of Korea*. This source reveals the construction of masculinity and femininity in North Korea by the government, and demonstrates that official claims of gender equality are undercut by the evidence of a gender-segregated workforce and clearly-differentiated roles of men and women in society and the home.

**Key words:** North Korea, propaganda, magazine, gender relations, gender equality laws, revolutionary women.
Introduction

In the past accessing reliable information from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) was difficult. However, since the mid-1990s several ways of obtaining sources from within North Korea has been made possible mostly because of the chronic food shortages and the unstable state economy. These events led to many social changes occurring within the DPRK society, as evidenced by the increased number of refugees, the emergence of the black market, the collapse of the public distribution system and the increase in incidences of social disorder (Suh 1998, 196). All events have resulted in the gradual opening up of the country to the outside world and therefore access to information easier to obtain. Sources that have become more readily available include: official statements provided by the government, the exchange of reports between the government and the Committee to Eliminate All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (2001-2005) and other United Nations (UN) bodies, information provided by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and the testimonies of North Korean refugees (For further reading refer to Haggard and Marcus Noland 2011; Smith 2004; Amnesty International December 2000). 1 These sources have allowed for further research into areas of the DPRK society that had previously been difficult to access. This increased accessibility to sources has led to the publication of several books recently on varies issues within North Korea (For further reading refer to Myers 2010; Demick 2010; Kang and Rigoulot 2005; Kim 2010; Portal 2005). These books have addressed issues such as the stability of the government and state economy, the food shortage, personal accounts of life within the country and state propaganda. In many of these texts the issue of gender relations in the DPRK is mentioned briefly and not exhaustively addressed. Therefore, it is important to critically examine the documents released by the government in regards to gender relations in order to form a better understanding of the current situation for North Korean women.

In this paper I analyse the text and images in publications released by the North Korean government specifically for an international audience. In particular, I examine gender relations as presented by the DPRK in English-language magazines on North Korean women. This magazine reveals the gendered assumptions of the North Korean government, a patriarchal view of social relations and a clearly gendered view of male and female roles in

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1 During the 1990s there was an increased number of North Koreans who escaped to China in search of food and money. Some returned with their new fortunes and others continued their journeys to a second country such as South Korea.
society and the home. In my doctoral research, I critically analyse documents and images presented by the UN, the CEDAW Committee and NGOs. These documents reveal their own set of assumptions about women's rights and status in the DPRK, which often reflects negatively on the North Korean government. All of these sources mentioned provide a different picture of gender relations and women's rights in North Korea and are equally valuable in providing evidence. While a full discussion of gender relations in the DPRK would involve the examination of all of these sources, in this paper I will conduct an analysis of the magazine *Women of Korea*. The articles and images published within the magazine *Women of Korea* reveal the construction of masculinity and femininity in North Korea, and demonstrate that official claims of gender equality are undercut by the evidence of a gender-segregated workforce and clearly-differentiated roles of men and women in society and the home. In this paper, I will consider how the North Korean government has constructed the roles of revolutionary women through an analysis of the representations of gender in the magazine. According to official government discourse, ordinary North Korean women are expected to emulate the image of revolutionary women in their daily lives. I will also examine how the government has presented gender equality laws in the *Women of Korea* magazine.

The Government's Control of Media and the United Nations

The North Korean government controls many aspects of society, including the use of media. As a result, the number of publishing houses in the DPRK are limited and all are state-owned and operated. Typically the publishing houses are based in Pyongyang. The government’s tight control over the media within the country ensures that only information deemed appropriate by the state is released to both the DPRK and the world audiences. Information which is deemed by the North Korean government to reflect negatively on the DPRK is not made public. For writers who are employed in North Korean publishing houses their work is subjected to a long and rigorous examination process before the actual publication in either magazine or book. Once their work is complete writers must first send their work to the head of their editorial section in their department. Once cleared their work is then sent to the editor of the magazine or book. After their work is deemed satisfactory by the editor it is stamped with the word “internal” by the Internal Investigation section of the department within the publishing house (Brossel 2004, 5). The writer’s work is then passed on to the National
Investigation section and after further scrutiny and once it passes all clearances it is stamped “national” (Brossel 2004, 5). These controls placed on North Korean writers ensure that all information reported is always in line with Kim Jong II's (1942–) position. The editors of all media outlets including magazines regularly receive correspondence from Kim Jong Il or other top-ranking officials setting out guidelines as determined by those in power (Brossel 2004, 5).

Although the DPRK became a member state of the UN on 17 September 1991 and has acceded to several human rights conventions this does not guarantee all measures are taken by the government to ensure its obligations to this humanitarian institution are fulfilled. Conventions that the North Korean government has acceded to include: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (Convention Against War Crimes), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Under several of these conventions there are provisions to protect the freedoms of people's expression in either speech or text. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) first outlined on 10 December 1948, that everyone has the right to “freedom of opinion and expression” (Article 19) (United Nations 2009). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) elaborated this commitment further in 1966, by stating that “this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of choice” (Article 19) (United Nations 1966). Although the DPRK has acceded to ICCPR this does not mean that the government allows publishing houses or writers the

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2 Kim Jong II is the current President of the DPRK.
3 The CPPCG was first adopted by the UN on the 9 January1948. The DPRK acceded to the CPPCG on the 31 January 1989.
4 The ICESR was first adopted by the UN on the 16 December 1966. The DPRK acceded to the convention on the 14 September 1981 and submitted its first report on the 18 December 1984.
5 The ICCPR was first adopted on the 16 December 1966.
6 The Convention Against War Crimes was adopted on the 26 November 1968. The DPRK acceded to the convention on the 8 November 1984.
7 The CEDAW was first adopted on the 18 December 1979. The DPRK acceded to the convention on the 27 February2001 and submitted its first report on the 11 September 2002. The DPRK was required to submit a second report in 2006 and has not done so to date.
8 The CRC was first adopted on the 20 November 1989. The DPRK signed the convention on the 23 August 1990 and submitted its first report on the 13 February 1996.
freedom to express their own opinions in written work. Instead the work of both publishing houses and writers are frequently scrutinised and under the tight control of the state. The control placed on both writers and editors by the North Korean government also extends to the magazine *Women of Korea*.

**Background of the magazine *Women of Korea***

There have been several versions of the magazine *Women of Korea* published in different languages. The Korean version of *Chosŏn yŏsŏng* (Women of Korea) was first published in 1946 and targeted primarily at women in the DPRK (Armstrong 2003, 97). The accessibility of this version of the magazine outside the country is limited. The English version of *Women of Korea* was published between the years 1966 and 1992 at the Working People’s Organisations Publishing House. It was published on a quarterly basis and typically in colour. There is also a French version of the magazine. The accessibility of this version of the magazine is also limited. It could be said that both the English and French versions of the *Women of Korea* magazine were ultimately published by the DPRK as tool to inform the international community about different issues primarily concerning women in both North Korean society and the home.

All versions of the *Women of Korea* magazine were published under the guidance of the Organ of the Central Committee of the Korean Democratic Women’s Union (Women's Union). This Union is also under the policy control and management of the North Korean government. The magazine was designed primarily by the Women's Union to circulate information acquired from the North Korean government. This information was then passed on to women within the country in Korean or to the international community in other languages. Articles and images in the English version of *Women of Korea* include topics concerning the daily life of North Korean women, North Korean culture and history, the economic achievements of the government, North Korean politics, natural scenery, the writings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and foreign relations, including historical incidents with the United States, Japan and South Korea.
Women's liberation from the home

During the formation of the DPRK in 1946 the North Korean government endeavoured to free all people from discrimination caused by economic inequality. This goal included women's liberation from patriarchy within the home and claims that gender equality could only be achieved once women were recognised as legitimate workers in the social labour force (Chun 2004, 225). However, it was difficult for women to be deemed free from stereotypical roles of housework, child care, home education or care of the elderly. Therefore, the North Korean government promulgated several gender equality laws and specifically aimed state propaganda between the years of 1946 to the early 1960s at liberating women from the home. At this time the North Korean government attempted to socialise housework and childrearing to ensure women's burdens within the home were lessened to some extent. The North Korean constitution of 1978 stated that special protection was awarded “to mothers and children through maternity leave, shortened working hours for mothers of large families, expanded maternity hospitals, nurseries and kindergartens and other measures” (Article 62) (Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1978, 19). Women were promised timesaving technologies, such as refrigerators and washing-machines and the number of kindergartens and schools were to increase (Kim Il Sung 1970, 451). However, these promises were never fully realised by a majority of North Korean women due to the economic instability of the country and the state’s classification system.

In the late 1960s, the North Korean government revised its policy direction towards women and once again emphasised the importance of their roles in the home as educators and primary carers of children. Typically the policies concerning women in the DPRK have been adjusted based on the needs of the government (Chun 2004, 226). In 1961, at the Fourth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea the government stated that women's roles were now to include the education of their children under Kim Il Sung's juche ideology (Park 1996, 96). Furthermore, at one of the first meetings of the Women's Union Kim Il Sung stated that

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9 This perspective on women's liberation is closely connected to the liberation theory of socialist classes.

10 The majority of North Korean women did not experience the benefits of the socialisation of housework or childrearing. Typically it was just women from the elite class who benefited and women in the lower classes experienced no assistance. During the Fifth Congress Meeting of the Korean Workers Party in 1970, the government reported that the population of North Korea would be divided under the three main classes the elite class, the wavering and the hostile class (International Federation for Human Rights November 2003: 5).

11 From the late 1950s, Kim Il Sung began constructing juche (‘self-reliance’) or Kimilsung Hyukmyeong Sasang (Kim Il Sung Revolutionary Thought). By establishing this uniquely Korean ideology Kim Il Sung promoted himself as a revolutionary thinker amongst other Communist leaders. By the 1970s, juche was
Korean women were to be “communist mothers and fine communist educators for the new generation” (Kim Il Sung 1961, 225). He also added that in order for Korean women to become communist mothers, they should participate in public life as it would help them to quickly acquire the ideology of the state (Kim Il Sung 1961, 225). This meant that not only were women to return to their homes to carry out their new roles as educators of their children but they were also required to continue their work in the social labour force. Women's burdens increased as the North Korean government placed yet another responsibility on their already heavy workload. Furthermore, the fact that the government promoted this stereotypical role of women as primary carers of children was in direct contradiction to the state’s initial plan of liberating women from the home. The government did not address these stereotypical roles of both women and men or the equal distribution of household responsibilities in any gender equality law.

The role of the Korean Democratic Women's Union

According to the magazine *Women of Korea*, the Korean Democratic Women's Union (Women's Union) was established on 18 November 1945 under the guidance of the interim North Korean government (1946-1950) and Kim Song Ae (1928–2001(?))12 (“Law on the Nursing and Upbringing of Children That Carries Warm Affection” 1984, 29). The establishment of this Union is said to have occurred just months after the liberation of the Korean peninsula from Japanese occupation (1910–1945). An article in the *Women of Korea* magazine quotes Kim Il Sung (1945) as stating that:

> From our experiences gained in women's activities during the anti-Japanese armed struggle, we know we must organise a women's union embracing the broad sections of working women in conformity with the specific conditions of our country and the demands of the new situation (“40th Birthday of KDWU” 1985, 29).

12 The year of Kim Song Ae's death is unknown. Kim Song Ae became vice-chairwoman of the Women's Union in the mid-1960s and chairwoman in the 1970s. She held the position until in 1998. Kim Song Ae is Kim Il Sung's second wife.
It is claimed, then, that from an early stage in North Korea's history the government attempted to ensure women were active participants in society. This goal was achieved through ideological classes conducted by the Women's Union which will be discussed further below.

Initially, between 1946 and the end of the Korean War (1950–1953) emphasis was placed on women's understanding of and participation in the country's development and reconstruction after the war. The role of the Women's Union during this time was to ensure women's political socialisation, which included women's political participation, the elimination of all the remaining remnants from the Japanese occupation, improving Korean culture, demanding national protection for women and abolishing feudal customs (Chun 2004, 226). During this time, it is stated in the magazine *Women of Korea* that “women activists and women fighters who had joined the anti-Japanese armed struggle, went among the broad sections of women and educated them actively” (“In the Sacred War for National Liberation” 1985, 5). These revolutionary women explained to ordinary Korean women Kim Il Sung's thoughts on the liberation of women from the home, as well as telling of their personal experiences as part of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. In the same article it claims that ordinary women were so inspired by the stories of revolutionary women that they began to leave their homes to build a new country under the leadership of Kim Il Sung (“In the Sacred War for National Liberation” 1985, 5).

To ensure the Women's Union was achieving its goal of increasing the number of women outside the house compulsory ideological classes were established for women. During these study sessions reading material was presented by the Union, such as the *Chosôn yôsông* magazine. These meetings were known as the *Mother Kang Ban Suk Study Groups* and were named after Kim Il Sung's mother, Kang Ban Suk (1892–1932). Other veterans of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army (1931–1934) such as Kim Jong Suk (1917–1949) were central figures in the Women's Union campaign to educate North Korean women in loyalty to both the government and their own families. In the study material the image of revolutionary women appears frequently (Armstrong 2003, 97). Images of revolutionary women also appear repeatedly in the English publication of *Women of Korea*.

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13 Kan Ban Suk was given the official title of *Mother of Korea* by the North Korean government.
14 Kim Jong Suk was Kim Il Sung's first wife.
From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the government emphasised the importance of revolutionary communist ideas. It was during this time that North Korean women became the target of the Women's Union and its ideological revolution, with the goal of transforming ordinary women into productive socialist workers (Chun 2004, 226). Women's participation in DPRK society intensified with the strengthening of women's political education and with the mobilisation of more women into the social labour force to increase productivity. From 1972, the Women's Union emphasised the importance of women's education as guided by the juche ideology. During this time the North Korean government's goal involved a revolution among women, classification of the labour classes and socialisation of the people (Chun 2004, 227). Women were asked to work as a collective group (rather than individuals) under the guidance of both Kim Il Sung's (1912-1994) regime (1948 -1994) and Kim Jong Il's regime (1994-).

**Revolutionary women and the magazine *Women of Korea***

In the magazine *Women of Korea* text and images represent North Korean women in two specific roles. According to Armstrong (2003, 97), the roles expected of women in North Korea from the 1950s were as militant nationalists, defenders of the ancestral land, and active participants in the official state economy. Secondly, women's role was thought to be as the primary homemaker, the educator of young children and the main instrument of social and cultural reproduction (Armstrong 2003, 97). These expectations placed on women by both the government and society are still reflected in the pages of *Women of Korea* magazine during the 1970s and 1980s. With images and stories written about Kang Ban Suk, Kim Jong Suk and others who fought against Japanese colonialism (1910–1945), ordinary women were expected to emulate these “model” citizens. In the magazines Kang Ban Suk and Kim Jong Suk are frequently represented as heroic women excelling in all forms of housework, such as childcare and the education of children, and armed with revolutionary ideas to help their husbands and parents-in-laws (Chun 2004, 226; Kang 2008, 63). These representations of women as supporters of their husbands and in-laws, as well as primary carers of children seem to contradict the government’s stated principle of liberating women from their household burdens. In fact, this idea of women as carers of their families was promoted and supported by the North Korean government as women once again returned to gender stereotypical roles within the home. The North Korean government has not addressed the
stereotyping of women to specific roles within the home, or the equal distribution of household work amongst men and women in any laws.

In the magazine *Women of Korea* the following two paintings accompany the article “Anti-Japanese Heroine” (1984b, 18, 19). The main figure in both paintings is Kim Jong Suk, who is represented as a militant nationalist and defender of the ancestral land. Similar representations of Kim Jong Suk can be found in other issues of *Women of Korea*. In the first painting (Figure 1) below, Kim Jong Suk stands in front of a young Kim Il Sung protecting him from enemy fire and apparently ready to give her own life for both him and the anti-Japanese cause. This story and others like it in the magazine are reported by the Women's Union to inspire ordinary women in loyalty to both North Korea and the Kim family. Kim Jong Suk’s attribute of loyalty is also reiterated in the article “Anti-Japanese Heroine” (1984a, 13,14).

Sometimes, shielding the great leader with her [Kim Jong Suk’s] own body, she shot down enemies one by one at a stroke at the critical moment for the great leader owing to the secretly approaching enemy soldiers and sometimes she saved the Headquarters of revolution and her unit from crisis by luring the enemies toward herself and annihilating them [sic].

Also, the depiction of Kim Jong Suk as protector almost seems as though she has taken on the maternal role of Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung stands to the far right of the picture and is depicted as a less important figure. His stance is less assertive and seems weaker than Kim Jong Suk. He is dressed in dark clothing and almost blends into the background while Kim Il Suk is dressed in a more vibrant and lighter green coloured uniform, which highlights her presence in the painting. Kim Jong Suk's uniform appears similar to Kim Il Sung's, as well as, the other men's, except she wears a near length skirt and the men trousers.

It is also important to note that Kim Jong Suk is the only female fighter represented in this painting. She stands equal amongst her three fellow fighters, who are all men. The landscape depicts the mountain region of northern Korea. This image promotes the thought that if a woman stands equal amongst men in the battlefield then she must be equal amongst men in all other areas of society. This thought is especially important as the Women's Union encouraged women to join the social labour force and participate in nation-building as actively as men. Furthermore, the image of a woman in the battlefield depicts qualities of
strength and courage. North Korean women were encouraged to emulate these characteristics in both their work in society as productive employees and within the home as mothers and educators. Also, in the right hand corner of the painting Kim Jong Suk's cheerful face appears.

(Figure 1: “Anti-Japanese Heroine” 1984b, 18, 19).

In the second painting (Figure 2) below, Kim Jong Suk is shown fighting alongside and leading other North Korean women into battle during the occupation of Korea. She stands amongst six female revolutionary fighters, holding a gun in each hand and waiting for the enemy to attack. Only two other women hold weapons. All seven women are dressed in a similar green uniform. Kim Jong Suk however, is depicted as the central figure within this painting. The colour of her clothing is lighter than the other figures, which highlights her figure amongst the other soldiers. Her stance is strong and straight while the other women are depicted as being less aggressive and almost hiding within the grass or behind rocks. The article “Anti-Japanese Heroine” states that historically in the battlefield Kim Jong Suk inspired women with her “wisdom and courage” (1984a, 13,14). These characteristics were qualities that ordinary North Korean women were encouraged to emulate by the Women's Union. Also, it is interesting to note that the style of clothing worn by the women in this painting is similar to what North Korean male revolutionary fighters also wore. Women however, are shown as wearing knee length skirts and socks to the hemline though, and men
long trousers. This image continues to promote the thought that even when men and women are shown engaging in similar activities, they are still clearly gendered. These gender differences are shown through the clothes that they wear and how their hair is styled.

(Figure 2: “Anti-Japanese Heroine” 1984b, 17).

These days ordinary North Korean women are still expected to follow in the footsteps and emulate the characteristics of these revolutionary heroines. Women are also encouraged by the government to educate their children about these stories of revolutionary women fighters (Kim Il Sung 1961, 225). In reality though, life for North Korean women has not been equal to men in all areas. Women have battled with their growing responsibilities in the home and society particularly since the food shortage and economic crisis of the 1990s. Since the 1990s North Korean women have had an even greater sense of responsibility placed on them by both the government and society as state factories and enterprises closed. It was also during this time that the role of North Korean men changed. Men were unable to continue their daily work in the official state economy with the closure of state-owned businesses. Therefore, they were unable to perform their stereotypical role as the primary financial supporters within the family unit (Park 2011, 165). This led to many women seeking food and money in non-
traditional places, such as markets. The image of revolutionary women promoted by the North Korean government now seems no longer relevant in the current environment in which ordinary women live and struggle to survive.

**Gender Equality Laws and North Korea**

Before the permanency of the separate states in 1948, the bulk of socialist reforms were established in the DPRK under the guidance of the Soviet Union. These campaigns were a part of the regime’s effort to unify the Korean peninsula under the political leadership of Kim Il Sung. These initiatives were directed primarily towards the traditionally underprivileged people of Korean society, in particular peasants, workers, women and youth. These groups were the main target as they were considered to be more manageable to mobilise in support of the governments’ economic and social campaign to unify Korea under a socialist system. From as early as 1946, the North Korean government instituted several laws to encourage women’s economic independence in society and liberation from the house. Some of these laws include: the *Law on the Agrarian Reform in North Korea* (5 March 1946), the *Labour Law for the Factory and Office Workers in North Korea* (24 June 1946), the *Law on the Equality of the Sexes* (30 July 1946), and the *Law on Rearing and Education of Children* (29 April 1976) (CEDAW 2005, 7). They were radical at the time and on paper gave North Korean women equal rights to men. They did not, however, directly address gender equality or the patriarchal system embedded in both society and families. Here I will refer to the *Law on the Equality of the Sexes* and the *Law on Rearing and Education of Children*, and how they are presented in the magazine, *Women of Korea*.

The *Law on the Equality of the Sexes* was promulgated on 30 July 1946 (CEDAW 2005, 11). The law consists of nine articles and was established to “transform the old feudal relations of the sexes” and to encourage women to “participate fully in cultural, social, political life” (Article 1) (Park 1996, 73, 74). The law emphasised equal rights in all spheres, the right to a free marriage (Article 4), divorce and child support claims (Article 5), equal rights to inherit property and to share property in the case of divorce (Article 8). The law outlawed polygamy, concubinage, licensed and unlicensed prostitution (Article 7), and nullified all previous Korean and Japanese laws regarding women (Article 9) (Armstrong 2003, 93). On paper, North Korean women were placed on equal footing with men. However, reception by society
was mixed. Some members of the Yan'an Guerrilla Group\textsuperscript{15} voiced their concern during the promulgation of the law that the gender equality laws were a too radical attack on the deep-seated patriarchy of Korean society (Armstrong 2003, 93). The promulgation of these laws though, was not enough to liberate women from the patriarchal system and stereotypical gender roles entrenched in North Korean society and the family. The North Korean government, has continued to claim, however, that women have achieved liberation since the groundwork for gender equality has been instituted (Kang 2002, 59).

The socialisation of childcare was especially important in the DPRK as the government stressed the importance of women to reproduce, particularly after the Korean War (1950-1953) (Ryang 2000, 332). Between 1956 and 1960, the number of nursery schools and kindergartens increased in North Korea thirty-one times, accommodating more than 700,000 children (Jung and Dalton 2006, 748). By 1960, 65 percent of children under the age of five were in childcare centres and by 1970 this number had increased 4.5 times (Jung and Dalton 2006, 748). The \textit{Law on Rearing and Education of Children} was promulgated on 29 April 1976 (Nahm 1993, 271). In the magazine \textit{Women of Korea} it states that the law promised that all children in the DPRK would be brought up in nurseries and kindergartens at governments expense (Article 2 Chapter 1), that the government and social cooperative organisations shall build modern nurseries and kindergartens in the most suitable places and furnish them with nursing and educational equipment (Article 13 Chapter 2), that the government would manufacture children's clothes, shoes and other goods to the best of its ability (Article 17 Chapter 2), and that in nurseries and kindergartens children would be adequately feed with various staple foods and snacks (Article 24 Chapter 3) (“State Benefits to Women and Children” 1986, 27). Though the number of nursery schools and kindergartens increased initially after the introduction of this law many of these educational institutions did not continue to function after the mid-1990s. It was at this time that the DPRK experienced a decline in its economy and severe food shortages, which ultimately worsened the situation for women as many promises made by the government were not fulfilled. As a result, many women became primarily responsible for finding food and money to support their families (Park 2011, 165). Below I will address how the \textit{Law on Equality of the Sexes} and the \textit{Law on Rearing and Education of Children} has been presented in the magazine \textit{Women in Korea}.

\textsuperscript{15} The Yan'an guerrilla group were ethnic Koreans, who had fled to China during the occupation of the Korean peninsula by Japan.
The Law on the Equality of the Sexes and the magazine Women of Korea

Throughout the Women of Korea magazine the idea is promoted that Kim Il Sung was personally responsible for the liberation of women from the home to North Korean society. For example, in the article “Impressions on Korean Women” (1985, 4) it states that during the drafting of the gender equality laws Kim Il Sung said “now that the centuries-old desire of workers and peasants were satisfied, women should be granted equal rights with men and the evil laws restricting their activities be abolished”. The intent of the government was for the restrictions placed previously on women to be removed so they were able to join in the social labour force. This goal by the government was ultimately achieved through both the promulgation of the gender equality laws and state propaganda disseminated through the Women's Union. The claim that since the promulgation of the Law on the Equality of the Sexes, women have been freed forever from all kinds of contempt, maltreatment and the shackles of feudalistic morality which had tortured them for thousands of years appears in most issues of the magazine (see, for example, “Democratic Revolution and Women Problem” 1985, 4, 5). This idea of women being freed to join the social labour force is supported by several images in the magazine as North Korean women frequently appear working in factories, schools and hospitals. However, in the article “Historic Days of Realizing Sex Equality” it states that “factory women (who) came to have equal rights with men in labour life ... were given special benefits from the state because of their natural feebleness and their motherly burden” (“Historic Days of Realizing Sex Equality” 1985, 5, 6). While stating that women were equal as productive workers, this was contradicted by the description of women’s ‘natural feebleness’.

The photograph (Figure 3) below accompanies the article “State Benefits to Women” in the magazine Women of Korea (1986, 11). In the article it states that under the Law on Equality of the Sexes “women have equal rights with men to work, to receive equal wages and social insurance and education” (Article 3) (“State Benefits to Women” 1986, 11). In this photograph the two women and the factory setting appear to be staged specially for the photographer and viewer. The women are neatly dressed in their white and blue uniforms and the food products are lined up in orderly rows. This image however, also reveals a recurring pattern in both the Women of Korea magazine and North Korean society. The image of women working in light industry and not in heavy industries can be seen frequently in the magazine. This possibly reflects actual patterns of employment, where women are mostly
employed in the light industry in the DPRK. This also reflects attitudes whereby such work is thought to be more manageable for women (Jung and Dalton 2006, 751). Wages in the light industry however, tend to be lower than in other places of employment in North Korea. Instead of promoting genuine equality in the social labour force the government continues to promote the idea that women join the workforce to ensure it is large enough to help build a stable socialist country under the control of the Kim family.

(Figure 3: “State Benefits to Women” 1986, 11).

The Law on Rearing and Education of Children and the magazine Women of Korea

The Law on Rearing and Education of Children is said to “[enable] women to take part in socialist construction without anxiety, freed from the burden of bringing up children” (“Law on the Nursing and Upbringing of Children That Carries Warm Affection” 1984, 4). The article “Law on the Nursing and Upbringing of Children That Carries Warm Affection” (1984, 4) also states that this “law is a legal guarantee” that women will be “freed from the burden of rearing their children, [to] lead a more independent and creative life to the full as masters of the revolution”. The statement that women will be freed from the burden of
rearing their children promotes the thought that it is women who are the primary carers of children and rests firmly on the paradigm that it is women who are responsible for both the home and family.

The photograph (Figure 4) below accompanies the article the “Tenth Anniversary of Promulgation of Law on Nursing and Upbringing of Children” as published in the magazine *Women of Korea* (1986, 25). Similar images appear in other issues of the magazine. In this image women seem to be working hard weighing and packaging biscuits in a factory setting. The caption accompanying this picture is “Nutritious foodstuffs are produced a great deal for children [sic]” (“Tenth Anniversary of Promulgation of Law on Nursing and Upbringing of Children” 1986, 25). As stated previously the government promised under The *Law on Rearing and Education of Children* that children would be fed various staple foods and snacks in kindergartens and nurseries. The government claimed that this would ensure that the burdens that women carry caring, educating and feeding their children would be lessened. Again, this idea constructed and promoted by the government rests firmly on the belief that the raising of children is women's responsibility and not shared with men. The law did not address the role and responsibilities of men in the house or towards their children. In fact, no policy or law in the DPRK has explicitly addressed the gender roles of men in either the home or society. Until the North Korean government takes the step to address the equal distribution of work between both genders in the home, women will not achieve liberation from the home as promised by the state.

(Figure 4: “Tenth Anniversary of Promulgation of Law on Nursing and Upbringing of Children” 1986, 25).
Conclusion

To conclude, the text and images published in the English version of the magazine *Women of Korea* represent the government’s constructed view of masculinity and femininity in DPRK society. The images of revolutionary women fighters during the occupation of Korea is depicted frequently in the magazine. Stories of these women's lives are presented not only to women within the DPRK but to the international reader of the magazine between the years 1966 and 1992. These revolutionary women depict qualities of strength and loyalty to both the North Korean government, as well as, their own families. Ordinary North Korean women were encouraged to emulate these characteristics by both the government and the Women's Union. Furthermore, the DPRK’s gender equality laws that the interim government promulgated over sixty-years ago are almost overvalued in the publication of the magazine *Women of Korea*. The government suggests that since these laws were established women in the DPRK have been liberated from their homes and therefore achieved gender equality (CEDAW 2005, 4). Women are now able to participate in society and the social labour force equal to that of men because of these laws. However, it is suggested in the magazine *Women of Korea* that these gender equality laws are undermined by the segregation of women to gender-specific roles in both the workforce and the home, supported by the governments constructed idea of masculinity and femininity. If women's roles in the DPRK are to improve however, the North Korean government needs to address the current environment in which women live, as the image of revolutionary women and the gender equality laws promulgated so long ago now seem not as relevant today.

Reference


Paper No. P016

Chan/Seon and a Goryeo ‘Continued Tripitaka’

John Jorgensen
Introduction: Chan and the Tripitaka

Chan/Seon texts were generally not included in the Tripitaka before the Yuan and Ming dynasties because Chan texts were composed in East Asia and not India, and because they were, with few exceptions, not commentaries on sutras. The Tripitaka or Buddhist canon was compiled in China by monks who were members of the Vinaya or Discipline School. These monks were most concerned to maintain orthodoxy and so had criteria for defining what could be incorporated into the catalogues of the Tripitaka on which the compilations of the canon were based. These criteria included that the texts had to be either sutras preached by a Buddha or commentaries on those sutras or their themes. They also included the vinayas or regulations of the Buddhist Order, which also supposedly had their origins in the words of the Buddha and the subsequent decisions made by Buddhist councils. The only other concessions were for ‘factual’ accounts such as the travel records of Xuanzang and others, the hagiographies of eminent monks, catalogues and historical matters that were not essentially doctrinal.

State support for the printing of the Tripitaka had a number of motives including use as a means of obtaining support from Buddhists and to demonstrate the regime’s commitment to culture over military power. The early Song dynasty therefore sponsored huge literary compilations of Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist texts, including the writing of Buddhist texts and later Chan literature (Welter 2008, 70-71). One of these projects was the Kaibao (era) or Shu edition of the Tripitaka, which was engraved between 971 and 983 in Szechwan. A copy was requested by the king of Goryeo in 989 and a copy arrived at the Goryeo court in 991 (Lancaster 1979, x). Thus copies of the Tripitaka were used in diplomacy and as trade items and were used as such by the Joseon court (Lancaster 1998, 321-322; Kang 1998, 267-268, 274). Requests came to Joseon from Japan and the Ryukyu kingdom, partly to meet the demands of the Gozan Zen monasteries (Kai 2006, 443ff.).
Furthermore, the possession of a Tripitaka was thought to bring merit to the owners and the spiritual protection via Buddhism. The two Goryeo state-sponsored compilations and printings of the Tripitaka were used to gain spiritual power to have the Khitan invaders withdraw in 1010 and the Mongol invaders retreat in 1232 (Lancaster 1979, xi-xiv). In Japan also, at least during the Ashikaga period, the shoguns and other military leaders often ‘read’ (turning pages over and chanting first line only) sutras in prayers for victories and to send merit to those defeated and killed. Some of these ceremonies ‘read’ the entire Tripitaka (issaikyō-kai 一切経会) and so there was a demand for copies of the Goryeo Tripitaka (Kai 2006, 458).

One reason Chan literature was not included in Tripitakas, at least until later in the Yuan and Ming dynasties, was because when the most important catalogue of the Tripitaka was being prepared during the mid-Tang dynasty, Chan was not very influential. State-sponsorship of Chan texts only began later in the Song dynasty (Welter 2006).

Uicheon and the Continuation of the Goryeo Tripitaka

There were probably moves from 998 to have some Chan texts printed as a supplement to the Shu Tripitaka. Evidence of earlier attempts to have the Guanxin lun 觀心論, a Chan text by Shenxiu (d. 706), included in a supplement to the Tripitaka comes from a collection of glosses on pronunciation and meanings of characters in the canon, the Yiqiejing yinyi 一切経音義 prepared by Huilin. The Chan texts that may have been prepared for incorporation into the so-called Continued Shu Tripitaka were the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch 六祖壇經 and the Baolinzhuang 寶林傳. Yet in 983, the Khitan Liao emperor, Shengzong, rejecting the Song dynasty’s Tripitaka, had his own carved (Lancaster 1998, 329) and he explicitly had the Platform Sutra and Baolinzhuang excluded and burned as apocrypha (Oya 1937, 50; Yanagida 1976, 725-726). We know this from the testimony of Uicheon 義天(1055-1101) writing in 1090. Uicheon may have desired to exclude works from the Tripitaka or its supplements. He certainly limited his catalogue of works that had been produced after the time of the definitive catalogue by Zhisheng, the Kaiyuan shijiaolu 開元廿教錄, to works of Doctrine as distinct from Chan (see preface from his Sinpyeon jejong gyojang chongnok 新編諸宗敎藏叢錄 in Jeong 1990, 224). Uicheon compiled his catalogue as a basis for a
continuation of the Buin-sa or first Goryeo Tripitaka (Jeong 1990, 158), and I suspect he needed to strengthen the case for the exclusion of the Platform Sutra and Baolinzhuang from this proposed Continued Tripitaka because the Baolinzhuang had already been included in the Jurchen Jin Tripitaka (Yanagida 1976, 725-726). He needed leverage against the domestic Seon followers in his attempts to remove their influence and it appears he succeeded.

The Ganghwa Tripitaka

Later, the main participants in the compilation of the Ganghwa 江華 or second Goryeo Tripitaka were members of the doctrinal schools, although there were also Seon monks involved in this project which lasted from 1236 to 1251. The Tripitaka Directorate (bunsa daejang dogam 分司大藏都監) was established by the military dictator Choe I (崔怡) (d. 1249), as was mentioned by King Gojong in Goryeosa 129.49b-50a (Jorgensen 2009, 103). This project excluded Seon texts. Yet it was sponsored and supported by the Choe military dictators who had strongly patronised Seon and who had suffered violent opposition from monks of the doctrinal schools and their aristocrat patrons (Jorgensen 2009, 103; Nakajima 2000, 542-544, 547). Therefore, although far from the majority of monastic participants, Seon monks did participate in the Ganghwa Tripitaka project, two Seon lineages in particular. These were from the Sagulsan 長崛山 lineage, to which Bojo Jinul’s group belonged, and several from the Gajisan 迹智山 lineage (Choe 2008, 136, 232-244). The main monastic groups involved were from the scholastic schools, the Hwaeom-jong 華嚴宗, then Yuga-jong 瑜伽宗 and Cheontae-jong 天台宗 (Choe 2008, 182-232).

Supplement to the Goryeo Tripitaka

Consequently, it is likely, given the sponsorship of the powerful Choe military dictators for the project, that concessions had to be made to those groups, especially Seon, whose works had been excluded from the Tripitaka, by creating a supplement to the Goryeo Tripitaka that was not dictated by Uicheon’s catalogue. These groups included Jinul’s Suseonsa line, and Hwaeom followers of Gyunyeo 均如 (923-973), whose works had been jealously ignored by Uicheon when compiling his catalogue (Oya 1937, 420). Of course, no Chan works were in that catalogue either (Oya 1937, 53).
The extant works of this supplement are listed in an 1865 catalogue from Haein-sa, the *Goryeo daejanggyeong boyu mongnok* 高麗大藏經補遺目錄 (K1514 in Lancaster and Pae 1979, 481). It lists fifteen texts (K1499-K1513). Of these, four are Chan or Seon texts, four are by Gyunyeo, one is a commentary by Wonhyeo to an apocryphal sutra favoured by Chan, three are Huayan or Hwaeom works, one is a survey of the Buddhist Canon, and two are confessional ritual texts. All but one of these was printed between 1245 and 1251; one of the confessional texts was printed in 1503 and so is excluded, leaving only fourteen works for consideration (Gim 2002, 88).

Questions have been raised about this supplementary catalogue as it was written in 1865 when a printing of the Ganghwa Goryeo Tripitaka was being made from the woodblocks stored at Haein-sa 海印寺. It was found that these fifteen texts were not listed in the catalogue of the Goryeo Tripitaka, but it was known these woodblocks had been kept in Haein-sa for a very long time. They were compared with the Tripitaka blocks proper to try and determine what they were (Gim 2002, 84-85). Some suggested that they included private or monastery woodblocks, but comparisons showed all fourteen texts are in the same calligraphic style, or share printers and carvers with the Goryeo Tripitaka woodblocks and that four have Tripitaka Directorate engraved on them, and they all belong to the same time period. Therefore it is likely they were all printed by the Tripitaka Directorate as supplements to the Tripitaka.

Moreover, as the Tripitaka Directorate did not carve all its blocks in the same place, but in a number of large monasteries throughout the country, not all of the blocks were to be found at Haein-sa. Five other texts published by the Directorate have been discovered; three Chan or Seon texts with print dates of 1254, one Chinese Tiantai text of 1245, and a text by Gyunyeo dated 1287 (Gim 2002, 86-98; Choe 2008, 56-70).

Therefore, it is possible that even after the fall of the Choe dictators in 1258, the Directorate may have survived, even though the only evidence for this is the imprint of Gyunyeo’s *Ilseung beopgyedo wontonggi* 一乘法界圓通記 in 1287. Of the extant nineteen texts then, seven are definitely Chan or Seon works. Two were by Goryeo Seon monks, two were by Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 (904-975) who was popular because he had numerous Goryeo pupils, one was first written in 952 in China but extended and edited in Goryeo by 1245, and two are Song dynasty works. However, they do not include essential
Chan works such as the *Platform Sutra, Linji lu, Dahui shu* or Tang dynasty works and those attributed to the Chan founder, Bodhidharma.

**Joseon Sutra Printing Office**

It is my contention that a number of Chan or Seon texts other than those extant had been published by the Goryeo Tripitaka Directorate and were then reprinted by the Joseon Sutra Printing Office (*gangyeong dogam* 削絁都監), which was established in 1461 under the reign of King Sejo and was abolished in 1471 under King Seongjong, largely against his will (Eda 1977, 293-319). This office was probably instituted in imitation of the Goryeo Tripitaka Directorate (Eda 1977, 294). It aimed to disseminate new texts in Chinese plus reproductions of Goryeo prints, many of the latter from Uicheon’s catalogue. Its other task was to print the *eonhae* translations or glosses of Buddhist texts (Eda 1977, 299). According to Eda Toshio, at least eight texts were printed for the first time from new blocks and ten were reprints of Goryeo imprints. In addition, seven *eonhae* translations or glosses were published (Eda 1977, 306-319). More recently, another list gives twenty-five texts in Chinese and nine *eonhae* translations, and excludes three texts in Chinese listed by Eda, probably because there was not enough evidence to substantiate the claim (Gim 1980, 162-163; the three excluded texts were the Jinguangming jing wenjushu by Zhiyi, the Shoulengyan jing yishu zhujing, and the Fayuan zhulin by Daoshi). The Korean monk Gwiam’s *Seonmun Seoldu Cheondong Won-o samga yeomsongjip* 禪門雪竜天童圓悟三家拈頌集 of 1464 can be added to the list (Dongguk Daehakkyo 1992, 11; 368c).

In the list of Chan or Seon works printed by the Joseon Sutra Printing Office all four are reprints 重修, usually meaning printed with some repairs to the original blocks. All four were printed between 1464 and 1468. They are, in chronological order: *Putidamo sijinglun* 菩提達磨四行論 (1464), *Seonmun Seoldu Cheon-dong Won-o samga yeomsongjip* (1464), *Cishou Heshang guanlu* 慈受和尚箋録 (1466), and *Linjian lu* 林間録 (1468). These texts or their blocks are all extant, but there is additional evidence that other Seon texts were printed by the Sutra Printing Office.

For example, Mujaku Dōchū 無著道忠 (1653-1744), a Zen scholar and bibliophile of Kyoto, had in his library a version of the *Platform Sutra* that had been reprinted by the Joseon Sutra Printing Office in 1462. He said it had been reprinted from a 1214 print that had been
made on behalf of the first of the Choe clan dictators, Choe Jungho (崔忠獻, 1149-1219).
Mujaku’s evidence suggests that this text had been sent to Korea from China in 826 and was
not subdivided as the later versions were (Bak 1989, 172). This was probably the version
Dammuk 湛黙, a pupil of 普照知訥 Bojo Jinul (d. 1210), obtained in 1207 and had Jinul
write a post-face for. Dammuk intended to publish this text, but this version was superseded
by Mengshan Deyi’s 1290 version of the Platform Sutra (Jorgensen 2005, 598ff., 638).

Interestingly, in 1256, a certain Angi 安其 wrote a post-face for the Platform Sutra,
and this was probably to the version that Dammuk had published earlier. Angi used the same
distinctive title, Fabaoji tanjing in one fascicle 法寶記壇經一卷, as used in the 1214 print
and the title for which Jinul wrote his post-face in 1207 (Bak 1989, 174). Angi in fact
referred to Jinul’s use of the text to cure his own blindness and that of others, which is why
he thought it had circulated in Goryeo (Angi, in 1883 Haein-sa imprint, Yanagida 1976a,
161a, block 87b8ff.). Given the date, 1256, this text may have been printed by the Goryeo
Tripitaka Directorate and then reprinted by the Joseon Sutra Printing Office in 1462. However,
as Angi did state that the monk Yongsuk had obtained a properly ordered or
classified text and gathered funds for its publication (道人永淑得科正本摭錄錄梓, Yanagida 1976a,
161b, block 88a5), it is more likely that this was a private publication that
was reprinted by the Sutra Printing Office. Further, the term 科正 suggests this was an
edited text with internal divisions. I suggest this was the version of Qisong 契嵩 (1056),
who wrote of correcting 正 earlier versions (Shiina 1989, 143, quoting Taisho 52.703c on
148-149). Perhaps it had subdivisions 科 like other versions that had various divisions 門.

Other evidence of a supplement to the Tripitaka

The above is the limit to our current knowledge derived from extant publications and records
of such printings. However, it is likely more texts will be discovered and other indirect
evidence may permit the inclusion of other texts that had been printed in a supplementary
Tripitaka. These clues include publications from a few monasteries that may have originally
participated in the Joseon Sutra Printing Office project or which may have kept these
woodblocks or from the association of certain texts with those known to have been published
by the Office.
The first are the clues provided by the *Seonmun chwaryo* 禪門摘要, which was published in 1907 at Beomeo-sa 梵魚寺 near Busan as a textbook for monks (reproduced in Yanagida 1974, 1-122). While all of it is a reprint of material from the *Beophae bobeol* 法海寶筏 compiled by the layman Yu Un 劉雲 and printed at Gamno-am 甘露庵 on Mt. Samgak in 1893 (Yanagida 1974a, no. 32, 451-452; now kept in Seoul National University Library, Gim 1980, 407), the *Seonmun chwaryo* contains valuable material for the study of Korean Seon. It contains late Goryeo Seon texts, plus a number by Bojo Jinul and Seosan Hyujeong 西山休靜 (1520-1604), as well as a number of Chan works popular in Korea. Most importantly, it contains a series of works of early Chan, including a number attributed, several incorrectly, to Bodhidharma.

One text that reflects Bodhidharma’s teachings and those of his followers is the *Sixinglun*. The *Seonmun chwaryo* reproduces the first half of the *Putidamo sixinglun* as printed by the Joseon Sutra Printing Office in 1464, although with a few lacunae and errors (Shiina 1996, 189). The compiler of the *Seonmun chwaryo* deliberately limited his selection to the part of the work thought to have been by Bodhidharma, and so only reproduced the first half of the 1464 text and did not reproduce the sayings of Bodhidharma’s pupils, the second part. This was possibly because the editor of the 1464 text divided the text into the “correct teaching” 正說 and “circulation” 流通 parts, with the correct teaching that of Bodhidharma and the circulation part that of the pupils (Shiina 1996, 190).

The divisions into parts and sections 門 in the 1464 text were likely made by an editor, perhaps for the Tripitaka Directorate edition, for there is a note near the end that states, “In fact, from the first title heading to the end of the fascicle, there should be no divisions into preface, correct (teaching) and circulation” (Shiina 1996, 190, 214). These headings are absent in all the manuscripts of this text found at Dunhuang and are thought at places to be inappropriate and a Korean product (Yanagida 1969, 15). The headings are in the style of sutra commentaries and the divisions like those introduced by Chinese into sutra translations. They may have imitated those used in Song dynasty versions of the *Platform Sutra*, such as in the Huixin 惠昕 version (967) which had sixteen divisions 門 in it according to the *Qunzhai dushu zhi* 羣齋讀書志 of 1151 (Shii na 1989, 139).

Given the avoidance of the character Geon 建 that formed the name of the Goryeo founder, Wang Geon 王建, the *Putidamo sixinglun* was definitely published in the Goryeo
period. As the text had poems by Longmen Qingyuan 龍門清遠 (posthumous title Chan Master Foyan 佛眼禪師, 1067-1120) appended, and textually these poems are closest to those found in the Jiatai pudenglu 嘉泰普燈録 (1204) and the Zimen jingxun 約門警訓 of 1267 (Shiina 1996, 192-194), the Putidamo sininglun had to have been published in this form after 1204. As the Jiatai pudenglu was not printed in Korea, while the Zimen jingxun was published in Korea, at least in the early Joseon period (Gim 1980, 259, 264, 268, dated 1532, 1537 et cetera), I suspect that the Putidamo sininglun was published after 1267.

The Seonmun chwaryo is in two fascicles. Fascicle one is made up of texts written by Chinese; fascicle two of texts written by Koreans. The order in each fascicle is supposedly chronological, with the two texts preceding the Sijinglun attributed to Bodhidharma. The fourth text, the Zuishangshenglun 最上乘論 is correctly attributed to the fifth patriarch, Hongren 弘忍 (601-674). As the Sijinglun was reproduced from the Joseon Sutra Printing Office, and ultimately from a Goryeo print, I suspect that the other texts attributed to Bodhidharma, the Xuemolun 血脈論 and Guanxinlun 觀心論, plus the Zuishangshenglun had a similar provenance.

The first clue comes from Mujaku’s Shōrin sanron narabini Shihin kōshū 少林三論 並四品校勘 of 1735, which compared various editions of the Shaolin sanlun. The Shaolin sanlun was part of the Shaoshi liumen 少室六門, which were texts related to Bodhidharma that were grouped together in the Song dynasty. It had been brought to Japan in the late Kamakura period and the Shaolin sanlun texts were grouped and published in Japan in 1387. It was made up of the Xuemolun, Guanxinlun and Wuxinglun 悟性論 (Yanagida 1974a, no. 13, 447). The Wuxinglun is not in the Seonmun chwaryo. Mujaku wrote that in 1734 he obtained a Joseon print that included the Guanxinlun, Xuemolun and Zuishangshenglun from Nanyō’in (mss. reproduced in Yanagida 1974a, 211). Mujaku had almost certainly seen and copied the 1570 print made at Ansim-sa 安心寺 that contained the Guanxinlun, Xuemolun and Zuishangshenglun (see Gim 1980, 251). Ansim-sa was in Gwangju and in 1570 it also reprinted the Dafangguang Yuanjue xiuduoluo liaoyijing 大方廣覺修多羅了義經, a commentary on the Yuanjuejing by the Chan Master Zongmi 宗密 (780-841) that had been printed by the Joseon Sutra Printing Office in 1464 (Gim 1980, 167, 244). In 1575 it also republished the eonhae translation of a commentary on the Jin’gangjing 金剛經 (Diamond Sutra) attributed to the sixth patriarch of Chan, Huineng, which had also been published by
the Sutra Printing Office in 1464 (Gim 1980, 169, 252; Eda 1977, 318). As the last was a reproduction, it is clear that Ansim-sa had access to woodblocks that originated with the Joseon Sutra Printing Office. Again, Ansim-sa published the Deyi 德異 version of the Platform Sutra in 1574. Comparing the prints published by Bak Sangguk, it appears that the 1574 print was a reproduction of a 1496 print from Okcheon-sa 玉泉寺 in Gyeongsang-do, but with some differences in the post-faces (Bak 1989, plates 5 and 7 on 181, 187, and comments 164-165).

Another monastery that may have inherited such woodblocks from the Sutra Printing Office was Byeog-un-sa 碧雲庵 in Gyeongsang-do. It published the Zaishangshenglun, Huangbo’s Chuanxin fayao 傳心法要 and Jinul’s Susimgyeol 修心誥 in 1483 (Gim 1980, 258). All three of these texts appear in the Seonmun chwaryo. The Chuanxin fayao was part of the Sijia yulu 四家語錄 collection, which had a preface by Yang Jie 杨傑 dated 1085 that said the text was edited by Huanglong Huinan 黃龍慧南 (1002-1069) (Yanagida 1974a, no. 14, 47; Welter 2008, 69). This collection was meant to emphasise that Linji Yixuan 臨濟義玄 belonged to the lineage from Mazu Daoyi 馬祖道一 (Welter 2008, 118-119). It came to be known as the Mazu sijia yulu, probably to distinguish it from other collections of sayings that appeared from the 1140s (Welter 2008, 119). Interestingly, Seosan Hyujeong (1520-1604) made an abstract from the Sijia yulu, which he titled Kangseo Majo saganok cho 江西馬祖四家錄抄 (i.e., Abstract of Jiangxi Mazu sijia lu) that reflects the title first attested in the Suichutang shumu 遂初堂書目, a catalogue by You Yanzhi 尤延之 (1125-1194) (Yanagida 1974a, no. 14, 447; for Hyujeong’s abstract, Dongguk Daehakkyo vol. 11 1992, 388-397). The Kangseo Majo saganok was published at Hwagap-sa 花峴寺 in Jeollado, but it is undated (Gim 1980, 419). Is it possible this text had been printed earlier by the Tripitaka Directorate or Joseon Sutra Printing Office?

There seems to have been some continuity in the printing of certain types of text, probably because places like Ansim-sa continued to store woodblocks and had the block-printing technology. For example, Namwon 南原 in Jeollado was one such region. Namwon had printed non-Buddhist texts in 1059 (Gim 1980, 96). Much later the eonhae translation of the Chanzong Yongjiaji 禪宗永嘉集 was published at Namwon in 1464 (Eda 1977, 318; Gim 1980, 168), as was the Putidamo sixinglun (Gim 1980, 167; Shiina 1996, 214).
Trends in the Chan/Seon Texts Published with State Support

Until more texts have been discovered and the history of some of these monasteries and their printing activities are understood, we will not clearly know the connections between state-supported Buddhist printing projects and what the the posited supplementary or continued Tripitaka contained. However, looking at the Chan or Seon texts that were printed by the Tripitaka Directorate and the Joseon Sutra Printing Office (and their successor monasteries), several trends are discernible. The first are the very early Chan texts and those that combined Chan and doctrine. The second are those connected with the Suseonsa lineage from Jinul and those that had the support of the Choe military dictators.

The first category includes the Putidamo sixinglun, possibly the Xuemolun and Guanxinlun, all attributed to Bodhidharma; and possibly the Zuishangshenglun attributed to Hongren, the fifth patriarch, and the Platform Sutra attributed to Huineng, the sixth patriarch. Then there is the Yongiaji attributed to Xuanjue 玄覺 (665-713), allegedly a pupil of Huineng. This is in an eonhae translation. The text is more Tiantai in content than Chan. Also, there is an eonhae translation of a commentary attributed to Huineng to the Jin’gangjing. From the early Song, there is the massive Zongjinguo 宗鏡錄 of 961 and the Zhuxinfu 註心賦 (Choe 2008, 67), both by Yongming Yanshou, who wrote to provide doctrinal justification for Chan practice. Yanshou was a member of the Fayan lineage. There is also the Linjianlu of 1107 by Juefan Huihong 覺範慧洪 (1071-1128) of the Huanglong branch of the Linji lineage. He was famed for his wenzi Chan 文字禪 or “literary Chan.” Again, the Cishou Heshang guanglu, which are the collected works of Cishou Huaishen 慈受懷深 (d. 1131) of the Yunmen lineage, has a more literary content, being made up of sermons and poetry. Finally, we can add the Zutangji 祖堂集, which was originally compiled by members of the Xuefeng lineage in Quanzhou in 952, but which had been expanded later in the Song and then Korean content added before it was printed in Goryeo in 1245. It shows influence of the Wei-yang 洵仰 lineage, possibly from Goryeo (Jorgensen 2005). Similar trends can be seen in the Zongmen zhijingji by Weijian 惟簡, printed in 1254. Finally, there were the additions to Zongze’s work on monastic regulations, the Chanyuan qinggui, which were compiled between 1098 and 1100. These additions were called Chongtian zuben Chanyuan qinggui 重添足本禪苑清規 and were published by the Tripitaka Directorate in 1254 (Choe 2008, 67-68).
The second category, the works associated with the Choe dictators, were primarily related to the new *kanhua Chan* 看話禪 that had been introduced by Jinul and promoted by his pupil Jin-gak Hyesim. In 1243 the Tripitaka Directorate produced Hyesim’s *Seonmun yeomsongjip* and the Joseon Sutra Printing Office published the *Seonmun Seoldu Cheondong Won-o yeomsongjip* in 1464. This last was compiled by Gwiam 龜庵 by abstracting and evaluating the cases of Xuedu Chongxian, Tiandong Zhengjue and Yuanwu Keqin from Hyesim’s *Seonmun yeomsongjip*. Gwiam then requested Choe I to print it (Dongguk Daehakkyo vol. 11 1992, 368c). The post-face to this by Cheonyeong 天英 (1215-1286) is dated 1246, the same year Choe I died. Cheonyeong was also a fifth-generation member of the Suseonsa lineage from Jinul and was abbot of Choe I’s old temple, the Seonwon-sa 禪源寺 in 1250 (Choe 2008, 232, 234). This suggests this text may have originally been printed by the Tripitaka Directorate. Another text, the *Namnyeong Cheon Hwasang song Jeungdoga sasil* 南明和尚頌證道歌事實, was a commentary on the *Zhengdaoge*. This commentary had been requested by Cheon Gwangjae 全光宰 (d.u.), a military official associated with Choe I. It was printed in 1248, soon after Choe I had personally had the base text, the *Namning Quan Heshang Zhengdaoge* reprinted in 1239 with movable metal type (Jorgensen 2009, 87, 104; Gim 1980, 86-87, 122). The Joseon Sutra Publishing Office also published *eonhac* translations of Jinul’s *Susimgyeol* and Mengshan Deyi’s *Mengshan Fayu*. This last is a collection mostly of the words of Mengshan Deyi 蒙山德異(1231-1298?) about *kanhua Chan* (for an evaluation of Deyi’s influence in Korea, and how his *Platform Sutra* was related to that used by Jinul, see Heo 2008. I have yet to evaluate this study). These were also included in the *Seonmun chwalyo*.

**Conclusion**

Tentatively I conclude that the printing of Chan and Seon texts by the Goryeo Tripitaka Directorate was largely due to the support of the Choe clan for the newly emerging Seon of Jinul and his Suseonsa lineage. This was meant to counter the doctrinal schools that were mostly supported by the aristocrats and which were opposed to the Choe clan. The Choe had sponsored the publication of the Ganghwa Tripitaka to shore up Goryeo’s credentials as a civilized i.e., Sinocentric, state in the face of the Mongol threat. However, because the Tripitaka excluded Chan and Seon works, a supplement or continued Tripitaka was created.
and some of the works were printed by the Tripitaka Directorate. The works selected were those that gave doctrinal support to Seon practice or gave outlines of the teachings of various Chan masters. The other works were those of the Suseonsa group, to which the Choe clan gave support.

Many of these works were probably reproduced by the Joseon Sutra Printing Office, possibly from the same woodblocks. The Sutra Printing Office operated in an entirely different context. The Confucian bureaucrats were hostile to Buddhism, but King Sejo attempted to make Buddhist texts more accessible via *eonhae* translations of the most important texts as the Korean script had only been instituted in 1446 and the Office was only started in 1461. The selections of works to publish were partly dictated by the fact that most of the translators belonged to the Naong Seon lineage and a few to the Taego Seon lineage. Therefore, even when the translations were of standard Buddhist sutras, they were mostly interpreted from a Seon stance (Yi 1978, 23-30). On the other hand, the Office probably found it easier and cheaper to reproduce works in Chinese that had already been published by the Tripitaka Directorate, especially if they had acquired the Directorate’s woodblocks. Obtaining the required wood and the skilled carvers was difficult and expensive (MBC NET 2005, part 5), and so such short-cuts would have been most welcome, especially since the Confucians constantly attacked the Office for wasting money (Eda 1977, 297-298). Access to these blocks may explain why some texts, such as those of early Chan, which did not lend great support to the *kanhua Chan* style of the Naong and Taego lineages, were published rather than more suitable works. Some of the selections may reflect the literary dispositions of the Seon monks of the Office’s operating period, for Seosan Hyujeong had complained in 1564 that the monks of his day were obsessed with poetry and literature.

It appears also that after the Sutra Printing Office was abolished, a number of monasteries inherited its woodblocks, possibly because the blocks had been carved in those monasteries, and subsequently made new imprints from them. I believe that we can recreate the contents of the original supplementary Tripitaka of Goryeo times by tracing the histories of these texts, and along the way learn more about the history of Seon in Korea. This is because there was probably a continuity created through the inheritance of the woodblocks from the Tripitaka Directorate by the Sutra Printing Office, which were then later kept by a number of monasteries.
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Popular Religiosity and State Control: Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Korean Buddhism

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Abstract

Over the past decade, studies on Korean Buddhism have grown increasingly nuanced. This tendency is most conspicuous in two spheres of scholarship. The first is the recent attempt to revise the depiction and understanding of Korean Buddhism during the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910) and thus move beyond the generally negative assessments that have dominated much modern scholarship. The second is the treatment of Korean Buddhism from its late nineteenth-century encounter with Japanese Buddhism through the era of Japanese colonialism (1910-1945). Likewise, noteworthy attention also has been given to the broader question of popular religion over roughly the same period, specifically in relation to Tonghak (Eastern Learning) and its later incarnation as Ch’ŏndogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way). Nonetheless, little has changed with respect to the broad conceptual and chronological typologies and frames of reference. Indeed, the basic framework for analysing Korean Buddhism in some respects has changed little from the 1970s. In this paper I suggest that the commonplace conceptual and chronological frameworks are themselves distorting. I examine the trajectory of modern Korean Buddhism from the late eighteenth century, paying particular attention to relations between institutional Buddhism and the state, elite attitudes towards popular religiosity, and the question of religious competition between Buddhism and Tonghak. In turn, I examine the diversity of Korean Buddhist responses to the state during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) and conclude that Korean Buddhism from the late nineteenth century through the early twentieth century was forced to confront debilities that had been exacerbated and exposed—rather than caused—by Japanese colonialism.
Introduction

The centrality of Neo-Confucianism in the socio-political formation of the Chosŏn (1392-1910) dynasty has led to relatively little interest in the question of religious pluralism in pre-modern Korea. Notable exceptions to this tendency are found in Baker, whose argument on religious pluralism in Korea during the second half of Chosŏn has been echoed and amplified in the work of Cho and Walraven, who have focused exclusively on Buddhism (Baker 1999, esp. 201; Cho 2003; Walraven 2007). Korean scholars of literary history, in particular, have also added to an increasingly nuanced picture of Chosŏn Buddhism, arguing that it proved to be a rich source of ideas in the literary arts. As such scholarship has shown, often in considerable detail, Buddhism in Chosŏn functioned in ways that typically have been excluded from serious historical inquiry. The commonplace characterizations of Chosŏn dynasty Buddhism have thus come under much-needed scrutiny. In the first instance, the Chosŏn state and the Chosŏn elite cannot always be adequately described as anti-Buddhist. Second, there was far more vigour in Chosŏn Buddhism than has typically been supposed.

Nonetheless, no one has argued that Korean Buddhism was better off or stronger during Chosŏn than it had been before. Likewise, the view that the Chosŏn state had a disinterested attitude towards popular religion is not wholly convincing on either theoretical or empirical grounds (cf. Baker 1999, 205). To be sure, diverse religious practices existed and were not penalized by the state, and on the contrary, when popular religiosity looked likely to lead to social disorder, the state responded. By that point, of course, popular religiosity was no longer a matter of belief but action. But to the extent that the state ignored popular practices and religious sentiment, it did so as a necessary consequence of the limitations of its power. An inability to act should not be confused with tolerance.

These interconnected issues were all in evidence during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. As the Chosŏn court was forced to consider how best to respond to the threat of Catholicism, King Chŏngjo (r. 1776-1800) turned to Buddhist symbolism to underscore Buddhism’s link to the state, albeit in a position of subservience. His reign therefore allows for a compact examination of a broader pattern that was in place long before then and remained in place well into the twentieth century. As I argue below, the most conspicuous feature of Korean Buddhism during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) was the degree to which clerics predominantly acquiesced to state power. The fact that the state was controlled by a foreign government largely became an issue in the post-colonial era.
due to the assumption that there must be unanimity between the nation, on the one hand, and the state and government, on the other. Nonetheless, by the first decade of the twentieth century there was recognition among some Buddhists of the pitfalls of an alliance between the state and Buddhism. They saw that such an alliance weakened Buddhism’s prospects for competing effectively against other religions, in large part because it forestalled the need for Buddhists to function within and on behalf of society as a whole so as to make Buddhism popular. By that point, the notion of a popularized Buddhism bore little relationship to the popular religiosity of the past. Indeed, the need to redefine Buddhism required consideration of its relationship to the state, and these questions had been accurately foreshadowed in the late nineteenth century by Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) in Japan and Yun Ch’iho (1865-1945) in Korea.

**Popular Religiosity: Attitudes of the State**

Popular religiosity became an issue of extreme concern in Korea during the late eighteenth century due to mounting concern over Catholicism. It was feared that Catholicism’s teachings on the centrality of God would lead to socio-political upheaval, by weakening peoples’ deference to fathers, in the household, and to the king, at the state level. Three central points can be gleaned from the official records of King Chŏngjo’s reign.

First, the fact that Chŏngjo explicitly regarded Buddhism as heterodoxy did not preclude him from using institutional Buddhism for political and personal reasons. Second, it is necessary to focus on the fact that institutional Buddhism was based in temples and had a recognizable clergy. It is misleading to think of Buddhism as an undifferentiated whole. Chŏngjo was willing to use Buddhist symbols where it suited his purposes, and his focus was on institutional Buddhism. By contrast, popular Buddhist religiosity was as threatening as anything else. The hierarchy of heterodoxies as bodies of beliefs was partly a function of their institutional visibility. Buddhism was deemed heterodoxy, but institutional Buddhism had temples, a recognizable clergy, and a body of texts, whereas as shamanism did not. But Catholicism was worst of all, because it had no formal buildings and to the naked eye, there was no way to know who might be a Catholic. For all intents and purposes, Catholicism was invisible, and that heightened fears around it. Ultimately, this had major consequences when, through the 1790s, Chŏngjo undertook a program of censorship which aimed at uncovering secret Catholics. The third and most important point is that from the outset, Chŏngjo and his
court were inclined to view Catholicism as a form of Buddhism, drawing parallels between the two on the basis of similar teachings on heaven and hell, rebirth, and immortality. Although such teachings were defined as heterodoxy, there were also seen as a species of magic. Indeed, the terms for witchcraft or sorcery (yosul; sasul) are the terms which, used in the court records, best indicate how Chŏngjo and his court viewed popular religiosity (e.g., see CWS: Chŏngjo 11 [1787]/4/27, #1; Chŏngjo 19 [1795]/8/4, #1).

Chŏngjo’s overtures towards institutional Buddhism were a consequence of his fears over Catholicism that took shape from 1785, but they also fulfilled a personal need that had a political dimension arising from the fact that his mentally-ill father had been killed by his own father (that is, Chŏngjo’s grandfather, the previous king, Yŏngjo [r. 1724-1776]). Starting from the late 1780s, Chŏngjo turned to Buddhism for complementary purposes. He began granting posthumous titles to Buddhist priests who had demonstrated their loyalty to the state. In addition, he ordered the construction of a Buddhist temple, Yongju-sa, which would serve as the site for his father’s tomb and be cared for by Buddhist priests. Chŏngjo was thus able to demonstrate his filial piety towards his father, thereby underscoring his own commitment to Confucianism, while also demonstrating Buddhism’s subordinate relationship to the state (for an overview of these events, see Yi [1918] 1986, vol. 3, 69-73). In this scenario, institutional Buddhism was seen as a means to check the influence of Catholicism, not because Buddhism was necessarily better than Catholicism as a form of beliefs, but because institutional Buddhism in Chosŏn had a history that could be invoked for the purposes of the state. Nonetheless, popular religiosity was seen as dangerous, and in this respect, no hard distinction was drawn between Catholicism and popular Buddhist beliefs in those who claimed to be a “living Buddha” (saengbul) or avatars of the Maitreya Buddha, whose coming was typically seen in apocalyptic terms. On the contrary, such beliefs were all seen to be fundamentally the same. This viewpoint was evident in 1791, when during a discussion over the crimes of two Catholic converts, who were soon to be executed, Chŏngjo drew a comparison with the case of a “living Buddha” executed during his grandfather’s reign (CWS: Chŏngjo 15 [1791]/11/7, #2).

Over the course of the next century, Chŏngjo’s fears over the dangers of popular religion proved to be prescient while institutional Buddhism, for the most part, proved to be inert. The obvious question is, how to account for Korean Buddhism’s apparent torpor during the second half of the 19th century, that is, a time during which Korea was increasingly beset with problems from without (provocations from foreign powers and specifically, Japan’s forced opening of Korea in 1876) and within (rebellions and more general social unrest)?
Given these circumstances, one would expect to see outbreaks of popular religiosity of the sort described above, that is, belief in the “living Buddha” or the coming of Maitreya. Therefore, it is startling to see how few entries of any substance for a thirty year span were recorded by Yi Nûnghwa (1869-1943) in his 1918 chronology-cum-study of Korean Buddhism. Between 1864 and 1895, the entries constitute little more than a running obituary for deceased clerics. The paucity of entries for those three decades, of course, might be due to insufficient records, but given the general degree of detail throughout his study and the fact that those years were within living memory, it is more persuasive to conclude that he recorded so little because there was so little to record.

The obvious explanation for the lack of Buddhist activity over those decades is to be found in the popularity of a new religion founded by Ch’oe Cheu (b. 1824), the self-proclaimed divine and founder of Tonghak (Eastern Learning), later renamed as Ch’ŏndogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way). 1864 was the year in which Ch’oe was executed for bewitching the people with evil and heterodox teachings. Although Tonghak has typically been discussed as an amalgam of various religious ideas, Beirne has recently argued strongly for Tonghak’s distinct religious identity. This is fundamentally a matter of interpretation and a consequence of the weight one places on the authenticity of Ch’oe’s religious experiences. In short, it is a matter of faith. What is of interest here, however, is a stage in Ch’oe’s religious maturation that constitutes a key moment in the development of Tonghak/Ch’ŏndogyo as understood by its adherents. In effect, Ch’oe demonstrated that he was superior to a Buddhist priest, who asked him to explain a certain book. The priest could not understand it, and Ch’oe could (Beirne 2009, 28). This obvious intimation of competition with Buddhism was underscored in Ch’oe’s name: Cheu, or “saving the ignorant”—a none-too-subtle reference to the popular Buddhist practice in which the ignorant invoke the name of Amida Buddha when praying for salvation, with Cheu cast in the role of Amida.  

The success of Tonghak/Ch’ŏndogyo in attracting followers attested to a deep reservoir of religious feeling that Buddhists did not or could not exploit. In a sense, it would seem that Ch’oe did understand something that Buddhists did not. Nonetheless, at court Ch’oe was seen to be cleverly espousing Catholicism while calling it by another name. He was thus executed for boldly espousing magic in the form of “Western trickery” (sŏyang ji sul), which is to say, Catholicism (CWS: Kojong 1 [1864] /3/2, #1). His execution was as portentous as it was ironic, for two years later the Catholic community suffered the bloodiest of several nineteenth-century persecutions.
Buddhist Clerics: “Slaves of the Government”

If one looks at the major qualitative shifts that defined an emerging sense of modernity from the late nineteenth century in Korea, one can speak meaningfully about modernity in relation to Korean Buddhism. None of these shifts, however, were unique to Korean Buddhism. Korean Buddhism followed the same general pattern, though with a significant time-lag and under additional stress imposed by religious competition with Christianity and Ch’ondogyo. Thus, by the first decade of the twentieth-century, religious competition, in particular, had led to the recognition of the need for modern education as well as making Buddhism available to the people at large through texts written in the vernacular (for an overview on Buddhist education, see Nam 1992, 209-263). What this meant in practice varied widely, however, and ranged from efforts at revivifying and preserving traditional Sŏn/Zen education to combining religious and secular education to translating Buddhist texts into Korean to modern critical scholarship on Korean Buddhist history (Nam 1992, esp. 234, 238, 243, 245, 247; Park 2010).

By the early twentieth century, Korean Buddhist intellectuals and reformers were thus intent on strengthening their religion and making it fit for competition with its competitors. They also were generally uneasy over popular Buddhist religiosity, which they came to see as superstitious and pernicious to Buddhism’s adaptation to the modern world. For them, Buddhism had what we would now call an image problem. Two sticking points remained throughout this process of change: the nature of institutional Buddhism’s relationship to the state and the content of Buddhist beliefs.

For Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901), in Japan, as well as the Korean Protestant Yun Ch’iho (1865-1945), Buddhism’s chief problems were the alliance of its clergy with the state and the general unwieldiness of Buddhist doctrine. In Fukuzawa’s view, the connection between institutional Buddhism and the government in Japan had made Buddhist clerics into “slaves of the government” (Fukuzawa 2008, 192-193). Although targeted at Japanese Buddhism, Fukuzawa’s critique was applicable to the Korean situation, and it is reasonable to think that at least some Koreans were aware of his views. Yun’s criticisms, by contrast, highlighted how Buddhism’s massive textual tradition meant that one might “[pick] out any nonsense” one might like. Buddhism was, in Yun’s view, a “regular India rubber ball... being so vague and undefined one may modify it into any shape or form” (Yun 1987, vol. 3, 239-240).
The actions of Korean Buddhist clerics confirmed the basic validity of Fukuzawa’s and Yun’s critiques. Moreover, some Korean Buddhist clerics worried over precisely the same things. In particular, the writings of Han Yongun (discussed further below) suggest an awareness of Fukuzawa’s views. This is understandable inasmuch as Japanese Buddhists played a crucial role in many of the early Korean Buddhist educational endeavours, either by providing direct support or models for emulation. In 1907, the first graduating class of the Myōngjin School (Myōngjin Hakkyo), the first modern Buddhist educational institution in Korea, had five priests who would distinguish themselves over the following decades: Kwŏn Sangno (1879-1965), an educator and prolific scholar of Korean Buddhism as well as a publisher of Buddhist journals, he would become in 1946 a professor at Tongguk University, the successor to Myōngjin Hakkyo, where he was later named University President; Kang Taeryŏn (1875-1942) would work to effect a merger between Japanese and Korean Buddhism through the 1910s and then in 1919, submit a notorious petition to the Japanese Governor General urging that Buddhist priests ought to marry; Yi Chonguk (1884-1969), an independence activist who received public recognition with honours and a national funeral in 1977; An Chinho (dates unknown), who worked on temple histories; and Han Yongun (1879-1944), a vigorous proponent of modern education, the freedom for priests and nuns to marry, publisher of Buddhist journals, and one of two Buddhist priests who signed the Korean Declaration of Independence in 1919 (for the listed names, see Nam 1992, 234; on Yi and An, see also: Im 2001, 427-428; Chŏng 2001, 362-363, 365-366).

The reputations of each of these clerics—but those of Kwŏn, Kang, Yi, and Han, in particular—have been inextricably linked with colonial era politics, and for different reasons and to different degrees, each has been seen as either an outright collaborator with the Japanese or otherwise unacceptable in the longer tradition of Korean Buddhism. Such judgments, however, often reflect more about post-colonial historiography than about Korean Buddhism during the colonial era. There is, of course, nothing remarkable in this. It is understandable in light of the stresses of colonialism as well as the consequent shame, anger, and desire to apportion blame in the post-colonial era. What is of concern here is the overarching logic and what it reveals about the nationalist framework in which Korean Buddhism in the colonial period has been typically assessed.
Parallel Careers in Response to the State: Kang Taeryŏn (1875-1942) and Han Yongun (1879-1944)

The cases of Kang and Han most sharply illustrate the tensions within this interpretive framework. They were roughly the same age and both had a Japanese-influenced modern education at Myŏngjin Hakkyo. Ultimately, both became known for having questioned the primacy of celibacy for Buddhist priests (though the nature of what they actually did was, in fact, radically different, as will be discussed below). Yet in other respects, their careers were very different. In the fractious attempts to merge Korean Buddhism with a Japanese sect in 1910, Kang was part of the pro-merger faction while Han was part of the group that strongly opposed it. Although the architect of the plan, Yi Hoegwang (1862-1933), and his supporters are viewed as traitors, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of their conviction that any deal was better than no deal. There was by 1910 a broad consensus that Korean Buddhism was so weak that its very survival was at stake, despite differences in opinion as to what was needed to save it. In short, it is more reasonable and historically convincing to view the attempts at effecting the merger as an act of desperation over the parlous state of Korean Buddhism. Nonetheless, the events surrounding the failed merger hold a significant place in scholarship on Buddhism during the colonial period (for a concise overview, see Im 2001, 56-67).

The problem is that there is nothing to justify an interpretation of this episode in black and white nationalist terms. Political and religious interests were certainly involved, as were questions of influence and quite likely, intra-Buddhist rivalry on the Korean side owing the regional affiliations (Yi [1918] 2003, 84-85). None of this, however, has much of anything to do with nationalism. First, the formal agreement outlining the details of the merger made it patently clear that Korean Buddhism was to be subordinate to its Japanese counterpart; that in and of itself provided grounds for disapproval. Second and more importantly, although the anti-merger faction does not seem to have written at any length about why they opposed the merger, their opposition was understood by contemporaries to have been established on doctrinal grounds, with Pak Hanyŏng (1870-1948), Han Yongun, and others organizing a rival faction in 1911 (see Yi Nŭnghwa's summary of Takahashi Tōru's [1878-1967] interpretation of the events in Yi [1918] 2003, 77; for Yi's analysis, published seven years after the event, see 78-104). To be sure, people can have more than one reason for doing something, and people can find common cause for different reasons. Even so, it seems that the main reason for opposing the merger was based on a view that Korean Buddhism as a
whole was of a single lineage that was incompatible with the Japanese sect which Yi Hoegwang had chosen as a merger partner. In short, opposition was fundamentally religious and organized around an elite clerical concern over the history of Buddhist lineages. (I will return to this point below.)

On balance, the anti-merger faction was successful; they thwarted the merger. But notwithstanding the personal and factional rivalries between the two groups, the incident itself and the people involved in it represented a tension which was rooted in Korean Buddhism’s past and foreshadowed much of what was to follow during the colonial period. This tension was the nature of Buddhism’s relationship to the state. As Shulman has noted, “Buddhist monks claimed from very early on a critical part in the very core of political life as kingmakers and carriers of primary values. Buddhism is not, and never was, an ‘apolitical’ religion” (2009, 52). During much of Korean history, Buddhism had been deeply and actively involved with the state. But beginning with the foundation of the Chosôn dynasty, that relationship ended precisely because the state and the elite came to reject Buddhism’s “primary values” in favour of a rigid adoption and adaptation of Neo-Confucianism. Even so, as discussed above in relation to the events at the court of king Chôngjo during the late eighteenth century, the historical alliance between the state and institutional Buddhism could be invoked when it suited the state. Buddhism was thus shut out of access to political influence, but lack of political influence did not, perforce, make it apolitical. It simply made it passive.

Circumstances began to change, however, with Japan’s forced opening of Korea in 1876 and the subsequent arrival of Japanese Buddhist missionar ies. Both events were a consequence of the Chosôn state’s cascading debilities, which gave rise to Korea’s reformist Enlightenment Party. Korean Buddhist involvement in the Enlightenment Party has attracted much interest, largely because it demonstrated that Buddhists were actively concerned with strengthening Korea. Much, if not all, of such research tends to look at these Korean Buddhist activities as emblematic of an eagerness to modernize on behalf of strengthening Korea. But what is perhaps most striking about the early Japanese-Korean Buddhist encounters is how swiftly available opportunities through the Japanese were grasped by Koreans and used to gain influence at the Korean court (for an excellent survey of these events, see Tikhonov 2010, 245-274).

Im Hyebong, in sharp contrast, views these Korean Buddhist activities during the late nineteenth century as an incipient stage of collaboration with the Japanese that would expand over the following decades (Im 1993, vol. 1, 51-52). Im’s argument is valuable because it
directs attention to the equally problematic and more common tendency to view such Buddhist activities in a nationalist light. Indeed, Im, who is himself a Buddhist priest, has done more than anyone else to demonstrate the hollowness of the commonplace connection drawn between Korean Buddhism and nationalism. Yet Im, as a product of the twentieth-century, takes Korean nationalism for granted (for a concise overview of the theoretical issues involved, see Wells 1990, 2-16). Nationalism and collaboration thus sit as the primary categories of his work on modern Korean Buddhist history.

This inadvertently underscores three essential points. First, at least through 1910, it is historically and conceptually incoherent to examine Korean Buddhism in relation to nationalism. 1910 stands as a meaningful date. The attempted merger of Korean and Japanese Buddhism seems to have forced an historical analysis of Korean Buddhism along national lines, and if that analysis was as contorted as it seems, there is even greater cause to see in this the possibility of speaking about something approximating Korean Buddhist nationalism (Yi Nŭnghwa hints at this possibility; see Yi [1918] 2003, 103). Second, by the end of the year, the formal loss of Korean sovereignty and the start of Japanese colonialism meant that Koreans were a subject people in their own land. One need not agree with all the details of Im’s analyses of Korean Buddhists’ collaborative activities to accept that it is reasonable to question how Buddhists responded to Japanese colonialism. Third, the divergent responses of Korean Buddhists to Japanese colonialism after 1910 demonstrates that Japanese-influenced modern Buddhist education of the sort offered at Myŏngjin Hakkyo could—and did—have very different consequences.

The paths of Han Yongun and Kang Taeryŏn, starting in 1910, illustrate this broader pattern in its most extreme form. There was, of course, a vast middle ground occupied by those who seem to have lived out their lives as best they could and those who moved between activities ranging from overt efforts on behalf of national independence to overt acquiescence to and support for the Japanese. Examples of each type, in fact, can be found among Han’s and Kang’s classmates as cited above. But the core question was the same: what was the relationship between the state and institutional Buddhism? Because this issue was forced into prominence with Korea’s loss of sovereignty to Japan, it is easy to overlook the fact that Kang’s embrace of the Japanese was rooted in Korean Buddhist history. Indeed, in terms of Korean Buddhist history, Kang makes sense whereas Han does not. The reason is that Han was relatively quick to decide that it was desirable to break the link between the state and the Korean Buddhist institution. Ironically, it is reasonable to conclude that this view took shape around his experience with Japanese Buddhists and his understanding of the consequences for
Japanese Buddhism when the newly-modernizing Japanese government broke the time-honoured juridical connection between it and institutional Buddhism after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Han had studied at Myŏnjin Hakkyo and then made a trip to Japan as a visiting student for six months in 1908.

Although the anti-Buddhist backlash that arose in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration caused a great shock to Japanese Buddhist clerics, it also elicited from them an energetic response which, among other things, found expression in Japanese Buddhist missionary activities in Korea in the late nineteenth century. There are telling details throughout Han’s writings that clearly show how his understanding of the complexities of Japanese Buddhist history formed a framework in which he examined Korean Buddhist history. However, Japanese influence is nowhere more apparent than in Han’s argument that it was necessary first to destroy Korean Buddhism in order to save it. This argument was central to the proposals contained in his Thesis on the Reformation of Korean Buddhism (Chosŏn Pulgyo yusillon). Although his Thesis was first published in its entirety in 1913, it was completed at the very end of 1910, which is to say, not long after his trip to Japan and only months after Korea’s annexation by Japan in August and the eruption of the dispute over effects a merger between Korean and Japanese Buddhism in October. In broad terms, there is nothing unusual about colonial subjects learning from an imperial power so as to benefit their own anti-imperial cause. But on balance, Han was unique in attempting to apply the central lessons of Meiji Buddhist history to Korea. By far, his most radical proposal argued that it was necessary to legalize clerical marriage, an idea that was first set forth in two formal petitions submitted in 1910 and then elaborated upon in his Thesis. That idea and his emphasis on the need to destroy Korean Buddhism in order to save it, read like a minimalist summation of Meiji Buddhist history: aiming at modernizing Japan and its institutions, the Meiji government effectively severed the longstanding connection between the Buddhist clergy and the state by granting Buddhist clerics the freedom to marry and eat meat if they chose to do so. In essence, Han’s Thesis was a plan to replicate in Korea much the same situation that had occurred in Japan: destruction of the traditional institution, through severing its connection to the state by allowing clerical marriage, to be followed by renewal. There were other reform proposals put forth at roughly the same time by other Buddhist priests, including Kwŏn Sangno, Han’s former classmate at Myŏnjin Hakkyo. But none were willing to countenance anything as radical as what Han was urging, and there is no reason to suspect hyperbole on his part. Indeed, Han’s contemporary, the lay Buddhist scholar Yi Nŭnghwa (1869-1943), offered a pithy summation of Han’s character, calling him
harsh and impatient, while emphasizing his debt to Japanese Buddhism and belief that Korean Buddhism had to be destroyed before it could be reformed (Yi [1918] 2003, 126).

Kang Taeryŏn offers a clear idea of what was to be destroyed, and why. Kang’s career was initially established through his ties to the court of King Kojong (r. 1864-1907) after the king remarried in 1897. In 1901, Kojong’s second wife, Sunhŏn-bi (1854-1911), provided Kang with a considerable amount of money to undertake construction projects. Five years later, she again gave Kang funds to help restore the woodblocks of the Buddhist Tripitaka at Haein-sa (Haein Temple) and then finance printings from it (Yi 1993, 251). With what remained of the money, Kang purchased land which provided the priests at Haein-sa with additional rice. In the following years, as discussed above, Kang attended Myŏngjin Hakkyo and became involved with Yi Hoegwang’s attempts to merge Korean and Japanese Buddhism.

Kang was then named as the abbot of Yongju-sa in 1911. That he was selected for this position at a temple so strongly associated with the Chosŏn dynasty’s royal family cannot be explained solely in relation to his conciliatory attitude towards the Japanese or to the Temple Regulations (S.K., Sach’al ryŏng), the laws governing Buddhist temples that were established that year. These laws are commonly invoked to explain all manner of contradictory things. It is obvious that the Japanese accepted Kang to be the abbot of Yongju-sa; they could have rejected him if they had chosen to do so. But it is likewise obvious that he was favoured by his fellow priests, and this clearly suggests that his activities leading up to the failed merger were insufficient to create much, if any, animus against him among the priests at Yongju-sa. On the contrary, his rise to prominence is understandable in light of his Buddhist undertakings. Yi Nŭnghwŏ, in fact, categorized Kang and Yi Hoegwang together for their focus on Buddhist “good works” (S.K., sagong) and emphasized Kang’s praiseworthy actions in giving “external aid” (S.K., woeho) for the preservation of Buddhism (Yi [1918] 2003, 120-121).

Nevertheless, Kang would attain even greater renown over the following years. His most notorious act occurred shortly after the March First Independence Movement of 1919, when he submitted a petition requesting that the Japanese Governor General force marriages between Korean priests and Japanese women of high and low classes, and vice versa, for the purpose of promoting harmony between Japan and Korea. Ultimately, Kang accomplished something quite remarkable in that he was, to all appearances, openly despised by some priests, who saw him as a schemer, called him a “great demon” (S.K., tae angma), and on one occasion physically attacked him. Despite all of this, Kang also had a wide base of support among his fellow priests which allowed him to wield great influence in Korean Buddhist
affairs. Among other things, this gave him the wherewithal to help block attempts to change the Temple Regulations through the early 1920s, which is to say, long after his petition to the Japanese Governor General on behalf of forced clerical marriages. Kang may have been despised by some of his fellow clerics, but the feeling was far from unanimous (for a summary of these events, see Pak 1992, 60-62).

This is understandable in terms of the longer trajectory of Buddhism in Korea. The Temple Regulations could be—and obviously were—interpreted from two diametrically opposed perspectives, each of which was historically valid. For some, such as Kang, the Temple Regulations represented safety by maintaining a formal link between the government and the Buddhist institution; for others, such as Han Yongun, the Temple Regulations represented a continuation of past practices that had stripped Korean Buddhism of its vigour by removing any need for Buddhist priests to function within and as a part of society as a whole. The coherence of these two positions is evident through Yi Nünhwa’s contemporary analysis, which makes it clear that the Japanese were far from innovative in establishing the Temple Regulations and instead used structures and practices with antecedents in the Chosŏn dynasty (Yi [1918] 2003, 143-144). Contrary to the now commonplace assumption that these Temple Regulations marked a rupture in the tradition of Korean Buddhism, it seems that, if anything, the opposite is closer to the truth. This suggests another dimension to the conflict over the Temple Regulations that is apparent, in particular, in Han Yongun’s writings and his emphasis on the need to “separate government and religion” (*chông-gyo pullip*) (Pak 1992, 62). In effect, the establishment of the Temple Regulations by the Japanese appears to have encouraged consideration of the general question of the relationship between the government and religion, that is to say, Korean Buddhism’s relationship to the state, rather than Korean Buddhism’s relationship to the Japanese colonial government. Opposing attitudes towards the Temple Regulations thus reflected, at least in part, a division in views over how institutional Buddhism was to be situated vis-à-vis the state. To be sure, this was a political question for all involved, but it was not at that time necessarily a question of nationalism. It became so, however, after Korea regained independence from Japan in 1945.

Kang is, therefore, fascinating, though less because of anything he did than how his actions have been interpreted in the post-colonial era. For Im Hyebong, as well as the priests who now occupy Yongju-sa, Kang is a troubling figure due to what is seen as a striking contradiction in his character. How can one explain a priest who had worked on behalf of preserving Korean Buddhism, undertaking activities of the sort defined by Yi Nünhwa as “good works,” only to become an arch-villain in terms of his collaborative activities with the
Japanese? Working with the Korean court in 1901 and 1906 is thus seen as commendable, whereas working with the Japanese from 1910 is condemned. Im thus concludes that Kang was a “complex person with two faces” (tu ŏrgur-úl kajin pokchaphan inmul) (Im 2005, 157; also, YWS). This judgement reflects the core assumptions and analytical frameworks of post-colonial scholarship. Therefore, it entirely misses the central point that Kang illustrates so vividly. There was, in fact, nothing complex about Kang whatsoever—something demonstrated in considerable detail, paradoxically, in Im’s own thorough examination of Kang’s activities (Im 2005, 156-191; also Im 1993, vol. 1, 100-107). On the contrary, Kang’s role and political manoeuvrings as a Buddhist priest were consistent throughout his entire career which was devoted, from 1901, to strengthening the link between the Korean Buddhist institution and the state. Ultimately, Kang himself did not change, nor did his objective of safeguarding the interests of institutional Buddhism by working with the state. What changed was the government.

Despite this, Kang maintained considerable influence in Korean Buddhist affairs, simply because he could garner more support than his opponents could. Ironically, Kang’s 1919 petition on clerical marriage to the Japanese Governor General is, in this instance, particularly helpful in revealing reflexive tendencies in the Korean Buddhist institution both before and through the colonial period. Inasmuch as no single issue is regarded as more contentious than clerical marriage during the colonial period, it would seem possible to trace the failure of the opposition to the Temple Regulations to a deep-seated animus towards Han Yongun and his views on clerical marriage. However, this cannot bear any scrutiny. Twice in 1910 Han submitted formal petitions to the government to grant Buddhist priests and nuns the right to marry if they so wished, and then in 1913, he appended copies of those two petitions to yet another analysis of the issue as published in his Thesis on the Reformation of Korean Buddhism. Han’s views were publicly known. However, they were far milder than those contained in Kang’s recommendation that the Japanese Governor General, in effect, serve as a matchmaker and arrange forced marriages between Japanese Buddhist priests and Korean women of various classes, as well as between Korean Buddhist priests and Korean and Japanese women of various classes. This petition was initially submitted in the months just after the March First Movement of 1919. It was then published in a major Korean Buddhist journal in March of 1920, that is, the one year anniversary of the March First Movement (Im 1993, vol. 1, 100-102 and for the original, 101n26). To a modern sensibility this looks like terribly insensitive timing, but, of course, the timing was central to Kang’s purpose of
promoting Buddhist influence on behalf of harmony between Japan and Korea. Kang’s views were publicly known, no less than Han’s.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the furore over the issue of clerical marriage in Korea, it is obvious that Kang’s vision of Buddhism’s socio-political role held much wider appeal among his fellow clergy than the alternatives which, through the 1920s and after, can be organized into three main groupings with respect to their interactions with the government: first, those, such as Paek Yongsŏng (1864-1940), who undertook Buddhist activities, as much as possible, outside of the realm of government interference; and second, those who, like Song Mangong (1871-1946), intermittently worked with the government only to grow frustrated. The third grouping was exemplified by associations such as the Korean Buddhist Youth Society (Chosŏn Pulgyo ch’ŏngnyŏn hoe), which was established in 1920, and the Buddhist Reformation Society (Pulgyo yusin hoe), which was established by Han Yongun the following year. The two groups, which subsequently worked together to abolish the Temple Regulations, would be followed by other similar groups over the following years.

To all appearances, Han had a much greater degree of influence among the younger Buddhists who comprised these groups due to his emphasis on the need to integrate a modern and intellectually credible form of Buddhism into society at large. Unlike Paek Yongsŏng and Song Mangong, who were likewise opposed to the Temple Regulations, Han’s goal of popularizing Buddhism entailed opposition to the Temple Regulations because these maintained a link between Buddhism and the state which, by subordinating the former to the latter, complicated any attempt to make Buddhism a credible force for social change. By the 1930s Han’s views were well known, and his relative influence was possibly reflected in a 1932 popularity poll conducted by the journal Buddhism (Pulgyo), which he won by an extremely wide margin. The result of this poll, however, must be read cautiously, since Han was, at that time, the publisher and editor of the journal. Nonetheless, the poll was published just as the journal was about to be forced to suspend publication, in large part due to Han’s break with the editorial policies of his predecessor and former classmate, Kwŏn Sangno, who had focused on non-controversial topics. Particularly problematic was Han’s use of the journal as a forum for agitating over the Temple Regulations and the need to separate government and religion (Kim and Yi 1996, 17).
This suggests, at the very least, that however widespread or popular the views exemplified by Han were, they were not nearly as influential or widespread as they needed to be in order to make any substantial change to the status quo. By contrast, even Kang Taeryŏn’s call for the Japanese to force Korean Buddhist priests to marry proved insufficient to spark any wider agitation for change. In sum, the attitude towards the state as typified by Kang was reflected in the general acceptance of the Temple Regulations among the Buddhist majority, while others, such as Paek and Song, who opposed Japanese government control over institutional Buddhism did so on the grounds that such control had led to the destruction of traditional monastic life. Indeed, it is little wonder that by the 1930s Han looked at younger Buddhists (both clerical and lay, it seems) who formed the General Alliance of Buddhist Youth (Pulgyo ch’ŏngnyŏn ch’ŏng tongmaeng) as the only reasonable hope for effecting fundamental changes that might break the link between the government and Buddhism and in turn, allow for the “attainment of a popular Buddhism” that could influence society at large (taejung Pulgyo-ŭi sirhyŏn) (Han [1931] 1988, 215). By the 1930s, however, the idea of “popular Buddhism” as something which, in modern terms, was intellectually credible and socially progressive marked a rejection of much of Korea’s own Buddhist history. The principal sticking point was the relationship between the state and institutional Buddhism, and the majority of Korean Buddhist clerics could not conceive of themselves or their religion outside of an alliance with the state. The advent of Japanese colonialism did not create this problem, but rather exposed it.

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Globalization and Economic Nationalism in South Korea: A Critical View

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Abstract

The paper attempts to shed light on the paradoxical nature of the coexistence of economic nationalism and economic globalization in South Korea. The paper offers an analysis of the evolution of the Korea’s economic nationalism with a particular focus on the relationship between economic nationalism and state policy is examined. An analysis on how Korea’s economic nationalism is perceived by foreign business community as well as the Korean society based on the results of our empirical data (results of questionnaire survey on 257 South Koreans) and of one-on-one interviews with 41 foreign companies operating in South Korea both conducted in late 2010, will also be presented.

Introduction

South Korea’s economic development has been in any scale outstanding. The nation has recorded an annual average economic growth of 9% over the last four decades and achieved the status of ‘Tiger among Tigers’ among the world’s high growth economies. Despite its economic suffering from the 1997 financial crisis South Korea has the 15th biggest economy in the world in 2009. This successful economic growth and accumulated economic wealth has inevitably led to a significant escalation in the consumption of material goods. A common factor across South Korea in this new millennium is the ever-increasing level of buying power coupled with westernization.\(^1\) It is now commonly seen by anyone in South Korea to

see a wide range of products that did not exist ten years ago. If the term ‘globalization’ is measured by movement of capital, trade, investments and people across borders and the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ is measured by consumption level of international media, foreign products and by the openness to global influences (internationalism) and brands, South Korea would certainly demonstrate the phenomenon.

It should be noted, however, that the arrival of globalization in South Korea since the late 20th century is arguably revolutionary in view of the fact that South Korea’s industrial capitalism since its liberation from Japan in 1945 has had a long history of economic nationalism in a sense that the South Korean state has been active with industrial, trade, investment, and technology policy with a strong intent to promote domestic capitalists and thus national economic development. The South Korean state's authoritarian and corporatist structures that underpinned the processes of capital accumulation, state-allocated monopolies and the reliance on the international economy such as foreign capital (e.g. aid, loans) were the key forces that pushed South Korea’s growth trajectory in a highly nationalistic direction.

The concept of economic nationalism has found applications across many disciplines including sociology, economics, foreign policies, political economy, international relations and political psychology. With rapid internationalization and trade globalization, recent studies have extended the twin concepts of economic nationalism and globalization. One commonly found paucity among the literature, however, is the little relevance to the process

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by which economic nationalism as an economic trajectory was challenged with the advent of rapid economic globalization among emerging economies like South Korea, who are at the transitional stage, planning to shift towards more mature economy. South Korea where the strong economic nationalism is in action provides the most fascinating case to what degree how a strong nationalistic economic culture has been shaped by the nation’s integration into the globalization since the late 20th century.

Equally importantly, though there is not enough empirical evidence yet, there is a notable possibility that government policies have led to nationalist culture. Given the coexistence between economic globalization and economic nationalism led by the government is evident today in South Korea, it is crucial to examine how South Korea’s strong economic culture, accumulated over the last three decades (1960s-1980s), has been embedded and reflected in the South Korean people’s attitudinal dispositions emanated from the today’s accelerating globalization. Accordingly, the empirical attempt to examine the link would become a remarkable contribution to the economic nationalism research. To this end, this article attempts to shed light on the paradoxical nature of the coexistence of economic nationalism and economic globalization. In particular, to understanding the seeming paradox, the study focuses on the following questions:

- Does globalization and internationalism signal that we can expect all vestiges of collectivist nature of economic nationalism to disappear?
- Has the nature of economic nationalism support from the South Korean society?
- Would the level of economic globalization be consistent with the level of the South Korean people’s global mindsets?

The rest of the article contains the following. First the paper presents a conceptual discussion on economic nationalism within the context of South Korea’s capitalist industrialization. Second, the paper provides an overview of the evolution of the South Korea’s economic nationalism with a particular focus on the relationship between economic nationalism and state policy is examined. Third, an analysis on how South Korea’s economic nationalism is perceived by foreign business community as well as the South Korean society based on the results of our empirical data (results of questionnaire survey on 257 South Koreans) and of one-on-one interviews with 41 foreign companies operating in South Korea both conducted in late 2010, will be presented followed by conclusion.
Economic Nationalism: Conceptual View

The term, ‘economic nationalism’, firstly theorised and conceptualised by a German economist, Friedrich List (1841) is in general associated with the policy prediscriptions. Harry G. Johnson’s study on economic nationalism in developing states adopting Breton’s analysis of the economics of nationalism focusing on ownership of various types of property finds that economic nationalism tends to direct economic development policy that would foster the concepts of national identity and nationhood, activities offering better jobs and favour both extensive state control and public ownership of enterprises including allocation of jobs to nationals. This particular concept has been widely used by the scholars of international political economy and international relations over the last three decades and one of the three main ideologies of modern political economy, namely economic liberalism, economic socialism and economic nationalism. Similar works can be found in Abdelal who defined the term as ‘a set of policies that results from a shared national identity, or from the predominance of a specific nationalism in the politics of a state’ and it (economic nationalism) involves the implementation of economic policy that follows the national purpose and direction, prioritizing national interests above private property and profit motives. To them, the central actor for nation building through economic autonomy is the state. The main role of the state, according to List, in the economic sphere should be the nourishment of the national productive powers including mental capital, natural capital and material capital. Robert Gilpin provides three critical components of economic nationalism, namely emphasis on the state as the predominant actor, its preference of industry to agriculture and its anti-trade bias. Gilpin sees the term as a statist tradition of thought influenced by Gerschenkronian theory (state-driven industrialization) on the role of the state in backward economies or late-industrializing countries of France, Germany and Russia that has its roots in mercantilist doctrines of the 17th and 18th century.

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Recent literature on economic nationalism, on the other hand, has concentrated on the adoption of foreign economic policies aimed at securing the well being of the state or a group within the state. Dent sees the ‘economic nationalism’ as the ‘proclivity of the state, firms and individuals for economic actions, decisions or alliance-formation that seek to advance the nation’s international position at the potential expense of foreign national or international interests.’ Younghan Cho also correctly views in the case of South Korea that the doctrine (economic nationalism) underscores ‘national growth and modernization, processes in which the nation-state plays a central role in allocating economic elements to maximize their efficiency; it particularly increases the increasing amounts of export/trade and the progress of industrialization’. Economic nationalism is thus best characterized by the following three assertions: a nation’s citizenry largely shares (or should share) a common economic fate; the state has a crucial positive role in guiding the national economy to better performance; and the imperatives of nationalism should guide the state’s economic policies. It also contrasts with economic liberalism in two major ways: ‘it rejects self-interest as the main guideline for organizing the social and economic, and second, it rejects the notion that the market can maximize the welfare of the collective’.

In short, a nation’s national economic well being through preservation of the state and national economic autonomy and domestic economic security from the influence of foreign forces (eg., multinational enterprises) are key components of economic nationalism. Economic nationalism is therefore not so much about the economy but is about the nation as a functional entity against economic threat and national sovereignty posed by foreign competition such as multinational enterprises-led foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign workers. Economic nationalism as examined by Baughn and Yaprak (1996) involves, ‘attaching utility or value to having certain jobs held or property owned by members of the national groups rather than by non-members of the national group’. This is where the concept differs from other related but conceptually different concepts including nationalism (strong bias against other countries), patriotism (commitment and readiness sacrifice for the

15 Pinto and Le Foulon, “Individual Sources of economic nationalism”, p.6.
nation), ethnocentrism (belief in superiority of one’s nation, ethnic group and cultural values to others) and consumer ethnocentrism (moral obligation to buy home made products).\(^{18}\)

**Economic Nationalism: Case of South Korea**

Considerable debate about South Korea’s developmental capitalism over the three decades (1960s-80s) occurred among neo-liberal economists who attribute the country’s rapid economic growth to the pursuit of EOI along with policies that favour a market orientation and minimal state intervention\(^{19}\), political scientists, and political economists who focused on domestic political processes and structures in South Korea\(^{20}\). In spite of this considerable debate, the general consensus has been that the South Korean state has intervened in the market as the *primum mobile* of socio-economic and cultural progress. In other words, South Korea's economic success, and its place at the top of the economic hierarchy among developing countries, is a product not of culture, geography, or uninhibited market forces, but of the actions and institutions of a developmental state.\(^{21}\) Robert Gilpin’s neo-realist approach to economic nationalism depicts well the South Korean case in which ‘economic activities are and should be subordinate to the goal of state-building and the interests of the state’\(^{22}\). The South Korean state must lead and protect the economy for the sake of the nation’s survival. As such, economic nationalism is closely bound up with the imperative of survival.


\(^{22}\) Crane, “Economic Nationalism”, p.57.
South Korea’s strong and extensive economic nationalist tradition can be found in the state’s ‘developmental alliance’ forged with the Chaebol (groups of mostly family-owned and managed conglomerates in South Korea such as Samsung, Hyundai, SK, Daewoo and LG).\(^{23}\) It set industrial targeting, directed lending, protection and subsidies for a small number of big firms, and controlled foreign exchange that would allow the state to select investment projects for the Chaebol.\(^{24}\) In other words, the South Korean state’s autonomy and control over the economy (Amsden’s term ‘getting the prices wrong’), embedded in its economic nationalism strategy, has been central to the nation’s pursuit for economic success that was achieved in a relatively short period of time.

**The Birth of Economic Nationalism**

The transition of the regime from Syngman Rhee (South Korea’s first president, 1948-1960) to Park Chung Hee (1963-1979) brought important and fundamental structural changes in the post-war South Korean political economy. This can be termed export-oriented industrialization (EOI), meaning a phase realised through the active introduction of foreign capital, emphasising exports and participating in the global economy. The Park regime chose this policy due to various unfavourable national conditions for economic development such as limited natural resources, negligible domestic savings and the lack of development experience. The result was remarkable. Growth of South Korea’s exports between 1960 and 1971 exceeded 40 percent per year. Real GNP grew by an annual average of 7.9 percent and the saving rate per year exceeded 8 percent during the same period.

One important factor behind the rapid economic growth can be attributed to the state’s active and intensive intervention in every economic affair such as control of labour (and wage) and financial institutions.\(^{25}\) As in the 1950s, the South Korean state continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s to exercise virtual control of the entire economic growth process.\(^{26}\) It regulated the flow of financial capital through its complete control over banks. During the period between 1961 and 1980, the state owned most of the important banks, including Bank of South Korea, five nation-wide commercial banks, six special banks, and the two

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\(^{25}\) Amsden, “Asia’s Next Giant”.

\(^{26}\) Jones and Sakong, “Government, Business, and Entrepreneurship”.
development banks (South Korean Development Bank and Export-Import Bank). Further the state controlled the entire budget and dictated the levels of foreign borrowing and direct investment. On the other hand, inward foreign direct investment in the 1960s was minimal; the first foreign investment made in South Korea was 1962. This is because South Korea’s EOI policy required a large amount of capital, the country relied heavily on foreign borrowing rather than FDI and also held the power to screen and monitor the various activities of foreign investors.

The Era of Globalization

With progressive South Korean industrialization, the limits of industrial policy based on low labour costs have been brought into sharp relief. Other factors, such as labour and land cost, impeded export led economic growth and brought about a strong tendency for South Korean firms to become excessively dependent on Japan and the US for their supply of critical components. For example, during the 1980s, South Korean firms depended on Japanese corporations for between 40-60 percent of their machines, 60 percent of their parts, and 50 percent of their licensed technology. The lack of South Korea's technological competitiveness is an inheritance from South Korea's industrialization strategy of the 1960s and 1970s.

A consequence of this can be seen in the frequent and progressive relaxation of foreign exchange control and deregulation towards foreign investment laws since the early 1990s. This has been accelerated by President Kim Young-sam’s (1993-1998) globalization drive (Segyehwa), which puts a strong emphasis in introducing new technologies, which South Korean companies are so far only able to procure from other countries. The South Korean government's ambitious blueprint issued in 1992 aimed to see South Korea become one of the top seven technological powers in the world by year 2000. To aid this goal, the government invested US$15.4 billion into high-tech industries by the end of 1996.

As was found in the case of Park Chung-hee’s motto ‘nation building through exports’, Kim Young-sam’s new growth strategy, ‘Segyehwa’ is a state-enhancing, top-down strategic plan and, perhaps more importantly, a governing ideology, which is the pinnacle of state-driven developmental nationalism. The 1993’s ‘100 Day Plan for the New Economy’ initiated by the Kim administration was regarded as revolutionary. Its main theme was to liberalize the

formally restricted business areas such as agriculture, government procurement, retail financial services and capital markets, in an effort to meet the membership criteria for joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (South Korea later joined in October 1996). The plan was to initially increase the percentage of the domestic market open to foreign investment from 83% in 1993 to 93% in 1997, and then to 99.5% in 2000. But it should be noted that keeping the base of national philosophy (i.e. socio-economic and political independence from foreign forces) unchanged, new growth strategies were only adjusted when structural problems in the economy (internationally and domestically) required the state to adopt more outward looking policies in the name of economic pragmatism, mainly in the context of acquiring technological know-how and investment from private and foreign capital. Such was the case when Kim Young-sam faced internal and external challenges. Of necessity, he opened the economy to foreign capitalists and followed policies towards a more market-oriented philosophy. Does this new strategy oriented towards neo-liberal doctrines mean an end to economic nationalism?

The Kim Young-sam regime made only limited progress with economic liberalization, which aimed at dismantling the underpinning structure of the South Korean political economy – ‘a network of power relationships that center on the state-Chaebol nexus’. Instead, South Korea’s first experience of a globalization campaign accommodating principles of neo-liberal global capitalism was strong local (Chaebol) resistance. Samuel Kim calls Kim Young-sam’s ‘Segyehwa’ a status drive and an easy and cheap way of projecting a new South Korean entity’. More importantly, the Chungkyung Yuchak, which is the center of South Korea’s economic trajectory and economic nationalism, has proven difficult to relinquish. Barry Gills adequately points out that Kim Young-sam’s initial anti-Chaebol (big deal) measures and attempts to dismantle vested interests and root out corrupt practices made part of the middle classes uneasy, reviving a conservative backlash against reform. More fundamentally, Kim Young-sam concluded he could not conduct his economic policy without the cooperation of the Chaebol, and

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thus turned away from the idea of a decisive break in the government-Chaebol reliance.33

One of the most conspicuous evidences of the continuing existence of economic nationalism can be found in South Korea’s move towards outward FDI (OFDI). One of the top-down and command-and-control reforms administered by Kim Young-sam’s globalization drive was the frequent and progressive relaxation of foreign exchange control and deregulation towards outward FDI (OFDI) laws from the early 1990s. South Korean Chaebol responded to those initiatives. In terms of cumulative total investment, South Korean OFDI, particularly in the Asian developing countries, increased from US$5.4 billion involving 2,726 projects at the end of 1993 to US$10.22 billion with 5,327 projects at the end of 1995. In most Southeast Asian countries since the early 1990s, South Korea has been among the top ten investors. To the South Korean state (the Kim Young-sam regime), ‘globalization’ meant increasing exports and booming OFDI.34 The late 1980s and onwards saw a vast relocation of part of the export manufacturing base to avoid trade friction with trading partners caused by the South Korean balance of payments surplus.

However, this process of state-led Chaebol-based ‘transnationalization of Chaebol’ as a part of Segyehwa35 became a major triggering factor behind South Korea’s unprecedented financial crisis in 1997 that had brought dramatic changes to the South Korean political economy.36 Ironically though, this financial crisis offered opportunities to implement major reforms, including hostile mergers and acquisitions, full opening of the domestic market to foreign products, and massive restructuring of financial institutions and the Chaebol. As Christopher Dent pointed out, the new government intended to ‘change the calculus of the state’s relationship with transnational capital, essentially switching priorities from promoting Chaebol transnationalization to domestic economy transnationalization’.37 In other words, the aim of the reforms was to change the engine of the South Korean economy from Chaebol expansion to inward FDI. In contrast to the dwindling OFDI, FDI inflows began to surge from 1997 and maintained strong growth until 2002. FDI inflows in 1997 were valued at $7 billion, which is more than double the previous year’s figure. FDI inflows peaked in 1999

35 Dent, “Transnational capital”, p.263.
and 2000, reaching $15.5 billion (11 per cent of exports) and $15.2 billion (8.8 per cent of exports), respectively. And out of a total of 1,148 inward FDI subject sectors, 1,117 sectors were completely opened and 18 sectors were partially opened to foreign investors at the end of 1998. This stark change was a direct consequence of the state’s curtailment of the Kim Young-sam administration’s OFDI strategy.

Despite its remarkable economic transformation in the late 20th century from a predominantly agricultural society into an industrial one, a corresponding change in people’s consciousness and perception is yet to materialize. The recent rise (2007 and 2008) in South Korea of sentiment opposed to foreign capital, due to the growing presence of foreign-controlled banks, to the entry of foreign equity funds, and to a series of anti-globalization/liberalism protests in 2008 (against a free trade agreement with the United States and imports of American beef), questions whether South Korea is reverting to the South Korea of old, that is, to a country dictated by isolationism, self-sufficiency and the closed mindset of the people. In this sense, South Korea’s stance toward foreign investment is at best ambivalent. This hybrid nature of the globalization process in South Korea – whereby the state is highly selective in embracing the principal values of globalization, adopting economic values but resisting cultural transformation – is likely to continue to be a dominant characteristic of South Korea’s globalization paradigm. As Samuel Kim correctly notes, ‘for a trading state like South Korea, with an extremely high trade/GNP product ratio, the extent of its openness and transparency and the degree of its global competitiveness correlate most closely with globalization in only one domain: economic globalization’. The following comment of the official from the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade well reflects this sentiment: ‘selling Daewoo to Ford, GM or any other foreign companies to many South Koreans equates to selling your country’.

South Korea’s Economic Nationalism Perceived by MNCs
In the 1970s and even early 1980s, the purchase and consumption of foreign consumer products (eg, whiskies, cosmetics and food products, tobacco) were completely prohibited, and were available only in the black market. Today however, almost any foreign consumer

product is obtainable from most small to medium and big department stores as well as small shops in South Korea. Even the tobacco industry, which has been the toughest industry to enter, shows a strong contrast to the previous decades. Yet, many South Koreans still tend to believe that their government was forced to adopt liberalization measures under external pressure (the 1997 financial crisis), rather than viewing them as being truly beneficial to themselves and to their own economy.

A recent survey of changes to South Korea’s international business environment such as perceptions of big corporations such as Samsung, Hyundai, LG, SK, South Korean workers, management system and improvements of living conditions after the 1997 financial crisis from a foreign perspective reveals there has been little evidence of improvement contrary to the government effort.42 ‘Global Benchmark Report 2010’ published by the Confederation of Danish Industry echoed the above. This report evaluated the 28 OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) member states on 84 measurable indicators in six main categories: growth and development; knowledge and competences; business flexibility; enterprise and entrepreneurship; costs and taxation; and internationalisation and openness. According to the report, while South Korea was ranked third in overall adaptation to the globalised world among the OECD member countries, South Korea was ranked 20th in the category of Business environment attractiveness for foreign highly-skilled workers, 22nd in Internationalisation and openness, 11th in Attitudes toward Globalization, 27th in Cultural openness, and 28th in Discrimination towards race, gender, etc.43

Despite some recent efforts by the South Korean government to further an economic globalization agenda, a strong and extensive tradition of economic nationalism (state-business alliance and non-reliance on inward foreign direct investment) is still evident in South Korea. As found in many collectivist and relationship-oriented cultures44, the South Korean government behavior is still often perceived as nationalistic and xenophobic by many in the international business community.

To verify the perception, we conducted 41 face-to-face in-depth interviews between April and September in 2010 in Seoul, South Korea with chief executive officers (CEOs) of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) and 4 foreign chambers of commerce operating in South Korea. Companies interviewed in this study reflected a variety of sources of ownership: American (10), German (10), Japanese (9), British (4), Swiss (2), French (2), Australian (3), Taiwanese (1) and South Korean (1) as did the nationality of the interviewees. Although sample of the firms was small and not fully representative, MNCs were selected based on a wide range of sectors, length of stay in South Korea, nationalities of firms, individuals and firm sizes. Sectors include automobile products, law firm, IT, Ultrasound engineering, banking, insurance, semi-conductor, Medicine, Shipbuilding, LED/LCD, Laser etc, and foreign chambers of commerce.

The advantage of this approach is that face-to-face interviews are able to delve into perceptions which, though extremely important, are very hard to identify using conventional quantitative, survey and macro assessment methods. Given the highly sensitive nature of the data collected, confidentially was guaranteed and the views of individual firms are not given in the article, although anonymous quotations are used to make some of the points directly. Interviews were taped, transcribed, and subsequently interrogated, then deconstructed. Qualitative software, Nvivo, is used for data analysis to identify the patterns, themes and causal-effects relationships. This entails categorising respondents’ comments according to their subject matter. The programme can then arrange for all comments on related issues, or concerning particular themes, to be viewed together. These comments are cross-referenced with the interview context so that, for example, it will be apparent whether the speakers were from western or Asian firms, with which industries they might be involved and so forth. Interviewees were invited to give their comments on the following questions:

- Does the South Korean government have a serious intent to accelerate an effort to make the nation integrate into global economy?
- Why are there still frequent changed and the government attitude towards FDI viewed as nationalistic, neo-mercantilistic and parochial?
- How is the concept of globalization viewed by the government and the people in general; and
- What is the feasibility of South Korea’s becoming a R&D Hub in Northeast Asia?
Each interviewee was asked to comment on major areas to be improved in the South Korea’s transition to a mature economy. Interestingly, contrary to the South Korean government’s strong belief, over 95 per cent out of 41 interviewees believed several factors would delay globalization process. These factors include strong South Korean nationalism, militant union, labour inflexibility, inconsistency and unpredictability of government regulations, bureaucratic red-tape and excessive regulatory bodies. As shown in Table 1, two thirds of company managers interviewed saw in South Korea strong economic nationalism; different concept on globalization or xenophobic attitude towards doing business in South Korea, transparency and inconsistent regulations, bureaucratic red-tape and regulatory bodies, as major challenges and impediments for South Korea’s moving into a mature economy.

**Take Table 1 here**

One of the notable findings from the interviews is that the prevailing psyche within South Korea is that foreign investors still perceive South Koreans are anti-foreign. Indeed, the government still classifies the attraction of foreign direct investment as a nationalist goal. Not surprisingly, our interview data shows that 73 per cent (or 30 interviewees) of the 41 foreign CEOs viewed South Korea’s strong nationalism as the most challenging constraint to the success of the South Korea’s integration into the global economy. South Korea is still considered among CEOs in general to be an unattractive place for conducting business. Without further change, South Korea’s new vision for becoming Northeast Asia’s R&D Hub will remain a ‘desk theory’. For example, only 2 out of 41 respondents (5%) agreed that South Korea could become a business center in the Northeast Asian region.

**South Korea’s Economic Nationalism Perceived by the South Korean Society**

Majority of our interviewees still perceived to be difficult for foreign brands to penetrate and its consumers are relatively ethnocentric on average. Findings from the J.D. Power, a market research firm, on consumer attitude towards imported cars in South Korea, show that almost 50% of potential owners feared tax audits if they bought a foreign car; 42% were worried that their car would be vandalized; 30% feared they would be assaulted; and 13% believed that driving a foreign car would make them a target for traffic police”.

And the reasons given by South Korean consumers for being feared of buying imported cards according to the report include ‘detrimental to national interest’ and ‘reception of dirty looks from peers’. A survey

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conducted by *Se Gye Ilbo* (The World Daily) immediately following the financial crisis (1997) revealed that South Koreans were still pretty much occupied with economic nationalist tendency: 78.1 per cent of the total respondents answered yes to the question, “Are you willing to purchase and use products made only by South Korean companies, regardless of price or quality to overcome the crisis?”; over 93% of respondents replied yes to the question, “Will you join the movements and campaigns for working one hour more or working on a rest day to help the country overcome the crisis?”.

If economic nationalism (EN) is one of the major phenomena dominating South Korea society broadly and therefore leads to citizens’ supports for domestic industries, it is likely that EN has a positive and wide influences on domestic product preference. To verify this speculation, we conducted an empirical survey.

Two product categories, automobile and shampoo, were selected for the survey. Compared to shampoo, automobile is not only a more time and money consuming product with a higher perceived risk to buy, but also very important to South Korean economy. In contrast, shampoo is a non-durable product requiring less expenditure and time than automobile. The adoption of two product categories and their comparison will be helpful to grasp more elaborately the influence of economic nationalism.

We employed Baughn and Yaprak’s scale for measuring EN tendency. The scale consists of 16 items, reflecting EN’s 8 domains: (1) restrictions on foreign firms, (2) restrictions on foreign investment, (3) restrictions on immigration of workers, (4) formal barriers to foreign products, (5) “buy domestic” sentiment, (6) intellectual property, (7) domestic production by U.S. firms, and (8) a general “U.S. first” orientation trade and interfirm competition. Based on the result of a pretest for 50 South Koreans, further, we reduced carefully the original 16 items by half, considering semantic accuracy, question similarity and internal consistency. The reliability of retained items showed a sufficient value (Cronbach’s alpha = .74).

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47 Baughn and Yaprak, “Economic Nationalism”. 
In the mean time, we measured South Koreans’ preference of domestic automobile (PA: preference for automobile) and shampoo (PS: preference for shampoo) by using Yi and Jeon’s\textsuperscript{48} attitude scale consisting of 4 items. With the questionnaire form produced through a careful translating & back-translating process by four bilinguals of English and South Korean, we collected 257 samples by convenient sampling at the Metropolitan area of South Korea in November, 2010. Respondents’ ages ranged from 19 to 73 with a mean age of 34.09; 37.0 percent (n=95) of whom was male and 63.0 percent (n=162) was female; 59.9 percent (n=154) was unmarried; 87.2 percent (n=224) had more than 12 years of educational period; occupations were composed of undergraduate student (n=37, 14.4%), employee or self-employed (n=184, 71.6%), housewife (n=21, 8.2%), other (n=6, 2.3%), and unemployed (n=9, 3.5%); the highest level of annual household incomes were 30 – 50 million South Korean Won (n=88, 34.3%). As of February 2011, in passing, one U. S. dollar is approximately 1,100 South Korean Won.

An exploratory factor analysis for the entire data (principal component extraction; varimax rotation) showed a good dimensionality, resulting in one factor for each construct (EN, PA, PS) respectively. Subsequently, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), using the maximum likelihood fitting process in AMOS 17. The model fit was judged by $\chi^2$ statistic and degrees of freedom, the adjusted chi-square test ($\chi^2$/df), the comparative fit index (CFI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). The goodness-of-fit of model with three constructs allowed to correlated with one another exhibited a good level ($\chi^2 = 272.80$, df = 101, $p < .001$, $\chi^2$/df = 2.70, CIF = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.082). Furthermore, all the constructs indicated acceptable factor loadings ranging from 0.34 to 0.94 (see Table 2). Hence, the convergent validity of the scales was found to be reasonable.

\textbf{Take Table 2 here}

Meanwhile, a constrained model with each correlation of three constructs fixed at one, showed a poor fit ($\chi^2 = 375.592$, df = 104, $p < .001$, $\chi^2$/df = 3.61, CIF = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.101). When the correlations were unconstrained, however, the model fit improved considerably ($\chi^2 = 272.80$, df = 101, $p < .001$, $\chi^2$/df = 2.70, CIF = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.082)

with a significant reduction of chi-square ($\chi^2 = 102.79$, df = 3, $p < .001$). Therefore, the discriminant validity of constructs was found to be established.

Table 3 shows the results of descriptive statistics, reliabilities and intercorrelations among constructs used in this study.

**Take Table 3 here**

Table 4 and Figure 1 exhibit the results of structural equation modeling (SEM).

**Take Table 4 here**

**Figure 1 here**

As shown in Table 4 and Figure 1, EN predicted positively on both PA ($b =.32$, $t = 3.42$, $p < .001$) and PS ($b =.27$, $t = 3.06$, $p < .01$). Even though the effect of EN on PA rather than PS was stronger, PS was also influenced strongly at $p < .01$ level. This result provides a proof that EN tendency has still notable influences on South Koreans’ product preference, irrespective of product categories.

South Korea can be regarded as an emerging country experiencing a variety of changes across broad aspects of society under the recent globalization. Although the accelerating globalization facilitates rapid social and economic changes and in turn leads to transitions in the traditional value system and social norms, this finding suggests EN tendency remains unchanged, rather having still a considerable impacts on South Koreans’ attitudes that attempt to protect domestic industries. Given that, furthermore, the effects of EN were found widely in different types of products, that is, automobile and shampoo, such South Koreans’ supports to domestic industries are deemed to hold true, regardless of the level of perceived risk, time and money on purchase.

Our empirical result echoed what Samuel Kim found in his evaluation of South Korea’s segyewha or globalization drive in that “despite the rising globalization and globalism chorus, deep down South Korea remains mired in the cocoon of exclusive cultural nationalism, which acts as a powerful and persistent constraint on the segyehwa drive…no
fundamental learning, no paradigm shift has occurred in the course of South Korea’s segeypla drive, only situation-specific tactical adaptation”. 49 In other words, economic nationalism is in action despite the massive influx of foreign products (culture) since its first use of the term ‘globalization’ since the mid 1980s.

In South Korea where economic globalization since the mid 1990s has been led mainly by the state’s intervention and coordination in a collectivist manner, South Koreans’ global mind-set might be less effective in making consumers open to foreign made products although their self-conscious level of globalization would be relatively high”. 50 Although the country has been regarded as a typical collectivist culture, the case of South Korea reveals that individualistic and collectivistic cultural dispositions exist together with the advance of globalization. 51

**Conclusion: Is Economic Nationalism in Action?**

The South Korean case clearly shows that structural and institutional factors such as state-capital relationships affected by internal and external factors in the course of capitalist industrialization, (all of which have driven a set of different targets for the state in achieving economic and political goals) do not seem to influence South Korea’s development trajectory. The significant increase of foreign capital in South Korea from the late 1990s has been closely related to the South Korean state's change in economic policies particularly towards foreign capital. These economic activities whether neo-liberal or neo-mercantilist adopted over the process of capitalist industrialization have been found to be subordinate to the goal of state building and the interests of the state. This suggests a very different consideration from the tradition of economic liberalism, which emphasizes factor endowments. In fact the study reveals that the South Korean regimes’ ‘liberal motivation for liberalization’ has been directed and promoted by developmental and neo-mercantilist policies. Thus, all vestiges of collectivist nature of economic nationalism are yet to disappear.


Our qualitative (in-depth interviews) and empirical study also substantiates the view that there is a strong correlation between the state’s economic nationalistic policies and consumer economic nationalism tendency. The study shows that South Korea’s strong economic culture (economic nationalism that has prioritized national interest and security over ideology), accumulated over the last three decades (1960s-1980s), has been embedded and reflected in Korean consumers purchasing behavior today. The collective nature of economic nationalism still is prevalent in the South Korean society despite rapid development of globalization and cosmopolitanism. Empirical result shows that the level of economic globalization is inconsistent with the level of the South Korean people’s global mindsets.

To conclude, the neo-liberal nature of globalization (where one finds an open and expanding market in South Korea in the late 20th century) has yet brought about political, institutional, and socio-cultural transformation along with the shift in South Korea’s developmental growth paradigm. There still is ample evidence of the South Korean state’s autonomy, which is a strong indication of economic nationalism. Perhaps, the oscillation between economic nationalism and global openness may not be a phenomenon unique to South Korea. It could quite commonly surface in the countries with strong traditional values driven and led by the strong state that are at the transitional stage, planning to shift towards more mature economy.
Table 1. MNCs’ perceptions on the South Korean Market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Negative factor (number of respondents)</th>
<th>Per cent (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour inflexibility</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Labour cost</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaebol’s dominance in domestic markets</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Globalization mindset among bureaucrats and the public</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Nationalism/xenophobia/anti-foreign sentiment</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistency/unpredictability/ambiguity of policies/regulations</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Instability</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean business culture (strong relationship)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility of becoming a Northeast R&amp;D Hub</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Construct Measures and Results of CFA (Standardized Regression Weights)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct Items</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(EN)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign products should be taxed heavily to reduce their entry into South Korea.</td>
<td>.738</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign investment in South Korea is a threat to South Korean economic security.</td>
<td>.622</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The operations of foreign companies in South Korea should be tightly controlled by our government.</td>
<td>.584</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean companies that ship jobs overseas are deserting their country.</td>
<td>.553</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korean consumers who purchase products made in other countries are responsible for putting their fellow South Korean out of work.</td>
<td>.547</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants should not be permitted to come into South Korea if they compete with our own workers.</td>
<td>.504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The transfer of South Korean technology to foreign firms should be tightly controlled.</td>
<td>.432</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In our trade relations with other countries, it is important that South Korea come out on top.</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(PA)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like South Korean cars more so than foreign cars.</td>
<td>.932</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a strong preference for South Korean cars.</td>
<td>.864</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would recommend South Korean cars to others.</td>
<td>.783</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I give prior consideration to South Korean cars when I have a need for a product of this type.</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(PS)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a strong preference for South Korean shampoos.</td>
<td>.937</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like South Korean shampoos more so than foreign shampoos.</td>
<td>.896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I give prior consideration to South Korean shampoos when I have a need for a product of this type.</td>
<td>.866</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would recommend South Korean shampoos to others.</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 272.80, \text{df} = 101, p < .001, \chi^2/\text{df} = 2.70, \text{CFI}=0.92, \text{RMSEA}=0.082$

Notes: EN denotes Economic Nationalism; PA, Preference for Domestic Car; PS, Preference for Domestic Shampoo.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, Reliability and Construct Intercorrelations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construct Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.71</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * Internal Consistency Reliability: Cronbach’s alpha coefficient; * the number of items. EN: Economic Nationalism; PA: Preference for domestic Automobile; PS: Preference for domestic Shampoo. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05.

Table 4. Structural Equation Model Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Standardized parameter estimate</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>CR</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>PA</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>3.416</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>3.055</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<.001

Figure 1. Structural Equation Model Results

\[ \chi^2 = 302.84, df = 102, p < .001, \frac{\chi^2}{df} = 2.97, CIF = 0.90, RMSEA = 0.088 \]

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05.
The Introduction of a Formal Garden as a Sign of the Diffusion of Geomancy (Pungsu) to the Korean Peninsula

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The Introduction of a Formal Garden as a Sign of the Diffusion of Geomancy (Pungsu) to the Korean Peninsula

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Abstract

Geomancy (pungsu in Korean and feng shui in Chinese) is the ancient Chinese art of landscape evaluation when choosing auspicious sites for houses, public buildings, settlements and graves. It is postulated that the art of geomancy originated from the Loess Plateau, North China and its well developed form was introduced to Korea with an early wave of the cultural diffusion from China before or during the Three Kingdom’s Period. This paper proposes that the appearance of formal gardens (Chinese gardens with ponds) is a sign of the diffusion of geomancy to the Korean Peninsula. This argument is based on the following two points: Firstly, both geomancy and the art of creating gardens share the same purpose of creating an ideal environment for humans. A garden is more than a collection and display of beautiful plants and trees. It represents a human endeavour to create an ideal environment for human habitation. Gardens are reorganisations of nature in a way that humans see as most ideal (beautiful). The art of geomancy is also an attempt to choose a most auspicious site and to create an ideal residence or grave on it. Secondly, Chinese garden art and geomancy share similar views on the quality of water: a pond or a watercourse should be in front of a house, not behind the house. This classical Chinese garden principle is an application of the geomantic idea that vital energy travels through soil, but stops when the energy meets water, for it cannot cross through the water (Guo Pu, Zangshu, 1). The ancient art of garden making incorporates much of these geomantic principles. Therefore, I suggest that the appearance of palace gardens in Koguryo, Paekje and Silla during The Three Kingdoms Period can be used as a sign of the diffusion of geomancy to the Korean Peninsula.
Introduction

The impact of geomancy (pungsu in Korean, fengshui in Chinese) on Korean culture and landscape is persistently significant throughout Korean history. Often the art of geomancy played the key role in the selection of sites for graves, temples and settlements including cities and villages. However, geomancy is not of Korean origin, rather the practice began in China. The basic geomantic principles of choosing an auspicious site by observing its surrounding landscape (especially landforms) and its facing direction are closely related to the ideal conditions of cave dwelling sites in the Loess Plateau, North China. The geomantic principles applied on the Korean Peninsula were derived from the Chinese classical geomantic textbooks.

There are differing views on the beginning of the practices of geomancy in Korea. Some argue that geomancy is of Korean origin. However, much credible evidence supports the view that the art of geomancy is of Chinese origin and that it arrived on the Korean Peninsula in a fully developed form, although the time of its introduction remains uncertain. Based on my earlier research published elsewhere, this paper aims to argue that the initial appearance of the exemplary Chinese style garden in Korea is a sign of the diffusion of geomancy from China to the Korean Peninsula.

The view that geomancy is indigenous to Korea is known as “chasaeng pungsu”. This view is not well supported by any credible evidence, because all key and popular geomantic textbooks used in Korea are from China and the basic principles of geomancy, especially those of landforms, closely reflect the environmental conditions in the Loess Plateau. Clearly, it previously appeared that geomancy was developed as an integral part of ancient Chinese culture, which was then diffused to Korea, much in the same way as Confucian doctrines and

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3 An important scholar representing this view is Choi Changjo. In his book, Chasaeng Pungsu (Korean origin geomancy)
its classical works had been distributed.

Some people argue that the Tangun myth (the story of founding Korea by the mythical ancestor) contains a certain geomantic idea, but I refute such a view on the grounds that it does not suggest or refer to any geomantic terms of favourable sites or geomantic criteria for an auspicious site. However, the legend relating to choosing the capital city site by King Surowang (supposedly AD 42-199), the first king of Karakguk, (a confederated state in the South-eastern part of the Korean Peninsula) is much more geomantic in its nature. According to the Samgukyusa, or Memorabilia of the Three Kingdom, the king went to a place called Simdabpyong to examine the site’s worthiness as the Capital City and commented that it was a suitable site, because its landscape (mountains and watercourses) were beautiful and unusually shaped. Although no geomantic terms are found in the king’s comment during his field inspection, his comment on the landscape of the site is somewhat geomantic, for he gave attention to the shape of the surrounding landforms as geomancers do when they examine a settlement site. A legend from early Korean history containing more geomantic nuance is the story of Talhae during his childhood before becoming the 4th King (AD 57-80) of the Silla dynasty. In the story, Talhae cheated a man known as Hogong to occupy a house site that is shaped like crescent. The crescent shaped land is a geomantically auspicious site as its three sides are surrounded by hills (namely white tiger, the Main Mountain and azure dragon). These early Korean myths and legends are recorded as written documents only in the 13th century, although they are likely to already have existed as oral tradition long before their conversion into written records.

In the study of the early history of geomancy in Korea, the story of the migration of a legendary Chinese sage, Qizhi (Kija in Korean) to Korea is significant. According to an early Chinese source, Qizhi fled to Choson (Korea) around 1050 BC in response to the then newly installed Chinese regime. The sage supposedly brought Chinese culture with him to Korea, and when he became a Korean king, he taught his people about morality, farming and weaving. It is important to consider that this story may not be entirely based on historical facts. It is possible that Qizhi did not come to Korea, or that he did not even exist. However, the story may signify an important historical reality: the arrival of some Chinese immigrants

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5 Ilyon (1969), Samguk yusa, vol. 1, p. 120.
6 Fu Sheng, Shangshu dachuan (Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1937), 59.
with a more sophisticated ancient Chinese culture compared to that of Korean people. Some Chinese at that time would have immigrated to the Korean Peninsula for various socio-political reasons, especially with their more advanced cultural ideas and technology. The Chinese geomancy was perhaps introduced to the Korean Peninsula through these early waves of Chinese immigrants. Its introduction could have occurred at a similar time as the introduction of the ancient Chinese culture such as Confucianism and Daoism.

Geomancy is likely to have been practised in Korea since the early stages of its history, perhaps even predating the Three Kingdoms Period (BC 57-668). However, no concrete historical evidence exists to support this view, for the first written record known to date on the use of geomancy in Korea is The Stele Inscription of Sungboksa Buddhist Temple written by Choi Chiwon (857-?) on an event associated with the practice of geomancy in 798. According to the inscription, when King Wonsong of the Silla dynasty died, his tomb was made at the site of the Buddhist temple called Koksa after forcefully removing the existing temple buildings. The tomb was built despite resistance from the Buddhist temple side. The Stele inscription also briefly hints at the beneficial influence of descendants from an ancestor’s grave in an auspicious site and even mentions the famous ancient Chinese geomancer Qingwuzhi (青鸞子) or Master Azure-crow. This Stele inscription is still regarded as the first written record on the practice of geomancy in Korea. This Stele inscription reporting a conflict over an auspicious site suggests that the belief in and the practice of geomancy in Korea was already so well established by 798 that the ruling royal families forcefully took over an auspicious temple site for constructing a royal tomb. If the belief in geomancy was as intense as shown by the events leading up to the year 798, then it is plausible that geomancy arrived in Korea many years before this date. In search for evidence of the introduction of geomancy in the Korean Peninsula, we need to give special attention to the first appearance of the Chinese style garden in Korea, for their designs appear to reflect the earliest known applications of geomantic principles.

**Geomancy and Gardens**

The art of house geomancy and the practice of garden design share one common goal of creating an ideal environment for human habitation. Geomancy aims to find an auspicious

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site and build a suitable structure upon it. It is an act of creating an ideal environment for living. Gardens aim to reorganise the natural environment into the way people see most pleasing. A garden is more than a collection and display of beautiful plants and trees. It represents a human endeavour to create an ideal environment for the human habitat. Gardens are reorganisations of nature in a way that humans perceive as most ideal (beautiful). A house garden is an outcome of the reorganisation of the land and the vegetation surrounding a house according to what its residents (or garden designers) thought most ideal. The design of gardens can also be seen as an act of creating an ideal environment for living. Japanese and Chinese garden manuals reflect the application of geomantic principles in arranging ground, creating ponds, and planting trees.

In geomancy, there is a belief is that vital energy flows into the house site through the soil from background mountain range, but the energy will not flow away when it meets water, for the energy cannot cross water in a stream or a pond. One of the most important geomancy classics, Zangshu, written by Guo Pu (276–324) of the Jin (晋) dynasty states: “The canon decrees that the (vital) energy scatters itself as it rides wind, and it stops and stays (in the place), as it meets water. That is why it is called fengshui (wind and water: Chinese geomancy).” As shown in this classic, it has been a fundamental geomantic belief that the vital energy cannot flow across water in front of an auspicious site and thus it stays in the house site. That is why an auspicious site for a house or grave was normally at the foot hill with hilly ground at its rear and water in front of it. In order to guarantee the capture of vital energy in the auspicious site (house or grave site), they often prepared a pond (garden pond) in the front yard of a house (or in front of a grave in south China). When considering a site, a preferred direction in geomancy is normally the south and its front yard is naturally on the south side of a house. Seeing this as the general condition of an auspicious house site in geomancy, if a traditional Korean house (palace, a government house or a rich person’s house) is facing the south and there has been prepared a garden pond in its front yard, such a house site arrangement strongly signifies the influence of geomancy. On this ground, I would like to suggest that an ancient Korean establishment of a garden with pond on the south (front) yard of a house can signify the practice of geomancy. I would now like to trace back to the time of the first appearance of a house garden with a pond in a front yard (south side) in Korea.

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8 Guo Pu, Zangjing, neipian [The book of burial, the inner volume], in Chongwen Shuju Heikeshu (Wuhan: Hubei Chongwen Shuju, 18750, l.)
The first garden in Korean history

During the Three Kingdoms period (BC 57-AD 668) all three kingdoms, Koguryo, Paekje and Silla, appeared to have established gardens with ponds. Especially in the gardens that were established by Paekje palaces, which were clearly recorded in the Samguksagi or the History of Three Kingdoms. The earliest record on a palace garden with a pond is on the event in spring AD 391 (the 7th year of the reign of King Chinsa), during which the palace rooms were renovated, the garden ponds were prepared, and garden hills were constructed where rare and beautiful animals and flowers were raised. The book also recorded that on the 35th year of the reign (635AD) of King Muwang that:

During the Third Moon (March according to Lunar Calendar) on the southern side of palace a garden pond (lake) was constructed and irrigated water from 20ri (5Km) away from it. On the four sides of pond the willows were planted and in the middle of the pond, an island was constructed. The Island was compared with Bangjiang Mountain for Supernatural Sages (Bangjangsunsan).

The same book recorded that during the Eighth Moon (August according to Lunar Calendar) of King Muwang’s 35th year reign a feast (party) was held for the King and his staff (officers). It is also recorded that the King, along with his wife and concubines, went boating on the Great Pond in March AD 639. The great (garden) pond is likely to have been the so-called South Pond of the Palace (Kungnamji). Historical records also show that at least one Paekje king had floated pleasure boats in the palace garden pond and had feasts (garden parties) at the garden pavilion called Manghaeru (The Pavilion of Looking out the Sea). These records suggest that the size of the palace garden was quite grand with a pleasure boat(s) in a big garden pond and garden pavilion(s). However, these historical records are not sufficient in order for us to understand the exact size and floor plan of the palace garden. Nevertheless, we have enough evidence to conjecture that the garden was probably influenced by geomancy, for the garden pond and garden hill (the island in the pond?) was prepared in the south court (the front court) of the palace. In our effort to understand the characteristics of the ancient Paekje palace gardens, it is useful to consider the

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11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
Japanese historical records concerning the introduction of the first palace garden from Korea. From the description of the first Japanese garden, we can conjecture the garden characteristics of Paekje palace, for the first Japanese palace garden designer was Rojakong or ‘Michiko no Takumi’ in Japanese, an immigrant from Paekje. According to the Nihongi, the book of early historical records of Japan, the story of the first garden in Japan is as follows:  

This year a man emigrated from Pekche [Paekje] whose face and body were all flecked with white, being perhaps affected with white ringworm. People disliking his extraordinary appearance, wished to cast him away on an island in the sea. But this man said: “If you dislike my spotted skin, you should not breed horses or kine in this country which are spotted with white. Moreover, I have a small talent. I can make the figures of hills and mountains. If you kept me and made use of me, it would be to the advantage of the country. Why should you waste me by casting me away on an island of the sea?” Hereupon they gave ear to his words and did not cast him away. Accordingly he was made to draw the figures of Mount Sumi and of the Bridge of Wu in the Southern Court. The people of that time called him by the name of Michiko no Takumi, and he was also called Shikomaro.

From the above record we can assume that the Korean immigrant built the first Japanese garden on the south court of the palace by preparing an arched bridge over a pond or a stream. The Bridge of Wu, or Ojakkyo in Korean, was likely an arched bridge similar to the one that we often see in Japanese gardens. The above historical record does not inform us whether or not he indeed prepared a garden pond in the first Japanese palace garden. However, the fact that he made an arched bridge in the garden suggests that either he built a pond or at least he created a stream that he then placed a bridge over. Such an example of garden design sounds quite geomantic for the two reasons that: firstly, the south court must be the front court, because the palace accordingly faced southward (an auspicious direction) position just as other palace buildings were located in China and Korea; secondly, a garden pond in the front of a house is also geomantic, primarily because it symbolises the capturing of vital energy in the house.

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The figure of Mount Sumi in the Japanese historical record can be interpreted as Mount Sumeru, the mythic Buddhist Mountain, which is supposed to be in the centre of Buddhist Mandela. In geomancy, an auspicious site requires the background hills and an open flat front. However, a hill, called Ansan or Table Mountain, in the front at some distance from the auspicious site (e.g., palace) is needed to protect the site. Mount Sumi in the first Japanese palace garden would have functioned geomantically as the Table Mountain that protected the auspiciousness of the palace. The garden hill (Mount Sumi) was perhaps created as an island in the middle of the garden pond or somewhere further away from the pond and palace building. Whether it is an island or a garden hill further away from the pond, a hill in the front court is a table mountain in geomantic terms. This first Japanese garden was likely modelled after the Paekje palace garden, for it was created by an immigrant garden designer, who had just arrived from the Paekje Kingdom. I conjecture that Rojagong (Michiko no Takumi) was one of the Paekje palace gardeners (or garden designers). Judging from the way he introduced himself as a garden designer, and also the fact that he was commissioned to build the first Japanese palace garden, he would have necessarily acquired the garden construction skills from the Paekje palace garden as a gardener or garden designer. It is unlikely that the commoners at that time had the ability and resources to build such formal gardens as described in the historical records. It is assumed that only sites such as the palace and the royal temple were likely to have had any gardens of sizeable scales with garden ponds.

Rojagong might have created a garden stream instead of a garden pond and he would have then put the arched bridge over the stream, while he created a garden hill (Mount Sumi in the historical record) beyond the stream from the palace building. If this was indeed the case, such an arrangement would also be very favourable geomantic conditions, for a palace with watercourse in front and a hill beyond the water resembles an auspicious site in a miniaturised form. Judging from the information from Nihongi that Rojagong put across an arched bridge, he most likely created a garden pond in the Southern Court, instead of a garden stream. However, he might even have created both, a pond and a stream, only to put the arched bridges over them. In any case, a creation of water features and a garden hill in the Southern Court of the palace forms such a geomantically suitable arrangement. Considering these historical records, the garden that Rojagong created appeared to reflect an application of geomantic principles and may in fact also reflect the prototype of the Paekje palace garden design, since he was from Paekje and almost certainly a palace gardener. If a
garden reflecting an application of geomantic principles appeared in Japan by AD 612, such a garden would have existed in Korea (Paekje) some time before that date. In fact, already by AD 391, The Samguk sagi had recorded the existence of the Paekje garden with a garden pond and a garden hill on which were raised extraordinary flowering plants and animals. Perhaps in light of this evidence, the Paekje palace garden might well have been the model for the first Japanese garden.

Clearly, Japan practised the art of geomancy by 7th century. According to the Nihonshoki, during the 10th Moon of AD 602 Kwanruk, a Buddhist monk from Paekje, brought books relating to astrology, chiri (geomancy) and divination to the Japanese palace. At that time, some 3 to 4 Japanese scholars learned about those books from the Korean monk. And in AD 612, Japan created the first palace garden reflecting geomantic principles by a Korean immigrant. In addition to these records regarding the introduction of geomancy to Japan, there is a clear Japanese record that the then Japanese government officers examined the newly proposed capital site, Nara basin, by applying geomantic principles on the 15th Day of the Second Moon (February), in AD 708. The Shoku Nihongi (The Sequel to the Nihongi) recorded the incident, citing that “the land of Nara is suitable for the new capital to build, because the land is in accordance with the four guardians (azure dragon, white tiger, black warrier and red bird – the protective hills on the four directions of an auspicious site) and three sides are sheltered by mountains (hills)”.

The Shoku Nihongi’s statement clearly demonstrated that geomantic terms and principles were applied when the Japanese court inspected the newly proposed capital site. Based on these records, we can assume that geomancy was practised some time before the 7th century by the ruling class in Japan. Korea must, therefore, have practised geomancy sometime before that time, for the Koreans most likely introduced the art to Japan.


Conclusion

The art of geomancy and of garden design share one common goal of creating an ideal place (landscape) for human dwelling. The principles of garden design used in Ancient Korea and Japan reflect the influence of geomancy (fengshui). In East Asia, both the art of garden design and that of geomancy originated from China and were seemingly diffused to the Korean Peninsula, and thereafter introduced to the Japanese Archipelago. Nihongi, a key historical record of Japan documented that the first garden was created by a Korean immigrant in AD 612. This first Japanese garden appeared to reflect the influence of geomantic principles by having a garden pond and a garden hill (probably an island in the pond) on the Southern (front) Court. This first Japanese garden built by a Korean may well be a sign of the introduction of geomancy in Japan. Therefore, it can be said that in the Korean Peninsula such a type of garden necessarily existed some time before the first Japanese garden. Here I suggest that the Paekje palace garden, which was created in AD 391, during the 7th year of King Chinsa’s reign, was the proto model of the first Japanese garden created by a Korean immigrant. Based on these discussions, one can argue that the first appearance of gardens reflecting geomantic principles signifies the introduction of geomancy into the Korean Peninsula. This paper argues that the diffusion of geomancy to the Korea can be traced back as far as AD 391, with the first written record of the appearance of the palace garden in Paekje.
The Political Impacts on Korean Music Education During the First Period of Japanese Colonial Rule (1910-1918)

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Abstract

Despite a rising international awareness of world music, including Korean traditional music (Howard 2005) and a national increase of Korean music content in the Korean school curriculum (Choi 2007), Western art music is still regarded as artistically superior to traditional Korean music by the majority of the general Korean public (Min 2002, 34). So far, there is little research into the cause of this lack of national identity. The root of this problem might lie in Japanese colonialism of Korea. Similarly, Mukuna (1997) claims that in Africa for example colonial teaching methods continue to provide moulds in which and students’ progress is measured according to standards foreign to the culture. This is a similar to the situation of music education in Korea today. Many music educators in Korea have not even considered the impacts of colonialism, even though some scholars work in this area.

For this I am investigating how political and educational environments influenced each other during the first period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1918, also known as military policy) and how school music was involved in other music genres. To address these questions, I am using two different approaches: examination of original Japanese education policies and the analysis of teaching materials in music text books. In particular, I am trying to find out how the content of school policies and teaching materials was related to political circumstances of the time.

Introduction

The school music education during Japanese colonial rule is usually a ‘forgotten period’ in Korea, because music at school was hardly considered by historians, including
musicologists. Even though some scholars have researched school music during the colonial period (e.g. Lim 2001; Kim 1997; Lee 2007; Park 1999; Chun 1997) these studies all focus on the musical analysis of music text books. Some Korean scholars believe that Korean school music began after Korea’s independence from Japan in 1945 (e.g. Choi 2007). This is correct only from a purely chronological point of view since Korea itself largely developed its own music curriculum after independence with an American education influence.

In fact, however, the beginnings of Korean school music should be considered as from the enlightenment period of the 1880s, because the modern education system was initiated in that period by the Korean government. Later on, school music was shaped during Japanese colonial rule. In particular, the beginning of the 20th century was a time when new music genres emerged in Korean society, and these music genres involved and influenced school music.

Even though music was an optional subject in the school curriculum during the first period of the colonial period (1910-1908), it was fundamentally significant because new music genres appeared for the first time, in particular Changga, which all influenced school music. Later, Changga was used in military music and these kind of military melodies are still in use at school and in Korean society today, particular in protestant churches (Min 2008). From this point of view, it is important to examine how school music was shaped through the colonial political situation and educational policy.

This article is to examine how political and educational environments influenced each other during the first period of Japanese colonial rule (1910-1918), generally known as ‘military policy’, and how school music was involved with other music genres and how they influenced each other. Due to different types of schools (Botong hakgyo and private schools), I also examine and assess two different education systems through the regulations for primary and private school. In the last section of this article it is considered how music was developed through these regulations at school and what kind of music was used at these two school types.
1. Political background

Strong resistance to the Japanese colonialization of Korea continued from the end of the 19th century and through to the beginning of the 20th century, with the most intense period between 1907 and 1910 (Gang 2004, 54-55). Resistance was in form of a guerrilla warfare, which was connected with the Donghak Peasant Movement (1893-1895). Most of the guerrillas (Uibyeong or righteous army) were former Joseon soldiers and patriotic literati. In 1907, a force of 10,000 penetrated within miles of the capital Seoul. Japan estimated that there were 69,832 armed guerrillas operating in Korea in 1908, engaging in nearly 1500 clashes with the Japanese army (Cumings 2005, 146). Nevertheless, Japan established its power over Korea gradually and intensively through military force.

In the end, after the annexation of Korea to Japan on the 29 August 1910, Field Marshal Count Masatake Terauchi was appointed as the first Governor-General of Joseon, who was under direct command of the Japanese Emperor. From the beginning of the annexation of Korea, Terauchi employed a strong military force, which was highly unpopular with Koreans. That is why this period was called ‘the era of military policy’ (Gang 2006, 25). Terauchi tried to forcefully transform Korean politics, economics, culture and education into the Japanese colonial system, which was unacceptable to a large part of the colonised Korean population (Gang 2006, 30-32).

For example, The New People’s Society (Sinminhoe), a secret independence group connected with the Protestant church, was suspected to attempt to assassinate the first Governor-General. As a result, 600 Koreans were arrested and 105 people put on trial (Han 1971). The office of Masatake continued to arrest as many as approximately 50,000 Koreans in 1912 and 140,000 in 1918 (Cumings 2005). The military policy lasted for nearly a decade in order to control Korean resistance and was directly influencing all levels of governmental control, such as legislative, judicial and administrative powers. The military policies were not only used to control the public but also to organize and manage Korea’s economy. Japan started its intensive economic exploitation of Korea (Shin 2001).

In 1912, the Governor-General initiated a land survey, which resulted in the confiscation of properties, particularly from lower class land owners. These properties were subsequently sold to Japanese investors, literally at no costs (Nozaki 2006). Eventually,
Japanese owned 59.6% of Korean properties (Shin 2001). The Oriental Development Company, a Japanese national enterprise, particularly benefited from this land survey, acquiring one third of all farming land in Korea by the late 1920s. Indeed, the Governor-General encouraged Japanese people to migrate to and own land in Korea. Tempted by cheap land, 170,000 Japanese already migrated to Korea and lived there by 1920. At the end of the Japanese colonial rule the number of Japanese living in Korea was over 700,000. Contrary to this, many Koreans lost their employment and property, and were subsequently displaced, some as far away as to Manchuria (Berry 2008).

During this period, Japan built new train lines and bigger shipping ports to enable the rapid exploitation of Korea through the transport of rice and raw materials to Japan. At the same time, due to these new infrastructure and facilities, Japanese products could be imported to Korea without difficulty (Peterson 2009, 144-146). This kind of development was called modernization by pro-colonialists, while in reality this was part of a scheme to exploit Korea.

2. The first Joseon Education Policy (Joseon gyogykryeong 1911-1922)

The first modern style school (Wonsan haksa – Wonsan Akademy) was opened by the Korean government in 1883 and Baejae hakdang in 1886. A few years later in 1895, the Korean government officially announced the modern style regulation of primary school (Sohakgyonyeong) (Lee 2007). However, this modern style regulation did not last long. After signing the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 (Eulsa boho joyak), the office of the Japanese Residency-General (Tonggambu) was constituted, which subsequently completely changed the existing Korean education system originating from the enlightenment period (1880s). From 1906 to 1910, ten different and new regulations only regarding primary school were announced (Kim 1999). From that time on, the Korean education system was already entirely controlled and influenced by Japan.

Since the annexation to Japan in 1910, the ‘military policy’ began to influence the Korean education system. During the first colonial period (1910-1918), Korean education was rapidly changed and completely modified by announcing many school regulations. Teachers even wore Japanese imperial uniforms and carried swords at school (Cumings
The first Governor-General Terauchi Masatake held a speech about the Korean colonial education system in July 1911 (Kim 1999, 96):

The education in Joseon is all about to make Koreans to be Japanese enthusiastic subjects. Therefore, Botong (lit. ordinary or common) education is to be taught and practical education is the priority. (In the second local ministry meeting 1st July, 1911)

This speech states the obvious, that the aim of Japanese education in Joseon was merely to transform Joseon people into good colonial subjects. One month after this speech, on the 23rd August 1911, the first Joseon education policy (1911-1922) was announced. Through this, the Japanese colonial government effectively controlled the existing Korean education system. As a result, the Japanese colonial government immediately made amendments to the existing schooling system, such as a shortened school duration from six to four years. Moreover, the office of Terauchi employed education as a tool to support its colonial goals by announcing many school regulations. For instance, the following two important regulations will be discussed later on: 1. The Regulation of the Primary School (Botong hakgyo gyuchik), and 2. Private School Regulation (Sarip hakgyo gyuchik).

The first education policy (Fig. 1) was a fundamental but central regulation to establish the colonial education of Korea. For instance, it consisted of the aim of the Korean education (Articles 1 and 2) and the need for a Korean education (Article 3).

Fig. 1: The draft of ‘The First Joseon Education Policy’ 12 July 1911.

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In the First Joseon Education Policy that includes overall 30 articles, several crucial features can be found without difficulty:

Firstly, the Governor-General targeted and at the same time transformed the newly built-up Korean education system by introducing this education regulation to change the Korean school system into a Japanese education system.

Secondly, it was obvious that the Governor-General could reach his aim to ‘educate’ Korean children becoming ‘good subjects and to become Japanese’, which can be seen in Article 2 ‘Educating is to promote Joseon people to become good and loyal subjects’. This same aim was already proclaimed in the speech of the Governor-General as stated previously.

Thirdly, Japanese language was recognized as the national language (Article 8). This was not to learn Japanese as a second language at Korean school. In fact, Korean language at Korean schools was treated and taught as a second language. By teaching Japanese as a first language the Governor-General expected Korean children to be transformed into Japanese.

Fourthly, Japan shortened the length of the primary school, from six years of the traditional system, to four years for primary school based on Article 9. However, this rule did not affect Japanese school children, residing in Korea at the time. There was a special school policy for Japanese children.

Fifthly, another crucial finding was that the aim of Japanese colonial politics was always directly connected with the same aims of colonial education policy. For instance, the Governor-General strengthened industrial schools (Sireop hakgyo, learning basic agriculture skills), in which children should only learn the basic knowledge of agriculture with no higher education system. Japan wanted Korean children to only learn this matter that directly benefited Japan. And this was the same aim as in the Article 2 of the First Joseon Education Policy ‘educating is to promote Joseon people to become good and loyal subjects’.

2.1. The Regulation of the Primary School (Botong Hakgyo Gyuchik)

The regulation of the primary school (Botong hakgyo gyuchik) was announced in October 1911, just two months after the first Joseon education policy. The most notable fact from this weekly time table of ‘The Regulation of the Primary School (Botong hakgyo gyuchik)’ was that Japanese language was regarded as the national language and 38% of the
total weekly hours were Japanese language teaching, compared to 21% of Korean and Chinese language combined (Oh 2005).

Table 1. Primary school weekly time table (Gongrib botong hakgyo) (1911), The regulation of the Governor-General (Joseon chongdokbu kwanbonyeong 110 ho [20 October, 1911]).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Ethics</th>
<th>National language (Japanese)</th>
<th>Korean &amp; Chinese</th>
<th>Mathematics</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Changga (music)/Gymnastics</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2. Private School Regulation (Sarip Hakgyo Gyuchik)

The aim of private schools was to teach modern knowledge and foreign languages since the first modern school was established in 1883. Many patriots opened private schools from this time on. In particular, around the time of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 (Eulsa boho joyak), these schools had the additional aim to encourage patriotism, to liberate the country and to implement a modern education system (Hwangseong Newspaper 8 May 1909).

Approximately 1,200 private schools already existed in 1905 and numbers increased to about 3,000 until 1909. Private schools were separated into two major school types: 1. missionary schools established by foreign missionaries and 2. patriotic schools founded by Korean patriotic groups. Initially, those private schools were not bound by the Rule of the Primary School (Botong hakgyo gyuchik). The colonial government needed stronger regulations to cover and tighten Korean private schools, because in particular the Korean patriotic schools’ aim was directly aimed against Japanese colonial interests, i.e to build patriotic Korean children instead of loyal Japanese subjects.

Just one year after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1911, the ‘Private School Regulation (Sarip hakgyo gyuchik)’ was announced in the official gazette of the Governor-General (Joseon chongdokbu kwanbo). Opening of private schools needed to meet certain criteria, such as permission to open private schools strictly only by the Governor-General.
As a result of these regulations, many private schools effectively had financial problems as they were not able to obtain funds from well-off private donors (Guhanmal kwangbo 1 March 1909). Another problem was that only textbooks approved by the Governor-General were allowed (Articles 9 and 10).

As a result, the number of private schools decreased dramatically. There were about 3,000 private schools in 1909, but only approximately 1,000 remained in 1912, and when the colonial government was becoming stricter with regulations, only 690 private schools survived in 1919 (Son 1971).

3. Impact of colonial policy on school Music

Music was not a compulsory subject in the curriculum and was interchangeable with gymnastics. Therefore, school music itself was not crucial in the curriculum yet. This also becomes apparent in the preface of the first music text book (Changga book for primary school in 1910, [Botong gyoguk changgajib]), where it is stated that only one music book was published for all school levels. However, the most important music genre, Changga (lit. sing songs), appeared at schools during this time. That is why music text books were called and published as ‘Primary school Changga (Simsang sohak changga-1905)’ ‘Changga Book for Primary School (Botong gyoguk changga-1910)’ and New Changga Book (Shinpyen changga-1914).

The word 'music' was not used. Instead, ‘Changga’ was used equivalent to music in primary school and the word ‘music’ was only used in the middle school as a subject at school. From here on, the word Changga and music is used interchangeably in the remaining parts of this article. It is interesting that schools including primary and private schools (patriotic and Christianity schools) taught different kind of music genres during the first period (1910-1918) of colonialization. Teaching such music genres was one of the most important features of the school music during the first education policy (1911-1922).

I argue that emerging new music genres happened only due to the political situation. The music genres, Changga and patriotic songs, will be discussed in terms of two different
school types with their political relationship: (1) Primary school (botong hakgyo) with Changga and (2) Private school with patriotic songs (e.g. Aegukga; Korean anthem).

### 3.1. Music at Primary School (Botong Hakgyo Music)

Music itself at school was not of primary importance in the school curriculum as shown previously. However, one music genre, Changga (literally sing a song) was a new emerging music genre, both in Korean society and at schools of the time. Despite of no proper academic definition of Changga, it is generally regarded as a music genre associated with western rhythm and style. Depending on the music style, Changga can include church music (Changsongga), military music (Gunga), lyric music (Gagok) and school music until the end of Japanese colonial rule. Occasionally, depending on the functionality, Changga can be categorised such as into ‘church music (Changsongga) and Changga’, ‘children music (Dongyo) and Changga’ and ‘military music (Gunga) and Changga’ (Min 2008).

Such blurred use of terms for Changga seemed to be a result of the random transfer of western style music into traditional Korean society. The term Changga originally referred to a Korean literature genre till the early 20th century (Lee 2007). The use of the same word Changga for music had no connection to the one used in Korean literature. In fact, the term Changga referring to music was already used in Japan since 1872 (Min 2008, 9).

Western music was already introduced into Japan in the 16th century (Maček 2001, 151) and was firmly rooted when the music curriculum was constituted in 1872. The term Changga for music in primary school and the term Juak for middle school was introduced. In particular, in 1891 the aim of Changga at school, published by The Japanese Education Department, was ‘to cultivate moral character by recognizing beautiful music’. As can be seen, the term and the aim of Changga was used in Japanese schools in a similar way as in ‘The Regulation of botong hakgyo (Botong hakgyo sihaeng gyuchik)’ in 1906 in Korea (August, 27. 1906, The Regulation of botong hakgyo (Botong hakgyo sihaeng gyuchik), Article 23). Due to a lack of appropriate music teachers and materials around the 1870s in Japan, western music seemed initially not to be successful at Japanese schools. Nevertheless, since The Music Study Committee (Uemak chwijogwae) was set up in 1879 by Shuji Izawa (1851-1917), a chief of the Japanese public school program, to research music education and
western style music started blossoming at school. In the following report, he mentioned how Western music was better than oriental music, which reveals a rather peculiar sense of inferiority of Asian music:

> It will, therefore, be far better to adopt European music in our schools than to undertake the awkward task of improving the imperfect oriental music (Wade 2005, 13).

In the year 1880, one Changga book (Simsang sohakdokbon changga) was published by Japanese musicians for the first time in Japan. In 1881, the Japanese education department proclaimed in an education policy that Changga was recognized as a subject (Lee 2007, 177). And this music institute started playing a significant role spreading western music, in particular music education. This Japanized western music replaced traditional music in Korean schools with the same Japanese music books and aims.

In Korea, during the First Joseon Education Policy (1911-1922), music (Changga) was one of the least important subjects and was taught for three hours per week exchangeable with gymnastics (Oh 2000). During this time, seven music textbooks were published for public primary schools, including ‘New Changga Book (Sinpyen changgajib)’ concentrating on ceremonial purposes such as the Japanese anthem and the song for the Emperor’s birthday.

Some Korean scholars previously analysed how Japanese music influenced the content of Korean music textbooks from a musical perspective (e.g. Lim 2001; Kim 1997; Shin 2000). As an example, one of the seven music text books, ‘Changga Book for Primary School (Botong gyoyuk changgajib)’ is presented here, which was the first music text book published in Korea in May 1910 by the Education Department (Hakbu). In the introduction of this music text book, it is emphasized that ‘this Changga book was intended to be used at school as well as at home’. It can be hypothesized that Japan intended with this to introduce school songs that were not only sung by school children but also by all Koreans (Park 1999). In this ‘Changga Book for Primary School (Botong gyoyuk changgajib)’, there were twenty seven songs, which were mostly identical with the Japanese school Changga book in Japan. Lyrics were mainly about nature (11 songs), encouragement to study hard (10 songs) and relationship with friends, teachers and parents (6 songs) (Hong 1998). In this first music text book, there were no lyrics that were involved with politics and nationalism, which is very
distinctive from later colonial periods. However, all songs were typically Japanized western music, which means that there were 26 songs with duple (2/4) and quadruple (4/4) beats out of 27 songs, compared to a triple beats of the typical Korean music style (Tokita and Hughes 2008). Japanese newly formed melody of the time had six notes per octave that are C, D, E, G and A, called Yona nuki scale. Along with mixing western harmonies and syncopation rhyme, this Yona nuki scale had been dominated music in Japan (Garrett 1998).

Of the 27 songs, seven are still used and sung as school songs and church music in Korea today. I provide two examples, of some well-known Japanese soldier songs that were reworked into nowadays popular church songs (Fig. 3, left). The song of ‘A brave marine soldier’ was originally a Japanese military song, written by Sasaki Nobuchuna and the composer Oku Yoshinori in 1895 (Fig. 3, right) after Japan won the Japanese - China War (1894 - 1895). Then, the melody of the song was used as a school song in the ‘Changga Book for Primary School (Botong gyoyuk changgajib)’. This was one example how school music, controlled by the colonial government, played an important role at the time. This song was also a typical example for westernised Japanese music, using syncopation rhyme and a duple and quadruple beats and using the C Yona nuki major scale (Fig. 3, right). The music on the left hand side (Fig. 3, left) is still used in Korean church with the same melody but without syncopation.

Fig. 3 Church music in Korea nowadays (left) and military music entitled ‘A brave marine soldier’ (right), original song².

² Accessed on 10 May 2011; http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/culture/music/241228.html
Another example, the next song was originally called ‘The song of the train’ (Fig. 4, left) after the opening of the train line between Tokyo and Yokohama. This song was also used in the school music song of the ‘Changga Book for Primary School (Botong gyoyuk changgajib)’. Additionally, the melody was used as a patriotic song in Korea, called ‘The song of students (Hakdoga)’ with different lyrics and is also still used in Korean church today (Fig.4, right). The syncopation is used as the whole melody, which is typical for Japanese-westernised music (Fig. 4 left).

![Fig. 4 The song of the train. The music on the left was used as a celebration of the opening of a train line in Japan and was also used as patriotic song of the time in Korea, whereas the music on the right hand side is still used in churches of Korea with different tonality but the same identical melody.](image)

The two presented examples of Japanese songs, ‘A brave marine soldier’ and ‘The song of the train’, show how Japanized western music found its way into Korean culture. These Japanese songs, such as military and celebration songs, came to Korea through school music songs and subsequently spread into Korean society. Therefore, it is significant that school music played an important role to spread Japanized western music in Korea. As mentioned, typical Japanese music styles such as using duple/ quadruple beats and syncopation rhymes are in use in Korea until today. These examples highlight the power of colonial music education. Through the introduction of music styles Japan achieved its colonial goals, which was to make and transform Koreans into enthusiastic subjects of the colonial government. This was one of the stated goals by the first Governor-General Terauchi Masatake in a speech about the Korean colonial education system in July 1911.
3.2. Music at Private Schools

3.2.1. Patriotic schools

Patriotic school used music in a different way to establish patriotic Korean children through music. In 1996, an original music text book used in private schools was found by The Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs of Korea. This music text book called Recent Changga Music book was used in a Manchurian middle school, China, probably published in 1914. In the book, there were 152 Changga with music scores. The lyrics of songs used in private schools throughout Korea consisted of themes for the hope of Korea’s independence and the holding on to patriotism (The Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs of Korea, 1996). The way to teach music songs at private schools was unique. Lyrics were usually published by pro independent newspapers and teachers taught them at private schools. For instance, it was only possible that such songs could be published in the Korean Daily News (Daehan maeil sinbo), because the official publisher of this newspaper was an Englishman, Ernest Thomas Bethell, who was connected with Korean patriots. Because of the involvement of an international citizen, the Residency-Governor (Tonggambu) could not censor the Newspaper around the time. Nevertheless, after Bethell's death in 1909, this newspaper was taken over by the colonial government in 1910 and the way to spread patriotic songs had to be changed (Clark 1998).

One of the most famous patriotic songs was written by Ahn Chang-ho (1878-1938), who was a well known Korean independent activist that defected to America in April 1910. This song was published in the Korean Daily News (Daehan maeil Sinbo) on the 12 May 1910. This song, the song of the whole country (Geogukga), spread very quickly within Korea and overseas. Ahn showed in the lyrics the sadness that he felt leaving the fatherland and he swore to return (authors own translation):

Leaving, leaving, without you I am leaving.
The unstable situation makes me leave and separate from you.
Although I won’t be able to see you for many years, I work for you.
Don’t be sad, my dear fatherland.
It is believed that the following lyrics of the still used Korean anthem Aegukga were written by Ahn Chang-ho. Initially, the lyric of Aegukga were sung to the tune of the Scottish folk song ‘Auld Lang Syne’. On 15th August in 1948, at the ceremony celebrating the founding of South Korea, the tune of ‘Auld Lang Syne’ was finally replaced by the tune written by Ahn Eak-tae in 1935 (Fig. 6).

Fig. 6: Today’s Korean anthem composed by Ahn Eak-tae, see below for the translation of the anthem.

1. Until the East Sea's waves are dry, (and) Mt. Baekduusan worn away, God watch o'er our land forever! Our country forever!

REFRAIN:
Rose of Sharon, thousand miles of range and river land! Guarded by her people, ever may Korea stand!

2. Like that Mt. Namsan armored pine, standing on duty still, wind or frost, unchanging ever, be our resolute will.

3. In autumn's, arching evening sky, crystal, and cloudless blue, Be the radiant moon our spirit, steadfast, single, and true.

4. With such a will, (and) such a spirit, loyalty, heart and hand, Let us love, come grief, come gladness, this, our beloved land!

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These lyrics are very nationalistic similar to anthems of other countries. The Korean anthem used many metaphoric phrases such as the expressions of ‘Until the East Sea is dry and Mt. Baekdusan worn away’ expressing the eternity of Korea. Also, there are many colourful expressions about nature, but above all, it encourages patriotism and loyalty to Korea.

Private schools, in particular the patriotic ones, played a significant role by teaching songs and lyrics regarding the independence of Korea and to encourage students’ patriotism. The Korean anthem was one of the most important songs and seemed to be sung during demonstrations against Japanese annexation according to C.W. Canthal’s report on a Korean uprising in 1919, the biggest uprising against Japan organized by Koreans:

The crowds were unarmed and the march was consisting with the elder, the young, the students and the women. The crowds started singing the Korean anthem, waving the Korean flag and the streets were filled with crowds.

(The Independent News (Tongnip sinmun) 29 June 1899)

At the time, there were many unofficial Korean anthems and the lyrics below were presumably one of those:

For five hundred years has an Emperor
That beautiful country our fatherland
Three thousand marvelous rivers and mountains,
filled with mugunghwa (Korean national flower)
Joséon people, keep Joséon

3.2.2. Christian schools

While patriotic schools were mainly engaged with patriotic songs, Christian schools not only spread religious songs but occasionally also played the same role as patriotic schools. The impact of Christianity on modern Korean music plays a crucial role. One of the mainstream introductions of Western music in Korea was when missionaries came to Joseon to introduce their religion of Christianity, and brought along Western worship songs (Chansongga) with them in 1885. Most Christian schools were established in the 1900s, and
by 1909 there were 184 approved Christian schools in Korea. Among them, 168 schools had music or Changga as a subject. Some other schools were teaching music under the terms of ‘Punggeum (organ)’ or ‘Chanmi (praise)’. Teachers at Christian schools were mostly missionaries, Korean musicians, Westerners and Korean students who studied overseas. In the special outdoor activity class of a Christian school, children would sing the most popular songs such as the Korean anthem (Aegukga) and the ‘Boys Marching Song (Soyen hengjinga)’ composed by Ahn Chang-ho. These songs would be developed and encouraged to be sung in the street as protests songs (Park 2005; Min 2008).

Conclusion

Music at Korean school during Japanese colonial rule has been ignored by Korean scholars as a part of Korean music education history. Reason for this might be because it was the colonial period, which fills most Korean’s even today with shame and is a period of Korean history that would rather be forgotten.

Japan employed its ‘military policy’ during the first period after 1910 and this policy also applied to education, e.g. through allowing only permitted music text books. Moreover, through education policies and its regulations, it was the time when Korean schools were initially shaped and transferred into a Japanese education system from the beginning of the colonial period. Music at school was no exception. Initially, on the surface there was no intention of imperialistic aims regarding music during the first Joseon education policy (1911-1922), according to the aim for music, which was ‘to sing easy songs and to contribute to a moral mind’. In music text books as an example, many songs involved ordinary themes without any obvious imperial themes, although there were extra music books specifically for imperial ceremonies. However, under the surface the school regulations were a pretext to gain control over Korean education by prohibiting music text books. However, this first colonial period was different from the following ones because Japanese intentions for music education were well hidden.

At primary school during the first colonial period (1910-1918), the new emerging music genre Changga played a crucial role. This happened only once the colonial government
controlled the publication of music text books. Changga originated in Japan and influenced all music text books and it eventually became one of the most important Korean music genres involved with school songs, military songs, and even patriotic songs. As illustrated through music examples, some features of Japanese westernized music such as duple/quadruple beats and syncopations directly influenced Korean music text books. This can still be seen nowadays in school and popular songs in Korea.

Due to the quickly rising popularity of patriotic songs, these were prohibited and consequently the Residency-General (Tonggambu 1906-1910) already proclaimed the private school regulation (Sarip hakgyo reyung) in 1908. Just as Japanese colonial government used school music for its colonial goals, it was obvious that music at Korean private schools was taught mainly for political reasons as well, not for musical education. The melodies of the patriotic songs were often borrowed from Japanese music text books, Changga, or Christian song books. Compared to borrowed melodies, the lyrics were more important to patriotic schools than the melodies of songs.

School music of the time (1910-1918) was surely not to enjoy music itself, but was used for political purposes. Music from different countries can influence each other and can create new hybrid musical genres. And this is still happening in the world, such as Indo-Jazz fusion. However, because of the colonial circumstances, Japan intended to erase Korean culture and only taught Westernized Japanese music at school. Korea, nowadays, has still been struggling to keep its identity after loosing its traditional music.

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Contemporary Korean Photography:
“How Artists Use a Photographic Sensibility to Produce New Knowledge?”

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Abstract

The centrality of photography to postmodern theories of representation is well documented. In the field of contemporary Korean photography, changing concepts of photographic representation are fostering a paradigm shift. This paper investigates the intersection of Korean contemporary photography—a rapidly expanding, dynamic field of practice—and postmodern theories of representation from the viewpoint of an image’s relationship to reality to its intertextuality.

This paper investigates the work of five contemporary Korean photographers: Seung Woo Back, Sangil Kim, KOO Sung Soo, NOH Sun tag, and Hein Kuhn Oh. The work of these artists represents what I call “sensibilized knowledge” for the way their photographs bring the artist’s gaze and sense into dialogue with contemporary debates concerning Korea’s newfound economic and political power in the world arena, and the cultural upheavals this development has produced. Korean photographers are actively participating in the production of a critical visual culture that explores problems of knowledge and cultural identity. It now engages how people live, act, and even express beauty, and it justifies itself in culture. As opposed to a photographic tradition that uncritically celebrated Korean life or national traditions, the work of the artists in this paper addresses the complicated processes that constitute Korean reality and identity. Photographic sense in their works is not limited to esthetic meaning but includes reflections how images constitute reality, the ambiguity of the documentary image, the virtuality of photography, and other photographic messages. Korean photographers use photographic sense as a strategy way to capture heterogeneous cultural phenomena, show irony and contradiction in a multi-culturalized society, and transform a style of knowledge by taking on the role of both observer and researcher. Through an analysis of Korean contemporary photography, this paper
Photography has become a key medium since the arrival of postmodernism, which is defined not as an exact replica of reality but a representation of its visual aspect, interpreted in a cultural and social environment. In the field of contemporary Korean photography, changing concepts of photographic representation are fostering a paradigm shift that engages issues of postmodernism. This paper examines the intersection of contemporary photography, a rapidly expanding, dynamic field of practice in Korea, and postmodern theories of intertextuality.¹ I discuss the work of five contemporary photographers: Sung Soo KOO, Seung Woo BACK, Sanggil KIM, NOH Sun-taeg, and Hein Kuhn OH,² whose work represents what I call “sensibilized knowledge”. Their photographs bring the artist’s gaze and sense into dialogue with contemporary debates concerning Korea’s newfound economic and political power in the world arena, and the cultural upheavals this development has produced. These photographers are actively participating in the production of a critical visual culture that explores problems of knowledge and cultural identity. They strategically use a photographic sense to capture heterogeneous cultural phenomena, show irony and contradiction in a multicultural society, and create a distinct style of knowing by taking on the role of both observer and researcher which is differentiated from existed knowledge. Through my analysis of contemporary Korean photography, I explore how this new photographic language functions as a critical medium that talks back to society.

**Sung Soo KOO** captures the hybridity of Korean culture in the vulgarity of interior and exterior designs in motels, karaoke rooms (Fig.1), tourist buses (Fig.2), and wedding halls (Fig.3). Here all styles of art are mixed in. The interior of a wedding hall may sport Rococo-style chairs, Gothic arches, and paintings on the wall and ceiling that imitate the frescoes of the Sistine

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² In Korea, family names precede given names; however, some individuals reverse the name order international contexts. In this paper, the names arranged according to the artist’s individual preference. Where no preference was determined, the names are spelled according to the Korean Revised Romanization system. For the convenience of readers the surnames are written in capital letters when it comes with the given names.
Chapel. Perhaps all this points to a desire to flaunt knowledge of Western culture and the superiority complex of a developing country trying to “catch up.” Rapid economic growth has brought power to Korea internationally, but this development has also given rise to a popular attraction to randomly combined heterogeneous references that tend to be very different from the traditional aesthetic. The Statue of Liberty planted on the rooftop of a motel is so coarse that it may be called kitsch, but Koo turns this image to photographic beauty by using a large-format camera and a long exposure to maximize the sharpness of the photograph. (Fig.4) With this process, Koo works to refine and purify the vernacular character of his subjects and reveals the ironies and contradictions in Korean society beyond the spectacle of his outsized photographs.

Seung Woo BACK’s photography combines the real and the imaginary, the true and the false, both record and fantasy, taking a slightly indirect approach to current societal and cultural issues in Korea, which he dramatizes in the spectacle of large format presentation. The problems of identity, culture shock, war and division dealt with in his early work barely scratches the surface of his photography, however. What really interests Back is the photographic irony to be found in devices that frame thought, the way patterns of thought are forced upon us by those devices, and the chain of reaction thereby set off. In 2002, when BACK visited North Korea for the first time, he took snapshots of the city of Pyongyang under the alert monitoring of accompanying guards. He was allowed to shoot only in limited areas and even had his film censored, however, the camera had captured things that even the artist and the North Korean security agents had failed to spot. So he magnified those and came up with a totally different kind of photograph he calls Blow Up (2005-2007). (Fig.5) These images feature a domain of photography beyond all controls, they are about the in-betweens that even social systems and political surveillance cannot constrain. This is a domain that exists beyond good and evil, harmony and conflict, and reality and imagination. Photography in North Korea is produced only by the government to celebrate the Great Leaders and to promote juche (literally, self-reliance), the political philosophy that has been the official state ideology in North Korea since 1972. The North Korean promotional photos from the 1970s that Back stumbled on in a small bookstore in Tokyo were also politically controlled and artificially manipulated. Just as original copies do not

3 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 401.
exist in photography, Back shows in his series *Utopia* (2008) how vain government attempts to assert utopian illusions are; he further questions just what constitutes utopia in people’s minds. (Fig.6) He mocks both kinds of illusions by digitally manipulating the images from North Korea and by creating his own “utopic” images that appropriate the colors of Russian avant-garde propaganda posters and the architectural structures associated with the Bauhaus. (Fig.7) In the end, “Utopia” exists only as something elusive, an image that is beautiful on the surface but unattainable, something constructed by socio-political ideology and personal fantasy.

Photography has played a significant role in the project of categorization. Like an identification card, a photograph is an effective tool for sorting by type. With categorization come the accompanying problems of knowledge and its power in a society. Categories frame our thinking and not only determine how we understand the world but also how we produce knowledge. Sanggil KIM poses questions about categorization and knowledge throughout his work. He is interested in the diverse cultural subjects of today’s Korea such as internet communities, part-time workers, empty interiors, college buildings, architectural forms built or renovated in certain periods, and so on. He claims that the structure supporting society is like a program. He takes photographs of people not as subjectively human, but rather as elements of the social structure. His portrait of an off-line internet community highlights a new trend in consumer taste that combines brand names like Burberry, Harley Davison, and Alaska Malamute. (Fig.8) The goal of his photographic process is to uncover the structures that tie together elements of capitalist taste, and he visualizes this categorization using an objective attitude such as a librarian might use to classify books, according to a certain system. (Fig.9) This photographic classification is more clearly shown in the series *MOD-E* (2006-present). In *MOD-E* he makes a visual construction of current knowledge system by presenting the façades of academic department buildings such as the college of natural science, foreign studies, economics, and commerce. (Fig.10) He has used his medium to strategically connect his artistic explorations to his conceptual statement. His uses a large format camera to produce an evenly flat image from center to edge, intentionally eliminating the vanishing point perspective normally produced by a

5 “Like a Program” is the title of Sanggil KIM’s 2007 survey exhibition in the project space Sarubia. It is also the conceptual title for a whole series: *MOD, MOD-E, MOD-E-L, RE-MOD-E-L, DISPLAY, OFF-LINE, and MOTION PICTURE*
camera lens. The absence of a center demonstrates the disappearance of any centrist perspective and eliminates the need to classifying knowledge from the model of functional control inspired by Cartesian thought. Kim’s photographs suggest the dislocation of extent forms of knowledge production; his decentering of the knowledge system suggests the necessity of an extreme make-over, and such a make-over invites systems of knowledge to renounce old functional frames and welcome instead fluid, dynamic connections. All these photographic strategies make Kim’s images highly symbolic, a sort of language beyond photographs’ surface of images.

NOH Suntag, formerly a photographic journalist for a left-wing newspaper, provides glimpses of social, political, and historical developments in Korea such as the anti-American movement, far-right organizations, save-the-nation rallies organized by religious communities, and a recent candlelight protest: the strAnge ball (2006), State of Emergency (2000-2008), Forgetting Machines (2007), Paths of Patriotism (2003-2006). But the images he collects are not only records of socio-political events, they also include diverse cultural moments that reference the mundane and trivial in everyday life. Noh defines the current state of affairs in Korea as “delayed danger” or “a state of uncertainty.” He satirizes the misled patriotism of Koreans in his series How to use a national flag, (Fig.11) and in the series Indulgence (Fig.12) he sarcastically criticizes the Protestant church in Korea for its involvement in politics. He shows a violence that goes unrecognized but which seriously penetrates everyday life in reallyGood murder (2008-2009). (Fig.13) According to the artist’s note, he collects images that reveal traces of the Korean War that continue to “breathe” in Korean society. The series Red House I, II, III (2004-2006) shows aspects of the South and North, which are divided ideologically and culturally as well as geographically. The third part of the series, Red House III: North Korea in South Korea, reflects on how the North is shaped by the ideology of the South. With humor and a somewhat cynical eye, Noh finds similar scenes in the two Koreas and these reveal that both societies are controlled by an invisible power even though they have different political identities. That power

7 NOH Suntag’s solo exhibition State of Emergency was shown at the Württembergischer Kunstverein in Stuttgart, Germany from March to May 2009 and at the La Virreinal Gallery in Barcelona Spain in the fall of 2009. In this exhibition Noh showed a total of 196 photographs from his eight different series.
8 See the artist’s notes on www.suntag.net
is revealed in the gazes within his photography. The gaze of the camera, the gaze toward the camera, and other mutual gazes that intervene in Noh’s photographs make the substance of that power sensibly visible via the mutual act of looking and being looked at. Noh uses the characteristics of photography strategically to allow the viewer to believe that what s/he is seeing truly reflects reality. He connects this photographic strategy to his artistic voice and draws on the various strengths of representational photography. Representation in photography never copies reality but features in multiple layers the historical, socio-political, and cultural context of the photographed subject.

Hein Kuhn OH takes portrait photographs of particular groups of people in contemporary Korean society. Over his six series—featuring subjects from middle age women to teenage girls and from Itaewon, a special foreign residency district in Seoul, to Gwangu, the traumatized city of the 1980s uprisings—Oh visually examines how social views and prejudice imbue certain groups of people with a new notion of social class. Ajumma (1997) (Fig.14), his first solo show after obtaining his degree in the U.S., caused a sensation in Korean art circles in 1997 because he took on a photographic subject nobody else was interested in. Ajumma means “middle-aged women,” and their status in Korean society is quite unique and uncertain. As to their sexual identity, ajumma are not considered male or female. They are regarded as in-between, forming a new type of “tribe” that presents a certain culture, attitude, and behavior.

In the course of the rapid economic development after the Korean War, individuals sacrificed much for the reconstruction of the nation and family. Mothers sacrificed for their husbands and sons, giving up their own desire for achievement. Instead of femininity, they became armed with a strong backbone. Despite their sacrifices, in this harsh period they have not been fairly treated by either family or society, both of which are strongly dominated by patriarchy. Their sacrifice has been taken for granted, and the tendency to neglect this class of women has prevailed throughout the society. Tough, impolite, and stubborn are words typically used to describe them. Oh’s

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11 Jin-sang YOU, Hein-kuhn Oh’s portrait Portrait Photographs: The Front and Back of the Face, www.heinkuhnoch.com
photographs expose these views toward ajumma. Under a direct flash, the Ajumma portraits present middle-aged women in thick makeup who look tough and strong.

Oh’s other series Girls’ Action (2000-2004) (Fig.15) and Girls’ Cosmetics (2007-2008) (Fig.16) are in nearly the same format as the Ajumma series, but use a different technique, with soft grey tones under defuse light. These images show teenage girls through the eyes of a middle-aged male photographer, and they have been controversial for bringing up the taboo issue of sexual interest toward minors. A young face with soft hair in an enormously magnified photograph catches the viewer’s eye, stimulating both sexual desire and feelings of guilt at the same time. The girls’ gestures, actions, facial and physical expressions, and even makeup are all elements that present a sort of mystery. Oh captures this perfectly by the refined photographic effects of silvery grey gradation and elaborately detailed descriptions. Oh’s portraiture takes a typological approach and has expanded to diverse kinds of people who are characterized as a collective in society’s view. His work has become a project of visual research into the representation of certain classes that are not categorized in a binary system, but segmented by the tastes and desires of a complicated society. At this point, his photography has moved to another level of knowledge that must be differentiated from the traditional aesthetic.

In sum, I have been concerned with the ways in which photographic representation produces theoretical, critical, and practical discourses; in particular I contend that contemporary Korean photographers have been especially interested in the problem of knowledge in ways not limited by aesthetic and emotional concerns. Since the inception of postmodernism, photography has begun to participate in a movement of “research-based arts”12 that follow changes in forms of knowledge. Types of knowledge have been modified and the areas of knowledge production have been broadened so they are no longer limited to positivistic and scientific approaches. "Narrative knowledge" what I call here, is concerned with the way living, acting, and even expressing beauty justifies itself in culture. Contemporary Korean photographers now use their knowledge of photography as a medium to produce the new types of knowledge based on photographic grounds. They visualize their subjects in connection with other arenas of knowledge. They look on photography as an intertextual exercise, which means reading the

layers of texts in the images in connection with society, culture, politics, and history. They take notice of cultural phenomena and produce work through interdisciplinary research, assuming the attitude of a researcher and an inspector. This point differentiates Korean contemporary photography from its predecessors, and by this it conforms with the postmodern paradigm.

Figures

(Fig.1) Sung Soo KOO, *Magical Reality*, 2005, digital c-print
(Fig. 2) Sung Soo KOO, *Magical Reality*, 2005, digital c-print

(Fig. 3) Sung Soo KOO, *Magical Reality*, 2005, digital c-print
(Fig. 4) Sung Soo KOO, *Magical Reality*, 2005, digital c-print

(Fig. 5) Seung Woo BACK, *Blow Up*, digital c-print, 2005-2007
Installation view at the Artsonje Center, Seoul, 2008

(Fig. 6) Seung Woo BACK, *Utopia #001*, 2008, digital c-print

(Fig. 7) Seung Woo BACK, *Utopia #017*, 2008, digital c-print
(Fig. 8) Sanggil Kim, *Off-line_Burberry internet community*, 2004, digital c-print

(Fig. 9) Sanggil Kim, *display_leeum samsung museum of art #3*, 2007, digital c-print
(Fig. 10) Sanggil KIM, *Mod-e museum of seoul national university*, 2006, digital c-print

(Fig. 11) NOH Suntag, *How to Use a National Flag*, 2005, digital c-print
(Fig. 12) NOH Suntag, *Indulgence*, 2005, digital c-print

(Fig. 13) NOH Suntag, *reallyGood murder*, 2008, lambda print
(Fig. 14) Hein-kuhn OH, *Ajumma*, 1997, gelatin silver print

(Fig. 15) Hein-kuhn OH, *Girls’Act*, 2003, digital c-print
Bibliography


Fantasy and Aspirations: 
Identities of Young Korean Sojourners as Portrayed in The Melbourne Sky

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Fantasy and Aspirations: 
Identities of Young Korean Sojourners as Portrayed in The Melbourne Sky

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Abstract
The Korean community has seen a few newly established weekly magazines catering to young and short-term visa holders, for whom the magazines provide with information on shared accommodation, church services, food and groceries. The weekly Melbourne Sky chooses its cover models from its readers and publishes their professionally taken photos with their life stories. This paper analyses the models’ life stories, their searches for identity, values, ultimate concerns and life goals with reference to Archer’s (2003) communicative reflexivity (a mode of internal conversation whose deliberation is often carried out by turning to similar others); autonomous reflexivity (the ‘upward and outward bound’ tendency in their internal conversation between self and society); meta-reflexivity (the tendency to be reflexive about their own acts of reflexivity); and fractured reflexivity (the inability to hold an adequate internal conversation between self and society). On the one hand, the readership of the magazines and the personnel it represents appear to strive towards expressing and realising their ultimate values and concerns, while on the other hand they seem to live in their own Western fantasy world that they dreamt of during their childhood or their period of dissatisfying ‘academically driven’ youth, which tends to fracture their professional aspirations and personal values.

INTRODUCTION

It is estimated that there are about 100,000 Koreans in metropolitan Sydney and more than 20,000 in greater Melbourne. The Korean community in Australia consists of 60,873 individuals...
with a full or partial Korean ancestry, according to the 2006 ABS Census. This is a modest increase from the 1986 ABS Census figure of 10,264, in comparison with the population growth of other minority groups. The economic prosperity of South Korea (hereafter, Korea) since the 1990s has led to a large influx of Korean students, tourists and other short-term residents in Australia. For example, in 2006, following China (90,287) and India (39,166), Korea supplied the third largest number of students to Australia (31,257) studying at schools, higher education institutes and English-language schools (Australian Government 2006). In addition to these influxes of Korean students, the actual Korean populations of major Australian cities, as noted, are far greater than the figures provided by the ABS Census at any point in time.

By far, the church remains the most significant Korean ethnic institution in terms of maintaining Korean ethnicity and interaction for economic, cultural and educational purposes (Han 1994). A range of media such as print media, television and radio also constitute an important institution which keeps the Korean immigrant population informed of news from Korea, the Korean community and the broader Australian society. Generally speaking, the media in the Korean community not only has a role to play in exerting a positive influence on personal and group identity formation and maintenance, but it also reflects closely the breadth and depth of the socio-economic reality of Korean migrant life. Despite its significance, the media in the life of Korean immigrants in Australia, has not been given scholarly attention it deserves except for the work by Kwak (1991).

This paper aims to fill this gap and (1) explore and describe the ways in which Korean ethnic and cultural identity is depicted through the media consumed by temporary Korean youth in Australia; and (2) discuss the significance of the media as factors that affect the formation and maintenance of Korean identities. Cunningham (2002, p.268) notes that ‘minoritarian public spheres’ created and utilised by ethnic minorities are different from typical large scale and dominant public spheres, ‘but are nonetheless vibrant, globalised but very specific spaces of self- and community-making and identity.’ I intend to explore the Korean-Australian media’s depiction of ‘self- and community making and identity,’ bearing in mind that the Korean-Australian community and its media operate within the given political-economic context of Australia, Korea and the world system. In light of these, the paper analyses cover stories of a Korean ethnic weekly magazine in Melbourne, the Melbourne Sky. Korean migrants in Australia often assume that the young and short-term residents (sojourners) maintain their own values and...
pursue life goals that are significantly different from those of permanent residents. This paper attempts to explore what these different values and life goals may be as portrayed in the cover stories of the magazine.

Postmodernist perspectives have celebrated their prominence in most disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, especially over the last three decades. Individuals and minority groups have been re-invigorated with such concepts as ‘active audience’ and ‘decentred’ individual subjectivities (Ang 1996). It is undoubtedly important to acknowledge that minority communities, for instance in Australia, have a significant degree of control over respective media cultures through their own patterns of production, distribution and consumption of media texts such as ethnic magazines, satellite TV, and DVDs containing materials originating from their home countries (Cunningham and Sinclair 2001, p.6). However, it is also important to examine how the consumption of such media texts takes place in the broader context of the often marginalised life of migrants; how they cope with, and eventually, overcome their dislocated identities. That is, contemporary industrial society has a number of new and unique characteristics that have been brought about by new information and communications technologies, but the fundamental premise under which contemporary society and its media operate still has much more in common with modern society than is often proposed. That is, similar to industrial society or that of modernism, contemporary society can also be discussed using concepts such as dominance, mainstream and peripheries (Cunningham 2002, p.269). This is the broad context in which the subjects of analysis of this paper are located.

A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE MAGAZINE

In Melbourne, there is one Korean ethnic weekly newspaper: Melbeon Ilyo Simmun (Melbourne Sunday Paper), and three weekly magazines: the Melbourne Sky (Melbeon-ui Haneul)¹; Melbeon Jeoneol (Melbourne Journal); Raon by Korea 21.² Melbourne Journal is the longest and best established magazine of the four and its target readership is the ‘established’ Korean migrants in

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¹ The English title is printed on the cover with far bigger fonts than in Korean.
² Raon is a Korean word meaning literally ‘happy together.’ Melbourne Story was established in June 2008 and lasted for over twelve months.
Melbourne. Apart from Melbourne Journal with its several years’ history, the rest are no more than a few years old. The Melbourne Sky published its first volume on 24 April 2007. Its readership is targeted at tertiary Korean-Australian students and medium- to long-term residents with tourist or working holiday visas (the age limit to qualify for this scheme is 30) or student visas. The cover stories of the Melbourne Sky are the foci of the analysis in this paper.

The Melbourne Sky magazine contains 168 pages including the covers, consisting of a cover story, Australian news in brief (3 pages), 2-3 current affairs and issues from Korea (2 pages), sensational news from around the world (3 pages), brief news items from Korea (2 pages), sports news from Korea (3 pages), news about celebrities from Korea (3 pages), world news items (3 pages). The rest covers know-how on dating, sexual health, romantic histories, psychology of the sexes, cartoons, a profile of a successful professional person, exemplary success stories, and classified advertisements.

The magazine seems to report little, if any, news and information created by the magazine’s own reporters. Instead, it reproduces news from media around the world. The editor of the Melbourne Sky lists the names of major media companies from Korea, China, Russia, Brazil and Australia with which it has contractual arrangements. The editor also disclaims responsibility for the accuracy of the news, information and the contents of advertisements.

Son Jae-Hun, cover model of the fifth issue of the Melbourne Sky describes the magazine as ‘publishing the contents just right for our generation.’ In its early days of the publication of the magazine, a few models were asked to make suggestions as to how overseas students from Korea could improve their English language ability (v.6, 29/5/2007). Such a question partly indicates that Korean overseas students make up the important audience. Kim Min-Ji, cover model of volume seven describes it as follows:

The magazine is really open-minded. It handles the kinds of issues that other magazines are reluctant to handle. It puts the magazine in a rather comfortable position. Older generations are not as open-minded as they should be. Younger generations generally wish to discuss things openly.\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Seong Kyeong-Jin (v.73, 21/7/2008) says, ‘this opportunity is given to a person only once in life time.’

\(^4\) Similar comments are made by Sin Ji-Ye, cover model of volume 9 (v.9, 19/6/2007), and Lee Jae-Kyeong (v.13, 17/7/2007).
Perhaps, those ‘things’ may refer to the ones including dating, sexual health, romantic histories, psychology of the sexes, etc. It seems natural that when a group of young people find matters of their own interest those issues become conversational topics for them. Park Eun-Hye (v.12, 10/7/2007) contends that this is a feature of the magazine, distinct from other magazines which do not usually generate conversations with her friends.

Also important in the context of this paper is that the Melbourne Sky recruits its cover models from its own readers within the Korean community in Melbourne. This idea seems appealing to a good proportion of those female readers in their twenties. According to Song Yun-Seon (v.14, 24/7/2007), ‘My mother and my work colleagues were highly encouraging me to contest for a cover model. They thought that it is such a brilliant idea to use ordinary people like me for the magazine’s cover models and publish their personal life stories.’ Yang Sena (v.25, 9/10/2007) adds: ‘There are past models of the magazine whom I personally know and others whom I do not know. However, what is obvious is that there are high chances that I will come across those models in my everyday life. This is what makes me feel so close to all those models.’ Many of the published models have contested the model some weeks before their departing schedule and regarded the opportunity as memorable. Until the contesting moment they remain shy about the idea of being a cover model.

THEORIZING REFLEXIVITY WITH REFERENCE TO STRUCTURE AND AGENCY

Reflexive self-consciousness is achieved by way of an internal conversation within a person. Archer’s (2003) reflexivity is an attempt to specifically reclaim the importance of the individual agent as she or he constantly establishes a stance towards societal enablements and constraints. The reflexive self-consciousness is closely related to individual identities. The Korean sojourners in Australia in their twenties are in the process of planning their goals, preparing necessary skills to achieve them, sharpening their ultimate concerns and practising their required principles.

Kim Ye-Jin (v.24, 2/10/2007) also expressed the view. Jeon Na-Yeong also says: ‘The Melbourne Sky uses its readers as its cover models and asks them to share their experiences and thoughts. This creates common interests for the readers, which is unique.’
Archer notes that there are different modes of reflexivity that individual agents practise throughout their life although the individual type is not fixed. Archer’s suggested types are: communicative, autonomous, meta-reflexivity, fractured reflexivity and near non-reflexivity. The central aim of this paper is to analyse life stories of the cover models of the Melbourne Sky with reference to Archer’s suggested modes of reflexivity. This section briefly summarises the different modes of reflexivity for the purpose of this paper.

Firstly, ‘communicative reflexivity’ is a mode of internal conversation whose deliberation often carries out by turning to similar others. ‘Communicative reflexives’ are not ambitious with their professional aspirations and they are not enthusiastic social competitors. Their satisfactions are ‘intrinsic and expressive’ (p.205). They do not generally make distinctions between the public and the private. Their source of contentment is sought from their small personal world which is somewhat detached from the broader society, but that is where their ultimate concerns lie. Family and friends make up the most significant concerns for them (p.167). For example, ‘communicative reflexives’ may skilfully reduce their work related career aspirations in order to honour their values on family relations or friendships (p.236). ‘Communicative reflexives’ need to stay in touch continuously with those who can confirm or endorse their ‘thought and talk’ processes (p.235). Archer (p.168) notes that her study participants who fall under this category maintain ‘considerable occupational continuity’. In regards to class, status, and power, Archer (p.203) contends that ‘communicative reflexives’ seek ‘comfort rather than affluence, personal respect rather than high esteem and, at most, a limited local influence rather than substantial power or authority.’

Secondly, ‘autonomous reflexives’ may originate from diverse socio-economic backgrounds. However, they tend to distance themselves from their own backgrounds and look to ‘broader social horizons’ (see Archer 2003, p.228). Unlike ‘communicative reflexives’, ‘autonomous reflexives’ think that none of others can know their own minds better than themselves and to them, their inner deliberations are self-sufficient’ (p.210). Again unlike ‘communicative reflexives’, ‘autonomous reflexives’ pay significant priority to societal issues and their work. Thus they may be inclined to formulate ‘projects which would burst their contextual bounds’ (p.228), that is, projects that may encounter hostile opposition from their own parents. High standards of ‘fairness’ in inter-personal relations make up one of the few priority concerns that are important to ‘autonomous reflexives’ (p.237). ““Contextual discontinuity”
spells a break with the traditions of their upbringing, and the thrust of their ultimate concerns usually precludes the adoption of the conventions prevalent in their new milieu. ... To “communicative reflexives”, “family and friends” came first and work was subordinate; for “autonomous reflexives” these two priorities are reversed’ (p.243). They are generally strategic in their own lives, that is, they are active agents who will try to control their own life affairs rather than being passive and watching things happen to them (p.251). They are also sure as to what they want in society and through their personal life, and formulate strategies to achieve their wishes. They are also actively coordinating and ‘activating the causal powers or constraints and enablements’ (p.252).

Thirdly, ‘meta reflexivity’ is found in people with a tendency to be reflexive about their own acts of reflexivity (p.255). ‘Meta-reflexives’ tend to be wanderers and never permanently settled because there are one or more things that ‘they find lacking, disagreeable or detrimental about a given context, which tends to impede ‘the full expression of who they want to be’ (p.258). They are ‘amongst society’s critics, not only in relation to their own pre-occupations but also in terms of distributive injustice. ... there is a deep concern for the underdog, the oppressed, and the globally deprived’ (p.258). They are idealists and are constantly bothered about an inherent tension between structure and culture. No available social arrangements are close enough to their ideal prescriptions, leading to be critical of the society. Their idealist attitudes make them critical of themselves as persons as well as whether they are leading ideal lives (p.258). ‘Meta-reflexives are idealist ever seeking a better fit between who they seek to be and a social environment which permits their expression of it’ (p.259). ‘Autonomous reflexives’ and ‘meta-reflexives’ share similarities as they both pursue contextual discontinuity from their original socio-economic backgrounds. However, ‘autonomous reflexives’ see work as their ultimate value and their capacity for work is externally assessed by their level of performative skills, whereas ‘meta-reflexives’ pursue a vocation that requires those who have chosen it increasingly achieve personal qualities that represent the vocation, in addition to external assessments of their performative skills. This makes their internal dialogues largely ‘concerned with themselves’ (p.266).

According to Archer (2003, p.270), ‘meta-reflexives’ are: ‘such close monitors of themselves, rather than monitoring their task-performance like the “autonomous reflexives”, they know that “self-work” needs to be done if they are to approximate to their ideal way of being-in-
the-world.’ They also assess and take up courses of action to pursue their projects in accordance with their ideals; they evaluate their actions against their personal principles of what is right rather than what is strategically convenient (p.289). A distinctive feature of ‘meta-reflexives’ is that they continue to assess their current situations against their values and concerns, and not vice versa. In this process, they are reluctant to compromise their ultimate concerns, but they rather choose to pay the price and to move on instead of having their ideals modified (p.293).

Fourthly, ‘fractured reflexivity’. The above-mentioned three modes of reflexivity are qualities that enable individual agents to exert their personal capacities to devise their individual projects and to coordinate relations between self and society in the process of achieving their goals or realising their concerns in reality (p.302). ‘Fractured reflexives’ are unable to manage these tasks since their reflexive abilities are suspended from previously holding an internal conversation between self and society, i.e. agent and society (p.298). ‘Displaced persons’, according to Archer (2003, p.298), are the ones who have developed their particular type of reflexivity, but they are no more useful enough to enable them to exert their subjective ways to deal with the objective environment. ‘Impeded persons’ are the ones who do not develop the ability to hold an internal conversation to monitor between self and society. Both ‘displaced’ and ‘impeded’ persons are ‘fractured reflexives’ (p.298). It is not that they do not think or hold an internal conversation, but rather it does not provide them with a practical guide as to what to do in practice. They tend to be overly expressive of what they wish their concerns or achievements to be, rather than instrumental to be effective enough (p.299). Archer (2003, p.299) also says that the choice of the word ‘fractures’ is to indicate that they can often be amended. Because of their inability to exert personal powers to objective social conditions, ‘fractured reflexives’ are ‘passive agents’ to whom things happen (p.300). One ought not assume that ‘active agents’ are necessarily ‘better off’ or materially more successful than ‘passive agents’ (p.300), but ‘passive agents’ may have little chance of being successful (p.301). ‘Fractured reflexives’ are generally at a loss rather than focused in regard to their ultimate concerns, or the kinds of actions they should take to achieve their priorities (p.302). Consequently, nearly everything that happens in their life is beyond their control (p.305).

Finally, ‘near non-reflexivity’. The person with no reflexivity would have no inner dialogues, without which they have no self-knowledge that would trigger ‘regret’, ‘frustration’, ‘dismay’ or ‘nostalgia’. These emotions cannot be felt if they know nothing about themselves.
Without reflexivity, they are not able to monitor relations between self and society. This is obvious, as they have no understanding about themselves and lack any possible orientation towards society (p.334). One may be nearly non-reflective if his subjectivity has been ‘arrested before it had reached that stage of development’ (p.335). As a subject, ‘near non-reflexive’ is ‘entirely passive, one who does not mentally intervene to monitor his own actions, but simply accepts their repercussions’ (p.338).

METHODS

The Melbourne Sky magazine has been in print since 24 April 2007. The cover stories of the issues published between April 2007 and 13 July 2010 have been analysed for this study. Its cover stories have also been published in its official website until 16 March 2010, publishing its 160th volume, except the stories published between 23 September 2008 and 5 January 2010. The cover stories have been updated on the website since 13 July 2010. Otherwise, the contents of the website are minimally updated. Of the one hundred and seventy volumes of the magazines sixteen have included cover stories of ‘established and well known’ male figures from the Korean community in Melbourne and a few well-known celebrities from Korea. These have been omitted from analysis. The cover story usually allocates between one or a half page for the photo and between one and one and a half pages for the personal story although the web versions mostly include five to six photos of the models. The total number of cover stories that I have been able to get hold of was one hundred and forty volumes. Thus, I have analysed one hundred and twenty-four cover stories for this study. The analysis of data has been conducted on the basis of the principles of grounded theory method (Corbin and Strauss 1990; Strauss and Corbin 1994).

One major difficulty applying these theoretical categories to the cover models of the Melbourne Sky would be that they are in their twenties and they may still be in the formation of their characteristics and reflexivity in terms of the ways in which they make use of structural enablements and constraints affecting their approaches of making their way into the world. Thus there is limited scope to illustrate and confirm exemplary cases across the age range. Other difficulties are that the cover stories are rather carefully scripted around several prompts given by
the editor rather than the stories that are shared in a ‘natural’ setting. On the other, it is possible that these carefully prepared scripts may precisely represent the kinds of identity and reflexivity that they are forming and practising. A focal point of Archer’s reflexivity is about the kinds of ultimate concerns that individual agents develop; how they formulate their projects to realise their concerns, and then undertake their projects or live towards their ultimate values. In this respect, Archer’s different modes of reflexivity are appropriate to examine those transnational sojourners, describing their journeys of ‘making their way through the world’ (Archer 2007).6

**FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

*The Melbourne Sky Cover Story – Women’s Narratives of Their Lives*

Every issue of the *Melbourne Sky* has a female cover model or a representative reader. This segment, which the editor calls ‘the story of our friendly neighbour’,7 is a creative way to ‘stay in touch’ with the readership. A cover model notes as follows:

> It is highly interesting to come across one of us turning up as a cover model. She is one of us living in a foreign environment. The models tell us the kinds of dreams they came to Australia with and how they have adjusted to their life in Melbourne. All these stories are greatly encouraging the readers of the magazine (Yun JY, v.61, 9/6/2008, p.5).

The models find it most exhilarating to be selected as a model and to realise that it is a special and memorable event in their life (Park MH, v.63, 16/6/2008, p.5). The female cover models are chosen from sojourners8 rather than permanent residents in part because the latter are often known to each other in the relatively small Korean community in Melbourne and they may not

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6 Whether or not it is appropriate to apply Archer’s reflexivities in analysing the modes of reflexivities in another socio-cultural context is a matter of interest. I think that there are more universalities between the societies of England, Australia and Korea than particularities of each of those societies.

7 This English phrase is included in the front cover of the magazine.

8 Most cover models of the *Melbourne Sky* have stayed for 12 months, and some for six months and others for a few years.
necessarily be proud of appearing as a cover model. However, there were several residents amongst the models. Most models were hesitant about the idea of ‘cover model’ initially, but expressed high satisfaction once selected. The March 10 edition of 2009 contains one full-page advertisement (p.153) and two more partial-page advertisements (pp.37, 157) looking for models. The magazine pays the select a $50 reward. The cover page of the *Melbourne Sky* portrays the model while pages 4 and 5 carry two more photos and her brief life story.

Cover stories of the magazine are written by the models rather than through interviews between the model and editor of the magazine. Thus, the stories are succinct life stories as well as readers’ feedback on the quality of the magazine. Nearly all the cover stories mention that the magazine is full of useful information for their everyday life in the Korean community as well as in the Australian community and that they have easy access to Korean, Australian and international news. Those who are not equipped with personal computer in Melbourne are especially relying upon the magazine. In a slight contrast to what the readers say about the magazine, the publisher of the magazine notes that ‘the *Melbourne Sky* is not a magazine for everyday life, but a professional magazine dealing with knowledge information’ ⁹ (v.48, 18/3/2008, p.73). A cover model notes as follows:

*The Melbourne Sky* is a shrunk version of the world news. It covers all the stories happening in Korea and all other parts of the world in a weekly period rather than monthly. Arriving in Melbourne, I have greatly benefited from the magazine, being able to rent a flat, purchase a car, utensils, electronic goods. Not sure how I would have managed my life in Melbourne without this magazine (Park ES, v.65, 23/6/2008, p.5).

Again, the contents of the cover stories are prepared by the cover models as they are requested to provide their personal information as to what they did prior to coming to Australia, what brought them to Australia, what they think about the city of Melbourne, what their future aspirations are and how they plan to achieve their professional goals, what they think about the *Melbourne Sky* magazine and their note of thanks to their loved ones. There are diverse and rich life stories in

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⁹ Melbeonui haneuleun jisik jeongbo jeonmun maegeojin imnida (멜번의 하늘은 지식 정보 매거진입니다).
many issues of the magazine and it is most fascinating to see how individuals invest time and effort to achieve their professional goals, strategically and enthusiastically. The following sections are the analyses of those personal life stories.

**Escaping from a Stressful Life in the Name of Learning the Global Language**

Most cover models note that they are in the stage of preparing for working life. They note that if they wish to enjoy a quality life in Korea they must not hesitate to compete severely with others. Many have chosen to be overseas as a way of learning English effectively, as well as escaping from their stressful life, especially their grim work opportunities in Korea whereby university graduates have just over fifty per cent chance of securing employment commensurate to their qualifications. Their life in Melbourne offers them a time for reflection of their life and comparative perspectives on life between Australia and Korea. Jeon Yeong-A (v.176, 6/7/2010) spent her first semester of her fourth year of her university worrying about her employment opportunity. Six months away from her graduation, she decided to have a break for twelve months overseas. According to Jeon, the reason she wanted a break was not only to study English in Australia but to escape from the competitive context (Tokita 2010, p.03.9). Importantly, she recalls: ‘I wanted to think through what I want out of my life, in my own terms, and be able to reflect on my life so far. Prior to coming to Australia, I had never experienced anything on my own. Such a lack of autonomous life compelled me to meet the challenge of living alone away from home.’ Others have given up their studies or work in Korea and wished to try a different career path or a radically ‘new’ life in the bigger pool where the global language of English is the medium. Many of them are expressive of their plans and achievements, but how their professional goals may be achieved often seems to lack coherence, which will be discussed further later (e.g., v.12, 10/7/2007).

Nearly all the cover models recall Korean society as an extremely busy, fast moving and competitive society. Song Yun-Seon (v.14, 24/7/2007), a student of a university in Melbourne, mentions that ‘I will try my first job in Korea rather than in Australia. Korean society may be much more active and lively than Australia. If I can survive a job in Korea I can comfortably create a place of my own anywhere in the world.’ When they observe the lifestyles of
Melburnians, they are contrastingly reminded of how people live in Korea. Kim SH (v.166, 27/4/2010) contends, ‘People in Korea are always busy. Even when they travel it is not for the sake of relaxation. They have to seek sceneries, food, have photos taken. At the end of their travel, they are left with their comfort of their mind and body, but many photos in their camera.’ Kim AM (v.167, 4/5/2010) who migrated to Australia in 1995 observes: ‘Korea is fascinating and comfortable to the rich, but extremely hostile to everyday life of the poor. Welfare is not taken seriously enough. … I am still proud of my birthplace, Korea.’ Kim’s view was applicable in the early 90s, and is still so today especially when compared to Australia.

Perception of Melbournians: Relaxed and ‘Kind to Strangers’

Australia is the first overseas country to visit for most of the Korean sojourners. They have chosen to come to Australia with the knowledge that it is an internationally competitive nation in its productivity of most areas including economy, education, tourism and culture. Nonetheless, they quickly develop the impression within a few weeks of their arrival that Australian people are relaxed and ‘laid back’ towards their life. This impression reinforces their prior impression that the workers in the West enjoy much more relaxed lifestyles than those in Korea. This impression becomes an empirical knowledge of their own through positive experiences in their interactions with others. Lee So-Yeong (v.27, 23/10/2010) shares as follows: ‘The first thing that I have learned in Melbourne is that Melbournians are considerate and generous to others, and simile at others. Even the strangers say “hello” to me when my eyes meet theirs. When I walk around and may look a bit lost, holding my tourist map, people are willing to approach me and offer me help.’ This convinces her to think that these are the reasons why Melbourne is a good place to live and is popular as a tourist destination. According to Ms Lee, well organised parks, leisurely lifestyle and close family relations in Melbourne contrast to people’s extremely busy life in Korea. For these reasons, the cover models are generally overwhelmed by what the city of Melbourne can offer them physically, educationally and psychologically. They have hardly mentioned the strengths of the Korean society, with the exception of a few students (e.g., Park
Interestingly, Park Jin-Hee had never considered settling in a foreign country prior to coming to Australia. However, after living in Melbourne for several months, she feels like settling in Melbourne. Travelling through the ‘beautiful Australia’, some sojourners reinforce their conviction about their homeland: ‘Korea is unlike Australia with God given beautiful nature, but still has a lot of man-made achievements, which I would like to inform the rest of the world about’ (Hong HA, v.87, 21/10/2008).

**Represented Reflexivities**

The cover models of the magazine are in their twenties and their time and effort is primarily centred on their future plans, especially their aspirations for professional career plans. Their short-term to long-term desires include achieving a high score of IELTS and gaining permanent residency for a small number of them, becoming a capable English teacher, a tour planner, a business woman, a professional newsreader, a nurse, a stewardess, a golf pilates
d11 enjoying a range of hobbies, travelling to every country during life time. Some are expressive of their plans, able to set their projects and continue to practise their values/concerns. Others have chronic disjuncture between these steps, thus displaying fractured reflexivity. How these women try to make the best use of their time as sojourners in a foreign country is a specific interest of this paper since their effort involves the processes of reflecting and rediscovering who they are, uncovering what they want to be and how they want to live, and detailing the strategies as to how they can achieve their personal and professional goals. Also importantly, these individuals as agents are necessarily engaged in mediating their surroundings, that is, the given structure which enables and constrains their steps towards achieving their goals.

My analysis shows that most cover models display the combination of different modes of reflexivity as can be expected. Notable difficulty in identifying their specific reflexivities derives from the limited amount of life stories shared through the publication. As Archer (2003) notes, no reflexivity of a person is immutable, and therefore individuals go through the changes of their

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10 Most cover models of the Melbourne Sky have stayed for 12 months, and some for six months and others for a few years.

11 A person who provides care of muscles of golfers.
own reflexivity. Nonetheless, most people are unlikely to go through changes of their reflexivity regularly in a short span of time unless one’s reflexivity is completely ‘fractured’. In this respect, it is more of the limited information of individuals that make it difficult to work out the modes of reflexivity rather than a frequent change of reflexivity of the individuals. In the rest of the section, I shall describe common features of each of the four modes of reflexivity as described by Archer (2003) as well as ‘bring in’ illustrative examples from the cover stories with relevant analyses.

Communicative reflexives: working at staying put

Communicative reflexives, in Archer’s conceptualisation, are reluctant to break away from contextual continuity. They are also not social competitors. It is my presumption that those who strongly display ‘communicative reflexivity’ would be unlikely to leave their hometown and leave for an adventure in a foreign land. This would be particularly so when the world was much less globalised and had to rely on a ferry, spending many weeks to get across a continent. Yet, there would always be enough factors that ‘trigger’ those supposedly communicative reflexives to break contextual continuity at least temporarily, irrespective of time. For example, the sheer economic affluence of the Korean economy and having an ‘adventurous’ friend would be enough to encourage a communicative reflexive to try a life in Australia for several months. Thus, this kind of move is possible for those with ‘communicative reflexivity’ and may not necessarily be understood as an ‘autonomous’ decision. Their ‘communicative reflexivity’ is displayed by how they begin to adjust to their sojourning life. They find their initial life extremely bored without friends rather than being adventurous in a new place. It is primarily the network of friends that gradually ‘settle’ their adjustment process (e.g., Kim Ka-Yeong, v.33, 4/12/2007). In case of Kim KY, one important reason that she chose Australia was her assumption that Australia would warmly embrace her despite her young age and inexperience overseas. Collecting sufficient information about Australia from her acquaintance rather than work-related factors was another reason that led her to Australia in the first place.

Kim KY (v.33, 4/12/2007) has a series of professional aspirations. Her mid-term plan is to

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These headings have been taken from Archer (2003).
become a tour planner and she is overwhelmed by the idea that she will take her own customers to some great tourist destinations that she has recommended. Her further plans include establishing her own tour guide company. She is currently preparing to study tourism in an Australian university. After her graduation, Ms Kim wishes to go to Japan and learn Japanese since her stay there will help her meet a further range of tour customers. Kim seems to display her commitment to ‘work’. But, I am unsure as to whether readers of her story would be convinced enough to think that she has clearly worked out her ‘projects’. Kim goes on to say, ‘Most of all, I wish to be a confident woman whatever I do. Further, one important future goal is to reward my parents more than I have received from them. ... The opportunity to interact with diverse ethnic groups in Melbourne was a particular happiness. ... Without the Melbourne Sky, my life in Melbourne would have been bored.’ It seems that Kim’s sojourning is about having a ‘fashionable’ stay like many other tourists rather than seriously paving the way for her career.

The ones who display some degree of ‘communicative reflexivity’, irrespective of their ‘dominant’ reflexivity in any other types, tend to value their interactions with other ‘Koreans.’ For example, ‘There is a saying that the ones going overseas for their studies should minimise their interactions with other Koreans. This approach is not wrong, but I still feel that Koreans should closely interact with other Koreans and share their emotions and feelings between them’ (Hong JH, 4/3/2008). This seems to result from the commonly promoted ‘we feeling’ in the Korean society. However, there may be little value in imposing such artificial interactions between the sojourners living in Melbourne for a short or long-term simply because they originate from Korea.

**Autonomous reflexives: upward and outward bound**

Some of the sojourners are showing strong determinations to have their professional dream come true with detailed ‘appropriate’ plans and actions. Park In-Su (v.15, 31/7/2007), a twenty-two-year-old woman, is a university student in Korea. Park’s medium term career plan is to be CEO of a multinational hotel. She thought that her English language ability is a fundamental requirement and has completed her twelve months study of English in Melbourne. According to Park (v.15, 31/7/2007),

‘Last twelve months was an investment to be able to communicate in English. My planned...
internship after graduating from the university is to gain a range of experiences from the bottom of the hotel hierarchy, which is preparatory for me to become a CEO. If I don’t undertake such internship when young I may regret about it in the future. I plan to throw my whole self into that training process. I am determined to display the Korean woman’s spirit of perseverance, challenge and diligence. More than anything else, it will be a struggle against myself.

Park seems clear as to what it takes to realise her professional goals. She also knows that the biggest obstacle could be herself. She has delved into monitoring the relations between self and society, being prepared to cope with the process until her goals are accomplished. Ms Park also points out that she is not disinterested in going out with her friends and travelling for the sake of fun and scenery. However, Park is more devoted to her professional achievement than to ‘having fun.’ She also notes that a surprisingly good proportion of her age groups have detailed career plans for their own. Such observation seems to engender more effort and commitment on her part. An important reason that she contested for the cover model was to publicise her personal dream to be hotelier, which, she trusts, will continue to remind her dream today and be a stimulus till she accomplishes her dream.

Many of Korean students also seem to pick up a few important lessons that might be invaluable for their lifetime. For example, Kim Sena (v.26, 16/10/2007), who plans to be an interpreter, shares her experiences as follows: ‘A lesson that I have taken out of my 10 months life in Melbourne is that opportunity in my life will not come and wait for me. I am the one to look for it and I have to get my own “bowl” ready to contain the opportunity.’ Others develop a stronger sense of what they want to do with their future and what kinds of professional career they would like to pursue. For example, Lee So-Yeong (v.27, 23/10/2007) knows that she chose to study tourism in the university because she had always loved the concept of studying a subject that she can enjoy. Nonetheless, since entering the university in Korea she has studied the subject largely because that is what she chose and that is what she is supposed to do as a student. Since coming to Australia, Lee So-Yeong has developed a strong sense of how she can utilise her university studies to prepare her future professional career as a tour planner.

Mun Seo-Jin (v.29, 6/11/2007) was touched by a best seller of travel diaries and developed her wish to travel around the world. On the other, she loved physics and math during her high
school days. She chose to study civil engineering as she wanted to design bridges. After her first year of the university, she travelled to India. Despite parents’ antagonistic opposition, Mun changed her major from civil engineering to tourism studies. She worked as a tour guide to India, for a Korean tour agency. She may be in her late twenties and has spent about two years travelling to all the continents except Africa, covering 30 different countries. She is just about to complete her Diploma of Tourism at a TAFE (Technical and Further Education) in Melbourne and is currently working as a tour planner for a travel agency in Melbourne. She does not seem to have a strong sense of vocation, but her lifetime wish is to travel to all the countries in the world before she is too old to do so. Mun would like to be a capable tour planner and thinks that she has a great pleasure being able to help others to have a great travel. Mun has already displayed her strong commitment to her values and established her projects. Her life in the last several years has systematically been focused on leading her successful projects. She already lives and practises her life as a committed tour planner.

Meta-reflexives: moving on

Teaching profession is a common vocation that many Korean young people put high values on under a strong influence of Confucianism (Selth 1988; Han 1997). It is particularly popular among women since the profession offers them professional longevity in comparison with most other jobs in the context of Korean job market. It is not surprising that many cover models wish to be a teacher/professor of numerous disciplines. However, few of them persuasively show devotion to teaching vocation in the way that Archer’s (2003) concept of ‘meta-reflexivity’ refers to. For example, an IT officer of a Korean company envies those who have fluent English and plans to be an English teacher (Hong JH, v.46, 4/3/2008). However, her story starts with the comment: ‘I wished to have an experience of living overseas before too late.’ Hong also notes: ‘the reason I want to be a teacher is because the job offers relative freedom and I can utilise my own time. It gives me pleasure to teach others ...’ Hong learns that a TESOL [Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages] qualification is something that can be achieved in a short span of time rather than a few years, and decides to take up the program. In brief, there appears to be little sense of ‘vocation or devotion’ in her wishing to be a teacher, and there is little monitoring between her less than established concerns and her projects to ‘achieve’ the concerns. This person’s reflexivity may not fit in ‘meta-reflexivity’ as described by Archer.
Lee Haet-Nim (v.101, 27/1/2009) appreciates what the city of Melbourne can offer its visitors like any other cover models. Ms Lee was majoring in English language in a university in Korea in 2007 and spent six months in Brisbane, studying TESOL, for six months in the same year. However, sometime prior to her arrival in Australia in 2007, Lee read a book, *Nurse, Have the Dream of Professional Nursing*\(^\text{13}\) and recalls that the book changed her values forever. Her six months in Brisbane allowed her to see ‘studying English’ from the perspective of teachers rather than students. Importantly in conjunction with her ultimate concerns, Lee developed her goals to go beyond studying/teaching English, but embark on a professional area. In her case, nursing was the one that combines her ‘brain and heart’ to use her words. Lee withdrew from her studies in Korea and returned to TAFE in Geelong in November 2007. Lee completed her Nursing Diploma in twelve months and is about to continue her Nursing Degree in a university in Queensland. She looks forward to working as Division 2 Nurse during her nursing degree program.

Lee had many difficulties with medical terminology and felt as if she were ‘blacked out’ when studying anatomy and pathology. Lee studied harder and more diligently than she did for her university entrance in Korea. She has almost given up her nursing studies a few times. Her network of international peers at the TAFE seemed to have provided her with the opportunities to display ‘communicative as well as autonomous reflexivities’, i.e., relying upon friendships and being determined to pursue the value of her professional work. She still finds it incredible that she is studying to become a nurse. Her friends in Korea are about to graduate from the university, but she has just restarted her nursing degree. This must have had an adverse impact on her ‘Korean’ pride. Lee has not only chosen ‘contextual discontinuity’, leaving her previous studies, but also chose to study in Geelong rather than in a metropolitan city. However, what sets Lee most distinctly from ‘communicative and autonomous reflexives’ is her values attached to her *vocation* of nursing. According to Lee, ‘I know nursing is a difficult profession, but the rewarding from the work outweighs the difficulties. I simply cannot begin to express my joy of seeing the patients discharged from the hospital after their recovery.’ Lee compares nursing work between Korea and Australia and she could not initially understand why Australian nurses have

\(^{13}\) *Kanhosa, Peuroeul Kkumkkwora* (간호사, 프로콜 굳군다).
to feed and shower the patients, rather than leaving such work with their relatives. Lee now agrees that ‘Australian’ nursing is a better care for patients. These learning experiences further persuade Lee that nursing entails a kind of values that she has dreamt of throughout her life. The patients that Lee looks after through nursing homes are more than her patients to care. Ms Lee visits them and takes them for a walk during her off duty. Unlike many other cover models, she continues to develop and sharpen her ‘meta-values’ through her life in this foreign land and all the people that she comes across: ‘My ultimate values in life have continued to be influenced by the great experiences I get from Australia.’

**Fractured reflexives: ‘displaced’ and ‘impeded’**

The young sojourners or those cover models are highly positive about their future opportunities and often make a link between personal and professional goals. That is, they wish to achieve their professional goals in conjunction with fun and leisure. Their approach to realising their ‘concerns’ seems somewhat relaxed. Their enthusiasm for their aspirations is high, there are little strategically appropriate pathways. For example, Han Bo-Ra (v.11, 3/7/2007) plans to be a professional marketer of commercial products. She thinks or ‘decides’ that it is essential to travel all around the world and be able to understand the dreams and lifestyles of people in different parts of the world: ‘Fluent foreign languages are important, but more important for a capable professional marketer is the ability to identify with the feelings of those consumers from extremely diverse cultures.’ How ideal or realistic her approach to being a professional marketer seems to be a matter for debate. Her approach may have been conceived under the influence of the penetrating globalising culture and her way may be a useful recipe for success. Ms Han is rather expressive of her professional dreams, tending to demonstrate ‘fractured reflexivity’. That is, there seems to be a disjuncture between her ‘concerns’ and ‘projects’. My analysis shows that a large number of the cover models exhibit similar modes of reflexivities.

Of the cover stories that I have analysed, there appear to be a good number of those who may be less than sure about how they may be able to achieve their professional dreams. It is possible that they have not been able to express their strategies to achieve their dreams and as a consequence I have not been able to make sense out of their stories adequately. For example,
Yun Jina\textsuperscript{14} (v.25, 9/10/2007) graduated with a public health diploma from a technical college. At the time of graduation, Korean economy was going through a recession. Under the circumstances, Yun Jina became a hairdresser to work for her mother who was running a hair dressing shop. She then realised that there are many other hairdressers who were very well trained in Korea and overseas and that she did not have much hope in her hair-dressing career. Then, she decided to study hair dressing overseas and prepare herself for a university position to teach hair dressing. At the time of the publication of her cover story, she was undertaking a hair-dressing program at the Pivot Point Hair Design College in Melbourne. After completing the program, Yun Jina plans to study management or education. One may wonder how these disciplines will assist her to become an academic to teach hair dressing although those disciplines may not be completely irrelevant to her academic career.

Some of the Korean students have accumulated a range of work experiences prior to coming to Australia. They had reasonable and thoughtful reasons moving from one occupation to another. On the other hand, their decisions may not necessarily have been thought through over a period and may be even erratic in some cases. For example, Im Su-Ye\textsuperscript{15} (v.28, 30/10/2007) opened a shop for women’s clothing in Korea sometime in the past. She must have been diligent in what she was doing. As can be expected she came across a large number of women customers, which ‘somehow’ led her to think ‘how nice it will be for beautiful women to wear beautiful clothes!’ She notes that this led her to learn skin care, massage and hair dressing. Im Su-Ye also recalls her decision that as far as she was confident about herself she would like to try out her life in a big pool like Australia. She told herself that there was nothing to prepare except applying for a visa and purchasing an air ticket. Ms Im had arrived in Australia with no basic English and had run into difficulties resulting from the language barrier and cultural differences. In the midst of numerous trials and errors, she was encouraged by her occasional achievements and seemed to have managed to become a permanent resident in Australia due to her qualification as hairdresser. Undoubtedly, Ms Im has made a continuing progress with her chosen work, now having established her long term residency in Australia, which seems to make many of her peers envy her. As Im sees her peers return to Korea, she is emotionally overwhelmed by the departure of close friends, making her cry loud under the blanket. According to the categories of internal

\textsuperscript{14} This is a pseudonym, different from published name.
\textsuperscript{15} This is a pseudonym.
conversation that Archer (2003) illustrates, Ms Im may partly fall in the category of ‘communicative reflexivity’ which tends to give predominant values to their significant others, in terms of pursuing their ultimate concerns, as opposed to ‘autonomous reflexivity’ or ‘meta-reflexivity’. Im’s long-term professional dream is to establish a business that combines fashion, skin care and hair dressing. The nature of that business enterprise and how she will achieve that dream are yet to be thought through.

‘Impeded communicative reflexivity’ has also been observed by a small number of them. Ms Kim Su-Ji16 (v.107, 10/3/2009) majored in fine arts and graduated from a Korean university in January 2008. She saved her wages, working for three months day and night, sleeping about 3 hours a day. In the first paragraph of her story, she recalls that her attending to Catholic church was driven by her mother and relatives and that she has loved fine arts from the age of six, but has been unsure throughout university days as to whether fine arts is what she loves to do. In fact, she says that ‘there was no one day in my life in Korea I felt comfortable.’ Yet, she designed no ‘project’ to overcome such dissatisfaction. Ms Lee’s plan to attend World Youth Day 2009 in Sydney in the presence of the Pope Benedict XVI was an opportunity for her to escape the uncertainty of whether or not she should continue to pursue fine arts for her career. Ms Kim thought that her university life was ‘stained’ by the extra-curricular activities she was involved in for making income to support her expensive art school program. There seems unclear order of her priorities. Neither significant persons in her life, including relatives, nor work. Although Ms Lee planned her escape, this escape seems designed for little tangible outcome. Eighty youths from Incheon city attended World Youth Day, of whom she was one. Attending the Convention, Ms Lee stayed on under a working holiday visa. She soon travelled to Melbourne as she had planned in advance. Whilst Ms Kim expected a lot of ‘positives’ out of the city of Melbourne, she felt lonely and unwelcomed. Her travel was planned, but no ‘project’ was set to help her cope with a life in a foreign place. Her ‘concerns’ of priority are also unclear. A complicating factor here was the breaking up of her four-year-long relationship with her boyfriend soon after their attending the Convention together. Walking along Swanston Street in Melbourne, she was overcome by loneliness and emptiness, and cried aloud in public for a while. She found it amazing and fascinating that no one paid her any attention at all. Ms Kim ‘suddenly

16 This is a pseudonym.
found’ or decided to find herself completely liberated from such restraints as the need to be conscious of what she should or should not be wearing and any ‘trivial’ surroundings around her, which she had to be conscious of in Korea. Ms Kim seems to display little ability to initiate inner dialogues as to how she can coordinate relations between self and different social and cultural contexts. What she realises is simply the great benefit of anonymity and then behaves ‘unexpectedly.’ That was her last lachrymal episode in Melbourne after which she decided to be ‘successful,’ telling herself, ‘I will eventually succeed.’ How such an ‘expressive’ moment can dramatically save her from the depressed situation is unclear. Following her determining moment, she walked into a Korean grocery store and picked up a copy of the Melbourne Sky which provided her with basic information on English language schools, share houses, part-time jobs. Her life as a back-packer in Melbourne ‘settled’ within a week.

I have completely overcome the sadness resulting from breaking up with my boyfriend. I spend quality time with classmates from my English language school. I eat yummy foods and create great memories with my housemates. Working as a salesperson in a shop, I get to know many foreigners. When I have spare time I pick up my digital camera and visit every corner of Melbourne, riding on trams and trains. ... There are so many places worth visiting. The more I see the more I am deeply immersed into Melbourne. One important lesson I have learned is that I should not be in a hurry. I was always anxious and worried in Korea everyday. I am convinced that my life can work out perfectly okay even in the midst of leisurely life in Melbourne. ... In my journey back to Korea I might find myself free of all the burdens and worries that I brought to Melbourne with me. I am rediscovering myself and my mind is filled with hope and happiness under the beautiful sky of Melbourne. (v.107, 10/3/2009)

Ms Kim’s main mode of overcoming her sadness was through relying on her friends, i.e., ‘communicative reflexivity’ of ‘thought and talk’. Ms Kim’s important inner dialogue is to keep telling herself that she will be successful and she will be free of all the troubles she brought from Korea, and that if she takes her life easy all will go smoothly. What her ultimate values are is unclear, except hoping that her artwork will be pleasing to others, e.g., ‘It is invaluable for someone to be happy because of me [my art work]’. Consequently, there is little exertion of her
personal powers in realising her concerns which are again unclear. Yet, she tells her again that she would like to plan her life and she will find her mid-age getting closer to achieving her plan and she would be highly satisfied with ‘the taste of her success’ that has grown out of her struggles and adversities till then. Her reflexivity seems largely arrested before it commenced to develop, displaying ‘impeded communicative reflexivity.’ After the break-up with the boyfriend, she was determined not to fall in love again. She has just learned that she is falling in love again, not long after the recent break-up. Since she is unclear about her own ‘projects’ it is likely that she will see things happen to her rather than keeps her own life under control.

Fractured reflexivity is also displayed by numerous examples. Kim Seul-Gi¹⁷ (v.37, 1/1/2008) had a long-lasting interest about singing and performing, starting with her joining a chorus of a broadcasting company. She is a performing arts student in a Korean university. She was selected and performed for a big scale play but disenchanted about profit-oriented goal of the production. Kim SG decided to put aside her passion for performance and then suddenly became interested in English as a means for communication, but deliberately ignoring English grammar. This triggered her with a desire to study English in a country where English is the medium. Ms Kim wrote to her friend studying English in Melbourne. Within a few weeks she arrived in Melbourne with no preparation except buying an air ticket. On her day of arrival she went to a pub, ‘drinking and dancing madly.’ At night, she and her friend took ten ‘[Anglo]-Australian’ friends to a karaoke. They have been meeting three times a week for the last ten months. She attended English language school only for two months and avoided meeting ‘Koreans’ since she disliked Koreans pointing out the importance of grammar. Ms Kim spent the whole time visiting tourist destinations, parks, and drinking bars. She was totally satisfied with the fact that she had been ‘able to communicate with those friends of blonde and blue eyes.’ She has deliberately avoided seeing ‘Koreans’ and eating kimchi and rice for the first eight months, which, she thinks, led her to put on ten kilograms. She rarely rang her parents in Korea and rarely read Korean language for the same period. Kim’s professional plan is to become a stewardess as it allows her to travel to many places. Another reason is to showcase ‘Korean kindness’ through her hospitality. Once that experience of travel is achieved, she would become a singer of Christian songs, which is what her mother wants. For the moment, she thinks that

¹⁷ This is a pseudonym.
foreign language fluency will internationalise her ‘work’ and plans to learn Chinese, Spanish and Japanese. As she is about to return to Korea, Ms Kim has persuaded a few ‘Australian’ friends to travel to Korea with her. Kim seems to display an unusually high appreciation to her ‘Australian’ friends to the extent that she denies Korean friends and identity. Yet, she conveniently exploits her Koreanness, e.g., being dressed with Korean costumes and posing for the camera.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The *Melbourne Sky* is certainly an interesting transnational medium linking the two nations, Korea and Australia. The readers of the magazine find it highly relevant to who they are and what they need. It addresses their ‘material’ needs and developmental needs. Therefore, the value of the magazine to those young Korean sojourners seems remarkable. However, the focus of the analysis for this paper has been the life stories of the cover models of the magazine, who are representing its audiences. The stories represent trials and errors as to how those young sojourners take advantage of their sojourning period or ‘struggle’ to achieve their future professional dreams and to be reflective on their life’s ultimate concerns. They have broadly demonstrated their transnational tendencies since they perceive the possibility of engaging in their activities around the global village. The sojourners thought that English language has become an important instrument to be part of the global village, in which they also regard travelling as an essential activity. Thus, individual agents try hard to equip themselves in the competitive and globalised world with language skills and professional knowledge. This may suggest an important point in the following sense. The literature on transnationalism often seems to focus on active international political, economic and cultural links between nations. Nonetheless, these political and economic links between nations may not be able to sustain or even initiate its start without the engagement of those qualified individual agents. In other words, these individuals are the active carriers and ‘performers’ of transnationalism.

Most cover models were not satisfied with their work and life in Korea, escaped from it, and left Korea in search of a much more meaningful life (Cohen and Taylor 1992). That is, their dissatisfaction with Korean life led them to seek their solution in a ‘global’ context rather than within Korea. However, such dissatisfaction and ‘escaping abroad’ was not usually ‘permissible’
in Korean society before the 1990s. Even if a person was dissatisfied with his/her profession s/he would cautiously look for another professional opportunity within Korea rather than internationally. From a viewpoint of older generation, it is puzzling that many sojourners did not seem to have concrete and pragmatic goals or ‘projects’ they wished to achieve in Australia at their times of arrival although it is often understood that learning English as a foreign language in itself is considered invaluable and that Australia is a popular destination for that purpose.

Whilst many cover models displayed strongly the mode of ‘fractured reflexivity’ in conjunction with ‘communicative and autonomous reflexivities’, as expected there are stark differences between the generation of those analysed sojourners and older ‘Koreans’ in terms the ways in which they managed their individual ‘projects’, which are the means to monitor between self and society. It may also be characteristic of the younger generation that, for example, Ms Kim (v.107, 10/3/2009) did not hesitate to reveal publicly her personal affairs such as her break up with her boyfriend. Although she did not attract any public attention by crying aloud in the street, she quickly interpreted the experience as the one of anonymity in a foreign land that she seems to enjoy greatly, without indication of being aware that she now faces the cold reality of having to survive in a strange land. In fact, this anonymity leads to uncommitted short-term ‘intimate’ relations for many of them and often causes an alarm in the Korean community. Through her ‘awakening experience’ on Swanston Street, Ms Kim learned of a stark difference between Seoul and Melbourne and seemed to have felt liberated from many kinds of social restraints present in Korea. Ms Kim is now remade with new opportunities and identity. She now has a new life goal – being successful, whatever that may mean. According to Ms Kim, her current life is completely filled with meaningful activities and that she lives with hope and happiness. Some of the difficulties and troubles she has to endure on an everyday basis seem to be ‘mysteriously put away’ and the readers of the story are not able to speculate much further. It is unclear as to whether the younger generation is not well understood or whether such media representation tends to misrepresent or ‘mystify’ their reality. The extent to which Korean diasporic media can make reflective contribution to the formation of Korean identity should be seriously considered (Thompson 1995). Perhaps the younger generation are truly trans-national and are less than well understood.

Undoubtedly, their time in Melbourne is relaxing enough for them to be reflective and many are refreshingly able to think through what to do and how to achieve their new goals.
Many will even pick up life-long skills and lessons in Melbourne. Yet, it seems fair to point out that the sojourners are in the journey of ‘escapism’ and ‘utopianism.’ It appears that these short-term visitors still desire and to some extent live in a fantasy – where they still are longing for and willing to experience an exotic Western world, dreamt of throughout their childhood, not a real world, although the lengths of their stay and the levels of exposure to the actual and local reality would influence the level of their fantasy life over time. According to Stuart Hall (1996, p.4), identities are often formed as a consequence of the process narrativising the self and the process of weaving their individual stories is ‘in the imaginary (as well as symbolic) and therefore, always, partly constructed in fantasy, or at least within a fantasmatic field.’

The cover models and the readers of the magazines demonstrate their ambivalent or ‘split’ desires whereby they desire an exotic Australian lifestyle as well as maintain their close – both physical and ‘virtual’ – contact with the ‘Korean’ society, culture and people by reading community magazines, through which they are informed about Korean community services, DVDs, news and foods.

A couple of questions that remain unanswered is ‘why ‘fractured reflexivity’ has been particularly strongly represented and ‘meta-reflexivity’ with a sense of calling for a profession has been under-represented through ‘the sample’.

One may suspect whether or not the cover models adequately represent the young adults in their twenties who have come to Australia often to study English and/or under the working holiday scheme. The stories do represent how the younger generation goes through trials and errors as they work out who they are today and what they want to be tomorrow. Some of them realise that it is a continuing struggle to be able to successfully handle their own selfhood. Again, the cover models are not an esoteric group of people, but rather that much of their reflexivity has been formulated under an influence of the increasingly competitive and demanding Korean society in particular. There may be some differences between Korean and Australian societies in this matter, but the discrepancy between them is probably decreasing. It may be worth acknowledging the possibility of the applicability of Inglehart’s thesis of ‘culture shift’ from ‘materialist’ to ‘postmaterialist’ values to those young

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18 Not many people stick to one or related profession, but constantly moving on. It was not because the situation they were in did not allow them to pursue their ‘concerns.’ Mostly, their reasons have not been provided. Also noted in the analysis, which is an issue that goes beyond the scope of this paper, is that few develop their professional commitment for a long term, let alone ultimate concerns. An identified factor is that women are not treated equally enough in the Korean employment market and they are expected or prepared to quit their work when personal or family reasons arise. Accordingly they do not have rigorous plan to achieve their goals.
Korean adults who have been brought up in ‘economic abundance’ of Korean society (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1995). Yet, the issue of identities or reflexivities apply to everyone irrespective of their socio-economic or cultural backgrounds.

Note: An anonymous reviewer has offered constructive comments on an earlier version. A fuller version of this paper is to appear as a chapter of Korean Diaspora and Media in Australia: In Search of Identities (2012), Lanham, MD.: University Press of America.

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Harmonising International Development Efforts with Resource Diplomacy: Potential for the strategic use of ODA to Secure Lithium in South America

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Abstract
Korea’s current Green Growth strategy seeks to lessen the country’s dependence on fossil fuel resources and promote significant investment into the development of alternative, environmentally-friendly energy sources. As part of this strategy Korea has been investing heavily in the development of various green energy industries in particular it has become one of the world’s largest manufacturers of lithium based rechargeable-ion batteries to power electric or hybrid motor vehicles. The continued growth of this industry requires a secure and stable supply of lithium and to this end the Korean government has developed its so-called “resource diplomacy” strategy which is designed promote relations with countries with significant lithium deposits such as Chile, Argentina and Bolivia. However, to date, resource diplomacy has been somewhat narrowly targeted at domestic policies that support Korean firms to invest directly in acquiring and developing lithium mines or to increasing the number of embassies in these countries. More recently the Korean government is considering broader diplomatic measures. The paper argues that resource diplomacy has the potential to be an effective means of achieving Korea’s green growth objectives but that the success of this strategy must go beyond facilitating Korean direct foreign investment to become a more fully fledged cultural and foreign aid and development diplomacy strategy that promotes longer term, broader and deeper levels of engagement. This ‘soft-power’ approach is more likely to serve as an effective but subtle means to exert influence not only to promote specific Korean interests but to achieve longer term, mutually beneficial outcomes for both Korea and these South American nations.
Introduction

China’s move to block exports of rare earth metals to Japan following a territorial argument over the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 sent shockwaves throughout the region and, in particular, its resource poor neighbour South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea). Committed to the so-called “Green Growth Strategy” that seeks to develop a range of greener industries, the precariousness of the supply of key inputs into these industries such as rare earths metals has the potential to derail some of the Green Growth Strategy’s ambitious targets. More generally it underscored how disruptions in supply of a range of metals can threaten the viability of Korea’s emerging industries for example how disruption in the supply of lithium could affect the development of Korea’s growing lithium-based rechargeable battery industry. In this context, Korea has made the diversification of resources supply a priority. To this end the Korean government has developed its so-called “resource diplomacy” strategy which is designed promote relations with countries with significant lithium deposits in particular Chile, Argentina and Bolivia.

This paper analyses why the sales of eco-friendly vehicles and lithium-ion rechargeable batteries are significant for the realisation of Korea’s low carbon and green growth targets. Secondly, it examines the state of development of lithium-ion rechargeable battery technologies and the implications for the Korean battery industry. Finally, it examines how the Korea’s resource diplomacy has been applied to securing lithium in South America’s “Lithium Triangle” that falls within the borders of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia. The paper finds that, to date, resource diplomacy has been somewhat narrowly targeted at domestic policies that provide Korean firms with funds and special loans to support their acquisition and development of South American lithium mines. The other most significant initiative is the increase in the number of Korean embassies in these countries. The paper argues that securing a stable supply of key mineral inputs such as lithium will require more than facilitating Direct Foreign Investment and must expand Korean investment in areas such as the arts, education but in particular targeting Korea’s official development assistance (ODA) to investment in economic reconstruction and development projects such as those that develop local infrastructure and communications. The paper argues that while coordinating resource diplomacy with international development efforts is an approach adopted by others countries competing for resources, in particular Japan and China, given its history, Korea is well placed to share its experience and expertise with developing countries and has greater
capacity to being perceived as a “benign middle power” by recipient countries holding relevant mineral resources, and can further leverage that position to avoid accusations of neo-colonialism. This approach has the potential to be successful and valuable with regard to relations with Bolivia. Like Korea Bolivia has a troubled colonial past. It is also South America’s poorest country and thus requires greatest international development assistance. Bolivia also possesses the world’s largest untapped lithium reserves.

Korea’s Green Growth Strategy

Korea is heavily dependent on imported fuel to meet its energy needs in particular relying on imported fossil-fuel based energy resources. In 2007 Korea was the 10th largest energy consuming country in the world (EIA, 2007; Lee et al., 2008: 284) with 97 percent of its total energy consumption being sourced from overseas (EIA, 2007; Lee et al., 2008: 284). It is estimated that 84 percent of this energy supply is in the form of fossil-based energy resources (Presidential Commission on Green Growth, ROK, 2010: 13). In 2009, the country was the fifth largest importer of crude oil and the second largest importer of both coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world (EIA, 2010).

Fossil fuel dependence has increased Green House Gas (GHG) emissions at a constant rate with Korea far above the world average in both absolute GHG emissions and emissions per capita. From 1990 to 2009, Korea’s GHG emissions rose 118 percent and in 2009 the country was ranked 8th in the world in terms of GHG emissions (Kang, 2011: 120-21). The world average emission per capita in 2009 was 4.5 tons, while in Korea the amount was 2.5 times that at 10.9 tons.

To maintain sustainable economic growth while mitigating GHG emissions, on 15 August 2008, at a national address on the 60th anniversary of the Republic, President Lee Myung-Bak, announced a new national policy called the “low carbon and green growth strategy”. Six months later, in January 2009, the government responded to the Global Financial Crisis induced recession in Korea with an economic stimulus package equivalent to US$38.1 billion 80 percent of which was allocated to the development of more efficient usage of resources such as freshwater, waste, energy-efficient buildings, renewable energies, low-carbon vehicles, and the development of an energy efficient high speed rail network (United Nations
Environment Programme, 2010). This investment in green growth was the highest ratio among comparable stimulus packages from other G20 governments.

Part of the Green Growth strategy is to implement measures that have the potential to lessen the country’s dependence on fossil fuel resources and thereby reduce current emission levels. Korea ratified the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2002 as a non-Annex I country, meaning that it had no obligation to set a specific GHG emission reduction targets during the period 2008 to 2012 (Jones and Yoo, 2010: 9). Nevertheless, in 2009, the Korean government announced a mid-term mitigation target for GHG emission reduction of 30 percent (Woo, 2010: 19). The Korean government also announced that it aims to increase the portion of domestic renewable energy consumption to 5 percent by 2011 and 9 percent by 2030. This target is ambitious given that in 2006, Korea’s renewable energy accounted for only 2.26 percent of primary energy consumption (Kang, 2008: 7).

World Lithium-ion Battery and Vehicle Markets and Korea’s Green Growth Strategy

Another key aspect of the Green Growth Strategy is to mitigate emissions through the development of alternative energy sources. In this context, the development of the battery industry to power more environmentally friendly vehicles is seen as particularly important. Widespread uptake of electric or hybrid vehicle technology is seen not only as a means of lowing carbon emissions domestically but, through export and significant uptake in overseas markets, reducing emissions globally. The development of this export industry is also seen as a means of driving future domestic economic growth.

Currently nickel metal hydride batteries power most hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs). The main limitations of currently nickel metal hydride batteries are high cost (about the same as a small car in 2009) and the relatively short driving distance achievable on a single charge.

1 It should be noted that the genuine “greenness” of some of these initiatives has been questioned. For example environmental groups have criticised the government spending of USD20 billion on a plan to develop Korea’s four major river systems — the Han, Nakdong, Geum, and Youngsan — with the stated goals of preventing water shortages, improving water quality, bolstering flood control, and creating “eco-friendly culture spaces” for tourism. However, these groups argue that the project is not a genuine green initiative but a rebranding of an earlier Lee Myung-bak Pan Korean Waterway policy which sought to stimulate the local construction industry as it involves extensive dredging of waterways and the building of up to 16 new dams. Critics claim that this will further erode dwindling habitat and put added stress on the country's remaining wildlife (O’Donnell, 2010: 3; Card 2009).
The development of the electric vehicle industry thus requires new generations of electric vehicles (EVs) and HEVs with smaller and lighter weight batteries that can store more energy (Bruce, 2008: 752). The continued development of rechargeable technologies will however increasingly rely on the supply of various metals including lithium, chrome, manganese, molybdenum, cobalt, tungsten, indium, rare-earth elements, magnesium and titanium (Kim, H., 2010: 13). However lithium, the lightest metal with half the density of water, is the core raw material required for the production of latest generation of rechargeable batteries. Compared to nickel metal hydride batteries, lithium-ion batteries are lighter, 20 percent smaller and much more energy efficient (Gruber and Medina, 2010: 1). As a result, the market for lithium-ion batteries has increased dramatically driven by continuing improvement in electric-car and battery storage technologies as well as a drop in the price of these batteries and the vehicles in recent years (Kim, Y., 11/11/2010; Bok, 2011).

Demand for lithium has only increased significantly in recent years. The consumption of lithium in the world increased less than 100 tons per annum in the early 1990s to just over 70,000 tons per annum in 2000 (Ebensperger et al., 2005: 218). At this time the main uses for lithium were – batteries: 25 percent; ceramic and glass: 18 percent; lubricating greases: 12 percent; pharmaceuticals and polymers: 7 percent; air conditioning: 6 percent; primary aluminium production: 4 percent; continuous casting: 3 percent: chemical processing, 3 percent and others: 22 percent (Jaskula, 2008: 44.2). However in 2007, batteries became the leading end use for lithium for the first time and by 2011 lithium-ion batteries accounted for 76 percent of the global rechargeable batteries market, which was worth an estimated USD18.3 billion (Jaskula, 2008: 44.2). By 2020 this market is expected to increase to USD95.4 billion. The growth the industry has driven increased prices and with the price of lithium carbonate rising from USD1.49 per kg in 2001 to USD6.00 per kg in 2009 (Shultz, 2010: 14). Demand is being driven by the significant increase in the quantities of lithium required for rechargeable ion batteries to power EVs and HEVs. Unlike lithium batteries used in mobile information technology (IT) devices, EVs and HEVs batteries require much larger storage capacity and one EVs or HEV battery is equivalent in size to approximately 4,000 to 5,000 mobile phone batteries (Lim, 2009: 1).

With the continued tightening of environmental regulations, the green car market is expected to grow rapidly (Lim 2009: 1). Sales of lithium batteries for HEVs and EVs only began in
2009 and current demand for HEVs and EVs batteries remains relatively weak (Lowe et al., 2010: 21). However, this is likely to change and some analysts estimate that the share of HEVs and EVs in the global auto market will grow to between 18-50 percent of total sales by 2020 (Bok 2011:6). The Boston Consulting Group (2010: 7) forecasts that 26 percent of the new cars sold in the world market in 2020 – or approximately 14 million cars – will have electric or hybrid power engines and that the global market for lithium-ion rechargeable batteries that power them is expected to reach USD60 billion (Boston Consulting Group, 2010: 8). A summary of some of the predictions for the “green cars” market is shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forecasters (year)</th>
<th>Sales of Eco-Friendly Vehicles</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Bank (2009)</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>US: 23%, EU: 37%, Japan: 34%, China 20%, Others: 5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan (2010)</td>
<td>20–50%</td>
<td>50–70% in 2030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huji Economic Research Institute (2010)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>EVs: 9.4%, plug-in hybrids: 11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Korean Industries (2009)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bok (2011: 7)

The Development of Lithium Rechargeable Battery Technologies and the EV and HEV Industry in Korea

Japanese manufacturers have had a solid lead in the global lithium battery market for the last 20 years. The first lithium battery was produced in Japan in 1973 (Ogawa, 1985). In 1991 the Japanese company Sony further developed lithium-ion rechargeable battery technology and introduced the first batteries to the world market (Nishi, 2001; Bruce, 2008). As a pioneer of this technology Japan became the world leader in the development of four key lithium cell materials: anodes, cathodes, electrolytes and separators and dominated the lithium-ion battery world market (Takehara and Kanamura, 1993; Tanaka et al., 2001; Lowe et al., 2010). However in the last decade many other countries have entered the battery manufacturing markets and currently the market share for the batteries industry is as follows: Japan, 56 percent, Korea, 23.9 percent, China, 12.3 percent and others, 7.7 percent (Lowe et al., 2010: 19).
Of these countries Korea has made the most significant advances in lithium-ion rechargeable battery manufacturing technology and replaced Japan as the world leader in the production of mid to small sized lithium-ion batteries. In 2010, 11 years since Korea began making the batteries, Samsung SDI overtook Panasonic’s subsidiary Sanyo Electric, to become the world’s top manufacturer with LG Chem climbing to the third place. This market trend is expected to continue with Korean companies estimated to account for 38.5 percent of the global markets compared to 38.4 percent for Japan by the end of 2011 (Brown, 06/04/2011).

Korea’s largest chemical company, LG Chem, has been a particularly aggressive investor in the battery industry and announced that it plans to be the world’s number one vehicle battery maker by 2015 (Kim, Y., 06/04/2011). In 2011 it officially opened the world's largest electric vehicle battery plant in the Korean city of Ochang, the first of three plants LG Chem plans to build over the next few years. The company predicts that the Ochang plant will have sufficient production capacity to supply batteries to 100,000 electric vehicles per annum. One of LG Chem main competitors, Samsung SDI, has also decided to establish production facilities which it predicts will be able to produce 33.6 million units of batteries for electric vehicles by 2015 (Hwang, et al., 11/04/2011). However, despite their status in the world lithium-ion battery market as number one and three, LG Chem and Samsung SDI continue to rely on importing a significant portion of inputs from Japan which accounts for nearly 80 percent of their manufacturing costs. There are several steps involved in manufacture of lithium batteries. The first step is to procure lithium and to refine it into a white powder called “lithium carbonate” a process that generally occurs at the mine site. The lithium carbonate is then sent to Tier 2 or 3 manufacturers, which convert lithium carbonate into lithium metal which can then be used in battery cells and to make other components for lithium batteries. Finally, Tier 1 manufacturers assemble the individual cells and components from Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers into battery packs ready for placement in motor vehicles (Canis, 2011: 14). To date Korean participation in the battery market has been generally limited to that of Tier 3. To increase Korea’s net profits in the world lithium-ion battery market, Korea’s manufacturers of cell materials are gearing up their efforts to overtake Japanese rivals by focussing their efforts on narrowing the technological gap with Japanese manufacturers by developing their capacity to produce three of the four key materials: cathodes, separators and electrolytes (Kang et al., 17/05/2011).
Korea’s capacity to manufacture EVs and HEVs also continues to grow significantly. The Korean government estimates that within two years Korea will produce 1.4 million electric vehicles per annum of which 1 million will be made for export (Ministry of Knowledge Economy, 2010; Yi, 19/01/2010). As shown in Table 2, LG Chem has already secured 10 carmakers as battery clients including General Motors (GM), Ford Motor, Renault, Hyundai Motors and Kia Motors. Also the company has signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Changan New Energy Automobile Co., a subsidiary of the major Chinese automaker Changan Automotive Group, to cooperate in the development of the electric vehicle battery sector (Moon and Kim, 05/02/2010). Samsung aims to be the main car battery supplier to 15 to 20 global car companies by 2015 and BMW, Chrysler, Delphi and S&T Motors are on Samsung’s current client list as shown in Table 2 (Hwang, et al., 11/04/2011).

Table 2: Major Battery Clients of LG Chem and Samsung in April, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery Maker</th>
<th>LG Chem</th>
<th>Samsung</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clients (Car Makers)</td>
<td>Ford Motor, Renault, GM, Hyundai Motor, Kia Motors</td>
<td>BMW, Chrysler, Delphi, S&amp;T Motors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: News Reports

Korean companies and the resources race

South Korea is engaged in a sustained drive to buy up foreign natural resources, ranging from rare earths to oil fields, to supplement its meagre domestic fuel reserves, secure supplies of key input for industry and lessen exposure to the shocks of price volatility common in commodities cycle. To do this South Korean companies have found themselves in a competitive race against its neighbours to secure these natural resources in particular vis-a-vis China as Chinese interests have dramatically increased their investment in overseas energy acquisitions. In recent years Korean companies have been scouring the world to secure energy assets and according to Bloomberg, in 2009 South Korean companies made 30 bids for foreign natural resources assets (Kang 2010). According to the Australian Financial Review’s Deallogic database in 2010, Korean companies have announced a record $7.6 billion worth of mergers and acquisitions involving natural resources targets, two-thirds of which have been cross-border deals (AFR, 2010). Some analysts argue that this aggressive
Korean investment in energy sources has driven up the price of these assets as Korean players have overpaid for big overseas acquisitions in their rush to clinch the deals amid heated competition with richer neighbours. Some of the recent major deals include SK Networks purchase of a stake of between 11 per cent and 14 per cent of the Brazilian mining company MMX for about USD700 million. POSCO and Korea National Oil Corp have also beefed up their efforts to secure a stable supply of raw materials and both plan to nearly double their spending on overseas energy projects and acquisitions to USD12 billion in 2011 (Song 2010).

It should be noted that this was small in comparison to China as it is estimated that in 2010 China's oil and gas acquisitions alone totalled USD24.3 billion in deals, up from USD17.1 billion in 2009 (Dealogic AFR 2011).

Securing lithium through resources diplomacy

Chile, Australia, China and Argentina account for more than 95 percent of current global lithium output. Chile has been the world’s number one producer of lithium carbonate since 1997 (Jaskula, 2008; 2010; 2011). In 2009, the country contributes to 89 percent and 80 percent of total lithium imports to Korea and Japan respectively. However, a significant amount of the world’s lithium deposits are found in Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Australia (Jaskula, 2011). Indeed more than 50 percent of the world’s accessible lithium or 19 million tons of lithium is buried in an area known as “the Lithium Triangle”, bordered by three South American salt flats, Salar de Atacama in Chile, Salar del Hombre Muerto in Argentina and Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia (Gruber and Medina, 2010: 12; Jaskula, 2010; 2011). In 2008, this Triangle produced 55 percent of global production, even though Bolivia has yet to become a producer. Nevertheless with its significant deposits, Bolivia has potential to produce a massive amount of lithium carbonate in the future (Shultz, 2010: 16).

In order to diversify supply and reduce vulnerability to resource price fluctuations the world’s major lithium importers including Korea, China and Japan have been exploring ways to develop and exploit the Lithium Triangle’s production capacity. In the case of Korea, since the beginning of his presidency in 2007 President Lee Myun Bak, a former CEO of a major resource importer, Hyundai Engineering and Construction, has emphasized the importance of natural resources and vigorously pursued a strategy known as “resource diplomacy”. Part of this approach has involved senior officials touring resource-rich countries to strengthen ties and facilitate bilateral cooperation for the natural resource industry. Many senior politicians and government officials have been vocal in their support of the policy. President Lee’s older
brother of Lee Sang-deuk, a Grand National Party lawmaker and Park Geun-hye, the former leader of the Grand National Party, have voiced their support of the policy, and former Prime Minister Han Seung-soo has even dubbed the “resource minister” by the Korean Press (Koo and Shin 2009). Park Young-jun, the deputy head of state affairs, has also been a strong supporter of the president’s initiatives, and several South Korean diplomats have been involved in the effort. In May 2008 21 South Korean diplomats were reassigned posts moving from embassies in Western countries, including France and Germany, to energy-rich countries in Africa, the Middle East and South America in order to establish permanent bases from which they could strengthen existing diplomatic missions. “Diplomats in those areas are now able to provide prompt updates on the current status of natural resources development in those countries,” said diplomat Cho Hyun (Koo and Shin 2009). In another effort to bolster cooperation with Latin America in renewable energy, agricultural development and infrastructure, in September 2010, the Foreign Ministry dispatched the so-called “Latin America Economic Cooperation Caravan” to Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay on to discuss ways to “lay the foundation for Korean firms’ entry into their markets and to work more closely together” (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010). The Caravan delegation comprised 35 foreign ministry officials, businessmen and traditional Korean music performers and visited cities and/or provinces in each of the countries and met with high-ranking officials. The delegation also held a conference on agricultural expertise with agriculture experts and gathered information on the host countries’ agriculture and renewable energy sectors to look into the possibility of Korean firms’ entry into the markets of the countries (Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010).

Domestically a key approach in this strategy is through promotion of Korean Direct Foreign Investment in resource rich areas, a strategy outlined in the Ministry of Knowledge Economy’s (MKE) 4th Overseas Resource Development Plan (2010-2019). This Plan set a target that by 2019 Korea will achieve to secure the 26 percent of lithium consumption through the Korean companies’ owned overseas lithium mines. To this end the MKE has allocated funding to Korean companies to purchase and develop mines and in 2010 assisted with an overall investment of USD12 billion in overseas resource development projects around world (Ministry of Knowledge Economy, 2010; Yi, 19/01/2010).
Korea’ Resources Diplomacy and Chile’s Lithium Market

Chile has large deposits of lithium and highly developed mining and transport infrastructure and supplies more than 40 percent of lithium in the world market (Valda, 8/03/2011). Korea is particularly dependent on Chilean supply and imported 89 percent of total lithium from Chile in 2009 (Park et al., 16/08/2010). Japan has also imported more than 80 percent of its lithium imports from Chile (Kogure and Kamiya, 10/12/2010).

Diplomatic relations between Korea and Chile were established in 1962 and for many years focused primarily on political issues such as the promotion of democratic values in the world. A significant milestone in the relations between the two countries was the finalisation of a free trade agreement (FTA), which became operative on April 1, 2004. Korea has since utilised this agreement to secure energy resources including lithium (Chacon, 2008: 11). The FTA has also facilitated Korean firm involvement in exploration and development of lithium deposits in Chile.

Until recently Korean firms had only won the rights to explore certain sites. To increase Korea’ reliability of supply of lithium, in 2010 a consortium led by the state-run resource company, Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) acquired a 30 percent stake in Chile’s Atacama lithium project which is currently the largest lithium mine in the world (Park and Song, 15/11/2010). The Korean group’s paid USD190 million for its stake with the state-run company owning 12 percent and Samsung 18 percent, respectively. The deal marks the first time that Korean companies have secured a share of an actual productive lithium mine. Under the plan the Korean companies plan to establish a purification facility in the western part of the salt lake and a lithium-manufacturing plant near the city of Antofagasta by 2014 (Cho, 16/11/2010). Also, POSCO, the world's third-biggest Korean steel producer, has focused on developing technology for extracting lithium and securing lithium reserves. It aims to become a comprehensive resource company, signing a MOU with Li3, a Peruvian firm owning a lithium-rich salt lake in Chile. The agreement allows POSCO’s Research Institute of Industrial Science and Technology (RIIST) to build a plant for lithium extraction and for POSCO to acquire a share of Li3 Energy, the Peruvian partner (Kim, D., 08/05/2011).

The Korean companies are also seeking to secure lithium from Argentina and Bolivia by extending economic cooperation and sharing advanced technologies with these countries. LG
International Corp, Samsung C&T Corp and Daewoo International Corp have extended their efforts to operate in the two lithium rich countries of Argentina and Bolivia (Moon, et al., 27/08/2010).

Korea's resource diplomacy and Argentina

Although Korea established formal diplomatic relations with Argentina in 1962, a focus on resource diplomatic relations did not occur until the President Kim Young Sam’s visit to Argentina in 1996. His visit resulted in various agreements between Korea and Argentina such as protection of investments. The idea of promoting the expansion of exchanges and cooperation between Korea and South America were developed. Consequently, the Korean-South American Cooperation Centre in Energy and natural resources was created, with its offices in Buenos Aires in Argentina. In 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun visited Argentina to support to create a MOU between the Import and Export Korea Bank and Babco de la Nation Argentina. The Bank announced a Korean loan of USD30 million to Argentinean companies that wished to import Korea products (Chacon, 2008: 8).

Most recently, as part of Korea’s 2010 Latin America Economic Cooperation Caravan’s visit to Argentina, the delegation met with the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries and the Governor of Santa Fe, and held a conference on agricultural expertise to confirm the possibility of putting to work the country’s rich agricultural resources and Korea’s technology and capital in a mutually complementary manner. Diplomatic missions have on the whole however concentrated on enhancing Korean companies’ capacity to import natural resources from Argentina including lithium. In September in 2010, the government owned KORES and private companies, GS Caltex and LG international have made final agreements regarding a joint project on lithium development at the salt lake of Muerto in Argentina. This 338 square km mine is still in the initial stages of exploration; however its lithium reserve is estimated at 425,000 tons – which enable annual production of 12,000 tons. The three Korean companies own 30 percent stakes in the mine, USD15 million worth and exploration is underway (Chung, 06/09/2010).

Korea’ Resource Diplomacy and Bolivia

Korea and Bolivia established diplomatic relations in 1965, however Korea did not show significant interest in Bolivia and in 1997 closed it embassy as a cost cutting measure during
the Asian financial crisis. As part of the Lee Myun Bak government efforts to increase the number of embassies to various resource-rich countries the Korean embassy in Bolivia was reopened in 2008, one of five embassies reopened in 2008. After reopening the embassy, the Korean ambassador in Bolivia has developed close ties with the Bolivian president, Evo Morales (Yum, 05/03/2011). The Bolivian president’s visit to Korea in August 2010 further solidified the relationship between in the two countries (JoongAng Daily, 27/08/2010).

The Korean government has utilised various diplomatic initiatives with a view of securing lithium in Bolivia. Korean business negotiators have made several visits as well as held open briefings and discussion sessions in an attempt to showcase Korea’s specialised technology that can be used to extract and process lithium. These briefings emphasised how the combination of the Korea’ specialised technology and investment, and Bolivia’s lithium can provide mutual benefits for the two countries based on developing partnership (Kang, H., 17/08/2010). The Korean government dispatched a president’s special envoy, President Lee Myung-bak’s elder brother, Lee Sang-deuk, a member of the National Assembly, to Bolivia three times to negotiate for Korean companies’ right to develop the country’s lithium mines, visits that received plenty of media attention in Korea (Lee, T., 20/08/2010; Lee, E., 27/08/2010; Kang, C., 10/09/2010; Shultz, 2010: 5). Cultural programs such as exhibitions of Korean music and taekwon-do were included (Kim, S., 24/06/2010). In addition, Korea promised up to USD250 million in development loans to Bolivia by 2014 (Lee, T., 26/08/2010).

In August 2010 at the Korean - Bolivian summit Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Bolivian President Evo Morales signed an agreement which paved the way for Korean companies to take part in the extraction of lithium reserves under the Lake Uyuni in Bolivia which likely has the world’s largest reserves (Kim, S., 26/08/2010). Following the summit, the two state-run mineral resources corporations, KORES and La and Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) signed a MOU on research and development of technology to facilitate mining of the salt flats. The two countries will also set up a joint committee to oversee a lithium development project to produce lithium carbonate to be suitable for use in rechargeable batteries (Choi, 26/08/2010; Kawamoto and Tamaki, 2011: 58).
However competition between Korea, Japan, China and France to secure the right to develop the salt lake Lake Uyuni in Bolivia is intensifying. A state-backed Japanese firm, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corp (JOGMEC) has also signed on a MOU with the COMIBOL to develop the technology needed to produce lithium carbonate in the Lake Uyuni (Achtenberg, 12/04/2010). Under the MOU Japan will provide technology to Bolivia’s pilot programme to help produce lithium carbonate (Reuters, 10/11/2011). The MOUs do not guarantee that Korea and Japan will be entitled to extract lithium from the lake however they are important progress for the two countries to secure to lithium in Bolivia to diversify supply. Korea and Japan are the first countries to finalise MOU and secure participation in the development of Bolivian mines, beating France and China with these two lithium deals (Lee, T., 26/08/2010).

Korea’s trading companies are highly encouraged by new business opportunities that have emerged since Bolivian President Morales’s Korean visit and the MOU. LG International Corp has set a primary goal of securing a stable supply of lithium as it has begun the lithium-ion battery business (Moon, et al., 28/08/2010; Chung, 06/09/2010). The new battery business is the reason why the company has its eye on Bolivia’s lithium, following the Sal de Vida Lithium Brine Project, which is a joint venture to develop a lithium mine in Argentina. Also Japanese activities for securing lithium are encouraged by the MOU between the JOGMEC and the COMIBOL. A the beginning of 2011, the consortium between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), JOGMEC and Kitakyushu University and Mitsubishi Corporation took the lead over other countries by acquiring the rights to participate in lithium extraction experiments in Bolivia. The consortium plans to begin extract experiments at a centre near the Uyuni Lake and to continue experiment for about one and a half years (Kawamoto and Tamaki, 2011: 58).

However a stable supply of lithium from Bolivia is not guaranteed. Due to the increased competition between many companies from Korea and Japan it is likely that Bolivia’s negotiating position will be strengthened. A more significant obstacle is Bolivia’s state of development. Compared to Chile’s lithium mines, the Uyuni in Bolivia is remote and inaccessible, while Chile’s salt flats are served by modern roads, leading to nearby seaports. Moreover Bolivia is South America’s poorest country and has very poor infrastructure across the country (Achtenberg, 2010). The President of Battery Research Centre of LG Chem, currently the leading lithium-ion battery manufacturer in Korea, has warned that the
conditions to develop lithium resources in Bolivia remain difficult and are likely to reduce the economic value of developing lithium near the Lake Uyuni in Bolivia for lithium manufacturers in the near future (Kim, M., interview 21/02/2011). The Bolivian government has recognised this is an issue and committed to invest USD500 million to develop roads, electricity and water, gas pipelines, communications, and other basic systems.

**Harmonising International Development Efforts with Resource Diplomacy: Potential for the strategic use of ODA**

Coordinating resource diplomacy with international development efforts is an approach adopted, to various degrees, by others countries competing for resources, including Japan and China. In particular the emergence of China as a powerful player in access to, and extraction of, energy and resources is a key factor in reinforcing the use of aid for commercial interest not only in Korea but also across the donor community (Lum et al., 2008; Woods, 2008). However given its history, Korea is well placed to share its experience and expertise with developing countries and has greater capacity to being perceived as a “benign middle power” by recipient countries holding relevant mineral resources, and can further leverage that position to avoid accusations of neo-colonialism. In this case of Bolivia sensitivity to imperialism is an important issue. Korea and Bolivia share a colonial past and the present government has embraced a narrative of anti-colonial rebellion. Despite over 200 years since the start of its independence struggle from Spain the sense of injustice among Bolivia’s majority indigenous people remains deep. When Evo Morales, Bolivia's first president of Indian origin, was appointed in 2006 he initiated a "decolonising revolution” (Burman 2009).

Korea is one of the few countries which have successfully transitioned from a recipient to a donor in the last two decades. It is expected that Korea will become a member of DAC (development assistance committee), OECD (Chun and Lee, 2009). However, one of the challenges Korea faces in becoming an effective contributor to development efforts in the region is its relatively low ODA budget. In 2009, Korea’s ODA/ GNI ratio increased to 0.10%, still significantly lower than the OECD/DAC2 members’ average of 0.25% (OECD, 2010). Other problems are a regional bias and a relatively large number of recipients. Although the share of assistance to Asia has gradually declined from 72.6% in 2001, to 61.2% in 2007, Korea still allocated disproportionately large amount of its ODA to Asian countries.
With regards to Latin America the amount has only increased incrementally to just over 11% in 2007 as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3: Regional Distribution of Korea’s ODA (2001-2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(% of total net ODA)</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD DAC Statistics

To compensate for relatively low ODA funding, the entities implementing Korea’s international development projects can target narrow areas in which Korea enjoys a comparative advantage, and maximum returns can be acquired within limited budgets. Strategic use of ODA is important not only for mineral extraction but infrastructure projects can also involve numerous “soft” components, and Korean firms engaged in international development consulting could complement the actual construction work with projects that identify ways to mitigate the social, cultural, environmental impacts – thereby aligning and give international breadth to its Green Growth Strategy. To do this however investment must be translated into an effective ODA agenda. It can also build on its “middle power” status to gain further legitimacy as a provider of international development, Korea can also focus on efficient application of its resource diplomacy.

**Conclusion**

Korea’s Green Growth Strategy recognises that the expansion of HEVs and EVs vehicles, and rechargeable-ion battery industries have the potential to realise a low carbon and green growth future. In this context the Korean government’s and firms’ resource diplomacy has explored ways to secure the materials critical to the strategy’s success.
Benefiting from the FTA between Korea and Chile, a consortium led by the state-run resource company, KORES, has been established and a MOU between POSCO and Li3 to lithium develop extraction and refining technologies have been finalised. In the case of Argentina, the two Korean presidents’ visits to Argentina in 1996 and 2004, respectively, helped to facilitate Korean companies to import natural resources and develop lithium. These diplomatic expansions also facilitated to increase the state owned KORES’ role to lead an agreement with Korean private companies to develop lithium at the salt lake of Muerto in Argentina.

The Bolivian president’s visit to Korea in August, 2010 marked a turning point in the two countries’ diplomatic relations to assist Korea to secure lithium in the Lake Uyuni. Bolivian government has an ambition to help its people out of poverty by developing lithium. Korean has implemented much kind of resource diplomacy methods to secure lithium by satisfying Bolivia’s ambition. The Korean government held an open briefing and discussion session explaining Korea’s specialised technologies for maximising benefits from the lithium development. Korea also shared historical pains and emphasised on enhancing partnership. These diplomatic efforts led to the two sides signing on a MOU to research and develop lithium technologies to mine the salt flats in the Lake Uyuni in Bolivia. The MOU will not guarantee that Korea will be entitled to extract lithium from the Lake however it is important progress for Korea to secure lithium in Bolivia.

Nevertheless the competition between companies from Korea, Japan and other countries for securing the lithium is likely to intensify and barriers to the development of the Bolivian lithium market, in particular inadequate infrastructure, remain. If Korea is to successfully diversify its supplies of natural resources Korea must consider its role in these countries economic development.

To build on these efforts resource diplomacy can be bolstered by a broader set of initiatives that contribute to economic construction. Korea stands as a successful model of economic development for developing countries and is well placed to play a role in the development of other countries. As such Korea can be a meaningful actor all along the hierarchy of “soft” development projects, from the strategic (project implementation) level to the tactical (behaviour change campaigns) and structural (cultural) levels. Thus it is essential to cultivate
a broad view of international development. To do this the government must resource agencies that can identify opportunities for investment such as in infrastructure and market development areas as well as develop programs in education, the arts, business and community awareness. In short to realise resource security Korea must consider reinforcing resource diplomacy with other deeper and more meaningful means of engagement, engagement that builds long-term and sustainable relationships, relationship that reject imperialist past, that are of mutual benefit to both Korea’s and recipient countries’ national interest.

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The Grammaticalisation of -(u)l ke(s) in Korean¹

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¹ In this paper, the Yale Romanisation System was used for the transcription of Korean data, and the following abbreviations are used to label the linguistic items for the data: Acc: Accusative case marker; Decl: Declarative; Dir: Directional; Excl: Exclamatory suffix; Nom: Nominative case marker; Past: Past tense; Pol: Polite style; Pos: Possessive marker; PresMod: Present Modifier; ProsMod: Prospective Modifier; SHon: Subject honorific suffix; Top: Topic marker; Trns: Transferative suffix. I used the following three characters of for the transcription of Middle Korean letters: A for ᚠ (the so-called aray-a), z for ᚠ and β for ᚡ.
0. Introduction

This paper presents the grammaticalisation processes of -(u)l kes (Prospective Modifier (ProsMod hereafter) + ‘thing’) in Korean. The paper asserts that the modified bound noun -(u)l kes ‘things to ~’ underwent various transformations during grammaticalisation. Grammaticalisation has been studied from two perspectives—diachronic and synchronic. Here, the constructions with -(u)l kes are examined mainly from synchronic perspective, although some functions of earlier forms of the prospective modification ending followed by bound nouns will be presented.

In contemporary Korean, the phrase -(u)l kes, with its literal meaning of ‘things to ~’, is still used, e.g., mekul kes ‘things to eat (food)’, ipul kes ‘things to wear (clothes)’, ttael kes ‘things to burn (fire wood or fuel)’, sal kes ‘things to buy (shopping list)’, and onul hal kes ‘things to do today’. In speech, the shorten form ke is more frequently used.

The phrase -(u)l ke(s) as it is, or combined with a predicate like the copula verb and existential verbs, underwent various grammaticalisation processes. For example, ppalli o-l kes ‘(you) should come quickly’; ce-nun nayil hankwuk-ey ka-l ke-yeyyo, ‘I will go to Korea tomorrow’; nen o-l ke epsta, ‘(You) don’t have to come’; and so on. Before we discuss contemporary Korean constructions on this, let us look at some similar constructions in Middle Korean from the 15th to 17th centuries.

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2 In this paper, the Yale Romanisation System was used for the transcription of Korean data, and the following abbreviations are used to label the linguistic items for the data: Acc: Accusative case marker; Decl: Declarative; Dir: Directional; Excl: Exclamatory suffix; Nom: Nominative case marker; Past: Past tense; Pol: Polite style; Pos: Possessive marker; PresMod: Present Modifier; ProsMod: Prospective Modifier; SHon: Subject honorific suffix; Top: Topic marker; Trns: Transferative suffix. I used the following three characters of for the transcription of Middle Korean letters: A for ᆗ (the so-called aray-a), z for Ꚁ and ß for ꚑ.

3 According to Hopper et al. (1993, xv), grammaticalisation is defined as the process whereby lexical items and constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and, once grammaticalised, continue to develop new grammatical functions. Here, I am not employing any particular grammaticalisation framework, but it is worth mentioning that Newmeyer (1998, 260-288) claims that unidirectionality of grammaticalisation needs to be phrased as an empirical hypothesis, as it is challenged by many counterexamples of the so-called ‘upgrading’ cases like inflectional or derivational affixes becoming lexical items.
1. 

Similar constructions can be found in early writings in the Korean script after the promulgation of the Korean script by *Hwunmincengum* in 1446. For example, the preface of *Hwunmincengum Enhay* (1446) and Canto II of *Yongpiechenka* (1447), the first books published right after the invention of the Korean script, begin with the following phrases;

(1) a. … mwunca-walo sAmasti ani hA-l-ssA-i

   writing-with-by do not communicate-ProsMod-thing-Loc

   ‘since we cannot communicate with Chinese writings’ <Preface, *Hwunmincengum Enhay*>

   b. pulhwi kiph-un namk-An pAlAm-ay ani mwi-l-ssA-i

   root deep-PresMod tree-Top wind-by not sway-ProsMod-thing-Loc

   ‘because a tree with deep roots won’t sway by the wind’ <Canto II, *Yongpiechenka*>

   c. sAym-i kiph-un mul-un kAmAl-ay ani kuchu-l-ssA-i

   spring-Nom deep-PresMod water-Top drought-by not stop-ProsMod-thing-Loc

   <Canto II, *Yongpiechenka*>

The ending of these three phrases all have the same construction, Verb+ProsMod plus *sA* (/s/ becomes tensified after ProsMod), which is one of the old forms of bound noun ‘thing’ followed by the locative case marker *i*, and the construction is translated as ‘because/since’. This form -l-ssA-i itself is a grammaticalised form that has changed from its literal composition of ‘at the thing to ~’ to the causal function of ‘because/since’.

Other similar constructions with the modifier -(A)l or -(o)l⁴ are listed below:

(2) a. ... malssAm-Al sAlβ-Al-i ha-tAi …

   word-Acc ask-ProsMod person many but

   ‘…there are many people who are asking (the King), but…’ <Canto XIII, *Yongpiechenka*>

   b. tekman-g-i tyelehAsi-l-ssAi kataka toloa-lh kwunsa-i…

   reputation-Nom like that-ProsMod thing-Loc go-Trns return-ProsMod soldier-Nom …

⁴ Note that inserted vowels after a consonant-ending stem are *A* ‘.’ and *o* ‘רוצה’ in Middle Korean, while that is *u* ‘우’ in contemporary Korean. Also note that in the 15th century, the prospective modifier was often transcribed as -lh or -l followed by a tensified consonant.
‘Because his reputation is that high, soldiers who returns … <Canto XXV, Yongpiechenka>

c. mom-Al mot mitu-\textbf{lh} kes-\textbf{ini} …
   body-Acc cannot believe-\textbf{PosMod} thing-because
   ‘because one cannot rely on his body… <\textit{Sekposangcel} (the early 16\textsuperscript{th} C)>

d. cyemun atAl-An panAl-Al twutulye koki nask-\textbf{Al} naks\textbf{Al} mAingk\textbf{An} Ata
   young son-\textbf{Top} needle-Acc beat fish to catch-\textbf{ProsMod} hook make-\textbf{PresDecl}
   ‘My young son, beating a needle, is making a hook to catch fish.’ <\textit{Kangehon}, \textit{Twusienhay}\textsuperscript{5}>

e. ta pinhye-\textbf{lAl} ikuyti moth\textbf{A-\textit{tAs hAtota}}
   all hairpin-Acc stand cannot-\textbf{ProsMod} looks like-\textbf{Excl}
   ‘It looks like all (of my hairs) even cannot put up with my hairpin!’
   <Chwumang, \textit{Twusienhay}>

f. … olay k\textbf{Al-\textit{ol}} i epsuni…
   for long fight against-\textbf{ProsMod} person do not exist
   ‘since there is no person to fight against for long…’ <\textit{Kotohochongmahayng}, \textit{Twusienhay}>

As shown in (2), some older forms of \textbf{ProsMod} indicated the present or no tense rather than the future tense. As shown in (3), the same construction was also used to express obligations in Middle Korean.

(3) a. ak-\textbf{ul} pokom pyeng k\textbf{Athi ho-\textbf{lh} tini…}
   evil-Acc see body’s disease like do-\textbf{ProsMod} thing as
   ‘(you) should think of evil as if it is a disease of body… <\textit{Naehwun} (1475)>’

b. nimkum-kwa epei-wa susung-kwa-n\textbf{An} h\textbf{Ankaci-lo} syemky-\textbf{ol-\textit{ii-lahako}…
   king-and parents-and teacher-and-\textbf{Top} one kind-by respect-\textbf{ProsMod-thing-Decl}
   ‘(you) should respect the King, parents and teachers as if they were one…’
   <\textit{Samkanghayngsilt\textit{o}} (1481)>

c. cyunma-ka saski-l\textbf{Al} syewul-sye nakhetun mastangi oypang-ka kil-\textbf{Al kes-\textit{io}.}

\textsuperscript{5} The first edition of \textit{Twusienhay} was published in 1481 while the second edition came out in 1632. Since there is a 150-\textsuperscript{year} gap between the two versions, they are good sources of Korean linguistic data from the late 15\textsuperscript{th} to the middle of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century (Cho 1998, 172).
good horse-Nom offspring-Acc Seoul-Loc have of course countryside-Loc raise-
ProsMod thing-Copula
‘If a good horse has an offspring in Seoul, of course you should raise it in the
countryside.’
<Ewuyatam (1621)>
d. syenpi-ka atAl-ul oypang-uy-sye nakhetun mastangi syewul-sye kil-Al kes-ila.
scholar-Nom son-Acc countryside-Pos-Loc have of course Seoul-Loc raise-
ProsMod thing-copula
‘When a scholar has a son in the countryside, of course he should raise him in Seoul.’
<Ewuyatam (1621)>

The future tense was indicated by the suffix -li as well as ProsMod followed by a
bound noun kes ‘thing’ or the, a bound noun which means ‘a place’.

(4) a. … unhye-lAl thAti ani hA-li-losoni
    favour-Acc receive not ha-Future-as
    ‘As I will not receive a favour…’ <Kotohochongmahayng, Twusienhay>
b. kulimyen cAm natputi ani-l kes-ila
    then a little bad not-ProsMod-thing-copula
    ‘Then, it won’t be that bad.’ <Pakthongsa (the early 16th C)>
c. hakAuyk-ul poketun alae syuyem-ul manti-l kes-ini…
    lower guest-ACC see-if lower beard-Acc touch-ProsMod thing-Copula-as
    ‘as I will touch my lower beard if I see a lower class guest…’ <Ewuyatam (1621)>
d. oykwuk sacyengto … kankani kuylokhA-l the-i-ni…
    overseas news-too… occasionally record-ProsMod place-Copula-as
    ‘as we will write some overseas news occasionally…’ <Toklipsinmwun, 7th April, 1896>
e. phichakan wenhwasopokha-nun chepkyeng-im-ul myengciha-l kes ani-nka
    you and I inviting fortune and making distance from disaster shortcut-Nom-Acc realise
    ProsMod thing is not-Inter
    ‘Wouldn't this be a shortcut for you and I to invite fortune and distance ourselves from
disaster?’ (Kimitoklipsisenmwun, 1st March, 1919)

The limited amount of data leads to a conjecture about its transformation. Because of
the lack of examples of future meaning in -(u)l kes in Middle Korean (except ones like (4b/c)),
I assume that although -(u)l kes might have undergone a grammaticalisation process since the early 15th century, it has been competing with other forms of futurity like -li (cf. (4a)) and -(u)l the (cf. (4c)) for centuries until it started to be used widely since the late 19th century. Note that the future meaning of -(u)l kes can be found in the first editorial of Toklipsinmwun (Independence Newspaper), the first Korean newspaper published in 1896, and in the March 1st Independence Declaration, which was produced in 1919 (cf. (4d) and (4e)).

2. -(u)l ke(s) in Contemporary Korean

In contemporary Korean, the obligation meaning is used as shown in (5). The obligation meaning is easily assumed to be derived from the original meaning ‘things to ~’. Such phrases can be seen in the warning signboards of train stations, instructions on application forms, and so on. Also, the meaning of (un)necessity (cf. (6)) is a natural derivative of the meaning of obligation. Notice, however, these constructions of necessity ‘(someone) needs or doesn’t need to ~’ are accompanied by the existential verbs iss-ta ‘exist’ and eps-ta ‘doesn’t exist’, respectively. Here, the function of (un)necessity is seen in the composition of ‘(for someone) such and such obligation exist/does not exist’ or ‘(someone) has/has not such and such obligation’.

(5) a. nolan sen pakk-ulo mwullen-al kes\(^6\)
   yellow line outside-Dir step back-ProxModKES
   ‘(You) should step back behind the yellow line.’

   b. makamil an-ey ceychwuha-l kes
   due date inside-Time submit-ProxModKES
   ‘(You) should submit (it) by the due date.’

   c. ppalli o-l kes-ul kangochaysta.
   quickly come-ProxModKES-Acc emphasise-Past-Decl
   ‘(He) emphasised that (I) should come quickly.’

(6) a. ne-n o-l ke(s) eps-ta.
   you-Top come-ProxModKE(S) doesn’t exist-Decl
   ‘You don’t have to come.’

   b. kulehke ha-l ke(s)-kkachi-n eps-eyo
   like that do-ProxModKE(S)-up to-Top doesn’t exist-Pol

\(^6\) Somehow, in the construction of obligations the colloquial form ke is not normally used.
‘You don’t have to do it like that.’

However, as shown in (7), usage of the same phrase with the copula verb *i-ta* ‘to be’ incorporating the meaning of *futurity/probability* reveals that there was a greater development or grammaticalisation in terms of its semantic shift. Furthermore, as shown in (8), the *first person intention* construction -*(u)*-*l*-keyyo is surely an extra grammaticalisation from the same base form, -*(u)*-*l*-ke+i+eyo (ProsMod+copula+Polite Style).\(^7\) Notice that the usage of the *first person intention* -*(u)*-*l*-key(yo) is limited to 1\(^{st}\) person subject in the declarative sentence only, while the *future/probability* construction is a productive structure which can go with any kind of subject (e.g. 1\(^{st}\), 2\(^{nd}\) or 3\(^{rd}\) person) and with both declarative and interrogative sentences (Compare (7b/c) with (8b/c)).

(7) a. ilehke ip-umyen yeppu-*l* ke-yey-yo
   like this wear-if pretty-ProsMod KE-copula-Pol
   ‘If you wear it like this, it will be pretty.’

b. kim sensayngnim-un kos o-si-*l* ke-yey-yo
   Mr Kim-Top soon come-SHon-ProsMod KE-copula-Pol
   ‘Mr Kim will come soon.’

c. kim sensayngnim-un kos o-si-*l* ke-yey-yo?
   Mr Kim-Top soon come-SHon-ProsMod KE-copula-Pol
   ‘Will Mr Kim come soon?’

d. ce-nun taum thooyil-ey hankwuk-ey ka-*l* ke-yey-yo
   I-Top next Saturday-Time Korea-Dir go-ProsMod KE-copula-Pol
   ‘Next Saturday, I will go to Korea.’

(8) a. ike-n cey-ka nay-*l*-ke-yey-yo
   this-Top I-Nom pay-ProsMod-KEY-Pol
   ‘I will pay for this.’

b. nayil cenhwah-ke-*l*-ke.
   tomorrow call-ProsMod-KEY
   ‘I will call (you) tomorrow.’

c. * nayil cenhwah-*l*-ke?
   tomorrow call-ProsMod-KEY

\(^7\) Note that while *y*-Insertion occurs in the future/probably construction, Glide Formation (iÆy) is applied in the first person intention construction.
‘Will you call me tomorrow?’

3. Language Corpus Study

In order to find out practical usages of the phrase -(u)l ke(s) in various grammatical structures, I conducted a small investigation with a language corpus. I used the spoken language corpus of The 21th Century Sejong Project (2010), which consists of 200 texts with 805,652 words in 227,310 sentences or 78,913 utterances. As expected, more than the five constructions presented above were detected. The following table (9) shows the search results of all constructions with the phrase -(u)l ke(s):

(9) The distribution of -(u)l ke(s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>forms</th>
<th>constructions</th>
<th>cases</th>
<th>percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke(s)</td>
<td>Literal</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke(s)i-</td>
<td>Futurity</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>22.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke(s)i-</td>
<td>Probability1</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>26.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke(s) kath</td>
<td>Probability2</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>37.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l key-</td>
<td>First Person Intention</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke-l</td>
<td>Conjecture</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke-l</td>
<td>Regret(^{8})</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke(s)</td>
<td>Obligation</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke(s) iss-/eps-</td>
<td>Necessity</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(u)l ke(s)</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1925</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two extra constructions were found during the search of the phrase -(u)l ke(s), and they were named as the "conjecture" and "regret" constructions in the table above. See (10) for their typical examples. These two constructions are with the accusative case particle -l after ke. Often, these constructions end with kel, omitting the main clause. Interestingly, the full form plus the accusative case particle kes-ul is only possible in the regret construction, not in the conjecture structure, e.g., for the expressions like (10) nay ka kal kesul is acceptable, while imi kassul kesul is not.

\(^{8}\) This is for the meaning of regret felt for not doing something in the past.
(10) a. Regret

nay-ka ka-I ke-I (kulyay-ss-ney)
I-Nom go-ProiMod KE-Acc (like that-Past-Excl)
‘I should’ve gone.’

b. Conjecture

imi ka-ss-ul ke-I
already go-Past-ProiMod KE-Acc
‘(S/he/they) might have gone already.’

As we do not separate the functions of futurity and probability1 since they are predictable9, -(u)l ke(s)i is the most frequent expression, which consists of 48.72 percent (938 out of 1925 cases) of the whole -(u)l ke(s) constructions in the spoken language corpus. As the language corpus was a collection of natural conversations in various situations, the actual forms varied with different sentential/clausal endings. Out of 938 cases of the futurity/probability1 constructions, 568 cases were used with the sentence terminal endings for the addressee honorification: The most frequently used sentence styles are in the order of the Intimate Style -ya (321 cases), the Polite Style -eyo/yeyo (148 cases), followed by the Deferential Style -pnita/pnikka (63 cases) and the Plain Style -ta (36 cases) (See Table (11) below.). Notice also that as the data derives from the spoken language corpus, the form kes is used much less than its colloquial form ke:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech styles</th>
<th>kes</th>
<th>cases</th>
<th>ke</th>
<th>cases</th>
<th>sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deferential</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(i)pnita</td>
<td>kesipna</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>kepna</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-(i)pnikka</td>
<td>kesipnika</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>kepnika</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polite -(i)eyyoo</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keiyeyyo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>ke(y)eyyo10</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ke aniyeyyo11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 The probability meaning is with an adjectival construction or a past tense event, e.g., cikum ccum manhi yeppu-l keeyyo. ‘By now, (s/he) will be pretty.’; cikum ccum Seoul-ey tochakhay-ss-ul keeyyo. ‘By now, (s/he) might have arrived in Seoul.

10 The transcription in the language corpus was inconsistent with and without ‘y’ after ke. There were 40 cases of keeyyo (kerjaə) and 82 cases of keyeyyo (kerjaə), while the latter is the one prescribed by the correct writing rules.

11 There was one case of aniyeeyyo (arıyaə) and 25 cases of aniyeeyo (ariyaə), as the latter is the prescribed way of writing.
There are other (370) cases with non-sentential terminal suffixes for the futurity/probability1 construction: i.e., for example, among others, clausal connective suffixes such as the quotative -la, -lase, ‘because’; ciman, ‘although/but’; -nikka ‘because’; and -myense, ‘although’, etc.

Another interesting finding is that while the colloquial form ke appears much more widely in the data (mainly because it is a spoken language corpus), when delimiters were used the opposite phenomenon occurs. Delimiters, somehow, seem to prefer the full form kes rather than the shortened colloquial form ke even within the spoken language data. This point is illustrated in the table below:

(12) kes with delimiters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delimiters</th>
<th>kes cases</th>
<th>ke cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-to ‘also’</td>
<td>kesto 44</td>
<td>keto 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-man ‘only’</td>
<td>keman 5</td>
<td>keman 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-pota ‘than’</td>
<td>kepota 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-pwsuthe ‘from’</td>
<td>kepwsuthe 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Analysis

4.1 Reanalysis/Rebracketting

After the ProsMod -(u)l, the initial sound of the bound noun is tensified as in [k’o], [k’as]–[k’at] or [k’e]. While the education authority’s standard writing rule prescribes that there must be a space between the Prospective Modifier -(u)l and the bound noun ke(s) except for the 1st person intention construction like (8), many native speakers of Korean write them as one word with no space between them and pronouncing them with the tensified velar stop
[k’]. This is more true for the futurity/probability1 construction like (7). The fact that native speakers tend to omit the space between ProsMod and the bound noun ke(s) indicates that—ke(s) is no longer perceived as a separate lexical item ‘thing’ but rather a grammatical function word or suffix which indicates ‘probability’ or ‘futurity’. This can be represented by rebracketting of the structure like the following:


This is the case where a clausal construction becomes a flat word, where both the bound noun phrase and the copula verb became morphological suffixes. This is where Givón’s earlier slogan “Today’s morphology is yesterday’s syntax.” fits (Givón 1979, 208-9 in Heine et al. 1991, 13).

4.2 Phonological Attrition and Stages of Grammaticalisation

Phonological attrition is one of the major characteristics of grammaticalisation. Phonological attrition or erosion is the loss of phonological segments as the process of fusion continues. This loss typically occurs at boundaries, such as at the end of a word or morpheme (Heine and Reh 1984, 21-5 in Hooper et al. 1993, 148). For example, in English, be going to with a future meaning can be reduced to gonna as in I’m gonna teach you, while its original directional form cannot be, e.g., *I’m gonna library.

Interestingly, as exemplified in (14), in natural and allegro speech, /l/ from ProsMod can be dropped in the first person intention construction, whereas such l-Deletion is not possible in the construction of futurity/probability1, unless we are dealing with extremely sloppy speech, e.g., /yep’ilkəyeyo/ → *[yep’iik’ayeyo] ‘(It) will be pretty’ and /osilkəyeyo/ → *[ošik’ayeyo] ‘(S/he) will come.’

(14) l-Deletion

iken cey-ka nay-l keyyo.

/iken ceka næk’eyo/ → [igən cega næk’eyo] ‘I will pay for this.’

nayil cenhwa ha-l keyyo.

/næil cənhwahalk’eyo/ → [næil cənwaak’eyo] ‘I will call (you).’

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12 Notice that in (14), in addition to l-Deletion, other phonological rules—intersonorant voicing and intersonorant h-Deletion—are applied.
Notice that both l-Deletion and s-Deletion are possible in the first person intention construction, while s-Deletion is possible in all constructions except the obligation construction. The obligation construction is the only one which calls for the full form of the ‘thing’ kes and of ProsMod -(u)l. Here, what I propose is that mainly on the basis of the phonological attrition, I locate the obligation construction at the first stage, and the first person intention construction in the last stage of grammaticalisation, while all others in between the two stages. This point is illustrated in (15):

\[(15)\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Constructions</th>
<th>I-Deletion</th>
<th>s-Deletion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage I</td>
<td>Obligation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage II</td>
<td>Futurity/Probability1, Propability 2, Necessity, Conjecture, Regret</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage III</td>
<td>First Person Intention</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of the synchronic semantic and phonological evidence discussed in Sections 2 and 4 respectively, I propose the following three stages of grammaticalisation of -(u)l ke(s) like below:

\[(16)\]

\[\text{Stage I} \rightarrow \text{Stage II} \rightarrow \text{Stage III}\]

Literal $\rightarrow$ Obligation $\rightarrow$ Future/Probability1 with the copula i-ta $\rightarrow$ 1st Person Intention

- Probability2 with kath-ta
- Necessity with the existential verbs iss-ta/eps-ta
- Conjecture with Acc
- Regret with Acc

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\[13\] In the table, plus (+) and minus (-) indicate that the phonological rules concern are applicable and inapplicable, respectively.
5. Summary

In this paper, I presented how the structure -(u)l ke(s), together with predicates (like the copula verb i-ta, the existential verbs iss-ta and eps-ta and the verb kath-ta ‘be identical’ and the accusative case particle) have undergone various grammaticalisation processes. On the basis of synchronic evidence of semantic shift and phonological attrition, I assume that there were three stages of grammaticalisation, while all the constructions co-occur in contemporary Korean.

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Paper No. P056

Christianity and *Chesa* Rites in Korea

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Christianity and Chesa Rites in Korea

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Introduction

A young school boy in Seoul has recently posted on the Internet that he was hurt and baffled by his mother who angrily hit him after finding out that he had eaten chesa (ancestral sacrificial rites) food at his best friend’s house. His mother, a devout Protestant Christian, told him that it was the Devil’s food, since it was offered to the ancestral spirits whose worship was tantamount to idolatry. The boy, who was led to believe by his friend’s parents that it was a beautiful Korean tradition and good custom (mip’ung yangsok), did not understand why his mother reacted in such a way, and asked the readers why it is considered to be idolatry by many Christians like his mother.

Whether offering chesa is compatible with the Christian doctrines has been a controversial issue from the very beginning of Christianity in Korea1, which was Catholicism. It was one of the main reasons why so many early Korean Catholics were persecuted and killed (Rev Joseph Kim 1984; Grayson 1985; Palmer 1986; Buswell 2006). To understand why this conflict brought about so much bloodshed, contextualization is vital, so I will first discuss the significance of chesa in Korean society at that time.

It is axiomatic to many westerners that Christianity has ‘failed’ in Asia (Palmer 1986:5), where there are ancient civilizations with deeply rooted religious traditions. Christian writers, such as Harry Williams (1982: 373), a British clergyman/monk of the Community of the Resurrection, have maintained that Christianity will never take root deeply in Asia, since ‘the [Gospel] stories don’t speak to the peoples of the Far East’. Korea has proved them wrong, and Christianity has spread ‘like wild fire’ (Shearer 1966) over the two and half centuries after its introduction.

In Korea, the term kidokkyo, which includes all denominations of Christianity, is now very often used to refer to Protestantism2, while Catholicism is called ch’önjugyo (literally Heavenly Lord Religion), since more are affiliated to the former than the latter. The attitude of Protestant Christians towards chesa differ significantly from that of the Catholics, many of

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1 In this paper Korea refers to South Korea, when dealing with the post-division era.
2 Protestantism is also sometimes called kaeshin’gyo (‘Reformed Religion’).
whom still regularly perform it in the prescribed traditional form. I attended many chesa rituals at the Korean Catholics’ homes. At one performed at the home of Mr. K, the head (changson) of an ancient family, I witnessed an interesting phenomenon. His younger brother, a born again devout Protestant Christian, was present and helped actively with the preparations, but refused to prostrate himself in front of wip’ae (ancestral tablets) or offer libation and food like the other members of the family, and just stood there. He was clearly torn between his sense of traditional family duty and religious principles. Like him, many Korean Protestants have abolished chesa, regarding it as a form of idolatry like the boy’s mother that we discussed earlier.

The Korean Christians’ views on chesa are influenced by those of the religious leaders in the West, which have undergone changes over the years. Therefore to understand their attitudes towards chesa, it is necessary briefly to examine Western Christian ideology and practices, leading up to the nineteenth century when Christianity began to spread among the Koreans. I will begin with a discussion of the so-called ‘Chinese Rites Controversy’, a dispute within the Catholic Church from the 1630s to the early eighteenth century, followed by the more recent endorsement of such rituals and customs by the Pope. And to understand the difference of opinion between Catholics and Protestants, it is also important to examine the history of the Protestant Church in Korea.

In summary, this paper discusses how the ever-contentious issue of the compatibility of chesa with the Christian doctrines has evolved in contemporary Korea, which is now considered by many Koreans to be a ‘Christian country’.

It also attempts to find out why Korean Catholics and Protestants tend to have such differing views on chesa, which is their common cultural heritage, through analyzing historical data. I will then examine the contemporary Korean general public’s views on chesa, by analyzing some of the data that I collected in the field and on the Internet. I will also ask the question whether there is any connection between the changing attitudes of the Korean Christians toward it and the worldwide phenomenon of the revival of ethnicity in the face of globalization in the contemporary world.

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3 A large proportion of the elites including members of the National Assembly, are Christians. According to some more than half the Koreans are now Christians. In the paper presented on 17 August 2007 at the 8th ISKS International Conference, held in London, I stated that according to the statistics available to me then 35% of the South Koreans were Christians. It was refuted by one of my fellow presenters, who said the figure was 55% or even more than that. The exact current figure is unavailable to me now, but it seems to be clear that the number is increasing (No 1998:48-49).
**Chesa in the Chosŏn dynasty: Political manipulation of ritual by the rulers**

The case of *chesa* in traditional Korean society fits in very well with the general anthropological theory that ritual and religion fulfil a social function in that they help establish and preserve social order (Durkheim 1912/1995; Radcliffe-Brown 1952: 158-159).

The original meaning of *chesa* is simply ‘sacrifices offered to the spirits’⁴, but it became synonymous with the ancestral sacrifices. Performing *chesa* was considered to be man’s most important duty in traditional Confucian-orientated Korean society. According to Confucianism, the ideology governing every aspect of the social order at the time, filial piety (*hyo*) was undisputedly accepted as the prime human virtue (Yi Nūnhwa 1926/1990, 484; Lee Kwangkyu 1975; Choe Chaesŏk 1982; No 1996:18; Pae 2007, 161 & 164), and the duties of man did not stop at caring for his parents in their old age, but also included regular after-death ‘feeding’ of the spirits of his ascendants, which were represented as small wooden tablets with their names written on them, called *wip’ae*.

I would maintain, however, that *hyo* is not an innate human emotion such as a mother’s love for her baby, but is culturally patterned, based on the principle of reciprocity (Hogarth 1998, 2009). Therefore the importance of *hyo* varies depending on the type of society and also a specific age. No society has rewarded a mother who guarded her baby to the death with any special prizes, whereas many awards were given and monuments erected to commemorate a filial son or daughter who would do the same in Confucian societies, such as Korea. Filial piety is a foundation stone on which Confucian society is built, since the concept of absolute obedience to one’s father in the family, and to the king who is considered the father of a nation, is essential in maintaining the order and status quo in society.

Confucianism was first adopted by the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910) government as the national ideology guiding every aspect of society and culture. It was an unadulterated form of Neo-Confucianism compiled by Zhu Xi (1130-1200)⁵ in Sung dynasty (960-1279) China. Prima facie, it is highly paradoxical that the founder of the Chosŏn dynasty, Yi Sŏnggye (later King T’aejo: b.1335-d.1408, r.1392-1398), a military genius who usurped the crown from his king, should adopt the political ideology which bestows higher ranks to scholars than military men, and moreover imposes absolute obedience to the king. On closer

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⁴ *Sae urimal k’un sayŏn* (The New Comprehensive Korean Dictionary).
⁵ Chu Hūi in Korean, the respectable term being Chuja.
analysis, however, it made perfect sense for him to adopt Confucianism as the national governing ideology.

The newly found Chosŏn dynasty lacked legitimacy, since Yi Sŏnggye was not of the royal blood line, which traditionally had implications of divinity. His initial position was very precarious, with many of the previous king’s courtiers refusing to accept him as their sovereign at the expense of their lives and livelihood. The commoners’ sentiments towards him were even more antagonistic. To this day people’s hatred of him at the time is well reflected in a speciality food from Kaesŏng, called choraengi ttŏk (‘strangled rice cake’) which is shaped like strangled men. It is thought that every time women made it, they were symbolically strangling their much-hated new king. Although the commoners had no power, Yi Sŏnggye’s position was not a comfortable one, and he had to create a government with social systems suitable to pacify the situation, strengthen his position and build a successful stable dynasty. Confucianism was the ideal tool with which he could establish and maintain the power and the authority for himself and his descendants. It can be said then that it is thanks to the inherently conservative and rigid Confucian state structure that the Chosŏn dynasty lasted 518 long years with 27 kings, despite its shaky beginning.

Rituals of all kinds dominate Confucian society, which help maintain the unfair hierarchical social system. The most important and conspicuous of all the rituals during the Chosŏn dynasty was chesa. At the national level, imposing memorial shrines dedicated to the successive kings and queens, called chongmyo, were built where elaborate and complicated chesa rituals were offered regularly. The courtiers who were Confucian literati, also offered chesa to Confucius and the historical sages of both China and Korea, called Sŏkchonje at Sŏnggyungwan, the National Confucian Academy. These two large-scale rituals had a function of displaying the power and authority of the king in the former case, and the intellectual superiority of classical Confucian scholars in the latter. They contributed to the creation of the idiosyncratic Chosŏn dynasty government, which consisted of the weak king despite his absolute heaven-sanctioned power, and the strong court with the power to

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6 There exist many myths and legends surrounding the miraculous birth of the founder of a dynasty, which suggests that the sovereigns were Heaven-sent or at least sanctioned by Heaven.

7 Those who stayed loyal to the last king of the Koryŏ dynasty are remembered to this day as Sa yuk shin (the six high-ranking government officials who chose death over serving the new king) and Saeng yuk shin (the six scholars/courtiers who chose poverty and anonymity over riches and high government offices and retired to the countryside).

8 The modern name for Kaegyŏng, the capital of Koryŏ Kingdom.

9 According to the owner of the restaurant in Seoul where I had this dish for the first time. She was born and bred in Kaesŏng, now in North Korea.

10 T’aejo himself got disillusioned by his sons’ bloodthirsty struggle over the crown, and retired to the mountainside only 10 years after his coronation, and spent the rest of his life as a Buddhist.
influence and at times coerce the king to abide by the rules rigidly set according to the Confucian doctrines. Through constant learned petitions to the king, the courtiers controlled and curtailed the absolute authority of the king (Hogarth 2005). These rituals, which are still performed today, have lost their original significance, and are enjoyed by the public and protected by the government as two important intangible national cultural heritages. There is also a sense in which they contribute to the retention of the moral, aesthetic and religious values that they once conveyed in contemporary Korean society (Palmer 1984: 95).

At the private level, chesa was offered to one’s ascendants going back to four generations. The elaborate procedures and protocol specified in Chuja (Zhu Xi)’s Karye (‘The Family Ritual’) were closely followed with little modification (HMMTPS 1997; Lee, Peter 1996). These rituals, both public and private, helped maintain the pecking order in society, the patriarchal authority in the family, the absolute power of the crown and the influence of the literati courtiers to curtail the royal power.

Then it is no exaggeration to say chesa was the very cornerstone of the Chosŏn dynasty’s political structure and social systems, which were so unfair to the vast majority of people, especially women. Refusing to perform chesa was therefore tantamount to treason, being a highly subversive destructive action, shaking the very foundation of society, and as such was punishable by death.

The Korean Catholics and chesa rites

The beginning of the Christianity in Korea in the form of Catholicism is unique in the history of Christianity in that it was initially self-evangelized by Koreans who studied its doctrines through books, most notably Matteo Ricci’s True Doctrine of God and Ch’i Ko (The seven Mortifications) (Clark 1961; Kim, Joseph Chang-mun 1984: 8; Grayson 1985; Adams 2002). Unlike other countries where Christianity was first introduced by foreign missionaries among the poor and deprived, Korean Christianity was first embraced by the

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11 Originally the four-generation-chesa was only performed by the yangban (aristocrats) classes, commoners offering them only to the one previous generation, but the latter eventually adopted the former’s ways.

12 Han’guk mimjok munhwa tae paekwa sajŏn (The Comprehensive Encyclopaedia of the Korean National Culture).
educated people\textsuperscript{13}, their families and dependants even before the arrival of a proper foreign missionary. Kim Pòmu ( ? -1787), a translator, who went to China as part of an envoy group, learned about the Christianity through the Chinese translations of the books on the Christian doctrines and came to believe them as the truth. He brought home Chinese versions of Christian literature, with which he acquainted the Confucian literati, such as Yi Pyŏk, Yi Sûnhun, Chŏng Yak-jŏn, Chŏng Yak-yong, with the Christian doctrines in the 1770s and 1780s. Their activities were condemned by the establishment, and Kim Pòmu was arrested, tortured and banished for his Christian activities, being of the \textit{chungin} class (The ‘middlemen’), while the others in the group were spared thanks to their \textit{yangban} (aristocrats) status. He died from his torture wounds on the way, thus becoming in a sense the first Korean martyr. The first ‘proper’ Korean Christian was Yi Sûnhun ‘Pierre’ (1756-1801), who went with his father to Qing China in 1783 and was baptized by a French priest called Fr. Grammont in 1784.

Their clash with the prevailing established social morality of the time was first manifested in their refusal to perform \textit{chesa} and burning \textit{wip’ae} (Rev. Joseph Kim 1984; Grayson 1985; Palmer 1986; Buswell 2006:9), following the existing Papal edict to ban such rituals. The first Catholic martyrs, Yun Chich’ung ‘Paul’ (1759-1791) and Kwŏn Sangyŏn ‘James’ ( ? -1791), were executed for this very reason. When Yun’s mother died in 1791, he refused to perform proper \textit{chesa} rites according to the prescribed Confucian ritual code, following the instructions from the Vatican which came through Peking (Issued by La Société des Mission-Étrangères de Paris \textsuperscript{14}). He and his cousin Kwŏn who followed his example, were arrested and put on trial. The articles that they presented to the prosecution in their defence impressively displays their in-depth knowledge of the Christian doctrines and newly found deep faith (Rev. Joseph Kim 1984: 35-38). But they failed to convince the judges, were found guilty of ‘treason’ and were beheaded in 1791.

There followed several large-scale gory executions of the Korean Catholics and foreign missionaries, most notably in 1801 (\textit{Shinyu saok}), 1839 (\textit{Kihae saok}) 1846 (\textit{Pyŏngo saok}) and 1866 (\textit{Pyŏngin saok}). During \textit{Pyŏngin saok}, which was instigated by King Kojong (1852-1919; r. 1863-1907)’s father, the Regent Taewŏn-gun (Yi Haŭng 1820 – 1898) and lasted for six years until he handed over the power, more than 8,000 perished. The total

\textsuperscript{13} It was first embraced by \textit{chungin} (literally meaning the ‘middlemen’, referring to a class of people consisting of technical specialists such as translators), and dispossessed \textit{yangban} (aristocrats) who were pushed out of power through faction wrangling, and women (Lee Hyun-hee, et al. 2005:459).

\textsuperscript{14} Following the Papal decree, it stipulated that the independent activities were illegal, and ancestral rites should also be abolished.
number of the martyrs numbered more than 10,000, including foreign priests and the first Korean priest Kim Taegón ‘André’ (1822 – 1846)\textsuperscript{15}. Against the backdrop of the complicated political scene at the time, which was dominated by the factional wrangling, the early Catholics were often victimized in the political game (Yi Kibaek 1967/1994: 315; Lee Hyunhee 2005: 459-460). Of over 10,000 martyrs, 103\textsuperscript{16} were later canonized by the Vatican.

The Catholics worldwide are guided by their spiritual leader, the Pope, as are the Korean Catholics from the early days. Therefore it is necessary briefly to examine the changing attitudes of the Pope towards ancient local ‘customs’ and traditions over the ages.

The dispute over the local ancient rituals inside the Catholic Church, dubbed ‘the Chinese Rites Controversy’, rose in the 1630s, when the first Catholic missionaries began to evangelize in China, and continued until the eighteenth century. Of the Catholic orders who conducted missionary work in China, the Dominicans, together with Franciscans and Augustines, argued that some ancient local customs and traditional rites, such as ancestral sacrifices, were incompatible with the Christian doctrines, and wished to apply the same rigid principles that they had applied to other places. On the contrary, the Jesuits respected the local customs and adapted themselves to them, at one point wearing the Buddhist monks’ habits before adopting the more prestigious silk gowns of Chinese literati.

Pope Alexander VII (b. 1599 – d. 1667; papacy 1655 – 1667) issued an edict on 23 March, 1656, accepting practices ‘favourable to Chinese customs’. In 1659 instructions were given by the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (known as the ‘Propaganda Fide’) to new missionaries to Asia that adapting to local customs and respecting the habits of the countries to be evangelized was of paramount importance. As a result, Chinese Emperor Kangxi (b.1654 – d.1722; r. 1661 – 1722) issued an edict of toleration of Christianity.

However, the Dominican position won out with Pope Clement XI (1649-1721: papacy 1700-1721), who in 1705 sent Charles-Thomas Maillard De Tournon as his representative to the emperor, to communicate the ban on Chinese rites. On 19 March 1715, Clement issued the papal bull \textit{Ex illa die}, which officially condemned the Chinese ancestral rituals, describing them as ‘idolatrous’ and ‘barbaric’, and in conflict with the Christian doctrines. In 1721 Emperor Kangxi disagreed with Pope Clement XI’s decree, and banned Christian missions in China. In 1742 Pope Benedict XIV (b.1675 – d.1758; papacy 1740-1758), reiterating Pope Clement XI’s decree, promulgated his famous laws about missions in two

\textsuperscript{15} Baptized by Fr. Maubant in 1936, ordained in 1945.
\textsuperscript{16} 11 clergymen including 3 French bishops, 7 French priests and 1 Korean priest, and 92 laymen of whom 45 were males and 47 females.
papal bulls *Ex quo singulari* and *Omnium sollicitudinum*. He demanded that missionaries in China take an oath not to take part in or endorse ancestral rites, forbidding them to discuss the issue again.

‘The Rites Controversy’ continued to hamper missionary work to gain Chinese converts until well into the twentieth century. On 8 December 1939, only a few weeks after his election to papacy, Pope Pius XII (b. 1876 – d. 1958; papacy 1939 – 1958) ordered the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples to relax certain aspects of Clement XI’s and Benedict XIV’s decrees. To sum up his decree:

- Catholics are permitted to be present at ceremonies in honour of Confucius in Confucian temples or in schools.
- Erection of an image of Confucius or tablet with his name on it is permitted in Catholic schools.
- Catholic magistrates and students are permitted passively to attend public ceremonies which have the appearance of superstition.
- It is licit and unobjectionable for head inclinations and other manifestations of civil observance before the deceased or their images.
- The oath on the Chinese rites, which was prescribed by Benedict XIV, is not fully in accordance with recent regulations and is superfluous.

Since the eighteenth/nineteenth centuries, the early days of Christianity, when the Korean Christians believed ancestor worship was a form of idolatry and should be banned in accordance with the Papal decree, their way of thinking has undergone various changes, as the Papal views changed in the next century. Today, *chesa* continues to be performed by many Korean Catholics in its original, albeit more simplified, form.

**The Korean Protestants and *chesa* rites**

Protestantism was established in Korea a century after the introduction of Catholicism, and through quite a different route, and therefore took on different characteristics in keeping with the then prevailing social conditions which were different from those of a century before. It was a transitional period, when Korea was undergoing great social and political changes. As many peoples in similar situations (Cannell 2006), Koreans linked Christianity to modernity and also interestingly to Korean nationalism.
The beginning of Korean Protestant Christianity can be traced to 1873, when John Ross (1841-1915) and his brother-in-law John McIntyre (1837-1905), Scottish Presbyterian missionaries based in Manchuria, met there some young Korean men, including Yi Úngh’an, Yi Sŏngha, Kim Chin-gi and Sŏ Sangryun. In 1876 the Koreans were baptized. With their combined efforts, Korean translations of the Bible were made, leading to the publication of Korean versions of Luke\(^{17}\) in 1882 and the entire New Testament\(^{18}\) in 1887. In the spring of 1884, Sŏ Sangryun established a church in his hometown of Songch’ŏn, Changyŏn in Hwanghæ-do (Province).

In 1883, Yi Sujŏng, who accompanied Pak Yŏngho, the Korean envoy to Japan, embraced Christianity while there, and published a Korean translation of Matthew\(^{19}\) in Yokohama, Japan. In April 1885, when Horace G. Underwood, the first missionary to Korea, arrived in Inch’ŏn he had in his possession a copy of that book. That is a testimony to the fact that like Catholicism in the previous century, Protestantism in Korea was also founded by Koreans themselves, which is quite unique in Christian mission history (No 1993:31-32; HMMTPS\(^{20}\) I: 420). This view is supported by the fact that when in September 1887, Sae Munan Kyohoe, the first Protestant church in Korea was opened, 13 out of 14 members of the congregation had already embraced Christianity.

Christianity, however, was still regarded with extreme antagonism, so Horace Newton Allen (1858-1932), the first medical missionary who arrived in Seoul on 22 September 1884, came ostensibly in the capacity of a medical doctor affiliated to the American diplomatic mission. He, however, earned the trust of the royal family after successfully treating Min Yŏngik, Queen Min (Empress Myŏngsŏng)’s nephew and a high government official, who was seriously wounded during Kapshin Chŏngbyŏn\(^{21}\) in 1884 (Sŏ 1996: 14-15). As a result, on 10 April 1885, the first modern hospital in Korea, named Kwanghyewŏn (‘House of Civilized Virtue’)\(^{22}\) was founded, which opened the door for western missionaries. Soon afterwards on Easter Day two American missionaries, Horace Grant Underwood (1859-1916), the first evangelistic missionary for the Northern Presbyterian Mission, and Henry Gerhard Appenzeller\(^{23}\) (1858-1902), the first Northern Methodist evangelistic missionary, arrived

\(^{17}\) Yesu shŏnggyo Nuga pogŭm ch’yŏnsyŏ.

\(^{18}\) Yesu shŏnggyo ch’yŏnsyŏ.

\(^{19}\) Shinya Maga pogŭmsyŏ ḏnhae.

\(^{20}\) Han’guk mijok munhwad tae paekkwa sajŏn (The Comprehensive Encyclopaedia of the Korean National Culture), published by the Acedemy of Korean Studies.

\(^{21}\) An incident that took place in 1884, involving some young radical Korean reformists.

\(^{22}\) Its name was changed to Sebransū Hospital in 1904.

\(^{23}\) He was originally a Reformed Presbyterian, but converted to Methodism in 1876.

aboard the same ship, and began what is generally deemed to be the first ‘proper’ Protestant Christian missionary activities in Korea (Shearer 1966: 164). In May 1885, Dr. William B Scranton, a Methodist medical missionary, and his mother Mary Fletcher Benton Scranton, arrived, and concentrated on education and women’s issues. Mrs. Mary Scranton started Ewha Haktang24, a school for girls, and Appenzeller opened Paejae Haktang for boys in the summer of 1886.

Like Catholicism, the early Protestant churches also encountered severe persecution by the establishment, because of its ideological clashes with the traditions and existing moral values of Chosŏn society. Numerous petitions by learned Confucian literati courtiers were made to the King, criticizing the Christian doctrines (Peter Lee 1996,: 131-144). These anti-Western and anti-Christian attitudes led to the destruction of an American trading vessel called the General Sherman on the River Taedong, all those aboard including Rev. Robert Jermain Thomas (1840-1866), perishing in the river (Grayson 1985:102; No 1993: 33-35; Choi Jai-keun 2007).

Therefore to be accepted by the general Korean public, the missionaries had to prove that they were there to help the Korean people and that Christianity which they represented would be beneficial to them. Opportunities soon presented themselves after an incident called Ûlmi sabyŏn (1895), when the Japanese soldiers brutally murdered Queen Min (Empress Myŏngsong; 1851 - 1895). After her murder, the royal family including Emperor Kojong found themselves in a perilous situation, fearing for their lives. The American missionaries, including H. G. Underwood, Homer G. Hulbert (1863-1949) and Oliver R. Avison (? -1952), took turns, and kept vigil next to the Emperor, guarding him 24 hours with loaded guns (Bishop 1898/1970: 279; Grayson 1985: 110). The medical missionary H. N. Allen reported the cruelty of the Japanese to the world through the diplomatic channel available to him. The western missionaries’ loyal support of the Korean people and royalty was further manifested during the ensuing years, which contributed to the success of their missionary work.

Over the ensuing years, the Korean Protestantism developed and consolidated its nationalistic idiosyncrasy (Grayson 1985; HMTPS IV 1997:420; Buswell 2006; Choi 2007:24; No 1993: 35-38). The collection of hymns by Yun Ch’ihŏ published in 1905 included several patriotic songs, the most notable being the Korean national anthem25. Also included are songs eulogizing the Emperor. Even the members of the Tonghak Movement,

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24 Which later became Ewha Women’s University, arguably the largest women’s university in the world with (as of 2007) 899 professors, 15,596 registered undergraduates and 2,923 postgraduates including 726 PhD candidates.

25 It is the oldest surviving printed version of the national anthem.
whose aim was to protect the Korean nation and traditional culture, their motto being ‘ch’ŏk yang ch’ŏk wae (repel Westerners repel Japanese)’, deleted ‘ch’ŏk yang (repel Westerners)’ from their motto, after witnessing the help that they received from the Western missionaries. The religious affiliation of many of the Korean patriots fighting against the Japanese was Christianity, as well as more obvious Ch’ŏndogyo, which was a new religion founded by nationalistic leaders, based on traditional religious ideology. Hong T’aesun, the leader of the ‘Righteous Rebel Army’, and U Dongsŏn, who committed suicide in protest against the Japanese annexation of Korea against her people’s wishes, were both Christians.

The independence movement known as, the March First Movement (*Samil undong*), which took place in 1919, was one of the largest and bloodiest protest movements by the Korean people during Japanese colonial rule. Influenced by US President Wilson’s theory of a nation’s right to self rule, the peaceful protest movement proclaiming the independence of the Korean nation swept through the whole country. The Declaration of Independence, drawn up by Ch’oe Namsŏn, was signed by 33 distinguished people’s representatives, which triggered off the movement. Of the 33 original signers, 15 were affiliated to Ch’ŏndogyo, 2 to Buddhism and 16 to Christianity (Choi 2007: 75-76)\(^2\). The fact Christians outnumbered even the blatantly nationalistic Ch’ŏndogyo followers, clearly demonstrates the nationalistic nature of the Korean Protestant Christians. A similar percentage is indicated among the ordinary people who participated in the Movement, as the following two sets of statistics on record show:

\(^2\) It is interesting to note that of the 16 Christian representatives, 10 were Methodists and 6 Presbyterians (Yi Sanghun, 1998: 96), although the Presbyterians vastly outnumbered Methodists among Korean Christians, then as now.
Table 1: Religious Affiliation of the Arrested (Source: Palmer, 1986:65-66)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch’ŏndogyo</td>
<td>2,268</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinch’ŏnkyo</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucianist</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregational</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestants</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholics</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religious affiliation</td>
<td>9,255</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3,809</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19,054</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Religious Affiliation of the Arrested (Source: No, 1993: 221)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Buddhism</th>
<th>Confucianism</th>
<th>Ch’ŏndogyo</th>
<th>Christianity</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Atheist</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,659</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above tables clearly demonstrate that Christians, particularly Protestants, together with the nationalistic Ch’ŏndogyo believers, predominate in number among the most active participants.

Another interesting fact is that most of Korean patriots fighting for independence were Christians, most notably So Chaep’il, Yun Ch’iun, who founded Tongnip hyŏphoe (The Independence Society) and Tongnip shimun (The Independence Newspaper). The independence fighters who formed the Temporary Korean government in Shanghai, such as Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŏngman), Pak Yongman, Kim Kyushik, Yi Tongnyŏng, An Ch’angho and Yu Tongryŏl, were all Christians.

Given that the early Protestant missionaries helped the Korean people identify Christianity with ‘national feelings involving a continuity with tradition’ (Palmer 1986:95; Sŏ 1996:16), it seems paradoxical that today’s Korean Protestant Christians, whose religious ideology was formed under their influence, are more strongly opposed to chesa than the Catholics. To divulge the reasons, we must scrutinize the characteristics of the nineteenth century Western missionaries, who were predominantly Presbyterians and Methodists. Both
denominations were strongly influenced by earlier Western religious reformers, such as Martin Luther (1483-1546), John Calvin (1509-1564), and John Wesley (1703-1791), etc. (Knight 2008). They mostly followed an ‘exclusive’ line, believing that salvation was found only through faith in Jesus Christ and abiding by the words contained in the Bible (Yi Wŏn-gyu 1992: 57-58; Morris 2007:204). The founder of Methodism, John Wesley, and his brother Charles (1707-1788), so methodically (hence the name Methodism) studied and adhere to the Bible that they were called ‘Bible Moths/Bigots’ or ‘Bible Christians’ while at Oxford University (Yi Sanghun 1998: 77-89). Presbyterianism similarly acknowledges the pivotal role of the Bible.

The early missionaries to Korea, who adopted the Scottish Presbyterian approach, namely evangelical conversion, Scripture-based education, poor relief, and putting community before individual (Knight 2008:37) had conservative theology, and relied heavily on the Bible for guidance in their daily lives. They had Wesleyan fervour, diligence and sincerity (Yi Wŏn-gyu 1994: 85-91), and leaned towards exclusivity (Yun 2001:243) and fundamentalism (Grayson 1985; Palmer 1986:26; Adams 2002:86-90). Contemporary Korean Protestant Christians have inherited the same rigid approach, hence many, like the younger brother described earlier, are fundamentalists rejecting anything that does not fit in with their own hermeneutics of the Bible. Many of them consider the traditional form of chesa as idolatrous and reject it, claiming that it is a violation of the first of the Ten Commandment, ‘Thou shalt have none other gods but me’.

However, from the late 1890s Protestant Christians made a compromise by applying the fifth of the Ten Commandment, ‘Honour thy father and thy mother,’ and ‘Christianized’ chesa into ancestral memorial services, called ‘ch’udohoe’, which are held on death anniversaries. The ritual procedures of ch’udohoe in varying forms have now been incorporated into the ‘books of liturgy of virtually every Protestant denomination (Grayson 2006: 21). They are usually limited to one’s parents and grandparents, and the meals that follow are informal and often eaten out at restaurants. However, the underlying concept is basically the same as chesa.

In 2008, 2009 and 2010, I attended many Sunday services at Korean Protestant churches located in Seoul, such as Chŏngdong Methodist Church\(^{27}\), Yoido Full Gospel Church\(^{27}\), .
Church, Kwanglim Methodist Church, Somang Presbyterian Church and Kangnam Joongang Baptist Church, and talked to as many members of the congregations as I could. Amongst other things, I asked them whether they still offered chesa rites in the traditional form, and most of them emphatically replied, ‘No’, although I noticed that a few of them hesitated before answering, which made me think that they might do. However, they all told me that they held ch’udo yebae (Christianized memorial services) on the anniversaries of their parents/grandparents, followed by family meals, taken at home or at restaurants.

However, in recent years, I have noticed a definite softening in the attitudes of more Korean Protestant Christians towards chesa. The heads of large ancient families sometimes compromise their religious scruples and offer Confucian-style chesa, and many junior members follow the procedure, albeit reluctantly. Some of my family members and close friends confided to me that they are in favour of preserving the chesa customs. Why then have the attitudes of some Korean Protestant Christians become less rigid and show a certain compromise in recent years? I would venture to suggest that it is related to the worldwide revival of ethnicity.

The revival of ethnicity in today’s globalizing world

At the turn of the twentieth century, many tribal and agrarian peoples were undergoing great social changes in the aftermath of the colonization mostly by the industrialized western nation-states. Since they immediately observed the benefits of the industrialization, such as improved health through advanced medicine, an easier lifestyle with the highly developed western technology, what they strove to become like their colonial masters. In other words, their modernization equated with westernization. Thus the millenarian movements, called the ‘cargo cults’, which swept through Melanesia in the early twentieth century, were greatly influenced by the European preoccupation with materialism (Worsley 1957).

After the two great world wars, many tribal peoples were grouped as a ‘nation’, which then became an independent modern nation-state. There swiftly followed modernization or more precisely westernization. They adopted a parliamentary system based on western

28 It has 1,000,000 members as of 2007, and is the largest Pentecostal Christian congregation in the world. It was founded by Cho Yonggi (David) and his mother-in-law, Choe Chashil in 1958.
democracy, a modern market economy and an education system similar to that of advanced industrialized nation-states.

By the 1950s, industry and commerce dominated the world, and the rapid development in science, technology and communications, resulting in easier travel and contact with other cultures, seemed to suggest the dissolution of cultural boundaries and the creation of a single homogeneous global culture. Liberals and the cosmopolitan idealists predicted, ‘as mankind moved from a primitive, tribal stage of social organization towards large-scale industrial societies, the various primordial ties of religion, language, ethnicity and race which divided it would gradually but inexorably lose their hold and disappear. The great forces of trade and industry would bind continents together and erase internal barriers and differences. Ancient customs and traditions would become obsolete and the myths of common ancestry would be recognized for what they were and consigned to the museum of mankind’s memory (Simth 1981:2).’

However, what has actually been happening is not congruent with the predictions of the liberals. The cosmopolitan ideals and rationalistic expectations have faded and ethnic ties and sentiments of nationalism have been revitalized. The modern renaissance of ethnic solidarity and sentiment has been manifested in the ethnic conflicts in places like the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, often in aggressive and fanatical forms. Today more and more people are realizing that they live in a plural world, and the diversity of culture should be respected and preserved. Since few ‘nation-states’ have ethnically homogeneous populations, the ethnic revival has become a wide-spread phenomenon, even in the developed nations. Since the Second World War, the world has witnessed the revival of ethnicity and nationalistic aspirations among Bretons, Basques, Scots, the Welsh, the Cornish, Flemish Quebecois, Catalans, Kurds, Ibo, Somali, to name but a few.

The underlying cause for the revival of ethnicity in the contemporary world has been analyzed by various academics. For example, Smith (1981) explains it by examining the development of a sense of history which first arose in eighteenth-century Europe. This ‘historicist’ vision involves both a rejection of the materialism and impersonal political system of modern nation-states, and a quest for spiritual regeneration in historical communities. He argues that the cause of this dissatisfaction is the rise of the ‘scientific state’, which is the ‘peculiarly western type of state.’ This and the impersonal modern urban lifestyle have generated a highly charged romantic nationalism, and revived the ancient ethnic bonds, whose extinction liberals and socialists predicted with the advancement of science and industry.
I would add that globalization which has been largely oriented to ‘mainstream’ Western cultures has generated the sense of alienation, estrangement and exclusion on the part of non-European peoples and ethnic minorities. Ethnic nationalism can alleviate it, which is the main reason why the ethnic revival will continue to flourish not only in Africa, Asia, but also in Europe and North America.

Against this background, cultural nationalism is sweeping through the non-European nation-states, as a reaction to the globally homogenized culture, or more specifically western-oriented culture. Asserting one’s cultural identity through ‘quaint ethnic’ beliefs and objects has become topical, even among the sophisticated educated elites. So people everywhere are reviving archaic customs, religion, rituals, traditional architecture, foods and costumes, etc., which often take on different meanings. Maurice Bloch (1986) has shown how the ancient custom of circumcision took on various meanings according to the changing social conditions in Madagascar. The custom, which was considered ‘barbaric’ in the early days of colonization of the island, became a vehicle for their cultural nationalism later on. In Japan, there has been a movement to ‘discover’ long-forgotten ancient customs or traditional objects, with the slogan ‘One Traditional Item per Village’ in a given time (Kim Kwangôk in private conversation in 1997).

A similar phenomenon has been happening in Korean society; today traditional food, clothing and artefacts command high prices, and many once-forgotten customs and cultural heritages have been revived (Hogarth 1999). Likewise there has also been a renewed interest in chesa rituals, and that could be one of the reasons why even the Protestant Christians, who once condemned it as idolatrous, seem to have less negative views on chesa than they once did, albeit not always consciously.

Public Views on Chesa in Contemporary Korean Society

My random sampling survey during the past few years reveals that the chesa tradition is still very much alive in contemporary Korean society. I asked several hundred people whether chesa was still prevalent, and many told me that it was not only widely performed, but also was considered as the most important household event. The most frequently occurring answer was, ‘Achikto chip chip mada chesa chinae chiyo (Every household still performs chesa).’ The notable exception was the Sunday worshippers at Protestant churches,
who told me they did not perform chesa, but instead commemorated the anniversaries of their parents’ and grandparents’ passing with ch’udohoe (Christianized memorial services), as previously mentioned.

The chesa culture based on ancestor worship being still embedded in many people’s lives, the traditional boy preference, verging on boy-mania, still persists in contemporary Korean society. Young families tend to choose to have only one child, and many still want it to be male. As a result, no fewer than 30,000 female foetuses are said to be aborted each year after ultra-sonic scans (Pae 2007, 194). As of 1994, the number of boys born is 15.4% more than that of girls, compared with the world average of 10.5%, and this ratio is said to be the highest in the world (Pae Ibid., 194).

The biggest fear of the older couples without sons is that nobody would offer them regular chesa after their deaths. But the attitudes have been changing in recent years with the improved women’s status, and it is not considered such a great tragedy not to have sons, as a woman can now be the legal head of a family and perform chesa. Mr. K, a highly educated well-to-do retired octogenarian with three daughters and no sons, told me that although some of his friends and family felt sorry for him for not having a male heir, he was very happy with his daughters. He proudly confided to me that his eldest daughter promised him to offer him and his wife regular chesa after their deaths.

The proliferation of information on chesa, such as ritual protocols, foods, utensils, correct table settings, etc., and various discussions on it on the Internet suggests that the Korean public are still very much interested in it and its present implications and future prospects. An article by Choe Chunshik, a professor of Korean studies at Ewha Women’s University, was published in the Korean Geographic in 2007. In it, he analyzes chesa in terms of political implications in Chosŏn dynasty Korea, and states that chesa is a deeply rooted Korean tradition which is not possible to abolish. The article immediately generated no fewer than 101 comments by the readers.

They can be summarized as follows:

- Agree with the author, and think chesa is a beautiful Korean tradition and should be kept alive: 47
- Agree, but modifications and compromises should be made to lighten

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29 With many younger women working full-time, one-child families are quite common among young people, and the population is said to be decreasing. The worried Korean government is trying to encourage more child births, and the poster saying, ‘The best present you can give your child is a baby brother or sister.’ is often seen in subway trains.
women’s burden: 15
- Disagree and think it should be abolished: 32
- Neutral: 7

It is interesting to note that a majority of the readers (47%, and 63% if you include those in favour with modifications) think that chesa should continue to be performed, while 32% are opposed to it. They do not reveal their religious affiliations, but from my research by random sampling, those who are strongly opposed to it can be said to be mostly Protestant Christians. However, more intensive research over a long period is required to get a more accurate picture, in view of the changing Christian demography and cultural patterns.

The following table showing the views of the religious leaders well illustrates those of the Korean population with religious affiliations, since the leaders’ views can be said to reflect those of their congregations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Buddhist monks</th>
<th>Protestant Christian ministers</th>
<th>Catholic priests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In favour of chesa in traditional form</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against chesa in traditional form</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Yi Wŏn’gyu 1992: 58-59)

**Conclusion**

Despite its gory beginning, Christianity has now been firmly established as the dominant religion in contemporary Korean society. Its spread and growth is unprecedented in Asia, where Christianity has found little favour with the majority of people because of its clashes with the existing cultural and religious traditions. The reasons for its successful implantation in Korea have been suggested by many scholars (Clark 1961; Palmer 1984; Grayson 1985; Adams 2002) and continue to be researched. I have elsewhere suggested that one of the important reasons is that Christianity itself, especially the Old and New
Testaments, contains many shamanistic elements. They speak to the Korean people’s psyche, in which lies deep-rooted shamanistic ‘collective consciousness’ (Hogarth 2007). The early Christian missionaries also observed some inherent similarities between the indigenous Korean religiosity and the Christianity, such as the concept of Hananim (‘The Supreme Being/Heavenly Being’) (Palmer 1984; Grayson 1985:137-138), although they openly condemned shamanistic practices as barbaric devil worship. In Korea, conflicts between old Korean traditions and customs and the Christian doctrines seem to have been largely resolved through different interpretations of the Bible and successful adaptation and implementation.

However, the question whether performing chesa, sacrifices offered to ‘feed’ the ancestral spirits, is compatible with the Christian doctrines remains to be contentious. The Korean Christians are generally thought to be opposed to performing it in its traditional form, which was the main reason for its bloodthirsty persecution. The early Korean Christians, who were Catholics, were martyred, because of their refusal to perform chesa. However, Korean Christians are divided in their opinion according to the denomination to which they are affiliated. Generally speaking, Catholics tend to continue with the chesa in its traditional form, whereas most Protestants have stopped performing it. Analysis of historical and field data suggests that it is because of the influence of the Western religious leaders. In the case of Catholics, the Papal edicts play an important role in that like Catholics all over the world, the Korean Catholics directly follow the instructions from the Pope. Since Pope Pius XII decreed that ancestral and other similar sacrificial rituals are no longer heretical in 1939, they see nothing wrong with performing chesa in its original form. In the case of the Protestants, I would suggest that their firm stance against chesa, originates from the theology of the influential western religious reformists, who shaped the religious ideology of the early western missionaries, mostly American. They had puritanical zeal and Wesleyan fervour, which leaned towards exclusivity, fundamentalism, and sometimes bigotry.

Chesa is no longer the cornerstone of contemporary Korean society, but it is considered to be a valuable national cultural heritage, which helps define the Korean national identity. And against the backdrop of the worldwide revival of old traditions and customs (Hogarth 1999: 333-335), chesa shows no signs of receding into oblivion.
References


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North Korea’s Informal Markets and the Increasing Role of Women

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While North Korea’s nuclear capacity and leadership succession have attracted intense media interest, little attention has been given to equally important changes taking place inside the country: in particular those associated with the ongoing collapse of the command economy and the emergence of an informal market economy. In the face of famine and in the absence of a functioning public distribution system (PDS), markets have become the chief coping mechanism. In a recent U.N. estimate, private markets provide perhaps half of the calories North Koreans consume and up to 80 percent of household income (Harden 2009). A remarkable aspect of this process is that the vast majority of North Korean traders and merchants are women (Yi 2006; Lankov and Kim 2008; Haggard and Noland 2009).

This paper focuses on the spread of markets in North Korea and the role of women in this process. It does this by presenting individual accounts of North Korean female defectors and contextualizing these with data drawn from in-depth interviews with representatives of transnational and South Korean NGOs, government officials and North Korean experts and analysis of a variety of English and Korean language materials. In so doing the paper seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of North Korean society at a time of unprecedented economic and social change.

The objectives of this paper are to understand:

- how markets evolved
- why women became the nation’s traders
- where and what kinds of economic activity are taking place,
- the key challenges and opportunities facing women that engage in business

Greater understanding of these issues will in turn assist us to consider much broader questions namely:
What are the social and political implications of these kinds of female economic activity? Has participation in the markets improved women’s lives?

Do these female operated markets threaten or protect the continued existence of the North Korean regime?

More fundamentally, has the participation of women in markets led to a broader change in the role and status of women within North Korean society?

In this paper we argue that the impact of the spread of capitalism on the role and status of women is likely to be ambiguous and we cannot assume that the long term consequences of this trend will necessarily be to women’s’ benefit let alone deliver female empowerment. On one hand, for some women it appears that they are now more prominent in decision-making in many aspects of domestic life and enjoy new levels of social mobility. In the course of their trading activities women are being increasingly exposed to information from the outside world including media depictions of more empowered South Korean women. This has led some to question the value of a North Korean system and even to protest in public. On the other hand, economic participation has had a dramatic effect on women’s daily workload. This is in the context of facing a range of constraints, such as continued lack of many basic needs, lack of capital, relative exclusion from positions of power, and male dominance of the family, frequently expressed through violence. Also increasing numbers of women are pushed into prostitution locally or have fallen victim to sex exploitation in China. They have also become the target of official crackdowns which lead to either harsh punishment or having to pay hefty bribes. It is also possible that the growing market economy be a source of system maintenance. Moreover there are major political and cultural barriers as the North Korea’s totalitarian system lacks any institutions capable of empowering women and a more fundamental block is the culture of gender subordination, with values and attitudes so deeply rooted that they are likely to endure.

But it is likely that there will be another long lasting impact. This period has been the first time in North Korean history where women have found the space and opportunity to become entrepreneurs. Now the scope of female operated business activities is quite broad. These women discover, evaluate, and exploit opportunities to introduce new goods and services through organizing efforts that previously did not exist. Their activities involve securing capital, looking for business partners for delivery, transport, retail and wholesale and building
networks with public officers or local authorities. With these new skills North Korean women’s enterprising spirit will not be easy to contain. For this reason it is time to reconceptualize the role of women in North Korea’s economy and broader society by moving beyond notions of “vulnerability” to recognize women as economic actors and agents of social change and acknowledge the critical role played by women in the changing economy.

Methodological approach and sample description
Data for this research was collected between 2008 to 2011. Over this period we conducted 17 semi-structured in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors (14 females and 3 males) that had resettled in South Korea, with the exception of one defector who was living in a third country (with so few North Korean defectors the country is not listed to protect their identity). We used snowball sampling and, to diversify the sample, new contacts were made in various sites where we conducted participant observation, including attending the church fellowships and Bible study groups of two Protestant churches that offered special services for North Koreans. The lead author also became involved in a choir for both North Korean and South Korean women.

Most of the interviewees are from northern parts of North Korea and had lived for extended periods of time in China before arriving in South Korea. The period of time spent in South Korea varied in the sample, from two to 16 years, yet most commonly they arrived in the 2000s. 14 out of the 17 interviewees were in school, or had full- or part-time employment. Only three respondents remained married to their North Korean spouse. In the sample 11 or the 17 were directly involved in market trading and the remainder had relied on markets for most of their food supply and basic needs.

In the interviews, we asked North Korean defectors about their daily lives in North Korea, including experiences in school, employment, social groups and family life. We focused in particular on their experiences in the informal market economy: and if they were traders their types of trade; how they got started; and how they dealt with the logistical and other challenges they may have faced. We also asked about what, if any, impact female participation in markets may have had on women’s lives including whether it had any effect on the role or status of women. See Table 1: North Korean Defectors for descriptive data of
our sample. Note that to protect the identities of participants, only surnames (pseudonyms) are used and personal details of the participants are not fully revealed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Place of Residence before leaving NK</th>
<th>Occupation in NK</th>
<th>Gender Status</th>
<th>Place of Residence</th>
<th>Year of Arrival</th>
<th>Occupation in South Korea</th>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Occupation in South Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cha</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>Factory Worker &amp; Poet</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heo</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Cheongin</td>
<td>Professor /Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>S'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Single</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N,Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Factory worker /Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>Doctor / Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cho</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>S.Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Book keeper /Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>S'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N.Hwanghae Province</td>
<td>Railway Officer</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>S'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>N,Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
<td>Miner / Construction Worker / Vendor</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Onsung</td>
<td>Nurse / Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>N.Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Factory Worker /Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>N,Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Medical Doctor / Vendor</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suh</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>N. Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Factory Worker / Vendor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Pyongsong</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>Separated</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kang</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>S.Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Railway Worker / Vendor</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Jagang Province</td>
<td>High ranking government officer</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son's Husband</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Onsung</td>
<td>Medical Doctor</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chon</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>N.Hamgyong Province</td>
<td>Fuel trader / importer</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>N'Hamyong Province</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Author and Scholar</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: North Korean Defectors Interviewed
Interviews were also conducted with representatives of NGOs (including aid, educational and religious organizations), governmental agencies and North Korea specialists. Many of these interviewees were in regular contact with North Korean defectors. During fieldwork, we also attended several forums and conferences on North Korean defectors and participated in various events such as a ‘women in leadership’ program which included many North Korean women and specialists.

This research is also informed by analysis of a diverse range of English and Korean language research materials. These materials include books, PhD and Master’s dissertations, media articles and NGO publications by major International NGOs and South Korean advocacy organizations for North Korean Defectors, in particular the newsletters produced by the groups Good Friends and The Daily North Korea, and the magazine Rimjingang (in which articles are claimed to be written by underground reporters living in North Korea).

A note on limitations of interview data from defectors

Over the past two decades there has been a growing exodus of defectors leaving North Korea. Most remain in China although a significant proportion eventually make the often long and hazardous journey to South Korea. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification as of December 2010, 20,460 North Korean defectors live in South Korea. Just under 70% of defectors are female and seven out of ten are from North Hamgyong Province (Chosun Ilbo May 16, 2011). The numbers and gender of defectors resettling in South Korea is summarized in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'93</th>
<th>'98</th>
<th>'01</th>
<th>'02</th>
<th>'03</th>
<th>'04</th>
<th>'05</th>
<th>'06</th>
<th>'07</th>
<th>'08</th>
<th>'09.8</th>
<th>TOTAL 10/10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>6351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>1,974</td>
<td>2,197</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>14009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>2,544</td>
<td>2,892</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>20,460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Unification, ROK

The increasing numbers of North Korean defectors presents an opportunity for researchers as defector testimonies can provide valuable insights into daily life in the country. However, this data has its limitations. One problem is that there is potential that data will be affected by the unrepresentative nature of the sample. In previous surveys conducted in China and South Korea women, members of lower income classes and residents of the northeast provinces
were consistently overrepresented (Robinson et al., 1999; Robinson et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2001; Chon et al., 2007). This was also the case in our sample.

Those that undertake the risks of trying to leave North Korea may also have individual characteristics that differentiate them from the rest of the population. These characteristics may include more adverse life experiences and more severely truncated opportunities, both of which could give rise to behaviors and attitudes that are quite different from the population as a whole. In particular, duration outside North Korea is likely to affect attitudes and perceptions. The perspectives of longtime defectors are likely to be influenced by their experiences outside of North Korea (particularly for those living for extended periods in China where many suffer years of violence and exploitation) or they may have become socialized to alternative views (particularly those living in South Korea) (For more in-depth discussion of these issues see Haggard and Noland 2009: 134-135). As noted, to minimize some of the limitations associated with defectors’ testimonies, data from defectors has been augmented with data from interviews with NGO workers and experts in the field, and analysis of other secondary sources.

Crisis-induced marketization

The cumulative and interrelated effects of the collapse of the socialist bloc, structural problems of the command economy, and the droughts and floods of the 1990s, resulted in the North Korean economy contracting by approximately 30 percent in the period between 1991-1996. Economic decline coincided with a widespread and devastating famine. It is estimated that between 600,000 and one million people, or about 3–5 per cent of the pre-crisis population, perished from famine-related causes (Goodkind and West 2001; Haggard and Noland 2007).

Faced with increasing food shortages from lack of production capacity and minimal support from its Cold War allies, the North Korean government systematically reduced food rations for the general population, relaxed price controls, and decentralized decision-making for factories to allow market-determined prices. Subsequently, many factories shut down production and the Public Distribution System (PDS), the rationing system under which citizens used state-issued coupons to
procure food and other necessities operating in some form or other since 1948, to all intents and purposes collapsed.

In the absence of government rations, the people of North Korea turned to markets for essential daily items. Informal markets (known to North Koreans as Jangmadang literally translated as “market grounds”) sprang up all over the country in the late 1990s and included general markets in larger cities, farmers’ markets, and more informal markets or exchange networks such as barter, transfers from relatives in the countryside, and corruption. In 2002 the North Korean government officially recognized these farmers markets and introduced various reforms including a partial liberalization of wages and prices, permission to farmers to cultivate abandoned plots, and devaluing the official exchange rate. Buildings were also constructed to enclose the markets. Now all merchants are required to pay deposits to reserve a space within the structure. In addition, merchants are required to pay officials a daily fee to maintain the rights to a pre-allocated space. If merchants are unable to pay the fee, officials have the power to confiscate all goods and escort the merchant off the premises and prohibit them from engaging in business until the following day. Those caught conducting business outside the Jangmadang also risk having their merchandize seized or otherwise must pay hefty bribes.

In North Korea’s markets goods flow from various sources. The bulk of manufactured goods are imported from China via clandestine (and thus necessarily complex) supply chains. Some foodstuffs are the surplus production of farmers, kitchen gardens and other goods are assets stripped or otherwise stolen from state enterprises. In the early phase, however, food aid was crucial to the development of the nascent market economy. North Korea solicited assistance from the international community in 1995 and by 2005 North Korea received more food aid from the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and US government than any other country. Similarly, private relief aid to North Korea significantly increased, with approximately 130 organizations worldwide providing over US$2 billion in aid between 1995 and 2005. Noland estimates that in the 2000s about 30 percent of this aid found its way into both official and informal markets. In this way diverted food aid assisted in priming the pump for market growth. This was acknowledged by International NGOs themselves and an interviewee with an employee of Caritas (the relief agency of the Roman Catholic Church) said:
Although some Caritas workers mentioned that some donated food etc will end up in markets …but with a market economy developing, chances that food and non-food donations are sold or bartered increase (pers comm. 2008)

Despite initial tolerance, the leadership has always viewed the spread of markets and the emergence of a merchant class as a threat to their power. As a result they have experimented with a range of interventions to restrain the marketization of the economy. In October 2005, the government took the measure of monopolizing grain sales in markets to prevent grain diversion. In March 2009, markets were ordered to open for only five hours a day in the afternoon and were only allowed to sell farm products, excluding rice and the sale of industrial goods and imported products was banned. The government also suspended or closed several wholesale markets around the country. This brought North Korea to the brink of hyperinflation.

Despite government designs to bring markets under control, resistance against these measures meant that the state quickly abandoned them (Haggard and Noland 2010). In February 2010 the government announced that all markets could be reopened until the state distribution system ‘gets back to normal’ (Park 2011).

However the most dramatic measure came in November 2009 when the government redenominated and revalued the currency while sharply restricting the amount of old won that could be traded for new (under $40 at unofficial rates) and banned the use of foreign currency (to “stabilize and improve people’s lives” and “reinforce economy management system and order” “to construct a Strong and Prosperous Nation in 2012” according to North Korean propaganda). This had the effect of wiping out many people's savings while sending food prices soaring. According to Mansourov (2010) the currency revaluation particularly affected, and was thus especially unpopular, with lower level officials that lost their accrued savings from regular bribe taking and other corrupt activity. This may explain the highly unusual move on the part of the government to publicly execute the former finance director of the ruling Workers’ Party Pak Nam-ki, blaming him as the instigator of the reform. The North Korean Prime Minister, Kim Yong-il, also made a rare public apology for the currency revaluation.
Why an “ajuma” [auntie] economy?

Existing literature on female entrepreneurship in developing countries [See among others, such as Das (2000), Raju. (2000), and Shane (2003)] argue that there are three categories of women entrepreneurs, that is: “chance”, “forced” and “created” entrepreneurs. In the case of North Korea it appears that many female entrepreneurs are a mixture of all three.

Reports from defectors state that between 75 percent (Haggard and Noland 2009) and 80 percent (Yi 2006: 37; Lankov and Kim 2008) of market traders were women. As Lankov writes “the new North Korean capitalism of dirty marketplaces, charcoal trucks and badly dressed vendors with huge sacks of merchandise on their backs demonstrates one surprising feature: it has a distinctly female face.” (2005: 1)

In this way women’s contribution to the household is no longer regarded as secondary or auxiliary and for many families women have become the main breadwinner. According to research based on interviews with 111 defectors, 83 percent of the participants were wives involved in market activities and their earnings contributed more than 60 percent of household income (Lee & Park 2011). An extract from an article in North Korea Today newsletter illustrates the role of women as the breadwinner:

Kang Jung-gil (40s) of Heungwon County, South Hamgyong Province was working at a factory last spring. He never missed work, even though he never received any rations or wages. His wife was the breadwinner for all five members of the family, including his mother and two children. When the food shortage began last spring, the family could hardly afford daily bowls of porridge. His mother, who was over seventy, fell sick after a lengthy period of starvation. His wife, in the mean time, was trying to collect herbs in the mountains. She fell down a hill and became paralyzed. Her disability caused a disastrous hardship for the family because she was the breadwinner, earning money by peddling various items and occasionally collecting herbs. (North Korea No.269 March 2009)

The overrepresentation of predominantly middle-aged women (referred to as ‘ajuma’ in Korean) in North Korea’s market places seems at odds with their position in North Korean society. Building on the Confucian ideals of the passive and sequestered women of traditional Korea, North Korea’s leadership cult gave patriarchal relations a significant boost, recasting the whole nation in line with traditional family structures. The analogy of the father has been
used consistently to personalize the role of the leader and the analogy of children to personify the people. Thus the political system directly perpetuated gender subordination (Kim 2010; Jung and Dalton 2006).

However, this status is partly why women became the nation’s traders. Prior to the 1990s those that engaged in trading activities were accorded low status and considered by many as ethically suspect (Lankov and Kim 2008). As such farmers’ markets of the past were frequented only by women. This remained the case as they expanded. Also, by the standard of many communist countries, North Korea has always had an unusually high percentage of housewives among its married women. For example, in the northern border city of Sinuiju, up to 70% of married women were estimated to be housewives in the 1980s (Koo and Oh 2004). For those women that did work, it became increasingly easier to exit the formal employment sector, and for some State Owned Enterprises shedding female workers became a matter of state policy. Men on the other hand were either expected to stay with their work units or, as Lankov argues, still believed that it would be more prudent to keep their old "official" jobs on the assumption that the country would revert to its old ways sooner or later (Lankov and Kim 2008:61). One of interviewees explained this situation in the following way:

Most of the merchants are women. I think this is because of the North Korean system. In North Korea society, men must have their jobs in factory or office, wherever...because labor is an obligation according to North Korea Law. There is no private labor. Only national labor exists. It is compulsory for all single men and women to participate in national labor. Certainly, all men must participate except over 60 years old men. In the case women only those over 55 years old are excluded from working for the state. In reality women that are younger have managed to free themselves of this obligation to work. Thus, women are freer than men to go to the market. It is easy to find women who do business. If you meet young men in the market, that men would have had to give a bribe to allow him to be absent from his work place and do business. (Heo)

This ability to exit the formal employment is coupled with a strong financial incentive to become involved in trading. One study has estimated that women could earn 200 times more through trading than the average monthly wage of ordinary factory workers (Lee & Park 2011:126). Haggard and Noland’s analysis of two large defector surveys (one of 1,300
refugees in China and the other of 300 refugees in South Korea) found that when refugees were asked “what is the easiest way to make money in North Korea - work hard at assigned job; engage in market activities; engage in corrupt or criminal activities; or none of the above”— 67 percent of those who left North Korea after 2005 said that engaging in market activities was the easiest way to make money (Haggard and Noland 2010:15). One of our interviewees said that:

Most women preferred not to go to work or quit their jobs because of the large gap between their wage and the amount money they could earn through trading. Basically wages were so small or weren’t paid at all. Wages became useless (Chang).

Finally, many women engaged in trade as a matter of sheer necessity with increasing numbers of widowed, divorced and single women (Jung and Dalton 2006). Although divorce is officially discouraged since the famine in the 1990s incidences of family breakdown have sharply increased.¹ A survey of 426 female defectors living in Seoul found that 34.4 percent had married and divorced more than once (Chang and Lee 2009). This is in line with an earlier study that found that among defectors reaching South Korea, 6.9 percent experienced a family breakdown prior to 1994. After 1994, 20 percent of defectors had left their husbands (Park 1999). Most (12 out of 17) of those interviewed for this study were widowed or divorced when they were in North Korea. As a sole ‘breadwinner’ women had to find ways of feeding their families. One respondent in this study said that:

I couldn’t put up with my husband’s inability to feed my child and me. After 1997–98 men became useless. They went to their jobs, but there was nothing to be done there, so they came back home. Meanwhile their wives went to distant places to trade and kept families going. Such women’s long and frequent absence for trade often led to family breakdown (Jie).

Types of merchandise and services

Studies of female entrepreneurship in developing countries have found that women tend to be involved in micro and small ventures and that the gendered division of labour affected women’s choice of business. Women tend to run business in the areas of food production,

¹ The government does not approve of divorce, stipulating in Article 20, Clause 2 of the Family Law that a divorce can only be granted through court proceedings. Furthermore, it regulates divorce by way of policy, by imposing limits on acceptable conditions for divorce and charging a substantial divorce tax. However, divorce is supposedly more easily obtained through bribery (Cho 2011).
nutrition, health and childcare and engage in low value added production. (Della-Giusta et al. 2006; Nyanzi et al. 2005) This is comparable to the experience of North Korean women.

The markets are primarily made up of women who operate stalls selling cereals, vegetables, fish, eggs, poultry, rabbits, seasonings and other foodstuffs, as well as home brewed alcohol. Popular market foods include fried tofu with seasoned rice filling, fried bread and corn noodles. (Kim 2007; Lankov & Kim 2008).

A variety of manufactured goods, principally from China, are also traded from car batteries (to provide power during the common power outages), shoes and new and second-hand clothes imported from China, vinyl and cosmetics and accessories for women (Daily NK1/1/2009).

Women are also involved in the services industry running small businesses such as food stalls or small restaurants, motels, sewing workshops and home-based clothing alteration businesses. Money lending also presents an opportunity for women to make money. One of our interviewees said that:

Another type of business is private money lending to people who want to purchase materials to sell. The private moneylenders are often Koreans who have connections to relatives in Japan. They acquire foreign currencies and charge high rates of interest. Some women engage in this job (Nam).

At the markets there has been a growth in handcart delivery services. Some businesses are larger scale. An article in the NGO newsletter Rimjingang described how ‘a woman run a big wholesale clothing business’ and one participant said that she was involved in trading bikes and another who traded second hand cars from China to North Korea. (Rimjingang, 2007 No.1)

With the withdrawal of state run services such as childcare women have also taken to caring for children of other working mothers. There are also reports of women running private orphanages (NKHR 2009).

Since the famine increasing numbers of women have become involved in the sex-trade. Prostitution is illegal in all its forms in North Korea and, according to official propaganda,
was completely eradicated around 1950. Since the famine and more recently since the currency reform in 2009 that left many jobless prostitution has become widespread as desperate women sell sexual services. In large cities of North Korea, there are many motels, bathhouses and skincare salons with signs that euphemistically refer to sex services as “selling a bed” or “selling flowers” (Daily NK August 7, 2007). Sources say it is common to see young women soliciting at bus stops and railway stations during rush hour (2010 Daily NK). One of our interviewees said “I had heard that some women engaged in prostitution with Chinese traders, some foreigners and some high officials.” (Song)

It is not only the spread of markets but with the spread of prostitution women themselves have also become commodified. One male interviewed for this study said: "In difficult times women are luckier than men as they can survive just by selling their bodies. It is easier for women nowadays." (Chun)

**Getting started: sourcing capital and turning a profit**

Studies on women entrepreneurs in developing countries have also found that women are likely to have more difficulties accessing physical, human and social capital than male counterparts. (Della-Giusta et al. 2006; Nyanzi et al. 2005) From the accounts of those we interviewed, these barriers also exist although overcoming them is arguably even harder in North Korea.

Establishing a private business in North Korea is no mean feat. Women face several barriers from accessing goods, capital, transport and dealing with corrupt officials. One significant hurdle is accessing start up capital. Because of the limited resources some interviewed began their trade by selling their household items or borrowed start up money from neighbours and friends. Some interviewees said that they borrowed the money from moneylenders. According to an article in the NK Daily these lenders charged interest rates between 10- 20percent (Kang 2011).

The role of relatives abroad was also an important source of capital. As a result many of the traders said that they had relatives already in China or South Korea. In particular, Japanese-

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2 Article 7 of the Law on Sex Equality stipulates, “The State shall hereafter forbid such violations of female human rights as polygamy and traffic in women as a wife or a concubine, the remnants of the mediaeval feudalism. The licensed or unlicensed prostitution and Kisaeng system (Kisaeng service, Kisaeng school etc.) shall be forbidden. Anyone who offends against the above provision shall be punished by law.”
Koreans began to invest their money into a multitude of trade adventures. Here is an account of how one trader we interviewed obtained money:

My maternal grandmother and grandfather live in the US. They migrated to America after first coming to South Korea over the border. They sent me $500 via an international money order on a regular basis. There was the maximum amount permitted for any international money transfer. There is only one International Bank in each province where I could exchange this international money order into North Korean currency. The problem is not only that it is not easy to get to the bank, but also that the bank allows only $100 withdrawal at one transaction every second year. It means that it will take 10 years to withdraw for $500. It is so ridiculous. What is worse more, the bank gives $500 worth coupons which can be used in only foreign goods shops in North Korea. As a result, I offered $100 as a bribe to a banker and withdrew $400 at one transaction. I used this money to buy items wholesale and then re-sell through the market (Kim).

In recent years transfers through the official banking system is commonly avoided and most of the foreign currency that enters North Korea comes via a Chinese exchange broker then a North Korean broker, whose processing fees together add up to between 20-30% (Daily NK 2007).

Many scholars have highlighted the importance of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) for women in developing countries (Ardener & Burman 1995). ROSCAs still remain popular among women in South Korea and are known as kye (pronounced keh). In a kye a group of individuals agree to meet for a defined period of time in order to save and borrow together. We asked each of the interviewees whether Kye existed in North Korea and if it was a vehicle to source start-up money for businesses. Most respondents understood the term and the kye system but it appears that in North Korea Kye has been used more as a

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3 In the 1960s it is estimated that as many as 95,000 Japanese-Koreans moved to North Korea. Most still have relatives in Japan and some of these relatives have been willing to send them money. Traditionally, the authorities looked at Japanese-Koreans with suspicion. At the same time, since money transfers from Japan have been a major source of hard currency for Pyongyang, their activities were often tolerated

4 In a Kye a group of individuals gather for a series of regular meetings, at which each person contributes a predetermined amount into a collective "pot," which is then given to a single member. This person is subsequently excluded from receiving the pot in future meetings, while still being obliged to contribute to the pot.
means of food distribution. A South Korean academic Professor Kim Seokhyang who has done numerous interviews with North Korean defectors said that Kye is mostly rice Kye in North Korea, where rice is collected and distributed to those who need it for a birthday or marriage celebration. This was also related to a Public Distribution System which used to distribute rice fortnightly. This practice seems to have been abandoned since the famine. One interviewee said:

Kye for food such as the winter solstice rice and red-bean porridge were common before the food shortage… Nowadays, this Kye has vanished because there is no food to share. (Jin).

Sourcing start-up capital is only one of many hurdles. It is then up to would be traders to find ways to make a profit. Some live off the mark-up they can pass on to customers by transporting goods to more distant markets. This is the case for many Chinese goods that travel to inland markets. It has also been reported that traders buy seafood, such as squid, whiting fish, abalone and sea cucumber at the fishing villages and then sell them in places like Sinuiju and Hyesan. Some travel to the border to sell products such as dried shellfish, medicinal herbs, coal and minerals directly to Chinese merchants (Lankov 2007).

Most women interviewed for this study made profits by value adding to basic ingredients such as preparing foods (bread, rice cake, noodles) and brewing alcohol at home and then selling the food in farmer’s markets or street corners.

With the sale of rice people buy ‘Kannengi’ (dry corn or corn flour) for noodles. If they sell these noodles, it makes some money … With this money, they buy ‘Kannengi’ again and do the same again. This is the way to earn money (Suh).

Another respondent to this study said:

Life there is that you work all day and then you return home and work hard all through the night to make things for sale at the market – making food stuffs or maybe alcohol – made from corn, potatoes, acorns etc. (Heo)

The account of a second hand clothing dealer below describes how women respond to changing opportunities and expand and value add to their business:
Second hand clothes were coming in mainly through Hoeryong and Musan. Two years ago, the second hand clothing business was pretty good, with a high volume of trading. I didn’t make a lot of money at that time because I was doing simple work, but it was a relatively good pay since I could buy 1 Kilogram of rice with my daily wages. The Board Security’s decision to forbid used clothing imports later opened up opportunities to me. Of course used clothes are still smuggled in, but people who didn’t have a network to get supplies started to collect used clothes personally. The condition of those clothes was pretty bad. I mended those as I used to, but so many were not reparable with simple sewing. So I used a little of my own creativity, like cutting out designs and patching new patterns in styles that people liked, etc. I was then encouraged to run my own business by my female customers who were fully satisfied with my work (Chang quoted in North Korea Today No. 403 2011).

The account above demonstrates the entrepreneurial spirit of North Korean women. However, it is not clear whether women are in a position to empower themselves socially and economically through entrepreneurship and business ownership.

**Mobility and transport**

Another barrier women must overcome is to find ways to travel to the source of the goods and then move them to market. Fuel constraints, the near absence of private automobiles and poorly maintained roads makes transporting goods to market a logistical nightmare. To make matters more difficult, for many years women have been prohibited from riding bikes or obtaining driving licenses. As Demick explains “there was a social stigma— people thought it unsightly and sexually suggestive— and periodically the Workers’ Party would issue formal edicts, making it technically illegal” (Demick 2010:13) However, until recently this was only intermittently enforced in Pyongyang with most women traders travel by bicycle in the provinces (Hosaniak 2009). One of our interviewees said that they used a bicycle and another said she rented a car or truck from local officials to move goods.

Another option is public transport but travellers are then faced with difficulty of obtaining permission for non-local travel. One interviewee explained how she dealt with this problem:
From 1999 I started a small business to sell general goods as a peddler with my two sons. To go to other cities, we must have “right-of-way” papers. Some people obtain the papers officially, however, mostly people pay a travelling tax [bribe]. I also paid it (Heo).

Economic participation and the role and status of women

North Korea is a deeply patriarchal society. Husbands are considered the head of the family and, from childhood, North Korean girls are taught that males are their superiors and the duty of a woman to her husband is absolute and unquestionable. A woman who expresses any assertiveness either in the public or private sphere is the subject of social disapproval and such behaviour often leads to domestic violence (Kim 2010; Hosaniak 2009).

In this context, women’s participation in the marketplaces and small businesses represents an important departure from women’s traditional roles. It involves work away from the domain of family and household or state controlled factories, a high level of public visibility and unregulated social interaction with customers and others involved in trading. Thus markets provide a relatively less government controlled space allowing freer exchange of information and the building of border networks. It also demands independent decision-making and a degree of assertiveness in bargaining.

Involvement in market activities also offers women access to scarce and thus highly valued resources – money and goods. This can potentially translate into greater social mobility. For generations family status has been hereditary and the only mobility in North Korea’s class system was downward. With the emergence of a merchant class things are no longer so straightforward. As Lankov writes:

People involved in the new market activities are independent from (or inured to) subtle government pressures that had ensured compliance for decades. One cannot promote or demote a vendor, transfer him or her to a better or worse job, nor determine his or her type of residence (Asia Times Dec 14 2004).

Another by-product of women’s market activities is that women have increased access to information. For the average North Korean all “information” they encounter is in effect
propaganda. Some women who travel across the border or deal with Chinese merchants in border areas act as a conduit to the inflow of foreign information. Lankov (2005) notes how markets have become the main mechanism to distribute the items that help North Koreans learn about the outside world, selling tuneable radios, DVDs of movies and television shows and mobile phones. South Korean dramas have become especially popular. Based on in-depth interviews with 33 defectors, one study has found that 34 percent of the survey respondents watched Korean programs everyday and 41 percent, once or twice a month (Kang and Park 2011).

Seeing the extent to which the regime has misrepresented the outside world especially South Korea but also of the relatively higher social status afforded South Korean women in popular culture may have some impact on how North Korean women view their own social position. One interviewee, a railway officer and then vendor, said:

I got to know that South Korea is a very rich country through TV dramas which showed women in nice two-story houses and fancy clothes (Song).

Another piece of research by the Korea Institute for National Unification found that the perceptions of North Koreans about South Korea changed due to their exposure to South Korean visual media and that this influenced their decision to defect to South Korea (Kang and Park 2011).

In North Korea, the state endorsed version of female beauty was typically a symbol of docile femininity with a woman with short bobbed hair, no make-up and a modest dress that ended between knee and ankle. However, according to recent media reports, earrings, various kinds of plastic surgery favoured in South Korea such as facelifts and eyelid operations (sancuppil) and South Korean style make-up and skinny jeans have become increasingly popular. One woman who ran a sewing and dress alterations business from her home said:

I copy South Korean styles. Although the materials are from China, I get more customers when my products are made in South Korean styles. (Chang quoted in North Korea Today No. 403 2011).

Of course, whether these changes in women’s appearance and clothing can be interpreted as a sign of women’s exploration of their long suppressed individual identity or of their adoption of capitalist obsessions with physical appearance and materialism is debatable.
In this way the emergence of a kind of grassroots capitalism in North Korea may have brought new options to women. Some South Korean scholars argue that the new entrepreneurialism of North Korean women has translated into a notable improvement in the economic strength and status of women over the past 15-20 years and that they are now more prominent in decision making in many aspects of domestic life and enjoy new levels of social mobility and access to money (Lim 2004; Koo and Oh 2004). Women now spend longer periods away from home and they said the number of men who regularly do household chores and child rearing has increased. One interview said that husbands are often described as ‘a dog which watches their house’:

Before, due to the dominance of men over women, women in North Korea didn’t have much power in their home. However, after women engaged in some kind of business, a slang expression for husbands became popular they would describe their husbands as ‘Men are a lock for keeping house’, or ‘a dog who stays at home all day’ (Cha)

One interesting development is that there may be a decline in a preference for sons. As in other Asian countries, a preference for sons continues influenced by Confucian traditions where boys carry on the family line and care for elderly parents. However, based on calculating male-to-female ratios of standard socio-economic indicators, the traditional preference for sons has been on the wane and there is even a moderate preference for daughters. The author of the study attributes this trend in part to income decisions of parents to invest in daughters in the emerging economy (Schwekendiek 2010). One interviewee for this study said that: “many families preferred daughters than sons because they say daughters can survive the crisis more easily than sons.”(Min)

Economic participation and women’s views of the regime

North Korean society is based on a strong state-household nexus as this has been a useful tool in consolidating the power of the regime. Leaders have been portrayed as a symbolic household head. The leaders had absolute power over the populace through benevolence, fatherly love and the responsibility of the head of both the household and the state. North Korean people used to be in love with the leaders by adoring their images, admiring their wisdom and totally submitting to their command (Ryang 2000). This loving and loyal relationship has been indoctrinated and reinforced throughout schooling and by being
exposed to the state controlled media. People in North Korea used to demonstrate ‘unconditional love and devotion’ to their leaders. However, there is evidence that with participation in market activities, women’s faith in the political system and leaders has eroded.

In their analysis of North Korean magazines Lee and Cho found that the state has been publicising how women in post communist countries have become worse and miserable after they gave up communism (Lee & Cho 2011). The regime’s campaign may be well founded as, according to some research, the ongoing economic hardship and increased workload of women have led many to question the value of a North Korean system. Now that the state no longer provides rations, wages and social services, there is evidence that increasing numbers of women have grown sceptical about socialism. One study found that more women than men said that when they were in North Korea they adopted ways of life which were not in line with the socialist way. These women said they their priority was to support themselves and their family over the state and the leaders (Yang & Lee 2011). The loyalty and commitment to socialism and the party has weakened and individualism has become prevalent. One defector said, “What can socialism do for people starving to death? Why should we uphold socialism if we can’t be fully fed. It is also said that now some people even want to exchange their party membership for bread” (cited Yang & Lee 2011).

There have also been occasional reports of incidents in which market traders, mostly women, have publicly protested (Martin and Takayama 2008; World Tribune 2008). According to one report, when the government placed an age restriction on female traders in the markets some women fought back when the security forces tried to shut down their stalls. In addition to protests, younger women, had found ways to deceive authorities. One popular method was to form a partnership with older women. Another was to accompany older family members such as mothers-in-law or aunts to the market stalls they owned (World Tribune 3 April 2008). Another report said the protests not only involved female traders but also ordinary women joined shouting ‘give us rice’ and ‘do you [government officers] only care about your own survival’.

Even women passing by markets and women who did not participate in market activities joined the protests. Kang Myung-hee, a 47-year old female resident, said that “Middle aged married women went to the market management office and
expressed their anger. As soon as one woman shouted that ‘give us rice,’ other women started shouting after her.” Han Jeong-aeh, a 38-year old resident, said “Do you [government officials] only care about your own survival? Let us trade so that we can live on our own. Otherwise, provide us with food rations! The state should offer us at least either one,” which was originally claimed at the protests. “Probably, if we were men, police officers would have arrested us,” she went on to say, “However, because we were women, they could not take any physical actions to us and rather felt impatient.” Reportedly, police officers did not take any forceful actions after all. (North Korea Today No 117, March 2008)

In research by Haggard and Noland (2010) that draws on two refugee surveys— of more than 1,300 refugees conducted in China and the other of 300 refugees in South Korea—found the share of household income derived from market sources is correlated with the respondent reporting joking about and speaking freely about the government among peers. However, this research also found that respondents reported relatively low levels of collective action among traders. When asked whether traders cooperated with each other, the share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing ranged from 32 to 42 percent. Likewise, when asked whether traders in the market were beginning to organize to protect their interests, the affirmative response rate was 28 to 29 percent in all time periods. Given the information-constrained environment it is likely that we cannot accurately ascertain whether resistance is isolated and sporadic or more widespread and organized. One thing seems likely, however, angry female traders cannot be characterized as political dissidents.

**Challenges**

Despite these trends we cannot assume that the long term consequences female participation in markets will necessarily be to women’s’ benefit let alone deliver female empowerment. Some researchers who have studied the impact of the transition of communist regimes to market economies argue that women are marginalised, effectively becoming the ‘losers’ in the transition process (Heinen 1997; True 1999; Moghadam 1993; Einhorn and Sever 2001). In North Korea the impact of the spread of capitalism on the role and status of women is likely to be ambiguous.
North Korean women still face a range of constraints, such as continued lack of many basic needs; an overwhelming domestic workload; relative exclusion from positions of power; and male dominance of the family, frequently expressed through violence. The famine and ongoing shortages has also taken a huge toll on women’s health (Amnesty International 2010). In the 2002 Nutrition Assessment of the DPRK, conducted by the government of the DPRK in cooperation with UNICEF and the WFP World Food Program, a third of mothers who were surveyed were found to be anaemic and too malnourished to breastfeed their babies (DPRK Nutrition Assessment 2002). According a report by Hwang Na-mi analyzing the 2008 census report of the North's Central Statistics Bureau, the North’s maternal mortality rate, the rate of mothers who die during pregnancy or childbirth, was 77.2 per 100,000, up from 54 in 1993. The country’s average life expectancy was 69.3 years in 2008, down from 72.7 years in 1993 (Choson Ilbo Dec 6 2010; DPRK 2008 Population Census National Report Central). A 2009 UNICEF report found that North Korea was one of 18 countries with the highest prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years old. One study argues that the major underlying cause of this stunting is maternal under-nutrition during gestation (Shrimpton and Kachondham 2003).

As noted the social disruption since the famine in North Korea has pushed increasing numbers of women into prostitution locally or led to them falling victim to sex exploitation and trafficking in China (Noland, Haggard, and Chang 2009; Davis 2006; Kim et al. 2009). Related to this, there are reports that some North Korean women's magazine have recently warned against what they call "the housewife disease" which, based on the description, are forms of STDs (Myers 2010). It is highly unusual for the regime to admit to such a problem which suggests STDs have become a serious epidemic.

According to some research women’s increased participation in informal economic activities have made women’s lives more difficult because of the dramatic effect it has had on their daily workload (Cho & Lee 2011; Lee 2004; Lim 2004). All defectors interviewed said they still did most of the domestic labour as well as having to work outside. Increasing shortages of food, fuel, clothing, medicines, soap and so on further exacerbated the burden. One defector’s situation was described as follows:

From dawn she has to participate in common activities as well as trading for her living
without any rest, but when she comes home, she has to do her domestic chores. Cho said that she could endure the lack of sleep and fatigue. She just wishes that she could live even one day without worrying about food, and sighs wondering whether that day would ever come. (North Korea Today No. 269 2009)

Another cause for women’s increased workload has been the withdrawal of many state services. For example, the state used to provide basic medical care and childcare to help women to fully participate in state owned enterprises. Now such services only exist for those who can pay for them.

Adding to this burden has been government efforts to more frequently mobilise women into nation building work such as farm work, road construction and grave making. It was reported that to recruit more women into public work, the authorities would only give permission to trade to women who participate in public works (NK Today No. 287 2009). There are reports that officials in some cities have been instructed to form "production squads" made up entirely of Democratic Women’s Union (DWU) members. Women often offer the party officials rice or money to be exempt from the public services (North Korea Today No. 399 2011). In propaganda statements women have also been “encouraged” to look after orphans and veterans and to avoid divorce and family breakdown. (Lee & Cho 2011)

Another negative impact on the changing economic role of women is that they have become the main target of regime control. Haggard and Noland’s analysis of the two large defector surveys found that those involved in market activities are more than twice as likely to be incarcerated. According to these authors the penal system subjects these detainees to horrific conditions in an attempt to keep them atomized and quiescent; a major finding of the paper is that conditions in lower-level penal facilities approximates in several measurable ways conditions in facilities designed to house felons and even the most dangerous political prisoners (Haggard and Noland 2010: 16).

With regards to the treatment of women traders the security apparatus maintains a high degree in discretion and intermittently enforces measures specifically targeted at women. According to the Korea Institute for National Unification in the 2007 North Korean Human Rights Report there are many examples of violence perpetuated by male market security
guards, rail security guards, and soldiers (KINU 2007). In October 2007, the government decreed that women under the age of 40 were forbidden from engaging in market trading (Lim 2009). Officials at times also enforce a dress code for female traders where woman must wear long skirts not trousers (NK Today No. 285, 2009; Park & Jeong 2011). In May 2011 National Defence Commission ordered border guards to stop all girls and women between 10 and 60 from travelling on railways and roads to the North Korea-China border (Chosun Ilbo May 28, 2011). There also reports that local governments have been conducting regular show trials of prostitutes and their customers at public stadiums. Most arrested are women with the male pimps behind them rarely arrested amid widespread corruption. Public executions have also been on the rise and women traders shot in public places (Chosun Ilbo Nov. 06, 2010). These measures highlight what Haggard and Noland describe as “the centrality of discretion and terror to the maintenance of the North Korean regime’s power” (2010: 16).

But enforcing of these measures is not only driven by central powers seeking to protect the regime. More commonly enforcement is carried out by lower level officials using these arbitrary and often petty rules and regulations as an opportunity for rent seeking. The enforcement of rules and regulations and the paying of bribes are recurrent themes in refugees’ accounts. As the measures outlined above suggest, officials can regularly and arbitrarily impose fines on women for all kinds of behaviour from riding bikes to travelling alone to following South Korean fashions or even for wearing trousers. Haggard and Noland (2010) just over a quarter of the defector survey respondents that arrived in South Korea post 2005 thought that corruption and criminality was the most lucrative career path because it enabled the pursuit of business and corrupt or criminal rent extraction. (Haggard and Noland 2010: 15). Haggard and Noland point out “High levels of discretion with respect to arrest and sentencing and very high costs of detention, arrest, and incarceration encourage bribery ... These characteristics not only promote regime maintenance through intimidation, but may facilitate predatory corruption as well” (2010: 1). From women’s perspective this rent seeking is the cause of much hardship as this story about a woman in her 60s whose handcart was confiscated by the local authorities shows.

She saved every penny and was able to buy a handcart end of the last year for 100,000 NK Won. However, only a few days after 2.16 national holiday the crackdown of street trading began and her handcart was confiscated. She could not afford the bribe to
get it back. All of sudden she lost the very means of her survival. She was completely exhausted and angry. "It feels like that I would die from the anger. There is nobody that I could complain to. How could our family survive from now on?" she cried while beating her chest. (North Korea Today, No.269. 2009)

A marketized economy riddled with corruption is also likely to deliver highly uneven benefits and thus widen the gap between rich and poor women. While becoming the main source of food, the spread of markets has exacerbated social stratification by favouring low level bureaucrats and military officers who can use their connections and government vehicles to fill market stalls (Lankov 2007). The effects may be that a new power elite is created. Noland describes the emergence of “a form of apparatchik capitalism similar to Romania’s” (Noland 2003:13). Conversely United Nations officials describe a growing "new class of urban poor". Richard Ragan, World Food (WFP) director in Pyongyang, said "As the economy shifts from a planned economy to a more market-based economy, there are winners and losers, as the country's public distribution system was unable to respond to the ongoing food-shortage crisis." (cited in Klingner 2004)

More fundamentally it could be argued that that the participation of women in markets is, in effect, a shift in responsibility to feed people and provide basic social services from the state to women. Female operated markets are essentially sustaining the nation and thus allowing the regime to put its limited resources elsewhere (which is convenient given the government’s commitment to various showcase projects in preparation for Kim Il Sung’s 100th anniversary in 2012). According to Haggard and Noland “the marketization of the North Korean economy has probably reduced vulnerability from what it would have otherwise been. Even with rapidly rising prices, markets - including those fed by cross-border trade in grain with China - are able to ameliorate internal supply constraints to some extent” (Haggard and Noland 2009: 394). In this way, women’s economic role might contribute to supporting the existing political system by preventing (or at least forestalling) the complete collapse of the economy. Mansourov’s argument is relevant in this regard:

North Korea is not being torn apart by an epic battle between the state and markets. The two have over time established an uneasy but symbiotic relationship. The state still
considers the markets as parasites and vice versa, but each has learned to exist with the other (Mansourov 2010: 593).

**Powerful and enduring political and cultural barriers to female empowerment**

A full appraisal of the potential for change in women’s role and status must however acknowledge that North Korea’s political system and culture are unique in many respects in particular in terms of the imperviousness to or capacity to resist change. The recent economic transition in North Korea has gone nowhere near transforming the system from communism to capitalism. This ability to remain intact in the face of economic change is also why there are almost insurmountable political barriers to gender parity. North Korea’s totalitarian system lacks any institutions capable of channelling and responding to any changes in the role of women. There are no institutions that protect various freedoms and rights such as the right to join and form organizations, to access alternative sources of information, or in other way challenge authority.

More fundamentally the major barrier to North Korean women’s advancement is a deeply rooted culture of gender subordination. Tradition dictates a woman’s role is to serve her husband and care of her children. Sharing of household work is uncommon. Lee describes how in North Korea a woman is expected to serve her “master,” while single-handedly carrying out household duties and keeping her family in perfect harmony. A North Korean wife will worry that her husband might skip breakfast and leave for work on an empty stomach if she isn’t careful, and she strives to do both her domestic and outside jobs equally well. No matter how busy she may be at work, she feels more comfortable if she can return home during the lunch break to set the table for her husband (Lee 1991: 73-74). One defector interviewed for our study statement encapsulated both the political and cultural dimensions of gender inequality and subordination when she said:

Seeing women as inferior is deep rooted in North Korean society and I do not expect this attitude will change easily. There is simply no room in North Korea to think about whether women’s status has advanced or deteriorated. The mere fact that more women participate in trade doesn’t automatically lead to a change in people’s attitude and perception about women including women’s role (Heo).
Conclusion

Since the 1990s North Korea markets have sprung up all over the countryside. Given that this society is strongly patriarchal, a remarkable aspect of this process is that the vast majority of North Korean traders and merchants are women. Women’s greater capacity to exit formal employment sector provided the opportunity to participate but they also has strong incentives to augment deteriorating family incomes and to find ways to feed their needy families. In this way North Korea’s female entrepreneurs have successfully diversified household earnings and in the process saved countless citizens from starvation.

But does female participation in these markets have the potential to improve the status of women? For some women it appears that they are now more prominent in decision-making in many aspects of domestic life and enjoy new levels of social mobility. One particularly interesting finding is that the traditional preference for sons has disappeared and that there is even a moderate preference for daughters, perhaps due to decisions of parents to invest in daughters in the emerging economy. Also a by-product of markets is they have increased women’s access to information including being exposed to media depictions of more empowered South Korean women. This has led some to question the value of a North Korean system and even to protest in public. However, it is questionable whether such resistance will ever become organised or widespread.

The impact of the spread of capitalism on the role and status of women is likely to be ambiguous and we cannot assume that the long term consequences of this trend will necessarily be to women’s benefit let alone deliver female empowerment. There are numerous reports that economic participation has had a dramatic effect on women’s daily workload. Moreover, North Korean women still face a range of constraints, such as continued lack of many basic needs, an overwhelming domestic workload, lack of capital, relative exclusion from positions of power, and male dominance of the family, frequently expressed through violence. Also increasing numbers of women are pushed into prostitution locally or have fallen victim to sex exploitation in China. They have also become the target of official crackdowns which lead to either harsh punishment or having to pay hefty bribes. It is also possible that the growing market economy may further enrich those with power and resources (generally male officials) and may even create a new power elite that will be a source of
system maintenance. Moreover there are major political and cultural barriers. North Korea’s totalitarian system lacks any institutions capable of empowering women. A more fundamental block is the culture of gender subordination, with values and attitudes so deep rooted that they are likely to endure.

But it is likely that there will be another long lasting impact. This period has been the first time in North Korean history where women have found the space and opportunity to become entrepreneurs. Now the scope of female operated business activities is quite broad. These women discover, evaluate, and exploit opportunities to introduce new goods and services through organizing efforts that previously did not exist. Their activities involve securing capital, looking for business partners for delivery, transport, retail and wholesale and building networks with public officers or local authorities. With these new skills North Korean women’s enterprising spirit will not be easy to contain.

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